WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006500070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 19, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
4 4-
19 July 1968
No. 0029/68
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(Information as of noon EDT, 18 July 1968)
VIETNAM
Uneasiness over the possible eventual need to nego-
tiate with the Liberation Front continues to color
Saigon politics. Both houses of the National Assembly
passed resolutions strongly opposing any deal with the
Communists, ar_d certain oppositionist senators are
reported pressing for an early debate centering on
charges that the Huong government is "soft" on the
negotiations issue. The pronounced lull in enemy of-
fensive activity continued during the week.
NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTH REDUCED
Pyongyang continues to try to infiltrate agents into
South Korea but at a considerably lower rate than
last year.
SOUTH CHINESE TURMOIL GROWS
Armed conflict and other turmoil and confusion con-
tinue to plague south and central China. Despite the
continued chaos, the military has largely stood aside,
taking little action to contain or suppress Red Guard
troublemakers.
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INDONESIAN COMMUNIST FACTIONALISM LIKELY TO INCREASE
The loss of the Indonesian Communist Party's two top
leaders probably will exacerbate already serious
cleavages in the party over tactics but is not likely
to disrupt Communist guerrilla activities in East and
Central Java.
CHINA'S TRADE CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE
The Cultural Revolution continues to depress Chinese
trade. The most dramatic drop is in exports to Japan
which fell 35 percent in the first five months of this
year compared with the same period last year, and to
Hong Kong which fell 25 percent over the first four
months.
Europe
USSR AND PACT ALLIES TRY TO TAME CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Moscow and four other Warsaw Pact states intensified
the pressure on Prague this week in the face of Czech-
oslovak resistance and growing opposition from other
Communist parties.
GOMULKA SURFACES SPLIT IN POLISH PARTY
Party leader Gomulka, in drawing a line between his
moderate views and those of his challenger, hard-line
factional leader Mieczyslaw Moczar, has for the first
time admitted that a split exists in the party leader-
ship.
FRENCH CABINET CHANGES STRENGTHEN DE GAULLE'S CONTROL 14
The new cabinet has few ardent social reformers, but
also no one who is likely to oppose the program of
social and educational reform which De Gaulle wants.
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
15
SERIOUS
LOCUST PLAGUE THREATENS MIDDLE
EAST
AND AFRICA 17
The
present locust situation, the
most
severe since
the
early 1950s, may bring serious
crop
destruction
in
the infested areas. Little has
been
done by the
concerned governments as yet to bring a recession.
IRAQI COUP LEADERS IN CONTROL
The Baathist regime which seized power in a bloodless
coup on 17 July seems to have no significant opposi-
tion so far.
ARABS, SOVIETS DISCUSS FURTHER MILITARY AID
The second round of Soviet-Arab arms negotiations
since the last year's Middle East war is under way.
The Soviets are negotiating with military delegations
from Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria.
YEMENI POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES
Ideological, religious, personal, and tribal dissi-
dence continues to plague the republican regime in
Yemen, while the military stalemate with the royal-
ists drags on.
INDIA STUNG BY REPORTS OF SOVIET ARMS TO PAKISTAN
The Soviets' notice that they intend to sell arms to
Pakistan has given rise to a storm of protest and
indignation in India. The move has shaken informed
public opinion and caused considerable official soul-
searching.
POSSIBLE ARMS RACE ENDANGERS SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN DETENTE 22
Somali Prime Minister Egal is being pressured by his
military to accept Soviet aircraft to counter Ethio-
pia's purchase of Canberra bombers from the UK.
SECRL+"I'
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
23
VENEZUELA-GUYANESE BORDER DISPUTE FLARES
AGAIN
24
Venezuela has reiterated its claim to more
than half
of Guyana's territory and has added a claim
to juris-
diction over the offshore waters outside the three-
mile limit claimed by Guyana.
STUDENT UNREST TROUBLES MEXICO
Disorders have occurred at two provincial universities
in the past two weeks, and reports of agitation at the
National University in Mexico City have led to tighter
controls on students there.
CARIBBEAN EX-COLONIES MOVE TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 26
Prospects for effective economic integration of the
former British colonies in the Caribbean have been
boosted by Jamaica's entry into the Caribbean Free
Trade Area and indications that it may join the Car-
ibbean Development Bank.
BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WARNS STUDENTS
In a statement released after the second National Se-
curity Council meeting in less than a week, the Presi-
dent clearly implied that if new disorders occur, the
armed forces will be used and a state of siege de-
clared.
ECUADOREAN GOVERNMENT FACES WIDESPREAD UNREST
The interim government's inability to cope with grow-
ing resentment among Ecuador's lower classes has re-
sulted in a rash of disturbances, and the incoming
Velasco administration will inherit a difficult situa-
tion.
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Vietnamese Communist propaganda remains focused on rebutting U5
arguments at the Paris talks and on the effort to undermine the Saigon
government. The timing, scope, and duration of the current lull in Com-
munist-initiated military activities, however, could in part represent an
effort to give the appearance of limited military restraint while probing US
intentions in Paris.
Meanwhile, there is unmistakable evidence of preparations for Com-
munist offensive operations later this summer, with most reports suggest-
ing no widespread coordinated offensives until next month at the earliest.
Even so, nervous South Vietnamese security authorities show considerable
edginess over the possibility of an imminent fresh wave of attacks in the
Saigon area. The Communists would certainly not be averse to helping
foster this impression to keep the Saigon populace on edge and to divert
allied forces from offensive operations at a time when the enemy appears
to be heavily engaged in redeployment and retooling.
On the eve of President Thieu's departure for Honolulu, both houses
of the National Assembly passed strongly worded resolutions opposing any
political accommodation with the Communists. Strongly anti-Communist
northern Catholic elements, allied on this one issue with some Dai Viet
senators, also reportedly plan to seek an early debate centering on allega-
tions that the Huong government is "soft" on the negotiations issue.
Perhaps partly in response to these pressures, Thieu on 17 July made an
unscheduled appearance before some Revohationary Development workers,
assuring his audience that there "would never be a coalition government
with the Communists."
The vulnerability of efforts to promote regionalism in Southeast Asia
to long-standing bilateral disputes was brought home once again this week
by the breakdown of Malaysian-Philippine talks concerning Manila's claim
to the Malaysian Borneo state of Sabah. Malaysia again rejected the
Philippine claim. Although President Marcos is still resisting domestic
pressure to break relations, this latest imbroglio will in any event cast a
pall over the impending annual meeting of the Association of Asian States.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jul 68
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VIETNAM
Uneasiness over the possible
eventual need to negotiate with
the National Liberation Front con-
tinues to color Saigon politics.
Opponents in the National Assem-
bly, looking for a way to get at
the Huong government, seem in-
creasingly to be centering on
Huong's alleged "softness" toward
the Communists as their principal
weapon. Both houses have recently
adopted resolutions urging the
government to adhere to a firm
anti-Communist stance.
