WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 27, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
NEW Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
OSD review
completed
cret
48
27 January 1967
No. 5.4/67
z71
r1 ?
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRET %o'
(Information as of noon EST, 26 January 1967)
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
VIETNAM
Communist-initiated military action declined in South
Vietnam this week, but there is increasing evidence
of possible future moves in the northern part of the
country. The dismissal of southern General Co is be-
coming more widely known in Saigon and could exacer-
bate relations between northern military leaders and
southern politicians. North Vietnam's rice harvest
may be the worst in years. Large truck convoys are
:reported moving south through the Laos panhandle.
COMMUNIST CHINA
The internal struggle appears to have been brought to
a major turning point by the public threat of Maoist
leaders to use the army against their adversaries.
There are indications, however, of cleavages within
the military and of confusion and disunity in the
Maoist faction itself.
ANTI-SUKARNO CAMPAIGN ACCELERATES IN INDONESIA
More key figures in the 1965 coup attempt have been
arrested and reportedly are further implicating Su-
karno.
BURMA SEEKING TO PURCHASE US MILITARY EQUIPMENT
General Ne Win apparently is prepared to depart from
his carefully plotted neutralist course, partly out
of concern over the implications for Burma's security
of the upheaval in China.
NEGOTIATIONS OVER MACAO STALEMATED
Despite Chinese Communist economic pressure and gun-
boat diplomacy, there are signs that the Portuguese
position has hardened. The evacuation of Portuguese
dependents from Macao continues.
OSD review completed
SECRET
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
Page
1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
SECRET
Europe
SCVIET LEADERS CONFER WITH GOMULKA
They consider him the key East European leader with
regard to intrabloc problems and want his support for
Moscow's China policies.
CCAL-STEEL PROBLEMS POSE THREAT TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The need for decisions on the problem of high costs
and overproduction within the coal and steel industries
has brought a threat to the authority of the Communi-
ty's supranational executive.
SECR1?'I'
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
SECRET
ISRAEL AND SYRIA MEET ON DEMILITARIZED ZONE DISPUTE
There was no immediate progress toward an accommodation
of their dispute over farming in the zone, and pros-
pects for a reduction of tension along the border ap-
pear slim.
IMPASSE CONTINUES BETWEEN CONGO AND UNION MINIERE
A few glimmers of hope appeared during the week that
a deal could be worked out, but it is still unclear
whether the company is willing to go back into the
Congo at any price. The Congo is in for a serious
short-term foreign-exchange and supply crisis no mat-
ter what the outcome of the dispute.
TANZANIA REMOVING WESTERN SCHOOLTEACHERS
President Nyerere's current efforts to reduce Western
influence in the educational system will provide a
new opening for the Communist countries to expand
their presence in Tanzania.
POLITICAL STORM SIGNALS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Rising public discontent with and increasing strains
within President Bokassa's regime--which came to power
through a coup a year ago--may culminate in a new up-
heaval.
Western Hemisphere
NICARAGUA TENSE FOLLOWING PRE-ELECTION RIOTS AND ARRESTS
The long-ruling Somoza family's principal opposition
staged a riot last Sunday which it was hoped would
provoke an oppressive government crackdown warranting
OAS intervention in the 5 February election. Although
more violence flared on 25 January, the government
still plans to hold elections as scheduled.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
25
26
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
SEC REF
DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT MOVES AGAINST OPPONENTS
The heavy-handed round-up of numerous opponents of
the Balaguer regime--Communist as well as non-Com-
munist--has unleashed a torrent of criticism against
the government for "Trujillo-like" Policies.
NEW CONSTITUTION TO STRENGTHEN BRAZILIAN EXECUTIVE
The constitution that goes into effect when Costa e
Silva becomes president on 15 March continues many of
the special powers exercised by President Castello
Branco under the Institutional Acts and other decrees
that lapse on that date.
CHILEAN PRESIDENT SQUARES OFF AT CONGRESS
Repeated senatorial obstruction of President Frei's
reform program, capped by the vote that forced him to
cancel a visit to the US, has led him to introduce a
constitutional reform that would allow the president
to dissolve Congress and call new elections once dur-
ing his term.
ECUADOR-PERU BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY MAY ERUPT AGAIN
The 25th anniversary of the Rio Protocol, which estab-
lished the boundary, falls on 29 January. It is like-
ly to be marked by serious demonstrations in Quito and
Guayaquil, and possibly even by armed clashes along
the border.
SECRET
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
SECRET
FAR EAST
The struggle in China appears to have been
brought to a major turning point by the public
threats of Maoist leaders to use the army against
their adversaries. This resort to open intimidation
reflects deep concern in the Mao faction over the
strength of opposition forces.
Actions by leaders around Mao last week sug-
gest that they now believe that the use of direct
military force is the only way to overcome their en-
trenched enemies in the party apparatus. They or-
dered the army on 23 January to begin supporting pro-
Mao forces in suppressing "antirevolutionary ele-
ments." According to a wall poster in Peking, troops
of the Peking garrison crushed "counterrevolutionary"
forces in a town 30 miles south of ,the capital--the
first publicized report that troops have been used
in strength against Mao's enemies.
