WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005500030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

28 October 1966
OCI No. 0313/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
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CROUP I Exc uded4rom*autoieafic
downgrading and declassification
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(Information as of noon EDT, 27 October 1966)
VIETNAM
Communist forces may have begun their fall-winter cam-
paign in three of South Vietnam's northern provinces,
and evidently are massing along the Cambodian border
for an offensive in that area. East European officials
seem to be hinting about improved prospects for peace
talks, but Hanoi shows no sign of softening its stand.
In Saigon, Premier Ky must still resolve his cabinet
crisis, which was papered over before he left for
Manila. The crisis, however, does not seem to have
slowed the work of the Constituent Assembly.
MUTINY BY LAOTIAN AIR FORCE CHIEF COLLAPSES 5
The growth in influence of General Kouprasith, which
has been accelerated by the departure of air force Gen-
eral Ma, is likely to result in increased pressure for
a greater military voice in the government.
CAMBODIA MOVES TOWARD IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE US 6
Sihanouk is no longer certain of a Communist victory in
Indochina and has begun to reappraise Cambodia's posi-
tion. This has inspired a series of steps to expand
contacts with the West and open a dialogue with the US.
CHINESE RED GUARDS STEP UP CRITICISM OF HIGH OFFICIALS 7
They have intensified attacks on officials in the party
apparatus and begun major criticism of important govern-
ment officials.
Europe
SOVIET INDUSTRY CONTINUES ITS LACKLUSTER PERFORMANCE
Moscow's plan-fulfillment statistics for the third quar-
Ler of 1966 indicate no significant change in industry
from trends observed earlier this year and only a slight
improvement in the standard of living.
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WEST BERLIN MAYOR AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR LXPLORE DETENTE
Mayor Brandt believes expansion of West Berlin's contacts
with the East is essential to the city's future. To this
end he has met four times since spring with Moscow's am-
bassador to East Germany. Both sides see advantages in
the exchange which override any concern they may have
about objections from the East or West German govern-
ments.
SPAIN INCREASES PRESSURE ON GIBRALTAR
After a fourth inconclusive round of talks, Madrid has
imposed trade and traffic restrictions--and threatened
to make further such moves--in an effort to force Lon-
don to concede Spanish sovereignty over the disputed
territory. In a bid for US support, Madrid has also
warned of repercussions for Western defense interests
if it is rebuffed.
NATO MOVES TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF SOME OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS
The tripartite (US, UK, West German) review of Alliance
strategy and financial burden-sharing has gotten under
way despite continuing protests from the other allies
anxious for a role in these talks. The French have won
their point on procedures for talks regarding French
forces in Germany. A decision to transfer the North
Atlantic Council from Paris to Brussels has been made.
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TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI PRODUCES NO SURPRISES
The three-day meeting in New Delhi of Presidents Tito
and Nasir and Prime Minister Gandhi is unlikely to in-
fuse new life into the concept of a united nonaligned
world.
CENTO LIKELY TO SURVIVE DESPITE DISSATISFACTION AMONG
MEMBERS
Continuing disenchantment with CENTO on the part of
Pakistan and Iran is reflected in recent rumors and
press speculation that they and their ally Turkey are
considering an alternative regional arrangement. The
prompt official denials and the inherent political and
financial problems involved make any serious move
against CENTO unlikely at present.
PURGE OF YEMENI GOVERNMENT CONTINUES
Egypt's encouragement of President Sallal's ruthless re-
pression suggests Nasir has abandoned any attempt to pre-
serve the image of Yemeni cooperation in Cairo's domi-
nation of the country.
NIGER.IA'S EASTERN REGION AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STILL AT ODDS 18
The Eastern Region is boycotting the interregional con-
stitutional conference which resumed last Monday in Lagos,
negating the modest progress which had been made toward
resolving Nigeria's drawn-out governmental crisis, and
pushing the East closer to de facto independence.
FOURTH SUMMIT OF AFRICAN UNITY ORGANIZATION DUE EARLY NEXT
MONTH
The conference probably will focus on southern African
issues in an effort to revive the flagging interest of
the OAU membership. The proceedings may be marred by
several bilateral disputes among member states.
MOBUTU TRIES TO OUST CONGOLESE PREMIER
Mobutu has fired Premier Mulamba, but the popular army
general is resisting the move and may yet cause trouble.
Western Hemisphere
BORDER DISPUTE FLARES UP BETWEEN GUYANA AND VENEZUELA
Venezuela admits to a calculated decision to build an
airstrip on disputed Ankoko Island to "catalyze" long-
stalled negotiations over its claims to more than half
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of Guyana's territory. The Guyanese premier's emotional
reaction results in large part from fear that his oppo-
nents would capitalize on any weakness on his part.
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT MOVES TO END LABOR ABUSES
The imposition of new work rules governing dock workers
indicates that the Ongania regime intends to pursue
vigorously its efforts to end privileges long abused
by various sections of organized labor--still dominated
by Peronist leaders.
PARAGUAYAN PRESIDENT SEEKS OPPOSITION COOPERATION
Stroessner wants to replace the 1940 Constitution so
that he would have a legal basis for retaining the
presidency. Even the opposition recognizes that his
long authoritarian rule has brought stability to Para-
guay and that his re-election would be in the nation's
best interest.
ANTI-DUVALIER SENTIMENT GROWS IN HAITI
New signs of disaffection--usually centered in the capi-
tal--have emerged in outlying districts
(However, no
opposition group is well enough organized to mount a se-
rious move against dictator Duvalier at the present time.
NEW DEMONSTRATIONS PROBABLE IN PANAMA
A small-scale Communist-led student demonstration took
place last week in the Canal Zone, and celebrations
next month honoring national independence and the Pana-
manian flag have traditionally been occasions for ex-
tremist-led political agitation.
MOVES AGAINST GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS MAY SPUR NEW TERRORISM
The Communists appear likely to renew terrorist activ-
ity on a wide scale in an effort to divert army units
now encircling guerrilla redoubts in the mountains of
northeastern Guatemala.
