WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 8, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/30 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005300110001-3
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SECRE ~f ~"~
(Information as of noon E:DT, 7 July 1966)
VIETNAM
Preliminary analysis indicates that the air strikes
against North Vietnam's oil installations are already
causing distribution problems, but no serious difficul-
ties in the immediate availability of petroleum for
transport and other essential needs are anticipated.
The strikes, in any case, have given the Communists an
occasion to freshen their rou~tirne propaganda attacks on
the US, although Soviet criticism has been restrained.
In South Vietnam, as allied forces continued to inflict
heavy losses on the Viet Cong, the Buddhist Institute
formally announced a temporary truce with the government.
SUKARNO'S POWER DWINDLING
Indonesian leaders have made decisive and perhaps
conclusive gains in their phased campaign to relieve
President Sukarno of his power.
SOUTH KOREANS TIGHTEN SECURITY MECHANISM
Intensified North Korean efforts to infiltrate agents
are spurring Seoul to improve the effectiveness of its
security apparatus,
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST ~~HINA
The 1 July People's Daily alluded to the recent polit-
ical upheaval in the past tense, but subsequent ~pro-
nouncements in the equally authoritative Red Flag indi-
cate that the witch-hunt against enemies the regime
is to go on.
YUGOSLAV PARTY CRISIS
Tito has removed his heir apparent, party secretary
Rankovic, who has been explicitly accused of opposition
to economic and political reforms instituted in recent
years. Tito now plans a complete overhaul of the party.
SECRET
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~E~~~~
SOVIET LEADERS ALTER TRAVEL PLANS
An unusual amount of current business in July, possibly
including a high-level party gather:~ng, has obliged at
least two members of the Soviet leadership to curtail
foreign travel.
DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO TILE SOVIET UNION
The most significant result of the French President's
tour of the USSR may be the encouragement it gives
other West European states to open bilateral "dia-
logues" with the Soviets.
NATO DEVELOPMENTS
Despite hints from French officials of limited future
cooperation, the basic uncertainty regarding France's
military position in the Alliance remains.
PRO-NASIR COUP ATTEMPT FAILS IN IRAQ,
President Arif's regime appears to have been strength-
ened as a result of crushing last week's coup attempt
by pro-Nasir elements.
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO IRAQ
Soviet and Iraqi negotiators, unaffected by the recent
abortive coup in Iraq, are working out delivery sched-
ules for over $100 million worth of military equipment
ordered two months ago, including some items new to Iraq,
~E+~'~t ET
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~""~ S'ECRE'T ~
TERRORIST ACTIVITY CONTINUES IN SOUTH ARABIA
Nasir apparently hopes to foster the illusion that
the British are being driven out and at the same time
to prevent the orderly transfer of power to any but a
pro-Nasir government.
CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATING WITH DISSIDENTS 18
The confrontation between the g~evernment and dissident
elements of the 1,700-man army has been temporarily
checked by the return of President Massamba-Debat from
abroad.
Western Hemisp,~here
ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING PRE-COUP PLANNING 19
President Ongania has appointed a cabinet of civilian
technicians characterized by the' press as Catholic
nationalists and conservatives.
NEW DOMiNICAId PRESIDENT INAUGURATED 20
Balaguer, in his inaugural address, outlined. an austerity
program, and promised an al]-inc?lusive agrarian reform
plan. He apparently plans no immediate sweeping changes
in the armed forces.
GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT PLEDGES GOVERNMENT OF UNITY
The newly installed Mendez' first decree lifted the
state of siege which had been in effect since early
May, although he reminded his inaugural audience that
internal security remained a grave problem.
SURFACE CALM RETURNS TO BRITISH HONDURAS
The curfew imposed during last week's rioting has been
lifted, but a new outbreak could result from continuing
public fear that the UK will allow undue Guatemalan in-
fluence in arrangements being made for the colony's in -
dependence.
VELASCO FALTERING IN ECUADOR
The ex-president seems to have lost his ability to ex-
cite the masses and interim President Yerovi has shown
Brea..+,er vigor of late. However, Velasco's determination
to regain the presidency by any imeans remains a threat.
BOLIVIA ELECTS A NEW GOVERNMENT
With 75 percent of the vote counted, Rene Barrientos
and his Bolivian Revolutionary Front are virtually
~'ECRE~,
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'E~`.~ET
assured of victory in last Sunday's national election.
Barrientos, lacking a real political base and facing
Bolivia's chronic economic troubles, must also contend
with the major problem of freeing his government from
armed forces control.
~.7~1..+~,~r 1
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`'~' SECRET
Far East
VIETNAM
Seven of the ten principal
bulk petroleum storage facili-
ties in North Vietnam--compris-
ing almost 90 percent of North
Vietnam's total storage capacity
--were attacked by US aircraft
last week. Preliminary analysis
of the effects of the strikes in-
dicates that the DRV is probably
already experiencing some prob-
lems in the distribution of pe-
troleum and that a major reorgan-
ization of the import and primary
distribution system will be ne-
cessary. Despite these difficul-
ties, no serious problems in the
immediate availability of petro-
leum for transport or other es-
sential needs are anticipated.