Despite propaganda portraying the armed forces
as united and loyal to Mao, there were further indi-
cations of cleavages within the military and of con-
fusion and disunity in the Maoist faction itself.
Concern over the implications of the upheaval
in China for Burma's security probably underlie Gen-
eral Ne Win's decision to seek modern military
equipment from the US. This approach to the US rep-
resents a major departure from Burma's cautious
neutralist policy.
There was no change last week in the pattern of
Communist military action in Vietnam. The Saigon
military regime's dismissal of Defense Minister Co
so far has produced no political repercussions from
southern politicians.
Although the anti-Sukarno campaign in Indonesia
has accelerated, no definitive action against the
President apparently will be taken before congress
meets in March or April. The Suharto government is
preparing the ground by publicizing more information
on Sukarno's involvement in the attempted coup of
October 1965.
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRET w
un-ming
100 200
MILES
27 JANUARY
qN ~~
GIANG
C o ~
PHUOC
LONG
PHUOC
TUY ,
QUANG
NGAM
PHU
BON
DUC
KHAN
HOA
CAPITAL
MILITARY 70
TA
HIEN
PHU
YEN
65518 1-67 CIA
The Indochina -South China Area
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6 *War
SECRET
VIETNAM
The pace of military activity
in South Vietnam slackened dur-
ing the past week, as Viet Cong/
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces
initiated few significant actions
and continued to avoid major con-
tact with allied search-and-de-
stroy operations.
In what was probably the week's
most important Communist initia-
tive, enemy units on 20 January
shelled the US Marine enclave at
Phu Bai, ten miles southeast of
Hue in northern coastal Thua Thien
Province, inflicting 44 American
casualties but no major damage
to equipment.
In response to this threat,
additional US Marine units have
been deployed to the Phu Bai area
to prevent the Communists from
disrupting local rice harvesting
activities and to support marine
elements positioned south of the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
FS-izable numbers of
North Vietnamese troops are mov-
ing across the formerly neutral
buffer zone, possibly to rein-
force battalion-strength elements
of the NVA 324 "B" Division known
to be operating in the northern-
most districts of Quang Tri_ Prov-
ince. Simultaneous and coordin-
ated mortar and ground penetra-
tion attacks against six South
Vietnamese police posts and civil-
ian hamlets in the eastern por-
tion of the DMZ on 21 January may
be indicative of a general intensi-
fication of Communist activity
in this area.
Allied Ground Operations
Multibattalion allied task
force elements engaged in Opera-
tion CEDAR FALLS this week con-
tinued their systematic destruc-
tion of the Viet Cong's Iron
Triangle base area in Binh Duong
Province, north of Saigon. Al-
though the three-week offensive
has established only light and
sporadic contact with enemy main
force units, over-all Communist
personnel and materiel losses
have been heavy. As of 27 Janu-
ary, more than 700 Viet Cong
had been killed, 200 captured,
and 500 apprehended as suspects.
In addition, allied sweep forces
had confiscated nearly 4,000
tons of rice and 566 weapons.
US casualties to date stand at
72 killed and 328 wounded.
Two airborne battalions of
the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN),
conducting a search on 20 Janu-
ary for a suspected enemy troop
concentration, encountered Viet
Cong elements estimated at
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRE'T'
battalion strength in an area ten
miles west-northwest of Saigon.
The paratroops killed 117 and
captured 12 of the enemy, while
:Losing one killed and 14 wounded
in the action. There are tenta-
tive indications that the enemy
force may have been massing for
a possible attack against nearby
Tan Son Nhut Airfield
Dismissal of General Co
The ouster of Deputy Premier
and Defense Minister General Co
---agreed on last week by his mil-
itary peers but kept generally
secret until this week--has so
far brought no serious repercus-
sions. Co, although widely con-
sidered to be corrupt, was South
Vietnam's most prominent southern-
born general in a position of po-
Iitical influence.
The removal of Co is the
latest in a series of changes
in the military hierarchy over
the past year, allegedly aimed
at ridding the government of
officers who are either corrupt
or somewhat independent of Sai?-
gon's control. The fact that
generals so far dismissed have
either been from south or cen-
tral Vietnam has led to charges
that Ky and other northerners
are attempting to entrench them-
selves in power. There have
been reports, for example, that
several more province chiefs
in the delta provinces of IV
Corps are about to be replaced.
These changes suggest that
the military leaders now in
power are attempting to pack
key posts with loyal followers.
There are also scattered re-
ports of an initial military
plan to establish a grass-roots
political mechanism in hopes of
electing one of the military
leaders, possibly campaigning
as a civilian, as the first
constitutional president of
South Vietnam.
Poor Harvest Reported
In North Vietnam
unusually small
SECR1fl
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRET
the harvest may
have fallen short by 800,000 to
a million tons. Although it is
not clear whether this meant a
shortage from a planned total of
about 5 million tons or from an an-
nual average of about 4.5 million
tons, either would be significant.