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Communist forces may have
begun their "Thu Dong" or fall-win-
ter campaign in the South Vietnamese
provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tin,
and Quang Ngai in the southern part
of I Corps. Since 14 October, en-
emy units have attacked five out-
posts, a power plant, and a dispen-
sary, shelled two district headquar-
ters, and harassed refugee camps
and lines of communications.
Principles allegedly set forth
at a Communist strategy meeting in
this area in early September said
that the "Thu Dong" offensive will
employ the 5,600-man North Vietnam-
ese Army (NVA) 620th Division, two
Viet Cong sapper (demolition) bat-
talions, and Viet Cong main force
units operating in conjunction with
local guerrilla forces. Tactical
plans call for intensified guerrilla
efforts in friendly rear areas and
widespread attacks against outposts,
especially those manned by South
Vietnamese paramilitary forces. The
primary role of Viet Cong/NVA regu-
lars will allegedly be to ambush
allied forces dispatched to relieve
friendly positions under siege by
guerrilla units.
However, the campaign in at
least Quang Nam Province appears to
have been temporarily disrupted by
a highly successful spoiling opera-
tion conducted this week by US Ma-
rines and the South Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) some 25 miles south-southwest
of Da Nang. The coordinated allied
effort---codenamed KERN/TRUY KICH--
resulted in more than 400 Communists
killed, as against friendly losses
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Far East
VIETNAM
of 35 killed (eight US) and 120
wounded (26 US).
NVA forces are continuing to
expand their infiltration corri-
dors on the western flank of the
Demilitarized Zone and to consoli-
date their base area in and south
of the zone. The Communists are
estimated to retain the capability
to attack troop concentrations,
outposts, and population centers in
the coastal and interior regions of
northern Quang Tri with a strike
force of up to three reinforced di-
visions.
In the western highlands of
II Corps, evidence continues to
mount that major elements of the
NVA 630th Division are massing
along the Cambodian border in south-
western Kontum and northwestern
Pleiku provinces, possibly in prepa-
ration for a major assault on the
Plei Djereng Special Forces Camp.
The primary objective of such an at-
tack would probably be to inflict
heavy casualties from ambush posi-
tions on large numbers of allied
forces dispatched to the area as re-
inforcements.
Elements of seven US Army bat-
talions participating in Phase IV
of Operation PAUL REVERE reported
several sharp skirmishes with pla-
toon- and company-size enemy units
in the Plei Djereng area during the
past week. To date, the six-month-
long PAUL REVERE surveillance cam-
paign along the Cambodian border
has successfully blunted several ma-
jor Communist offensive operations
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%001 %f
QUA THIEN
s;Da Nang
. 1.' OUANG NAM\
KERN /TRUY KICH
~ A
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KONTUM
1 1
Pleij Djereng ^\ ^
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planned in Pleiku and Kontum prov-
inces.
Prospects for Negotiations
Some East European officials,
following high-level contacts with
Hanoi and the summit conference in
Moscow, are broadly hinting that
prospects are now better for some
move toward negotiations. These
spokesmen are taking the line that
Eastern European countries are
sharply increasing their aid to
North Vietnam in order to increase
their influence at the expense of
the Chinese. At the same time, press
reports allege that they will advise
Hanoi to soften its insistence that
the National Liberation Front is the
sole representative of the South
Vietnamese people and call for a
halt to infiltration. The US, it is
argued, could then cease its bombing
of the North.
Previously, East Europeans
had urged a cessation of the bomb-
ing as a first step toward negotia-
tions, and they may hope by their
latest tactic to increase pressure
on the US to do so. Recent hints
are probably also an effort to put
the best possible face on their ad-
ditional aid to North Vietnam so
that it does not appear to be a di-
rect rebuff to President Johnson's
recent overtures for improved re-
lations with Eastern Europe.
There is no indication, how-
ever, that the East Europeans are
very hopeful that Hanoi will re-
spond to their suggestions. East
European delegations returning from
Hanoi have reported that the North
Vietnamese continue to insist on
their four-point peace proposals,
and the Czechs publicly endorsed
this stand while in Hanoi. It is
doubtful, therefore, that the East
Europeans would now undertake a new
initiative without a good indica-
tion that the US or North Vietnam
had altered its position.
Premier Ky's cabinet problems,
as well as the over-all issue of
north-south regional antagonisms,
were put aside while ranking South
Vietnamese Government officials at-
tended the Manila Conference.
Just before leaving for Manila,
Ky obtained a promise from six of
the seven dissident southern minis-
ters to remain at their posts until
after the conference; in a public
display of confidence, he named
Nguyen Luu Vien, one of the dissi-
dents, as acting premier.l-1
Ky's plans for dealing with
the cabinet dispute since his re-
turn are not clear.
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one of the dissident ministers now
says he is no longer pressing for
Loan's removal; he suggested a face-
saving device which would allow most
of the ministers to stay on.
Even if the immediate dispute
is quietly resolved, however, the
major issue involving the proper
southern share of influence in the
government will remain. Efforts
during the next several months by
northern officials to broaden their
political base, while restricting
the growth of any significant na-
tional opposition, will be carefully
scrutinized and probably opposed by
the southerners and other elements
eager for a significant voice in the
future constitutional government.
The Constituent Assembly
So far, the cabinet dispute
has not significantly affected the
work of the Constituent Assembly.
The credentials of all the deputies
have now been certified, and proce-
dural rules have been adopted. As
was generally expected, former chief
of state Phan Khac Suu, a moderate
southerner, was elected permanent
chairman of the assembly on 26 Oc-
tober, with a northerner and a Hoa
Hao leader elected as assistant
chairman. Second to Suu in the bal-
loting for chairman was Tran Dien,
a Catholic member of the Dai Viet
nationalist party from Central Viet-
nam, who apparently drew consider-
able support from the cohesive Cath-
olic bloc in the assembly. The posts
of secretary general and chairman
of the constitution drafting commit-
tee remain to be filled before
drafting begins.
