THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION CONFERENCE
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September 22, 1967
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Latin American Solidarity Organization Conference
Secret
State Dept. review completed
N2 45
22 September 1967
No. 0308/67B
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THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION CONFERENCE
The first conference of the Latin American
Solidarity Organization (LASO) held in Havana from
31. July to 10 August, provided an ideal forum for
the propagation of Fidel Castro's militant revolu-
tionary theories. Whether Castro's doctrine can
be translated into increased Communist "solidarity"
and effective programs, however, remains to be seen.
Disunity was evident during the many months of prep-
arations for the meeting as well as at the conference
itself. Indeed, the meeting took place at a time
when quarreling among the Latin American Communists
was at an all-time high.
The conference apparently did nothing to ease
relations between pro-Moscow and pro-Castro parties
in the hemisphere. These groups remain at odds
over whether to resort to armed struggle in the
near future, and over Cuban attempts to control the
Communist movements in Latin America. Neither did
it do anything to improve Cuban-Soviet relations.
Moreover, even if plans were discussed for major
new guerrilla efforts in the hemis here, nothing
is likel to ha en soon.
In short, the LASO conference is not likely
soon to lead to significant Communist advances in
the hemisphere. Communist gains will depend a
good deal more on the relative political and eco-
nomic stability in each country than on Havana's
efforts to export its brand of revolution.
Background
The Latin American Solidarity
Organization was founded by 27
militant Latin American delega-
tions in January 1966 immediately
after the Tri-Continent Confer-
ence in order to "coordinate the
struggle against US imperialism."
In August 1966, an organizing
committee consisting of represen-
tatives from Cuba, Brazil, Colom-
bia, Guyana, Guatemala, Mexico,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela met
to plan for the 1967 conference.
In October, this committee issued
a draft agenda, inspired by Cas-
tro's militant foreign policy,
which called for discussion of
a common strategy of armed
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFRO-ASIAN-LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY
ORGANIZATION (AALAPSO) AND THE LATIN AMERICAN
SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (LASO)
FIRST
AFRO-ASIAN-LATIN AMERICAN
PEOPLES
SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE
(FIRST
TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE)
HAVANA - JAN. 1966
ESTABLISHED:
I
AFRO-ASIAN-LATIN AMERICAN
PEOPLES
SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TEMPORARY
HEADQUARTERS IN
HAVANA
TO BE ESTABLISHED I N
HAVANA
COMMITTEE
ON ZIMBABWE
TO BE ESTABLISHED
COMMITTEE
TO SUPPORT VIETNAM
AMERICAN DELEGATIONS
THAT PARTICIPATED IN
TRICONTI NENTAL
CONFERENCE
I
ESTABLISHED:
I
LATIN AMERICAN
SOLIDARITY
ORGANIZATION
COMMITTEE
ON CONGO (KINSHASA)
SECOND
AFRO-ASIAN-LATI N AMERICAN v ~9
PEOPLES SOLIDARITY
CONFERENCE
(SECOND TRICONTINENTAL
CONFERENCE)
CAIRO - JAN. 1968
WILL DECIDE DEFINITIVE STRUCTURE
AND PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS OF
AALAPSO
FIRST
LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES
HAVANA
31 JULY - 10 AUGUST 1967
PERMANENT LATIN
AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION
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insurrection for all Latin Ameri-
can revolutionary movements. It
also issued a call for the crea-
tion of national LASO committees
in the various Latin American
countries.
The formation of these com-
mittees, which sent delegates to
the recent conference, caused
great problems in several coun-
tries. The obvious pro-Castro
tone of the conference prepara-
tions caused the pro-Soviet par-
ties of Argentina, Brazil, Vene-
zuela, and Ecuador to decide
against sending a delegation,
thus leaving the field clear to
the local pro-Castro extremists.
Other pro-Soviet parties--the
Chilean and Colombian for ex-
ample--debated the question but
finally decided to attend. In
any case, by conference time dele-
gates from all 27 countries--rep-
resenting either the orthodox
parties, pro-Castro splinter
groups, pro-Chinese organiza-
tions, or just themselves--had
arrived in Havana.
The Conference'
Cuban propaganda focused
from the beginning on the con-
ference slogan, "the duty of
every revolutionary is to make
revolution." This phrase was
attributed to "Che" Guevara, who
was made the spiritual leader
of the gathering. This Argen-
tine-born Cuban revolutionary,
who dropped from sight in March
1965, was elected first citizen
of Latin America, and his activi-
ties, "wherever he is," were
praised by all delegates.
