WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006300030002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 23, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
51
23 February 1968
No. 0008/68
State Dept. review completed
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J r,U K t_',1
Now
NNW,
(Information as of noon EST, 21 February 1968)
VIETNAM
The second wave of coordinated attacks against urban
centers lacked the scope and intensity of the earlier
Tet offensive, but indicates that the Communists in-
tend to keep up the military pressure. Saigon's
recovery effort may suffer from Ky's resignation as
chairman of the Joint Task Force.
COMMUNIST THREAT PERSISTS IN SOUTHERN LAOS
The anticipated Communist military offensive in the
Bolovens plateau has not yet developed but the enemy
is maintaining a credible threat in the area and
could strike with little advanced warning.
SERIOUS DISORDERS PERSIST IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Conflicts between armed civilian factions are still
occurring in many provinces and the armed forces ap-
pear to be involved on a larger scale than at any
time since last summer.
PUEBLO IMPASSE UNBROKEN
The North Koreans continue to imply strongly that
their handling of the Pueblo crew will be dependent
in large part on US actions. They clearly intend to
use the crew as hostages to forestall US pressure and
induce concessions.
Europe
Page
1
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MP"
SECRET
USSR PROTESTS WEST GERMAN ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN
Letters sent to the Big Three noted dangerous West
German activities in West Berlin but were devised to
encourage differences among the Allies.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA MOVES TO CUT BACK PARTY POWER
The new party first secretary, Alexander Dubcek, is
relying on "democratization" of the party to secure
his power.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM EVADES SOLUTION
An Arab-Israeli peace settlement seems as far away
as ever, despite UN special envoy Jarring's continu-
ing efforts to work out a peace plan.
SOVIET ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
In recent weeks the USSR has worked to get its eco-
nomic programs in the Middle East moving ahead and
has made specific offers of economic aid to conser-
vative Arab regimes which earlier had spurned general
offers.
SECRET
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vwo~ SECRET
FEDERAL FORCES ARE SLOWLY GAINING IN NIGERIA'S CIVIL WAR
Nigeria's federal army is continuing to work its way
into Biafra's Ibo heartland, but the civil war is
likely to continue for some time.
CYPRUS PREPARES FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
President Makarios is expected to win this month's
election easily, but the candidacy of an avowedly
pro-enosis figure could prove embarrassing.
Western Hemisphere
POLITICAL TURMOIL THREATENS PANAMA'S ELECTIONS
Mounting political tensions caused by a dispute over
control of the electoral machinery could result in
pre-election disorders or postponement of the 12 May
elections.
25X1
FUEL SHORTAGES IN CUBA
The addition of gasoline to the list of rationed
goods is causing hardships but has not seriously af-
fected the economy. Fidel Castro claims that Cuba's
fuel consumption increased by eight percent in 1967.
TEACHERS COMPLICATE SALVADORAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The campaign for local and congressional elections
is being complicated by the teachers union's demand
for the ouster of the minister of education, a stand
supported by sympathetic strikes of other unions,
and by the political opposition.
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W SECRET V
FAR EAST
The coordinated rocket and mortar attacks on
some 40 South Vietnamese cities and military fa-
cilities last weekend underscored the Communists'
intention to maintain pressure on population cen-
ters in an effort to demoralize the Saigon govern-
ment and army, and to tie down allied forces.
Skirmishes on the outskirts of Saigon and
mortar attacks on targets in the center of the city
continued and there are indications of preparations
for another major ground assault against the capi-
tal. North Vietnamese forces also continued spo-
radic shelling of Khe Sanh and other allied bases
in the Demilitarized Zone area but there were no
clear indications of the timing of a major ground
attack on these positions.
The Saigon government's recovery program has
been jeopardized by the resignation of Vice Presi-
dent Ky and General Nguyen Duc Thang from the joint
South Vietnamese - US recovery task force. The
government also risked further political disarray
by arresting three prominent opposition figures.
In Laos, North Vietnamese forces remain poised
to attack Saravane in the southern panhandle but ac-
tion so far has been limited to skirmishing around
outlying posts and to harassing fire on the city's
airstrip. In view of the low morale of government
defense forces, it is doubtful that they could re-
sist a concerted thrust to seize the city. The
capture of Saravane, which has been in government
hands since the 1962 Laos settlement, would raise
the possibility that the Communists intend to up-
set the fragile status quo in the country.
There has been no change in North Korea's ap-
parent intention to exploit the captured Pueblo
crew as hostages to forestall US pressure and to
maneuver for US concessions. Panmunjom has warned
the US to act discreetly and has strongly implied
that treatment of the US crew will be determined
in large art b US actions.
