WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006200030002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 29, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
NAVY review
completed.
Secret
49
29 December 1967
No. 0322/67
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 28 December 1967)
VIETNAM
The 24-hour Christmas truce in South Vietnam was
marked by 118 Communist-initiated incidents, and
the enemy again attempted to use the respite to
mount an extensive resupply effort. The Thieu
government's lack of political dynamism is gen-
erating dissatisfaction in Saigon. Meanwhile,
the Liberation Front continues efforts to enhance
its international position.
VIOLENCE SPREADING AGAIN IN COMMUNIST CHINA
During the past month, violent disturbances have
occurred in nearly every province of China, often
disrupting transportation.
CHINESE FOREIGN TRADE FALLING OFF
Communist China's failure to announce any major
trade deals at the conclusion of the Canton Trade
Fair on 15 December reflects the general decline
in China's foreign trade.
COMMUNISTS STEP UP FIGHTING IN LAOS
Communist forces are continuing their pressure
against government positions in widespread areas
of Laos.
Page
1
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 9
USSR PUSHES FOR MIDEAST CONSENSUS AT WARSAW MEETING
Last week's meeting of Soviet and Eastern European
foreign ministers was called on short notice and
at the behest of the Soviets, for whom these dis-
plays of superficial unity are useful for public
relations.
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CZECH PARTY WILL MEET AGAIN TO DISCUSS INTERNAL CRISIS 11
The crisis within the Czechoslovak leadership will
be considered again by the party central committee
when it reconvenes in a plenary session on 33 January.
SIZABLE SOVIET FLEET REMAINS IN MEDITERRANEAN 1:2
The Soviets are keeping a naval force of about 20
warships in the Mediterranean this winter, only
about half the all-time high reached last summer
but still considerably greater than the number de-
ployed in the past.
SOVIET UNION EXPANDING MERCHANT AND FISHING FLEETS 13
The USSR's rapid expansion of its merchant fleet
will still afford only limited competition to Free:
World shippers through 197C, but the growth of the
Soviet fishing fleet will probably lead to further
inroads in traditional Western fishing areas.
SOVIET-US COLLABORATION BRINGS NEW SPACE ACCORD 15
Behind-the-scenes cooperation between Moscow and
Washington was instrumental. in bringing about UN
approval last week of the agreement on rescue and
return of astronauts and space objects.
UROPEAN COMMUNITIES ASSESS FRENCH VETO
in the aftermath of Paris' obstruction of negotia-
tions, London and the Five are contemplating early
bilateral and possibly col:_ective contacts. Pre-
sumably, such talks will cover the possibilities
of various forms of cooperation, especially in
technology.
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 19
MILITANT POLICIES CAUSING TROUBLE FOR SYRIAN REGIME
The militant Baathist regime in Damascus is becoming
isolated from the rest of the Arab world and its
power base at home is narrowing, leading to the
possibility of a coup attempt.
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SUDANESE GOVERNMENT CONFRONTS OPPOSITION
Recent controversy over the granting of extraterri-
torial facilities to Egypt may bring a showdown in
Khartoum between the Mahjoub government and opposi-
tion leader Sadiq al-Mahdi.
POLITICAL TENSIONS HIGH IN MALI
Political conditions have become harsh and convulsive
since a shake-up within Mali's single political party
last August. Leftist militants who strengthened
their position threaten President Keita's authority
and freedom of action.
Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE-CHILEAN RELATIONS STRAINED BY CHANNEL DISPUTE 24
A long-standing dispute over navigation rights in
the Beagle Channel south of Tierra del Fuego has'
flared up again, and Argentina has rejected a Chi-
lean attempt to arrange for British arbitration.
CHILEAN LEFTIST APPARENTLY WINS SENATORIAL BY-ELECTION 24
The strong showing by Alberto Baltra, head of the
Soviet-Chilean Cultural Institute, enhances the
possibility that he could gain the support of most
leftist parties for the 1970 presidential nomina-
tion.
CUBA TO HOLD "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" CONFERENCE
An International Cultural Congress scheduled to be
held in Havana from 4 to 11 January will provide
Castro with an opportunity to extend Cuban influence
in world-wide "anti-imperialist" circles.
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FAR EAST
The 24-hour Christmas truce declared by the
allies in Vietnam was marked by some 118 Communist
violations, most of which were small-scale guer-
rilla attacks or reactions to allied patrol ac-
tivity.
On the political front, Hanoi and the National
Liberation Front have refrained so far from com-
menting on President Johnson's remarks concerning
informal South Vietnamese contacts with Front rep-
resentatives. This silence suggests Hanoi hopes
US encouragement of such contacts will strengthen
the Front's claim to a major role in any future ne-
gotiations and also cause frictions in US - South
Vietnamese relations. Some Saigon newspapers have
criticized what they interpret as a dangerous shift
in US policy toward the Front.
In South Vietnamese politics, President Thieu's
failure to provide strong leadership is drawing
growing criticism from influential circles. Vice
President Ky's withdrawal from active participation
in the government has prompted speculation that he
is biding his time until an opportunity appears to
assert a more prominent role.
Tensions between South Vietnam and Cambodia
have been aggravated by Saigon's statements re-
serving the right of "hot pursuit" of Communist
forces into Cambodian territory. Sihanouk's de-
fiant rejection of the US note of 4 December made
clear his unwillingness to cooperate in dealing with
this "sanctuary" problem. He again denied that
Vietnamese Communists are using Cambodian territory
and threatened to call for foreign Communist "vol-
unteers" if allied forces cross his frontier.
