WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005500100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/29: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05500100001-2
`'' `'e Secret '
State Dept. review
completed
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
nYTLli i' 'lU r tsl UI-CUJ e AT~t~ 7
IMMEDIATELY AFTER Utz December 1966
JOB - J BOX 0320/66
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Nwe SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 15 December 1966)
VIETNAM
The Viet Cong stepped up both military and terrorist
attacks throughout the country this week, but contin-
ued to avoid contact with large-scale allied opera-
tions. The Constituent Assembly is again making pro-
gress on the constitution after a brief recess follow-
ing the assassination of southern political leader Tran
Van Van. The Liberation Front has opened a permanent
office in Hanoi.
CHINESE NEED FOR FOOD IMPORTS GREATER THAN EVER
With the year's harvest below the level reached in 1957,
the last normal year before the "leap forward," grain
purchases for the current crop year seem likely to ex-
ceed the 6.3 million tons imported in the preceding
twelve months.
GROWING DISORDER IN CHINA'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"
Conflicts in the top leadership appear to be sharpen-
ing, but mounting disorder within the Red Guard move-
ment and the lack of decisive action indicate that no
faction or individual has thus far made significant
gains.
MALAYSIA CONDUCTS ANTI-COMMUNIST SWEEP IN SARAWAK
A security sweep on 6-8 December netted 119 members and
supporters of the Chinese-dominated Sarawak Communist
Organization, but probably missed the top leadership,
COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THAILAND
The Communists, in addition to their activities in the
northeast, are apparently scoring gains among some tri-
bal elements in northern Thailand and are building up
their organization in the mid-south.
PREPARATIONS FOR LAOTIAN ELECTIONS
Prime Minister Souvanna has made a temporary alliance
with some regional military commanders in an effort to
ensure that the 1 January election produces a national
assembly more amenable to his direction.
SECRET
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F t~
SECRET
COMMUNIST CHINA EXPLOITS MACAO RIOTS
Portuguese capitulation to Peking's demands has prob-
ably satisfied the Chinese for the time being but has
weakened the position of Portuguese authorities.
Europe
USSR MAINTAINS ANTI-CHINESE MOMENTUM
Moscow has further stepped up its campaign to ostracize
China's leadership. The Soviets appear genuinely con-
cerned over the excesses of the Red Guard upheaval in
China and convinced that Mao's policies have made him
vulnerable to foreign and domestic opposition. Thus,
they believe the time is ripe to strike out against
him.
KOSYGIN VISIT TO FRANCE HEAVIER ON FORM THAN SUBSTANCE
Both France and the USSR made the most of Premier Kosy-
gin's visit as an expression of the expanding common
interests of the two nations. Each was careful, how-
ever, to leave itself room for maneuver on major inter-
national issues.
WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT PROGRAM
Chancellor Kiesinger in his policy statement on 13 De-
cember set forth positive measures to deal with internal
problems but took a more cautious stand on foreign pol-
icy.
SI+,CRI-T
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SECRET
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 18
THE UN CONSIDERS RHODESIA
Amendments proposed by the African bloc go considerably
further than Britain's request for limited sanctions.
London would probably accept some extension of the eco-
nomic sanctions but nothing which would force it to a
blockade of South Africa or to a commitment to impose
majority rule on Rhodesia before independence.
ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING
Under pressure, Jordan assented to-an Arab Defense Coun-
cil decision to post Saudi and Iraqi troops in West Jor-
dan. King Husayn may still hope to forestall their ar-
rival because of the precedent this would set for sta-
tioning Egyptian or Syrian troops whose presence would
serve as a threat to his regime.
TANZANIAN MILITARY BUILDUP CONTINUES WITH COMMUNIST
SUPPORT
Tanzania fears Portuguese retaliation for its support
to the Mozambique rebels and seeks to strengthen its
military forces as well as its border defensive posi-
tions. It is turning increasingly to Communist China
for hardware and other military assistance.
INSTABILITY IN THREE WEST AFRICAN ENTENTE STATES
Political unrest, caused in part by the impact of aus-
terity budgets, has stimulated a tightening of military
control in Upper Volta and a structural change in the
government of Togo. A shake-up also appears imminent
in Dahomey.
Western Hemisphere
BRAZIL MOVES TOWARD ADOPTING A NEW CONSTITUTION
The government's majority in both houses of Congress
appears to guarantee passage of a proposed constitu-
tion which limits congressional powers in favor of the
chief executive.
SECRET
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SECRET
STRONG VENEZUELAN REACTION TO TERRORIST CAMPAIGN
The government has reacted to military pressure follow-
ing a mounting terrorist campaign by suspending consti-
tutional guarantees and by allowing the military to oc-
cupy Central University.
DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS FAIL TO MOUNT GENERAL STRIKE
The strike was to have protested Balaguer's Christmas
bonus policy but failed to develop because of division
among the Communists, the government's adept. handling
of the issue, lack of popular support, and absence of
backing for the strike by the non-Communist left.
ARGENTINE PRESIDENT REPLACES MILITARY CHIEF
President Ongania's appointment of General Alsogaray
as new army commander was a step calculated to cause
the least amount of resentment among the top officers.
SECRET
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'"` SECRET Nwe
FAR EAST
Recent events in China have provided further
glimpses of the scope and violence of the struggle
wracking the Peking regime. The conflict has not only
produced areas of chaos and anarchy throughout the
country but has brought the effectiveness of some as-
pects of the regime's political authority into ques-
tion for the first time since the Communist revolution.
These events strengthen the impression that the
faction headed by Lin Piao, claiming Mao's blessing,
has been stalemated in its drive to destroy opponents
of the "cultural revolution" and to "reorganize" the
party and its central committee.
Since late November
crusading Red Guards in the provinces have encountered
stiff resistance from party committees, resulting in
bloody clashes in widely scattered parts of China. The
party journal Red Flag now complains that enemies
within the party have "confused the masses," "created
sects," and "instigated armed battles."
Against this background of chaos and defiance of
central authority, China faces a worsening food situa-
tion which could have important influence on the outcome
of the leadership struggle and the shape of future pol-
icies. China's need for food imports is greater now
than at any time since 1962. Rations have been reduced
in many urban and rural areas, and officials in at least
one province anticipate peasant "resistance" to the
enforcement of food distribution plans.