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Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Feb 68
25X1
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SECRET
VIETNAM
The new wave of coordinated
enemy attacks last weekend
against some 40 urban centers
and military facilities was an
apparent effort to keep up the
pressure in the Communist "win-
ger-spring" campaign.
This second round lacked
the scope and intensity of the
earlier Tet offensive. The at-
tacks consisted mainly of rocket
and mortar barrages. These took
place in the southern provinces,
and there was only scattered ac-
tion elsewhere. Fewer than ten
of the targets hit were subjected
to follow-up ground assaults.
The heaviest of the assaults oc-
curred at Vinh Long in tht_ delta
and at Phan Thiet east of Saigon
on the coast. The allies re-
stored firm control in both of
these provincial capitals within
a few days. Tan Son Nhut Air Base
was bombarded with about 100
rounds of 82-mm. mortar and 122-
mm. rocket fire--the first time
rockets of this size were used
in the capital area. Scattered
mortar barrages were also di-
rected against key targets in the
capital itself. Sporadic shell-
ings of the large air base and the
environs of Saigon continued
into the week.
Casualties on both sides
were considerably lighter than
during the opening round of the
Tet offensive three weeks ago.
Reliance on heavy weapons tended
to minimize both Communist losses
and the chances of direct ground
engagements.
The Communists are probably
in the process of evaluating the
first phase of their "general
offensive." According to evi-
dence obtained from enemy prison-
ers and documents, they acknowl-
edge setbacks in the first wave
of attacks. Weak political prep-
aration inside the cities and in-
adequate support and poor timing
in the use of larger military
units from the "outside" are
usually cited as the principal
problems. The second round of
attacks suggests the Communists
are devising more flexible tactics.
Instead of a massive "second
wave," they carefully selected
certain areas for different modes
of attack.
Other developments since the
enemy's Tet offensive indicate that
the Communists will continue to
exert military pressure on the
populated areas throughout South
Vietnam, probably concentrating
heavily on the northern provinces
of Quang Tri and Thua Thien.
New weapons have appeared in
this area, including tanks near
the DMZ.
In addition, the flow of sup-
plies to the DMZ area and down
the Lao corridor continues at a
stepped-up pace. New road
construction improves the enemy's
ability to support military units
in the northern provinces.
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VAW W40
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VIETNAM
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SECRET
SOUTH VIETNAM
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MILES
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SECRET
At least four routes in the
Laos panhandle were extended into
South Vietnam during December and
January.
routes in the northern pan-
an le have been linked with
existing roads in South Vietnam.
Laotian Route 9 is in use between
Ban Dong and Ban Houei Sane for
the first time in about three
years. The road is probably open
all the way into the Khe Sanh
area of Quang Tr:i Province. In
addition, in the A Shau Valley,
the Commu-
nists are nearing completion of a
new road link which will open up
a route to Hue on the coast.
Political Developments
Saigon is still moving slowly
in recovering from the Tet offen-
sive and in taking the political
and psychological initiative from
the Communists. Vice President
Ky, probably hoping to point up
the lackluster performance of
other government leaders, has re-
signed as chairman of the joint
US-Vietnamese task force on na-
tional recovery. His place will
be filled by the ineffective Prime
Minister Loc.
The Saigon government's
ability to cope with recovery
problems will depend to a large
degree on the support and enthu-
siasm of officials in the prov-
inces. Little is known of the
current attitude and position of
many of them but it is apparent
that the Viet Cong offensive has
reduced their effectiveness sub-
stantially in many areas of the
delta and in the far northern
provinces. Should the Viet Cong 25X1
manage to keep up the pressure on25X1
the urban centers in these areas
over an extended period, the gov-
ernment's administrative apparatus
could begin to disintegrate.
Meanwhile, the impact of the
Viet Cong's show of strength has
impelled some of the more polit-
ically aware elements of the popu-
lace to form hasty alliances towa:25X1.
a common anti-Communist front. Iz
remains to be seen whether the di-
verse views and interests repre-
sented in these groups can be
translated into effective support
for the government's recovery ef-
forts.