Several senators aligned with
either the Revolutionary Dai Viet
Party or the strongly anti-Commu-
nist northern Catholic faction
are reported to have signed a
petition calling for an early as-
sembly debate on the Huong gov-
ernment. These senators profess
the belief that the government has
created a permissive climate for
propaganda and organizational ac-
tivities on behalf of the Libera-
tion Front and the Communists'
Alliance. They are also said to
believe that President Thieu's
policies are ambivalent on such
questions as accommodation with
the Communists and formation of
a coalition government.
Although some of Huong's op-
ponents hope that the projected
debate might lead to a no-confi-
dence vote, they probably fall
considerably short of the neces-
sary votes at this juncture. They
may thus have to content them-
selves with getting their case on
the public record for possible
later use, depending on how the
situation evolves.
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Page Z WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Capttatl Spac+cl Yone
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least two weeks in any region,
with the possible exception of
the northern III Corps area some
60 to 80 miles north of Saigon.
There have been few surface
reflections recently of the con-
tinuing split between Thieu and
Vice President Ky. A period of
renewed tension in the military
establishment may be ushered in,
however, if Thieu, as expected,
names General Do Cao Tri to re-
place General Khang as III Corps
commander. Tri, although an ag-
gressive unit commander, has
never been popular with the
"young Turk" faction associated
with Ky which had dominated the
military until Thieu began his
campaign this spring to reduce
Ky's power. Tri only recently
returned to Saigon after having
served as South Vietnamese ambas-
sador to South Korea.
The War in South Vietnam
The pronounced reduction of
enemy offensive activity continued
through the week. The bulk of
the Communist forces remained pre-
occupied with redeployment, refit-
ting, absorbing replacements, and
developing new battle plans for
possible future off -
paians.
(major enemy attacks
are not likely to occur for at
Shipping to North Vietnam
Cargo deliveries to North
Vietnam by foreign flag ships dur-
ing the first half of 1968 in-
creased by 26 percent over the
same period last year, a trend
which is expected to continue into
the second half of 1968. Growing
imports of foodstuffs and petro-
leum from the USSR and China ac-
counted for most of the increase.
In order to supplement below
average harvests in North Viet-
nam since the spring of 1966,
increasingly large shipments of
flour and rice have been made.
Foodstuffs now take up about 35
percent of North Vietnamese im-
ports compared with 29 percent in
the first half of 1967.
The Soviets continue to pro-
vide the largest share--some 44
percent--of North Vietnamese im-
ports. Communist China's share 25X1
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North Vietnam: Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals
rose to 35 percent but less of
this tonnage was carried aboard
Chinese flag ships and more aboard
Chinese-chartered free world
ships. All but 17 of the free
world ships were British flag
ships out of Hong Kong which are
believed to be owned by firms un-
der Chinese control.
Cargoes originating in East-
ern Europe have risen some 40 per-
cent. Most of this increase re-
flects agreements for increased
aid reached between East European
countries and Hanoi last fall.
Ships are being unloaded in
Haiphong at a record rate.
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Unloading operations are being car-
ried out 24 hours a day and work
is not being interrupted by air
raid alerts. The rail and road
system out of the port has been
partially restored, permitting
the Vietnamese to move goods out
of the port area more efficiently.
Ships' layover time is increasing,
however, because of the rise in
the number of ships calling at
Haiphong and the limited wharf
space available for berthing.
NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATION OF THE SOUTH REDUCED
Pyongyang continues to try
to infiltrate agents into South
Korea but at a considerably lower
rate than last year.
Recently most of the signifi-
cant incidents along the Demili-
tarized Zone appear to have re-
sulted from the interception of
small Communist agent teams at-
tempting to cross into the South.
In most cases the teams were
clearly attempting to avoid de-
tection and when intercepted
quickly tried to break contact.
The large amounts of food and
equipment carried by some teams
suggest that they were trying
to penetrate into South Korea's
interior.
The level of activity along
the Demilitarized Zone in recent
months, however, has been consid-
erably less than during the same
period last year--about 200 inci-
dents during the second quarter
of. 1967, compared with about 100
during the same period this year.
Improved South Korean security
measures, both along the Demili-
tarized. Zone and in the interior,
Page 5
apparently are resulting in the
detection of more of those at-
tempting to infiltrate.
Seaborne operations this
year appear to have been cut back
even more than has land infiltra-
tion. Since the first of the year
there have been indications of
only about four landings by boat
that might have involved infiltra-
tions or possibly contacts with es-
tablished agents. By early July
1967, over 90 agents had been put
ashore, over two thirds of these
in teams of up to 12. Since a
number of these seaborne infiltra-
tors avoided discovery until later
in the year, some may also have
escaped detection so far this year.
The South Koreans remain con-
cerned that Pyongyang will follow
up the attempted raid last January
against the presidential mansion
in Seoul with additional acts of
terrorism or sabotage. Although
there have been no confirmed Com-
munist terrorist or sabotage inci-
dents since the January raid, re-
cent information suggests that
North Korean agents continue to
be given such missions.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 19 Jul 68
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SOUTH CHINESE TURMOIL GRO~JS
Armed conflict and other
turmoil and confusion continue
to plague south and central China.
Factional fighting in many areas
is reported to have grown more
acute
(residents of
troubled areas expect even greater
trouble to develop. Despite the
continued chaos, the military has
largely stood aside, taking little
action to contain or suppress Red
Guard troublemakers.
Conflict has been particularly
severe in Fukien and Kwangtung
provinces, which have been shaken
by mounting violence for more than
two months. Amoy, a major port
in Fukien, is apparently in a
state of semianarchy; factories
are shut down and residents are
lving in a siege atmosphere.
Clashes have also flared up in
Chuan-Chou, Fukien, and inhabitants
are said to be fleeing to safety
outside the city. In Kwangtung
trouble appears to be widespread.
Between 5-7 July a clash broke
out between several hundred fac-
tionalists in Yang-Chiang, result-
ing in ten deaths and scores of
serious injuries. In Ching-yuan,
opposing groups
are fighting wit machine guns
and grenades. The city of Shih-pu
on Hainan Island has also become
involved in violent conflict.
Fighting broke out in June, with
participants using pistols, rifles,
submachine guns and antiaircraft
machine guns. Twenty persons
have been reported killed.
Red Guard violence also
continues in Canton, Factional
clashes appear to be growing in
scope and violence, and many resi-
dents reportedly believe that
worse is to come. An attempt by
the acting chairman of the pro-
vincial Revolutionary Committee
to dissipate Red Guard antagonisms
merely resulted in the mutual
display of force by opposing
groups, with armed factionalists
marching through the street in
virtual military formation. A
major clash is reported to have
taken place on 12-13 July.
Trouble has also been re-
ported from Chekiang Province,
where armed struggle appears to
be widespread, and from Hupeh
Province, where factional antago-
nisms are evidently growing.
Tension has again increased in
the triple city of Wuhan, scene
of a major crisis last summer,
and in the nearby river port of
Huang-shih, which appears to be
in a state of near anarchy.