Page 3
In further propaganda moves,
recently captured "North Ameri-
can insurgents" were twice dis-
played as "proof" of US activi-
ties against Cuba. Because of
this propaganda effort and the
Cubans' argument that their ad-
vocacy of "armed struggle" was
based on the tenet that "reactionary
oppression" must be met with
"patriotic revolutionary violence,"
the Cubans were able to outmaneu-
ver the pro-Moscow Communists.
Even the most orthodox of the
pro-Moscow Communists were forced
to admit that "armed struggle"
would probably have to be used
ultimately in each country in order
to achieve political power.
Contrary to what had been
expected in view of the obvious
conflict in ideology between pro-
Castro and pro-Moscow Communists,
only two disputes over the pro-
posed wording of resolutions
came to the attention of the public.
The first--which caused a brief
furor--was over a committee reso-
lution condemning the orthodox
Communist Party of Venezuela for
its policy of "via pacifica," or
the peaceful way to power. This
formulation which did not appear
in the final declarations, rep-
resented, of course, a direct attack
on the position of all pro-Soviet
parties.
The most serious disagreement
did not surface until the night of
8 August when Armando Hart, orga-
nizational secretary of the Cuban
Communist Party central committee
and chairman of the Cuban LASO
delegation, tabled a resolution
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LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
Country Delegation Chairman
Argentina John William Cooke
Representatives
Important organizations Represented (approx. total)
Peronist Revolutionary Movement
Communist Youth Federation
Movement of National Liberation
Argentine Movement for Vietnam
Peronist Revolutionary Youth
Cuba
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Guadeloupe Henri Delagua
Guatemala Nestor Valle
French Guiana Robo Jean Marie
Guyana Lall Bahadur
Haiti Andre Feray
Honduras Hector Martinez
Martinique Eduard Delepine
Mexico Heberto Castillo
Nicaragua Fernando Martinez
Panama Floyd Britton
Paraguay Francisco Mendez
Puerto Rico Juan Mari Bras
Surinam H. F. Herrenberg
Trinidad.-Tobago Clive Phill
Uruguay Rodney Arismendi
Bolivian Communist Party
Armed Forces of National Liberation
Dissident Brazilian Communist Party
National Revolutionary Movement
Popular Action
Communist Party of Chile
Socialist Party
Communist Party of Colombia
Army of National Liberation
Worker-Student-Peasant Movement
Communist Youth of Colombia
Popular Vanguard Party
Authentic Revolutionary Party
Socialist Action Party
Dominican Popular Movement
14th of June Revolutionary Movement
Communist Party of Ecuador
Revolutionary Socialist Party
Leftist Revolutionary Movement
Communist Party of El Salvador
Revolutionary Party of April & May
General Association of Students
Guatemalan Workers Party
Rebel Armed Forces
Guianese Progressive Party
Peoples Progressive Party
Party of Popular Accord
Haitian United Democratic Party
Honduran Communist Party
Revolutionary Party of Honduras
General Confederation of Workers
Communist Party of Martinique
Communist Party of Mexico
Movement of National Liberation
Sandinista National Liberation Front
Nicaraguan Socialist Party
People's Party
Movement of Revolutionary Unity
Communist Party of Paraguay
Movement of Revolutionary Left
Revolutionary Vanguard
Peruvian Communist Party/China
Puerto Rican Independence Movement
Nationalist Republic Party
Workers and Farmers Party
Communist Party of Uruguay
Leftist Liberation Front
Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement
Movement of Revolutionary Left
Armed Forces of National Liberation
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condemning the policy of certain
"socialist" countries that give
credits and technical aid to
"dictatorships" and "oligarchies"
in Latin America. This descrip-
tion was an obvious swipe at the
Soviet Union and several East
European countries, which had
accelerated their economic and
diplomatic activity in Latin
America in 1966 and have con-
tinued their effort this year.
The resolution expressed
the Cuban conviction that LASO
should "coordinate and give im-
petus to the struggle against
US imperialism and other oppres-
sive factors in Latin America."
It also restated a position ex-
pounded by Castro during a
speech on :L3 March in which he
condemned the aid and trade poli-
cies of the "socialist" countries
toward Latin America. The al-
leged Cuban retort to pro-Soviet
Communists who threatened to walk
out of the conference if the
resolution passed was "the doors
are wide open...the time for
true revolutionary definitions
has come." The resolution was
passed by a 15 to 3 margin with
9 abstentions. The pro-Soviets
did not walk out, however, and
the text was never made public.