Hanoi Pushes "Fight-Talk" Strategy
The North Vietnamese have
orchestrated their military offen-
sive with renewed diplomatic ef-
forts to increase pressure on the
US for political concessions. In
an effort to underscore its readi-
ness to talk if the US stops the
bombings, Hanoi within the past
three weeks has been in touch with
the Italians, the Swiss, the
Swedes, the Indians, the French,
and the UN Secretary. Hanoi in-
sisted in these discussions that it
will never consider any reciproc-
ity for the bombing cessation, 25X1
and gave no hint that the Commu-
nists are ready to modify their
long-standing terms for a settle-
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NOW SECRET
COMMUNIST THREAT PERSISTS IN SOUTHERN LAOS
The anticipated Communist mil-
itary offensive in the Bolovens
plateau has not yet developed but
the enemy is maintaining a credible
threat in the area and could strike
with little advanced warning.
As many as four North Vietnam-
ese battalions are deployed in the
vicinity of Saravane and minor
skirmishing north and west of the
town continues to be reported. The
enemy has placed some harassing fire
on aircraft flying into Saravane
but has not hit the airstrip there
or government positions in the im-
mediate vicinity of the town.
There now are more than two
government battalions committed
to Saravane's defense. Their mo-
rale is low, however, and it is un-
likely that they can successfully
resist a concerted thrust. They
are entirely capable of abandoning
the town without a fight. One stra-
tegic position west of Saravane was
temporarily.lost on 14 February,
apparently in this manner.
Since the Laos settlement of
1962 the Communists have refrained
from attacking Saravane despite its
extremely exposed position. Its
capture now would deal a severe and
psychological blow to an already
uneasy leadership in Vientiane and
would raise the possibility that
the Communists intend to upset the
status quo in Laos.
At any rate, the Communists
have already achieved a number of
objectives in the northern Bolovens
area at little cost to themselves.
They have established an effective
presence in the Sedone valley, a
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
rich rice-producing area which
came under full government con-
trol only last year. They thereby
have not only negated two years of
government development work but
have also taken an important step
in securing the western approaches
to the infiltration corridor and
in countering stepped-up govern-
ment interdiction efforts.
In addition, the current dry
season offensive provides a fresh
reminder that the enemy has the
means to create a major military
crisis in Laos with a relatively
modest effort. It is also clear
that although improvements have
been made in the performance of
government troops they are still
no match for the North Vietnamese.
NORTH
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Valley
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SECRET
SERIOUS DISORDERS PERSIST IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Conflicts between armed ci-
vilian factions are still oc-
curring in many provinces of
China, and the armed forces ap-
pear to be involved on a larger
scale than at any time since
last summer.
The major trouble spots are
Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien,
and northern Kiangsu, but most
provinces have also been affected
to some degree.
Fighting has apparently in-
tensified in Kwangsi since early
February.
Almost daily skirmishes
have been reported between armed
Red Guard factions in Canton
and nearby towns recently.
A trend toward anarchy is
reported in Fukien Province,
where several cities have been
occupied by warring Red Guard
factions for months. The guards
are armed with machine guns and
heavy weapons obtained from
local army units, which have
thus far apparently been ordered
not to intervene directly.
Northern Kiangsu appears
to be a particularly tense area.
fighting at
Hsu-chou has disrupted traffic
on the Shanghai-Peking railroad
in recent weeks.
Conscription for the army--
suspended two years ago at the
start of the Cultural Revolu-
tion--has been resumed in many
provinces, probably mainly to
strengthen the army's capability
for civil control work. F
in
January army recruiting teams
went to rural communes and
urban schools throughout the
country, and that at least half
a million men--the number nor-
mally conscripted annually--
will be inducted. If recruits
are drawn mainly from rural
areas, as the evidence thus
far suggests, conscription will
have little effect on Red Guard
organizations, which are com-
posed mostly of urban students.
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Communist China
MONGOLIA
SECRET
( HLILJNGKIANG
i' HOPE/ J
I_IAONIN
-11
MACAO
(Part.)
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SECRET
PUEBLO IMPASSE UNBROKEN
The North Koreans continue
to imply strongly that their
handling of the Pueblo crew will
be dependent in large part on
US actions. They are clearly
intent on using the crew as host-
ages to forestall US pressure
and induce concessions.
General Pak Chung-kuk, the
senior North Korean representa-
tive at Panmunjom, on 19 February
warned that Pyongyang would care-
fully watch every future US move
and cautioned the US to act "dis-
creetly. He pointedly protested
the US build-up since the Pueblo
seizure and US plans to increase
military assistance to South
Korea.
In addition, during the past
week various North Korean spokes-
men have again warned that the
crew may be punished in accordance
with North Korean law.
In South Korea initial
criticism of the Vance mission
has given way to an official ef-
fort to play down differences
with the US. Senior officials
in Seoul now are apparently con-
vinced that they must put the
best possible face on the recent
discussions.
