WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006600010001-0
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
45
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
2 August 1968
No. 0031/68
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(Information as of noon EDT, 1 August 1968)
Europe
SOVIETS AND CZECHS AGREE ON MULTILATERAL TALKS
A brief respite in the crisis came on 1 August as a
result of the agreement to move from the bilateral
talks at Cierna to a multilateral gathering in Brati-
slava. The Czechs, however, will not find their task
easier there.
SOVIET ECONOMY AGAIN FAVORS MILITARY AND CONSUMER
Moscow's mid-year report on the Soviet. economy indi-
cates that the 1966-67 policy of favoring the mili-
tary and the consumer at the expense of growth-
oriented investment is continuing.
BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT REFORM IS NO REAL LIBERALIZATION
The Bulgarian party leadership has outlined major
changes in the basic structure of the government and
has emphasized the need to revitalize the economy,
but the reorganization does not constitute a signifi-
cant liberalization.
GIBRALTAR'S NEW CONSTITUTION UNLIKELY TO END TENSION
The British and Gibraltar governments have agreed on
a new constitution for the Rock which is likely to
provoke Madrid to take steps demonstrating its dis-
approval.
Page
1
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 9
VIETNAM
Communist-initiated ground actions remained at a low
level as the enemy seems still to be preoccupied with
preparations for a possible major new offensive. In
Saigon, the Huong government made further progress in
strengthening its credentials with the legislature as
a firmly anti-Communist regime that will not sell the
country short.
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ARMY CRACKS DOWN IN SOUTH CHINA
The army has been taking tough action in the past
week against unruly Red Guards in the city of Canton
and in Kwangtung Province, but it is meeting defiance
from some factionalists. Army action has included
much more active patrolling, house-to-house searches
for weapons, and swift intervention when disorders
occur.
PHILIPPINE-MALAYSIAN RELATIONS REMAIN STRAINED
The Philippines seems disposed to damp down the dis-
pute over Sabah while Malaysia, although agreeable
to an easing of tension, remains adamantly opposed
to further discussion of the Philippine claim.
THAI COMMUNISTS ATTACK US-OCCUPIED AIR BASE
Communist terrorists have made no attempt to follow
up their raid on the Udorn Air Base, which appears
to have been locally inspired.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15
BAATHISTS OUST PARTNERS IN IRAQ
The more experie1iiced al-Bakr has outmaneuvered the
leader of the junior officers but may face eventual
military opposition.
STUDENT UNREST IN TURKEY PROVOKES REACTION
A week of leftist anti-US and antigovernment protests
in Turkey has evoked a strong ultraconservative re-
action and has raised the possibility of army inter-
vention to maintain order.
Western Hemisphere
STUDENTS STAGE MAJOR DISORDERS IN MEXICO
The recent disturbances are a classic example of the
Communists' ability to divert a peaceful demonstra-
tion into a major riot. Mounting student grievances
over police treatment are aggravating the poor rela-
tionship between students and government.
S EC R E'1'
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NEW BOLIVIAN CABINET REKINDLES POLITICAL CRISIS
The political crisis first sparked by the Guevara
diary scandal has been re-ignited by President Bar-
rientos' naming of a new cabinet composed entirely
of military officers.
PERU TO TAKE OVER US-OWNED OIL FIELDS
President Belaunde's announcement is intended to have
the appearance of forcing the International Petroleum
Company to accept a harsh set-:lement but seems to
follow an offer recently made by the company.
CASTRO RELAXES "REVOLUTIONARY OFFENSIVE" IN CUBA
Concentrating almost entirely on domestic problems
in his speech marking the 15th anniversary of the
Cuban revolution, Castro attempted to modify some of
the harsh reforms of the "revolutionary offensive"
launched last March.
SLIGHTLY GREATER AUTONOMY IN PROSPECT FOR BAHAMAS
The Bahamas will probably gain minor constitutional
adjustments in talks with the British next month, but
no basic change in the presen-: governmental arrange-
ment is likely.
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All Europe this week awaited the outcome of the Czechoslovak-
Soviet confrontation at Cierna nad Tisou. The wait proved longer than
expected before the announcement on 1 August that this meeting had
ended and that a collective conference-including East Germany, Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR-would begin on 3
August in Bratislava. The Czechoslovaks will not find their task any easier
there.
The threat of Soviet military intervention still hangs over Czecho-
slovakia. Such pressure may continue for some time.
The Soviets have very little support for their position on the Czecho-
slovak question in Western European Communist parties. They have been
seeking to broaden the base of their support in these parties and elsewhere
around the world, but without much success.
In the meantime, Bulgarian Communists,
are keeping a tig t rein on thousands of
rac sous young people gathered in Sofia for the ninth world youth
festival. Dissension has broken out on ideological grounds, with the Soviet
handling of the Czechoslovak problem a major source of contention. There
are also nationality problems between Arabs and Israelis, as well as among
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Paqe 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Aug FR
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SOVIETS AND CZECHS AGREE ON MULTILATERAL TALKS
There was a brief respite
in the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis
on 1 August as a result of the
agreement to move from the bi-
lateral talks at Cierna to a
multilateral gathering in Bra-
tislava, scheduled to open on
3 August.
The communique at Cierna,
besides announcing the upcoming
meeting of Soviets, Czechoslovaks,
Poles, East Germans, Hungarians,
and Bulgarians, said that the
four-day session had been con-
ducted in an atmosphere of "com-
plete frankness, sincerity, and
mutual understanding." The
formula is one generally used to
describe disagreement but not
a total impasse. Four out of
the six participants in the up-
coming meeting at Bratislava
have been openly hostile to the
Czechoslovaks, with only Hungary's
Kadar expressing a limited sym-
pathy. Thus, it appears that
the Czechoslovaks will be sub-
ject to the same kinds of de-
mands that they faced at Ciern-a.
in the good graces of the Soviets.