Both early and late rice crops in
1966 were below average because of
poor weather and difficulties
caused by the US bombings, but
there is no evidence to confirm
shortages of this magnitude.
the harvest would be lower than
the poor harvests of 1960 and 1963
and possibly the lowest ever at-
tained under Communist rule. Such
a failure in domestic production,
however, would not create serious
food problems, for North Vietnam
could, as it has in the past, make
up shortages in domestic produc-
tion by stepping up its usually
modest imports of food from Commu-
nist countries.
North Vietnamese
Reactivate Kep Airfield
The fighter aircraft base at
Kep, northeast of Hanoi, has ap-
parently been returned to fully
active status, providing a valuable
alternative to the concentration
of DRV air defense assets at Phuc
Yen Airfield northwest of Hanoi.
Kep had been virtually abandoned
as a major MIG operating base dur-
ing the latter half of 1966 after
US aircraft had destroyed the
field's radar facilities in June.
19 MIG-15/17 fighters are
now at the field.
Heavy Truck Traffic in Laos
Large numbers of southbound
trucks have been observed recently
A
total of about 340 vehicles were
counted moving through the Mu
Gia Pass between 3 and 17 Janu-
ary, a figure as high as any re-
ported comparable period during
last year's dry season. Farther
south, a total of approximately
225 trucks was seen on Route 23
during a five-day period in mid-
January suggesting that, as in
past years, the Communists are
moving some of their supplies to
the south in large, sporadic
convoys.
The movement on Route 23
also represents the first heavy
use of that road in two years.
During the 1965-66 dry season
the Communists relied almost ex-
clusively on the parallel Route
911. The reactivation of Route
23 provides the enemy with an al-
ternate road south from Mu Gia
thus making this portion of the
logistic network less vulnerable
to US air attacks.
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
ik
SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA
Recent Peking pronouncements
imply that the forces around Mao
Tse-tung are disunited and hav-
ing considerable difficulty press
irtg attacks against their oppo-
nents. The directive issued on
23 January ordering the army to
begin backing "revolutionary"
forces--attributed to Mao him-
self--is indicative of the
strength of the opposition. It
was announced for the general
public by the Liberation Army
Journal on 25 January.
should not be a "hodgepodge" of
persons, suggesting that this
describes pro-Mao forces now.
The editorial warned that Mao's
enemies were powerful and de-
vious. Their latest trick, it
said, was to disguise themselves
as "revolutionary rebels," an
implicit acknowledgement that
some reported take-overs of
propaganda media and govern-
ment functions by "rebel" groups
have in fact been successful
deceptions by opposition forces.
By publicizing the new di-
rective, the Maoist forces have
p'-aced both their own control of
the armed forces and the effec-
t _ven.ess of the army as a politi-
cal instrument at stake. Failure
to achieve a quick victory now
over the durable "handful" of op-
ponents Peking has been talking
about for months would be taken
as an indication that the armed
forces either would not do Mao's
bidding or were unable to impose
his will on a balky people.
The tone of an editorial
p-ablished in People's Daily the
day before the directive was is-
sued suggests that the decision
to issue the directive was a dif-
ficult one. One 22 January the
party journal took an unusually
defensive line, exhorting Mao's
supporters to form an alliance--
implying they are not united now---
so they could more effectively
seize power everywhere. The
editorial declared the alliance
The editorial referred
soberly to "strong, unprece-
dented resistance" and warned
against expecting an early vic-
tory. Speaking gloomily of more
"twists and turns and reverses"
which might lie ahead, it pre-
dicted that the Maoist revolu-
tionaries would "eventually"
prevail over the "small" opposi-
tion alliance.
Use of Armed Forces
In view of indications that
Mao considers some elements of
the army untrustworthy, it is
unclear how far he will be will-
ing and able to go in carrying
out threats to use the armed
forces. Maoist propaganda media
have already claimed that mili-
tary forces played a key role
in recovering several party
headquarters, but the vague de-
scriptions make these forces'
,activities sound like local po-
lice actions.
SECRET
age 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
Pro-Mao political forces dominant
Tentative Assessment of Political Orientation of Provincial Party Authorities,
I
2
[ Orientation of dominant political authority uncertain
Political authority probably held by forces openly
or covertly opposed to Mao
Communist party region boundary
as o
6 January
?fi
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
(-W- in
lrspufe)
,Urumchi
5,':1 X I ANG Lr'G U,d2
4UTO;VOAMOUS REG'C
uviet conflict. The top-level
z;(viet-Polish talks probably will
followed by personal consulta-
ions between the Russians and
=)t.her foreign party leaders over
next several weeks.
The Soviets clearly regard
:cat-sh party chief Gomulka as
tt.e~ key East European Communist
c: ad.er in terms of intrabioc
,,,oblems. This has long been
~vident in the efforts they have
ride to secure his support for
Moscow's campaign against China.
_t~at week's encounter was the
latest in a continuing exchange
of visits at the highest level,
d_l:e farm of personal contact Mos-
ccw's present leaders clearly
erefer. Brezhnev and Gomulka
have met, either in Poland or the
USSR, on eight occasions since
the ouster of Khrushchev in Octo-
ber 1964, but this is the first
time the USSR's top three offi-
cials have joined forces in such
an undertaking.