Preliminary analysis of pho-
tography indicates severe damage
to the important installation at
Hanoi, where virtually all the
facilities were apparently dam-
aged or destroyed. The instal-
lation at Haiphong--the largest
and only import terminal in
North Vietnam--apparently was
about 38 percent destroyed by
the strike on 29 June, but a num-
ber of tanks remained intact. The
three oil jetties also were un-
damaged. This target was struck
again on 7 July. ~
Initial information indicates
that damage to the other five in-
:>tallations was less severe and
ghat some capacity and stocks
Y?emain .
Propaganda Reaction to
POL Strikes
The Communists drew on the
US air strikes to freshen up
their routine propaganda attacks
on US policy in Vietnam. None
of the statements indicated that
t:~e strikes had generated any
b~~sic change in the attitude of
H~~noi, Peking, or Moscow.
Hanoi called the strikes a
nE~w escalation of the war but
limited its threats of retalia-
tion to promises that the Libera-
tion Front would attack US forces
ir.~ South Vietnam. It also played
up the air strikes as .being di-
rected primarily against civil-
ian targets. Although Peking and
Moscow echoed this line, neither
pictured the strikes as necessi-
tating any comparable escalation
of Chinese or Soviet support for
Vietnam. The propaganda threat
of foreign volunteers in Vietnam
was revived for the first time
in many months--this time by
I~'o:rth Korea .
Peking used the strikes to
il:Lustrate "collusion" between
this US and the USSR to force a
pe~~ceful settlement of the war
sECRE ~r
WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 Jul 66
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CAPITAL
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1V CORPS
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~~ SE CRS; T
on the Vietnamese and contrasted
alleged Soviet perfidy with the
faithfulness of Chinese support.
Peking's reiteration of support,
however, was standard and did not
imply any greater Chinese involve-
ment, making it clear that the
Chinese expect the Vietnamese
themselves to carry the primary
responsibility for conducting the
war.
Soviet criticism of the US
action was very restrained. The
government issued a formal state-
ment and both Brezhnev and Kosy-
gin promised continuing Soviet
ssistance. ~
DRV Navy Loses
Three Torpedo Boats
North Vietnam lost one
fourth of its small patrol/tor-
pedo boat fleet on 1 July when
three boats were sunk in the Gulf
of Tonkin southeast of Haiphong,
The naval craft were apparently
trying to intercept two US de-
stroyers which had been search-
r a downed US pilot,
Military Action in South Vietnam
Major allied and Vietnamese
search-and-destroy operations
along the Cambodian border, in
the north-central coastal plain,
and in the Mekong Delta contin-
ued to inflict heavy losses on
the Communists last week.
In Binh Long Province, 65
miles north of Saigon, elements
of the U5 1st Infantry Division
zee-established heavy contact
with an estimated two Viet Cong
k>attalions on 2 July after kill-
ing more than 300 Communist troops
i.n an abortive enemy regimental-
strength ambush on 30 June. Once
again enemy losses were high,
and, by week's end, units conduct-
ing the month-old Operation EL
PASO II had killed more than 600
Viet Cong and captured or de-
stroyed considerable quantities
of war materiel.
In the central highlands,
elements of the US 25th Infantry 25X1
Division and Vietnamese Special
Farces troops reported several
heavy contacts with Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese Army (PAVN)
units during the conduct of Op-
e_cation PAUL REVERE in Pleiku
a~1d Kontum provinces, Since 9
M~~y, the border surveillance
g~?ound sweep has cost the Commu-
n_~_sts serious reverses in the
high plateau region, including
tYie-loss of 550 men killed and
7]. captured.
However, the disruption of
ar.~ticipated Communist offensive
activity in the Binh Long and 25X1
Pleiku-Kontum areas during the
rainy season has not been cheap,
The combined allied casualty toll
stands at 200 killed (162 US),
692 wounded (580 US), and 27
missing (one US),
In northern coastal Quang
Nam Province, US Marines killed
72 members of an estimated Viet
Cong battalion during the open-
ing phase of clearing/security/
SECRET'
WEEKLY SUMMARY $ Jul 66
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~~ ~~~
pacification Operation MACON south-
west of Da Nang on 4 July.
The pattern of allied success
was repeated in the delta prov-
inces of Vinh Long and Ken Hoa,
where South Vietnamese Army (ARVN)
units killed 264 Viet Cong in sep-
arate engagements on 5 and 6 July.
Communist-initiated military
activity during the week was high-
lighted by mortar attacks on 2 and
3 July against US/Vietnamese Spe-
cial Forces camps near the Cambo-
dian border in Pleiku and Tay Ninh
provinces, and by a penetration as-
sault against an ARVN battalion-
sized outpost in Binh Dinh Prov-
ince on b July.
Political Developments
In South Vietnam
In a formal communique, the
Buddhist Institute on 3 July called
for a period of good will between
the Saigon. government and the Bud-
dhists, indicating that it would
cease opposition at least until an
extraordinary session of its parent
organization, the Unified Buddhist
Association (UBA}, convenes in a
few weeks.