The final conference dec-
larations, approved on 9 Au-
gust closely followed the Cas-
tro line but paid lip service
to the orthodox Communists.
They stated in brief that the
armed revolutionary struggle is
the primary path of the revolu-
tion in Latin America and that
all other forms of the struggle
must serve and not hinder this
line. Furthermore, guerrilla
action is the immediate and pri-
mary task in the majority of
Latin American countries and in-
evitable in the others.
Stokely Carmichael's appear-
ance provided a much-needed pub-
licity boost for the conference.
The "black-power" advocate prob-
ably measured up to Castro's ex-
pectations by haranguing the
delegates on everything from the
dangers of "Yankee imperialism"
to his views of Abraham Lincoln.
"The next Vietnam will take
place on the Latin American con-
tinent," Carmichael said. "Guer-
rilla warfare must begin in
the US.... We will not fight in
Vietnam, nor in Santo Domingo,
nor anywhere else in the world.
Our fight will be inside the US."
Castro's Closing Speech
After many delays, Castro
finally addressed the gathering
on 10 August. His speech was
a major ideological statement
of Cuba's foreign policy and a
blueprint for solidarity with
Latin American guerrillas. Al-
though he grudgingly ac-
knowledged the pro-Soviet Commu-
nists, stating that "in some
countries violent revolution may
not be an immediate, but a fu-
ture task," he left no doubt
that Cuba views "armed struggle"
as the only valid course to
achieve "national liberation."
He also indicated that Cuba is
prepared to advance this doc-
trine.
Castro publicized the Cuban
conflict with the Communist Party
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LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION
CONFERENCE DECLARATIONS
We, representatives of the peoples of our America, conscious of the conditions which exist on
the Continent, knowing of the existence of a common counterrevolutionary strategy directed by Yankee
imperialism, proclaim:
1. That it is the right and duty of the peoples of Latin America to make revolution;
2. That revolution in Latin America has its deepest historic roots in the liberation movement
against European colonialism of the 19th century and against the imperialism of this century.
The epic of the peoples of America and the great class battles against imperialism waged by
our peoples in previous decades are the sources of historic inspiration for the Latin Ameri-
can revolutionary movement;
3. That the essential meaning of the revolution in Latin America is given by its confrontation
of imperialism, the oligarchies, and bourgeois landowners. Consequently, the character of
the revolution is that of a struggle for national independence, emancipation from oligarchies,
and the socialist path for complete economic and social development;
4. That the principles of Marxism-Leninism guide the revolutionary movement of Latin America;
5. That the armed revolutionary struggle is the primary path of the revolution in Latin America;
6. That all the other forms of struggle must serve and not hinder the progress of the primary
line which is armed struggle;
7. That for the majority of the countries of the Continent the problem of organizing, initiating,
developing, and culminating armed struggle is today the immediate and primary task of the
revolutionary movement;
8. That those countries in which this task is not being considered as an immediate task should
at any rate consider it as an inevitable prospect in the development of the revolutionary
struggle in their country;
9. That the people of each country and their revolutionary vanguards will have the historic re-
sponsibility for advancing the revolution in each of them;
10. That the guerrillas as the embryo of the armies of liberation is the most effective means for
initiating and developing revolutionary struggle in the majority of our countries;
11. That the leadership of the revolution demands as an organizational principle the existence of
a unified political and military command as a guarantee for its success;
12. That the most effective solidarity that revolutionary movements can give each other is the
development and culmination of their own struggle in each country;
13. That solidarity with Cuba and collaboration and cooperation with the revolutionary movement in
arms are an unavoidable duty of international type of all anti-imperialist organizations of
the Continent;
14. That the Cuban revolution as a symbol of the victory of the armed revolutionary movement is
the vanguard of the Latin American anti-imperialist movement. As the people who carry out
armed struggle advance along that path, they also place themselves in the vanguard;
15. That. the people directly colonized by the European mother countries or subjected to direct
colonial domination by the United States on their way to liberation, have as their immediate
and primary objective the fight for independence and the maintenance of links to the general
struggle of the Continent as the only manner of avoiding being absorbed by North American
neocolonialism;
16. That the second declaration of Havana, which contains the beautiful and glorious revolutionary
tradition of the last 150 years of American history, is a programatic document of the Latin
American revolution which the peoples of this Continent have confirmed, deepened, enriched,
and radicalized during the past five years;
17. That the peoples of Latin America have no antagonisms with any other people of the world and
they extend a fraternal hand to the people of the United States themselves whom they urge to
fight against the repressive policy of the imperialist monopolies;
18. That the struggle in Latin America strengthens its bonds of solidarity with the peoples of
Asia and Africa, the socialist countries, and with the workers of the capitalist countries,
particularly with the Negro population of the United States who simultaneously suffer class
exp:oitation, poverty, unemployment, racial discrimination, and denial of the most elementary
human rights and who are an important force to be considered in the context of revolutionary
struggle;
19. That the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people gives all the peoples who fight imperial-
ism an inestimable help and is an inspiring example for the peoples of Latin America;
20. That we have approved the statutes and created the permanent committee with headquarters in
Havana of the Latin American Solidarity organization which is the genuine representation of
the peoples of America.