During Gomulka's most recent
visit last fall, the Russians
were successful in gaining a
public joint condemnation of Pe-
king's policies. Moscow finds
it useful in its offensive against
China to re-emphasize--as did
the official announcement of last
week's visit--the "full identity
of views" between the USSR and
Poland on the present situation
in the Communist movement.
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Pod-
gorny undoubtedly brought Gomulka
up to date on their handling of
the Chinese problem at the party
plenum last month, and on their
fair-flung campaign over recent
weeks to indoctrinate party and
military cadres throughout the
USSR.
Plans under way for gather-
ings of East and West European
Communist parties were certainly
discussed and coordinated. On
20 January--two days after the
Soviet-Polish talks--Pravda again
stressed the utility of such re-
gional party meetings. The Pravda
article pointed out that while a
world meeting is "really indis-
pensable," one must prepare for
it "very minutely."
The Soviets and Poles presum-
ably went over questions of Euro-
pean security, particularly Bonn's
recent overtures to Eastern Europe.
There are indications that Warsaw,
somewhat disturbed by growing West
German flexibility toward the East
--and fearing isolation--has put
out its own cautious informal feel-
ers to Bonn. The Polish-Soviet
talks probably also covered Polish
relations with the Vatican, es-
pecially in light of Podgy
orn '
visit to Rome this week.
SHCRIT
Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
S E C R T
COAL-STEEL PROBLEMS POSE THREAT TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The Council of Ministers of
the European Coal.-Steel Community
(ECSC) will meet in Luxembourg early
next month in a new attempt to
Come to grips with problems plagu-
ing the coal and steel industries.
The immediate problems are the
high costs and overproduction
within these industries, and the
search for a solution during the
past year has brought a threat
to the role of the ECSC's supra-
national executive, the High Au-
hority. Unless the community
can find ways to modernize these
two basic industries without
causing politically unacceptable
economic distress in the geo-
graphic areas where they are con-
centrated, the individual members
may resort to uncoordinated, na-
tional measures.
in an effort. to retain the
i.nit:iative within the community,
the High Authority has recently
made a number of proposals for
community action. Last November,
:.he Council agreed to study High
Authority suggestions for com-
inunity-wide subsidies for coal
used by the steel industry--de-
sired particularly by the Germans
?--and that an ad hoc committee
:should further explore problems
in the steel sector. France's
agreement to "study" coal was at
.Least a partial reversal of its
earlier position opposing a com-
inuni.ty solution. It has long
been hostile to the High Author-
ity's supranational powers, which
in some respects exceed those of
the EEC Commission. Discussions
taking place preparatory to the
February session suggest that
the principle of community-wide
subsidies may be accepted, al-
though the national delegations
differ on the amount and scope
of such payments.
Fundamental differences be-
tween the French and the others
on steel policy, however, may
not be resolved. The High Au-
thority prefers production and,
possibly, price controls. The
French, suffering from Belgian
penetration of their domestic
market, want to restrict intra-
community trade in steel. This
.notion was reportedly opposed at
a recent meeting of the ad hoc
steel group by all the other
delegations, who saw it as con-
to the whole idea of the
Community.
Should a Council deadlock
persist on the steel problem,
the high Authority will have to
decide whether it should resort
to the kind of mandatory action
---production cutbacks, for ex-
ample--which it can take under
treaty provisions, at the pos-
sible cost of another community
political crisis.
SECRET
Page 18 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
v
SECRET
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The Middle East has come through another week
of threats and counterthreats, with the most immedi-
ate crisis papered over at least while Israel and
Syria meet to discuss the issue of farming in the
demilitarized zone. Terrorist operations against
the Israelis--which have been a matter of greater
concern--are being held to a minimum during the
meetings. Meanwhile, the looming prospect of the
Iraqi regime's seizure of Iraq Petroleum Company
properties--following Syria's lead--will further
embroil the Arabs with the West.
On the subcontinent, India's Congress Party
is girding itself for next month's elections while
basic national problems of food shortages, commu-
nal and religious strife, and student unrest whit-
tle away at the party's majority. In Pakistan,
President Ayub continues to consolidate his au-
thority as one after another of the politicians
now permitted to return to public life feels
obliged to join his party rather than go into the
opposition.
In Africa, Mobutu's dispute with Union Miniere
has brought the Congo close to an economic crisis,
with food supplies due to run out soon in the polit-
ically sensitive Kinshasa area. There was some pros-
pect that the mining company and the Congolese Govern-
ment could work out a deal, but it is still unclear
whether the company is willing to go back at any
price. In Nigeria, the paper-thin "agreements" be-
tween Eastern military governor Ojukwu and Supreme
Commander Gowon are beginning to show strain as the
two again resort to name-calling in their fight
over the country's eventual political structure.
The ever-present threat of coups in Africa is
highlighted by new evidence of Nkrumah's chronic
plotting to regain his dictatorship of Ghana. Now
there are signs of a possible "second-stage" up-
heaval in the Central African Republic where a con-
servative military regime came to power by a coup
just a year ago.