In several other provinces,
where detailed information is
lacking, provincial radiobroad-
casts and editorials have spoken
in shrill terms of divisions
within the provincial Revolutionary
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Committees and of attempts--pre-
sumably by disaffected Red Guards--
to undermine the authority of
existing provincial administrative
organs. Problems of this nature
appear to be widespread, and
armed conflict may well accompany
disputes over political authority.
On the other hand, several
provincial radiobroadcasts in
the past week have spoken harshly
of Red Guard obstruction and of
unnamed renegades who have ex-
ploited and distorted "leftist"
slogans. Although this theme
has not been elaborated by
national propaganda media, it
would appear that some provincial
authorities are attempting to
curb and control Red Guard li-
cense, which has been tacitly
encouraged in the past two months
by the central press and radio.
In the midst of the recent
disorder the military establish-
ment has largely remained on the
sidelines. Several persons,
however, were killed in Canton in
June during an attem t to
naval arsenal.
INDONESIAN COMMUNIST FACTIONALISM LIKELY TO INCREASE
The loss of the Indonesian
Communist Party's two top leaders
probably will exacerbate already
serious cleavages in the party
over tactics but is not likely
to disrupt Communist guerrilla
activities in East and Central
Java.
On 11 July, Djakarta announced
the capture of the party chair-
man and the death of his leading
aide. The two men were presumably
coordinating a Java-wide reorganiza-
tion and allegedly directing East
Java paramilitary activities from
a redoubt in that province. Their
loss probably will sharpen the
controversy between a moderate
faction, which contends that the
party has not sufficiently re-
covered from its debacle in 1965
to undertake armed struggle, and
militants who have been waging
the terrorist campaign.
The ease with which provincial
militants established a redoubt
in East Java, originally in de-
fiance of party directives, ap-
parently induced some party lead-
ers to acquiesce in these tactics.
The militants, however, are not
in a position to seize national
party leadership and impose a
program of immediate armed strug-
gle throughout Java.
There are indications that
the militants plan to extend their
operations into northern East
Java and Central Java in order
to divert army pressures from
their stronghold in Malang-Blitar
on the southeast Java coast. Last
month assassinations of anti-Com-
munists took place in north coast
areas, possibly--as had occurred
earlier in Malang-Blitar--as a
prelude to more widespread ter-
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CHINA'S TRADE CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE
The Cultural Revolution con-
tinues to depress Chinese trade.
Fragmentary 1968 trade data from
Western Europe, Japan, and Hong
Kong show a sharp drop in Chinese
exports in every case and a drop
in imports with all trading part-
ners except France. The most
dramatic fall is in exports to
Japan which declined 35 percent
in the first five months of this
year compared with the same period
last year, and to Hong Kong which
fell 25 percent in the first four
months of the year.
The deterioration in China's
trade began last year when total
turnover fell seven percent to
about $4 billion. The Cultural
Revolution began to affect Chinese
industry and agriculture in the
beginning of 1967 but the Chinese
were able to utilize stockpiles,
and exports did not fall off until
about the middle of the year.
China's major exports, textiles
and agricultural goods, accounted
for most of the decline. Imports,
which were increasing rapidly at
the beginning of 1967, leveled
off and began to decline later in
the year as the Chinese became
concerned about their growing
trade deficit.
The trade deficit is likely
to widen this year as China con-
tinues to buy substantial amounts
of grain and fertilizer. Peking
has already signed contracts for
the delivery of 3.6 million tons
of grain for delivery this. year.
Fertilizer purchases for the year
have reached 5.9 million tons.
These two commodities alone will
cost the Chinese more than $450
mi 11 i on .
Imports of machinery and
equipment are expected to slacken
because construction of whole
plants contracted for in 1965 and
1966 are nearing completion.
Recent harassment of foreign tech-
nicians installing equipment in
China and construction delays
caused by Red Guard activity may
cause imports to drop further.
China recently ordered all the
technicians of an Anglo-German
firm installing a petrochemical
plant at Lan-chou to leave and
canceled the contract.
China's trade with Communist
countries also appears to be
falling off. Last year Sino-
Soviet trade dropped by two
thirds to about $106 million and
will probably fall further this
year. Trade with Eastern European
countries, which held fairly
stable last year, may also be
declining.
Although total trade may
drop by as much as ten percent
this year, it will not reach the
low levels of the Great Leap
Forward. The growing trade
deficit will be eased somewhat
if remittances from overseas
Chinese, about $70 million last
year, remain steady, but China
will probably have to dip into
its reserves to make u the
difference.
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The confrontation between the Soviet Union, its hard-core allies, and
Czechoslovakia overshadowed all else in Europe.
The USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria bluntly
told the Czechoslovak party to retrench and abandon its "politically
extreme" policies. In the face of this and a Soviet party central committee
resolution backing it, the Czechoslovaks firmly but calmly rejected the
demands of their neighbors, drawing the lines of the confrontation even
more clearly.
A recent statement by Rumania's vice president to a secretary of the
Hungarian party succinctly sums up Moscow's problem. He said, "At Sofia
we were seven, at Dresden you were six, and at Warsaw you were only
five."
Most Western European Communist parties, even before the Russian
party plenum, had joined the Yugoslav and Rumanian leaders in con-
demning the prospect of full Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Tito,
and probably Ceausescu, are due in Prague to provide moral and psycho-
logical support to Dubcek in his showdown with Brezhnev. Tito suddenly
ended a Yugoslav party central committee meeting to prepare for the trip.
As fears and tensions about Czechoslovak developments were rising,
Gomulka in Warsaw moved to dilute the effects of the promotion of his
challenger, Interior Minister Moczar, to the top party bodies. Intense
jockeying for power will be the order of the day between now and the
Polish party congress in November.
In Paris, Couve de Murville, addressing the National Assembly for the
first time as premier, pledged to move promptly to carry out many basic
domestic reforms.
The Disarmament Conference reconvened in Geneva with no fixed
agenda but with the hope that it could be of some use in creating a
favorable climate for US-Soviet talks on limitation of offensive and de-
fensive weapons systems.
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USSR AND PACT ALLIES TRY TO TAME CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Moscow and four of its Warsaw
Pact allies are trying to force a
turnabout in Prague but are meeting
with steadfast Czechoslovak re-
sistance and growing opposition from
other Communist parties in Europe.
By week's end the confrontation
had become so direct that neither
side had much room left far polit-
ical maneuver.
Party and government leaders
of the USSR, East Germany, Poland,
Hungary, and Bulgaria met in Warsaw
on 14-15 July to discuss the situa-
tion in Czechoslovakia, despite the
refusal of the Czechoslovaks to at-
tend. They sent a joint letter to
Prague declaring their deep anxiety
over the trend of events there, and
demanded that the Czechoslovaks turn
back the political clock.
