WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006600050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 30, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
44
30 August 1968
No. 0035/68
State Dept. review completed
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(Information as of noon EDT, 29 August 1968)
Europe
INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA LEAVES UNCERTAIN AFTERMATH
Czechoslovak courage and coolness in the face of
overwhelming Soviet force has left the question of
victor and vanquished in doubt even in Czechoslo-
vakia where the Soviets seem determined to settle
in for a relatively lengthy "presence."
Page
1
WESTERN EUROPE REACTS TO SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK DEVELOPMENTS 6
Setbacks for Soviet policies in Western Europe are
already visible as a consequence of Moscow's inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet action has
also confirmed the conviction among Western European
Communists that their nationalistic approach is cor-
rect.
CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS INFLAMES DIVISIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE 7
The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR and its
allies has inflamed the already serious differences
between Eastern Europe's orthodox Communist regimes
and the independent-minded Yugoslavs and Rumanians.
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VIETNAM
The opening round of the Communists' latest military
campaign was highlighted this week by widespread
mortar and rocket attacks and ground assaults against
allied positions throughout much of South Vietnam.
The staggered geographical nature of the attacks sug-
gests that the Communists intend to sustain their
current campaign over a prolonged period as well as
to confuse and complicate the allied response.
LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUE TO MAKE LIMITED GAINS
Laotian troops are continuing to make some progress
in regaining territory lost to the Communists during
the past dry season, although government forces are
still on the defensive throughout most of the country.
RED GUARDS UNDER HEAVY ATTACK IN CHINA
The drive against the Red Guards, which started in
July as a limited effort to stop the fighting and
violence, has developed into a full-scale campaign
to destroy their organizations as a present or poten-
tial political force.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 17
INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER GANDHI UNDER INCREASING ATTACK 18
Mrs. Gandhi's handling of the Czechoslovak issue has
evoked violent criticism from the non-Communist oppo-
sition and increasing disenchantment with her per-
formance in office on the part of senior Congress
Party leaders.
PAKISTAN ATTRACTING COMMUNIST INTEREST
A flurry of activity involving the exchange of
economic and military delegations is taking place
between Pakistan and several Communist countries,
sharpening the contest between the USSR and Com-
munist China for influence there.
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INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS REOPENING ON CYPRUS
The intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish
Cypriot negotiators reopened yesterday, but progress
will probably be slow and will require considerable
compromise on both sides over the basic issues.
Western Hemisphere
CUBA LINES UP WITH MOSCOW ON CZECH CRISIS
Fidel Castro's grudging endorsement of the Soviet
intervention in Czechoslovakia was an embarrassing
compromise of his pretensions of independence from
Moscow, and will probably tarnish his image abroad
and heighten disenchantment with his policies in
Cuba.
POPE FAILS TO RESOLVE DIVISIONS IN LATIN AMERICAN CHURCH 25
The Pope received a tumultuous public reception dur-
ing his visit to Latin America but his pronouncements
may widen the schism between progressive and conser-
vative clergymen.
ARGENTINE PRESIDENT OUSTS ARMY CHIEF
President Ongania has strengthened his control over
the Argentine military by replacing army Commander
in Chief Julio Alsogaray, one of his most vociferous
critics, with a close friend and loyal supporter.
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BOLIVIAN SITUATION EASES BUT TENSIONS REMAIN 28
The government has reached agreements with student
and labor groups, but many students are intent on
renewing their demonstrations. In addition, new
plots against the government are being planned and
the President is privately questioning the loyalty
of the commander of the armed forces.
INCOMING ECUADOREAN ADMINISTRATION FACES MANY PROBLEMS 29
When Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra assumes the presidency
on 1 September, he will be greeted by essentially the
same problems that caused his ouster from three of
his four earlier terms.
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The compromise settlement between the USSR and Czechoslovakia,
announced in Moscow on 27 August, was at best a Pyrrhic victory for the
Soviet leaders, and contains the seeds of its own destruction.
It was gained at the expense of igniting Czechoslovak nationalism and
uniting the Czechoslovak nation. In Moscow, the collective leadership has
been put under severe strain.
The erratic course of Soviet policy on Czechoslovakia has caused
serious problems for the East German regime both at home and abroad.
While Ulbricht may have been pleased by Moscow's lightning cannot fail to
be disappointed by the subsequent halfway measures.
The early endorsement of the Czechoslovak reforms by Hungary's party
leader Janos Kadar and his sudden about-face has put him in an awkward
position. The display of Soviet military force has strengthened Polish party
boss Gomulka's hand against Polish nationalist elements. The general mood
in both countries appears to be one of dismay and confusion which may
escalate when students return to their classes in September.
The US Embassy in Sofia reports wide but muted Bulgarian disapproval
of the invasion and of Bulgaria's participation. The Rumanians and Yugo-
slavs sharply condemned the invasion and are now uttering pious hopes that
reason will prevail following the settlement in Moscow. The Bucharest
regime developed a bad case of jitters over fears-now apparently sub-
siding-that it might be invaded next.
In Western Europe, the public and official reaction was one of dismay
and alarm. The sense of disillusionment about the possibilities the appeal of
NATO and European regional institutions has unquestionably been strength-
ened.
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EASTERN EUROPE
,Prague
9udopest*
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INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA LEAVES UNCERTAIN AFTERMATH
Czechoslovak courage and cool-
ness in the face of overwhelming
Soviet force left the question of
victor and vanquished in doubt even
in Czechoslovakia where the Soviets
seemed determined to settle in for
a relatively lengthy "presence."
There is no doubt that the pace of
Czechoslovak liberalization has
been slowed and that the Soviet
troops will assure greater compli-
ance with the Soviet interpretation
of the Moscow agreement than the
USSR was able to achieve after the
earlier Cierna and Bratislava agree-
ments.
As one Czechoslovak official
put it, however, the last ten days
have raised Czechoslovak national
unity to new heights, stirred mas-
sive anti-Soviet sentiments, and
thoroughly convinced the people of
the need for free media--all grounds
for new conflict between Moscow
and Prague.