The foreign minister, in
contrast to an earlier lukewarm
endorsement of the joint communi-
que issued at the conclusion of
the mission, stated publicly on
17 February that the communique
signified that there was complete
accord between Seoul and Washing-
ton on what constituted an at-
tack on South Korea. In line
with this more moderate public
posture, the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff has is-
sued instructions to all major
commands to maintain close re-
lations and cooperate with US
forces in Korea. The order
pointedly observed that to do
otherwise would help North Korea
to drive a wedge between the
South Koreans and the Americans.
There have been widespread
press reports in Seoul of an im-
minent cabinet shake-up growing
out of the North Korean attempt
on President Pak's life last
month and Seoul's unhappiness
with US handling of the Pueblo
incident. Those most likely to
be removed by President Pak are
reportedly the minister of de-
fense, the minister of home af-
fairs, and one economic minister.
Any changes at this time, how-
ever, would be largely a face-
saving gesture by Pak and prob-
ably would not foreshadow any
change in South Korean policies.
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`"Pol SECRET Nowe
EUROPE
In the USSR, Brezhnev and Kosygin in speeches
last week displayed concern about intellectual dis-
sidence. Both warned against alleged Western at-
tempts to exploit the differences between the party
and the dissidents. Numerous trials of members of
the literary underground are reportedly under way,
suggesting that the regime has decided to give no
ground in the sharpening conflict.
Economic issues, particularly the touchy agri-
cultural question, are also getting Moscow's atten-
tion. They are being discussed at a series of
provincial party conferences now in progress and
will head the agenda at the central committee
plenum expected to take place next month.
Brezhnev and the party first secretaries of
the other European Communist states (except Yu-
goslavia and Albania) gathered in Prague during the
week to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Com-
munist rule there. They had all the more reason
to go because of curiosity and concern about
Czechoslovakia's new leader and his sweeping
political reforms. The Czechoslovaks will regard
the leaders' presence as implicit endorsement of
the changes of the past six weeks.
In Belgium, the King dissolved parliament
after a week of futile efforts to form a new
coalition. Elections will be held around the end
of March and are expected to strengthen the hand
of those who favor autonomy for the country's
Flemish- and French-speaking communities.
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SECRET ~Iwo
USSR PROTESTS WEST GERMAN ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN
Moscow sent letters to the
Big Three last week clearly de-
signed to encourage differences
among them over West German ac-
tivities in West Berlin.
The letters sent by Soviet
Ambassador Abrasimov in East
Berlin blatantly differentiated
between the French on one side and
the US and the UK on the other.
The French were handed a one-
sentence note which opened with
an amiable reference to Franco-
Soviet interest in European de-
tente and then merely stated that
letters about dangerous West
German activities in Berlin had
been sent to the US and UK.
In contrast, the Soviets
sent Washington and London almost
identical letters, calling on them
to protect West Berlin's special
status from Bonn's "pretensions."
The letters went over much the
same ground covered by Moscow in
an unpublished communication
to West Germany last month, when
it alleged that Bonn was trying
to lay claim to West Berlin.
The Soviets probably are also
trying to foment friction between
Bonn and the Allies, especially
the US. Moscow evidently suspects
that the Big Three may be growing
uneasy about Bonn's plans to begin
another "work week" of parliamentary
committee meetings in Berlin on
4 March. The Soviets may expect
this to lead to Allied pressure on
Bonn to tone down or back away from
such demonstrations of its links
with the city lest they provoke a
stronger reaction from the Commu-
nists.
Moscow may be looking toward
the parliamentary week as a test
of the success of several diplo-
matic approaches it has made in re-
cent weeks seeking to encourage Bonn
to reduce--or at least to make less
conspicuous--its role in Berlin. 25X1
Thus the recent decision by the
Bundestag defense committee, con-
trary to a previous public announce-
ment, to meet in Berlin may bin
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA MOVES TO CUT BACK PARTY POWER
The new party first sec-
retary, Alexander Dubcek, is rely-
ing on "democratization" of the
party to secure his power. For
the first time since the Commu-
nists took over in 1948, party
central committee members and
alternates, together with the
central control and auditing com-
mission, are exercising the po-
litical power which has theo-
retically been theirs all along.
Inspired by their success in dump-
ing Novotny and encouraged by
Dubcek, these 200 people are en-
thusiastically helping to draft
a "party action program" which
will be presented at a central
committee meeting reportedly
scheduled for mid-March.