This latest Buddhist position
was apparently made possible by
conciliatory letters from Premier
Ky to moderate Institute Chairman
Tam Chau last week which promised
reparations for damaged pagodas
and clemency for Buddhist clergy
members and lower ranking non-Com~~
munists involved in the "struggle
movement. Immediately after the
Buddhist communique was issued, the
government responded by releasing
about 300 prisoners--including some
100 Buddhist monks and nuns.
The UBA conference may extend
the truce for lack of any real al-
ternative. No change of heart is
likely, however, among its polit-
ical-activists, who are responsive
to militant monk Tri Quang and have
built the UBA into a formidable po-
litical force, primarily in central
Vietnam. Formal UBA participation
in the September elections does not
seem likely at this point. The
L'BA, however, could still exert
some positive influence by unoffi-
cially supporting candidates on the
local level.
Despite the public dialogue
with Tam Chau, the government is
not relying on many persons c
to the Buddhist Institute.
Premier Ky's new cabinet, the for-
mal announcement of which was again
delayed, may retain the one minis-~
ter close to the institute, but his
responsibilities are likely to be
reduced.
Meanwhile, the government has
arrested and may court-martial five
generals, including former I Corps
commander General Thi, who were in-
volved in the recent antigovernment
movement.
il~C..r~~ l
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rS'ECR.~~. T
SUKARNO'S POWER DWINDLING
Indonesian leaders have made
decisive and perhaps conclusive
gains in their phased campaign to
relieve President Sukarno of his
power.
The nation's top policy-making
body, the Provisional People's Con-
sultative Assembly (MPRS), on 5
July revoked Sukarno's life presi-
dency but allowed him to remain in
office until an elected congress,
to be chosen in the next two years,
takes further action. Sukarno's
title, "Great Leader of the Revolu-
tion," was declared honorary and
not a source of executive authority.
A special committee will review
presidential decrees to determine
which are constitutional. In a
speech to the closing session of
the MPRS on 6 July, Sukarno an-
nounced that he accepted that body's
decisions.
The MPRS confirmed Suharto's
e~~.rlier ban on the Indonesian Com-
munist Party and outlawed the "propa-
g;~tion of ideology or teaching of
C~~mmunism/Marxism-Leninism."
The MPRS also urged the govern-
mE=_nt to rejoin the United Nations
a~1d the International Monetary Fund.
I1. has recommended that Indonesia
follow a "free and active" foreign
policy, thereby endorsing the gov-
e~cnment's efforts to disengage from
Sizkarno's pro-Feking line.
The MPRS has decreed that a
new cabinet shall be formed by mid-
August by General Suharto, army com-
mander and a member of the ruling
triumvirate and Sukarno.
SECRET
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The MPRS session interrupted
informal Indonesian-Malaysian talks
toward ending confrontation but these
probably will resume again shortly.
Despite the present regime's an-
nounced desire to end confrontation
acid its successful downgrading of
Sukarno, who had pressed an anti-Ma-
l~iysia policy, it insists that con-
frontation cannot be formally ended
until a "reaffirmation" of public
o~~inion is held in Malaysia's Borneo
tE~rritories on membership in the
federation. Moreover, Indonesia has
not abandoned its campaign of subver-
sion and paramilitar o erations
against Malaysia.
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SOUTH KGREANS TIGHTEN SECURITY MECHANISM
Intensified North Korean ef-
forts to infiltrate agents are
spurring Seoul to improve the ef-
fectiveness of its security ap-
paratus.
have added individual terrorist
acts ranging from murder to the
attempted hijacking of fishin
vessels on the high seas.
South Korean response to
scattered acts of violence com-
mitted by Communist agents, be-
ginning with the brutal murder
late last year of an army colonel
and his family, has pointed up
the poor cooperation between the
South Korean security services
and their shortage of equipment
needed to respond quickly and
effectively to North Korean agent
activity. Rugged terrain which
impedes rapid deployment of se-
curity forces to remote areas
and offers ready concealment for
enemy infiltrators is an added
handicap.
Recent Communist activity
appears to have adapted to meet
the new situation resulting from
the normalization of Japanese -
South Korean relations and the
deployment of Kor-can troops to
South Vietnam. To the usual ob-
jectives of gathering military
intelligence, fomenting disorder,
and creating a Communist appa-
ratus, the Communists apparently
To remedy the situation,
the government plans to establish
integrated command control cen-
ters tied into a single national
command headquarters. The new
system will include 200 nine-man
police "sweep" teams deployed to
cover known land and sea infil-
tration. routes. These teams are
to be trained and supported by
the army's special forces. Funds
are being made available to pro-
cure arms, vehicles, and commu-
nications equipment for the
teams.
The security services are
also under orders to improve
their capabilities to detect,
watch, and apprehend agents al-
ready in place.
~~ 1,rr
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
On 1 July the People's
Daily described the recent polit-
ical upheaval in the past tense
as a "counterrevolutionary coup"
which had been thoroughly crushed.
