WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006000020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
49
1 September 1967
No. 0305/67
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NWJOI SECRET
(Information as of noon EDT, 31 August 1967)
VIETNAM
Thieu and Ky are the expected winners as the South
Vietnamese presidential campaign draws to a close.
Throughout the week, Communist military units
sharply accelerated terrorism and harassment in an
apparent effort to discourage participation in the
elections. In Hanoi, evacuation measures have been
stepped up in the. wake of recent air strikes near
the city.
CURBS ON VIOLENCE DIVIDE CHINESE LEADERS
There is evidence of new measures designed to bring
the Cultural Revolution under tighter control, but
violence and disorder continue throughout China,
suggesting that top leaders in Peking remain deeply
divided over the need for ongoing purge efforts.
HONG KONG CRISIS EASES SLIGHTLY
The situation in Hong Kong has eased slightly, de-
spite continuing terrorist incidents in the colony
and clashes between police and Chinese diplomats in
London.
BURMESE GOVERNMENT HARASSED BY RICE SHORTAGES
The Ne Win regime faces serious difficulties during
the next few months as a result of rice shortages
and skyrocketing prices. Reports of unrest in Bur-
mese villages are increasing.
NORTH KOREANS CONTINUE DMZ INCIDENTS
North Korean forces are keeping up the pressure
along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in an apparent
effort, to discourage South Korea from sending addi-
tional troops to South Vietnam. UN command forces
have suffered more than 50 casualties in the past
week.
SECRET
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SECRET NNO,
Europe
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: THE NEXT PHASE
With parallel US and Soviet drafts on the table at
Geneva, efforts to overcome the remaining obstacles
to a treaty are under way.
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MOSCOW PAYS FOR SOVIET TROOPS IN EAST EUROPE
Recent research on the balance-of-payments deficits
in Soviet accounts since the late 1950s indicates
that Moscow reimburses its allies for most if not
all costs of maintaining Soviet troops in Eastern
Europe.
Middle East - Africa
NASIR QUASHES COUP ON EVE OF ARAB SUMMIT
A planned coup d'etat against Nasir was reportedly
quashed last weekend, but in spite of this the Egyp-
tian President has left Cairo to attend the Arab sum-
mit conference in Khartoum, where some press reports
say he and King Husayn are advocating a moderate ap-
proach to the impasse between the Arab states and
Israel.. Soviet military aid deliveries continued
near their prehostility level.
SECRET
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SECRET ine
BIAFRAN PUSH INTO NIGERIA'S WESTERN STATE CONTAINED 19
the federal
government will soon regain the initiative by launch-
ing a, major counteroffensive. Both sides continue
to receive new supplies of arms, but the federal
government is receiving decidedly greater quantities.
TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH IN THE CONGO (KINSHASA) 21
The prospects for a negotiated settlement with the
mercenaries have brightened somewhat but tensions
remain high in Katanga, where many Europeans are
preparing to evacuate.
BELGIAN RELATIONS WITH CONGO DETERIORATE FURTHER
Increasingly frustrated over the lack of progress
in negotiations with the Congolese, Brussels this
week decided not to send back to the Congo the
technical aid personnel who are presently vacation-
ing in Belgium.
POLITICAL UNREST RISES IN MALI AND GUINEA
The leaders of Mali and Guinea, highly nervous about
maintaining the elan--if not the basic stability--
of their "revolutionary" regimes, once again believe
they are acutely vulnerable to "imperialist plots."
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 25
DEBRAY TRIAL TO OPEN IN BOLIVIA
The trial, scheduled to begin on 7 or 8 September,
is attracting considerable attention from;-Communist
and leftist intellectuals abroad. Debray's defense
more than likely will include propaganda allegations
of "interference" in Bolivian affairs.
VENEZUELAN URBAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DECIMATED
Venezuelan police last week killed or captured eight
members of the urban terrorist arm of the Douglas
Bravo guerrilla movement, including a Cuban Army
sergeant whose involvement will add substance to
Venezuela's case against Castro.
GUYANA'S OPPOSITION PARTY MOVES CLOSER TO COMMUNISM
Party leader Cheddi Jagan, determined to create a
Communist organization, has ousted moderates from
top offices and installed a virtual rubber stamp
leadership group.
SECRET
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Iftv SECRET
FAR EAST
Violence dominated the scene in a number of
areas of the Far East during the past week.
As South Vietnam's presidential candidates
swung into their final lap, Viet Cong terrorist
action aimed at disrupting the election made its
anticipated upsurge. Can Tho, the delta's largest
city, was the target of one of the most severe in-
timidatory attacks, with over 200 civilian casual-
ties recorded. Communist units also launched ma-
jor attacks on other population centers and allied
military installations.
Violence continues to spread in Communist
China as well, and there seems little prospect of
success for Peking's efforts to halt it. Proclama-
tions and pleas designed to exert a moderating in-
fluence on warring factions may, as in the past,
be misinterpreted or ignored by local authorities.
China's border with Hong Kong, as well as the
situation in the colony itself, have been rela-
tively quiet in recent days. Terrorist acts in
Hong Kong are likely to continue, however, in re-
sponse to continued British pressure against local
Communists, including the recent conviction of
three Communist newsmen for sedition.
Along another sensitive border, armed inci-
dents flared again as North Korea maintained its
pressure on the South. The past week was a pain-
fu]. one for UN forces, with over 50 casualties--
about a third American--inflicted by harassing fire
and land mines.