The program, as outlined in
a communique from the party presi-
dium, will be designed to "ensure"
the central committee's continued
dominance, to reinvigorate the
top levels of the party with fre-
quent infusions of capable men
from the ranks, and to provide
for "evaluation" of the perform-
ance of party functionaries. The
program will provide for a new
system of party appointments,
thus breaking up the monopoly of
Novotny's former henchmen. In-
dividuals with posts in the party
and government will have to choose
one post or the other. A po-
litical atmosphere in which "free-
dom for criticism, and diversity
of views" could flourish in the
central committee would be guaran-
teed. Parliament would be given
complete leadership of the gov-
ernment; electoral procedures
would be changed to guarantee this.
Dubcek has begun making
changes in the central party bu-
reaucracy which up to now has
dominated both the central commit-
tee and the government. He has
replaced the chiefs of departments
responsible for military and se-
curity affairs, as well as for
ideology, with people he trusts.
These developments are re-
ceiving unprecedented publicity
and agitation for change is grow-
ing within the party. Local party
units from nearly every important
area of the country are demand-
ing liberalization and a voice
in the "democratization" process.
Many old-time Communists, shunted
aside after they carried off the
bloodless coup in 1948, are add-
ing respected voices to demands
for a cut back in the party's
power.
The same spirit animates those
politically active among the gen-
eral populace. Students want their
own organization, separate from the
officially supported mass youth or-
ganization. The mass youth organiza-
tion in turn has been demanding that
it cease being a mere arm of the
party. Slovaks have demonstrated
for fulfillment of economic promises.
The Writers' Union has demanded re-
instatement in the party of some of
its members who were banned by No-
votny for outspoken criticism. Econ-
omists are pressing for reform.
Journalists are calling for an end
to censorship.
Dubcek will begin to put his
stamp on the government at a meeting
of parliament scheduled to begin on
26 February. Conservative opposition
to Dubcek's ideas is still strong,
however, and the process of change
may take longer than hp has fnrPaPPn
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%SOF %W
SECRET
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Fresh turmoil over old problems has afflicted
the South Asian subcontinent this week, while ten-
sions in the mideast remained high and the Nigerian
civil war dragged on.
New Delhi was finally forced to dismiss the
legislature of chaotic West Bengal State after
months of bitter political infighting. The cen-
tral government imposed direct rule on the state,
which is bound to spur vitriolic debate when the
issue comes up for Parliament's approval. The
government of Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous
state, is on the brink of collapse.
Indian nationalists in Parliament reacted
angrily to an international tribunal's award of
ten percent of the desolate Rann of Kutch to Paki-
stan. Although both the Indian and Pakistani gov-
ernments are committed to accepting the decision,
Prime Minister Gandhi will have to fend off bitter
opposition attacks. Any foot-dragging by India
will not sit well with Pakistan and may add new
strains to relations between the two countries.
Continuing Arab terrorist raids on Israel,
and Israel's persistence in hitting back, have
kept the mideast pot boiling. The Jarring mission
has thus far been unproductive, and Jordan is
again threatening to call for further UN deliber-
ations.
The Nigerian federal offensive in Biafra con-
tinues to make slow progress, but a military con-
clusion is still a long way off. Meanwhile, Com-
monwealth Secretariat efforts to mediate have only
served to antagonize the federal leaders, who
are more inclined than ever to treat the war as
a strictly internal matter.
SECRET
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SECRET
ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM EVADES SOLUTION
An Arab-Israeli peace set-
tlement seems as far away as
ever, despite UN special envoy
Jarring's continuing efforts to
work out a peace plan in the con-
text of the November Security
Council resolution.
Jarring has been circuiting
Arab capitals and Tel Aviv since
December. Neither side, however,
appears to have made any sub-
stantial move toward an agree-
ment. The Jordanians are again
threatening to call for another
Security Council meeting to dis-
cuss the specifics of the Jeru-
salem question. The Jordanian
prime minister said earlier this
week that he can hold off for
"only a few days" before domestic
pressures force him to take such
a step.
Israeli retaliation against
Jordan. These terrorists are
trained and sponsored by Syria,
but the Israelis have persisted
in hitting back at the Jordanians
rather than striking Syrian posi-
tions along the Syrian-Israeli
cease-fire line. The flare-up
last week along the Jordan River
valley, one of the most serious
since the June war, has appar-
ently frightened the Jordanians,
and they now are trying harder
to deter terrorists from trans-
iting Jordan on raiding missions.
Husayn's bitterness toward
the Syrians and their comparative
immunity from retaliation has
lately begun to show through.