Subsequent pronouncements in Red
Flag, another journal of the
party central committee, indi-
cate that an intensive search
for enemies of the regime is to
be continued.
were there, as were four other
~~olitburo members, an important
military official (Yeh Chien-
~~ing), and Tao Chu, the powerful
}arty boss of the Central-South
I3ureau. The failure of Mao and
Defense Minister Lin Piao to
:show up is not necessarily sig-
nificant since neither appears
~_egularly in public.
A People's Daily editorial
on 1 July commemorating the 45th
anniversary of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, asserted that the
plotters, who were not mentioned
by name, had schemed their way
into high positions in the party,
army, and government. Their ob-
jective, the paper charged, was
to carry out a Khrushchev-style
coup and restore "capitalism."
This coup attempt was said to
be in the same class with un-
successful plots by high offi-
cials in 1953 and 1959 to usurp
power.
The editorial published
brief quotes praising Mao's
thinking by his four lieutenants
--Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Lin
Piao, and Teng Hsiao-ping--as if
to demonstrate that the plot was
put down by a leadership unified
under Mao. Another apparent at-
tempt to show which leaders are
in good standing was the turnout
of high officials at the Peking
airport to greet Chou En-lai on
his return from abroad on 1 July.
Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping
Red Flag indicated on 1
~Tuly,-~wever, that more politi-
cal turmoil is to be expected.
~t declared that "revolutionary
:Leftists" in the party are still
__ocked in a struggle against
"antiparty, antisocialist repre-
:~entatives of the bourgeoisie."
This was the label implicitly
~~inned on senior politburo mem-
k>er Peng Chen, whose downfall
Y>ecame public knowledge in June.
)ted Flag advised party inquisi-
tors not to be intimidated by
~~ny man's "rank, past working
Experience, and age," but to act
freely and boldly in their ef-
forts to distinguish "genuine
from sham revolutionaries."
Red Flag identified one
"sham revolutionary" as Chou
Fang, long-time party cultural
~~pokesman who is now alleged to
1-~ave led an antiparty clique for
~~0 years, The charge is no more
Believable than that leveled
~.gainst Peng Chen. Chows harshly
anti-intellectual speeches, es-
~~ecially in recent years, have
SECRET
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seemed a faithful reflection of
Mao's awn thinking on intellec-
tuals.
The "cultural" purification
drive which is sweeping China
has not only led to the downfall
of high officials, but is also
producing an atmosphere of appre-
hension and even terror at lower
levels. Red Flag revealed that
hundreds of millions of people
are caught up in the campaign,
busily exposing "counterrevolu-
tionary and revisionist elements."
Most high schools and universities
suspended classes in May, to al-
low students to spend all their
time in demonstrations against
allegedly disloyal students
teachers, and officials.
Euro e
YUG 4S LAV PARTY C R I S I S
Tito's removal of his heir
apparent, party secretary Ranko-
vic, and the impending party re-
organization and purge have
created the first party crisis
in Yugoslavia since the upheavals
in the mid-1950s when Milovan
Djilas challenged the regime's
one-party system.. Rankovic had
been a top leader and Tito's
trusted friend since their par-
tisan days in World War II.
Tito plans a complete over-
haul and purge of the party and
has established a 40-member com-
mission to work out the details.
The commission's membership--
more than one fourth of the cen-
tral committee, including many
top leaders--suggests that the
expected transformations will
be extensive and makes certain
the adoption of its recommenda-
tions, possibly at an extra-
ordinary party congress later
this year.
Tito apparently became
alarmed at some of the activi-
ties and methods Rankovic was
using to widen his power base
in the regime, and possibly saw
a threat to his own authority.
`i'he 1 July plenum, which forced
Rankovic's resignation as party
secretary, was told that he had
attempted to use his control of
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SE CRE Z" "~
the secret police to place his
own followers in key positions
around the country and to intim-
idate top officials.
Rankovic
may have attempted, unsuccess-
fully, to extend his power and
influence into the army, which
has long supported Tito, a move
the Yugoslav leader would have
viewed with special alarm.
In the accusations made
against Rankovic there were ex-
plicit attacks on his conserva-
tism and opposition to the eco-
nomic and political reforms in-
stituted in the last few years.
The object of these policies has
been to remove the party from
direct control of all aspects
of political and economic life
and to transform it into a guid-
ing ideological force which
would exercise influence in the
formulation of policy by persua-
sion, not command. Rankovic
probably saw in these policies
a trend that would undermine
party control of the country,
and thus his own authority, after
he succeeded Tito.
Rivalries among the Yugo-
slav nationality groups, partic-
ularly between the Serbs and
Croats, are likely to be exacer-
bated by the action against Ran-
kovic. Rankovic's conservative
outlook made him the champion
of those elements in the Serbian
and other republic parties who
saw the reforms as a program
which would injure the less-de-
veloped regions of Yugoslavia to
the benefit of Croatia and Slo-
Page 9
ve:nia. Rankovic, a Serb, was
politically strongest in his
home republic. He also had a
following among the many older,
middle-level and lower ranking
party members who feared that
li;~eralization and economic re-
form would mean loss of jobs,
prestige, and influence. Con-
versely, the Croats and Slovenes
wi.11 view the latest developments.
with satisfaction.