In relatively quiet Burma, there is growing
popular unrest over rice shortages as the economy
slides downward more rapidly. This has already re-
sulted in one severe clash between demonstrators
and security forces. With no relief in sight be-
fore the year-end rice harvest, there is the pros-
pect of further civil disturbances, bringing with
them a significant, if not decisive, erosion of
popular support for the government.
SECRET
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SECRET
VIETNAM
Official campaigning for
South Vietnam's presidential and
senatorial elections will termi-
nate at noon on 2 September. The
turnout at the next day's elec-
tions may run as high as 80 per-
cent of the 5.8 million carried
on voter rolls--a percentage
roughly comparable to the Con-
stituent Assembly election last
year. The government is taking
elaborate precautions to ensure
that polling places and access
routes will be open to the voters
in the face of a growing Viet
Cong effort to discredit and dis-
rupt the elections.
Civilian presidential candi-
dates have continued to charge
that the Th_ieu-Ky military slate
is applying pressure tactics
against their campaign workers
and is resorting to fraud and
trickery to ensure a government
victory. Few allegations of pres-
sure have been substantiated,
and most evidence points to rela-
tively clean elections even
though scattered irregularities
may well be uncovered. It is
not unlikely, however, that in
the event of a Thieu-Ky victory,
the civilian candidates will en-
deavor to delay the final certi-
fication of the results by rais-
ing formal charges of fraud.
Thieu and Ky are generally
expected to win the contest.
They have predicted publicly
that their ticket may garner
35 to 40 percent of the total
vote. Among the ten other com-
peting tickets--all civilians--
Tran Van Huong and Phan Khac Suu
will probably come in second and
third, respectively.
The militant, antigovern-
ment faction of the Buddhist
church, led by Thich Tri Quang,
remains uncommitted to any par-
ticular civilian presidential
candidate.
In any event, the mili-
tants have probably delayed too
long to become a seriously dis-
ruptive factor in the elections
or to cause any substantial swing
away from Thieu and Ky.
General Thieu, in what ap-
pears to have been in part a
shrewd political ploy to quiet
critics of the military ticket,
told the press that he planned
to fire up to 50 military offi-
cers, including several generals,
for corruption and inefficiency.
Most of the dismissals, however,
probably will not occur until
after the election.
SECRET
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%we SECRET
Military Harassment Stepped Up
Communist forces during the
past week sharply accelerated
the pace of their military and
terrorist campaign in an effort
to undermine popular confidence
and block participation in the
elections.
Attacks were launched against
major population centers and al-
lied military installations
throughout South Vietnam. In
what was probably the most spec-
tacular and damaging enemy ac-
tion, Viet Cong guerrillas fired
mortars on Can Tho, the capital
of Phong Dinh Province and the
largest city in the Mekong Delta,
causing almost 250 civilian casual-
ties.
The biggest concentration
of Communist pre-election mili-
tary activity, however, was cen-
tered in the five northernmost
provinces that comprise South
Vietnam's I Corps area. Quang
Nam Province was particularly
hard hit. Enemy units on 26 Au-
gust attacked and temporarily
overran the provincial capital,
Hoi An, and seven nearby mili-
tary outposts, including a South
Vietnamese Army (ARVN) district
headquarters. South Vietnamese
defenders and civilians sustained
casualties of nearly 200 killed
or wounded.
Later in the week, another
ARVN district; headquarters at
Thang Binh, near the Quang Nam -
Quang Tin province border, was
hit by mortars and ground assault
troops. South Vietnamese losses
were again heavy--206 killed,
wounded, or missing, more than
half of whom were civilians.
The US Marine airstrip at
Marble Mountain, three miles south-
east of Da Nang, was shelled by
140-mm. barrage rockets on 27
August. Some 12 helicopters
or destro ed.
Between 25 and 29 August,
Viet Cong demolition teams de-
stroyed or damaged 14 bridges in
the Da Nang area, closing the
strategically important Hai Van
Pass.
Other significant enemy ac-
tions this week included a heavy
mortar attack on the provincial
capital of Quang Ngai, followed
by a major ground penetration
into the city during which al-
most 1,500 prisoners--most of
them political cadres--were re-
leased from a POW compound. In
addition, three heavy mortar at-
tacks occurred on 29 August against
US and ARVN positions near the
Thua Thien provincial capital of
Hue.
In what may be the opening round
of a new period of heavy combat
in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
area, North Vietnamese forces
have resumed mortar, rocket, and
artillery bombardments of US Ma-
rine bases in northeastern Quang
Tri Province.
SECRET
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`'"""' SECRET
Hanoi Stepping Up Evacuation
In the wake of mid-August
air strikes on transportation and
power networks in the Hanoi area,
North Vietnam has ordered addi-
tional civilian evacuation of
the capital.
local Hanoi
authorities on 25 August told
all residents who were not di-
rectly involved in defense or de-
fense support to leave the cit
By 30 August,
the order was being
"strictly observed."
Workers in small industrial
and handicraft cooperatives were
ordered to move out immediately,
and even those in state-operated
enterprises were to begin evacua-
tion. Labor unions and managers
in state-owned companies were
made responsible for the evacua-
tion of worker families. Local
Hanoi authorities reportedly
have increased public dining fa-
cilities to accommodate the
workers whose families have been
moved out.
/ many government min-
istries, including foreign af-
fairs and defense, had already
moved part of their staffs out
of the city, leaving only skele-
ton administrations behind.