Violence in China has spread to almost every
province. The army's failure to take firm repres-
sive action suggests it is under instruction to
avoid taking sides. There was further evidence
that Mao himself as well as his militant colleagues
are behind this policy of restraining the army and
encouraging unruly "revolutionaries."
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VIETNAM
The allied 24-hour Christ-
mas truce period in South Vietnam
was marred by a greater number of
incidents than the number aver-
aged during the 48-hour Christmas
and New Year standdowns last year.
In addition, the Communists again
attempted to use the respite to
mount extensive resupply efforts
in both South Vietnam and south-
ern North Vietnam..
The Communists initiated 118
incidents during the one-day
pause, with the majority occur-
ring in South Vietnam's I and III
corps. Most of the violations
consisted of harassing fire
against allied field positions,
outposts, and base camps, or.of
enemy reactions to the intensi-
fied allied ground. and air recon-
naissance patrols. No large-
scale enemy attacks occurred, how-
ever, suggesting that Communist
main force units were generally
content to abide by the cease-
fire while repositioning, rein-
forcing, or resupplying major com-
bat elements, particularly in
northern South Vietnam.
As in previous truce periods,
the Communists went to great
lengths to move both men and ma-
terial. Pilot reports and photog-
raphy revealed large southbound
enemy convoys moving throughout
the southern half of North Viet-
nam on 25-26 December.
Truck traffic on the infil-
tration corridors of the Laotian
panhandle from 23 to 25 December
continued at a level consistent
with past dry seasons. No sig-
nificant sea infiltration was
noted this year, possibly because
of the shortened time frame of
the truce period.
Allied forces will observe
another 24-hour cease-fire on New
Year's Day, as well. as a 48-hour
respite in late January for Tet,
the Vietnamese Lunar New Year.
Similar enemy efforts are ex-
pected on these holidays...
Political Developments
In South Vietnam
The Thieu government's lack
of political dynamism is continu-
ing to generate dissatisfaction
among influential circles in Sai-
gon. A growing portion of this
criticism has centered on Presi-
dent Thieu's failure to provide
leadership and direction to the
new government, with some critics
speculating that the void created
by Thieu's inactivity will even-
tually be filled by Vice Presi-
dent Ky.
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Prime Minister Nguyen Van
Loc has also come under increas-
ing criticism. His critics claim
that. he lacks the initiative and
political instincts required for
the post, and that his cabinet
is generally devoid of persons
of experience who possess the
necessary vision to deal with
national problems.
In the National Assembly,
the Upper House this week elected
Nguyen Van Huyen, head of a pre-
dominately Catholic slate, as
its chairman. Huyen, once men-
tioned by Thieu as his choice
for the post, defeated an early
favorite, Tran Van Don. Huyen
will be assisted by two elected
vice chairmen, one of whom also
heads a Catholic slate.
Having completed the elec-
tion of its officers, the Upper
House can now be expected to
turn to legislative matters. The
first areas of legislative inter-
est will probably deal with the
drafting of laws governing po-
litical parties and the press.
Senator Nguyen Van Ngai report-
edly has already prepared a
draft of a political parties law
designed to facilitate the de-
velopment of a viable two-party
system.
The trial of the 26 people
involved in the Buddhist "strug-
gle" movement of 1965 has ended
with only four convictions, and
the military court handed down
remarkably lenient sentences.
Doctor Nguyen Van Matz, former
mayor of Da Nang, and three mil-
itary officers each received
prison terms of ten years after
being found guilty cf rebellion.
The light sentences imposed on
the principal defendants should
tend to defuse the antitrial
sentiment that had been generated
in the National Assembly and in
the press as well as among the
militant Buddhists.
:Liberation Front Position Enhanced
The Liberation Front's per-
manent delegations in Communist
China and East Germany have re-
cently been upgraded to the
status of diplomatic missions
in what appears to be a further
effort to improve the interna-
tional standing of the Front.
Cuba, Cambodia, and North Korea
have granted this status to
Front delegations for some time.
The important Front posts in
Prague and Moscow, although
granted certain diplomatic priv-
ileges, continue to be accredited
to unofficial national front or-
ganizations rather than to the
governments.
This improvement in diplo-
matic status ties in with other
recent efforts by the Front to
enchance its international posi-
tion without actually declaring
itself a government. These ef-
:orts abroad include the publicity
given the Fror.Lt's new political.
program and the attempt to get
maximum exposure for that docu-
ment by having it circulated to
United Nations members. There
is no evidence, however, that
the Front intends to proclaim it-
self a formal government in the
near future.
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VIOLENCE SPREADING AGAIN IN COMMUNIST CHINA
During the past month, vio-
lent disturbances have occurred
in nearly every province of
China, often disrupting trans-
portation. In some areas the
fighting appears to be as savage
as last summer, although the
scale of violence is still gen-
erally smaller.
As in previous disorderly
periods, the army has failed to
take firm action anywhere. it
appears to be under instructions
not to take sides or to intervene
unless localized violence threat-
ens to spread. Many units are on
alert, however. In Canton, the
army is building pillboxes at im-
portant road junctions.