The political demise of
Ra~zkovic reopens the question of
a ,successor to the 74-year-old
Tito and enables some of Yugo-
sl,~via's young liberals to emerge
as potential candidates. Al-
th~~ugh the position of party
se~~retary and President of the
Fe~~eral Assembly Edvard Kardelj
ha;~ been almost automatically
enlZanced, he has displayed few
le~~.dership qualities. Veljko
Vl~~hovic, the other party secre-
tary,does not appear to have yet
established a power base from
wh:Lch he could bid for the top
spot.
Mijalko Todorovic has been
elf~vated to replace Rankovic as
party secretary and presumably
wi:Ll assume Rankovic's former
dutcies as organizational secre-
ta~cy. His new prominence may
pui: him in a good position to
ch~~llenge Kardelj and Vlahovic.
Another who seems to have been
th~~ust upon the national scene
is Krste Crvenkovski, party
le~~der in Macedonia, who headed
the: commission which investigated
Rankovic and called for his res-
ignation.
SE GRE ~,
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~`E C'~~
SOVIET LEASERS ALTEP TRAVEL. PLANS
An unusual amount of current
business in July, possibly including
a high-level party gathering, has
obliged at least two members of the
Soviet leadership to curtail foreign
travel. There are indications that
a party meeting may be convened in
midmonth to prepare for a session of
the Supreme Soviet scheduled for
early August.
On 24 June TASS announced that
Premier Kosygin's state visit to
Sweden, postponed once and resched-
uled for 18 to 24 July, had been
postponed indefinitely because of
25X1"unexpected circumstances."
the Supreme So-
viet session called for 2 August was
the reason far the postponement,
since Kosygin would need time to pre-
25X1 pare for the session.
A
further hint that a ig - eve gath-
ering may be in the offing was pro-
vided by Soviet Ambassador to the
US Dobrynin who said on 25 June that
he would probably be leaving for
Moscow on 10 July. He is a member
of the central committee.
The 2 August Supreme Soviet
session, in addition to attending
to the pro forma business of re-form-
ing a government in the wake of last
month's elections, may consider
some important measures requiring
prior confirmation by the central
committee.
The Soviet leaders' docket for
July, Kosygin's in particular, is
crowded, with the Warsaw Pact meet-
ing in Bucharest and a number of
visits by foreign dignitaries
scheduled toward the end of the
month. India's Prime Minister, Mrs.
Gandhi, is slated to visit Moscow
from 12 to 16 July. UN Secretary
General Thant will confer with So-
viet leaders from 25 to 28 July and
Iraq's Premier Bazzaz is to arrive
on 27 July..
DE GAULLE~S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION
The most significant result of
De Gaulle's 20 June - 1 July tour of
the Soviet Union may be the encour-
agement it gives other West Euro-
pean states to open bilateral "dia-
logues" with the USSR. Both sides
apparently see advantage in giving
cautious impetus to detente in Eu-
rope. The joint declaration issued
after the visit stresses the ''deci-
sive contribution" toward detente
made by France and the USSR and the
need to draw others to their efforts.
The forms of future French-So-
viet contact are laid out in the
joint declaration's call for mutual
consultations on bilateral and
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`'~ ~S'E CRE T
international relations, the estab-
lishment of a Paris-Moscow "hot
line," and the creation of a joint
commission to oversee fulfillment of
the two economic and scientific tech-
nical agreements signed during the
visit. The frequency and level of
the "mutual consultations" were not
specified, but they may include semi-
annual meetings of the foreign min-
isters such as took place last year.
As expected, the declaration
revealed considerable Soviet-French
accord on disarmament, the UN, and
Vietnam
On
the question of Germany and European
security arrangements, the declara-
tion merely noted that both sides
"exchan ed their views."
At the outset of their talks,
Brezhnev made clear that Moscow's
position on Germany was not negoti-
able. He stressed the well-worn
doctrine that there are two German
states, and indicated that any dis-
cussions with the West on Germany
would have to proceed from accept-
ance of that fact.
De Gaulle probably views the
visit as a success, however, in plac-
ing France in the forefront of those
n~itions seeking a European settlement.
DE:spite some ackowledgement that the
LT;. has a role to play in that settle-
mE~nt, De Gaulle probably believes
treat he has taken a significant step
toward the day when it can be pri-
marily the work of the Europeans
themselves.
The Soviets displayed excep-
tional public cordiality and defer-
ence toward De Gaulle including an
invitation--unprecedented for a
WEBsterner--to view an ICBM and sat-
ellite launching. Reference in
tree Soviet-French declaration to
tree encouragement of "an atmosphere
of detente" and a "normalization
ar.,d then gradual development of re-
lations between all European states"
indicates Moscow's intent to con-
tinue its present policy toward
Europe. The Soviets in recent
months have been projecting an im-
age of reasonableness and respon-
siveness, holding out the prospect
of fruitful relations with those
who will follow the "realism" of
French policy.
Most other West European capi-
tals have reacted to the trip more
with relief than enthusiasm. De
Gaulle's firm position on Germany
has pleased Bonn and eased the way
for a cordial reception when he
visits Germany later this month.