The letter charged that po-
litical activities in Czechoslova-
kia were aimed at the foundations
of Communism in the countr~r and had
not met with any effective rebuff
from the party leadership. The
signers asserted they could not
stand aside while "imperialism"
made a breach in the socialist sys-
tem, "by peaceful or unpeaceful
means, from inside or outside,"
which would change power relations
in Europe. Such developments, the
letter said, threatened the security
of the whole socialist system.
The signers demanded that the
Czechoslovak party take four steps
to redress the situation: reso-
lutely attack right-wing and anti-
socialist forces, mobilize all the
power. of the state in defense of
Communism, reimpose party control
of news media, and return to opera-
tion of the party on the basis of
Soviet-style principles--includ-
ing that of complete centraliza-
tion of power. The letter made
no mention, however, of what ac-
tion the five would take if Prague
failed to heed these demands, sug-
gesting that the crisis is still
in the talking stage.
The Soviet leadership hastily
convened the Communist Party Cen-
tral Committee on 17 July to add
the weight of its formal endorse-
ment to the Warsaw joint letter.
A partial text of the committee's
resolution broadcast that day re-
peated the warnings of the letter
in more general but no less stern
terms. The sketchy information
thus far available on the meeting
does not indicate whether Brezhnev,
who made the major speech, sought
central committee approval for any
specific policy moves in the future.
The Czechoslovak party presid-
ium has calmly but firmly rejected
the. demands placed on it. Party
chief Dubcek called an expanded
meeting of the central committee
for 18 July to ratify the presidium's
decision. The same day he went on
national radio and television to en-
sure as much national popular sup-
port as possible. The implications
of these moves cannot help but be
understood by the other parties in
the dispute.
The Soviet pressure tactics
have aroused strong opposition from
other European parties. In Eastern
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Europe, the Yugoslav and Rumanian
leaders, Tito and Ceausescu, re-
portedly were prepared to demon-
strate their solidarity with the
Czechoslovaks by traveling to
Prague.
Led by the French, most of the
Western European parties--opposed
to the Soviet pressure tactics
more for domestic political reasons
than any other--have voiced support
for Prague.
The French Communist Party, in
an apparent attempt to ease the
Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis, pro-
posed on 17 July that an urgent
conference of European parties meet
to discuss Czechoslovakia. The call
was made on the day that party
leader Waldeck-Rocket returned from
a trip to Moscow, but it is doubt-
ful that the proposal was made at
Soviet instigation. Neither Mos-
cow nor Prague has yet commented on
the French suggestion. The Italian,
Austrian, and Swiss parties, how-
ever, have already responded fav-
orably to the French party's pro-
posal. No European party has as
yet rejected the idea, although
many have not yet made their posi-
tions known.
Czechoslovak leaders, mean-
while, buttressed by strong popular
support, maintained their resolute
Page 11
position. In an outspoken press con-
ference on 15 July, Lt. Gen. Prchlik,
chief of the central committee's de-
fense and security department, even
accused Pact commander Yakubovsky of
having broken his word to Dubcek by
interrupting Soviet troop withdraw-
als, and added that the Soviet marshal
would again fail to keep his word if
all Soviet forces had not departed
Czechoslovakia by 21 July.
The Czechoslovaks also of-
fered several criticism of the So-
viet-dominated Warsaw Pact command
structure. Prchlik complained about
the inequalities in the Pact command
and said that because the Pact is
outdated, Prague will propose revi-
sions. Defense Minister Dzur made
a more conciliatory statement, but
he also endorsed proposals for a
more representative command struc-
ture in the Pact. Foreign Minister
Hajek joined in the discussion on the
Pact, stating that the preamble of
the future Czechoslovak-Rumanian
friendship treaty pledges adherence
to the Pact "as long as it is valid."
Prague apparently is also pre-
paring to meet future Soviet polit-
ical and psychological measures. A
Czechoslovak official stated that
Prague has ready contingency plans
to counter Soviet tactics. He in- 25X1
dicated that the Dubcek regime is
wary of a Soviet-supported coup at-
tempt by conservatives.
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GOMULKA SURFACES SPLIT IN P(1LISH PARTY
Party leader Gomulka, in
drawing a line between his moder-
ate views and those of his chal-
lenger, hard-line factional leader
Mieczyslaw Moczar has for the
first time admitted that a split
exists in the party leadership.
Although Gomulka could not pre-
vent Moczar's promotion last week
to the party leadership, he is
trying to temper its effects on
the political power struggle.
The split is between Gomulka's
supporters, who are moderate on
domestic policy and strongly pro-
Soviet in foreign affairs, and
Moczar's hard-line, chauvinistic
wing of the party. In organiza-
tional terms, the fissure divides
the overwhelmingly pro-Gomulka
party leadership in Warsaw from
most provincial party leaders who
seem to look to Moczar.
during the discussion of the
p-arty 's program, Continued So-
viet support for Gomulka was evi-
dent in Pravda's publication of
his speech on 16 July.
The program, which was un-
animously adopted, reflects
Gomulka's views throughout, with
only its omissions suggesting
areas of discord. There is no
mention, for example, of the re-
cent anti-Semitic campaign, whose
"distortions" Gomulka categorically
condemned. The program stresses
Gomulka's assertion that "revision-
ism," exploited by the West, is the
main danger to the ideological
unity of the party. The program
will now be discussed by the rank
and file. It probably will run
into trouble in local party organ-
izations, where hard-line influ-
ence is strong.
In his speech to the central
committee plenum of 8-9 July,
Gomulka forcefully reiterated his
moderate positions on a score of
controversial issues. He urged
the committee to adopt the draft
party program in preparation for
the party congress in November
even though there were "differ-
ences within the leadership" over
some of its provisions. Gomulka
also implied that the factional
struggle for delegates to the
congress will be harsh, and pre-
dicted that "unfounded criticism"
and "wrong views" will be heard
The choice of three new cab-
inet members on 15 July appears to
be a move by Gomulka to mitigate
the political significance of
Moczar's elevation to the polit-
buro and secretariat. None of the
new ministers--including Moczar's
successor as interior minister,
Kazimierz Switala--seems to be
associated with the hard-line
faction. The new ministers of
finance and of health are respected
professionals.
There are reports that the
new interior minister is related
by marriage to reform-minded pro-
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MAIN PROTAGONISTS IN POLISH PARTY STRUGGLE
Politburo member, party leader
in Katowice Province - An
unorthodox Communist seeking
reform in an orderly fashion; has
helped Gomulka up to now, but
could someday be his successor.
91396 7-66
Party First Secretary - weakened,
but fighting to retain power
against MOCZAR
vincial party leader Gierek, who
is Moczar's rival for decisive in-
fluence within the party. If true,
this suggests that once again, in
return for support, Gomulka has
struck a compromise with Gierek's
"technocratic" followers.
As a member of the leadership,
Moczar may find that he will be
tainted with responsibility for
policies which he has opposed in
the past. The apparent dilution
Politburo candidate, and party
secretary, former Interior Min-
ister - main challenger for
Gomulka's power; espouses
hardline, chauvinistic policies
of his control over the Interior
Ministry may also weaken his power
base and circumscribe his room
for political maneuver.