There is as yet no report that 25X1
foreign embassies have been or-
dered to evacuate, although mis-
sions have been told in the past 25X1
that they could move north of
Hanoi if they wished. The pub-
lic appearances of high-level
party leaders have diminished in
recent months, suggesting that
some of them may have taken up
residence outside Hanoi.
Evacuation measures taken in
Hanoi in 1966 are estimated to
have reduced the city's prewar
population of over a million to
less than 700,000. Current
measures are apparently designed
to reduce the population even
further, probably well below the
half-million mark.
SECRET
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lw' SECRET yr
CURBS ON VIOLENCE DIVIDE CHINESE LEADERS
There is evidence of new meas-
ures designed to bring the Cultural
Revolution under tighter control,
but violence and disorder continue
throughout China. This suggests
that top leaders in Peking remain
deeply divided over the need for
ongoing purge efforts and that the
Maoists are reluctant to halt the
destructive activities of the "revo-
lutionary" Red Guards.
Leaders in Peking may be hav-
ing second thoughts about the whole-
sale arming of "revolutionary" ci-
vilians, which apparently has been
August posters put up in Peking
were claiming that Kiangsi was one
of several provinces where serious
armed struggles were taking place.
taking place in recent weeks.
a directive was issue
on about August instructing war-
ring factions in Canton to surrender
weapons to the local authorities.
Radiobroadcasts from several other
provinces attribute the directive
to Mao, and indicate that the di-
rective was nationwide in scope.
Madame Mao said in late July that
"rebels" must be armed, and poster
reports have stated that rifles
were being furnished to two elite
Red Guard groups in Peking and to
"revolutionary masses" in at least
one province in mid-August. Such
groups, however, will probably re-
sist any attempt to disarm them.
The directive, presumably in-
tended to bolster Maoist strength,
could lead to further conflict.
Local authorities have often
A 30 August radiobroadcast
from Kiangsi revealed that the cen-
tral committee had replaced the com-
mander and the political commissar
of the Kiangsi Military District and
appointed a provisional government
for the province. Both the new com-
mander and the new political commis-
sar have been serving in the Tsinan
MR.
Recent Peking broadcasts have
returned to an old conciliatory
line that most party bureaucrats
are politically reliable. Editori-
als in People's Daily on 18 and
25 August urged "revolutionaries"
to make bold use of party cadres.
The editorials stated that even
cadres who have committed serious
mistakes are to be welcomed and
supported. This theme was replayed
SECRET'
twisted such directives to iustify
arming their own groups.
killing and fighting continue in
Canton, despite wide publication
of the directive. This could well
be the case in other provinces.
In early
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*../ SECRET
in a broadcast on 25 August from
Heilungkiang-?-a province where
four former party and government
bureaucrats have re-emerged in
responsible positions just in the
past month.
This gesture toward the party
followed indications of new ef-
forts to curb the Red Guards that
COMMUNIST CHINA
began to appear on 18 August--
the first anniversary of the tu-
multuous founding of the movement
which was celebrated in surpris-
ingly low key. A People's Daily
article on 23 August underscored
the "return to study" theme which
had been brought up again at the
anniversary for the first time in
many weeks.
SECRET
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`"~ SECRET r.rr
The article noted that many
students and "young Red Guard
fighters" were reluctant to stay
at school and "always want to
break out"--a phenomenon that
should be corrected "immediately."
It declared that in the present
situation, Red Guards should not
travel about to "exchange experi-
ence" and urged the guards to
"pick up pens" instead of "knives
and spears."
On 26 August, People's Daily
replayed a Shanghai Red Guard
newspaper editorial calling for
an end to the practice of staging
parades in vehicles. Posters ob-
served in Peking on 29 August
stated that a key Red Guard leader,
the witch-like Nieh Yuan-tzu who
authored the first big-character
poster and was one of Mao's fa-
vorites, had been criticized by
Mao because she is not a "genuine
HONG KONG CRISIS EASES SLIGHTLY
The situation in Hong Kong
has eased slightly, despite con-
tinuing terrorist incidents in
the colony. The border has re-
mained relatively quiet since
26 August, and British authorities
see indications of increased Chi-
nese Army control of the border
situation as a "hopeful sign."
Ignoring Communist threats
of retaliation, the British
sentenced three Communist news-
men to three years in prison for
sedition. To date there has been
no direct Communist response in
the colony, although Communist
propaganda sheets are calling for
the assassination of selected
anti-Communist Chinese leaders.
The colony's supply situa-
tion has also improved. Truck
shipments of food across the
border have resumed after an in-
terval of two weeks, and recent
heavy rains have given Hong Kong
enough water to survive the
forthcoming dry season even if
the Communists do not resume water
deliveries on the scheduled date
of 1 October.
Peking is apparently giving
vent to its frustrations over the
impasse in Hong Kong by provoking
new clashes with the British else-
where. On 29 August, personnel
from the Chinese Embassy in Lon-
don attacked bystanders, includ-
ing police, for allegedly insult-
ing Maoist thought. The Chinese
followed this up by delivering
to the British charge in Peking a
protest accusing London of provok-
ing the incident, and have once
again begun demonstrations out-
SECRET
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SECRET NWO,
BURMESE GOVERNMENT HARASSED BY RICE SHORTAGES
The Ne Win regime faces
serious difficulties during the
next few months as a result of
rice shortages and skyrocketing
prices. Reports of unrest in
Burmese villages are increasing.