The impression of De Gaulle working
for a European detente without fi-
nally breaking with the West appears
temporarily to have muted criticism
from other European capitals.
S'E CRE7'-'
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~S'E G'RE T -`~"
NATO DEVELOPMENTS
Despite hints from French
officials of limited future co-
operation, the basic uncertainty
regarding France's military posi-
tion in the Alliance remains.
While the French response is
thus mild in tone, it seems to
involve neither a retreat from
previous positions nor any com-
mitment regarding the future mis-
sion and role of the French forces.
Following the cabinet meeting on 6
July, the French minister of in-
formation stated France would re-
main in Germany if Bonn desired
and the French troops would par-
ticipate in common defense--pro-
vided the French Government had
decided they should be engaged.
Reports that France might
not deny all financial support
to NATO have aroused mingled in-
terest and concern.
25X1
25X1
(However, welcome
such financial support might be,
some of the Allies question whether
France should be permitted to be
"Yialf an ally," choosing those
NATO activities of interest to
it:, while leaving the other mem-
bers to finance the rest.
Continuing ambiguity in the
French position probably reflects
a combination of negotiating
tactics, the absence of final de-
cisions by De Gaulle, and perhaps
some difficulty in reconciling
the idea of continued membership
in the Alliance with nonaccept-
ance of its practical implications.
IJ / These and other
.such basic questions are presumably
t,a}cen up in the dossiers prepared
for De Gaulle's consideration 25X1
fo:Llowing his Moscow trip and be-
fo~~e his visit to Bonn later this
month.
SE ~'RE ~!'
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~L ~~ ~ r~ '
Muddle East - Africa
PRO-NAS I R COUP ATTEMPT FAILS I ~ l RAQ
Iraqi President Arif's re-
gime appears to have been strength
ened as a result of crushing last
week's coup attempt by pro-Nasir
elements. The regime put down the
uprising within a few hours after
it began on 30 June. The dissi-
dents were led by former premier
Razzaq, who was also responsible
for a similar effort that mis-
carried in September 1965.
The uprising began in mid-
afternoon with an air attack
against the Presidential Palace
in Baghdad. The attacking MIG-
17 jet fighters came from Mosul,
in northern Iraq, where the com-
mander of the 4th Infantry Divi-
sion had joined the conspiracy
and taken control of the airport.
Uther rebel units seized a Bagh-
dad radio station and began is-
suing proclamations from the
"Council of the Revolutionary Com-
mand" over Razzaq's signature.
The regime, however, was aware
that a coup was in the making,
and the Republican Guard, together
with other loyal military units,
moved quickly to defend the palace
and restore order. Razzaq and
most of the other prominent par-
ticipants in the abortive effort
have been arrested.
The Egyptians' failure to
give Razzaq any material assist-
ance probably will make possible
the maintenance of a facade of
normal relations between Baghdad
and Cairo, as was the case fol-
lowing Razzaq's failure last fall.
Premier Bazzaz has already pub-
licly described the coup attempt
as "a domestic incident" for which
the government does not "accuse
anyone outside Iraq." Nasir,
nevertheless, may now have more
difficulty in getting the Iraqi
Government to cooperate in his
proposed alignment of "progressive"
Arab states.
Arif's success in suppressing
the pro-Nasir uprising may help
to ease relations with Iran. The
Shah's fear that Nasir would use
Iraq as a base for subverting Iran
.S"L +~"R.~ T
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.SE CRE ~~'
has been a major cause of strain
between Baghdad and Tehran.
Within Iraq, the stronger
position of the Arif-Bazzaz gov-
ernment may now give it a freer
hand to continue talks with the
rebelling Kurds. The government
may also have discourage/ other
dissident groups from taking early
action against the regime. ~
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO IRAQ
The USSR and Iraq are work-
ing out delivery schedules for
over $100 million worth of mili-
tary equipment ordered under the
fifth Soviet-Iraq arms agreement
signed on 5 May. The abortive
coup attempt of 30 June in Bagh-
dad has had no effect on Soviet-
Iragi relations.
Iraq's minister of defense
was reported to have arrived in
Moscow on 28 June to sign de-
livery contracts. The first de-
liveries under this agreement
probably will take place next
spring. Soviet instructors and
technicians are scheduled to ar-
rive in Iraq in the last quarter
of 1966 in order that basic in-
struction in the new equipment
can be completed before delivery.
18 MI-4 Hound helicopters or-
deYed by Iraq's Ministry of De-
fense in December-1965. With
the completion of deliveries un-
der the fourth arms agreement
last year Iraq had received $390
million worth of military equip- 25X1
ment, making it the second larg-
est. recipient of bloc arms in the
Middle East.
The agreement covers equip-
ment for all three services and
includes some items--SU-7 Fitter
fighter bombers, T-55 medium tanks,
130-mm. antiaircraft guns, Komar
guided-missile patrol boats, and
a Petya-class submarine chaser--
that Iraq has not heretofore had.
The USSR is believed to have
completed shipment recently of
SECRE7!~'
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TERRORIST ACTIVITY COf~TIN~IES Its SOUTH ARABIA
The recent rise in Egyptian-
directed terrorist activity in
South Arabia suggests that Nasir
still hopes to foster the illu-
sion that the British are being
driven out and at the same time
to prevent the orderly transfer
of power to any but a pro-Nasir
government.