The personnel changes made
so far merely reflect the divi-
sions in the party, and neither
faction probably considers them
decisive. Additional shifts and
intensive jockeying for power can
be expected before the part
con ress in November.
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FRENCH CABINET CHANGES STRENGTHEN DE GAULLE'S CONTROL
The cabinet reshuffle of 12
July, as well as last month's par-
liamentary elections, have placed
the future of France even more
firmly than before in the hands of
President de Gaulle. The dismissal
of Georges Pompidou as premier at
a time when he was fast becoming
a political power in his own right
and his replacement by Maurice
Couve de Murville, make evident
De Gaulle's determination to exer-
cise complete control of the new
government.
Couve de Murville, who had
held the foreign affairs portfolio
longer than any other minister in
republican history, is a gifted,
loyal, career bureaucrat who has
been described as the "best messen-
ger boy in the government." In his
new position he is likely to con-
tinue to be the "perfect reflection
of De Gaulle's policy."
'i'he new government is essen-
tially a "continuity cabinet"--
Pompidou's cabinet without Pompidou.
The key posts of foreign affairs,
finance, and interior went to faith-
ful Gaullists who had held differ-
ent positions in the previous gov-
ernment; two ministers dismissed
during the May crisis regained cab-
inet posts. Rene Capitant, an old
confidant of De Gaulle who has long
insisted on the need for basic so-
cial reform, remained as minister
of justice, and some reform-minded
men were brought in at the junior
secretariat level. On the whole,
however, the cabinet is not composed
of reformers, but neither does it
contain men who are likely to op-
pose reforms De Gaulle wants.
The June elections reduced the
opposition parties to parliamentary
impotence, and the massive Gaullist
majority in the National Assembly
is likely to function only as a
?'rubber stamp" for executive de-
cisions. De Gaulle probably be-
lieves that the election returns
represent the "massive vote of con-
fidence" in his own personal leader-
ship that he was seeking. Although
there are still rumors that he will
leave office in the fall, his re-
cent actions suggest that he in-
tends to remain and try to accom-
plish his self-proclaimed historic
mission of reforming France, so-
cially and politically. New pro-
grams for social and educational
reform will bear De Gaulle's clear
imprint, and whether France avoids
a repetition of the events of May
depends in large measure on how
successfully these reforms deal
with the country's underlying prob-
lems.
In his first major policy dec-
laration in the National Assembly,
Couve de Murville did little to
clarify what De Gaulle's concept
of "participation" might mean in
practical terms. He again underlined
that his government intended to main-
tain public order, and suggested
that the rebuilding of the economy
through financial orthodoxy would
be given top priority over the next
18 months. He assured the business
community that the prerogatives of
management would not be 'eo ardized
by any reform proposals.
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Arab terrorist intrusions from Jordan and Lebanon and border clashes
continued during the week despite increasingly effective Israeli counter-
measures and harsh retaliation.
In Iraq, the Baathist regime which seized power on 17 July seems to
be in firm control. A spokesman for the regime justified the coup by
charging that the former leaders' inaction on Iraq's problems had been
"ruining the country."
In Turkey, leftist students attacked visiting U5 Navy personnel in
Istanbul during two days of anti-US demonstrations. The attacks and
harassment of sailors and officers from the US Sixth Fleet were the most
violent so far. The Demirel government, sensitive to charges of being a US
puppet, hesitated to confront the student group directly.
The locust situation in the Middle Last and Africa threatens wide-
spread crop destruction on the scale of the near disaster in the early
1950s. The countries involved- including Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and the
Sudan-are aware of the threat but are unequipped to handle the problem
and are apathetic about it.
In the Nigerian civil war, renewed contacts between federal and
6iafran representatives may take place this weekend in Niamey, Niger,
where the Organization of African Unity's committee on Nigeria has been
meeting since 15 July. The Biafrans quickly accepted an invitation to the
parley, and. a high-level federal delegation is to attend. The continuing
unyielding opposing positions regarding acease-fire and a political settle-
ment, however, dim prospects for meaningful negotiations.
Rhodesia's ruling political party has proposed a new constitution
which. moves several big steps away from Britain's conditions fora negoti-
ated settlement of the country's independence. The new proposals would
permanently institutionalize political control by the white minority, end
all ties with Britain, and permit partition of the country along racial lines.
'The proposals must still be approved by a national congress of the ruling
party and by a referendum of the dominantly white electorate.
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LOCUST PLAGUE THREATENS AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST
MOROCCO 1
y..j
6PRNIaM t'~r l
6~NAR~" ~
!
ALGERIA
r
_~
~. r t f
Major locust breeding area
Country threatened by locust plague
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SERIOUS LOCUST PLAGUE THREATENS MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
The growing locust threat in
the Middle East and Africa is
menacing widespread crop destruc-
tion, but few measures have yet
been taken to counteract the
plague .
The locust situation now
could be the most serious in the
area since the early 1950s. Ac-
cording to the UN Food and Agri-
culture Organization, the threat
results from an unusual rainfall
pattern in a belt stretching from
central Africa through Saudi
Arabia. Heavy swarms of locusts
have accumulated in Saudi Arabia
and Africa. Ethiopia and the
Sudan are the most heavily hit
countries in Africa thus far.
Some swarms have already moved
into Iran and Pakistan, and re-
ports have been received of swarms
in West Africa and the Maghreb.
If the present wind and rain
pattern persists, extensive breed-
ing and migration will continue
through the fall. Unusually
heavy rainfall in Somalia is con-
tributing to breeding there , and
these locusts may invade Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda. The locust
migration out of Saudi Arabia,
which would under ordinary cir-
cumstances bring them across the
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden into the
Horn of Africa, has been disrupted
by unusual wind currents down the
Red Sea. The locusts are thus
spreading into the southeastern
part of the Arabian Peninsula,
northward into Jordan and Sinai,
and east toward Iran and Pakistan.
If the winds change and the
locusts are forced into the Horn,
their control would be compara-
tively simple. Their present
distribution, however, is largely
in inaccessib le areas, and the
countries involved have thus far
done little to control them. In
the Sudan, for example, where
some crops have already been de-
stroyed, the government delayed
until this week requesting con-
sultations with a regional locust
control organization in Nairobi
to discuss cooperation on the
problem. The Saudis, with one of
"and the Lord brought an east wind upon the
land all that day and all that night; and when
it was morning, the east wind brought the
locusts...very grievous were they; before them
were no such locusts as they...for they covered
the face of the whole earth so that the land
was darkened; and they did eat every herb of
the land, and all the fruit of the trees which
the hail had left; and there remained not any
green thing in the trees, or in the herbs of the
field, through all the land of Egypt."
the most dangerous locust groups,
claim to be using locust control
teams, but in general are playing
down the threat and have refused
an official US offer of assistance.