Buddhist Split Hardens
The special Unified Buddhist
Association (UBA) congress in Saigon
on 21 and 22 October ended in chaos
and failed to resolve the organiza-
tion's leadership and policy prob-
lems. A formal split between the
militant supporters of Tri Quang
and the moderates of Tam Chau now
appears one step closer. At pres-
ent, there are two rival Buddhist
Institute chairmen--Tam Chau and
militant Thien Hoa--each with his
own supporters and headquarters in
Saigon. Tam Chau's faction was in
the minority at the con ress
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MUTINY BY LAOTIAN AIR FORCE CHIEF COLLAPSES
The collapse of air force
General Ma's 21 October mutiny
against the Laotian General Staff
removes still another major obsta-
cle to the growing influence of
General Kouprasith, deputy com-
mander in chief of the Royal Armed
Forces (FAR). The end of Ma's
career came just a week after
General Kong Le was forced out of
his command of the neutralist
forces, a move that probably pre-
sages at least their partial ab-
sorption into FAR. One result of
these changes is likely to be in-
creased pressure for a greater
military voice in the government
and for elimination of "leftist"
vestiges in the coalition, such
as the vacant cabinet portfolios
held open for the Communist Pathet
Lao.
The mutiny began on 21 Oc-
tober, when T-28 aircraft under
Ma's command bombed the FAR head-
quarters installations near Vien-
tiane. The planes missed their
prime targets--the quarters of
senior officers--but succeeded in
knocking out armed forces communi-
cations and killing more than 20
people.
Ma's ostensible goal was the
removal of corrupt senior offi-
cers; however, it also appears
that he believed the pressure play
might stave off his impending de-
motion from command of the tactical
air force. After it became clear
that none of the regional military
commanders supported the move, Ma
fled with a number of his planes
and pilots to Thailand where he
requested political asylum.
The military have asked for
his extradition, and Premier Sou-
vanna Phouma reportedly is support-
ing the request. Although Souvanna
has long supported Ma and privately
acknowledged his contribution to
the fighting against the Pathet
Lao, he now may fear that leaving
Ma in Thailand--where disgruntled
generals Phoumi Nosavan and Kong
Le are also in exile--would bol-
ster the possibility that an op-
position might form there. it
is not clear whether the Thais
will agree to return Ma to Laos.
Ma's departure deprives the
Laotian tactical air force, which
has proved itself highly effec-
tive in strikes against Communist
forces in Laos, of a highly mo-
tivated and skilled leader. In
the long run, however, it will
pave the way for a closer inte-
gration of the air force into
the armed forces
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CAMBODIA MOVES TOWARD IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE US
There are continuing signs
that Sihanouk is moving cautiously
toward a more middle-of-the-road
course for Cambodia.
The substantial input of US
troops into South Vietnam and
the growing realization that the
Communists are not going to score
an early victory there have
prompted him to reappraise Cam-
bodia's position. At the same
time, a divergence of viewpoint
has surfaced between Phnom Penh
and Peking on the future of In-
dochina. Phnom Penh has been
particularly disturbed over Pe-
king's refusal to back a Cam-
bodian proposal to expand the
International Control Commission
in Cambodia, a move calculated
to keep the war from spreading
onto Cambodian territory.
Although Sihanouk's reap-
praisal has not led to any diminu-
tion in the flow of his anti-US
and pro-Communist rhetoric, it
has inspired a series of steps
to expand contacts with the West
and open a dialogue with the US.
The most remarkable sign of
the new Cambodian attitude, how-
ever, was the red-carpet treat-
ment given a Pan American Air-
lines team in late September.
Panam acquired landing rights
with little prior negotiation,
and the team was told that Cam-
bodia would like to be designated
as a rest and recovery area for
US troops. The Cambodian nego-
tiators stated that they realized
that diplomatic relations would
have to be restored, but indi-
cated that this could be worked
out by the two governments.
The new Cambodian cabinet,
announced on 20 October, is
further evidence that Sihanouk
has become responsive to propo-
nents of a more moderate course.
The new premier, former defense
minister Lon Nol, has long been
critical of Sihanouk's leftist
policies, and especially of Cam-
bodia's dependence on Chinese Com-
munist military assistance. The
conservative complexion of the
cabinet is also underlined by
the absence of Phnom Penh's most
prominent leftist and the appoint-
ment of Douc Rasy, leader of a
group of younger anti-Communist
figures, to the cabinet.
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CHINESE RED GUARDS STEP UP CRITICISM OF HIGH OFFICIALS
Since mid-October Red Guards
in Peking and other cities have
intensified attacks on officials
in the party apparatus and, for
the first. time, have directed
major criticism at important of-
ficials in the government machin-
ery. Descriptions of the attacks
indicate that they are officially
and centrally directed. They are
made through large and prominently
displayed posters, sometimes ac-
companied by well-organized dem-
onstrations.
The most prominent govern-
ment officials under criticism
are Foreign Minister Chen Yi and
Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien,
both ful:L politburo members. In
spite of the current criticism,
both men have been representing
the regime in meetings with for-
eign delegations. On 20 October
Li met a Pakistani delegation
which Chen has been hosting. On
25 October Chen even appeared
with Mao Tse-tung in a meeting
with the delegation. So far,
major regime pronouncements on
the "cultural revolution" have
focused attention on bringing
down party, not government, of-
ficials.
The strongest attacks in
recent weeks have been directed
at Li Hsueh-feng, who replaced
Peng Chen as head of the Peking
city party committee in May and
was promoted into the politburo
as an alternate member in August.
Red Guard posters have linked
him with chief of state Liu Shao-
On 21 October, large posters de-
manding the removal of Liu and
party general secretary Teng
Hsiao-ping reportedly appeared
on one of Peking's main streets.
This is the first reported major
attack on Teng.
Reports from Peking indicate
that unusually virulent poster
attacks against important regional
officials in the Northwest and
Southwest party bureaus have been
displayed in recent days. They
include demands, for example, that
the Southwest Bureau be razed be-
cause it is a "stronghold of op-
position to the cultural revolu-
tion." Its first secretary, Li
Ching-chuan, is a full politburo
member and is thought to be a
protege of Teng Hsiao-ping.