Mac) Tse-tung himself appears
to support the policy of restrain-
ing the army. Statements at-
tributed to Mao indicate he re-
mains more deeply committed than
ever to the Cultural Revolution,
and takes a more tolerant view
of disorders than some other lead-
ers. Red Guard newspapers cir-
culated in mid-November quote Mao
as saying that disorder can be
a "good thing" if it exposes his
enemies.
A speech by Mao's wife,
widely circulated in Red Guard
media during November, was even 25X1
more inflammatory. She warned
that some places were like a
"pool of stagnant water" that
needed to be stirred up. She said
that "crafty" and deceitful
"enemies" have concealed them-
selves in many organizations,
and exhorted her Red Guard
audience to "be disorderly" in
such groups in order to "disturb
the enemy."
Such warnings and exhorta-
tions have greatly hampered re-
cent attempts to set up new local
governments inasmuch as they tend
to encourage already hostile
factions to engage in disputes
over who should exercise author-
ity.
Red Guard groups have also
resumed attacks on officials who
have held positions of authority
throughout the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Recent poster reports
and newspapers put out by militant
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Red Guard groups contain denuncia-
tions of the two leaders of the
Heilungkiang Revolutionary Com-
mittee, the commanders of the
Foochow and Singkiang military
regions, and the ranking officer
in Tibet. All came in for
harsh criticism last summer,
but the campaign against them
abated in September and People's
Daily in October found occasions
to indicate that they were still
in good standing.
This list of officials openly
opposed by Red Guards is pre-
sumably far from complete. As
a result of tightened regime re--
stric:tions, Red Guard materials,
particularly those reflecting a
militant point of view, are cur?-
rently available for only a few
localities, and then only infre-
quently.
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CHINESE FOREIGN TRADE FALLING OFF
Communist China's failure to
announce any major trade deals at
the conclusion of the Canton
Trade Fair on 15 December reflects
the general decline in China's
foreign trade.
Although large numbers of
Japanese and Western traders at-
tended the fair, they apparently
were able to arrange only routine
sales. China's total foreign
trade, especially exports, will
show some decline during the last
half of this year, and trade for
the entire year may be as much
as ten percent below the 1966
level.
Primarily because of Cul-
tural Revolution disorders, China
has been unable to maintain suf-
ficient deliveries to its major
Western trading partners to off-
set mounting imports of machinery
and equipment covered by earlier
contracts. Peking apparently has
had to dig into its relatively
scarce foreign exchange reserves
to finance trade this year, and
imports from China's major trad-
ing partners probably will be cut
will decline further this year as
reflected in the late signing of
the annual trade agreement in
July.
China's need for Western
grain, however, apparently re-
mains substantial. Peking con-
cluded a contract with Canada
this month for two million tons
of wheat for delivery next year.
In addition to this contract,
negotiations for 1968 are also
under way with France, and prob-
ably will soon begin with Aus-
tralia. Although China's wheat
imports have averaged over five
million tons annually since 1961,
Peking bought only 4.5 million
tons during 1967.
COMMUNISTS STEP UP FIGHTING IN LAOS
Communist forces are contin-
uing their pressure against gov-
ernment positions in widespread
areas of Laos.
An enemy unit, estimated at
battalion strength, raided the
government base and airstrip at
Muong Phalane on 25 December,
destroying most of the camp's
facilities including the USAID
and Air America buildings. Pre-
liminary reports indicate that
government forces have reoccupied
the area.
The destruction of the US
facilities suggests that the at-
tack was specifically aimed
against the US presence at Muong
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The attack on Muong Phalane
is the first significant enemy
action in this part of the pan-
handle in over a year. It may
be related to recent attacks
farther south in the Bolovens
Plateau area, where heavy fight-
CAMBODIA }
69056 12- C Statue Miles
ing is continuing. These opera-
tions appear to be part of a new
Communist campaign to forestall
stepped-up allied efforts to
interdict the infiltration cor-
ridor.
In northern Laos, the Commu-
nists have resumed their harass-
ment of the government position
in the Nam Bac area. The air-
strip there has been closed since
24 December, when it came under
mortar fire. Continuing reports
of a Communist: build-up in the
vicinity suggest that more ground
assaults against Nam Bac's out-
=Lying defenses may be in the
offing. Government units are
being repositioned to reduce
their vulnerability and to cut
the enemy's supply lines into
the area.
Although the Communists ap-
pear to be putting a little more
bite into their dry season of-
fensive this year, there is no
evidence that they intend to
mount a concerted drive into gov-
ernment-held territory. The Com-
munist effort against Nam Bac in
the north and the Bolovens posi-
tions in the south appear designed
to restore the status quo. Until
last year, both areas had long
been under Pathet Lao control.
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EUROPE
Last week's meeting of Communist foreign minis-
ters in Warsaw ended with a statement of support for
the Arabs, but, in order to achieve the desired con-
sensus, it recognized Israel's right to exist as a
state, avoided labeling Israel as the aggressor and
contained no new promises of aid to the Arabs. The
Soviets probably hope the communique' will discourage
Arab extremists and will add weight to the advice for
moderation that Brezhnev is expected to convey to
Cairo during his visit scheduled early next month.
The poor showing of Soviet-backed republican
forces against the royalists in Yemen apparently has
led Moscow to press the republicans to seek a nego-
tiated settlement under the auspices of the commis-
sion set up at the Arab Summit Conference last August.