In view of the difficulties at home, Peking ap-
parently welcomed the recent disorders in Macao and
took the opportunity to improve its tarnished image as
the protector of Chinese abroad. In Malaysia, however,
the almost exclusively Chinese Sarawak Communist Or-
ganization suffered a considerable setback last week
when government security forces rounded u more than
a hundred of its leaders and members.
SECRET
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SECRET
VIETNAM
Communist forces this week
intensified the level of their
conventional military activity
and terrorist/sabotage actions,
largely against vulnerable South
Vietnamese Government targets,
in an apparent effort to score
psychologically significant mili-
tary gains prior to the Christ-
mas truce. At the same time, how-
ever they continued to avoid ma-
jor contact with large-scale al-
lied search-and-destroy operations.
The most significant enemy-
initiated action occurred on 10
December in Thua Thien Province,
when an estimated Viet Cong/
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) bat-
talion using heavy mortar and
small-arms fire attacked a South
Vietnamese Army regimental com-
mand post and battalion base camp
10 miles northwest of Hue. Twenty-
four government regulars were
killed and 85 wounded in the at-
tack. The Communists captured
over 100 weapons.
Other targets of battalion-
sized Viet Cong assaults included
an ARVN base camp in the delta
province of Chuong Thien, two
Regional Forces companies under-
going training at the Van Kiep
Training Center in Phuoc Tuy Prov-
ince, and a Vietnamese paramili-
tary company on patrol in Hau
Nghia Province. Cumulative gov-
ernment losses resulting from
these actions included 33 killed,
15 wounded, and 196 captured.
Communist terrorists and
saboteurs concentrated on tar-
gets in the Saigon area and in
northern I Corps. Several
grenade attacks were reported
against Vietnamese National Po-
lice in Saigon, while guards de-
tected a number of mines set to
destroy shipping in the capital's
main waterways. The Viet Cong,
for the third time in six weeks,
also managed a partially success-
ful attack on the major US am-
munition dump at Long Binh, 13
miles northeast of Saigon.
In the north, Viet Cong
saboteurs accelerated their in-
terdiction campaign against Na-
tional Route 1 in an apparent,
and at least temporarily success-
ful, effort to isolate Thua Thien
Province from adjacent Quang Tri
and Quang Nam provinces. In ad-
dition, Communist mortar crews on
14 December shelled a major South
Vietnamese POL storage area near
Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin
Province, destroying nearly
40,000 gallons of fuel.
The assassination of south-
ern political leader Tran Van Van
on 7 December does not appear
to be generating any overt polit-
ical repercussions. By its
prompt public identification of
one of the assassins as a Viet
Cong and by its willingness to
cooperate with the Constituent
Assembly in conducting a full
investigation of the crime, the
Ky government avoided any accusa-
tions of complicity in the kill-
ing. However, there are con-
tinued reservations in some cir-
cles as to the political affilia-
tion of the assassin; statements
deploring the incident issued by
both the Peoples - Armed Forces
Advisory Council and the Con-
stituent Assembly made no refer-
ence to Viet Cong responsibility.
SE,C:RFT
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' SECRI T
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SFCRF;T
After paying full honors
to Tran Van Van, including an
adjournment of five days, the
Constituent Assembly on 12 Decem-
ber resumed its debate on the
form of the future government.
The major issue in the debate
was the organization of the execu-
tive branch, and on 15 December
the assembly voted to adopt, in
principle, a modified presiden-
tial system which would include
an appointed prime minister.
Meanwhile, the second and
third largest blocs of delegates
officially merged, thus forming
the largest single groups in the
assembly. The members of the new
bloc represent several elements
in the assembly including
Catholics, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai.
They are mainly conservative in
their political outlook and are
generally sympathetic to the Ky
regime.
The government has not yet
officially informed the assembly
of its decision on 1 December
to reject the latter's requests
for changes in its founding law.
It is possible that government
leaders have decided not to make
a formal reply on the question
unless pressed.
Hanoi Improves Rail Links
With China
Hanoi has begun improvement
on the Lao Cai - Hanoi line in
northwest North Vietnam. Photogra-
phy revealed that 25X1
extensive improvements are under
way on this line to straighten
out curves and rebuild bombed-out
bridges. Until recently this
line had been neglected in favor
of the more important northeast
link which carries virtually all
rail shipments of foreign aid.
Now, however, internal Chinese
rail improvements make it possi-
ble to tie the northwestern DRV
line into the main Chinese rail
system.
Liberation Front Opens
Hanoi Office
With a burst of propaganda
on the theme of north-south unity,
the Communists opened an overt,
permanent office of the Libera-
tion Front in Hanoi this week.
Hanoi is virtually the last Com-
munist country to accept a Front
office in its capital, having
apparently held out until now in
the belief that such a move would
add color to allied statements
that the Front is controlled by
North Vietnam. In view of the
qrowing public evidence of Hanoi's
close and direct involvement in
the war, however, the old reluc-
tance to set up the Front openly
in Hanoi may have waned. The
move provides a dramatic public
demonstration to Viet Cong sup-
porters in the South of the im-
portance which the North Vietnamese
attach to the Front and to the
southern role in the conflict.
SFCRF'T
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Nlw SECRET
CHINESE NEED FOR FOOD IMPORTS GREATER THAN EVER
Because of the worsening
food situation, Peking's imports
of grain in the twelve-month pe-
riod that began last July may ex-
ceed the 6.3 million tons it im-
ported in the preceding year.
A recent purchase of 914,000
tons of wheat from Canada exhausts
the maximum of 2.5 million tons
that Canada must sell each year
under a three-year agreement
signed this fall. Purchases from
all sources for delivery during
the year which began in July 1966
already total about five million
tons, and China has reportedly
asked Argentina--which has sup-
plied a million tons or more
during each of the past three
years--for as much wheat as can
be spared. It is not certain,
however, that Argentina will be
willing or able to sell substan-
tial quantities of grain to China
this year. Either Canada or Aus-
tralia might be willing to sup-
ply additional quantities al-
though there is no indication
that China is negotiating with
either. The Chinese could also
seek small quantities of grain
from marginal suppliers such as
Mexico and. France as they have
in the past.