Jordan's interior minister has
publicly stressed that Jordan
will not allow other nations to
provide Israel with further ex-
cuses to attack the Jordanians.
The Jordanians have been
further frustrated by their fail-
ure to curb terrorist raids from
Jordanian territory which invite
SECRET
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'~."'r SECRET N
SOVIET ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
In recent weeks the USSR
has worked to get its economic
programs in the Middle East mov-
ing ahead and has made specific
offers of economic aid to con-
servative Arab regimes which
earlier had spurned general
offers.
In a review last December
of their economic aid programs
in Egypt, Iraq,and Syria, the
Soviets stressed the need to
get projects completed as well
as to get more production from
existing plants. The Soviets
are probably concentrating on
achieving these goals. The
Soviet-Iraqi communique, for
example, emphasized work pro-
grams designed to accelerate
completion of Soviet aid proj-
ects, many of them under con-
struction since 1959.
The USSR, nevertheless, is
willing to exploit new oppor-
tunities. In December it
offered to help Iraq in develop-
ing its petroleum industry.
Baghdad solicited the offer,
probably to goad Western oil
companies to be more cooperative
in negotiations with the Iraqi
National Oil Company (INOC).
The scale and terms of Soviet
assistance were left for later
negotiations. The president of
the INOC board of directors
recently announced that he will
go to Moscow soon to sign an
agreement on oil cooperation,
possibly another pressure tac-
tic. The Soviet offer included
assistance in oil exploration
in southern Iraq, transport, and
marketing. There is no evidence
yet, however, that Moscow intends
to depart from its current prac-
tice of funneling aid in this
field into prospecting and tech-
nical assistance.
The major Soviet effort in
Egypt is likely to begin shift-
ing from the Aswan Dam, which is
nearly complete, to the Helwan
iron and steel project. Work on
this has been held in abeyance,
although the Soviets a year ago
committed about $160 million in
credits for it.
A Soviet economic delegation
recently spent a month in Jordan
examining potential aid projects.
It showed particular interest in
projects designed to develop nat-
ural resources (including petro-
leum), and to improve transporta-
tion, public and municipal serv-
ices, and telecommunications.
Despite the careful preparations
which Moscow apparently made for
the visit, no agreement was con-
cluded.
In the field of military
aid, the Sudan has been added to
the list of Soviet arms clients
and the Sudanese defense minister
has stated Khartoum's armed
forces will convert entirely to
Communist equipment. Moscow ear-
lier this month was host to the
defense minister of the newly
independent Republic of Southern
Yemen and it has told Jordan that
a high-level military mission was
prepared to go there whenever it
was invited
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Page 17 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA
kot Okporo
Federal force
28 50 75
'8bnny
SECRET
CAMEROON
Santa Isabel,
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
FERNANDO PO )
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`"w'' SECRET W
FEDERAL FORCES ARE SLOWLY GAINING IN NIGERIA'S CIVIL WAR
Nigeria's federal army is
continuing to penetrate Biafra's
Ibo tribal heartland, and the Bi-
afrans appear to be unable to stop
the oncoming forces. The civil
war, nonetheless, will probably
go on for some time.
On the northern front, major
federal military forces now are
well south of Enugu. The lst
Division has moved south of Udi
and may be threatening Biafran
army headquarters at Awgu. The
2nd Division has captured the
town of Awka, where the Biafrans
had been assembling crude armored
vehicles. The 2nd Division's next
objective reportedly is Nnewi,
home of Biafra's leader, Lt. Col.
Ojukwu.
During the past two weeks,
Biafran patrols raided federal
supply lines in the Nsukka and
Eha Amufu areas. These patrols
appear to have been handled fairly
easily by federal battalions
guarding these areas, but one of
their objectives--disrupting the
growing sense of security among
the local populace--seems to have
been achieved. Many Biafran
soldiers also have put on civilian
clothes and probably will continue
to harass federal rear areas.
In the southeastern sector,
the federal 3rd Marine Commando
Division has thrust north of Ikot
Okporo in an apparent effort to
gain control of the entire area
within the great bend of the Cross
River. Federal troops are near
Ugep, but have run into surpris-
ingly effective Biafran counter-
thrusts all along the river. The
3rd Division is handicapped by
the longest supply lines in the
campaign, and it may take some
time before this area comes firmly
under federal control.
Federal leaders have lost
interest in negotiating a cease-
fire. Not only is the war going
their way but they have not taken
well to some features of the peace
package recently presented in
Lagos by Arnold Smith, head of
the Commonwealth Secretariat.