A campaign against key offi-
cials in the party apparatus has
been building up since the party
plenum in early August, and re-
cent developments appear to be
part of a concerted effort to
bring down those who oppose the
current ruling faction of Mao
Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and Chou En-
lai. Unlike the government men
now being criticized, the targets
in the party apparatus have not
been publicly active, except in
their seemingly routine appear-
ances at large leadership turn-
outs.
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Europe
SOVIET INDUSTRY CONTINUES ITS LACKLUSTER PERFORMANCE
Moscow has released statis-
tics for Soviet industrial pro-
duction during the third quarter
of 1966 which indicate no signif-
icant change from trends observed
earlier this year. The over-all
increase in output is at an annual
rate comparable to the unsatis-
factory level of recent years.
It is also considerably below
the performance necessary to re-
alize the 1970 goal. (See table.)
The rate of production of
chemical equipment during the
past quarter fell off drastically
from the performance of the first
six months, although the rate of
increase in petroleum equipment
and agricultural machinery rose
moderately. The increased pro-
duction of agricultural machinery
may be a harbinger of further ac-
celeration in output provided for
in Brezhnev's agricultural pro-
gram for 1965-70. In the energy
sector, the fuel industries--
with the exception of petroleum
--continued to develop at less-
than-acceptable rates.
The Soviet consumer continues
to experience only a slight im-
provement in his standard of liv-
ing, with increased supplies in
some products offset by virtual
stagnation in the output of
others. Most of the more impres-
sive percentage increases, more-
over, were in consumer durables
such as television sets and re-
frigerators which have been and
remain in extremely short sup-
ply in absolute terms. Consumer
welfare will improve noticeably
only after the food industries
and light manufactures dependent
on agricultural raw materials
have been able to raise their
production as a result of this
year's performance in agriculture.
Notwithstanding the excellent
wheat harvest, the Soviet regime
has not relaxed its 1963 ban on
the distribution of flour to the
public, except for token allot-
ments allowed in connection with
major holidays. The individual
ration for this year's 7 November
celebration is the same mea er
4.4 pounds as last year.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 28 Oct 66
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USSR: RATES OF GROWTH OF IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL ITEMS
1966
Civilian Indus#rial Production
civilian Machinery
Chemical equipment
Petroleum equipment
Agricultural equipment
Industrial Materials
Electric power
Cool
prude petroleum
Natural gas
Steel
Rolled .steel
Steel pipe
Mineral fertilizer
Plastics and resins
Chemical fibers
Cement
Commercial timber
Consumer Goods
= Television sets
25
28
Washing machines
19
15
Refrigerators
48
40
Cotton fabrics
2
3
Leather footwear
2
8
Meat
25
24
Dairy products 5)
N.A.
5
20
12
30
4
corresponding period in preceding year, as announced by Moscow
except as indicated otherwise.
2) Percentage figures rounded to nearest half-percent when applicable.
3) Calculated by CIA:
4) Official Soviet goal, including military as well-as civilian output.
16,
N,A
26
N.A.
5
5) Includes most production of the socialized sector; excludes all products
of the private sector.
N:A. - Not applicable
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WEST BERLIN MAYOR AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR EXPLORE DETENTE
West Berlin's Mayor Willy
Brandt has indicated that he will
continue to push his ideas on ex-
panding the city's, and West Ger-
many's, contacts with the East.
Speaking at the Social Democratic
Party's national meeting in Ber-
lin on 20 October, Brandt cited
the attempts of the "great pow-
ers" to move toward detente as
justification for his policy of
attempting to achieve the "most
orderly coexistence possible."
Brandt regards expansion of
West Berlin's economic and cul-
tural interchange with the East
as essential to its future growth
and prosperity, and for nearly a
year has advocated making the
city a center for East-West con-
tacts. To promote this idea with
the Soviets--as well as his own
political future--and probably to
generate more interest in West
Berlin's problems both among the
Western Allies and in Bonn,
Brandt has met with the USSR's
envoy to East Germany, Ambassa-
dor Abrasimov, on four occasions
since last spring. The mayor
has also authorized West Berlin
city officials to establish con-
tacts with Soviet Embassy offi-
cials and to explore the possi-
bilities of West Berlin trade
with Eastern European countries,
including East Germany.
There are obvious advantages
for the Soviets in encouraging
Brandt's desire to play a role
in East-West affairs. It of-
fers the Soviet Union direct con-
tact with a potential German
chancellor--Brandt is the leader
of the Social Democratic Party--
and the opportunity to encourage
dissension between Bonn and West
Berlin. These contacts would
circumvent Walter Ulbricht's ef-
forts to negotiate with the West
Berlin government, but Soviet
officials are not overly con-
cerned about the East German
leader's misgivings on such mat-
ters. Furthermore, direct deal-
ings with West Berlin would
suit the Soviet (and, inciden-
tally the East German) thesis
that the city is a "special po-
litical entity" and would pro-
mote a de facto quadripartite
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SE CRE T
SPAIN INCREASES PRESSURE ON GIBRALTAR
Spain is increasing its
pressure on Gibraltar following
a fourth inconclusive round of
talks with the UK over Spanish
claims to the British colony.
On 25 October Madrid banned
trade and vehicular traffic across
the land frontier at the town of
La Linea. It has asked Britain
to cease using the Gibraltar air-
field for military planes, charg-
ing violation of Spanish terri-
tory. The Spaniards also main-
tain that Britain is illegally
using part of a neutral zone on
the isthmus for its airfield.
The British expect further
harassments, including an attempt
to deny them use of the airfield.
Among these could be complete
closure
of the border and
tions on
sea
traffic from
Spanish
port
of Algeciras,
well as
interference with
restric-
the
as
ships
cut off telecommunications and
the water supply and start an
economic boycott.