China's need for food im-
ports is greater now than at any
time since 1962, when grain pro-
duction was restored to the 1957
level of about 180 million tons
following the food calamity years
1959-61.
early 1966 crops were be-
low average because of bad weather,
and beginning about July rations
were reduced in widespread rural
areas and, for the first time in
several years, in some urban areas.
ations apparently
fell by about a third from esti-
mated levels of recent years to
an inadequate 20-25 pounds of
qrain per month per adult. The
price of food on the free market
has reportedly increased sharply
since then, apparently in response
to stepped-up buying by individuals
on short official rations.
The harvest now under way,
which will be the main source of
food until next spring, will also
be below average and will be too
small to reverse the reduction in
rations. The authorities in one
province have called on peasants
to "practice the spirit of stretch-
ing 10-month grain allotments to
last through 13 months," while
local cadres in another province
have been warned that enforcement
of the "proper" grain distribution
policies will "encounter resist-
ance."
Annual grain production has
not exceeded 180 million tons in
any year since 1962, and the 1966
total may be as much as 10 mil-
lion tons smaller. Since 1962,
moreover, the population has in-
creased by some 60 million per-
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Dec 66
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SECRET
GROWING DISORDER IN CHINA'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"
Conflicts in the top leader-
ship appear to be sharpening, but
mounting disorder within the Red
Guard movement and the lack of
decisive action indicate that no
faction or individual has thus
far made significant gains.
For the past two weeks Red
Guards and newspapers in the cap-
ital have focused attacks on lit-
erary and political figures who
were early victims of the "cul-
tural revolution," giving the
impression that the stage was
being set for new disclosures.
This phase was sparked by a
Madame Mao speech, released on
3 December, demanding that for-
mer Peking mayor Peng Chen and
other "former" officials be "fur-
ther exposed." According to
posters, Madame Mao's words in-
spired one group of fanatical
Guards to rush to the home of
Peng and other officials on 4 De-
cember and to "seize" them "as a
warning to those still following
the bourgeois road." The reports
do not reveal what if anything
was done to Peng, who presumably
has been confined at home since
his downfall last May.
Most of the posters put up
since call for "striking down"
Peng Chen, former propaganda chief
Lu Ting-i, former army chief of
staff and secret police official
Lo Jui-ching, and Yang Shang-kun,
once an aide to Mao.
Attempts have also been re-
ported to bring down new victims.
According to a poster seen on
14 December, Tao Chin--fourth in
the hierarchy--has criticized
Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.
A wall newspaper displayed on
8 December said that now that
Peng et al have been "exposed,"
it is time to go after their "big
boss" Liu and his deputy Teng.
It renewed demands for the dis-
missal of the two.
Liu and party general secre-
tary Teng Hsiao-ping, who had
been dominant leaders of the
party machinery for many years,
were weakened at the party plenum
in August, but neither was dis-
missed and both have appeared
regularly with Mao at Red Guard
rallies. Liu continues to sign
state messages as chairman of the
Chinese Peoples Republic.
The 8 December poster implied
that Kang Sheng, a long-time in-
telligence official who was pro-
moted into the politburo standing
committee in August, is involved
in the attack on Liu. The poster
said that Kang was one of several
"revolutionary comrades" Liu had
been "keeping down" in the past.
Kang, reputedly a cunning and
conniving individual, headed the
party secret police in the early
1940s. He was relegated to a
provincial post about 1949 and
later demoted from a full to an
alternate member of the politburo.
Demands to dismiss Liu and
Teng have not been endorsed in au-
thoritative regime pronouncements.
An editorial in the latest issue
SEC RI '1'
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of Red Flag, broadcast on 12 De-
cember, conceded that there was
still a "tiny handful" of incor-
rigibles to be isolated and
brought down. The editorial
dealt mainly, however, with the
problem of currently active lead-
ers who oppose the "cultural revo-
lution." It probably was not re-
ferring to Liu and Teng, whose
freedom of action was severely re-
stricted at the August plenum.
The editorial provides the
first authoritative evidence that
opposing Red Guard factions are
directed by different individuals
in the current leadership. It
criticizes officials who have
"confused the masses," "created
sects" and "instigated armed
battles," but ends weakly with a
new plea that errant comrades
repent and come over to the Mao-
Lin side. This contrasts with
the confident tone of earlier
attacks on opponents and demands
that "fence sitters" choose sides.
crusading Red Guards in the prov-
inces have encountered stiff re-
sistance from party committees.
This may account for the defensive
tone of the latest Red Flag edi-
torial. Bloody clashes -involving
Guards sent from Peking and local
workers have been reported in
widely scattered areas of China.
After a particularly bloody melee
in Chungking on 4 December, in
which 11 were killed and 200 in-
jured, the Red Guards announced
they would institute a period of
"red terror" and "great disor-
ders." Their ability to press
attacks is clearly limited, how-
ever. The Third Red Guard Head-
quarters in Peking, which appar-
ently is directing most Red Guard
attacks, complained in a recent
newspaper article that people
it sent to the provinces to in-
vestigate incidents were beaten,
imprisoned, or often simply dis-
appeared.
SECRET
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SEGRE1'
MALAYSIA CONDUCTS ANTI-COMMUNIST SWEEP IN SARAWAK
In a major effort to cripple 1 Youth Association and the Sarawak
the Sarawak Communist Organization
(SCO), the Special Branch of the
Sarawak Police carried out a large-
scale roundup of SCO members and
sympathizers on 6-8 December. In
addition to the 119 persons arrested,
valuable documents and some funds
were captured. Although the Chief
of the Special Branch contends that
all top-level SCO members slated
for arrest were taken in,the roundup
probably did not reach the top lead-
_p]
The Sarawak Communist Organi-
zation has posed a major security
problem to Sarawak since the mid-
1950s. Almost exclusively Chinese,
it has an estimated armed strength
of 1,500-2,000, including 600-800
trained in Indonesia. It maintains
several illegal front organizations,
most notably the Sarawak Advanced
Farmers Association. The SCO,
moreover, has deeply penetrated
the Sarawak United Peoples' Party
(SUPP), a large Chinese opposition
party that advocates greater au-
tonomy for Sarawak. SUPP now is
cooperating with the Sarawak Na-
tional Party (SNAP), the main in-
digenous opposition group, in prep-
aration for elections next year.
A number of SUPP members were taken
into custody during the roundup.