There are signs that Rumania's economic diffi-
culties with its Communist allies may be getting
fairly serious. Moscow apparently has broken a
contract to buy oil-drilling equipment, and the
Czechs recently canceled a large order for railroad
cars to be delivered by Rumania. Bucharest's dis-
agreement with Moscow on various important inter-
national issues probably lies behind these actions.
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USSR PUSHES FOR MIDEAST CONSENSUS AT WARSAW MEETING
Last week's meeting of Soviet
and Eastern European foreign min-
isters in Warsaw was the fourth
Communist assembly focusing on
the Middle East since the June
war. The meeting was called on
short notice and at the behest
of the Soviets, for whom these
displays of superficial unity
are useful. As with the earlier
meetings, the Soviets were
seeking to obtain a consensus
on Middle East policy which
could be used to influence
forthcoming inter-Arab consul-
tations.
Previous meetings coin-
cided with Arab conferences in
July and September. The meeting
last, week precedes the Arab
summit at Rabat by three weeks.
The first Communist meeting was
in Moscow in June, and Soviet
bloc statements on the Middle
East. since then have been re-
shaped and diluted for the sake
of unanimity. At that time,
the European Communists--with
the exception of Rumania--warned
that. if Israel did not withdraw,
the signatories would do "every-
thirng necessary to help the
Arabs rebuff the aggressor."
The Budapest meeting in
July watered down that threat,
and the one in Belgrade concerned
itself only with economic
assistance, the communique
merely indicating the repre-
sentatives "exchanged opinions"
regarding stepped-up aid meas-
ure;. The latest meeting, how-
ever, made no mention of economic
aid discussed earlier suggesting
the failure of Soviet efforts -to
establish a program of joint
assistance.
Poland reportedly agreed
to hold the conference at the
request of the USSR and, ac-
cording to several Polish
journalists, the final decision
was not made until Rumanian
party chief Ceausescu agreed
to send a representative.
Rumania is the only European
Communist country that retained
diplomatic relations with Israel
after the June war. On the
day of the start of the Warsaw
meeting, Rumania signed a trade
protocol with Tel Aviv calling
for the establishment of joint
industrial projects. Previously,
Rumania had dissociated itself
from the Moscow conference's
communique and had failed to
attend the meeting in Budapest.
The Warsaw communique's omis-
sion of any reference to Israel
as the "aggressor" may have been
a Soviet concession to gain
Bucharest's support.
All of the Warsaw confer-
ees appear concerned that re-
newed Syrian and Algerian in-
temperance could undercut Nasir's
attempts to obtain a unified
Arab position. Thus, the
communique made special men-
tion of Egypt's constructive
approach, and also referred
to Israel's "right to exist."
The communique's endorsement
of a political solution with-
in the framework of the UK
resolution should he particu-
larly useful to party chief
Brezhnev during his trip to
Cairo in early January.
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CZECH PARTY WILL MEET AGAIN TO DISCUSS INTERNAL CRISIS
The crisis within the Czecho-
slovak leadership will be con-
sidered again by the party cen-
tral committee when it reconvenes
in a plenary session on 3 January.
The party began a critical
review of its problems at a cen-
tral committee meeting held from
19 to 21 December. That session
passed two resolutions--one ap-
proving an international Commu-
nist consultative conference, the
other relating to the economy.
It did not, however, announce
changes that might resolve the
confusion and lack of cohesion
at top party levels.
The economic resolution re-
veals no new policy changes and
appears to be a something-for-
all compromise typical of the re-
sponses that the regime has made
before to resolve the conflicting
pressures of its liberals and con-
servatives. The tone of the
resolution suggests that a major-
ity of central committee members
are "liberal" on the issue of the
economic reform. It calls for
the party's support of "progres-
sive, creative, and initiative-
minded people" to fight against
"obsolete, conservative views"
that are stagnating the program.
The reform-minded Slovaks
were able to gain approval of
measures to accelerate economic
growth in their part of the coun-
try. This probably resulted from
increasing pressure on the Novotny
regime by Slovak leaders, who op-
pose Prague's direction of the
Slovak economy and who have re-
cently played a prominent role
in the attack on the Prague re-
gime's ineffectiveness.
Published accounts of the
central committee meeting in De-
cember have not alluded to per-
sonnel or policy changes but it
has been privately reported that
the meeting decided to merge a
number of key industrial minis-
tries into one ministry. This
move will presumably eliminate
the top-heavy structure that has
complicated the relationship be-
tween the ministries and the in-
dustrial sector. It also implies
numerous shifts of government
personnel.
Other personnel and organi-
zational shifts, involving the
top echelons of the party, may
come to light at the plenum in
January.
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SIZABLE SOVIET FLEET REMAINS IN MEDITERRANEAN
The Soviets are keeping a
naval force of about 20 war-
ships in the Mediterranean this
winter. Although only about
half the all-time high of 39
reached last summer, the force
is considerably larder than that
deployed in the winter months
of previous years when only a
few Russian ships were in the
area.
Moscow appears to be
using the squadron to evaluate
the advantages and problems
of a distant deployment of
a mixed force of surface ships
and submarines. The warships
are intended to dilute the
threat of the US Sixth Fleet
and to provide a visible demon-
stration of support to friendly
Arab regimes. The cruise mis-
siles on both submarines and
surface ships provide the
smaller Soviet squadron with
a formidable weapon against
the more powerful NATO naval
forces.