The Soviets were represented by
the full politburo, less Kirilenko
and Polyansky, who stayed in
Moscow to run the affairs of the
party and government.
Both sides had moved to
bolster their negotiating posi-
tions during the preceding week-
end. The Czechoslovak leaders
publicly reaffirmed their deter-
mination to continue their re-
form program, at the same time
making a few conciliatory moves
aimed at the Soviets. On the
second day of the meeting, Prague
announced that a 35-page list of
official secrets had been distrib-
uted to news media, a move clearly
aimed at countering Soviet criti-
cism of the free-wheeling Czech-
oslovak press. The Soviets, for
their part, intensified still
more their military and political
pressure against Prague, massing
more forces near the Czechos-
lovak borders and continuing
their propaganda barrage.
The crucial meeting between
the leaders of Czechoslovakia
and of the Soviet Union began on
29 July at the small Czechoslovak
border town of Cierna nad Tisou.
The Czechoslovak delegation in-
cluded the full membership of the
presidium and President Svoboda,
one of the few leaders of the
Dubcek regime who had remained
The Soviets were expected to
insist on tight press controls,
the reinstitution of orthodox
Communist political structures, a
voice in the composition of the
presidium, and some form of So-
viet military presence in
Sr CRi'T
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Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslo-
vaks may have been willing to
agree to a token number of So-
viet military observers and to
provide foreign policy guarantees
but reportedly were determined
to avoid compromise on the
crucial issues of the domestic
reform program.
Despite frequent though
cryptic assurances by Dubcek
ITALY
and other Czechoslovak leaders
that they were "optimistic"
about the outcome of the meeting,
there was some suggestion that
they had privately been more
pessimistic. The departure of
Dubcek's wife and two of their
three children to Yugoslavia on
31 July has been explained by
some Czechoslovaks as only a
token of Dubcek's "confidence,"
but this is hardly convincing.
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25X1
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Czechoslovak press reports
claimed that Brezhnev fell ill
on 31 July and missed at least
part of that day's meetings.
despite his record of apparently
minor heart trouble there is
nothing to indicate that Brezh-
nev's illness was serious..
The presence of almost the
entire Soviet leadership in Ci-
erna was probably intended to
facilitate on-the-spot decision-
making and to commit all of the
leaders to any agreement with the
little doubt that the Soviet
handling of the Czechoslovak
crisis has been a controversial
issue for the leadership. What-
ever direction Soviet policy
takes now, there is every likeli-
hood that the controversy will
grow.
During the past week, the
Soviets apparently continued to
build up their military forces
near the Czechoslovak borders.
Military attache" reporting in-
dicated that sizable Soviet forces
remain in Czechoslovakia.
Moscow further increased its
pressure on the Dubcek government
by announcing that the rear services
exercise that began last week in
the western USSR was being ex-
tended into Poland and East Germany.
Military reservists in these two
countries were being called up for
the exercise, according to the
announcement. There is no evi-
dence that Czechoslovak units have
redeployed or been put on a full-
scale alert.
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SOVIET ECONOMY AGAIN FAVORS MILITARY AND CONSUMER
Moscow's mid-year report on
the Soviet economy indicates that
the 1966-67 policy of favoring
the military and consumer at the
expense of growth-oriented invest-
ment is continuing. This slight-
ing of investment over the past
two-and-one-half years has begun
to result in a moderate decline
in the rate of growth of indus-
trial output and portends no re-
surgence in industrial growth
for at least the balance of 1968.
During the first half of
1968, civilian industrial out-
put is estimated to have grown
at a rate of six percent, the low-
est since 1963. This decline in
the rate of growth was common to
all major sectors of industry--
industrial materials, civilian
machinery, and consumer nondur-
able goods. The sharpest down-
turns were in the rates of growth
of rolled steel, forest products,
construction materials, some pro-
ducers' durables, soft goods, and
processed foods.
Total industrial output--in-
cluding military and space hard-
ware--appears to have grown at a
somewhat higher rate than the out-
put of civilian goods. The dif-
ference results from what appar-
ently is a continuation of high
rates of growth in the production
of military and space hardware at
the expense of civilian machinery
production. One of the results of
this policy is that the production
and delivery of equipment to agri-
culture has lagged seriously be-
hind what was planned.
Total investment in both plant
and equipment grew slightly, but
the growth resulted wholly from
new construction because equipment
for investment purposes dropped
absolutely. Moreover, much of
this growth in construction appears
to have been concentrated in such
consumer-oriented sectors as hous-
ing and services, rather than in
industrial branches oriented to
growth in future production.