The government contends that
the arrests were aimed exclusively
at the Communist threat, but lead-
ers of the Chinese community are
reported to be virtually unanimous
in interpreting the arrests as an
effort by the governing Alliance
Party to intimidate SUPP. Stephen
Yong, SUPP's non-Communist Secretary
General, has openly charges the 25X1
government with using dictatorial
means to suppress the opposition.
MALAYSIA
?JESSELTON `_ti
% KUALA
LUMPUR
SINGAPOR E"OU ORE
SECRET
Sandakan
Tewau L--J
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14001, OJ )KL1
COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THAILAND
The Communists, in addition
to their activities in the north-
east, are apparently scoring
gains among some tribal elements
in northern Thailand and are
building up their organization
in the mid-south.
SECRET
25X1
Page 9
`TTHALUNG
In the northeast, government
police and army units are continu-
ing to sweep Communist strongholds
in Nakhon Phanom and Sakhon Nakhon
provinces. Although numerous sus-
pects have been picked up in recent
weeks, government forces have been
unable to establish contact with
Udon SAtKC~N'
NAKr-I' N
JN\P?KHON SI
TNAAMMARAT
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SECRET
terrorist bands operating in the
area. One apparent reason is that
government press releases are con-
tinuing to forewarn the subversives
of impending operations.
There are indications that the
Communists are gainin stren th in
the mid-south region.
there are
Thammarat provinces. These Thai
Communist elements are not di-
rectly related to ethnic Chinese
terrorists located farther south
along the Malaysian border.
Although the Communist groups
in the mid-south so far have con-
centrated on building their organ-
ization, recent broadcasts over
the clandestine Voice of the Thai
People suggest that they will soon
enter a more active hase. 25X1
some 750 -Communist supporters in
the ten-province area, and that 400
of these are operating in armed
bands in Patthalung and Nakhon Si
PREPARATIONS FOR
Prime Minister Souvanna has
made a temporary alliance with some
regional military commanders in an
effort to elect a new national as-
sembly more amenable to his direc-
tion. His action could set the
stage for a new round of political
infighting in Laos.
In order to block the re-elec-
tion of certain obstreperous dep-
uties, Souvanna has drawn up a list
of 34 candidates for the 59 assembly
seats that will be contested on 1
January. Each candidate on Souvan-
na's "united front" list is commit-
ted to supporting Laos' neutrality,
its tripartite form of government,
and Souvanna as prime minister.
This arrangement is almost cer-
tain to eliminate some of the left-
ist-leaning neutralists and "young
nationalists" who do not enjoy the
support of military leaders.
Souvanna worked out his list
in cooperaticn with Generals
Page 10
LAOTIAN ELECTIONS
Phasouk Somly, Vang Pao, and Ouan
Ratikoun. These regional command-
ers have agreed to use their influ-
ence in areas under their military
jurisdiction on behalf of the ap-
proved candidates. Souvanna thus
far has not been able, however, to
win the backing of Leuam Insisieng-
may, leader of the rightist faction
in the national assembly, who wields
considerable power in southern Laos.
The role which the powerful San-
anikone family will play in the
elections is not clear. 25X1
the Sananikones wi 25X1
use their in luence in the Vientiane
area to back Souvanna's list, but
this would bring them into conflict
with chief of the general staff Gen-
eral Kouprasith Abhay, whom they
have long supported. Kouprasith en-
visions himself playing an even
greater role in Laotian affairs,
possibly as Souvanna's successor,
and may have some misgivings about 25X1
the increasing cooperation between
Souvanna and the alread owerful
regional commanders.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Dec 6-6
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S I+;C R E'1'
COMMUNIST CHINA EXPLOITS
Peking has taken advantage
of recent disorders in Macao to
wring concessions from the local
authorities which further weaken
the Portuguese position in the
colony. Using modern "gunboat
diplomacy," Peking has publicly
underscored the fact that Macao
exists only on Chinese sufferance
and has attempted to improve its
tarnished image as the protector
of Chinese abroad.
The trouble began in mid-
November with efforts by local
Chinese in Macao to settle a long-
standing grievance--their failure
for more than a year to obtain
permission to construct a new Chi-
nese school. These efforts re-
sulted in riots on 3 and 4 Decem-
ber which were harshly suppressed
by the police.
Following the riots, Peking
moved four additional gunboats to
the area and staged Red Guard
rallies in neaby Kwangtung Prov-
ince supporting demands made by
the Macao Chinese. On 11 December
an authoritative People's Daily
Commentator article warned that
the Portuguese would have to ac-
cept the Chinese demands or suf-
fer the consequences.
On 12 December the Macao
governor announced that he had
accepted "in entirety" the de-
mands of the Kwangtung provincial
authorities. These demands were
almost identical with those made
Page 11
MACAO RIOTS
by Chinese Communist elements in
Macao for an apology and compensa-
tion for the riots but included
the requirement that the Portu-
guese take measures to prevent
Chinese Nationalist operations in
the colony. On the following
day, the governor accepted two
additional demands put forward
by Chinese elements in Macao.
Peking has not yet publicly
commented on the Portuguese capit-
ulation. However, the unofficial
Chinese Communist representative
in Macao has indicated his satis-
faction with the governor's
statement, and four Chinese
Communist gunboats reportedly
withdrew, suggesting that Peking
intends to relax its pressure
for the present.
The display of Portuguese
inability and unwillingness to
resist Chinese Communist pressure
makes it clear that Peking can at
any time score further cheap and
easy political victories at
Portugal's expense. For the mo-
ment, however, Communist China
will probably be satisfied with
the acknowledgment by the Macao
authorities that Peking has the
predominant role in respect to
Chinese citizens of Macao,. None-
theless, unplanned incidents which
might provoke riots and renewed
Chinese intervention cannot be
ruled out.
SI?CRI::I'
WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Dec 66
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EUROPE
The Soviet leadership is pressing ahead with
its political offensive against Peking. In the
party central committee meeting this week, the em-
phasis was explicitly on "the struggle of the CPSU
for the unity of the Communist movement." The eco-
nomic plan and budget for 1967, which are on the
agenda of the Supreme Soviet now in session, took
second place in the central committee's delibera-
tions.
The leadership thus got a formal expression
of approval from the party's ranking officials for
its policy toward China, and put in still another
call for an international conference of Communist
parties.