Whatever the outcome, for Mos-
cow the losses of prestige around
the world and the significant state-
ments of opposition from hereto-
fore "loyal" Communist parties are
palpable. Seldom has the propaganda
line issuing from Moscow provided
a thinner cover for its actions,
and many Soviet officials abroad
have expressed dismay. Over time,
Moscow can probably count on na-
tional interest reducing the harsh
feelings now being expressed, and
some of the Communist parties that
broke with Moscow probably will also
edge back into the fold. With the
West, and especially with the US,
the chance of working out mutually
advantageous agreements has been
set back.
Page 3
Presumably, Moscow took all of
these things into account when it
made the decision to invade, but
decided that the need to halt Czech-
oslovak liberalization was overrid-
ing. As it turned out, however,
Moscow took the expected losses with-
out real assurance that it had
achieved its main goal.
The settlement announced in Mos-
cow on 27 August was at best a Pyrrnic
victory for the Soviet leaders. In
contrast to its well-planned and
smoothly executed military take-over
on 20 and 21 August, the USSR does not
seem to have had any well conceived,
soundly based political alterna-
tives. If the Soviets expected a
puppet government to form from con-
servatives and hard liners in the
regime, they were sadly misled. In-
stead, the existing government,
though missing some members, con-
tinued to act effectively. The party
also did not falter and--with its
leader, Dubcek, under arrest--con-
vened its extraordinary 14th Party
Congress--originally set for 9 Sep-
tember--on 22 August.
The Congress elected an acting
first secretary, a new reformist-
minded central committee, and a new
party presidium, with Dubcek, Premier
Cernik, and President Svoboda named
as members. Several other Czechs
who had been strongly criticized by
Moscow were also elected, but none
of those members of the former
presidium who were considered So-
viet collaborators.
The unity and moral strength of
the Czechoslovaks in their opposi-
tion to the occupation, as well as
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMPLARY 30 Aug 68
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the high discipline of the populace
and the Czechoslovak military forces,
apparently gave the USSR second
thoughts about the severe risks of
provoking active resistance if it
imposed a narrowly based occupa-
tion regime. This behavior on the
part of the country also provided
the Czech leadership with some of
its strength in negotiating with
the Soviet leaders.
Out of the stalemate that had
developed--a total Russian occupa-
tion and an unbending population
and government--emerged the plan
for President Svoboda on 23 Au-
gust to lead a delegation to Mos-
cow to negotiate a settlement. He
was accompanied by two conserva-
tive party members and three re-
formers, all Dubcek appointees.
In a speech before his departure,
Svoboda-said he was going to Mos-
cow at his own request. He was
received by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and
Podgorny, and accorded the full
honors befitting a chief of state.
The talks in Moscow, instead
of lasting only a day as originally
announced, covered four hectic days
ending on the night of 26 August.
The original delegation from Prague
was joined on 24 August by Dubcek
and Premier Cernik, and later by
nearly all of the Czechoslovak
party presidium. On the last day
of the talks, the leaders of Mos-
cow's allies--Gomulka, Ulbricht,
Kadar, and Zhivkov--gave their
stamp of approval to the modus
vivendi worked out between the
Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders.
On 27 August, Moscow released
a communique' providing the sub-
stance of the agreement with the
Czechs. It was signed by 13 So-
viet leaders, including 9 out of the
11 members of the politburo, and
by 19 Czechoslovak leaders, also
including 9 of 11 presidium mem-
bers. President Svoboda and Party
First Secretary Dubcek subsequently
gave grave, emotion-laden speeches
appealing to their people to under-
stand the circumstances of the
agreement and to maintain order,
unity, and discipline.
The key points in the agree-
ment, as set forth in the communi-
que, are: the Soviet troops that
"temporarily" entered Czechoslo-
vakia will not interfere in Czech-
oslovak affairs and will be with-
drawn "as the situation normalizes
all Czechoslovak media would serve
the party and the cause of friend-
ship among Communist nations, i.e.,
censorship; both sides agreed to
strengthen the solidarity of the
socialist community, fulfill bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements,
and "administer a resolute rebuff"
to those who would encroach on the
existing borders in Europe; and,
the Czechoslovaks agreed to demand
the removal of the Czechoslovak
question from the UN agenda.
The Czechoslovak people have
somehow found it within themselves
to live with, at least for the
moment, the terms of the communi-
que--a very bitter pill--and at
the same time to retain their sense
of pride and of having played an
historical role in the restoration
of Czechoslovakia's honor. The
realization of their still precar-
ious position will probably prevent
any serious active popular resist-
ance. At this point, it is evi-
dent to the populace that they
would have much to lose and nothing
to gain by such action.
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Since 28 August, the govern-
ment has seemed intent on restor-
ing the country to an even keel.
A special commission has been es-
tablished to determine the steps
necessary to implement the Moscow
"agreement." At the same time, the
newly elected party central com-
mittee met, possibly to discuss the
validity of the extraordinary 14
Party Congress. Dubcek had implied
in his speech on 27 August that the
results of this congress might not
be acceptable. There were signs,
however, that Dubcek would face
stiff resistance within the party
if he tried to overturn the congress'
actions.
The National Assembly resolved
unanimously that the Warsaw Pact
occupation was illegal and insisted
that a "concrete date" be fixed for
the troops' withdrawal. It also
demanded that information media and
government organs be allowed to
function freely. The Slovak party,
for its part, on 28 August elected
a liberal as its new first secre-
tary, replacing a conservative.
A new presidium was also elected
with nine newcomers, giving it a
decisively reformist character.
Moscow's handling of the po-
litical side of the invasion and
its aftermath gave many signs of
misjudgement and vacillation in
the leadership. Although the col-
lective leadership as a whole has
the responsibility for the deci-
sions taken in the crisis, there
have been persistent reports of
divisions within this group. The
Czech issue will, in any case, put
severe strain on Brezhnev's "cen-
trist" coalition--Podgorny, Kiri-
lenko, Polyansky, and Shelest, 25X1
plus the doctrinaire Suslov and
the more moderate Premier Kosygin.
military intervention. It is pos-25X1
sible that the younger members of
the politburo whose political am-
bitions have been frustrated under
the Brezhnev leadership may be
seeking to capitalize on any dis-
satisfaction with the leadership's
handling of the Czechoslovak prob-
lem.