Soviet Industrial Growth (Civilian)
First Half of 1968
(percent change from corresponding
*Rounded to nearest half
**Including military &space
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plan)**
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Although the over-all mid-
year performance in industrial out-
put and gross fixed investment was
poor, the Soviet consumer continued
to experience moderate improvement
in his standard of living. Because
of a lag in time between production
and sales, the slowdown in the
rate of growth of consumer goods
so far has not been reflected in
retail availabilities. Sales of
quality foods--meat, milk, eggs,
and fruit--increased at a higher
rate. Even the housing sector,
the perennial laggard, performed
better than it has for several
years. The amount of money in the
Soviet citizen's pocket, however,
continued to outpace the produc-
tion of the things he can spend
it on--as well as running ahead
of the five-year plan goals. This
means a further increase in pent-up
demand -and in latent inflati ry
pressures. 1 7
BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT REFORM IS NO REAL LIBERALIZATION
The Bulgarian party leader-
ship has outlined major changes
in the basic structure of the gov-
ernment and has emphasized the
need to revitalize the economy.
The reorganization could hardly
be characterized as a significant
liberalization, however, and the
party leadership intends to ex-
ercise strict control over the re-
form measures.
A plenum of the Bulgarian Com-
munist Party's central committee
on 24-26 July adopted a resolution
providing for new government or-
gans, including a supreme state
council, as well as an increase
in management authority for Bul-
garia's technocrats. The pro-
posed state council will replace
the presidium of the National As-
sembly (parliament), and will act
as an executive administrative
body with the "right to represent
the state in international rela-
tions."
Bulgarian party leader Todor
Zhivkov's ability to get his pro-
gram adopted by the party hierarchy
without any apparent hitches is a
further indication of his firm
control of the country's power
apparatus. When the state coun-
cil is legalized, Zhivkov prob-
ably will resign as premier and
become its chairman, thus making
him the titular as well as the
actual ruler. He has received
some criticism for being the only
Eastern European party leader who
is also premier. As council chair-
man, Zhivkov would continue to rep-
resent Bulgaria in foreign policy
S1;cRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Aug 68
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matters, but he would not be
hampered by the cumbersome ad-
ministrative duties of the pre-
miership.
The plenum resolution also
came out in favor of legislative
initiative for the judiciary as
well as a broader role for the Na-
tional Assembly, a proposal Zhivkov
has championed since 1966. Up-
grading the National Assembly's
role probably is an attempt to
establish at least a facade of
parliamentary democracy.
The plenum also took steps
to increase the pace of Bulgaria's
economic reform, which to date has
produced meager results. It rec-
ommended the establishment of four
new government bodies, presumably
with ministerial status, to help
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Page 7 WEEKLY SUMMARY
apply the principles of Bulgaria's
new system of management, and
stressed the need for greater au-
tonomy in the day-to-day decision-
making process for the state-run
enterprises. If implemented,
these changes will in effect give
greater authority to technocrats
and management specialists at the
expense of party hacks.
Although Sofia recognizes the
need for economic liberalization,
it is aware that a relaxation of
party controls over the economy
usually cannot be accomplished
without a concommitant liberaliza-
tion of other aspects of national
life. To forestall such a develop-
ment, the regime will probably 25X1
make efforts to tighten further
the party's grip on ideological
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GIBRALTAR'S NEW CONSTITUTION UNLIKELY TO END TENSION
The draft of a constitution
for Gibraltar, agreed upon in
London on 24 July, reflects Brit-
ish efforts to compromise between
the Gibraltarians' demands for
closer formal links to Britain
and London's wish to avoid ex-
acerbating UK-Spanish relations.
The Gibraltarians have accepted
the document, but Madrid is likely
to take steps to show its dis-
approval.
stead, the preamble will refer to
the colony's desire that its re-
lationship with the UK be main-
tained until such time as two
thirds of its population vote to
join Spain. This statement will
i probably satisfy the Gibraltar pub-
lic for the moment.
When the UK-Gibraltar consti-
tutional talks began last May,
Spain denounced them as a violation
UN resolutions calling for AngLo-
The UK will retain the right { Spanish negotiations to end the
to handle Gibraltar's foreiqn at- colonial situation in Gibraltar.
fairs, defense, and internal se- Madrid emphasized its disapproval;
curity, which does not displease by closing its land frontier with:,
the Gibraltarians. They are dis- Gibraltar to all except Spanish
appointed, however, that Britain workers employed on the Rock. In'-
has insisted on maintaining the asmuch as the border closure did
right to intervene in internal not disrupt the talks, Madrid may
affairs "should this be deemed ~ now retaliate by halting ferry
necessary." service between the Rock and Al-
Furthermore, although the
constitution does provide for
much-needed administrative re-
forms and for universal adult suf-
frage, it does not satisfy one
of the colony's major objectives.
Gibraltar had hoped to obtain
some constitutional provision
that could be used in the UN to
argue that decolonialization of
the Rock has, in fact, been com-
pleted, that Gibraltar has a def-
inite link with Britain, and that
Spain, therefore, has no claim
to the territory.
London, however, does not
want to worsen Anglo-Spanish rela-
tions, so the body of the consti-
tution does not spell out the le-
gality of the relationship be-
tween Britain and the Rock. In-
geciras, and by enforcing its c 4in
to territori-al waters traditionally
used by the UK in port operations.