In recent months, the
Soviet Mediterranean squadron
has consisted of about 13
surface combatants and between
three and eight submarines. The
flagship is usually a cruiser;
a Kynda-class cruiser armed
with both surface-to-air mis-
siles (SAM) and surface-to-
surface missiles (SSM) recently
arrived to assume command.
This is the first ship armed
with both types of missiles to
appear in these waters since the
summer of 1966. Other major
surface ships now there include
a SAM-equipped destroyer and an
SSM-equipped destroyer, two or
three conventionally armed
destroyers, three destroyer
escorts, and a minesweeper.
Three landing ships--
capable of transporting a
Soviet naval infantry bat-
talion with its heavy equip-
ment--give the Soviets a
ground force deployment capa-
bility in the Middle East.
The three ships are operating
off the Syrian coast and can
reach Syrian and Egyptian ports
within 12 hours.
Soviet long-range sub-
marines from the Northern
and Baltic fleets are operating
in the Mediterranean inde-
pendently of the USSR's sur-
face forces. A large sub-
marine tender is in the area
to provide replenishment and
minor repairs to Soviet sub-
marines nearing the end of
their deployment. During 1967,
deployments of both nuclear-
powered attack and cruise-
missile submarines were in-
creased.
The continuous deployment
of over 20 naval ships in the
Mediterranean has placed an
operational strain on the
traditionally shore-bound
Soviet Navy. Most of the
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submarines and some of the major
warships sent to the Mediterra-
nean since May have been drawn
from the Northern and Baltic
fleets. In addition, sailors
from these fleets have been
transferred to ships of the
Black Sea Fleet, which furnishes
most of the surface warships and
auxiliaries for the Mediterra-
nean squadron. Soviet merchant
ships have been pressed into
service to provide fuel oil and
SOVIET UNION EXPANDING MERCHANT AND FISHING FLEETS
The USSR, already one of the
world's leading maritime powers,
is causing concern to Western
shippers by a rapid expansion of
its merchant fleet, although
this is expected to offer only
limited competition to Free
World shipping through 1970. The
growth of the Soviet fishing
fleet, the world's largest and
most modern, will probably lead,
however, to further inroads in
traditional fishing areas of
Free World countries, including
the US.
Despite sizable orders
abroad since 1960 for new ships,
the Soviet fleet still lacks
large bulk carriers and special-
ized general cargo ships needed
to compete with progressive West-
ern bulk-cargo shippers. Draft
limitations in Soviet seaports
have limited the USSR's interest
in the very large tankers now
being built for economic trans-
port from the Persian Gulf to
Japan and around Africa to West-
ern Europe.
One of Moscow's major goals
is to reduce foreign exchange
outlays for ship charters. The
USSR now carries slightly more
than half its own trade, and by
1970 will carry about three
fourths, the maximum for eco-
nomic movement. The estimated
Soviet share of world seaborne
trade will then be only about
five percent, however, thus offer-
ing minor competition to Free
World shipping.
The closure of the Suez
Canal caused some dislocations
in Soviet shipping patterns but
only a small part of Soviet
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trade--mostly exports--had been
routed via Suez. Soviet pe-
troleum shipments from the
Mediterranean to Japan in the
third quarter of this year
have dropped sharply. The im-
pact. on Soviet aid shipments
to Hanoi has not been great.
The Soviets were pouring goods
into Haiphong before June, and
this--along with increased
shipments from Vladivostok--
has cushioned the effect of
the reduction since.
The Soviet fishing fleet
is scheduled to crow substan-
tially by 1970. Orders have
been placed in the West and in
Communist countries for craft
ranging from small t.rawlers to
$15--million, fully automated
fish-processing and refrigera-
tion ships.
The Soviet fishing fleet
cont:inues most active in the
Nort:h Atlantic and North Pa-
cific. Last month, the US got
'Moscow to agree to limit its
fishing in the Middle Atlantic
over the next year. The Soviets,
:however, have reached agree-
ments with a number of African
countries--and are offering aid
in Latin America and Asia--to
establish fishing fleets, ports,
and facilities, deals that also
provide opportunities for ex-
panded Soviet activity in
nearby waters.
The total Soviet fish
catch in 1967 probably will be
over six million tons--80 per-
cent from international waters--
and the USSR has announced
plans for an increase of at
least 50 percent from ocean
fleet operations by 1970. In
an effort to overcome its de-
ficiency in marketing procedures,
Moscow is taking the further
step of trying to buy into
'Western marketing firms.
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SOVIET-US COLLABORATION BRINGS NEW SPACE ACCORD
Cooperation behind the
scenes between the Soviet Union
and the US was instrumental in
bringing about UN approval last
week of the agreement on rescue
and return of astronauts. The
new accord also establishes legal
procedures for returning fallen
space objects to the launching
authority. It grew out of the
treaty on exploration and use of
outer space which was approved
by the last UNGA and went into
effect in October.
The Soviet press has soft-
pedaled public discussion of both
space agreements in order to
avoid calling attention to these
joint US-Soviet undertakings.
Moscow has demonstrated again,
however, that potential discom-
fort from anti-Soviet propaganda
is not enough to deter it from
doing business with Washington
on specific matters in which the
Soviets have a strong interest.
In this case, the cooperative
spirit apparently was the product
of Soviet plans for space flights
in the near future.