The most serious violent
incident to date occurred in the
port of Akyab in west Burma on
13 August when a mob of about
5,000 looted government rice
stocks and attacked government
installations. Burmese security
forces opened fire on the demon-
strators, killing 22 and wounding
45. In other widely scattered
incidents, government rice ship-
ments have been looted, and angry
crowds have forced government
officials and private traders to
sell their rice holdings at of-
ficial prices.
There is no evidence of a
direct Communist hand in these
disorders, although both Peking
and local Communists are seeking
to exploit the situation by
focusing popular attention upon
Burma's deteriorating economy.
The current difficulties in
rice stem from the unrealistically
low prices the government has been
paying to farmers. This has held
down production and encouraged
hoarding. The measures the gov-
ernment has taken to cope with
the problem thus far have been
inadequate. A 15-percent reduc-
tion in rice exports and a partial
decontrol of the internal rice
trade in June came too late to
have much impact. Prices on
privately sold rice remain pro-
hibitively expensive for the aver-
age consumer and although rice
sold by the government is more
attractively priced, the ration
has been cut.
The rice squeeze has already
cost General Ne Win much of the
popular support that he picked
up earlier this summer by his
tough stand against Peking and the
local Chinese. Although Ne Win
will probably weather the present
crisis, the longer term outlook
remains uncertain and his popular
support may be further eroded if
the forceful measures employed by
security forces at Akyab are re-
peated elsewhere in Burma.
SECRET
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SECRET 'Nor
NORTH KOREANS CONTINUE DMZ INCIDENTS
North Korean forces are keep-
ing up the pressure along the De-
militarized Zone (DMZ). The tempo
of incidents increased in October
1966 and has continued at a high
level through this summer.
On 28 August the North Ko-
reans launched attacks south of
the western boundary of the zone,
leaving one American dead and 14
wounded. There were also 14 South
Korean casualties--two killed and
12 wounded. The action began when
elements of a US engineer unit
were attacked by an unknown num-
ber of North Koreans using auto-
matic weapons. The first of two
rescue parties from the 2nd In-
fantry Division was ambushed, and
a vehicle from the second party
detonated a mine. The next day
two more US vehicles struck land
mines in the same area, killing
three and wounding three.
On 27 August the North Ko-
reans used grenades against a
SOUTH
KOREA
ong, S,,Incidents
punjom i282fAugust)
SOUTH KOREAN
SECTOR
~ }L UNISEUCTORTES
SECRET
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South Korean Army checkpoint near
the eastern DMZ boundary, killing
six and wounding ten. Following
the attack the South Korean forces
fired mortars and 105-mm. how-
itzers at the suspected North Ko-
rean withdrawal route. No North
Korean casualties were reported in
any of the incidents.
. The number of clashes along
the DMZ is likely to continue at
a high level and could possibly
grow even greater. These North
Korean actions may be designed in
part to discourage South Korea
from sending more troops to South
Vietnam. The Communists, well
aware the South Koreans are chaf-
ing under US restraints against
retaliation, may also hope to
place a strain on relations be-
tween Washington and Seoul. There
is no evidence, however, of a
North Korean military build-up
or of impending North Korean plans
for a major military action.
KOREA-Armed Incidents of 27-29 August 1967
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NWO, SECRET
EUROPE
Political activity in Europe began picking up
as the traditional August vacation period neared its
end.
Ministers of the major industrialized nations
reached a milestone agreement in London last weekend
on a contingency plan for the creation of interna-
tional monetary reserves to supplement gold, sterling,
and the dollar. The plan gives a key role to the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. The Common Market coun-
tries will have greater collective voting power in the
new scheme than they have previously had in the fund's
operations.
The Belgian Government, lacking adequate security
guarantees from Kinshasa for Belgian personnel as-
signed to the Congo, has decided not to send back
those who are spending the summer in Belgium (see ar-
ticle on page 22). This means that 1,200 teachers
will not return for the new school year. As a result,
many of the Belgians still in the Congo under private
auspices may decide to leave. They have regarded the
Belgian schools as a symbol of Brussels' continuing
involvement and protection.
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SECRET
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: THE NEXT PHASE
The US and the USSR have
introduced parallel drafts of a
nonproliferation treaty (NPT)
at Geneva, but there are still
problems to be worked out between
them. The Soviets have begun
the search. for compromises on
these differences and for ways
in which they, together with the
US, can get around the remaining
objections of the nonnuclear
states.
Ambassador Roshchin, head
of the Soviet delegation, has
indicated that Moscow is willing
to consider a compromise on the
key question of safeguards--the
subject of Article III, which
was left blank in the draft sub-
mitted to the disarmament con-
ference last week. He told the
US delegate that the Soviet ver-
sion of Article III--calling only
for the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify
compliance with the treaty--could
be altered to help overcome ob-
jections raised by members of
EURATOM, which operates the safe-
guards system of the Common Mar-
ket countries.
Roshchin said the provision
could note that the IAEA can ne-
gotiate agreements "bilaterally
or multilaterally." Such a for-
mulation could accommodate EURA-
TOM in fact if not in name, and
clear the way for a compromise--
probably one in which the two in-
stitutions would work out the in-
spection problem between them.