Last weekend, Spanish police at
the Algeciras ferry dock began re-
strictions there by refusing passage
to Gibraltarians who did not have
new-type Spanish passes.
In addition, Spain will un-
doubtedly appeal to the UN for
further action in line with the
General Assembly resolutions. Ma-
drid is also seeking US support
for return of Gibraltar as one of
its terms for renewing the US-
Spanish defense agreement now be-
ing renegotiated.
With neither London nor Madrid
apparently ready to concede, the
prospects are for a ion eriod
of continued tension.
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Enemy-initiated ground activity stayed at a relatively low level al-
though mortar, rocket, and terrorist attacks increased somewhat. There
continue to be numerous indications that the Communists are gearing for
possible large-scale offensive action sometime this month. In some areas,
enemy forces may already be prepared, but in others they still seem days
or possibly even weeks away from combat readiness.
In Saigon, President Thieu is mending his fences with strongly anti-
no doubt contribute to improved relations between Premier Huong's gov-
ernment and the Upper House, but the President may be risking poorer
relations with other Vietnamese groups, especially the Buddhists, who still
recall the Diem period with great bitterness.
For the moment at least, the pendulum appears to be moving toward
a middle position between the excesses of the "right" and the "left" in
the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The army is proceeding with considerably
more vigor to control violence in Canton and surrounding Kwangtung
Province. Evidence of tougher military action is thus far limited to south
China, where the continued high incidence of disorder would cause Peking
special concern. Nevertheless, propaganda broadcasts both from Peking and
from a number of provinces have taken a more moderate tack in recent
weeks, and there has been considerably less open encouragement of un-
bridled radicalism.
The small-scale night attack on the Udorn Air Base in Thailand was
an amateurish affair, probably the work of local Thai Communist insur-
gents. Despite heightened security around US-occupied air bases, however,
these installations are considered still vulnerable to similar raids. The Thai
Communists might be tempted to try new attacks in the hope of counter-
balancing their lack of success in other efforts against Thai security forces
and of fanning popular apprehension over the massive US presence in a
year when elections for the national assembly are to be held.
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VIETNAM
Communist-initiated ground
actions remained at a low level
as the enemy seems still to be
preoccupied with preparations for
a possible major new offensive.
Although the timetable may be sub-
ject to change, intelligence re-
ports continue
to suggest at a country-wide
offensive may be planned for the
second or third week in August.
NORTH VIETNAM
'r~ L~E{IIla1~q~lED li4F
..Qumg Tri
PHNOM
PENH
Hue'
a C06(pS
lf3gon
The Communists are capable
of mounting multiregimental at-
tacks at any time in several
areas--across the Demilitarized
Zone, central I Corps, Ban Me
Thuot, and northwestern III Corps--
but available information indi-
cates that enemy preparations for
attacks against Saigon and key
objectives in I Corps are not yet
in the final stages.
In the Demilitarized Zone
area, elements equivalent to two
divisions, and possibly a third,
appear to be in place.
In the Da Nang area, Commu-
nist forces are still apparently
in the initial stages of prepara-
tion for a major offensive. The
enemy's intention of penetrating
Da Nang itself was confirmed on
28 July when allied forces cap-
tured a Communist stockpile of
arms and ammunition within the
city. The next day, allied
forces clashed with an 11-man
enemy reconnaissance team in
Da Nang. Interrogation of cap-
tured members of the team produced
information that their mission
was to reconnoiter the I Corps
headquarters and a bridge for pos-
sible rocket or sapper attacks in
early August.
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There is additional evidence
of enemy intentions to launch
some kind of an offensive against
Saigon. Documents recently
captured near Saigon indicated
that enemy preparations for the
"third phase" were to be completed
by 5 August. Communist practice
in the past indicates that an at-
tack could follow this date by
five to ten days.
Political Developments
in Saigon
The Huong government made
further progress during the week
in strengthening its credentials
with the legislature as a firmly
anti-Communist regime that will
not sell the country short. Its
most dramatic move was to sentence
politician Truong Dinh Dzu and
a student editor to five years at
hard labor. Dzu, an unsuccessful
candidate in last fall's presi-
dential elections, has been in
and out of "protective custody"
since last February, most recently
for a statement he is alleged to
have made advocating talks and
coalition with the National Libera-
tion Front. The student's crime
was the publication of articles
favoring a "false peace."
These sentences and other
recent government actions appear
to be muting Catholic opposition
o Huong in the Upper House.
Although Thieu's promotion of
Catholic political interests
would certainly improve his stand-
ing in the Upper House, where the
Catholics are heavily and dispro-
portionately represented, it would
also be likely to arouse the ap-
prehensions of many who recall
the Diem period with bitterness,
particularly the Buddhists.
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ARMY CRACKS DOWN IN SOUTH CHINA
tough army action in the past week
against unruly Red Guards in the
city of Canton and in Rwangtung
Province. The army action has
included much more active patrol-
ling, house-to-house searches
for weapons in Canton, and swift
intervention by army units when
disorders have occurred. This
is clearly an attempt to arrest
the deteriorating situation
in the province, which for over
two month-s has been wracked by
troubles approaching, though not
equaling, those of last summer.
severa
Western press reports have linked
the military action in the south
with a nationwide directive order-
ing the army to again suppress
Red Guard troublemakers. Author-
ities in Peking have shown signs
of concern about the situation in
the south for over a month, but
there is as yet no clear evidence
that orders similar to those of
January and September 1-967 have
been issued by Peking. Army units
apparently have not yet taken
drastic action against unruly Red
Guards in other troubled areas
of the country; any order from
Peking to the military in Kwang-
tung and Kwangsi is probably
limited in scope and less sweeping
than the earlier directives.