The Russians gave no sign
of being ready to negotiate in
earnest on the assistance and
return agreement until early
this fall. Moscow's sudden inter-
est in getting things moving came
at about the same time it made
demarches to several states--
India, Iran, the Malagasy Repub-
lic, Pakistan, and the UK--ask-
ing their assistance, if needed,
to recover a space vehicle in
the Indian Ocean area. Bilateral
negotiations with the US subse-
quently went smoothly and at a
relatively brisk pace.
Moscow acceded earlier this
month to US proposals on the word-
ing of the draft in order to
hasten its completion and final
negotiation. The Soviets also
offered a compromise to fill in
a missing article that would ac-
knowledge the interests of re-
gional organizations, thus help-
ing to overcome objections raised
by the European Space Research
Organization. Remaining language
difficulties were resolved and
the concurrence of all parties
obtained only as a result of in-
tense, concerted US-Soviet ef-
forts in the final days before
the UNGA adjourned.
The collaboration with Wash-
ington in speeding up acceptance
by the General Assembly once a
draft of the new space agreement
was completed has set a pattern
the Soviets can be expected to
follow when and if a nonprolifer-
ation treaty (NPT) gets to the
UN after the assembly resumes
its session in 1968. Developing
a complete NPT draft at the Geneva
disarmament conference, which is
now in recess, is the major hur-
dle. If this can be surmounted,
Moscow will probably bend every
effort with the US to win quick
UN approval of the treaty, to
which the Soviets attach far
higher priority than to either
space agreement.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ASSESS FRENCH VETO
In the aftermath of Paris'
obstruction of negotiations be-
tween Britain and the Communi-
ties, both London and the Five
are contemplating early bilat-
eral and possibly collective
meetings. Presumably, such talks
will cover the possibilities of
various forms of cooperation and.
joint action--especially in in-
dustry and technology. It is
less likely that the British will
attem;ot now to engage the Five
in what the French have excluded
For the Community as it whole,
namely, a mutual exam:-nation of
the problems and consequences of
UK membership in the Communities.
The Five are not prepared
to engage in retaliatory tactics
against the French within the
Community framework. Except pos-
sibly for the Dutch, they seem
content--for the moment, at
least.--to make clear France's
isolation in its stand against:
enlarging the Community. Opin-
ions vary as to whether the
British bid--which remains on
the agenda of the Council of Min-
isters--can be taken up effec-,
tively during the next: six
months, during which the French
occupy the Council chairmanship.
The Dutch may raise the matter
in the Council, but most of the
activity will probably take
place in diplomatic channels
outside the Council.
Decision-making within the
Communities may suffer even if
the Dutch and others do not
maintain the "silent partner"
tactic they employed :immediately
following the French veto. Each
of the Five will probably look
more closely at how policy de-
cisions will affect its own in-
terests, and especially closely
at. those policies that tend to
favor French interests. These
include financing the common
agricultural policy, renewal of
the convention associating Afri-
can states, and association
agreements with the Maghreb
states. Although none of these
is yet in a crucial stage of
negotiation, preliminary work
will be surrounded by much un-
certainty.
Any slowdown in Community
activity will conflict with the
pressures for settling many
"bread and butter" issues before
the forthcoming elimination of
internal tariffs on 1 July 1968,
and France will probably try hard
to foster agreements on matters
coming up for Community decision.
A major political issue, however,
on which discussion--due early
next year--would seem difficult
in the present atmosphere is the
merger of the three Community
treaties.
The US Embassy in London
views De Gaulle's negative posi-
tion and the support for Britain
by the Commission as enabling
Britain to bid for leadership of
the movement for European unity
based on an integrated community.
The embassy points out that less
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than a year ago most "Europeans"
were still deeply suspicious of
Britain's European vocation.
Maintaining this posture of po-
tential leadership from outside
the Communities, however, will
demand considerable ingenuity
and energy, especially since the
Five will not want to create an
open split with France as long
as reasonable prospects remain
for some immediate progress within
the Community.
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SEC EZE":[.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Attempted adjustments in the aftermath of coups
and countercoups dominated the area this week, but
uncertain power relationships cloud the political
atmosphere.
Emissaries shuttling between the junta in Greece
and King Constantine in Rome are optimistic about the
King's early return, but no date has been determined.
The King's political position under the junta's pro-
posed constitution is unclear but will be "clarified,"
according to a government announcement. Greece's
pre-Christmas amnesty omitted some 2,000. detainees
in island prisons, but included the most prominent
and enigmatic of the junta's prisoners, Andreas Pa-
pandreou.
The long-term outlook for stability remains
bleak in Dahomey following the military coup two
weeks ago--the third since 1963. Short-term pros-
pects, however, were boosted by last week's appoint-
ment, apparently at French urging, of Lt. Colonel
Alley as head of state. Alley will have problems
simply holding the army together, and continued gov-
ernment-by-drift is expected. Crucial French aid
payments still have not been reinstated.
The Algerian regime is still trying to round
up the principals of the mid-December coup attempt.
Meanwhile, it has begun a campaign--using the coun-
try's only political party--to drum up popular back-
ing among the apathetic Algerians for Colonel Boume-
diene's government.
In India, anti-Hindi language demonstrations
have spread from Madras to neighboring Andhra Pradesh,
and some pro-Hindi agitation has resumed in the
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MILITANT POLICIES CAUSING TROUBLE FOR SYRIAN REGIME
The militant Baathist regime
in Damascus is becoming isolated
from the rest of the Arab world and
its power base at home is narrowing,
leading to the possibility of a coup
attempt:.