Large numbers of Soviet troops
moved out of towns and cities into
positions away from the population,
but the Soviets continued to
strengthen their hold on the coun-
try.
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Suslov and Kosygin opposed
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SECRE'F
WESTERN EUROPE REACTS TO SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK DEVELOPMENTS
Setbacks for Soviet policies
in Western Europe are already visi-
ble as a consequence of Moscow's
intervention in Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet action has disillusioned
the Western Europeans and has rein-
forced the appeal of NATO and Euro-
pean regional institutions.
Recent events have also con-
firmed Western European Communists
in their nationalistic approach.
The effect on the Communist parties
and Communist-led labor unions is
likely to be the more lasting.
Western European governments are
discussing, at least for the pres-
ent, slowdowns of bilateral programs
with the USSR, but are keeping their
doors open for steps toward resump-
tion of detente.
In Western Europe, the Soviet
invasion was greeted with expres-
sions ranging from consternation in
such capitals as London and Brus-
sels to the low-key statements of
neutrals--Austria, Switzerland,
Sweden, and Finland. The Finns,
particularly sensitive to their
strategically exposed location, are
expressing concern over a possible
deterioration in their relations
with the Russians. The UK, Italy,
and West Germany are all stressing
the importance of NATO, and it ap-
pears that the Alliance's future may
be strongly influenced by the fact
of the rapid Soviet occupation of
Czechoslovakia.
NATO's present theory of warn-
ing, which presupposes a period of
critical consultation and military
build-up by prospective attackers,
is being re-evaluated. Moreover,
the recent trend of force reduc-
tions and redeployment within the
Alliance is likely to be halted by
a collective pledge to freeze cur-
rent levels pending a review of
European security. Italy and oth-
ers may reiterate calls for an-
other 20-year extension of the NATO
treaty. Italy and West Germany
have also stressed the need for
greater European political unity.
At the same time, however, Italy,
West Germany, and Switzerland are
using the Czechoslovak situation as
an excuse to postpone signature of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
French President de Gaulle has
denounced the invasion as an exer-
cise of the "doctrine of power blocs,
a consequence of the Yalta accords."
Paris' initial reaction to the Mos-
cow talks is that the Czechoslovaks
came out surprisingly well.
The Western European public
has expressed outrage over the de-
velopments in Czechoslovakia, both
in the press and through public
demonstrations. Except for the Com-
munist parties in Luxembourg and
West Berlin, and the illegal Commu-
nist parties of Spain, Portugal,
and West Germany, orthodox Commu-
nists in Western Europe have casti-
gated Moscow. The Italian and
French parties have been foremost
in this Communist rebellion, ac-
companied by the labor confedera-
tions each dominates. The Commu-
nist-controlled World Federation
of Trade Unions has not yet taken
a public position.
25X1 =_-
SECRE'T'
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CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS INFLAMES DIVISIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE
The invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia by the USSR and its allies
has inflamed the already serious
differences between Eastern Eu-
rope's orthodox Communist regimes
and the independent-minded Yu-
goslavs and Rumanians. The cri-
sis also has revived latent na-
tionalistic emotions in the Bal-
kans. Relations among these
states will henceforth be vexed
and uncertain.
Belgrade and Bucharest, by
insisting that nothing can jus-
tify the armed intervention in
Czechoslovakia, have provoked
unprecedented rebukes from their
more doctrinaire neighbors. For
the first time, Rumanian party
leader Ceausescu has been at-
tacked by name in highly unflat-
tering terms by the Hungarian and
Soviet press. Although Yugoslav
President Tito has not been so
arraigned, both the Yugoslav and
Rumanian "leaderships" have come
under heavy fire from Soviet,
Hungarian, and Bulgarian media
for their "unseemly behavior" in
joining the "imperialist chorus"
demanding an end to the occupa-
tion of Czechoslovakia.
Soviet bloc representation
at various Rumanian National
Day diplomatic receptions on
23 August was deliberately mini-
mal, a symptom of the multiply-
ing divisions in Eastern Europe.
In contrast to previous years,
no press commentary on the Ru-
manian anniversary appeared in
the Polish press.
Bulgaria has further added
to the fragmentation of Communist
unity, despite the tense atmos-
phere of the Czechoslovak crisis,
by choosing to escalate its long-
standing dispute with Yugoslavia
over Macedonia. Ordinarily, Sofia
is content to state its historical
claims to Macedonia in scholarly
journals. The day after the inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia, however,
:Bulgaria's leading party organ
directed a major assault at the
Macedonian party leadership.
Tito and Ceausescu appear
concerned, but undaunted. They
presumably agreed during their
:meeting on 24 August to avoid pro-
voking their adversaries, and
probably are preparing for addi-
tional ideological, economic, and
diplomatic pressures from Moscow
and its allies once the Czecho-
slovak situation stabilizes.
Tito told the US ambassador
in Belgrade that Yugoslav-Soviet
relations from now on would be de-
void of trust and confidence. This
fear of treachery and military
intervention will henceforth per-
meate bilateral relations between 25X1
the states of Eastern Europe.
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The Communist offensive in South Vietnam continues to focus on
secondary targets mostly in outlying areas, but indications are mounting that
a major effort against Saigon may be imminent. Although enemy casualties
have been running high, most of them have been sustained by Viet Cong
local elements. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units for the
most part have still not been committed.
Vietnamese Communist propagandists, meanwhile, are beginning to
emphasize the long-term nature of the campaign, suggesting that the enemy
intends to keep up the fighting for a fairly lengthy period. A recent
Liberation Radio broadcast characterized each of the staggered attacks thus
far made as an "individual general offensive" that contributed to the "high
tide of our general offensive."