In Western Europe, the NATO ministerial talks
got under way with hopes of completing permanent
nuclear planning arrangements and developing a
larger political role for NATO in the context of
both intra-European and East-West relations. The
US - UK - West German talks on the problem of off-
setting the foreign exchange costs of the British
Army of the Rhine have recessed until January.
The British, with a financial assist from the US,
have agreed to maintain this force at present
levels for six months.
In Bonn, Chancellor Kiesinger's first general
policy statement to the Bundestag contained no
sharp departures from established West German po-
sitions on major international issues, and sounded
a positive tone toward dealings with France and
Eastern Europe. With regard to a nuclear role
for West Germany, the chancellor reiterated past
commitments. The lack of new policies may signify
differences of opinion within the newly formed
coalition which may be difficult to reconcile.
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USSR MAINTAINS ANTI-CHINESE MOMENTUM
Moscow has further stepped
up its campaign to ostracize
China's leadership. The Soviets
appear genuinely concerned over
the excesses of the Red Guard up-
heaval in China and convinced
that Mao's policies have made
him vulnerable to foreign and
domestic opposition. Thus, they
believe the time is ripe to strike
out against him.
A plenum of the Soviet party
central committee on 12 and 13
December clearly indicated that
the Chinese problem remains the
main preoccupation and most press-
ing foreign policy concern of the
Russian leaders, particularly
Brezhnev. The plenum was de-
voted primarily to a foreign pol-
icy review focusing on Sino-So-
viet relations. A number of So-
viet ambassadors were summoned
to Moscow for the occasion.
Capping vigorous personal efforts
over recent weeks to drum up
wide support for Moscow's offen-
sive against China, Brezhnev him-
self presented the key report.
The text of his speech has
not yet been released. However,
a central committee decision, pub-
lished on 13 December, in effect,
summarized his presentation and
formally and--of course--"unani-
mously" endorsed the "political
line and practical activities"
taken against China.
The plenum met during an
increasingly vehement propaganda
campaign, notable for its per-
sonal attacks on "Mao and his
clique." Politburo member Shele-
pin attacked Mao by name and ac-
cused "the present Chinese lead-
ers" of preventing an early Com-
munist victory in Vietnam. So-
viet broadcasts to China in man-
darin have condemned the "in-
dividual dictatorship of Mao Tse-
tung." The Russian populace is
being fed a steady diet of "yellow
peril" propaganda, including in-
flammatory charges of Chinese
designs on Russian territory.
The central committee state-
ment scored the Chinese party's
11th plenum last August, and
asserted that the decisions taken
at that meeting indicated a "new
and dangerous stage" in Mao's
anti-Soviet crusade. The So-
viet document marks the most au-
thoritative reaction to the Chi-
nese plenum, and gives formal
sanction to the more aggressive
anti-Chinese tactics Moscow has
pursued since last summer.
The Soviet plenum decision
recorded Moscow's "agreement with
the views of fraternal parties
that favorable conditions are now
being created for a new interna-
tional Communist conference."
The decision added, however,
that such a conference "should
be well prepared in the course
of mutual consultations among
the parties." The statement
thus echoes Brezhnev's earlier
guarded endorsements of the
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SECRET
idea of a world conference.
Stress on the necessity for ade-
quate preparations means, how-
ever, that Moscow recognizes that
there is considerable resistance
to the idea of a formal all-
party meeting on the order of
the 1957 and 1960 conferences.
The various parties will no
doubt put their own interpreta-
tions on the phrase "adequate
preparation," and many of them
will be content if the project
never leaves the "preparatory"
stage.
The parties of Eastern Eu-
rope are divided over the con-
vening of a world-wide conclave.
The Bulgarians, Hungarians,
Czechs, and East Germans can
be expected to support any kind
of a Soviet-sponsored conference,
but for the Poles and Rumanians
the issue hinges on the nature
of any conference.
Warsaw continues to see lit-
tle advantage to itself and many
hazards in an international meet-
ing. Everything that is known
about Gomulka's position sug-
gests that he would participate
only if the meeting were designed
not to condemn China but to re-
endorse the independence and
equality of individual parties.
In keeping with Moscow's
admission that there is much
work to be done before a world
gathering can occur, various
moves are reportedly under way
to convene regional meetings
in Europe, and probably else-
where. 25X1
a gather-
ing of European parties to focus
on European security, Vietnam,
and problems in the Communist
movement may take place in War-
saw early next year.
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KOSYGIN VISIT TO FRANCE HEAVIER ON FORM THAN SUBSTANCE
Both France and the USSR
made the most of Premier Kosygin's
visit as an expression of the ex-
panding common interests of the
two nations. Each was careful,
however, to leave itself room for
maneuver on major international
issues.
Neither side appears to have
expected any more from the visit
than the generally predictable
items featured in the joint reso-
lution released on 9 December.
Promises of technical and scien-
tific cooperation, more trade, a
consular agreement, and further
exchanges of visits foster the
impression of growing political
concordance that both sides wish
to project. Each values this im-
pression for its own reasons:
France in order to bolster its
image of independence, the USSR
to encourage other Western Euro-
pean nations to break free of
lingering cold-war restraints
on dealing with Moscow.
The only touchy interna-
tional problem that made its way
into the resolution was Vietnam.
The two countries reiterated their
view that the war stems from "for-
eign interference" and is a threat
to peace. The statement in the
resolution varies little from
the declaration made at the end
of De Gaulle's visit to the USSR
last June. There was no sign
that Kosygin was able to soften
De Gaulle's opposition to a non-
proliferation agreement.
The German problem was side-
stepped in the resolution. Kosy
gin made the usual Soviet points
on the subject in his public
statements during the visit,
stoutly reaffirming Soviet oppo-
sition to reunification and any
change in the frontiers. De Gaulle
appears to have wanted silence
on the problem so as not to
jeopardize overtures he expects
from Bonn. Each may have hoped
to find some leeway in the other's
position, and there was probably
some mutual disappointment.