The Spaniards have not re-
sponded to the UK's offer to
take the dispute to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
The Spanish Government con-
tinues to seek US support in the
dispute. It notes that US "neu-
trality" favors the status quo
and charges that it is not con-
sonant with the US' general anti-
colonial stand. Madrid has warned
of serious repercussions for US
and Western defense interests if
it were rebuffed. It mentioned
such pending matters as resump-
tion of US nuclear overflights
and extension of the US-Spanish
defense agreement which expires
in 1968.
approaching Gibraltar through
Spanish waters. Spain could also
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S PA I N
La Linea_ SPANISH
CU -T =M 8
AN19H
///~~~ CONTROL
Neutral Zone r+I POINT
(British claim) H
(Spanish claim)
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SECRET
NATO MOVES TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF SOME OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS
US, British, and German rep-
resentatives began their review
of Alliance strategy and financial
burden-sharing in Bonn on 20 Oc-
tober, with NATO Secretary General
Brosio attending. It was agreed
at this meeting to establish three
working groups to study the three
phases of the review--threat,
forces, and costs. At their next
meeting, in Washington on 9 Novem-
ber, the principals will go over
the work of these study groups.
The initial meeting served to
highlight the continuing differ-
ences on how the talks should pro-
ceed. The US and Germany are urg-
ing careful assessment of the So-
viet threat and of NATO strategy
and force levels before going on
to the balance-of-payments ques-
tion. The British, on the other
hand, are insisting that Germany
decide quickly on plans to offset
the UK's foreign exchange cost of
maintaining forces in Germany. The
three sides hope to make enough
progress to enable them to report
to the NATO foreign ministers
meeting on 15 and 16 December.
In an
persistent
allies
selves
in the
talks,
effort to counter the
protests from the other
anxious to ensure them-
as great a role as possible
outcome of the tripartite
Brosio and the "big three"
representatives agreed that ar-
rangements would be established to
keep the others informed of the
progress of the review and that
any conclusions reached would be
submitted to them for considera-
tion. The protests have continued,
however.
As for the French problem,
Paris has won its point on proce-
dures for negotiating with the
other Fourteen allies over the
role and mission of the French
forces in Germany. At the 24 Oc-
tober meeting of the North Atlan-
tic Council the Fourteen and the
French agreed that talks on the
subject should begin at once be-
tween SACEUR and the French mili-
tary, with the Fourteen and the
French issuing direct and separate
instructions to their respective
military representatives at these
talks. This is the arrangement in-
itially proposed by the French but
rejected by the other NATO foreign
ministers at their meeting last
June on the grounds that the gen-
erals needed agreed political in-
structions from the council be-
fore beginning their talks.
Another major NATO problem
was settled at the 26 October
meeting when the full North Atlan-
tic Council unanimously agreed to
recommend to the NATO foreign min-
isters that they approve, at their
December meeting, the transfer of
the council from Paris to Brus-
sels. The break on this issue came
when the Canadian, German, and
Danish council representatives an-
nounced prior to the meeting that
their governments were ready to
drop opposition to the move and
go along with the majority. The
French had repeatedly said they
would not oppose the relocation of
the council.
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SECRET v
Middle East - Africa
TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE IN NEW
The communique issued on
24 October following the three-
day meeting in New Delhi of
Presidents Tito and Nasir and
Prime Minister Gandhi contained
no surprises. The three leaders
emphasized economic problems
facing underdeveloped countries,
although international attention
has been focused on the communi-
que's references to Vietnam. On
this issue, the three merely re-
peated their previous demands
for cessation of the bombing of
North Vietnam "without any pre-
conditions" and for participa-
tion of the National Liberation
Front as "one of the main par-
ties" in any peace negotiations.
The communique reiterated
opposition to colonialism and
racialism in Africa--a standard
theme at nonaligned conferences.
The use of economic "pressures"
against developing countries
was deplored while developed
countries were asked to provide
for easier transfer of resources
to the less developed countries.
The communique ignored the
problems posed by Communist
China's policies. Nasir told a
press conference that there was
a lack of "full or true" infor-
mation about China. All three
leaders again supported Peking's
admission to the UN.
This tripartite conference,
the third in a series dating
DELHI PRODUCES NO SURPRISES
back to 1956, was originally
proposed early last spring but
was put off by the Indians due
to "pressing internal problems."
Mrs. Gandhi's final acquiescence
and her insistence that it be in
New Delhi probably stemmed from
a hope that the presence of the
two other leaders in India would
enhance her own and the Congress
Party's prestige in the period
preceding national elections next
February.
Prior to the conference, the
three participants found it nec-
essary to emphasize that a tri-
partite meeting--not a "non-
aligned summit conference"--was
being proposed. The suspicion
within several Afro-Asian govern-
ments that the leaders intended
to arrogate to themselves the
role of spokesmen for all non-
aligned nations was never com-
pletely overcome, however.
The communique called for
continued cooperation among the
nonaligned states. However, in
view of the paucity of signifi-
cant results, the New Delhi meet-
ing is unlikely to infuse new
life into the concept of a united
nonaligned world--a concept which
has been battered more and more
often in recent years by divided
and often conflicting national
interests.
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SECRET
CENTO LIKELY TO SURVIVE DESPITE DISSATISFACTION AMONG MEMBERS
Current rumors predicting
a serious weakening or even dis-
solution of the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) probably
reflect no more than continu-
ing Pakistani and Iranian dis-
satisfaction with the organiza-
tion. Turkish support, although
not enthusiastic in recent years
does not appear to have weakened.
Recent trips by Turkish
President Sunay to Iran and
Pakistan and by Pakistani Presi-
dent Ayub Khan to Iran produced
widespread press speculation in
Rawalpindi and Tehran that the
tripartite Regional Cooperation
for Development (RCD) organiza-
tion--formed by Turkey, Iran,
and Pakistan two years ago--
would be given a new military
role. The addition of a mili-
tary function to what has been
a purely economic pact would
bring it in direct competition
with CENTO, and would be a clear
indication that the three "re-
gional" members of the older
organization were prepared to
see CENTO disappear.
RCD was formed in large
part because the Shah and Ayub
resented the far-reaching US
influence in CENTO. Although
the US is not a member of CENTO,
as are the UK, Iran, Turkey and
Pakistan, it provides the bulk
of CENTO's economic support and
is a member of the pact's Mili-
tary Committee.
CENTO has long been under at-
tack--especially in Pakistan--
for being an obstacle to im-
proved relations with the USSR
and for its failure to support
Iran against Iraq and Pakistan
against India. Its economic
contributions, although signif-
icant in some fields, have not
always been well publicized in
the three nations.