We, revolutionaries of our America, the America south of the Rio Bravo, successors of the men
who gave us our first independence, armed with unbreakable will to fight and with revolutionary and
scientific orientation, and without anything to lose but the chains that oppress us, declare that our
struggle is a decisive contribution to humanity's historic struggle to liberate itself from slavery
and exploitation. The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution. e.oiuca~
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of Venezuela (PCV) by excoriat-
ing its leaders and making
various veiled references to
statements by other orthodox
party leaders. In all, he left
little doubt that his "solidar-
ity" with these Communists is,
at best, an illusion. He lashed
out at the PCV as a cowardly gang
of traitors and a "mafia" of
"slanderers and defamers of the
Cuban revolution."
He then made a thinly dis-
guised reference to Chilean Com-
munist Party leader Luis Cor-
valan's statement--stressing the
role of the national bourgeoisie--
which had been published in the
USSR on the eve of the LASO con-
ference. Castro asked, "Is there
anyone at this time who might be-
lieve in the revolutionary role
of any bourgeoisie on this con-
tinent?"
Castro went on to declare
that-orthodox Communism "has
acquired a method, a style, and,
in certain things, not a few
characteristics of a church. We
sincerely believe that this
character must be overcome."
Answering the charge that he
is nothing more than a bourgeois
adventurer without revolution-
ary maturity, he said, "For-
tunately, the revolution came
before maturity because, finally,
those who are mature, the super-
mature, have matured so little
that they have decayed."
Castro also alluded to the
conference's resolution
criticizing t e socialist coun-
tries who give aid to "oligar-
chical" Latin American govern-
ments. Referring to Soviet aid
offers to Colombia (which, inci-
Page 7
dentally, apparently have not been
made), Castro said, "it is ab-
surd--loans in dollars to an
oligarchical government which re-
pressed the guerrillas, which is
persecuting and murdering guer-
rillas.... We think that this is
absurd." He continued, "If inter-
nationalism exists, if solidarity
is a word worthy of being uttered,
the.least we can expect from any
state in the socialist camp is
to deny financial or technical
aid to any of these governments."
Ideology of "Armed Struggle"
The major emphasis of Castro's
speech was on the ideology of the
"armed struggle." This doctrine,
which challenges the role of the
orthodox national parties, is
best described as the Castro-
Guevara-Debray thesis. Briefly,
it can be divided into three main
revolutionary tenets, all cited
in Castro's speech: The key to
revolution in Latin America is
guerrilla action, which should
be initiated, developed, directed,
and controlled from rural areas;
there should be only one major
guerrilla movement in each coun-
try, directed by a united leader-
ship and guided by one clear
strategy; and the guerrilla unit
precedes the urban-based party
and, in fact, ultimately evolves
into the "authentic" party.
Castro proclaimed, "Let no
one dream t]iat he will achieve
power peacefully in any nation
of this continent. Let no one
dream or attempt to tell the
masses such a'thing, he would
be fooling them miserably....
There is a basic path /armed strug-
glq and the rest of the means of
struggle should be subordinated to
it."
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On the correctness of rural-
oriented guerrilla action, Castro
said, "The experience acquired
in guerrilla warfare on this con-
tinent has taught us many things,
among them the terrible mistake,
the absurd conception, that a
guerrilla movement can be directed
from a city...,. It is our con-
viction that it is not only stupid,
but a crime to want to direct a
guerrilla movement from the city."
Castro concluded with a
prediction for the future. "A
revolution is seething within
this continent. Its eruption
might be delayed, but its out-
burst is inevitable.... The vic-
tory of the peoples against the
injustices, exploitation, oli-
garchy, and imperialism, regard-
less of the wrong concepts which
may try to change the course, is
inevitable.... /Real7 Communists
will not let the revolution down,
just as our revolution will never
let down the Latin American revo-
lutionary movements."