Local military commanders in China are taking full advantage of their
new license to crack down on the Red Guards. These former targets of Red
Guard abuse, now free to retaliate for the first time, are using all the
instruments at their disposal in what seems to be a rapidly escalating
campaign to destroy the Red Guards as a present or potential political force.
In Laos, government troops are moving eastward from recently cap-
tured Muong Phalane, but they will probably be careful not to push their
luck too far as they move closer to the strongly defended infiltration
corridor. Elsewhere in the country, military activity is generally at a low
level, even by rainy season standards.
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NORTH
1 Y7aTNAM
f` ?? eQuang Tri
-~~ Hue,
CAMBODIA
Special Forces CampI
r /
Lot!lllnh ~ Song Be
Tay Ninh ,Dau Tieng
r f ! 7~, SAIGON
SOUTH VIETNAM
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*Da Nang
Hoi An,
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VIETNAM
The opening round of the
Communists' latest military cam-
paign was highlighted this week
by widespread mortar and rocket
attacks and ground assaults
against allied positions through-
out much of South Vietnam.
In the northern provinces,
enemy forces maintained heavy
pressure on the main routes of
approach to Da Nang, Hoi An, Tam
Ky, and Quang Ngai city. Vigor-
ous allied spoiling operations,
however, inflicted enemy losses
in excess of 1,200 killed and
may have at least temporarily
pre-empted major ground attacks
against these capital cities.
With the exception of sporadic
heavy skirmishes in western Quang
Tri Province, allied bases along
the Demilitarized Zone as well
as the provincial capitals of
Quang Tri city and Hue remained
relatively free of major enemy
activity.
An attack by a North Vietnam-
ese regular force of regimental
size against the allied Special
Forces camp and district head-
quarters compound at Duc Lap in
Quang Duc Province generally over-
shadowed all other enemy activity
in the II Corps area during the
week. The three-day action at
Duc Lap appears to have been a
diversionary scheme designed to
draw sizable allied reinforce-
ments to the scene from nearby
Ban Me Thuot in order to allow
the North Vietnamese 1st Division
to mount a major attack on the
Darlac provincial capital.
Page 11
Duc Lap, however, was rein-
forced from allied assets else-
where in II Corps and this, cou-
pled with intensive B-52 and tac-
tical air bombardment, ultimately
forced the enemy to disengage
after sustaining losses of at
least 300 killed. Allied casual-
ties included 79 killed and 196
wounded.
Although the enemy continued
to maintain pressure against the
allied bases of Tay Ninh, Dau
Tieng, Loc Ninh, and Song Be in
the outer provinces of III Corps,
Saigon and its environs remained
generally untouched. Late in the
week, however, enemy action did
intensify in Hau Nghia and Long
An provinces on Saigon's western
and southern flanks, and the capi-
tal itself was subjected to a
light rocket attack.
Viet Cong forces in the
delta generally confined their
activities this week to small-
scale ground probes and wide-
spread mortar shellings, al-
though one heavy engagement in-
volving three main force battal-
ions was reported near the dis-
trict capital of Cai Lay in Dinh
Tuong Province.
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The enemy's current offen-
sive thus far has been marked
by the application of economy-
of-force tactics against allied
targets of secondary importance
in generally outlying areas. With
few exceptions--Duc Lap, Da Nang,
Tam Ky--the attacks have been
largely hit-and-run affairs spear-
headed in most cases by enemy lo-
cal force and sapper units. These
tactics, in addition to holding
down casualties to enemy main
force units, which for the most
part remain uncommitted, appear
largely diversionary in character--
designed mainly to weaken the de-
fense of major objectives by forc-
ing allied deployments to areas
under siege.
The staggered geographical
nature of the attacks, starting
in III Corps on 18 August and
shifting to the delta and thence
to the northern provinces and the
highlands area, suggests that the
Communists intend to sustain their
current campaign over a prolonged
period as well as to confuse and
complicate the allied response.
Communist Commentary
on the War
Hanoi is putting increased
stress in its propaganda on al-
leged domestic unrest in the US
over the administration's refusal
to stop the bombing of North Viet-
nam. Their action probably re-
flects a growing Vietnamese Com-
munist hope that the US will even-
tually concede the issue without
holding out for reciprocal con-
cessions. At the same time, the
Communists appear to believe that
the fighting in the South will
continue along inconclusive lines
for some time.
Recently captured documents
indicate, however, that plans are
in train for a series of further
offensive thrusts, which they
hope will result in higher US
casualties and a concomitant rise
in "dovish" sentiment in the US.
The documents suggest that the
enemy, although reaffirming the
"general offensive and general
uprising" strategy, has concluded
that a decisive break in the war
cannot be expected to result from
the offensives conducted so far
this year. The Communists prob-
ably expect nonetheless, that ac-
tions now in process and others
planned for the future will demon-
strate that the conflict remains
an indecisive stalemate from which
the allies can, at best, expect
only a compromise settlement.
Political Developments
Plans for an early shuffle
of the cabinet have apparently
been shelved for the time being
as Prime Minister Huong continues
to test how far he can go in -shap-
ing the government to his own lik-
ing.
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Although the
prime minister has thus demon-
strated considerable skill in
handling his cabinet, there are
indications that he was actively
pushing the transfer of Khiem
and that he was obliged to yield
to Thieu's cautious views in this
area. Khiem is already a con-
troversial figure and giving him
a strong hand over the military,
as Huong apparently desired,
would almost certainly have aroused
greater antagonism than Thieu
is prepared to face at this time.
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LAOS: Current Situation
Government-held location
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
Communist-held location
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LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUE TO MAKE LIMITED GAINS
Laotian troops are continu-
ing to make some progress in re-
gaining territory lost to the
Communists during the past dry
season, although government
forces are still on the defensive
throughout most of the country.
In the south, the Communists have
been pushed out of the Muong
Phalane area after some of the
sharpest fighting in over four
months. Close air support was
responsible for heavy enemy
casualties and government ground
forces captured large quantities
of weapons, ammunition, and other
equipment.