SECRET
Page 19 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SI (;R, i:I
ISRAEL AND SYRIA MEET ON DEMILITARIZED ZONE DISPUTE
The Israeli-Syrian Mixed
Armistice Commission (MAC) met
for the first time in eight
years on z5 January, but there
was no immediate progress toward
an accommodation of the two coun-
tries' dispute over farming in
the demilitarized zone. In ad-
dition, Syria subsequently an-
nounced that it will not give
any guarantees that Palestinian
commandos will stop raiding Is-
raeli territory. Prospects for
a reduction of tension along the
border thus appear slim, particu-
larly in view of Israel's earlier
assertions that the most serious
problem is the sabotage by Syrian-
supported infiltrators.
The delegates are scheduled
to meet again on 29 January to
discuss the farming issue. As
in the first meeting, the head
of the UN Truce Supervision Or-
ganization, Norway's General Odd
Bull, will be chairman.
The joint statement issued
after the meeting on 25 January,
in which both parties "reaffirmed
their commitment to refrain from
all. kinds of hostile or aggres-
sive action," is one on which
they could agree because each
has. accused the other of being the
aggressor. Syria is unlikely to
cease resisting what it regards
as Israeli encroachment of Arab
lands, and the Israelis probably
will continue their efforts to
establish their disputed claim
to sovereignty over the entire
demilitarized zone. Local UN
officials, nevertheless, hope
they can get an agreement on the
de facto limits of cultivation
in the zone.
The Israeli Government is
prepared to punish the Syrians
if violence along the borders
continues and is under strong
domestic pressure to take more
vigorous action. The right-wing
Gahal party and former prime min-
ister Ben-Gurion both have called
for immediate military action
against Syria, "with explanations
to world opinion and to great
powers later." Israel's parlia-
ment, however, voted 54-21 on
24 January to accept a statement
by Prime Minister Eshkol advocat-
ing diplomacy, not force, to
solve the country's border prob-
lems. Despite this display of
moderation, if the meetings with
the Syrians fail to diminish the
hostility along the border--and
there seems little prospect that
they will--the government will
not need any prodding to move
against Syria if further Israeli
S I+.(, ` F'l
Page 20 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRET NWF
IMPASSE CONTINUES BETWEEN CONGO AND UNION MINIERE
A few glimmers of hope ap-
peared during the week that the
Congo and Union Miniere could
work out a deal. Many difficult
issues remain to be resolved,
however, and even more important,
it is still unclear whether the
mining company is willing to go
back into the Congo at any price.
Even if an immediate deal were
arranged, the Congo would still
face a short-term foreign ex-
change and supply crisis.
During the week the Congo-
lese continued to backtrack from
their previous demands. On 24
January, President Mobutu an-
nounced that the Congo was will-
ing to turn the case over to an
impartial tribunal. He also
stated that if the tribunal found
that the Congo owed Union Miniere
compensation for the company
property it has seized, his gov-
ernment would pay.
Armed with the information
that the Congolese had committed
themselves to arbitration and
compensation, Belgian officials
on 25 January made a last-ditch
effort to persuade Union Miniere
to reopen talks with Mobutu's
government. They came away
guardedly optimistic that the
company would agree. As of noon
on 26 January, no results had
been heard from a company board
meeting which was considering
the question.
Some disruption of produc-
tion seems inevitable, however,
with attendant dangers that the
Congolese will take out their
frustrations on the European per-
sonnel who remain.
Even without these added
difficulties, the Congo seems to
be headed for a period of eco-
nomic crisis. Foreign exchange
has already run out, and short-
ages in imported goods are be-
ginning to appear. Belgian busi-
nessmen say that serious food
shortages will occur in the po-
litically sensitive Kinshasa area
in about ten days, and very little
food is now in the pipeline.
SECRI'T
Page 21 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SIiCRFT
TANZANIA REMOVING WESTERN SCHOOL TEACHERS
?resident Nyerere's current
efforts to reduce Western influ-
ence in Tanzania's educational
system threatens to remove the
West's last significant presence
i...n that country--already heavily
dependent on Communist military
and economic assistance.
A government order of late
November freezing all hiring of
foreign experts stopped the entry
of 150 Peace Corps volunteers al-
ready in training :For Tanzania as
well as volunteers from several
other Western nations. The gov-
ernment decided not to accept any
more foreign teachers in primary
schools, although to continue
them in secondary schools for the
time being. In a later memorandum
setting forth his new hiring pol-
icy, Nyerere stated that the pro-
West bias in previous recruiting
had undermined the country's non-
:alignment and had to be countered
if Tanzania was not to "remain a
Western colony." He ordered that
.:x.11 personnel recruitment be chan-
neled through his office.
The educational system which
the Tanzanian mainland inherited
From the British is staffed by
Western missionaries and teachers,
i_n~-ludinq nearly 400 Peace Corps
volunteers. It has inevitably
i_oster.ed, among university stu-
dents in particular, a new African
elite which Nyerere finds totally
incompatible with the egalitarian
society he envisions for Tanzania.