The tone of propaganda broad-
casts both from Peking and from a
number of provinces has changed
in the past several weeks, however,
and encouragement for unbridled
radicalism has abated. Warnings
against the "extreme left" as well
as the "right" have begun to appear
and some Red Guard activities have
been criticized. A rare pronounce-
ment by Mao on the subject of
technical and scientific education--
a subject that has generally been
ignored when radicalism has been
on the increase--has been given
great prominence in the past week.
Despite these multiplying
signs that more "moderate" views
are being expressed both in Peking
and in the provinces, the level
of disorder in the country still
remains high. The army's severe
measures in Kwangtung and Kwangsi
have reduced, but have not elimi-
nated, violence in those provinces,
and some open defiance of the
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PHILIPPINE-MALAYSIAN RELATIONS REMAIN STRAINED
The Philippines seems disposed
to damp down the dispute over
Sabah while Malaysia, although
agreeable to an easing of tensions,
remains adamantly opposed to any
further discussion of the Philip-
pine claim. Malaysia considers
discussion of the Sabah claim
to have closed with the collapse
of the talks in Bangkok in mid-
July, but it has said it is agree-
able to talks with the Filipinos
on other topics of mutual concern.
Both sides have taken steps
to reduce the likelihood of a mil-
itary incident. Late last week,
Manila moved quickly to scotch
press stories that a flotilla of
Malaysian gunboats was near Philip-
pine islands off Sabah.
In respect to Sabah, however,
Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman
has maintained his "outrage" at
w:aat he sees as repeated instances
of Philippine duplicity. The
Malaysians are considering showing
t:-ieir displeasure further by scrap-
ping the Philippine-Malaysian anti-
smuggling agreement, which has
benefited the Philippines by cut-
ting the flow of contraband from
Sabah.
Regional conferences may pro- 25X1
v:Lde a venue for keeping open chan-
nels of communication and allowing
relations to become more normal.
A,: the Asian and Pacific Council
session in Canberra this week,
however, Malaysia apparently was
deliberately represented by a
low-level delegation that could
not have engaged in constructive
talks with the Filipinos. The
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations meeting in Djakarta be-
ginning on 6 August is to be at-
tended by the foreign ministers
of both countries, and may 25X1
provide a more promising occasion 25X1
for talks. 25X1
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SECRE1'
THAI COMMUNISTS ATTACK US-OCCUPIED AIR BASE
Communist terrorists have
made no attempt to follow up their
raid on the Udorn Air Base, which
appears to have been locally
inspired.
The brief night attack on
26 July, which apparently was
targeted mainly against US mili-
tary aircraft, was carried out
by some ten terrorists armed
with AK-47 automatic weapons and
crude demolition charges. The
raiders were quite inept but
managed, nevertheless, to damage two
aircraft by gunfire while killing
one Thai and wounding four Ameri-
can defenders. Two of the Com-
munists were killed.
Although Thai military and
police units have now been alerted
to attacks against US-occupied
air bases in insurgent-infested
northeast Thailand, US officials
consider the bases still vulnera-
ble to similar attacks. The
raid may, however, prod Bangkok
to implement more effective base
security measures, heretofore
handled by local officials.
The lack of discipline and
the poor condition of the equip-
ment of the attackers suggest
that the raid was undertaken on
local initiative. Thai insurgents
have, however, traditionally re-
ceived training, arms, and guid-
ance from the Pathet Lao and
Hanoi.
The Thai Communists have been.
notoriously unsuccessful in their
military efforts against Thai
security forces and may have hoped
that a dramatic move would improve
their image and also demonstrate
their capability to strike a blow
against the US "aggressor." with
national elections coming up, the
Thai Communists may also believe
that the time is right to bring
susceptible and politically
influential Thais to question the
continuation of a massive US
resence.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The rate of terrorist incidents and fireLghts along the Jordanian-
Israeli cease-fire line has increased during the past week. A potentially
serious confrontation occurred early in the week when the Jordanians
refused to permit the entrance into Jordan of several busloads of Palestin-
ian refugees from Gaza who were being moved by the Israelis through the
West Bank to the Jordan River.
The Israeli aircraft that was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists is still in
Algiers, along with its male Israeli passengers and crew members. The
Israelis so far have limited themselves to exerting heavy diplomatic pres-
sures through various governments to have the plane released, but their
patience is probably wearing thin.
The Baathists apparently are in firm control in Iraq. An all-Baathi
regime is likely to pose a greater threat to neighboring Syria than the
ousted, more moderate government.
In Southern Yemen, the smoldering factionalism within and without
the government last week erupted into open mutiny and rebellion. The
army now appears to be able to control the situation, but the possibility
of further outbreaks remains.
Egyptian President Nasir arrived in the USSR last week after publicly
announcing that he was going there for two or three weeks of medical
treatment. Nasir has diabetes, and circulatory or peripheral nerve complica-
tions resulting from it probably necessitated his trip.