The recapture of Muong
Phalane, which the enemy took last
February, is the first major
government victory in more than
a year and should help repair
morale which sagged during the dry
season setbacks. Government
troops now intend to move east-
ward along Route 9 from Muong
Phalane, but they will probably
exercise care not to push their
luck too far as they move close
to the strongly defended infil-
tration corridor.
In the north, government
forces are attempting to close
out a two-month old operation
aimed at securing the rice-rich
Muong Son valley. The government
plans to establish an air navi-
gational facility at Muong Son
to replace the one lost at Phou
Pha Thi last March. Recent gov-
ernment air strikes have inflicted
a heavy toll of enemy casualties
and should enable the government
to maintain a foothold in the
area at least through the remain-
der of the rainy season.
Aside from these actions,
however, fighting this rainy
season has been at a relatively
low level. For the most part,
government forces are still on
a defensive footing and the Com-
munists have not demonstrated any
inclination to follow up their
considerable gains of the dry
season. The continuing presence
of a substantial number of North
Vietnamese troops is a clear sign
that they intend to defend most
of the territory they now hold.
Moreover, they are in a posi-
tion to launch new attacks at a
time and place of their own
choosing.
it is likely that the Communists
will wait until the next dry season
begins in October before initiating
any widespread offensive. Prior
to this, however, probing attacks
against forward government posi-
tions, such as Thateng, cannot
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RED GUARDS UNDER HEAVY ATTACK IN CHINA
The drive against the Red
Guards, which started in July as
a limited effort to stop the fight-
ing and violence, has developed
into a full-scale campaign to de-
stroy their organizations as a
present or potential political
force. The assault is being con-
ducted vigorously and even savagely
in some areas. Peking has made un-
usual efforts to link the cam-
paign with Mao himself even though
it is directed mainly at those
radical factions that were in-
cited by Mao Tse-tung and his
radical advisers to denounce lo-
cal military officers suspected
of disloyalty a year ago.
These former targets of Red
Guard abuse, now free to retali-
ate for the first time, are do-
ing this with all the instruments
at their disposal. Provincial
propaganda media, denouncing as
"counterrevolutionaries" the stu-
dent Red Guards who just a short
time ago had Mao's favor and pro-
tection, demand that no mercy be
shown them.
the army has in-
cited mobs to lynch some individ-
uals, others have been summarily
executed, and large numbers have
been paraded in public and whipped
with bicycle chains.
A number of Red Guard lead-
ers who held high positions in the
Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee
are reported to have been arrested.
The intention seems to be to elimi-
nate the radical leadership and
terrorize the rank and file. It
is not clear how long the campaign
will last. A broadcast from
Shanghai, reporting on plans to
send vigilante groups of "workers"
to clean out the city's 26 full-
time universities, gives the im-
pression that a protracted ordeal
is planned.
As a result of the campaign,
considerable disorder and tension:
persist in China, but of a different
sort than before. Police brutality
has replaced factional fighting
and, because attention is focused:
on political enemies, ordinary
crime is on the increase.
Old-line military and party
figures continue to consolidate
their strength in provincial gov-
ernments. The three "revolution-
ary committees" formed during August
are all run by local military offi-
cers and former party secretaries.
This leaves only Tibet and Sinkiang
without new committees, but an-
nouncements are expected soon for
these remote border areas. Last
year, several leaders in Peking
stated that one purpose of forming
provincial -committees was to lay the
groundwork for a new party congress.
Little has been heard of this plan
in recent months, however, possibly
because the top men in Peking cannot
agree on who is to occupy key podi-
tions in a reorganized leadership.
The present standing committee
of six men and Madame Mao includes
several Cultural Revolution Group
members who, like the Red Guard
movement they have been directing,
no longer seem to serve a useful
purpose. These figures, particu-
larly Mao's hatchet man, Kang Sheng,
and Chen-Po-ta, head of the group,
are probably bitterly disliked by
the military and old party offi-
cials who now dominate most local
governments outside the capital.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Border exchanges and terrorist incidents between the Arab states and
Israel have continued at a high rate.
The first Egyptian incursion in months across the Suez Canal has
infuriated the Israelis, who are threatening severe retaliatory measures. Israel
may hold back from major reprisals until the Israeli airliner, which was
hijacked last month and is still in Algiers, is released.
Splits between left- and right-wing republicans erupted in fighting in the
capital of Yemen last week. The royalists began to shell the city in order to
take advantage of the conflict, and the casualty rate was apparently high.
Prime Minister Amri successfully restored order, but further disturbances are
likely.
In Turkey, student groups protesting Soviet intervention in Czechoslo-
vakia twice forced the early closing of the Soviet pavilion at the Izmir trade
fair. Soviet officials are reported to have threatened to close their display
completely if the demonstrations were not stopped. The prevailing volatile
mood in Turkey probably will not have dissipated by the time personnel
from the US Sixth Fleet visit Izmir from 29' August to 9 September.
The growing locust threat in the Middle East and Africa has prompted a
new call for collective efforts by East African control officials. Observers
from the Sudan and the Arabian peninsula, where fertile breeding grounds
are located, will be invited to a meeting in Asmara, Ethiopia, to consider new
steps to combat the plague.
In the Nigerian civil war, federal troops are pressing on into the densely
populated Ibo heartland. The Biafrans are :reported to have evacuated Aba,
an important administrative center, thus adding to their already serious
refugee problem. Biafran troops are, however, stubbornly resisting the fed-
eral advance in all sectors. Meanwhile in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, negotiations
between the two sides on ways to bring relief supplies into war-torn Biafra
appear to have reached anUNCODEDspite the strenuous efforts of Emperor
Haile Selacciaf
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INDIA'S PRIME MINISTER GANDHI UNDER INCREASING ATTACK
India's Prime Minister Gandhi
has come under increasing attack
in recent days both from the op-
position political parties and
from within her own Congress Party.
The issue precipitating the latest
attack on her leadership was the
Indian Government's handling of
the Czechoslovak issue.