The issue came to a head in Octo-
ber when university students
demonstrated against Nyerere's
plan for compulsory national
service by all university gradu-
ates for two years at reduced pay.
incensed at the placards claiming
"colonialism was better" and cha-
grined at the students' lack of
national responsibility, Nyerere
expelled 393 of the demonstrators
--over 80 percent of the student
body. He became more determined
than ever to prevent their emer-
gence as a privileged class at
the taxpayers' expense.
Nyerere holds the foreign
staff, principally the British,
responsible for the students'
ideas.
e Natrona neon o
Students, a Western-influenced
organization, has been banned,
and the Youth League, for which
the East Germans are setting up
a trade school, will apparently
become the only authorized youth
organization. The banning of
English in all government business
as well as recent speeches by
Nyerere and his ministers indi-
cate a growing wave of xenophobia.
SFC,R1~"1'
"age 22 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRET
The reduction in Western
teachers plus the dismissal of
the students, many of whom were
destined for the understaffed
civil service, will create a
void which the government will
be hard pressed to fill. Last
June in Peking, a Tanzanian min-
ister made a special plea for
aid in developing Tanzania's edu-
cational system. On Zanzibar the
number of Communist teachers and
ministerial advisers has increased
steadily since 1964, and a simi-
lar prospect ma be in store for
the mainland.
POLITICAL STORM SIGNALS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
There are signs of rising
public discontent with, and of
increasing strains within, the re-
gime which came to power in the
Central African Republic through
a military coup a year ago. Presi-
dent Jean-Bedel Bokassa's recent
shakeup of his cabinet is unlikely
to check this trend, and a new
upheaval. could occur.
Since coming to power Bokassa
has used as a propaganda theme
the corruption and mismanagement
which plagued the previous regime.
In recent months, however, his
own government, including Bokassa
himself, has become susceptible
to the same charges, and the pub-
lic has gradually become aware
that it is no better off under
Bokassa's "revolutionary" regime
than it was in the past.
Some members of the cabinet
have become progressively dis-
turbed at the President's pen-
chant for ceremony, foreign travel,
and other expensive pursuits de-
spite a deteriorating budgetary
situation. There is also grow-
ing frustration in the cabinet
and among the subministerial elite
with the incessant homage that
must be paid to the chief of
state. With few exceptions, high
officials feel obliged to clear
with him even the most trivial
decisions. Bokassa whose actions
have been increasingly erratic
and impetuous has recently de-
veloped an exaggerated concern
for internal security and has
resorted to heavy-handed tactics
to suppress the slightest hint
of opposition.
Antigovernment tracts ap-
peared in Bangui in late December
1966 for the first time since
Bokassa's rule began.
Just before the cabinet re-
organization, which was mainly
a realignment of responsbilities,
the three military members re-
portedly sought permission to
SECRET
Page 23 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRET
.eturn to their posts in the army
and gendarmerie. Bokassa is said
to have turned them down and
threatened to jail them. Despite
their loss of formal ties with
the armed forces--which remain
the sole props of the regime--
these disaffected ministers prob-
ably retain some influence in
their old units.
The possibility of a coup in
the near future is mitigated by
Bokassa's present. control of the
rti.lA Lary. Nevertheless, his de-
pendence on personal ties with
army commanders and the lack of
widespread popular support make
his position inherently fragile
over the longer run. Bokassa has
allowed the previously well or-
ganized single political party
to degenerate to the point where
it no longer is an effective
means of mobilizing the popula-
tion behind him. Young leftist-
i_.nclined civil servants, who have
been suppressed by Bokassa, may
tend to coalesce with disaffected
military elements against Bokassa's
continued one-man rule.
f ~ < 65531 i-67
SECRET
Page 24 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
-M.00, Near
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Domestic political activity hit a high pitch
in several countries of the hemisphere this week,
and there were other political developments of in-
ternational importance.
In Nicaragua, the opposition presidential
candidate staged an uprising in an attempt to pro-
voke OAS intervention and put off next week's elec-
tion which he alleges will be rigged by the govern-
ment. The situation remains unsettled but elections
may still be held as scheduled on 5 February. Cam-
paigning also continues for the 5 March national
elections in El Salvador.
In Haiti, President Duvalier's carefully staged
legislative elections on 22 January were peaceful
and his hand-picked candidates were victorious. Par-
liamentary elections will be held in Jamaica, per-
haps as early as March, and there are reports that
aging Prime Minister Bustamante will retire.
President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic
ordered widespread arrests to head off what he
thought was a plot against his government. Heavy-
handed police actions brought charges of neo-Trujil-
loism that further marred the government's image.
Many of those arrested are being released.
Chilean President Frei is seeking to transform
last week's surprise veto of his US trip plans by
a balky opposition-controlled Senate into a politi-
cal victory for himself and his Christian Democratic
Party. A following article gives details.
SECRET
Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRET
NICARAGUA TENSE FOLLOWING PRE-ELECTION RIOTS AND ARRESTS
The Nicaraguan capital re-
mains tense following the riots
that broke out on 22 January after
arm opposition rally and new dis-
orders the evening of 25 January.