It is clear that the USSR
believes that a Franco-Soviet un-
derstanding has only a limited
usefulness in dealing with con-
tentious issues such as Germany
and European security. The So-
viets recognize that no meaning-
ful solutions are possible without
US participation. During his
visit, Kosygin pointedly expressed
his hope for better relations with
the US and did not rule out an
American role in the settlement
of European roblems
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WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT PROGRAM
Chancellor Kiesinger in his
policy statement on 13 December
put high priority on resolving
economic and financial problems,
suggesting that these may pre-
occupy the new government for the
next several months. The emphasis
on economy signals a less forth-
coming attitude toward assuming
any major new international obli-
gations such as troop offset pay-
ments, development aid, and Com-
mon market contributions.
The government's domestic
program incorporates long-term
Socialist objectives such as em-
phasis on economic growth and
high employment. Concessions by
the Christian Democrats in this
area may have facilitated agree-
ment on Kiesinger's foreign pol-
icy statement that varies little
from previous German policy. Al-
though Kiesinger stressed Bonn's
long-standing desire to develop
its relations with Eastern Europe
and, if possible, to establish
diplomatic relations, his refer-
ences to the Oder-Neisse frontier
and the Munich Agreement did not
go beyond Bonn's previous posi-
tions. Bonn traditionally has
maintained that only a reunified
Germany can settle the border
question. Though Bonn acknowl-
edges that Hitler voided the
Munich Pact by invading Czecho-
slovakia, it refuses to accept
the Czech view that the agreement
was invalid from the start be-
cause it had been concluded under
duress. Despite the known desire
of Foreign Minister Brandt to
abandon all nuclear sharing
schemes involving "hardware,"
the declaration left this ques-
tion open.
The government's position
on East Germany clearly reflects
a compromise. Kiesinger said
Bonn will seek to expand trade
and credits and increase "con-
tacts" that would not imply rec-
ognition, a cautious formulation
unlikely to produce the kind of
closer ties the Socialists want.
The emphasis on improving re-
lations with France reflects the
prevailing sentiment in both gov-
erning parties. Kiesinger and
Brandt have long advocated greater
"balance" in relations with Wash-
ington and Paris. The specific
actions Bonn may take are unclear,
but one immediate objective will
be to attempt to instill new
life into the 1963 Franco-German
Friendship Treaty.
In any case, though Bonn
will probably be less willing to
follow the US lead than it has
in the past, the Kiesinger gov-
ernment appears to want to main-
tain close ties with the US. it
is aware of Germany's dependence
on the US for its security and
shows no sign of a willingness
to endanger this guarantee for
other objectives.
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SECRi1''I'
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The Middle East is experiencing the opening
rounds of what could develop into a series of new
crises, any one of which could give rise to new
international alignments and confrontations or to
domestic turmoil. At the same time, it is far
from certain that any one situation will crystalize
into major crisis proportion. Each is susceptible
to postponement and short-term solution.
The Arab Defense Council decision to post for-
eign Arab troops to Palestinian west Jordan could
trigger an explosion in the Arab-Israeli confronta-
tion. If the troops move in, Israel would feel
obliged to react and their presence would favor
further instability in Jordan. If King Husayn
succeeds in staving off their arrival, this would
stimulate new resentments against his regime.
The Syrian move against the
Iraq
Petroleum
Company pipeline not only adds a
new
element of
instability to oil relationships
in
the Middle
East, but also threatens to hurt
Iraq
and Lebanon
and Syria itself.
Among tropical African nations the hope to
bring down the white regime in Rhodesia serves as
a thread presently linking them in their interna-
tional outlook. For the greater part, however, they
remain preoccupied with their own problems. This
is particularly the case with the more significant
states. For example, the trend toward the fraction-
alization of Nigeria continues despite continuing
but somewhat halfhearted efforts of the remnant
central government. The Tanzanian Government con-
tinues preoccupied with an alleged threat of in-
cursion from Portuguese Mozambique as a consequence
of Tanzanian help to Mozambique nationalist rebels
and is seeking more Communist arms.
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THE UN CONSIDERS RHODESIA
The Africa bloc has proposed
UN action which goes considerably
beyond Britain's earlier request
to the Security Council for lim-
ited mandatory economic sanctions
against Rhodesia.
The African proposal, as an
amendment to Britain's Security
Council resolution, would extend
the sanctions to oil and to Rho-
desian export of coal and manufac-
tured goods. Moreover, it would
deplore specifically South African
and Portuguese failure to comply
with earlier voluntary sanctions,
point out the consequences under
Article 25 of the UN Charter for
any future noncompliance, and in-
vite Britain to prevent "by all
means" the transport of oil to
Rhodesia. Finally, the proposal
seeks to bind Britain not to grant
Rhodesia independence before ma-
jority rule is attained and it
would retain the Rhodesia item on
the Security Council agenda.
Several non-African Security
Council representatives, including
the British, have indicated that
parts of the African proposal are
unacceptable, and various consul-
tations are under way for a mutu-
ally acceptable solution. Britain
probably would accept the inclu-
sion of oil in the sanctions but
is reluctant to include coal since
Zambia, which uses Rhodesian coal
for its copper industry, might
then ask the UK for help. Brit-
ain's UN representative has said
his government prefers not to
single out South Africa and
Portugal for condemnation since
that would destroy possibilities
for their tacit compliance. Most
important, London would not ac-
cept responsibility for policing
oil sanctions since that would
almost certainly require a block-
ade of South Africa. Nor does
it want a UN resolution which
would bind the British Parliament
to give Rhodesia majority rule
before independence.
Meanwhile, Salisbury is toy-
ing with the idea of unilaterally
implementing the constitutional
proposals which Prime Ministers
agreed to earlier this month.
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ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING
Jordan failed to fend off
its critics at the Arab Defense
Council meeting in Cairo last
week on the issue of stationing
foreign Arab troops in Palestinian
west Jordan. The internal and
external pressures to strengthen
Jordan's Israeli frontier finally
compelled the Jordanians to agree
to the council's decision that
Saudi and Iraqi troops be de-
ployed in Jordan within two
months of the meeting.
Jordan's reluctant acquies-
cence represents a sharp depar-
ture from its earlier stand and
indicates how seriously King
Husayn views the radical Arab
threat to his regime. He may be
playing for time in the hope that
before two months have passed
the situation will have changed
enough for him to say that for-
eign troops are no longer needed.
Public comments by.Jordanian
spokesmen since the Defense Coun-
cil meeting have suggested that
as far as Amman is concerned the
council decision is still tenta-
tive and conditional.