Unless effective counter-
measures are taken soon, exten-
sive crop damage will take place.
Locusts now breeding in the Sudan
and moving into Ethiopia would be
in a position seriously to damage
the Ethiopian crops by early fall.
The countries involve d are aware
of the dangers, but they remain
generally unequipped to handle
or apathetic about the problem
of controllin locusts. 25X1
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IRAQI COUP LEADERS IN CONTROL
The Baathist regime which
seized power in a bloodless coup
on 17 July seems to have no sig-
nificant opposition so far.
The new "Revolutionary Com-
mand Council" is headed by Hasan
al-Bakr, a former prime minister
and leader of the relatively
"moderate" wing of the Iraqi
Baath Party. Ex-president Arif
was stripped of his powers and
may have been flown to London,
and former prime minister Tahir
Yahya is said to have been im-
prisoned. Three military offi-
cers--the chief of staff, the com-
mander of the air force, and the
head of the Iraqi forces in Jor-
dan--were "retired." They have
been replaced by prominent Baath-
ists.
In a briefing for foreign
military attaches, the deputy
director of Iraqi military in-
telligence reportedly justified
the coup by charging that Prime
Minister Yahya's inaction with
respect to the Iraq's problems
had been "ruining the country."
President Arif had been aware of
the situation but had refused
to remove Yahya. The briefer
added that the old regime was not
representative of the wishes of
the people and that the revolution-
ary council hoped to conduct
elections for a national parlia-
ment as soon as possible--all
standard lines after a coup in
Iraq. With xespect to foreign
policy, he said that the regime
desired friendly relations with
its "neighbors, all Muslim coun-
tries, socialist countries, and
the USSR."
Although Syria is also ruled
by a Baathist regime, the Syrian
leadership is more extremist than
the new regime in Iraq, In fact,
the coup may encourage more
"moderate" Syrian Baathist lead-
ers, now in exile in Beirut, to
try to stage a comeback,
With more than 20,000 Iraqi
troops stationed in northern Jor-
dan, the coup may have political
implications for King Husayn's
already precarious position. Con-
tacts may be established between
the Iraqis and dissident Jordan-
ian elements, although the present
Baath Party in Jordan tends to
subscribe to the more radical
Syrian line.
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ARABS, SOVIETS DISCUSS FURTHER MILITARY AID
The second round of Soviet-
Egyptian arms negotiations since
the last year's Middle East war
is under way. The Soviet De-
fense minister is visiting Al-
giers, and an Iraqi military
delegation is scheduled to go to
Moscow.
According to the communique
issued at the end of Nasir's
recent trip to Moscow, the So-
viets will assist Egypt "in
the strengthening of its defen-
sive potential." Egypt's chief
of staff has remained in Moscow
to work out the details for
Soviet military aid. Support
equipment and artillery as well
as additional aircraft and tanks
are believed to be high on Egypt's
list of military requirements.
Cairo is not expected, however,
to get any new types of equip-
ment not previously on order.
The Soviets are likely to pro-
vide additional weapons only at
a rate at which they believe
Egypt can absorb them and to
continue their active partici-
pation in the stepped-up train-
ing program for the Egyptian
armed forces.
A delegation headed by
Iraq's minister of defense and
army chief of staff is scheduled
to arrive in Moscow 31 July. The
Iraqis may be seeking additional
Soviet fighter aircraft. The
Iraqi delegation probably will
also try to get accelerated de-
livery of equipment ordered un-
der old agreements, particularly
of MIG-21s and of SU-7 and Komar-
class guided missile patrol boats.
Marshal Grechko arrived in
Algiers on 15 July for a one-
week visit. The last Soviet-
Alge ri an arms agreement was con-
cluded in May 1965 and most of
the equipment covered by the
agreement is believed to have
been delivered. The Algerians
are expected to ask for destroyers
and TU-16 medium jet bombers.
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YEMENI PObJER STRUGGLE CONTINUES
Dissidence continues to plague
the republican regime in Yemen.
The situation is far from
clear, and several different power
struggles appear to be going on
at the same time. The most serious
seems to be the three-cornered
wrangling among the senior army
officers, led by Deputy Chief of
Staff Khawlani; the junior army
officers, led by commando chief
Abd al-Wahhab; and Prime Minister
al-Amri. The younger officers are
more radical and belong to the dis-
advantaged Shafi religious sect,
wh~_le the older officers are mostly
Zaydis. Al-Amri has been playing
each side against the other
in order to maintain his own posi-
tion.
When these factions came to
blows last March, al-Amri managed
to retain control and Khawlani,
then chief of staff, was demoted.
Another faction within the
Yemeni Government is a group of
Page 20
leftist civilian officials, includ-
ing the ministers of foreign
affairs, economy, and finance.
These men tend to be theorists
and have so far not taken an ac-
tive role in internal Yemeni
struggles, but side with Abd al-
Wahhab and the junior officers.
They are trying to consolidate
their strength and exert a greater
influence on Yemeni affairs.
Another potential source of
trouble is the Yemeni branch of
the radical Arab Nationalist
Movement (ANM); many of its mem-
bers support former rime
minister Sallal.
Meanwhile, friction between
al-Amri and Iryani, head of
Yemen's presidential council, led
to Iryani's refusal to accept
a second term of office when the
first expired on 5 July. He has
promised to stay on temporarily
until a successor is selected.
Iryani's resignation gives al-Amri
control of more of the reins of
power, but it also weakens the
government and may make al-Amri
more vulnerable to popular dis-
content.
Amid the political strug-
gles, the military stalemate with
the ro alists dra s on.
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INDIA STUNG BY REPORTS OF SOVIET ARMS TO PAKISTAN
The Soviet notice that
they intend to sell arms to
Pakistan has given rise to a
storm of protest and indignation
in India. Although foreseeable
for some time as a possible de-
velopment, the move has shaken in-
formed public opinion and caused
considerable official soul-search-
ing.
The militantly nationalist
Jan Sangh party is leading the
wave of indignation against the
Soviets. Describing the contro-
versial move as "a clear act of
betrayal," Jan Sangh President
Vajpayee is calling for a united
public protest against Moscow.
All Jan Sangh branches--most of
which are in northern India--are
directed to observe "anti-Soviet
arms aid to Pakistan day'? on 22
July. Right-wing elements have
already stoned the Soviet consu-
late in Calcutta, and the Jan
Sangh plans protest demonstrations
on 21 July at all Soviet instal-
lations in India.
Other non-Communist parties,
including some elements within
the ruling Congress Party, have
also freely voiced their displea-
sure. The pro-Moscow Communists,
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apparently chagrined by the Soviet
action, are feebly trying to play
down the whole affair.
The government's response
thus far has been to protest to
Moscow through official channels
and indirectly to stoke the public
protest at home. The tempo should
rise even more next week when
Parliament reconvenes and the
opposition parties focus more of
their wrath on Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi's government.