Mrs. Gandhi's statement on
21 August, in which she expressed
"concern" at news of Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia, was de-
nounced as too mild the following
day in Parliament. A proposed
resolution offered by a member
of the Congress Party, which char-
acterized the Warsaw Pact action
as a "clear violation of the UN
Charter," was defeated by the
Congress majority but had the
support of all non-Communist op-
position parties and four members
of the Congress Party, including
Minister of Petroleum, Chemicals,
and Social Welfare Asoka Mehta.
Mehta, who once was a close
economic adviser to Mrs. Gandhi
but has become increasingly es-
tranged from the prime minister
in recent months, subsequently
resigned from the cabinet.
When word reached New Delhi
that India had abstained on the
UN Security Council resolution
condemning Soviet intervention
in Czechoslovakia, violent criti-
cism of the government erupted in
both houses of Parliament and led
to a protest walkout
by all non-
Communist opposition
parties.
Mrs. Gandhi's assurance that the
government
supported
every word
of the UN
resolution
except "con-
demn"--she
preferred
"deplore"--
did little
to mollify
the law-
makers.
Party President
Nijalingappa recently joined the
ranks of those opposed to Mrs.
Gandhi, according to press re-
ports. Deputy Prime Minister
Desai and Home Minister Chavan,
both considered major contenders
for the prime ministership, have
become increasingly disenchanted
with Mrs. Gandhi's performance.
operating in the prime min-
ister's favor are the slowly im-
proving economy, the natural
reluctance of party leaders to
engage in a struggle that could
further damage Congress Party
unity, and the probability that
no agreement has yet been reached
on a successor. Additionally, Mrs.
Gandhi is not lacking in the art
of political infighting and has
given evidence that she is de-
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PAKISTAN ATTRACTING COMMUNIST INTEREST
A flurry of activity involv-
ing the exchange of economic and
military delegations is taking
place between Pakistan and sev-
eral Communist countries, sharpen-
ing the contest between the USSR
and Communist China for influence
there.
In July, a Pakistani delega-
tion received a Soviet commit-
ment to provide military equip-
ment. Details of the So-
viet agreement are not known,
but Moscow, in deference to India,
had heretofore provided only
vehicles and helicopters under
commercial contracts. China, the
first Communist country to deliver
combat equipment to Pakistan,
remains a major source of jet
fighters, bombers, tanks, and
ground forces equipment.
Much of the current economic
activity with the USSR is a fol-
low up to Premier Kosygin's visit
last April. At that time, some
impetus was given to the Soviet
economic program which, with the
exception of a seven-year-old,
$30-million oil exploration pact,
stems primarily from about $150
million in credits extended dur-
ing the past four years. The USSR
is expected to announce soon the
completion of feasibility studies
for a steel mill in West Pakistan
and a nuclear power reactor in
East Pakistan.
In late July, moreover, the
Pakistani minister of agriculture
visited Moscow to complete arrange-
ments for Soviet assistance in
developing the fishing industry.
As part of this project the USSR
offered to conduct a survey of
expanded facilities at a port in
West Pakistan. The USSR now has
announced the imminent arrival
of three Soviet trawlers to con-
duct oceanographic surveys and
to train personnel in deep-sea
fishing operations.
The USSR also is playing host
to a four-man delegation from the
West Pakistan Agricultural De-
velopment Corporation which is
studying the suitability of So-
viet agricultural machinery for
Trade with the
USSR has risen from only $14 mil-
lion in 1964 to over $65 million
last year.
Communist China meanwhile con-
tinues seeking to expand its
activities in Pakistan. Foreign
Minister Husain announced on his
return from China in early August
that a Pakistani team will soon
visit China to study flood con-
trol. The press in Pakistan
USE:d this occasion to report on
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progress at the $10-million-heavy
machinery complex the Chinese are
building just outside Rawalpindi.
submitted a bid including long-term
credits to construct a petrochem-
ical plant. Despite political
problems at home, Czechoslovakia
announced in mid-August that it
soon would deliver power equipment
other Communist countries
have recently shown renewed in-
terest in Pakistan. Rumania,
jointly with West Germany, has
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS
The second phase of the in-
tercommunal talks on Cyprus opened
yesterday in an atmosphere of
mutual hope for some movement
toward a settlement. Both sides
realize, however, that the nego-
tiators have considerable ground
to cover before any reasonable
progress will be forthcoming.
A gradual dissipation of the
momentum resulting from the
serious crisis last November will
add to the already substantial
burden of the negotiators. Con-
tributing to this slowdown
has been the tendency in the Greek
Cypriot community to believe,
rightly or wrongly, that time is
on their side and a similar im-
mobilism among some Turkish Cyp-
riot diehards who remain suspi-
cious of Greek Cypriot moves to-
ward normalization. In addition,
the extension last June of the
UN peace force for an additional
six months has contributed to
the complacency among the Greek
Cypriots. A shorter term would
under a $28-million aid agree-
ment concluded in mid-1966.
REOPENING ON CYPRUS
have applied pressure on the
parties to speed up their normal-
ization programs.
Although some moves have
given mild encouragement that
progress can be made, differences
of view on the basic issues are
considerable. Of these, the
least difficult would seem to
be the change to a unitary elec-
toral system. Under the present
constitution, dual elections are
held with the Greek Cypriot com-
munity electing the president
and its own legislative represent-
atives and the Turkish community
voting separately for the vice
president and its legislators.
The earlier talks gave some prom-
ise that compromise on this ques-
tion was possible.
A more difficult problem
will be faced when the future of
the vice presidency is considered.
This office now must be occupied
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by a Turkish Cypriot, a consti-
tutional provision that Greek Cyp-
riot President Makarios hopes to
abolish. This could bring trouble
with the Turkish Cypriots, who are
unlikely to agree to a decrease
in their executive authority in
the national government.
Two final issues, executive
veto and autonomy, are tied to-
gether and represent the crux
of the problem--that of guaran-
tees for Turkish Cypriot secu-
rity. In the past, the privilege
of the veto gave the Turks the
ability to block action in many
areas that they viewed as against
their best interests. Likewise,
the current Turkish Cypriot con-
centration on separate enclaves
where they are able to provide
for their own security seems
likely to continue and to be a
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Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
part of the Turkish bargaining
package. The degree of local
and national autonomy that Ma-
karios will be willing to grant
the Turkish Cypriots will be the
key to any real settlement.