London's declaration in
February that it would evacuate
its Aden base and grant independ-
ence to the British-created
South Arabian Federation (SAF)
in 1968 would appear to have
deprived the Cairo-backed nation-
alists of their principal cause
for terrorism. Two extreme sub-
groups of the Egyptian-backed
Front for the Liberation of Occu-
pied South Yemen (FLOSY)--the
Arab Nationalist Movement and the
leftist National Liberation
Front--are close to a break with
FLOSY over this issue. Neverthe-
less, in June there were 86
incidents, and comprehensive
stocks of terrorist weapons and
equipment have been uncovered.
Plans by FLO5Y to set up a
South Arabian government-in-exile
in Yemer. have yet to materialize,
and proposed executive elections
have been postponed. Neither of
the two natural candidates for
leadership commands both local
and Egyptian support. One is
Aden's former premier Makkawi,
whose interests South Arabians
suspect center too exclusively
on Aden. The other, Adeni labor
leader Abdulla Asnag, has coun-
seled legal political methods,
objects strongly to continued
violence, and is beginning to
suspect that FLOSY is supported
by Cairo only so long as it
serves Nasir's purposes.
Both men ere aware that
~ FLOSY is losing ground to the
Saudi-backed South Arabian League
~ (SAL} and the SAF. They have
~ recently toured Arab countries,
coming up with a statement of
support for FLOSY from Algeria.
They assert that the British
should be discussing the future
of South Arabia only with FLOSY.
They have also sought to embel-
lish their appeal in South Arabia
by claiming that political and
economic support from Russia,
China, and various Arab states
has been promised to FLOSY if
it gains control of an independ-
ent South Arabia. FLOSY has
had to continue its propaganda
war against the SAL, which claims
to have attracted more adherents
from among South Arabian dissi-
dents.
The .SAF government has tried
~o appear independent enough to
attract the support of the mod-
erate nationalists but still
retain the support of the British.
SAF ministers have visited London
and received assurances of con-
tinued defense and economic aid.
Constitutional conferences
scheduled for August at Ittihad,
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`~ sE CRE'r
the SAF capital, will
probably be scuttled
because it now appears
that too many federa-
tion states and oppo-
sition groups will not
attend.
The SAF accepted
"in principle"--while
FLOSY rejected--the
May resolutions of
the UN Special Commit-
tee that deals with
problems of independ-
ence in colonial
areas. The committee
again insisted that
the state of emergency
imposed by the UK last
fall be lifted, that
elections be held
under UN supervision,
and that political
detainees be released
and exiles be allowed
to return. The SAF
government has ex-
pressed willingness to
receive a representa-
tive from the UN Sec-
retary General, but
has reservations about
any mission sent by
the Special Committee.
The SAF has specified ezass
that countries with a special
interest in South Arabia, such
as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, be
barred from any UN commission.
tt~sr
~F KU 1T
KUWAIT
I$A N
ARABIAN PENINSULA
---- International
boundary
~~ -? ~?^^' Boundary shown
on British maps
O* N atlonal capital
IV. Z. Neutral zone
~,usca~r
-. b. ~.
r c ;
4
~~ f~l~rf~
50~~ S~
~*`~
~tti
~G e:~-
SOCtlTRA
(Prot.-.'aE $. A.)
now considering welcoming UN
assistance in bringing independ-
ence to South Arabia, provided
the UK could continue to guaran-
tee security, operate within the
existing constitution (written 25X1
under its aegis)., and hold a
veto in the selection of a UN
mission.
The UK, whose constitutional
maneuvers have not satisfied the
Special Committee, has its back
to the wall. London is reportedly
SECRE T
Page 17 WEEKLY SUMhYIARY
~'? -Ras Tanura ~~~
Qa1;If?>_ MANAMA tr~~ Umm a``s~l Khaimah
DhahrarJ~*~AH AIN AI Qaiwain --ti-..~-.~~~
a Q TAR Sbar(ahr Irian
~.~ +DOHA Fialalrah
f` Dub
Hufuf fir,' Abu 6habi~j
S ~r~r-r~r~i
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~~.`.~ T
CONGA (BRAZ'AVILLE) GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATING WITH DISSIDENTS
The confrontation between
the radical Congo (Brazzaville)
Government and dissident elements
of the 1,700-man army has been
temporarily checked by the return
of President Massamba-Debat from
abroad.
With the President`s popu-
lar appeal and self-confidence on
its side, the dominant political
leadership seems to have retained
the upper hand, and negotiations
with the dissidents appear to be
under way. In the long run, how-
ever, Massamba-Debat and his gov-
ernment will be hard pressed to
contain the ideological, tribal,
and personal quarrels which were
so glaringly exposed during the
disturbances.
Massamba-Debat criticized
government and party leaders for
their handling of the military
mutiny in a two-hour speech de-
livered on his return on 3 July.