In the event Saudi and Iraqi
troops do move into Jordan, they
would be less onerous to the Amman
government than those of Egypt,
Syria, or the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO). The de-
cision, nevertheless, is at least
a temporary victory for Husayn's
radical enemies in Cairo and
Damascus since it establishes a
precedent for the eventual entry
of forces they command. The is-
sue is a critical one for Amman
which would expect troops from
Egypt, Syria, or the PLO to be
more of an internal subversive
threat than a defense against
Israel.
Amman is especially concerned
about the threat posed by the PLO
which has won increased support
among Jordan's Palestinian popula-
tion since the 13 November Israeli
raid. At the Cairo meeting Jordan
remained adamant in its opposition
to the deployment of PLO military
forces in west Jordan. This
prompted PLO chairman Ahmad
Shuqayri to reiterate, after the
meeting, that whether Amman ac-
cepted them or not, PLO "army"
units would force their way into
Jordan "at the appropriate time."
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TANZANIAN MILITARY BUILDUP CONTINUES WITH COMMUNIST SUPPORT
Tanzania's deep involvement
in the southern African libera-
tion struggle and its fear of
Portuguese retaliation have caused
Dar es Salaam to accelerate expan-
sion of its defense forces. It
has sought some military hardware
from the USSR but is relying on
Communist China for most military
assistance.
Tanzania
will probably adopt Chinese weap-
ons as standard equipment through-
out the army. It is not yet clear
how this will affect the role of
the present Canadian training mis-
sion.
The volunteer reserve, cre-
ated in late 1964, was to be com-
posed of trained cadres operat-
ing from central depots in their
home districts. Chinese instruc-
tors are believed to have helped
train the first cadres recruited
for five centers along the Mozam-
bique frontier. These were called
up on 2 December following the
explosion of land mines on the
Tanzanian side of the border. No
evidence substantiates Dar es
Salaam's accusation that Portu-
guese military personnel were
involved, but the mines may have
been laid by local tribesmen in
Portugal's pay. For over two
years the Mozambique Liberation
Front (FRELIMO) has utilized
Tanzanian sanctuaries and Dar es
Salaam has become increasingly
jumpy about the possibility of
retaliatory attacks.
China's offer to supply arms
free of charge plus President
Nyerere's distrust of Western in-
tentions in southern Africa have
been major reasons for his growing
reliance on China. Most of the arms
have already been delivered as a
gift. Fourteen medium tanks and
two landing craft still to come 25X1
will be new to the Tanzanian inven-
tory. Their crews are to be trained
in China.
However, in addition, the Tan-
zanians are getting four torpedo
boats and more armored personnel
carriers from the USSR
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INSTABILITY IN THREE WEST AFRICAN ENTENTE STATES
Considerable political unrest
has produced a significant tight-
ening of military control in Upper
Volta and a structural change in
the government of Togo. A shake-
up also appears imminent in Dahomey.
With the anniversary of last
year's military take-over approach-
ing, Upper Volta's President Lam-
izana announced on 12 December that
the army would retain power for
another four years. This follows
months of futile efforts to get
the country's political leaders to
agree on means of reconstituting
civilian rule and probably portends
even greater military control. The
politicians seem unlikely to organ-
ize effective protests to Lamizana's
new action. Future unrest is more
likely to come from younger army
officers who feel deprived of their
full share of power.
The situation in Togo is the
most volatile. Army Chief of Staff
Eyadema, whose belated backing of
President Grunitzky during the 21
November abortive coup was a key
factor in thwarting that attempt,
apparently has decided to stick
with the President for the time
being. On 14 December, they se-
cured a National Assembly vote
abolishing the post of vice presi-
dent. The move was directed against
the incumbent, Antoine Meatchi,
who has long coveted the presidency
and who has been incriminated in
the 21 November episode. The role
of the army--which appears to have
divided loyalties--may be decisive
in determining the nature of the
future Togolese government.
SECRET
UPPER VOLTA
?OUAGADOUGOU
ABIDIA
All three countries are poor,
with few identifiable possibili-
ties for development. This, plus
cutbacks in subsidies from France
and other sources, has forced their
governments to impose unpopular aus-
terity budgets for 1967. Resulting
discontent, mixed with instability
caused by the absence of well-
rooted political institutions, is
stimulating both visionary politi-
cians and military leaders to com-
pete for power.
{ CCRA ~ ao~ o~Obo
- ona~ Sigh! n&Benin
Gulf (if Guinea
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Developments at the past week's Sixth Con-
ference of Foreign Ministers of the Latin Ameri-
can Free Trade Association (LAFTA) countries appear
to have set the stage for approval of a site and
date for the proposed inter-American summit talks.
The meeting also, however, underlined the fact
that many Latin Americans are at best prepared to
pay only lip service to a major goal of such a
summit conference: meaningful progress toward
economic integration.
Representatives of the ten LAFTA members met
in Uruguay primarily to discuss further reduction
of tariff walls in intra-LAFTA trade. Very little
progress was made, however, since by now member
countries largely have made all the tariff cuts
they feel they can make without sacrifices. Hag-
gling over the tariff issue led to some friction
during the meeting.
Nevertheless, it was informally agreed that
12-14 April appeared convenient for a summit meet-
ing and that Punta del Este, Uruguay, might be the
most desirable location for the talks. Final
designation of the date, site, and agenda for the
summit conference will have to await the conclusion
of negotiations among all the governments involved,
which may only be completed at the Third Inter-
American Conference tentatively set for Buenos
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%Mf SECRET NW
BRAZIL MOVES TOWARD ADOPTING NEW CONSTITUTION
The Brazilian Government has
moved to institutionalize the revo-
lution that brought President Cas-
tello Branco to power. On 12 Decem-
ber, Congress began a six-week spe-
cial session to consider a new
constitution proposed by the Presi-
dent. He has decreed a strict time-
table for congressional considera-
tion of the draft, which virtually
eliminates meaningful legislative
participation. One fourth of either
house may offer amendments, but the
administration is unlikely to accept
major changes.
By incorporating some of the
special powers employed by Castello
Branco, as well as new provisions,
the proposed constitution would
guarantee President-elect Costa e
Silva sufficient power to govern ef-
fectively for the next four years.
It would also provide him with the
legal means to name his successor.