The aim of the opposition
coalition--the National Opposition
Union (UNO)--was to provoke OAS
intervention in the 5 February
elections, which the UNO claims
have been rigged by the long-rul-
ing Somoza family. UNO presiden-
tial candidate Fernando Aguero and
other opposition hotheads hoped
to create enough of a disturbance
to prod the national guard into
oppressive tactics that would war-
rant OAS intervention.
However, the guard acted
with more restraint than had been
expected. It finally cornered
UNO leaders and several hundred
of their followers in the Gran
Hotel where they held out for 20
hours, detaining over 100 foreign
visitors as hostages. The rebels,
many of whom were armed, were al-
lowed to leave the hotel the
afternoon of 23 January after
surrendering their weapons and
releasing the hostages. Casual-
ties--all Nicaraquans--are esti-
matted at four national guardsmen.
and 60 civilians dead, and over
1.00 wounded including 13 guards-
meri .
New violence flared on 25
January when the government began
arresting opposition members who
had taken part in the 22 January
disorders. So far, none of the
leaders in the Gran Hotel affair
have been detained. A roundup
of all Communists has been ini-
tiated, and the majority of ar-
rests thus far appear merited.
Several UNO leaders, as well as
several Communists, have sought
asylum in foreign embassies.
Although they are still free
and retain all political rights,
there is still a possibilty that
Aguero and other leaders may be
arrested and tried on criminal
charges. If this happens, the
only opposition to the government
candidate, Anastasio Somoza, and
the Nationalist Liberal Party
would be the Nicaraguan Conserva-
tive Party. This small party
backing Alejandro Abaunza has
obligingly offered the Somozas
tame opposition in the past.
The newspaper La Prensa,
owned by another UNO lees er,
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, has been
closed for inciting violence, and
press reports say three radio
stations have also been closed.
Aguero is continuing his
campaign, and one UNO member
said a UNO rally will be held on
29 January in Chinandega. A pro-
Somoza rally is scheduled for
the same date in Managua. Only
a small spark would be needed to
turn either of these rallies
into disorder.
Si',C;IR1 '1'
Page 26 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
M. `+yr
SECRE'T'
DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT MOVES AGAINST OPPONENTS
The Dominican Government
launched a heavy-handed roundup
of "enemies of the state" on 22
and 23 January. Around 300 indi-
viduals reportedly were detained.
While some of these were Commu-
nists, many were former "consti-
tutionalists" and members of non-
Communist left-of-center parties.
Many are now being released,
but the government has refused to
divulge details of the alleged
conspiracy that ostensibly trig-
gered the arrests.
President Balaguer, however,
apparently felt it was time to
warn potential conspirators that
the regime was prepared to move
quickly against them. In deciding
to act now he may have been influ-
enced by alarmist "intelligence"
reports fed to him by self-serving
aides.
Opposition groups predictably
reacted with strong criticism of
the arrests. The general theme
of their commentary was that the
detentions were a return to the
tactics of the Trujillo era. A
spokesman of the PRD has publicly
stated it will not support the
"unconstitutional" Balaguer re-
gime in the event of a coup at-
tempt. The Revolutionary Social
Christian Party, which has been
a more moderate critic of the re-
gime, warned that it will abandon
its "constructive opposition" if
the government does not cease its
arbitrary actions.
Moderates and even some
Balaguer supporters have voiced
their misgivings over develop-
ments. The Balaguer-appointed
governor of one interior province
concluded that the arrests had
undone efforts to restore polit-
ical harmony and reported feel-
ings were running high against
the government. The impact of
the government's action may well
be to stimulate antiregime dissi-
dents and encourage unity among
opposition elements.
Adding to the tension has
been the forced retirement or re-
assignment of a number of mili-
tary officers, none of whom was
in fact known to be plotting
against the regime. Some of these
had fought with the rebels in
1965 while others were corrupt
or incompetent. Balaguer retains
the apparent support of'the armed
services, although on 23 January
he publicly admitted the exist-
ence of some "insignificant" o p7_--
position in military ranks.
SECRET
Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRET
NEW CONSTITUTION TO STRENGTHEN BRAZILIAN EXECUTIVE
A controversial new consti-
tution designed to strengthen
executive power in Brazil and
incorporate key principles of
the Castello Branco administra-
tion was promulgated on 24 Janu-
ary. It will go into effect on
1.5 March 1967, the clay President-
elect Costa e Silva takes office.
The final document, although
heavily amended in Congress, re-
tains key provisions proposed by
the administration, such as in-
direct election of the president
and vice president, executive
power to cancel individual polit-
ical rights for up to ten years,
and the right of military courts
to try civilians accused of crimes
against the "national security."
Attempts to restore many
congressional prerogatives were
generally unsuccessful. The pres-
ident will have broader authority
to declare a state of siege, to
govern by decree in the fields of
national security and public fi-
nance, and to intervene in states
when he deems it necessary. A
number of these provisions con-
tinue special powers exercised
by President Castello Branco
under other decrees that lapse
on 15 March.