In any event, progress on
these basic issues is likely to
be slow and tedious. Essential
for any resolution of the con-
stitutional problems would seem
to be continued forward movement
on normalization procedures such
as the freedom of travel, economic
integration, and a decreased
military readiness. These might
help alleviate Turkish Cypriot
fears and distrust that have
built up over the last four years.
Without this, a serious crisis
could again recur and destroy
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the visit of
Pope Paul VI to Colombia highlighted events in Latin America this week.
The Pope received a tumultuous reception during his three-day visit in
Bogota, but his pronouncements on the rote of the Catholic Church in social
change will probably widen the schism between the increasing number of
progressive clerics and the unyielding, ultraconservative church leaders.
Public and government reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia continues to be highly critical. All the major orthodox Communist
parties except Mexico have endorsed the Soviet move, but in some of these
parties the issue has produced considerable confusion, indecision, and even
factionalism. Extreme leftist and pro-Chinese parties have condemned the
action. The Mexican Communist Party, which heretofore has always fol-
lowed Moscow's lead, reportedly asked the Soviet Union to withdraw its
troops and begin negotiations based on the principles of equality, respect,
and noninterference in the internal affairs of states and parties.
Panama's President-elect Arnulfo Arias is confident that his coalition
will have at least a majority in the National Assembly. Arias has instructed
the Electoral Tribunal to annul the victories of certain progovernment
deputies and replace them with his own followers prior to the completion of
the vote count.
After a lull in antigovernment agitation in Uruguay, the Communists
are again planning student and labor demonstrations and work stoppages. A
48-hour general strike on g consid-
ered.
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CUBA LINES UP WITH MOSCOW ON CZECH CRISIS
Fidel Castro's grudging en-
dorsement of the Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia, in a
speech on 23 August, was an em-
barrassing compromise of his
pretensions of independence from
Moscow. It will probably tarnish
his image abroad and heighten
disenchantment with his policies
in Cuba.
Prior to this, Cuba had
adhered officially to a neutral
position on Czech-Soviet rela-
tions while tolerating some ex-
pressions of anti-Soviet senti-
IOn the 22nd, Cuban
authorities permitted more than
200 Czechs--including Prague's
ambassador in Havana--to hold
an anti-Soviet rally and to dis-
tribute a declaration demanding
the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
For two days following the
invasion, however, no official
statement was issued. Then on
the 23rd, Castro was forced by
circumstance to act against his
own instincts and convictions.
In an uncharacteristically
disordered speech, he simultan-
eously attempted to condone the
intervention and to maintain the
same level of criticism he has
directed against Moscow since 1966.
He said that the invasion was
a "flagrant violation" of Czech
sovereignty with "absolutely no
legality," but that it was justi-
fied. He criticized the Warsaw
Pact countries for supporting
"rightist" leaders in Latin Amer-
ica, and asked them if they would
also send troops to protect Cuba,
Vietnam, or North Korea. In
addition, a major portion of
Castro's speech was devoted to
criticism of the US. He ex-
plicitly rebutted rumors that
Cuba would consent to a rapproche-
ment with the US.
Castro's awkward position
was partly a result of his am-
bivalent feelings toward "lib-
eral-nationalist" Communist
regimes. Although he deplored
the "archrevisionist" reforms
in Czechoslovakia, he probably
also admired the willingness of
the Czechs to confront Moscow.
In the final analysis, however,
he apparently realized that he
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could not be silent. He may
have been concerned that there
had been a shift toward a hard
line within the Soviet leader-
ship. In any case, because of
his continued dependence on So-
viet economic and military aid,
he was compelled to support Mos-
cow.
In only one instance in the
past--when the Soviets in 1962
withdrew their strategic weapons
from Cuba--has Castro's ultimate
role as a pliant Soviet client
been so blatantly demonstrated.
Because of the self-conscious
excuses he put forth in his
speech, he probably feels humil-
iated, and may seek some means
of restoring his cherished image
of independence.
POPE FAILS TO RESOLVE DIVISIONS IN LATIN AMERICAN CHURCH
Pope Paul VI received a
tumultuous public reception dur-
ing his three-day visit to Co-
lombia last week, but his pro-
nouncements on the role of the
Catholic Church in social change
will probably widen the schism
between the increasing number
of progressive clerics in Latin
America and the unyielding ultra-
conservatives. Many of the bish-
ops, who are in Bogota to attend
the Second Conference of Latin
American Bishops, were hoping
for a papal pronouncement for
an active role for the church
in pushing for immediate changes
in the social structure--for an
immediate social revolution--
with a few even endorsing the
idea that violence might be nec-
essary in some instances.
Obviously, the Pope had
never intended to support the
position of the militant, noisy
minority of "left trend" priests
and laymen who see revolution
as the only means to solve Latin
America's problems. The large
group of progressive priests, on
the other hand, genuinely hoped
that the Pope would attempt to
direct the church to a left-of-
ceenter approach to Latin Amer-
ica's social problems.
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revolution as a means to achieve
social improvements.
Speaking to workers and peas-
ants on 19 August, the Pope
denounced the violence advocated
by radical priests. He assured
the poor of his concern for their
miserable conditions and, as part
of a five-point program for so-
cial reform, stated that the gov-
ernments and upper class Latin
Americans should strive for more
social awareness and sharing of
the wealth.
The five points, which are
in effect a partial restatement
of his encyclical "On the Devel-
opment of Peoples" of March 1968,
are: to proclaim the Christian
dignity of the poor; to continue
to denounce economic inequality;
to support fraternal assistance
from developed countries to under-
developed countries; to have the
church serve as an example of
generosity and service; and,
finally, to reject violence and
In his address to the bish-
ops' conference, however, the
Pope appeared to reverse his
position as he defended conserv-
ative theology including his
recent birth control encyclical.