It specifies indirect election of
the president and vice president by
an electoral college made up of
members of Congress, representatives
of state legislatures, and one dele-
gate for each 500,000 voters.
Although the draft has been
modified somewhat to soften its more
authoritarian features, it nonethe-
less embodies strong presidential
pow9 s. The president will be able
t9 decree a state of siege for 60
days (extendable for another 60
days) but will have to justify his
action to Congress within five days
after the decree. He will have
broad powers to intervene in states,
and to issue decrees with the force
of law in the fields of national
security and public finance. Under
the proposed constitution Congress
can approve such decrees, but it
will have no power to reject or
amend them.
Congress's power is to be
further restricted by reserving in-
itiation of money bills to the
president. Congress must act on the
national budget within a specified
period or it becomes law as sub-
mitted. Ordinary bills submitted
by the executive must be acted upon
within 90 days and "urgent" bills
in 40, or they also become law as
drafted. Congress may grant polit-
ical amnesties, but only if the
president concurs.
Military courts are given the
right to judge civilians for cer-
tain crimes against national secu-
rity, but their decisions may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Persons accused of "subversion or
corruption" can be prosecuted be-
fore the Supreme Court and lose
their political rights.
The proposed constitution sets
forth basic principles by which
political parties may be organized,
making it difficult to form any new
party. The draft also spells out
the workers' right to strike and
the right of public employees to
tenure.
Substantial government majori-
ties in both houses of Congress ap-
pear to guarantee passage but the
authoritarian nature of the consti-
tution and the method being used
to push it through Congress are
coming under widespread criticism.
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SECRET
STRONG VENEZUELAN REACTION TO TERRORIST CAMPAIGN
The government of Venezuela
has responded vigorously to the
mounting Communist terrorist cam-
paign in Caracas. Acceding to
military pressure, the government
has suspended constitutional
guarantees, and the military has
occupied Central University.
The campaign, accompanied by
small-scale rural guerrilla war-
fare, began slowly in September
and increased in intensity dur-
ing October and November. By mid-
November the tally was 65 armed
robberies, 19 attacks against po-
lice personnel, and eight attacks
against the homes of armed forces
officers. The campaign hit a peak
during the last week of November
when the volume and intensity of
terrorism reached a level not
seen since the all-out Communist
effort in 1963 to topple the gov-
ernment.
A sudden lull which took
place in early December was vio-
lently shattered on the morning
of 13 December when in two separate
attacks a retired army major was
murdered and the army chief of
staff wounded.
Military officers, outraged
at the latest attacks, directed
their anger at least as much
against the government for inac-
tion as against the terrorists
and demanded strong and prompt
government action. President
Leoni acceded to the demands by
immediately suspending constitu-
tional guarantees. This was
followed by military occupation
of the sacrosanct Central Uni-
versity, long a safe haven of
terrorists.
The government's moves will
probably soothe the military
and at least for the moment end
government confusion over policy
toward the terrorists. At the
same time, Leoni's bowing to in-
tense military pressure has prob-
ably weakened his position vis-
a-vis the military. Ambassador
Bernbaum comments, "The question
arises as to whether the mili-
tary, who have now achieved ex-
tensive influence and control,
will relinquish this in the near
future."
Whether the government's
moves will reduce terrorism re-
mains to be seen. If the current
action does not reduce terrorism,
it is probable that severe strains
on the government will reappear
during the coming months.)
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SECRET ..~
DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS FAIL TO MOUNT GENERAL STRIKE
The divided Dominican Com-
munist movement failed to mount
a general strike on 13 December
to protest President Balaguer's
decision to grant only part of
the traditional Christmas bonus
to government workers. The adept
handling of the issue by Balaguer,
a lack of popular support for
the walkout, and the absence of
support for the strike by non-
Communist left-wing political
and labor groups contributed to
the Communist debacle.
Balaguer defused the issue
in early November by reversing
an earlier decision to grant no
bonus and by giving instead a
partial premium to some govern-
ment employees. The President's
policy was aimed at obtaining
needed savings in the government's
relatively high wage payments.
Last year the Garcia Godoy gov-
ernment was confronted by a wide-
spread walkout over the issue.
Thus this year's result is an im-
portant victory for Balaguer and
resolves one of his many problems.
Non-Communist labor and po-
litical groups, including the im-
portant left-of-center Dominican
Revolutionary Party--whose sup-
port is essential to any effec-
tive strike--refused to back the
Communist demands for a walkout.
Some left-wing leaders admitted
that the government's policy was
economically sound while others
were restrained from striking by
fear of government retaliation
and by a recognition that wide-
spread unemployment makes re-
placement of discharged strikers
relatively easy.
Contributing to the defeat
of the strike attempt was the
inability of the various Domini-
can Communist groups to unite on
a common strategy and tactics.
There are now five Communist par-
ties in the country and they are
quarreling among themselves over
personal and ideological differ-
ences. Communist efforts to
provoke the security forces into
heavy-handed repression of agi-
tators favoring a strike resulted
in only minor disturbances.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 16 Dec 66
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SECRET
ARGENTINE PRESIDENT REPLACES MILITARY CHIEF
President Ongania's appoint-
ment of a new army commander,
General Alsogaray, and a reshuf-
fle of the army high command
will help maintain military unity
for the present. The President
has made it clear to the army
that he does not intend to per-
mit the high command to have an
active role in formulating gov-
ernment policy. Alsogaray and
the other senior generals ap-
parently remain prepared to give
Ongania strong support, if neces-
sary, when the government imple-
ments the reorganization of the
national railroads. Opposition
to some government policies among
the generals has not disappeared,
however.
General Pistarini, Alsogaray's
predecessor, was in command of
the army when the generals un-
seated the constitutional regime
of President Illia. Since On-
gania assumed the presidency,
Pistarini had been the spokes-
man for the military in criticiz-
ing government policy as too
dilatory, especially in the area
of economic and labor reform.
After a disagreement over the
promotion and reassignment of
the army's top generals, Pista-
rini stepped down. To replace
him, Ongania chose the next sen-
ior general not on foreign as-
signment, Alsogaray, a step cal-
culated to cause the least amount
of resentment among the top of-
ficers.
Alsogaray, an ambitious and
outspoken officer, was also among
those who were critical of the
regime in its early days. Re-
cently, however, he said that he
generally agreed with the Presi-
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Secret
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