Prospects for an end to the Nigerian civil war through peace talks,
now scheduled for 5 August in Ethiopia, took a tumble this week. Official
French support for Biafra's drive for independence--announced on 31
July--could provoke Lagos to begin a major offensive that has been under
preparation in case talks again break down. The Biafrans, moreover, will
be encouraged to continue their stubborn resistance, and to maintain their
hard line toward peace negotiations.
The continuing power struggle in Congo (Brazzaville) between rela-
tively moderate President Massamba-Debat and radical-leftists has moved
into the streets and threatens to plunge the country into chaos. Mas-
samba-Debat yesterday dissolved the National Assembly, suspended party
activities, and created a "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution."
In India, good weather and stepped-up development efforts have
produced record harvests, conservatively estimated by the government at
95.6 million tons during the crop year that ended last month. Even this,
however, may not be enough to restore consumption to the inadequate
levels of the early 1960s The monsoon, which has just arrived, must be
favorable if the momentum toward self-sufficiency is to be maintained.
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BAATHISTS OUST PARTNERS IN IRAQ
The uneasy coalition of junior
and senior army officers and ele-
ments of the "moderate" wing of
the Iraqi Baath Party that seized
power on 17 July split this week,
apparently leaving the Baathists
in firm control.
Signs of friction between
al-Nayif--leader of the junior
officer group calling itself the
"Arab Revolutionaries' Movement"
which apparently sparked the coup--
and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, leader
of the moderate Baathists, began
to emerge as soon as former presi-
dent Arif was safely out of the
way. Each leader seems to have
been trying to ease the other's
followers out of positions of
power and replace them with his
own men. Al-Bakr, 18 years
older than al-Nayif and with pre-
vious coup experience, proved to
be better at maneuvering; al-Nayif
is now in Morocco.
In his radio and TV address
following -al-Nayif's departure,
al-Bakr gave his own version of
the coup. Not surprisingly, he
maintained that the coup was to
have been Baathist both in plan-
ning and execution, but al-Nayif
allegedly got wind of it and in-
sisted on the premiership as the
price of his cooperation. Once
in power, according to al-Bakr,
al-Nayif went on to lead a "coun-
terrevolutionary" movement to
destroy the revolution's objec-
tives. In his list of al-Nayif's
crimes, al-Bakr placed greatest
stress on his reactionary oil
policy. It seems likely that al-
Nayif was prepared to go a great
deal further than recent Iraqi re-
gimes in reaching an agreement
with the Iraq Petroleum Company.
Following al-Nayif's removal,
al-Bakr--already President--as-
sumed the added role of prime
minister in a new cabinet. At
least 11 of the 26 cabinet mem-
bers are Baathists, including the
ministers of defense, interior,
and foreign affairs, and many
were members of the short-lived
Baathist cabinet formed after the
coup of February 1963. Seven
Baathist and four non-Baathist
members of the ousted al-Nayif
government have been retained,
including two Kurds; other mem-
bers are technicians and politi-
cal unknowns.
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STUDENT UNREST IN TURKEY PROVOKES REACTION
A growing confrontation be-
tween radical leftist and right-
ist groups has put the Demirel
government on the defensive and
has again underlined the impor-
tance of the Turkish Army as the
final arbiter of political con-
flict in the country.
Open clashes took place be-
tween the supporters of a right-
ist coalition and members of a
leftist teachers union attempting
to hold an anti-US rally in Konya
during the night of 23 July. The
leftist rally appears to be part
of a coordinated campaign designed
to remove the US military pres-
ence from Turkey and to get
Turkey out of NATO. It followed
several days of leftist student
attacks on visiting US Navy per-
sonnel in Istanbul and scattered
incidents directed against US
military personnel stationed else-
where in Turkey.
Fears that the present situ-
ation might parallel that of 1960,
when the army joined with social-
ist-oriented student protesters
to topple the Adnan Menderes gov-
ernment, have been quieted by the
army's decisive move against stu-
dents in the Istanbul rioting.
The leftist opposition's attempt
to drive a wedge between the mil-
itary on one hand and the na-
tional government and the police
on the other does not appear to
be succeeding. Chances for an-
other student-army coalition are
further weakened by the violently
antileftist views of Turkey's top
soldier, chief of the Turkish Gen-25X1
eral Staff Cemal Tural.
The Turkish Government was
at first hesitant about suppress-
ing the rioting leftist students
in Istanbul, but later local po-
lice and army troops moved in
strongly to quell the disorder.
Leftist protest broke out anew
when one of the students involved
in a clash with the police died on
24 July. Additional demonstrations
and counterdemonstrations were
quickly organized and, unless the
government imposes a ban, they
could grow in frequency and in-
tensity.
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Latin America was generally quiet oast week except for Mexico,
which is experiencing its worst disorders in decades, and Bolivia, where a
political crisis is brewing.
The series of student riots in Mexico is a classic example of the
Communists' ability to turn peaceful demonstrations into major disturb-
ances. As of 1 August, relative calm had returned to Mexico City follow-
ing talks between students and the authorities, but the ready issues of
police brutality and university autonomy still provide radicals ample op-
portunity for exploitation.