Subsequent publicity on a possi-
ble Commonwealth peacekeeping
force has served only to harden 25X1
Lagos' view that the civil war
is strictly an internal problem
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SECRET
CYPRUS PREPARES FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Pro-enosis (union with Greece)
elements have put up a candidate
against President Makarios and
balloting for the presidency will
take place on 25 February. Ma-
karios had expected his election
to be uncontested. The election
of a vice president to represent
the Turkish Cypriot community
was also originally scheduled for
the 25th but was canceled be-
cause no opposition candidates
were nominated to run against
the incumbent Vice President
Fazil Kucuk. He was declared
the winner on 15 February, the
final date for nominations.
President Makarios' appar-
ent abandonment, at least for
the moment, of enosis as a prac-
tical objective has opened some
fissures in the Greek Cypriot
community. Because of Makarios'
stand the pro-enosis element
nominated Takis Evdokas, a prom-
inent Nicosia psychiatrist, to
oppose him.
Makarios probably will walk
over the opposition, but the
pro-and anti-enosis agitation
within the community could create
some unpleasantness. Likewise,
a sizable vote for Evdokas will
be embarrassing to Makarios, who
is sensitive to criticism of his
leadership.
Makarios may also be embar-
rassed by the disclosure that
Greek Cypriot Communists have
been training Rhodesian national-
ists in guerrilla activities.
Makarios' personal physician,
Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, long
known for his leftist ties, has
been implicated in the affair.
Makarios has so far rebuffed
those of his advisers who
advocate an open break with
Lyssarides in order to head
off right-wing criticism. Ma-
karios undoubtedly aims to let
the issue lie--to avoid jeopardiz-
ing his position with the
large Communist element among
the electorate who have sup-
ported his re-election.
Makarios apparently is
confident the voters favor him
and consequently is waging an
essentially low-key campaign.
Only a few of his ministers
are actively participating, and
he reportedly has insisted that
no government funds be used to
finance his re-election. He
does show some concern, however,
over possible apathy among the
progovernment voters and has
instructed his political aides
to see to it that his supporters
are transported to and from
polling laces.
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SECRET sw~
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Most Latin American governments continued
their preoccupation with domestic problems this
week.
In Argentina, the army commander in chief,
General Alsogaray, angered President Ongania by
strongly criticizing the government's policies.
As a result, Ongania may have to replace him.
Brazilian President Costa e Silva is also being
subjected to criticism from the military, but may
find it more difficult than Ongania to resist
military pressures.
Although the recent campaign and elections in
Paraguay demonstrated that "political coexistence"
between the government and the opposition is more
than a slogan, it remains to be seen how much more
political liberalization President Stroessner will
be willing to permit.
Construction by France of the space center at
Kourou in French Guiana is on schedule, and the
center should be operative in April 1968. Several
countries are interested in arranging for use of
the facilities.
In the Bahamas, general elections seem'likely
following the death of a government member of the
House of Assembly. Premier Pindling's demand for
increased autonomy from Great Britain will be an
important election issue.
In the Dominican Republic, an agreement be-
tween the Balaguer government and university of-
ficials ended a confrontation between rebellious
students and security forces--without serious
violence. The praise accorded President Balaguer
for his deft handling of a potentially explosive
situation may evaporate, however, if military
units fail to relinquish "temporary possession"
of the university as promised.
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Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Feb 68
25X1
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SECRET
POLITICAL TURMOIL THREATENS PANAMA'S ELECTIONS
A growing struggle for control
of the electoral machinery and
thereby the means to manipulate
election results could provoke a
violent confrontation between parti-
sans of the government's presiden-
tial candidate, David Samudio, and
popular opposition candidate Arnulfo
Arias. President Robles stated in
a private conversation last week
that the political turmoil might
cause him to postpone the 12 May
elections and request selection of
new presidential candidates.
An open split over lines of
authority has pitted the progovern-
ment president of the three-member
electoral tribunal against two
judges supporting Arias. Samudio
is seeking a supreme court ruling
to remove the Arias supporters for
malfeasance and partisan conduct.
Robles has reportedly persuaded the
court to suspend the two judges so
pro-Samudio alternates can take over.
Arias has carefully avoided
any precipitate action against the
government's decision to instruct
the national guard to accept orders
from the minority tribunal presi-
dent. He is still trying to con-
vince guard Commandant Vallarino
that the integrity of the guard
would be respected if he were
elected.
Arias, however, has issued a
strongly worded warning that the
government's attempts to rig the
election would signal him to "sum-
mon the Panamanian people at any
moment to organize a march on Panama
City and impose justice." Large
demonstrations could result in a
breakdown of public order and in-
crease the likelihood of anti-US
incidents along the Canal Zone
border.