Speculation about an early
dissolution of CENTO, however,
kish officials have denied that
President Sunay's state visits
to Iran and Pakistan early this
month included military. discus-
sions.
The three regional members
have no assurance that they would
gain politically by weakening
CENTO, and RCD lacks the finan-
cial backing to assume CENTO's
economic functions. Turkey, Iran,
and Pakistan appear unlikely to
make any serious move against
CENTO, but their support for it
may continue to diminish. 1 7
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PURGE OF YEMENI GOVERNMENT CONTINUES
Yemeni President Sallal, fol-
lowing Cairo's lead, has culmi-
nated six weeks of stringent re-
pressive measures by the trial
and execution of two former cabi-
net ministers. Anti-Egyptian
Yemeni republicans have meanwhile
been casting about for ways and
means to counter Sallal's purge
without surrendering the few re-
publican political gains.
Since President Sallal was
first returned to Yemen and formed
a new government by arbitrarily
dismissing the al-Amri cabinet,
an increasingly harsh campaign
of arrests and dismissals has
been carried out. This move has
purged the government of any trace
of opposition to Sallal's new
program of complete support for
hard-line Egyptian policy.
The number of government
personnel affected is estimated
at over 700, including virtually
every army commander and every
civilian member of ex-Premier
al-Amri's anti-Egyptian govern-
ment. The only sizable political
segment thus far treated lightly
has been the powerful tribal
chiefs, who hold the only in-
digenous power in Yemen.
SECRET Nwf
Cairo obviously is backing
Sallal to the hilt. Such lack
of restraint may indicate that
Nasir has abandoned his attempt
to foster a "sister" socialist
state in Yemen. He may now be
responding to the demands of the
military to deal as ruthlessly
as necessary with the Yemenis to
carry out Egyptian policy, with
no further pretense of coopera-
tion.
Yemeni republicans also
appear to have abandoned hope
for any real collaboration with
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SECRET
NIGERIA'S EASTERN REGION AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STILL AT ODDS
The Eastern Region is boy-
cotting the interregional consti-
tutional conference which resumed
last Monday in Lagos, negating
the modest progress which had
been made toward resolving Niger-
ia's drawn-out governmental cri-
sis, and pushing the East closer
toward de facto independence.
Eastern military governor
Ojukwu had laid down stiff pre-
conditions for the East's attend-
ance, including a demand--impos-
sible for Supreme Commander Gowon
to meet--for the removal of North-
ern troops from Lagos and the
Western Region. Ojukwu's posi-
tion has hardened as the weakness
of the federal government and the
ineffectiveness of its army be-
come more apparent, and it is un-
likely that he is ready to partic-
ipate in any meaningful dialogue
on a new constitutional formula
at this time.
The East appears anxious,
nevertheless, to avoid the onus
for a final breakdown in negotia-
tions. A key member of the East-
ern delegation claimed this week
that the Easterners had no inten-
tion of "closing the door" to a
resumption of talks. He said the
East planned to circulate on
27 October a memorandum setting
forth its position. This docu-
ment, however, will simply re-
state the East's insistence on a
constitution providing for a
loose federal association. Fur-
thermore, it will put forward pro-
posals for an interim governmental
arrangement which run counter to
Gowon's announced plan for a 12-
member civilian advisory committee.
The East believes that such a
committee would scheme to entrench
itself in power.
Leading Nigeriahs have tried
but failed to break the deadlock
between the now almost intractable
positions of the federal and East-
ern Region governments. Northern
military governor Katsina's speech
on 18 October expressing "deep
sorrow" for the atrocities com-
mitted in the North against East-
erners was a peace-feeler designed
to placate Eastern bitterness. It
met, however, strong adverse re-
action from Eastern news media.
Similarly, the government's essen-
tially objective statement concern-
ing its proposed white paper on
events in Nigeria since January
1966 had the effect of further
antagonizing the East.
Meanwhile, Gowon appears de-
termined to restore discipline
among unruly Northern troops. He
plans to court-martial the mu-
tineers in Kano who joined civil-
ians in slaughtering Ibos from the
East. If the trial is held, it
will provide a major test of Go-
won's measure of control over the
Northern army elements who brought
him to power.
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SECRET
NIGERIA
I
SANTA
l ISABEL,;~
Z
f
{{
G 1/ IN F A 1 c (
(SnO'PO ?~d
FERNANb.)
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FOURTH SUMMIT OF AFRICAN UNITY ORGANIZATION DUE EARLY NEXT MONTH
The fourth summit confer-
ence of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), scheduled
to be held in Addis Ababa from
5 to 9 November, finds this
association of 36 independent
African states seriously flag-
ging as a result of divisions
among its members. For the
second successive year, many of
the heads of state and govern-
ment will be absent. However,
all members will probably be
represented at the preparatory
Council of ministers session
which begins on 31 October.
Presidents Houphouet-Boigny
of Ivory Coast, and Bourguiba of
Tunisia are among those who see
little use in a summit meeting
this year. However, Ethiopia's
Haile Selassie, whose country is
host for the OAU's headquarters,
would lose prestige if the or-
ganization failed. He and other
pan-African-minded leaders such
as Presidents Toure of Guinea
and Nasir of Egypt have pushed
for convening the summit. They
hope to revive the ailing OAU
by focusing attention on southern
African issues which engage the
emotions of all Africans. More-
over, certain of the military
leaders who have come to power
since the 1965 conference appear
eager to enhance their prestige
by attending.
No direct East-West issues
have been included on the pro-
visional agenda, and it is hoped
that inter-African territorial
discussions can be thrust into
the background to keep the spot-
light on the Rhodesia and South-
West Africa problems. However,
a lively interchange may well
break out between Ethiopia and
Somalia over French Somaliland
which both hope eventually to
annex.
The new moderate Ghana re-
gime and radical Guinea are also
likely to clash sharply over
Toure's continued support of
ousted Ghanaian president Nkru-
mah. Should Nkrumah himself at-
tend, the conference would cer-
tainly founder, as many moderate
leaders would leave in protest.