The question of security as-
surances to nonnuclear countries
is another hurdle still to be
gotten over. After the US-Soviet
draft was tabled, Roshchin told
the US it was essential for Mos-
cow and Washington to reach agree-
ment quickly on this and the safe-
guards question so that the NPT
could be more easily defended at
the UN General Assembly. The Rus-
sians see eye-to-eye with the US
on the desirability of confining
consideration of the draft to the
Geneva forum until a text--a com-
plete one, if possible--can be
put before the General Assembly,
probably in October.
The Soviets have also indi-
cated that they will go along
with Washington's wish to make
separate statements on security
for nonnuclear states, rather
than writing these assurances
into the treaty. Before the
treaty is signed, however, ob-
jections from several quarters
must be overcome.
Moscow's delay in tabling
the treaty draft, apparently the
result of Rumanian foot-dragging,
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.aw SECRET
indicates that approval of a
final text by the USSR's allies
will not in. every case be auto-
matic. As self-appointed spokes-
man for the nonaligned states,
India is giving the draft treaty
a cool reception and promises to
take an especially hard look at
the security guarantees. On the
Western side, West Germany and
Italy object to the proposed un-
limited duration of the treaty
and to the amendments provision,
which gives a veto power to the
IAEA board of governors--of which
they are not permanent members.
Moscow is least likely to
give ground on these latter two
points. The Russians are ob-
sessed with preventing West Ger-
man access to nuclear weapons,
and do not want to limit the
NPT's duration nor give the sig-
natories the right to reject
amendments.
MOSCOW PAYS FOR SOVIET TROOPS IN EAST EUROPE
Recent. research on the bal-
ance-of-payments deficits in So-
viet accounts since the late 1950s
indicates that Moscow reimburses
its allies for most if not all
costs of maintaining Soviet troops
in Eastern Europe.
The substantial deficits in
bilateral accounts with East Ger-
many, Poland, and Hungary are pro-
portional to the number of Soviet
troops billeted there. There is
no similar imbalance in accounts
with Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and
Bulgaria, where no Soviet troops
are stationed. This strongly sug-
gests that any contribution by
the Eastern European countries
toward the upkeep of Soviet troops
is small and in no case an eco-
nomic burden.
Against this background, Ru-
mania's grievances toward the
Warsaw Pact take on an overwhelm-
ingly political hue. The purported
Rumanian memorandum to other pact
members, published by the French
Communist Party newspaper L'Hu-
manit6 in May 1966, complained
about the expenses that arose from
the maintenance of foreign troops
on the territory of pact coun-
tries. Rumania was reported to
have argued that the country from
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which the troops came should pay
such expenses and that any coun-
try wanting foreign troops on its
territory should sign a bilateral
agreement to that effect. This
argument now appears to have been
for purely political effect, since
the situation it decried had prob-
ably long since ceased to exist.
The balance-of-payments defi-
cits in Soviet accounts with Po-
land, Hungary, and East Germany
showed up in the late 1950s, im-
mediately after Moscow had signed
new agreements covering the status
of Soviet troops in these coun-
tries. If, as the evidence indi-
cates, Moscow has been footing
the bill since then, it is pre-
sumably in accordance with these
agreements.
Moscow has never responded
publicly to Rumanian innuendoes
that the Soviet Union takes fi-
nancial advantage of its allies,
no doubt so as not to accentuate
its differences with Rumania and
because of a traditional penchant
for secrecy in defense matters.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The Middle East and African countries are cur-
rently engaging in "summitry."
The Arab summit opened in Khartoum on 29 Au-
gust without the presence of militant presidents
Boumediene of Algeria or Atassi of Syria. The adop-
tion of an oil embargo or other economic sanctions
against the West by the Arabs at the summit is un-
likely. Egyptian President Nasir and King Faysal
of Saudi Arabia have reached at least initial agree-
ment on the broad terms for a Yemen settlement.
Nasir, prior to his departure for Khartoum, broke
up a planned coup by arresting the former chief of
the armed forces and other high-ranking officers,
but his action will not fully quell the troubles
in his regime.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, British efforts
to contrive an interim arrangement before pulling
out of South Arabia at the end of the year are run-
ning into increasing difficulty. Early this week,
the acting head of the Federal Supreme Council--
presumably with British backing--asked the South
Arabian Army to take over the administration of the
federation. Such a move would have enabled the
British to depart without leaving utter chaos in
their wake. The army, however, has refused unless
stiff conditions--unacceptable to the British--are
met.
About 30 of the 38 members of the organization
of African Unity are planning to attend the pre-
li, Minary foreign ministers' meeting in Kinshasa,
Congo, opening on 4 September. Attendance by heads
of states at the follow-up summit meeting planned
for 11 September is likely to be even less repre-
sentative: there is widespread lack of enthusiasm
for the meetings as well as concern over the secu-
rity situation in the Congo. President Mobutu has
been pushing for the meeting in Kinshasa largely to
get a show of African endorsement for his regime.
The meetings are not expected to deal with Af-
rica's other current trouble spot, Nigeria, because
the federal government at Lagos insists the fighting
is an internal problem.
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`' SECRET
NASIR QUASHES COUP ON EVE OF ARAB SUMMIT
A planned coup d'etat against
Nasir was reportedly quashed last
weekend, but in spite of this the
Egyptian President has left Cairo
to attend the Arab summit confer-
ence in Khartoum.
Egyptian Coup
A scheme to depose President
Nasir is said to have been broken
up on the night of 25 August with
the arrest of former first vice
president and deputy supreme com-
mander of the Egyptian armed
forces, Abdul Hakim Amir, and some
150 of his military collaborators.