Bolivian President Barrientos' troubles, which began with Cuban pub-
lication of the Guevara diary, were compounded by his appointment of an
all-military cabinet on 27 July. Most armed forces leaders are strongly
opposed to bringing the military into the government, and many high-
ranking officers are openly critical of the way Barrientos has handled the
situation.
Tensions generated over Venezuelan claims to the disputed Essequibo
region of Guyana and the waters off the Essequibo coast have lessened.
Venezuelan Government officials have stopped issuing statements on the
subject in an apparent effort to cool the crisis. Guyana is also disposed to
let the issue die down, and is contenting itself with diplomatic appeals for
support from friendly governments.
A few Communist parties in Latin America have commented on the
Soviet-Czech dispute. The Mexican party reportedly supports Moscow
unequivocally. The party newspaper initial .ly supported Czechoslovakia,
but has been silent on the issue recently. Venezuelan Communists have
also thrown their support behind the Soviet Union. The Communist Party
of Chile, which is the hemisphere's leading exponent of the peaceful road
to power, initially tried to maintain a neutral position. Recently, however,
the party stated that it "shares the preoccupations expressed in the
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S F 'G R F" 1
STUDENTS STAGE MAJOR DISORDERS IN MEXICO
The disorders that began in
Mexico City on 26 July are a
classic example of the Commu-
nists' ability to divert a peace-
ful demonstration into a major
riot. Technical students pro-
testing police intervention in a
student problem several days
previously were agitated by Com-
munist youths out celebrating the
Castro revolution. The result
was a wild confrontation with
police during which many injuries
and much property damage occurred.
Student zeal to continue the
campaign against police brutal-
ity and authority in general
erupted into a second, more se-
rious, and apparently spontaneous
manifestation early on 30 July.
Harsh police methods designed to
break up a student fight ap-
parently precipitated a general
rampage of secondary school stu-
dents that soon became uncontrol-
lable. The federal paratroopers
who were called in to restore
order roughed up several hundred
youths and broke into university-
connected schools, thereby vio-
lating university autonomy.
Mounting student grievances
over police treatment in the cur-
rent crisis are aggravating the
poor relationship between the stu-
dents and the government. The
Diaz Ordaz administration has
been confronted with a continu-
ing series of student strikes
over a variety of local issues
for the past three years. Demon-
strations of sympathy and sup-
port for their student comrades
in Mexico City by provincial
youth groups may preclude an
early solution to the present
situation. Two students are
reported dead in the Mexican
Gulf state of Tabasco in the
wake of a student-police fray,
and student rioting has occurred
in Jalapa, the capital of Vera-
cruz.
The administration has made
good on Diaz Ordaz' warning
several weeks ago to leading
Communists that the government
would hold them culpable for
any disruption of order prior to
or during the Olympics. The
government's immediate response
to the first outbreak on the
26th, which was in fact Commu-
nist-incited, was to arrest a
number of prominent Communists.
S 1',( P. 6'.` 1
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NEW BOLIVIAN CABINET REKINDLES POLITICAL CRISIS
The political crisis first
sparked by the Guevara diary
scandal has been rekindled by
President Barrientos' naming of
a new cabinet composed entirely
of military officers. The cabi-
net appointments, announced on
27 July, are opposed not only by
civilian politicians but by the
armed forces as well.
The cabinet is a patchwork
of second-rate military officers
and cronies of the President.
Despite their lack of qualifica-
tions, Barrientos apparently de-
cided that military cabinet min-
isters would strengthen his
hand in dealing with opposition
groups and would reduce the armed
forces' potential for independent
action.
The armed forces high com-
mand believes that the military
should not be incorporated into
the government and is particularly
displeased with most of the min-
isters. On 30 July, armed forces
commander General Ovando sought
to disassociate the armed forces
from the cabinet by issuing a com-
munique denying that the cabinet
reflects official military partici-
pation in the government. Al-
Page 21
SECRET'
WEEKLY SUMMARY 2 Aug 68
though military leaders continue
to proclaim their support for Bar-
rientos, several officers have
mentioned the possibility of a
coup.
General Ovando's assertion
that the cabinet is an emergency
measure and that it will not last
longer than 20 days, plus the fact
that the new ministers have re-
tained their previous offices, in-
dicate that a new cabinet may be
named soon. Barrientos has de-
Hied this, however, and has said
that he may take even stronger
measures. The President has in-
dicated that he may not call Con-
gress to session on 6 August.
Such action would deny his polit-
ical opposition an opportunity to
question the government's handling
of the diary episode, and possibly
to censure the new cabinet min-
isters.
If civilians are not brought
into the government soon, and if
the opening of Congress is delayed,
Barrientos risks losing the support
of progovernment political elements.
Opposition groups, particularly
students, are already taking ad- 25X1
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in the government to rally senti-
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PERU TO TAKE OVER US-OWNED OIL FIELDS
President Belaunde's an-
nouncement that the government
will take over the La Brea and
Parinas oil fields from the In-
ternational Petroleum Company
(IPC) is intended to have the
appearance of forcing the com-
pany to accept a harsh settle-
ment but appears to follow an
offer recently made by IPC.