There are indications that
the organization's radically
oriented secretary general, Di-
allo Telli, will come under heavy
fire at the summit for his free-
wheeling activism. He is not
likely to be ousted, however.
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MOBUTU TRIES TO OUST CONGOLESE PREMIER
Congolese President Mobutu
has moved to consolidate his
position by stripping Premier
Mulamba of his post. The popu-
lar army general is resisting
the move to oust him, but his
chances of rallying effective
support appear slim.
Mobutu took over the post
of premier on 26 October and
designated Mulamba as minister
of defense. Mulamba initially
refused to accept the new post
and may be belatedly trying to
round up supporters in the ranks
of the Congolese National Army
(ANC) and among some of the pol-
iticians who are presently in
the bad graces of Mobutu.
Mulamba's position in the
military has made him one of the
few Congolese officials who has
a chance of displacing Mobutu.
However, Mulamba never seems to
have tried to build his own power
base and has loyally performed
those tasks assigned by the Pres-
ident. This has not prevented
Mobutu, as well as most of the
senior officers in the ANC and
the civilians in the ruling group,
from suspecting Mulamba because
of the latter's friendliness with
the Belgians, alleged ties with
former premier Tshombe', and per-
sonal popularity with the ANC
troops.
Although Mobutu is the likely
victor in this showdown, harsh re-
prisals against Mulamba personally
or against the Katangan mutineers
who recently surrendered and other
alleged supporters of Tshombe
could further alienate other groups
in the Congo which are unhappy
with Mobutu but have lacked the
strength to oppose him.
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SE CRE T
Western Hemisphere
BORDER DISPUTE FLARES UP BETWEEN GUYANA AND VENEZUELA
A dispute between Venezuela
and Guyana over ownership of the
border island of Ankoko resulted
last week in the sudden dispatch
of an 80-man Guyanese military
force to the vicinity of the is-
land.
Prime Minister Forbes Burn-
ham charged in an emotional radio
address on 14 October that a work
crew and national guard unit sent
by Venezuela to construct build-
ings and a 5,000-foot airstrip
had encroached on Guyana's part
of the island. On the same day,
during a demonstration by sev-
eral hundred persons encouraged
by the government, the flag of
the Venezuelan Consulate in
Georgetown was burned.
The strength of Burnham's
reaction against the alleged in-
trusion is in large part the con-
sequence of his fear that his
opponents, notably Cheddi Jagan,
would exploit any sign of weak-
ness on the part of his govern-
ment.
In a diplomatic note of pro-
test to Venezuela, Burnham took
the position that the border in
the area is that agreed to by a
Venezuelan-British commission
in 1905. Venezuela's response
was that "Ankoko has always been
Venezuelan."
The Venezuelan ambassador-
designate to Guyana has informed
the US Embassy in Caracas that
his government had made a cal-
culated decision to build the
airstrip on Ankoko in order to
"catalyze" negotiations on Vene-
zuela's long-standing claim to
more than half of Guyana's ter-
ritory. According to the dip-
lomat, his government is increas-
ingly frustrated by the lack of
progress made by the joint com-
mission created to resolve this
issue.
Although both sides still
appear interested in achieving
a reasonable, quiet settlement,
Burnham's emotional reaction and
Venezuela's aggressive attitude
have created new friction which
will handicap the work of the
negotiating commission. Also,
the presence of armed forces
from both countries in the An-
koko area has increased the pos-
sibility of a sudden incident
occurring.
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 CO ~OMBIA
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CARIBBEAN SEA
Boundary in
dispute
Caracas
; ~i Riuer Qeo rgetown
Disputed
VENEZUELA-GUYANA BORDER DISPUTE
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ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT MOVES TO END LABOR ABUSES
The imposition of new work
rules governing Argentina's dock
workers indicates that the Ongania
regime intends to pursue vigorously
its efforts to end privileges long
abused by various sections of or-
ganized labor--still dominated by
Peronist leaders.
Argentina's longshoremen had
for years insisted on working short
shifts, received outrageously high
overtime pay, and made Buenos Aires
one of the world's most expensive
ports for shippers. When the gov-
ernment announced early in October
that it intended to put the dock
workers on longer shifts and have
the docks operate 24 hours a day,
the Longshoremen's Union declared
that it would seek the cooperation
of all transport workers in call-
ing a general strike.
The government moved swiftly,
announcing its reasons for impos-
ing the new work rules, taking over
the union, and putting the Argen-
tine Navy in charge of the port of
Buenos Aires. Faced with loss of
their working privileges, the Buenos
Aires longshoremen began to return
to work late last week under the
new rules, undercutting the strike
call of the union leaders. Workers
in other ports accepted the govern-
ment decree, and the ports, although
still operating at less than normal
capacity, should soon show greater
efficiency.
The government carried out its
plans even though a meeting of the
Peronist-dominated General Confed-
eration of Labor, (CGT) at which
new
officers were
to be elected,
was
in progress.
The CGT condemned
the
government's
intervention
in
the
Longshoremen's Union, but
there
was
no sentiment
to support a
gen-
eral
strike.
Although the CGT elections
were largely controlled by Peronist
moderate Augusto Vandor, some inde-
pendent union leaders succeeded in
winning election to the executive
council. The confederation repre-
sents some 70 percent of organized
labor in Argentina. It has criti-
cized the government's labor poli-
cies, but has generally cooperated
with the government and obeyed its
decrees. A group led by Jose. Alonso,
who still takes his orders from Juan
Peron in Madrid, boycotted the CGT
election. This group has diverged
from the mainstream of organized
labor, and may be losing some of
its following.
This month's events indicate
that the "truce" which has prevailed
between Peronist elements and the
Ongania regime is continuing, de-
spite labor's growing unhappiness
with government labor policy. On-
gania expected some trouble with
the dock workers, but has said that
his major problem will come when new
work rules for railroad workers, who
are just as inefficient as the long-
shoremen, come into effect in Novem-
ber. The railroad workers' union,
probably stronger than the long-
shoremen's, may give the regime its
first major labor trouble.