Moreover, his emphasis on non-
violence and a gradual approach
would seem to contradict his
earlier emphasis on the "imme-
diate need" for social reform.
The result of the Pope's
visit, therefore, appears to be
a significant victory for the
church conservatives and a loss
for progressives. Although the
progressives, according to press
statements they have made, will
probably accept the Pope's pre-
cepts, they now believe that
the Pope's use of the terms
"order and gradual change' are
giving conservative churchmen
a ready-made excuse for blocking
change and maintaining the status
quo. They believe further that
the Pope is unwittingly aggra-
vating the estrangement of "left-
trend" radical priests and may
drive more progressives into the
radical camp. This, in turn,
could weaken the church's in-
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ARGENTINE PRESIDENT OUSTS ARMY CHIEF
President Ongania has
strengthened his control over
the Argentine military by re-
moving army Commander in Chief
Julio Alsogaray, one of his most
vociferous critics, and replacing
him with a close friend and loyal
supporter, General Alejandro
Lanusse. At the same time, On-
gania named new commanders for
the navy and air force, but both
those incumbents are ready for
retirement.
plan some return to constitutional
or elected government.
Ongania's choice of Lanusse
should end military pressure for
political reform. Lanusse has
sclid that he will permit Ongania
to oversee the army, rather than
try to make the army the watch- 25X1
dog over the President.
The relationship between
Ongania and Alsogaray has been
a stormy one. Alsogaray demanded
a greater role for the army in
policy making, and several times
accused Ongania of wanting to
establish a fascist or personal-
ist dictatorship. Alsogaray
drew his backing from the "lib-
eral" faction in the government,
which included his brother Alvaro,
the ambassador to the US until
early this month, when he, too,
was removed by Ongania. The
Alsogarays supported the "lib-
eral" economic reforms of Economy
Minister Krieger Vasena but ob-
jected to Ongania's refusal to
Alsogaray is reported to be
bitter over his abrupt dismissal
and his inability to line up
support among his fellow officers
to prevent it. Lacking.such
support, however, he will prob-
ably fade into the league of
retired generals who make oc-
cELSional ineffective statements
opposing Ongania.
Strong backing from the
military should enable Ongania
to continue economic reforms 25X1
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BOLIVIAN SITUATION EASES BUT TENSIONS REMAIN
Public disorders have abated
in accordance with agreements
the Barrientos government has
reached with student and labor
groups. Bolivia remains tense,
however, because of reports of
continued plotting and the pos-
sibility of renewed disorders.
The government secured
agreements from student and labor
groups to cease their disruptive
activities by granting most of
their demands and releasing ar-
rested leaders of both groups.
The labor groups have accepted
President Barrientos' explanation
for the state of siege and other
actions they had opposed, but
local student federations are
bitterly divided over the agree-
ment their leaders reached with
the government on 23 August. The
national federation has rec-
ommended accepting the agree-
ment, interpreting it, however,
as only a "temporary truce."
The recent student and labor
disorders were apparently not di-
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Page 28 WEEKLY SUMMARY
rectly associated with a plot by
the three major opposition po-
litical parties to overthrow
Barrientos, but the plotters hope
to capitalize on what they view
as a steadily deteriorating situ-
ation. General Marcos Vasquez,
who has evaded arrest since fail-
ing in a coup attempt on 21
August, has reportedly allied
himself with leaders of the op-
position, many of whom are in exile
and is seeking support for an-
other attempt to oust Barrientos.
He has been deprived of support
from within the armed forces by
the government's swift arrest of
officers suspected of having been
in contact with him.
The government appears to
retain the support of the mili-
tary and to be capable of turn-
ing back any new challenge. Pres-
ident Barrientos, however, has
indicated that he has doubts about
the motives and continued loyalty
of armed forces commander Gen-
30 Aug 68
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INCOMING ECUADOREAN ADMINISTRATION FACES MANY PROBLEMS
When Jose Maria Velasco
Ibarra assumes the presidency
on 1 September, he will be
greeted by essentially the same
problems that kept him from serv-
ing out three of his four earlier
terms.
Velasco's talent for obtain-
ing political power has been
matched by his inability to ex-
ercise it wisely. Although over
the years he has commanded the
respect and the support of many
able men, he has tended to ig-
nore their advice in favor of
unscrupulous, self-interested
counselors. A similar situation
appears to be shaping up for his
new administration. Many moder-
ate and capable men are support-
ing him, but so are opportunists
such as ex-president Carlos
Julio Arosemena and Castroite
Manuel Araujo.
In shaping his economic
policy, Velasco will be hampered
by a budget situation that is
deteriorating rapidly. Prov-
inces whose funds have been cut
this year are threatening strikes
and civil disorder. Velasco is
faced with the problems of re-
ducing current expenditures,
meeting the needs of the prov-
inces, and planning for future
budgets.
The election of center-left
vice presidential candidate Jorge
Zavala, who ran on a ticket op-
posed to Velasco, could also
cause problems. Zavala has
claimed publicly that his job
entails undefined but unlimited
powers, which he will exercise
as he sees fit. Although it is
doubtful that Zavala will have
official powers beyond those
mentioned in the new constitu-
tion, there are a number of ways
he could harass Velasco. He
could make public statements
criticizing the President and
his policies and expose cases
of alleged Velasquista graft or
corruption. Finally, he could
emulate Velasco's last vice
president, who succeeded in over-
throwing Velasco and having him-
self installed as president.
During three of his four
previous administrations, Ve-
lasco's inability to maintain good
relations with the armed forces
played a major role in his fall
from power. Although many mili-
tary men have no desire to inter-
vene in politics after the diffi-
culties their governing junta
encountered from 1963 to 1966,
their willingness to tolerate
the activities of leftist or
irresponsible officials who
threaten the nation's welfare
is not unlimited. The military
may already be concerned by a
statement attributed to Velasco's
probable defense minister that
some senior officers will be
retired involuntarily. This
statement conflicts with assur-
ances by other Velasquista
leaders that Velasco is not plan-
ing an extensive purge of senior
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