Belaunde told a joint ses-
sion of Congress on 28 July that
a solution has been reached in
the dispute with IPC over the
ownership and operation of two
oil fields, which has been a ma-
jor political issue for several
years. The agreement calls for
IPC to turn over to the state
petroleum company all of its
installations in the oil fields
and relinquish any rights it has
to the subsoil mineral deposits
in the two areas. In his an-
nouncement, the President care-
fully refrained from indicating
that any quidpro quo is to be
received by the company as a con-
dition for settlement.
Although reaction to the
announced solution has been gen-
erally favorable, some of the
more radical and nationalistic
politicians have criticized the
government for taking over the
oil fields and leaving the more
profitable Talara refinery in
the hands of the company. The
Popular Action Party's presi-
dential nominee for 1969 termed
the President's announcement
"very satisfactory," but said it
was "lamentable" that the Talara
refinery was not included.
Christian Democratic spokesmen
said it was like giving "the
state the bone and IPC the
meat." The Peruvian press has
also taken exception to a press
statement out of Washington
that implies IPC will be given
monetary compensation for its
losses.
Problems could still arise
in the negotiations over details,
but for now there is hope that
some of the emotion and the po-
litical pressure will be removed
from the issue.
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CASTRO RELAXES "REVOLUTIONAFY OFFENSIVE" IN CUBA
Fidel Castro concentrated
almost entirely on domestic prob-
lems in his speech on 26 July
marking the 15th anniversary of
the beginning of the Cuban revo-
lution. As in two other speeches
this month, Castro attempted to
modify some of the harsh reforms
of the "revolutionary offensive"
launched last March. Despite his
frequent denunciations of material
incentives, Castro said that "some
measures" to reward workers ma-
terially are necessary. He also
contradicted his statements earlier
this year that money would be
abolished.
In nearly all of his previous
speeches this year, Castro demanded
greater sacrifices from the people
while imposing, numerous austerity
measures and inducting thousands
for "volunteer" agricultural work.
The "revolutionary offensive,"
originally aimed at nationalizing
small businesses and at restoring
"momentum and purity" to the rev-
olution, was also an attempt to
mobilize workers for the 1968 sugar
harvest.
Castro is apparently moderat-
ing the intensity and scope of
the "revolutionary offensive" be-
cause he is concerned with in-
creased opposition to his policies.
His decree last March that closed
all bars and night clubs and
sharply curtailed beer production
has been particularly unpopular.
In a speech on 24 July, Castro
attempted to explain the measures.
He states that the "revolution
has nothing against beer," and
Page 23
that production of beer and a
nonalcoholic substitute will be
increased.
In the same speech, Castro
talked extensively about food pro-
duction. He apparently sought to
mollify the populace in the wake
of six months of increased food
es and rationin
The adjustments in the "rev-
olutionary offensive" are probably
also a result of a general relaxa-
tion of tensions following the com-
pletion of the sugar harvest. The
extensive propaganda campaign that
accompanied the inauguration of the
offensive last spring has slackened.
The harvest of slightly more than
5 million tons is a significant
setback in Castro's plan to produce
10 million tons in 1970. Never-
theless, Castro may be satisfied
that an optimum effort was made,
and that without the large mobili-
zations of workers and the strident
propaganda campaigns the harvest
would have been significantly
smaller.
It is unlikely that Castro
will completely abandon the "rev-
olutionary offensive" or disclaim
its objectives. It will probably
be gradually forgotten, however,
now that its major objectives have
been met. In the past, Castro
has frequently resorted to such
high-pitched campaigns to give
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impetus to certain programs. Un-
like most of them, the "revolu-
tionary offensive" also attempted
to define a new "revolutionary
morality" in Cuba. This aspect
is likely to be continued, per-
haps in new propaganda campaigns
or in other programs designed to
involve the population more directly
in the revolution.
SLIGHTLY GREATER AUTONOMY IN PROSPECT FOR BAHAMAS
Britain has agreed to dis-
cuss the Bahamas' requests for
increased autonomy, with talks
scheduled to begin on 19 Septem-
ber. The government of Premier
Pindling appears to be in a strong
bargaining position after the
general elections in April in
which it won 29 of 38 seats in
the House of Assembly.
The British are likely to
agree to minor constitutional
adjustments, such as a Bahamian
request for a government voice
in the Senate--whose members now
are appointed by the British gov-
ernor. The Bahamian Government
probably will also be granted in-
creased authority in foreign af-
fairs, enabling it to sign eco-
nomic and other types of inter-
national agreements.
The question of control over
internal security will probably
prove troublesome. The Bahamian
Government is seeking a greater
voice in police matters, but the
British have been reluctant to
relinquish any control. Premier
Pindling has been critical of
British performance in this area.
He has recently criticized their
handling of the large number of
Haitian emigres, particularly
those engaged in anti-.Duvalier
activities.
Another difficult and ex-
tremely important point at issue
will be the attempt of the Bahamas
to gain control over its foreign
exchange reserves and to augment
them with dollars rather than
sterling. The Bahamas is a net
foreign exchange earner for the
British, who have so far refused
to give up their right to regulate
Bahamian reserves.
No basic change in the present
governmental arrangement is likely
to result from the talks, and full
independence is probably several
years away. British acquiescence
con-
in Bahamian demands for minor
the
stitutional adjustments, plus
recent appointment of a more
,
govern
sympathetic
may improve relations.
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Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY
however,
or
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