Mrs. Gandhi's relative close-
ness to the Soviets--until now a
strong political asset--is becom-
ing an increasing liability.
Rightist elements within the Con-
gress Party opposing the prime
minister could be strengthened if
she appears to be glossing over
the Soviet action by opposing it
less vigorously than the public
expects. Thus far she has avoided
this trap, but as the minister in
charge of foreign affairs she will
have to bear the brunt of the
opposition attack and may not get
full public backing from key cabi-
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POSSIBLE ARMS RACE ENDAPJGERS SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN DETENTE
A new arms race in the Horn
of Africa may be shaping up if
Somali Prime Minister Egal decides
to accept a Soviet offer of MIG-
21s. Since becoming prime minis-
ter in mid-1967, Egal has worked
assiduously in the face of in-
tense army criticism to ease the
long-standing tensions between
Ethiopia and Somalia. Recently,
however, because of the Somalis'
discovery of the imminent delivery
to Ethiopia of four Canberra bomb-
ers purchased from the UK, Egal
was pressured by the Somali mili-
tary to send his defense minister
to Moscow for talks where the So-
viet offer was made.
The Somali Government is now
seriously considering the offer,
but a final decision apparently
has not been reached. Egal is
searching hard for a way to avoid
accepting the MIGs. His detente
policy has already been foundering
on the deep distrust that exists
between the two countries and
from the lack of a clear Ethiopian
response to his diplomatic initi-
atives. To complicate matters,
he has been given little room
for maneuver by the army and his
civilian opponents. With an eye
on the parliamentary elections
in 1969, Egal must now avoid any
actions likely to enhance his
critics' arguments that Ethiopia
is using the detente to improve
its military position at Somalia's
expense.
Egal's decision on the MIGs
hinges on Ethiopia's willingness
to offer concessions to activate
the detente again. He believes
that he could ignore Ethiopian
acquisition of the Canberras and
fend off his opponents if he
could reach some concrete under-
standing with Addis Ababa over
the problems of the Somali nomads
who inhabit the adjacent Ogaden
area of Ethiopia. Several high-
ranking Ethiopian Government of-
ficials have been thinking in
these terms and have been weigh-
ing the possibility of relaxing
the harsh military administration
of the Ogaden and permitting So-
mali commercial overflights and
land transit of the area. Unfor-
tunately, however, they appar-
ently have been unable to sway
their hard-line colleagues and no
initiative has come from the Ethi-
o ian Government.
It is likely that any Somali
acquisition of additional Soviet
aircraft, once known in Addis
Ababa, would end whatever prospects
there are for Ethiopian conces-
sions to the Somali Government
and of preserving the detente. A
new Somali-Ethiopian arms race
might also ensue, with resultant
Ethiopian pressure on the US for
more advanced equi~ent. ~~
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Latin America was generally quiet last week. There were a few labor
and student disorders in Uruguay, but the situation there was less disturb-
ing than at any time in the past month. Even the Brazilian students
refrained from demonstrating last week.
The press in Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador continued to
criticize US and local security arrangements during the visit of President
Johnson two weeks ago. The Central American Common Market tariff
surcharge, proposed in May and endorsed at the summit meeting, is
moving closer to ratification in Honduras and C,uatemala. If both countries
approve the tariff as expected, the agreement will enter into force for
them and for Nicaragua, which ratified last month, and probably weaken
opposition to the surcharge in Costa Rica and El Salvador.
Cuba will celebrate the 15th anniversary of the 1953 attack on the
Mancada Barracks on 26 July. This holiday, which marks the beginning of
the revolution against Batista, is one of the most important in Cuba. In his
speech celebrating the occasion, Fidel Castro will probably remind Latin
American Communists of the need for violent revolution and prescribe
agrarian-utopianist solutions to the country's economic problems.
An ancient boundary dispute between Venezuela and Guyana flared
anew this week when Venezuela claimed jurisdiction over the waters three
to twelve miles off the Essequibo coast. Since the two governments are
taking strong positions on the issue, a very delicate situation may develop
there.
After more than two years of pressure and pleading, Argentina's Navy
is finally getting some limited military re-equipment funds. The air force
has already bought subsonic jets from the US, and the army recently
acquired light tanks from France. Now, a destroyer and a submarine
prototype will be built either in the US or Europe, and. the navy hopes
that funds will be available to build additional craft in Argentine ship-
yards. The navy is using border disputes, Soviet fishing boat incursions,
and the "security of the South Atlantic" as justification for its purchases.
The Uniguayan Air Force may also be interested in re-equipment.
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VENEZUELA - GUYANESE BORDER DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN
Venezuela is taking a hard
line on its claim to all Guyana's
territory west of the Essequibo
River--some five eighths of the
country's total area.
On 9 July, Venezuela claimed
jurisdiction over the waters
three to twelve miles off the
coast of the disputed area. It
also claimed residual rights to
the first three miles, but rec-
ognized their current possession
by Guyana. Venezuelan Foreign
Minister Iribarren told Ambassa-
dor Bernbaum on 15 July that
naval patrols may be instituted
to enforce Venezuela's claim,
and that his country's territorial
~ CQliOM81A~
~-:---
claims must take precedence over
any consideration of Guyana's
domestic political situation,
He added that Venezuela could
not accept any US interpretation
of the dispute or the right of
the US to judge a sovereign
action by Venezuela.
Iribarren's hawkish views may
not have been cleared beforehand
with President Leoni. According
to the Venezuelan ambassador,
Leoni gave him full and direct
assurances that Venezuela had no
intention of physically exercising
its sovereignty over the Essequibo
coastal waters.
~-.a Ktt~r~F.a ~ tiF~:
Ca acas
VENEZUELA
Essequibo
Disputed
Territory
Wafers between the
3 and 72 mile limit
G U `lf`._Ali.' N A
Bogota
91394 7-68
_ _-_~_~,i The Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Dispute
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While most Venezuelan poli-
ticians are united behind the gov-
ernment on this issue, some party
leaders who have taken a strongly
nationalistic stance are withdraw-
ing unquestioning support for the
government and are voicing concern
where events may be leading.
Guyanese leaders are in-
creasingly concerned that Vene-
zuela may take over the area by
farce, despite its frequent
public denials of such intentions.
They would be likely to inter-
pret any patrolling action by
the Venezuelan Navy as a resort
to force.
Guyanese Prime Minister
Forbes Burnham has issued a state-
ment roundly condemning the Vene-
zuelan decree as "international
piracy." He realizes his limited
military and diplomatic options
but has recalled his ambassador
from Caracas and plans to seek
support in the United Nations and
in Washington during his current
visit.
The anti-Venezuelan mood in
Georgetown was heightened on 17
July when the Guyanese parliament
began debate on the border issue,
The opposition People's Progressive
Party--led by pro-Communist Cheddi
Jagan--no doubt wanted to take ad-
vantage of the dispute to stir up
dissatisfaction with Burnham before
the general elections that must be
held by the end of March, It de-
cided, however, to cooperate with
the government against Venezuelan
"aggressions" in an effort to keep
from being isolated on such an
emotional national issue.~~ 25X1
STUDENT UNREST TROUBLES MEXICO
Student unrest continues to
be a troublesome issue in many
parts of Mexico. Disorders have
occurred at two provincial uni-
versities in the past two weeks,
and outbreaks could spread to
the capital city.