Congress has also approved
an amended version of the admin-
istration's much-criticized press
bill. The law replaces a very
lax 1953 law that has been widely
abused. It fixes journalistic
responsibility more clearly and
forces the press to be more sure
of the facts before attacking
public officials, particularly
the president. The law strength-
ens penalties for slander, defa-
mation of character, or disclos-
ing "state secrets." Court pro-
cedures will be speeded up and
journalists charged under the
new law will be tried by judges
rather than special juries. De-
spite the internal and interna-
tional hue and cry that the law
is a "gag law," its impact will
depend upon how Brazil's tradi-
tionally liberal judges define
and apply it.
Probably no one--the admin-
istration, Congress, or the op-
position--is fully satisfied
with either the constitution or
the press bill. In fact, Cas-
tello Branco may veto portions
of the press bill., and many
congressmen are already talking
about amending the constitution
after Costa e Silva takes office.
Nonetheless, both measures will
effectively strengthen the new
chief executive in dealing with
Brazil's traditionally turbulent
S E{.(; R E I'
Page 28 WEEKLY SJMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
SECRET
CHILEAN PRESIDENT SQUARES OFF AT CONGRESS
The Senate vote forcing can-
cellation of President Frei's
proposed trip to the US next week
has brought to a head his long-
simmering dispute with the oppo-
sition-dominated Senate.
Frei's first reaction was
to attempt a complex parliamen-
tary maneuver that would have
forced a reversal of the vote.
Then, apparently recognizing that
this could not be accomplished
before his scheduled departure
date--if at all--he shifted tac-
tics. He now has called for pop-
ular repudiation of the Senate,
which he claims fails to mirror
the changing political situation.
He has presented a constitutional
amendment that would permit the
president to dissolve Congress
and call new elections once dur-
ing his term of office. Although
this action was precipitated by
the Senate's veto of his trip,
it is also a response to other
obstructionist actions that have
hampered Frei's reform programs
since the beginning of his admin-
istration.
The constitutional reform
must be approved by both houses
of Congress. It has the support
of Frei's own Christian Demo-
cratic Party and of the Commu-
nist Party both of which see a
chance to improve their repre-
sentation. If the Socialists
follow the Communist lead, as
seems probable, the reform is
likely to be adopted over the
opposition of the right-wing
National Party and of the cen-
trist Radical Party, both of
which would almost certainly
lose some of their congres-
sional seats in new elections.
The Senate's action has
also called into question the
extent of the president's power
to fulfill his constitutional
responsibility for the conduct
of foreign affairs. Frei is
said to feel that yielding to
Senate dictation would impair
his ability to promote Latin
American integration and would
reduce his international repu-
tation. His inability to visit
the US may make him unwilling to
attend the inter-American summit
meeting in April or to engage in
other foreign travel during the
remainder of his term.
Thus, the stage is set for
a confrontation between Frei and
the congressional opposition.
The US Embassy speculates that
if the constitutional reform
fails, Frei may try to get direct
popular approval of his program
SECRET
Page 29 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927A005600060001-6
SECRET
ECUADOR-PERU BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY MAY ERUPT AGAIN
The 25th anniversary of the
Rio Protocol establishing the
boundary between Ecuador and Peru
is not likely to pass quietly.
Ecuadorean resentment of the pro-
tocol could erupt into serious
demonstrations in Quito and Guaya-
quil on 29 January, and there is
even the remote possibility of an
armed clash with Peru.
Ecuadorean Government offi.-
c=_als and the military high com-
mand are extremely worried over
the possibility of Peruvian in-
cursions along the border on or
about 29 January. They are con-
vinced that Peru is concentrating
troops near the boundary and that
an attempt will. be made to place
markers along the 70-mile portion
that is still unmarked. Ecuador
insists that it will meet any
Peruvian provocation with force.
To counter the alleged Peruvian
threat, Ecuador reportedly is
increasing its troop strength
along the border and recalling
former conscripts to duty.
COLOMBIA
QUITO ?"~-_~ ~.
Boundary established Under
1942 Rio Protocol
Disputed area before 1942
_._., Undemarcated boundary
However, Ecuadorean fears of
a Peruvian provocation are largely
unwarranted. Peruvian military
sources report that Peru has no
plans to attack Ecuador or to
place markers in the disputed
area. Peruvian Army units along
the border are not on alert, re-
serves have not been dispatched,
and there has been only a limited
augmentation of troop strength.
Peruvian Government and military
reaction to Ecuadorean bombast
over the border issue has been
restrained and in keeping with
President Belaunde's desire to
ease tensions. Peruvian leaders
have repeatedly stated that if
there is an incident, it will oc-
cur only as a result of action
by Ecuador.
Violent demonstrations may
very well occur in Ecuador on
29 January. University students
plan protest marches and mani-
festations. The government
is trying to channel demonstra-
tions along peaceful lines, but
this may not be possible. In-
terim President Arosemena is
especially eager to keep the is-
sue out of the constituent assem-
bly to prevent opportunistic poli-
ticians from inflaming emotions.
The Peruvian Embassy in Quito
is a likely target of violence, as
are US installations. In previous
years, the US Embassy has been 25X1
stoned because the United States
is one of the four guarantor pow-
ers of the Rio Protocol
SECRET
Page 30 WEEKLY SUMMARY 27 Jan 67
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6
Next 3 3 Page(s) In Doc
ument Denied
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05600060001-6