Amir was reportedly very
popular among the military, and
his arrest could spark further
opposition from that quarter. Such
opposition would probably take
some time to become effectively
organized, however, because the
military leadership at present
appears decimated and badly de-
moralized.
Arab Summit
Nasir, apparently confident
that the immediate threat to his
position has been put down, is
presently in Khartoum participat-
ing in the current sessions of
the Arab summit conference. King
Husayn of Jordan has privately ex-
pressed optimism that a moderate
consensus on Arab actions in the
aftermath of the war will be ar-
rived at by the Arab heads of
state, but the split between the
moderates and the radicals appears
to be as wide as ever.
Page 18
The Syrian delegation to the
summit, led by Foreign Minister
Makhus, reportedly did not par-
ticipate in the opening sessions
and appeared to be contemplating
flying back to Damascus before
the conference ended. Algeria's
intransigent stance, meanwhile,
was emphasized on 30 August by its
nationalization of the Esso and
Mobil distributing companies in
Algeria.
Nasir's position is the key
factor. Some reports suggest that
he has joined Husayn in supporting
a "political solution" with Is-
rael.
The Khartoum meetings have
led to at least initial agreement
between King Faysal of Saudi Arabia
and Nasir on the broad outlines
for an end to the Yemen conflict.
A similar agreement in 1965 failed,
however, and a number of thorny
issues are yet to be resolved.
Soviet Military Aid
Soviet military aid deliveries
to the Middle East continue at
about the prehostilit level.
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BI[AFRAN PUSH INTO NIGERIA'S WESTERN STATE CONTAINED
Federal. military forces ap-
pear to have contained secession-
ist Biafra's thrust along all ma-
jor routes into the West, al-
though some minor infiltration
by Biafran troops is continuing.
the main federal. thrust
will come out of the north into
the Biafra-occupied Mid-Western
State, with the objective of mov-
ing south of the town of Auchi
to cut the main road between
Benin and the Niger River. Some
light skirmishing near Auchi is
now under way. Lagos reportedly
has 3,000-4,000 men and a number
of armored cars available for this
Page 19
ambitious operation, but the dis-
cipline of many newly recruited
troops is questionable. The
federal military may also be
planning a new seaborne assault
along the coast of Biafra or the
Mid-West State.
Federal leader Gowon has
established an inner circle of
civilian and military advisers
who reportedly will meet daily
on the war situation. Although
the move does not reduce Gowon's
authority, the civilian leaders
may prove troublesome once they
are fully aware of the many
federal military deficiencies.
Nevertheless, Gowon probably
hopes that the deeper involve-
ment of these individuals es-
pecially Yoruba leader Awolowo,
will solidify their political
commitment to the federal regime.
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Ifto, SECRET Imw
The Nigerian Air Force has
encountered problems in getting
its recently acquired jet air-
craft operational
Both sides continue to re-
ceive new supplies of arms, but
the federal government is receiv-
ing decidedly greater quantities.
Northern military leaders
may be making preparations to
protect northern interests in
case the federation fragments
Ward
Yee
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( `Makurdi
~~g4 K-; eniCi
New State boundary
decreed by Gowan
on 27 May 1967
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SECRET "W
The north-
erners probably believe they
must make some contingency plans
in the event the Yorubas in the
Western State join with Biafra
and the Mid-West in a southern
alliance against the northern-
dominated central government.
Gowon is aware of some of this
free-wheeling by northern offi-
cers but probably does not be-
lieve it to be serious.
Yoruba political leaders,
meanwhile, seem to be increas-
ingly concerned over the intensi-
fication of the war. A number
of key leaders of the main Yoruba
political croup reportedly dis-
agreed sharply with Awolowo's
strong support of the federal
government at a meeting in Iba-
dan on 27 August.
Nigerian news media, busi-
nessmen, and labor officials
continue to attack the US for
its statement disapproving the
Soviet arms delivery to the
Lagos government. Gowon re-
portedly is under pressure from
various groups to permit demon-
strations against the US.
TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH IN THE CONGO (KINSHASA)
Although the prospects for
a negotiated settlement with the
mercenaries have brightened some-
what since Mobutu's complete re-
jection of the idea late last
week, tensions remain high in Ka-
tanga Province.
Mobutu, on 24 August, stated
that negotiations had failed and
that a Congolese military victory
was the only face-saving solution
to the mercenary problem. He
probably has few illusions,
however, regarding the capability
of the Congolese Army to defeat
the mercenaries or to force
their surrender, and has since
backed down a bit. His latest
suggestion is that if mercenary
leader Schramme were to "dis-
appear," negotiations could be
arranged with the rest of the
mercenaries. In any case, Mobutu
is now primarily interested in
hosting the coming OAU summit
meeting and has said that he will
take no further action until
after that conference.
Tensions remain high in
Katanga Province following fur-
ther Belgian deaths there and
elsewhere in the country at the
hands of the Congolese Army. To
complicate matters still more,
hostilities have developed be-
tween two military units sta-
tioned in the province. Mobutu
has finally agreed to replace
the hated and feared Governor
Manzikala, and has also ordered
the least disciplined unit out
of downtown Lubumbashi (formerly
Elisabethville) and into barracks
about 75 miles away. Mobutu's
gestures may be too little and
too late, however, for most
consulate staffs in the area
are preparing their citizens for
possible evacuation.
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BELGIAN RELATIONS WITH CONGO DETERIORATE FURTHER
The Belgian Government this
week decided not to send back to
the Congo its technical aid per-
sonnel who are spending the sum-
er in Belgium.