Soviet Reaction
Publicly the Soviets under-
standably have played down the
LASO conference
For_ the most part,
Soviet commentators have preferred
to argue the merits of the USSR's
"united front" policy--combined
political action by all "progres-
sive" Latin American parties, in-
cluding the Communists--in each
country. Critics of this policy
have been described as "ultra-
left-wing" groups inspired by
Peking. There has been no men-
tion of the hard line taken by
Castro and others at the confer-
ence.
The Soviet ambassador to
Chile, Aleksandr Anikin, so far
is the only Soviet official to
belittle the conference publicly.
He told reporters in Santiago that
the LASO agreements "are of no
great importance" and "probably
would not be taken into considera-
tion" by the USSR. In an ap-
parently candid private conversa-
tion, another Soviet diplomat
commented to a US official in
Washington that there were no
real prospects for revolution in
Latin America and that Castro
had been inflating the idea for
his own purposes.
There is no evidence that
Moscow and Havana are any less
at odds since the conference, but
no sign that either wants an open
dispute. It appears that, as
expected, each side will continue
doing what it has been doing but
may talk about it less. Thus,
it is expected that the Soviets
will continue to do what they can
to maintain, and hopefully im-
prove, their position within the
Latin American revolutionary move-
ment, but not by sacrificing the
consolidation and expansion of
their trade and diplomatic rela-
tions with selected established
governments.
Latin American Reaction
Implementation and further
discussion of the resolutions
adopted at the conference have
been delayed for the past month
because of a decision that delegates
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could best avoid arrest by
their own governments by taking
circuitous routes home and de-
laying their arrival. Some dele-
gates may also have remained in
Havana for post-conference dis-
cussions.
A preliminary assessment
of available information indi-
cates that the conference, as ex-
pected, pleased pro-Castro groups
and displeased supporters of the
orthodox Moscow line. The or-
thodox Communist Party of Colom-
bia (PCC), for example, was re-
ported to be in general agreement
with the conference resolutions
but opposed to the Cuban position
on the primacy of "armed struggle,"
which it viewed as only one of
several methods in carrying out
the revolution.
The Colombian Communists
also disapproved the F- reso-
lution condemning the USSR for
aiding Latin American countries,
believing that it will only serve
to split the revolutionary move-
ment. On the other hand, the
PCC's militant guerrilla arm was
pleased with the conference and
is in the process of studying new
guerrilla strategy and tactics
with the hope that it can inten-
sify guerrilla activity in the
near future.
In Chile, the Communist
Party has scarcely even noted
LASO, although its partner in
the Popular Action Front, the
pro-Castro Socialist Party, is
strongly in favor of all confer-
ence resolutions, including the
attack on the Soviet Union. The
Socialists themselves, are badly
split, however, as the rebel wing
led by Raul Ampuero is taking an
increasingly contemptuous at-
titude toward the advocates of
f armed struggle.
The Uruguayan Communist
movement, led by Rodney Arismendi,
is in basic disagreement over the
conference results.
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however, that a public polemic
with the Cubans over the results
of the conference would be disas-
trous.
Outlook
The LASO conference, viewed
in the context of Latin American
Communism today, has clearly
widened the policy rift between
Cuba and the pro-Soviet parties.
Although it may produce a short-
term spate of propaganda that will
give the impression of increased
Communist activity, in the long
run the conference will probably
have a detrimental effect on the
pro-Soviet parties. Already
largely ineffectual except in ex-
ploiting existing discontent,
these parties now are torn be-
tween Castro-style militants try-
ing to organize armed insurrection
and the official Moscow-supported
apparatus favoring a "united
front" policy.
What is being witnessed to-
day is an effort to make many of
the orthodox Communist parties
appear to be relatively conserva-
tive in terms of the existing
political pattern in the hemi-
sphere. The real revolutionaries
are those who are willing to "go
to the hills." This is a problem
of considerable concern to the
urban-based orthodox parties,
who fear that they may be sup-
planted by so-called "authentic"
Communist parties.
In short, the trend is to-
ward less emphasis on ideological
considerations than on revolu-
tionary action. Any immediate
threat to political stability
from the pro-Soviet parties in
all but the most vulnerable coun-
tries may well be diminished in-
stead of enhanced, as each party
becomes more intent on preserving
its influence in left-wing circles
than on en a in in urban agit
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