In addition, there are indi-
cations that the Arias majority in
the National Assembly is prepared
to convoke a special sassion to
impeach Robles and possibly the
supreme court justices if the
court decides to oust the pro-Arias
tribunal judges. Unless the na-
tional guard prevented such a ses-
sion the first vice president--an
Arias supporter--would legally as-
sume the presidency.
For its part, the government
is beefing up strong-arm squads
to oppose Arias in the event of
a clash, and Robles is planning
to place more government assets
at Samudio's disposal for the
elections, if they are held as
February
Vallarino
told a US Embassy
official
that he was "in the middle"
of pressures from both political
camps but was following orders from
Robles' minister of government.
During the conversation there were
indications that Vallarino favors
Samudio's position in the dispute.
The
guard was brought to
full
alert on
20
February and will
prob-
ably try
to
maintain order.
Should
serious
viol
ence break out, however,
Vallarino might intervene and take
over the government himself.
SEC RET
Page 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Arnulfo Arias
National Union
Presidential Candidate
Gen. Bolivar Vallarino
National Guard Commandant
David Samudio
Government Presidential Candidate
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NWPOI SECRET
FUEL SHORTAGES IN CUBA
The addition of gasoline to
Cuba's long list of rationed
goods is causing disruptions and
hardships. The real reasons for
the fuel shortages are still not
clear. In announcing the ra-
tioning on 2 January, Fidel Cas-
tro said that consumption rose
by eight percent in 1967, mainly
because of increasing industriali-
zation and mechanization of agri-
culture.
Other factors are probably
involved, since actual consump-
tion is believed to have increased
by only about two percent during
the past few years. Military re-
serves, which Castro said were
seriously reduced last year,
are probably being replenished
and it is possible that there is
some attempt at stockpiling.
Miscalculation of POL needs,
the declining efficiency of
Cuba's aging refineries, and in-
creased refining of industrial
and aircraft fuels instead of
automotive fuels may also have
played a part.
Some of the increase in con-
sumption can be attributed to
SECRET
Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY
industrial expansion and agri-
cultural mechanization, espe-
cially during the current sugar
harvest. In 1967, 65 elaborate
cane collection centers were set
up and 4,500 cane cutting ma-
chines were in use. More equip-
ment will be needed if Castro is
going to come close to his sugar
production goal of ten million
tons a year by 1970.
The rationing has prin-
cipally affected private con-
sumers and public transportation
systems. Castro has c-at an
example of personal sacrifice
by trading his three limousines
for army jeeps. His regime is
dealing harshly with profiteers
and other violators of the ra-
tioning decree, and wide public-
ity has been given to the im-
prisonment of 25 persons for
gasoline theft.
Although the USSR is ap-
parently unwilling at present to
add further to its POL commit-
ments to Havana, the fuel situa-
tion is undoubtedly a major topic
during the current negotiation
of the 1968 trade areement.
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SECRET
TEACHERS COMPLICATE SALVADORAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The campaign leading up to
local and congressional elections
in El Salvador next month is
being complicated by labor dif-
ficulties and recurring coup
rumors.
Both the Christian Demo-
crats, the major opposition party,
and leftist elements, including
the Communist labor center, are
supporting the teachers' union
(ANDES) demand for the removal
of the minister of education.
At least seven Communist affili-
ated unions, including the garbage
men's union, staged sympathy
strikes this. week and some bus
lines have scheduled sporadic.
walkouts.
Security forces in the
capital were strengthened on 16
February in response to the
teachers demonstration that began
on the 15th. The demonstration
attracted at least 7,000 partic-
ipants and continued into this
week. There was little violence,
but the crowds blocked traffic
and prevented education officials
from entering the ministry.
Talks between the government
and teachers began on 17 February.
President Sanchez has refused to
remove the minister of education
and three successive meetings
have foundered on this ANDES
demand.
Students, not yet unified
behind the ANDES stand, could
SECRET
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY
be caught up in the movement. A
university torchlight procession,
supporting the teachers, is under
preparation. If additional uni-
versity and labor support is
forthcoming, the government will
probably be forced to use repres-
sive tactics.. Severe measures
could spark a counterreaction
that could develop into a real
threat to the government.
Military elements probably
prefer to resort to strong meas-
ures. The President is aware,
however, that the government's
legislative majority will be
weakened in the 10 March elec-
tions if repression is applied
and apparently still hopes for
a compromise solution
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Secret """' %0
Secret
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