Brussels had notified the
Congolese in late July that fu-
ture technical aid would depend
on adequate security guarantees
for Belgian personnel. The Con-
golese Government was preoccupied
with the mercenary problem, how-
ever, and negotiations on guaran-
tees and other conditions never
proceeded far. The sacking of
the Belgian Embassy in Kinshasa
on 14 August, more atrocities in
the eastern Congo, and Mobutu's
proclivity to blame Brussels for
the mercenary problem have all
added to the Belgians' sense of
frustration.
Brussels' decision means
that some 1,200 Belgian teachers
will not return to the Congo for
the new school year. As a re-
sult, most if not all the Belgi-
ans in the Congo under private
auspices may decide to leave.
They regard the Belgian schools--
to which most send their chil-
dren--as a symbol of Brussels'
continuing involvement and pro-
tection. The Belgian ambassador
estimates only about 20,000 Bel-
gians remained in the Congo as
of last week.
The Belgian ambassador has
been instructed to renew contacts
with Mobutu on future technical
aid. Even in the unlikely event
these contacts should immediately
prove fruitful, however, Brussels
will insist on a period of calm
before encouraging its personnel
to return to the Congo.
POLITICAL UNREST RISES IN MALI AND GUINEA
The leaders of Mali and
Guinea, highly nervous about main-
taining the elan--if not the basic
stability--of their "revolution-
ary" regimes, once again believe
they are acutely vulnerable to
"imperialist" plots.
The Malian regime underwent
a sudden and drastic shake-up on
21 August, when President Modibo
Keita announced the dissolution
of the politbureau of Mali's
single party and the transfer of
its powers to the National Com-
mittee for the Defense of the
Revolution (CNDR). Twelve of the
18 members of the politbureau
were dropped completely from posi-
tions of power. The directing
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committees of all local party
branches were also abolished.
These party groups, which gave
representation to the conserva-
tive countryside, lost influence,
and the appointment of five new
members greatly intensified the
CNDR's leftist cast. Keita
stated that the shake-up was
necessitated by an increase in
the "international threat from
imperialism."
M A U R I T A N I A
*Nouakchott
Conakry*
Freetown*
SIERRA LEONE
*Monrovia
SECRET VMW
The 12-man CNDR--which now
has virtually full powers--was
originally created as a security
measure in March 1966 when mili-
tary coups appeared to threaten
radical African regimes. As modi-
fied, it constitutes a coalition
of the youth, labor, and military
groups that have been agitating
for several months for a resur-
gence of revolutionary zeal, com-
plaining of corruption and foot-
SECRET
Santa Isabe* *Yaounde
FEFNTNO0 PG
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
ta..i
PivIo iiac Rla xuxi I
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SECRET
dragging in both party and govern-
ment. These groups have made ex-
travagant pledges of loyalty to
Things are even more tense
in neighboring Guinea, where a
congress of the ruling party is
scheduled for late September. The
domestic issues are similar--eco-
nomic stagnation, corruption among
government and. party officials,
and a diminishing interest in
revolutionary fervor on the part
of the masses. President Sekou
Toure' has long been dissatisfied
with the Guinean politbureau, but
previous party congresses have
blocked his efforts at reform.
The Malian solution may be viewed
by some Guinean leaders as a way
out of their own dilemma.
Meanwhile, Toure remains pre-
occupied with the idea that the
French are out: to bring him down
and that the pro-French regimes
in Ivory Coast: and Senegal are
cooperating with Paris. Ivory
Coast's continuing detention of
Guinea's foreign minister is
causing Conakry increasing in-
ternational embarrassment as the
OAU summit and the UN General
Assembl a roach.
political moment.
25X1
L _f_Senegal's current forced
repatriation of about 5,000 Guin-
eans as well as the anticipated
visit to Dakar of De Gaulle's
chief agent for African affairs
are additional upsetting factors.
Underlying the internal
tension in both Mali and Guinea
is the question of choosing be-
tween France and Communist China
as a model and a prime source of
economic aid. Mali signed new
financial accords with France
last March, and Keita has reit-
erated since the shake-up that
Bamako intends to abide by their
terms. Nevertheless, a number
of Malians, led by those recently
elevated to key positions, op-
pose close ties with France
and continue to look toward Pe-
king.
In Guinea, the existing ties
are with China, but many Guin-
eans are nostalgic for the more
prosperous days under the French.
Several recently completed Chi-
nese aid projects, among them
a "People's Palace" to be used
as a new party headquarters, are
to be dedicated next month. This
will give the proponents of Chi-
nese aid an opportunity for con-
siderable fanfare at a crucial
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_ SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Guerrilla activity, actual and threatened, domi-
nated the news in several Latin American countries
during the past week.
Much of the comment evolved from the publicity
emanating from the conference of the Latin American
Solidarity Organization (LASO) in Havana and from
speculation about the reports that will be brought
back by the LASO delegates--many of whom visited Mos-
cow on their circuitous way home.
In Guatemala, the newly reorganized Communist
Rebel Armed Forces took on security forces in a se-
ries of gun battles in the capital city. The Nica-
raguan National Guard has found evidence of an armed
band north of Managua, but earlier press reports of
a major clash seem to have been exaggerated.