A clash between opposing
factions at the University of
Puebla over elections to the
university governing board on
10 July resulted in two killed
and eight wounded. Classes have
been suspended indefinitely.
A student strike at the
University of Veracruz--originally
undertaken in support of higher
salary demands by professors
and other university employees--
appears to have taken a turn for
the worse. Twenty students are
reported to be on a hunger strike,
and the financial demands far
exceed anything the state could
afford. The Cuban consul in
Veracruz has reportedly pro-
vided propaganda material and
advised the students on the
staging of demonstrations.
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A popular student "cause"
could be provided by the ruling
party's use of power to prevent
the moderate opposition from as-
suming offices it won in at least
one of the four recent state elec-
tions. For example, despite the
government's claims of victory in
Chihuahua, it is widely believed
that the National Action Party was
the real winner in the local elec-
tions on 7 July. Eight guberna-
torial contests are still pending
this year and it is likely that the
government will continue its extra-
legal tactics to ensure against
even local setbacks. 25X1
CARIBBEAN EX-COLONIES MOVE TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Prospects for effective
economic integration of the for-
mer British colonies in the
Caribbean have been boosted by
Jamaica's entry into the Carib-
bean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA)
in June and by indications that
it may join the Caribbean De-
velopment Bank (CDB),
Both organizations were
created to promote trade and
attract expanded foreign eco-
nomic assistance. Jamaica, how-
ever, participated only reluc-
tantly in the preparatory meet-
ings and withdrew from bath
projects when the other partici-
pants refused to designate
Kingston as the bank site.
This go-it-alone policy
was nothing new; as the most
economically advanced of the
Caribbean states Jamaica has
feared that its development
would be hampered by involvement
in a cooperative economic en-
deavor with its poorer neighbors
In fact, Jamaica's withdrawal
from the former West Indies Fed-
eration in 1962 sounded the
death knell of that organization
The shift in Jamaica's po-
sition may be attributed in part
to diplomatic efforts carried
out by Guyanese Prime Minister
Forbes Burnham in concert with
other CARIFTA council members.
Burnham has played a leading
role in Caribbean economic in-
tegration and regards Jamaican
participation as highly desir-
able. He has made determined
efforts to assuage the personal
animosities of many of the other
Caribbean leaders toward Jamaica
in hopes of attaining a more
viable economic entity. He be-
lieves that granting Jamaica
certain face-saving political
concessions as well as economic
concessions can induce it to
join the CDB.
Britain and Canada have
indicated they will support the
CDB with or without Jamaican
participation. Nevertheless,
they have actively promoted
Jamaican entry because this
would add to the bank's finan-
cial resources and serve as a
drawing card for other Caribbean
governments such as the Bahamas.
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BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WARNS STUDENTS
President Costa e Silva has
announced that the Brazilian Gov-
ernment will use all constitu-
tional means available to prevent
attempts to subvert public order.
In a statement released after
the second National Security Coun-
cil meeting in less than a week,
the President clearly implied
that if new disorders occur, the
armed forces will be used and a
state of siege declared. His
appeal to the press to cease
maligning the administration and
to exercise greater responsibility
suggests that communications media
might be a principal target of any
government action.
The President ratified the
ban on student demonstrations and
rallies. Costa e Silva and most
of the members of the council re-
portedly believe that there is a
Communist plot to overthrow the
government and that in fact Brazil
is now in the early stages of Com-
munist-directed revolutionary war-
fare. If this indeed is their
view, it reflects an unwilling-
ness to recognize that much of the
problem stems from the govern-
ment's failure to provide firm,
effective leadership and to in-
stitute needed reforms.
The government has reportedly
decided to make some changes in the
educational system--charging tui-
tion and reducing vacations from
three months to one--but these are
hardly what the students have de-
manded. Students have complained
about the lack of funds, space, and
facilities, the poor quality of in-
struction, and the failure to adapt
curricula to current needs. Past
attempts to institute tuition charges
have brought widespread student dis-
satisfaction, and the new ruling
could well serve as the focal point
for further demonstrations when
school begins again next month.
Both military and civilian
"hard liners" have urged strong ac-
tion by the President to halt agi- 25X1
tation, but he has hesitated, fear-
ing that such moves would lead to
more authoritarian goverr~ment.~~
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ECUADOREAN GOVERNMENT FACES WIDESPREAD UNREST
Ecuador's national elections
on 2 June did not alleviate
spreading unrest aver a variety
of deep-seated problems.
Recent weeks have seen an
unbroken series of student dis-
turbances, strikes by government
workers and private employees,
invasions of privately owned land
by peasants and slum-dwellers,
and other outbursts in widely
scattered urban and rural areas.
Last week thousands of peasants
demonstrated in Quito and Guaya-
quil to protest 'lack of govern-
mental support for agrarian re-
form and threatened to call a
nationwide strike.
Leftist and Communist forces
in Ecuador have not been noted
for effectiveness or good organ-
ization in the past, but in re-
cent months they have reportedly
been preparing to take advantage
of urban unrest.
Although military and police
forces appear determined to main-
tain order, they are inadequately
trained and in any case lack the
manpower to handle simultaneous
widespread disorders.
Publicity given the disturb-
ances is increasing tensions and
stimulating further demands on
the interim government of Otto
Arosemena, whose temporizing ac-
tions have neither satisfied the
discontented nor disciplined the
irresponsible. His palliatives
have, however, put a drain on the
government's already serious fi-
nancial situation. He justified
an additional overdraft from the
Central Bank of some $5 million
on 12 July to pay some overdue
salaries as "indispensable" to
prevent internal disorders. Arose-
mena added that, like himself and
his predecessor, incoming presi-
dent Velasco would start his term
on 1 September with an empty
treasury. Finance Minister Correa
said on 10 July that some public
entities had received less than
30 percent of the funds appropri-
ated for them thus far in 1968.
The current problems stem
from Ecuador's failure to develop
either responsible political lead-
ership or a modern institutional
framework for political reform and
economic and social development.
The US Embassy believes that Arose-
mena, backed by the armed forces,
can control the situation until
Velasco takes office. The 75-year-
old former president can probably
ease the situation in the short run.
His strongest support is among the
lower classes, where discontent
is greatest.
In the long run, however, he
will need funds for any develop-
mental programs, particularly the
extensive public works he has
favored in the past. In addition,
his previous record in office
gives no indication that he can
solve the basic wrongs that cause
Ecuador's chronic instability.
Faced by an opposition majority in
Congress and many influential ene-
mies from the past, Velasco faces
a difficult road. His fifth term
could end abruptly in his over-
throw as have three of his four
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