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PARAGUAYAN PRESIDENT SEEKS OPPOSITION COOPERATION
President Stroessner is ap-
parently seeking the cooperation
of some of the opposition politi-
cal groups in Paraguay in his ef-
forts to replace the 1940 consti-
tution and thereby permit his re-
election to the presidency.
Since assuming power in 1954,
Stroessner has sought to give a
legal basis to his rule. Although
authoritarian he has gradually re-
laxed the controls on individual
and press freedom while giving
the country stability. Stroes-
sner is a popular president and
even the opposition recognizes
that his re-election would be in
the nation's best interest, but
the present constitution allows
a president to serve only two
terms. Stroessner's present term
expires in 1968. If a new con-
stitution is adopted, Stroessner
could be elected for a first term
under it at the end of this term
and could legally remain in the
presidency for still another term
as well.
constitutional
draft when actually
revealed in
the
Colorado Party
convention
held
last month did
not include
the
liberal provi-
sions that
had
originally been
discussed.
Stroessner reportedly would
like to have at least some repre-
sentatives of the opposition po-
litical parties participate in
the constitutional convention,
which will probably be held late
this year or early next. He re-
cently met with Rafael Franco,
leader of the Febrerista Party,
in an apparent bid for coopera-
tion. The Febreristas are now a
recognized party, but were once
banned for subversive activity.
The bulk of the Liberals, the
major opposition party, is still
illegal and considered subversive
by Stroessner. Only a small Lib-
eral faction, called the Levi-
Liberals, is actually seated in
the legislature.
When the ruling Colorado
Party politicians first began to
discuss the constitutional revi-
sion this year, they indicated
that the new document would be
more liberal than the existing
one. It would have given the
legislature more influence in
government, especially in deciding
when to declare a state of siege--
a situation in which the president
exercises dictatorial powers. The
Stroessner probably will
permit the opposition little more
than token representation in re-
writing the constitution, but his
efforts to give his regime more
of at least the trappings of de-
mocracy support his professions
that he wants to develop a viable
political system in a nation that
has known little else but dicta-
torship or political strife 25X1
throughout most of its history.
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Page 25 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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ANTI-DUVALIER SENTIMENT GROWS IN HAITI
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In addition to the peren-
nial plotting against the Duvalier
regime which continues in Port-
au-Prince, new signs of public
disaffection have recently sur-
faced in Haiti's outlying dis-
tricts.
J President Duvalier, as
usual, has acted quickly to pre-
vent this unrest from solidifying
into a possible challenge to his
authority, and his tough measures
are likely to prove effective as
they have in the past.
The first manifestation of
increased unrest was a seemingly
spontaneous demonstration in the
coastal city of Gonaives on 3 Oc-
tober. This was touched off when
a local tax collector attempted
to collect fees in the town's
market area. Some of the people
refused to pay and many shouted
antiregime slogans. Militia in
the area did nothing to stop the
demonstration, which reportedly
continued for about two hours.
The unrest at Goanives, among
people who are normally apathetic,
subsequently spread to two other
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anti regime
leaflets were distributed. This
occurred while US naval forces
were in the country participating
in relief activities following
Hurricane Inez. The coincidence
of these activities apparently
encouraged the various groups in
Port-au-Prince long engaged in
conspiracies against Duvalier
to believe that their prospects
of success had improved. This
is probably not the case, al-
though there may be more than the
usual amount of restiveness among
the Haitian military, partly in-
duced by the regime's frequent
delays in paying salaries.
Duvalier is fully aware of
the potential dangers to his po-
sition these signs of unrest con-
note. He has ordered the trans-
fers of a number of officers to
prevent a coalescence of anti-
regime sentiment in the military.
In addition, Duvalier has stepped
up police surveillance of sus-
pected trouble makers.
Notwithstanding the indi-
cations of increasing unrest,
Duvalier's opposition--including
that within the military--lacks
the organization which would be
required to mount a serious ef-
fort against Duvalier at the
present time. A spontaneous act
against the "President-For-Life"
by someone with frequent access
to the closely guarded Presi-
dential Palace, however is al-
ways a possibility.
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NEW DEMONSTRATIONS PROBABLE I N PANAMA
Students and urban slum-
dwellers, Panama's most volatile
and discontented elements, may
soon instigate another series of
antigovernment and anti-US demon-
strations. Celebrations on 3, 4,
5, and 28 November honoring na-
tional independence and the Pana-
manian flag have traditionally
been occasions for extremist-led
political agitation.
A recent student incursion
into the Canal Zone may fore-
shadow additional acts of this
nature. On 20 October a small
group of flag-carrying Communist-
led secondary students was inter-
cepted by zone police near the
governor's residence. Before
they were dispersed the students
shouted slogans, threw several
"cherry bomb" firecrackers, and
taunted police. The incident was
reminiscent of the one that
sparked the anti-US riots in
January 1964.
Opposition leader Arnulfo
Arias, in his efforts to dis-
credit President Robles, has
been encouraging extremist ele-
ments to agitate against the
government
commitment
Arias is likely to
attempt to exploit any outbreak of
antiregime activity during the up-
coming anniversaries to undermine
public confidence in the Panama-
nian President.
The National Guard is alert
to the possibility of trouble and
can be expected to take precaution-
ary measures. President Robles has
consistently frustrated moves by
extremists to initiate prolonged
disorders and should be able to
maintain order
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MOVES AGAINST GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS MAY SPUR NEW TERRORISM
Guatemala's Communists ap-
pear likely to renew terrorist
activity on a wide scale in an
effort to divert army units now
encircling guerrilla redoubts
in the mountains of the north-
east.
There are indications that
the army is having greater suc-
cess in its present antiguerrilla
campaign than in others in the
past. Its operations have led
to several engagements with the
guerrillas, and its forces have
reportedly killed 16 extremists
and captured weapons and sup-
plies. The encirclement tactic
has been under way for several
weeks, and the guerrillas now
are concerned that they will be
unable to break out.
A full-scale revival of
guerrilla terrorist activity
therefore appears possible.
Such activity on widely dis-
persed fronts would be diffi-
cult for the army to handle
and could cause a further de-
cline in public confidence in
the government.
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