The radical Baathist faction
that took power in a bloody coup in
February 1966 has tried. to eradicate
all opposition forces. It has
failed to attract popular support,
however, and the ascendancy of the
minority Alawite religious sect in
the government has antagonized ele-
ments within the army itself.
Moreover, the Soviet Union,
long the supporter of Syria's eco-
nomic and military establishment,
is disenchanted with the regime's
continuing bellicosity toward Is-
rael and the West. Last September,
the Soviet ambassador in Damascus
reportedly chastised Premier Zuayyin
For Syria's support of terrorist
raiding parties into Israel, warn-
ing that such actions might invite
,aL second round with they Israeli
Army. Nevertheless, the raids have
continued.
The regime has also proclaimed
the establishment of a "Popular
Army" and a "Committee for the De-
fense of the Homeland and Protection
of the Revolution," whose vice
chairman is a well-known former. Sy-
rian leader with Communist ties.
The "Popular Army" has been assigned
the task of "reclaiming the home-
land" of Palestine, and includes
militant workers' squads as well as
the Baathist-sponsored National
Guard.
There are few signs that the
Syrians will moderate: their posi-
tion. Syria participated reluc-
tantly in the Arab foreign minis-
ters' conference in Cairo in
early December and has not yet
indicated whether it will send
a delegation to the Arab summit
conference now scheduled for mid-
January.
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SUDANESE GOVERNMENT CONFRONTS OPPOSITION
A showdown in Khartoum
between the Mahjoub government
and opposition leader Sadiq
al-Mahdi may be imminent as a
result. of last week's contro-
versy over granting "extra-
territorial" facilities to the
Egyptians at the Wadi Saidna
military airfield near Khartoum.
Should a showdown occur,
Sadiq seems to have little
chance of garnering sufficient
votes in the present assembly
to form a new government.
If Sadiq provokes a con-
frontation, it is likely to
weaken the already divided
Umma Party. Sadiq is the
president of the Umma, the
political wing of the powerful
Ansar politico-religious
brotherhood, but his uncle,
the Imam al-Nadi al-Mahdi, is
spiritual leader of the sect
and supports Mahjoub with a
rival branch of the party.
Moreover, a confrontation
between Sadiq and Mahjoub
would strengthen the political
prospects of the new Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) which
earlier this month reunited
two groups that had split in
1956 over the question of
whether to seek merger with
Egypt rather than independence.
If it came to power, the DUP
would probably be strongly
susceptible to radical pres-
sures from Nasir's government
in Cairo and continue the
anti-Western orientation of
the present Mahjoub government.
In foreign affairs, re-
cent discussions concerning
military assistance from the
Soviet Union for the Sudanese
armed forces apparently have
not yet resulted in firm
decisions on either side. The
Sudanese Army, trained and
equipped by the West, report-
edly is reluctant to accept ma-
jor equipment from the Soviets.
They may be forced to accept
Soviet assistance, however, be-
cause of the present lack of
other sources of supply.
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POLITICAL TEf\SIONS HIGH IN MALI
Political conditions in
Mali have taken on a harsh,
convulsive quality since a
shake-up within the country's
single party last August.
Leftist militants strengthened
their position within the
party, and they now appear to
be threatening President
Modibo Keita's authority and
freedom of action.
The militants dominate
the National Committee for
the Defense of the Revolution
(CNDR) --the new supreme ar-
biter of power in the ruling
political party. They have
used the CNDR to support the
efforts of youth and labor
groups and of the civilian
militia to purge, usually on
charges of corruption, more
moderate elements whose loyalty
to the regime's proclaimed
"socialist option" is suspect.
In late November, the CNDR
member in charge of ::?arty
youth announced that some 160
government officials, includ-
ing a few prominent ones,
would either be fired or cen-
sured for illegal business
activities. As the purge has
gathered momentum, Keita, who
previously had maintained a
reasonable balance between
moderate and extremist elements,
seems increasingly forced to
identify with the militants in
order to preserve his own posi-?
tion of leadership.
This shift to the left
within the Bamako regime may
threaten Keita's accords of
February 1967 with France
that provided for Mali's
gradual return to the French
economic fold---a move long
urged by leading party mod-
erates. So far, however, the
principal Malian officials
responsible for the accords
have not been removed and Keita
continues to insist that Mali
will adhere to the arrange-
ment. Last week, two new
agreements were signed in Paris
which will speed up the time-
table for implementation of
the accords even though Bamako
has failed to carry out some
promised economic reforms.
Meanwhile, party militants
apparently are meeting increased
resistance from entrenched
local politicians in Mali's
upcountry areas. In some
cases, the CNDR has dissolved
:Local revolutionary committees,
presumably in order to recon-
stitute them with more ideo--
__ogically reliable members.
Upcountry malaise seems wide-
spread, and at, least two anti-
government riots have occurred
recently, one requiring the
dispatch of military units.
The unsettling developments
of recent months are bringing
government activities to a
standstill, with civil servants
increasingly reluctant to make
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
The holiday period was in general politically
quiet throughout most of Latin America.
Venezuela's annual Christmas amnesty was ex-
tended to almost 500 political prisoners, including
a number of guerrilla leaders. The government ap-
parently decided that any resulting increase in
terrorism would be overbalanced by the political
advantage it would realize in next year's election
campaign.