Colombian guerrillas, although reportedly plan-
ning to intensify their activity, are still avoiding
any significant confrontation with the army. Bo-
livian authorities preparing the public trial of
French Communist Jules Regis Debray fear a guerrilla
attack may disrupt the trial and are considering
shifting it to a city outside the guerrillas' usual
area of operations.
In Venezuela, the capture of a Cuban Army ser-
geant among the urban terrorists inspired several
prominent citizens to issue press statements calling
for paramilitary action against Cuba--including the
infiltration of anti-Castro guerrillas onto the is-
land.
A more realistic action by Venezuela is the pro-
posal to condemn Cuba at the Meeting of Foreign Min-
isters of the Organization of American States (OAS)
which will convene on 22 September. The Venezuelan
foreign minister probably will review the OAS dis-
cussion in his speech to the United Nations General
Assembly after 24 Septmber. The major problem will
remain, however, of what--short of military action--
the OAS can do to curb Castro.
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DEBRAY TRIAL TO OPEN IN BOLIVIA
The public trial of cele-
brated French Communist Jules
Regis Debray has been deferred
until 7 or 8 September in order
to give the Bolivian Government
more time to prepare its case.
Debray, an expert on guer-
rilla warfare and a close asso-
ciate of Fidel Castro, was ap-
prehended by Bolivian authorities
last April. He is charged with
rebellion, murder, assault, and
robbery, and if convicted, could
be sentenced to as much as 30
years in prison.
The Debray trial has at-
tracted considerable attention
abroad, where he has become some-
what of a cause celebre among
leftist intellectuals, particu-
larly in France. Foreign Commu-
nist propaganda has successfully
exploited Debray's imprisonment,
winning considerable sympathy for
him. Once the trial begins,
Havana can be expected to use it
to propagandize against US poli-
cies in Latin America and around
the world. Moreover, Debray's
defense will more than likely
include propaganda allegations
of US "interference" in Bolivian
affairs.
The guerrillas have little
prospect of success, but if they
could spring Debray the Bolivian
Army's prestige would be dealt
a crippling blow. In any case,
if the decision is made to trans-
fer the trial, the guerrillas
will have won a psychological
victory by demonstrating again
the army's inability to control
the situation in the guerrilla
zone.
Except for a skirmish on 26
August, there has been a general
lull in guerrilla activity over
the past two weeks.
The secret preliminary hear-
ings for the trial are being held
in Camiri, a small town close to
the area in which the guerrillas
have been active since last March.
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VENEZUELAN URBAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DECIMATED
Venezuelan police scored
a significant victory over urban
terrorists last week by killing
or capturing eight members of
the Strategic Sabotage Command
(CES), the urban terrorist arm
of Douglas Bravo's Armed Forces
of National Liberation.
In three separate raids be-
ginning on 11 August, the police
killed four top terrorists, three
of whom were platoon leaders and
one who is believed responsible
for the assassination last March
of the brother of the Venezuelan
foreign minister. Among those
captured is Adolfo Meinhardt
Lares, the CES commander in chief.
A Cuban Army sergeant who entered
Venezuela clandestinely with 12
to 14 other guerrillas in July
1966 was also taken prisoner.
Police confiscated a substantial
quantity of weapons and materiel,
in addition to some $20,000 of
the $100,000 taken by the CES in
a bank robbery the day before.
The CES was organized by
Bravo in July 1966 shortly after
he broke with. the pro-Soviet Com-
munist Party. Its objectives
are the assassination of Vene-
zuelan military personnel; the
theft of arms, explosives, medical
equipment, and supplies; bank
robbery; sabotage of military
installations; and "spectacular
military actions"--presumably
attacks on military garrisons.
The CES is responsible for
a good deal of the urban terrorism
that has plagued Caracas for over 25X1
Last week's police
actions have hurt it badly, but
approximately 30 members are still
at large and can conduct sporadic
acts of violence on a small scale.
The capture of the Cuban
Army sergeant will add substance
to Venezuela's case against Castro
intervention that will be pre-
sented to the Meeting of Foreign
Ministers of the Organization
of American States beginning on
22 September. Although Venezuela
has plenty of evidence and the
support of most Latin American
countries, there is little en-
thusiasm for the meeting since
many believe there are no meaning-
ful sanctions that can be applied 25X1
i--n Havana at this time.
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GUYANA'S OPPOSITION PARTY MOVES CLOSER TO COMMUNISM
Cheddi Jagan, the leader
of Guyana's opposition People's
Progressive Party (PPP), has
moved his party closer to be-
coming a Communist organization.
At the party's annual con-
gress on 26 and 27 August, Jagan
engineered the election of a
large majority of his personal
supporters to top leadership
posts. In creating a virtual
rubber-stamp :Leadership group,
Jagan allowed a few moderates
whom he does not control to re-
tain executive offices. This
bow to the moderate wing allows
Jagan to take advantage of its
administrative expertise for a
while longer, but he is still
determined to turn the PPP into
a Communist organization and get
rid of all his opponents.
Several defeated moderates
are members of the National As-
sembly. They are deeply resent-
ful of Jagan's high-handed tactics,
and boycotted assembly sessions
in a public protest. Even if some
of them bolt the party, however,
it is doubtful that they could
take an appreciable number of fol-
lowers with them or cause any
mass disaffection.
The PPP is a racially based
East Indian party whose members
idolize Jagan as their champion
without regard to his ideological
beliefs. Without the moderates'
influence the PPP will become
more radical and doctrinaire--
possibly on occasion slighting
Guyanese political issues in
favor of international Communist 25X1
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