Honduras and El Salvador exchanged a few of the
less-controversial prisoners held as a consequence
of last May's border skirmish, but major issues re-
main unsettled.
National elections next May are the subject of
continued tense maneuvering in Panama, where Presi-
dent Robles is again trying to find a ticket that
can stop Arnulfo Arias' bandwagon. He faces a
13 January deadline for registration of the candi-
dates.
In the Dominican Republic, inflammatory broad-
casts by opposition party leaders and renewed po-
litical maneuvering by the rightist followers of
the exiled General Wessin are further straining the
political atmosphere. President Balaguer is re-
portedly considering shifting some high-level mil-
itary figures in an effort to keep on top of the
situation. Such changes, however, would probably
add to latent unrest among some military elements.
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ARGENTINE-CH[LEAN RELATIONS STRAINED BY CHANNEL DISPUTE
A recent series of incidents
in the Beagle Channel south of
Tierra del Fuego has increased
tension between Argentina and
Chile. For more than 50 years the
two countries have been involved
in a dispute over navigation rights
in the channel.
dispute under a 1902 treaty.
Irked by this unilateral move,
Argentine President Ongania
rejected UK participation,
preferring instead to continue
the bilateral talks that have
been carried on sporadically for
some time.
'rhe current trouble began
last August with a dispute between
Chilean and Argentine pilots over
who should take ships through the
channel; it continued when Argen-
tine fishing boats, supported by
naval vessels, blocked the entrance
to the Chilean naval base at
Puerto Williams. The atmosphere
became even more tense in late
November when a Chilean patrol
boat twice approached the Argen-?
tine naval base at Ushuaia during
firing exercises. The Argentines
fired at the Chilean craft, making
it clear that they would sink it
if it attempted further provoca-
tions. Both governments denied
any offensive intent in the inci-
dents, but a series of diplomat.-'-c
notes failed to cool tempers on
either side.
In early December, Chile an-
nounced that it had asked the
United Kingdom to arbitrate the
The dispute over the channel
waters and three strategically
unimportant nearby slands has
given both navies an excuse to
seek higher budgets and new equip-
ment. The Argentines reportedly
believe that the Chilean Navy is
trying to embarrass President Frei
and possibly to establish grounds
for military intervention in the
government. The Chileans say they
fear that Argentina will occupy
the islands and attempt to solve
the controversy by force.
Because of the emotional
nature of the dispute, it seems
unlikely that a definitive solu-
tion will be reached in the near
future. Although Presidents
Ongania and Frei seem anxious to
reach at least a temporary solu-
tion, both are under military
pressure to defend national
"sovereignty?"
CHILEAN LEFTIST APPARE:NTL'( WINS SENATORIAL BY-ELECTION
Alberto Baltra, president of
the Soviet-Chilean Cultural Insti-
tute, is the apparent. winner of the
senatorial by-election held on 17
December.
The provincial electoral col-
leges declared Baltra the winner
over the Christian Democratic candi-
date by 23 votes out of a total of
more than 150,000. The electoral
qualifications court, which meets
next month, will make the final de-
cision, however, and the govern-
ment is expected to use its
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v \ Channel boundary
claimed by Chile
(CE 01 4 WUE A
Channel boundary
claimed by Argentina
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influence in trying to overturn the
preliminary result.
Baltra, a member of the Radi-
cal Party, was minister of economy
from 1947 to 1950. Since then, he
has not been politically active,
although he reportedly considered
running for the presidency in 1964.
He has visited the Soviet Union as
well as several East European coun-
tries, and his position as head of
the Soviet-Chilean Cultural Insti-
tute has put him in touch with most
Soviet visitors to Chile.
Baltra's strong performance
in the senatorial by-election
strengthens his chances for the
presidential nomination in 1970.
The Communist Party of Chile
(PCCh) played an important part in
his campaign, and the Communists
and Radicals seem likely to con-
tinue their cooperation. The PCCh
reportedly hopes to form a broad
front behind a strong leftist
candidate such as Baltra or pro-
Castro Socialist Salvador Allende.
CUBA TO HOLD "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" CONFERENCE
Cuba will hold an International
Cultural Congress in Havana from
4 to 11 January. The announced
purpose of the gathering is to
discuss the problems of the under-
developed world and to publicize
the accomplishments of the Cuban
Government. It will also provide
Castro with. an opportunity to ex-
tend Cuban influence in world-wide
"anti-imperialist" circles.
Several hundred intellectuals
from throughout the world, includ-
ing Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de
Beauvoir, will attend. A number
of "new left" personalities and
journalists from the US are also
expected.
Cuba's espionage and subver-
sion agency, the General Directorate
of Intelligence is probably deeply
involved in the planning because
the conference will provide ideal
cover for bringing small numbers of
Latin American students to Cuba for
political indoctrination or guer-
rilla warfare training.
The Cubans hope the congress
will launch a "cultural crusade"
against "imperialist" influence.
Advance propaganda has hammered
on the theme that Cuba believes
it has an enormous responsibility
toward developing an anti-imper-
ialist awareness among African,
Asian, and Latin American countries.
The assembly is expected to con-
clude that as long as the coun-
tries of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America retain political and eco-
nomic ties with the "imperialist
countries," they will not be able
to develop a truly indigenous na-
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