He said the leadership should
have curbed rumormongering rather
than contributing to it by its
fears and failure to take deci-
sive action. The President
blamed the mutiny on a few indi-
viduals who he claimed were in-
fluenced by tribalism or a coun-
terrevolutionary spirit. He gave
no indication of how he would
quiet army unrest, noting only
that he would undertake a "ser-
ious analysis" of the problem.
The government appears to
have rejected most of the dissi-
dents' demands. It has refused
to dismiss the 200 or so Cuban
soldiers who guarded government
and party leaders last week and
has launched a campaign to praise
the broad scope of Cuban aid to
Congo (Brazzaville). Leaders of
the regime are said to believe
that without the Cubans, the gov-
ernment would have fallen. A re-
cent government broadcast claimed
that Cuba will continue to provide
not only instructors for paramili-
tary units but also extensive tech-
nical and educational assistance in
agriculture and medicine.
Despite opposition from con-
servative elements in the army, the
regime is going ahead with plans to
"democratize' the army as called
for by the ruling party's central
committee last spring. It does not
intend to disarm paramilitary units
which are under party control, as
the dissidents have requested.
However, the regime has given some
ground by appointing a new provi-
sional army command made up of po-
litically reliable junior officers.
The present whereabouts of the un-
popular former army chief of staff,
Mountsaka, who was arrested by
mutinous soldiers, is unknown.
Although Deputy Army Chief
of Staff Kimboula claims that most
of the army supports the govern-
ment, a major question is whether
the regime actually has the power
to flout the dissidents' demands.
At last report, the paracommandos
were reportedly still holding out.
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,SE ~'RE T ~
Western Hemi~~ here
ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING PRE-COUP PLANNING
Argentina's new military
government, headed by President
Juan Carlos Ongania, appears to
be following plans established
prior to the 27 June coup.
Ongania has appointed a
cabinet of civilian technicians
characterized in the press as
Catholic nationalists and con-
servatives. Several of the new
appointees to the cabinet of
junior secretary positions have
university backgrounds and are
without ties to political groups.
Page 19
The government has made no
frontal attack on the Peronist
movement, merely including it
in the over-all ban on political
activity. The Peronists, in
turn, have failed to react
against the government's boli
The Peronists
h.~.ve indicated that they will
c~~operate with the new regime,
b~~t the truce may be broken if
i-`_ tries to take action against
the labor unions. Peron him-
sE~lf made it known that he did
not oppose the coup
Although most Latin Ameri-
can states have been hesitant
at~out recognizing the new gov-
eY~nment, Bolivia extended recog-
nition on 1 July and Brazil on
5 July. The nations of Western
Europe have begun to resume ties 25X1
with Argentina and many have al-
ready sent formal notes to the
new government.
S'E CRE T
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~~~~~
NEW D~JMI N I CAN PRES l DENT l NAUGURATED
Dominican President Joaquin
Balaguer set the tone for his
administration in a somber, de-
termined
inaugural address on 1
July.
No
untoward incidents
marred
nies.
the swearing-in ceremo-
The new President stressed
that his government would estab-
lish the rule of law for both it-
self and the governed. He made
it ~~lear that he does not intend
to allow a dissident minor~~ to
disrupt the peace and order he
claimed three fourths of the Do-
minican people desire.
Ile outlined an austerity
program of at least six months
duration which will begin with
salary cuts for an estimated nine
percent of the government's work
force, including himself, Bala-
guer affirmed his intention to
enforce the law prohibiting pub-
lic employees from striking by
automatically firing all those
joining walt_;,uts. 'the President
warned that he intends to put a
stop to corruption, privileges,
and unearned pensions, which he
claimed were making the country
a "nation of invalids." He prom-
ised that the state-owned enter-
prises, especially the debt-rid-
den Dominican Sugar corporation,
would be purged of politics. By
a decree of 2 July, Balaguer him-
self assumed direct control of
the sprawling sugar complex to
"eradicate political interfer-
ence."
An all-inclusive agrarian
reform program was listed by
Balaguer as the most important
social reform he plans to ini-
tiate.
The newly appointed 13-
man cabinet is dominated by nine
members who owe their political
allegiance to Balaguer. The
other three civilian ministers
are leading members of the op-
position Dominican Revolution-
ary Party. The only holdover
~:rom the provisional government
is Defense Minister Enrique
Perez y Perez. Although not
particularly popular among his
fellow officers, Perez y Perez
has done a creditable job and
his retention appears to indi-
cate that Balaguer plans no im-
mediate sweeping changes in the
armed forces.
On the international
scene Balaguer quickly ruled out
any recognition of Castro's
Cuba but has already taken steps
to normalize relations with the
Duvalier regime in neighboring
Haiti. The Dominican Republic
will, according to Balaguer,
seek closer economic ties with
Puerto Rico, whose economy he
termed complementary. He also
forecast efforts to establish
'"commercial relations" with "so-
cialist" countries.
-3~ ~~~ l
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GUATEMALAN PRES l DENT PLEDGE`. GOVERNMENT OF UN[TY
Guatemalan President Mendez
in a reasoned and powerful in-
augural speech on 1 July pledged
responsive and responsible gov-
ernment "representing unity of
the nation." He expressed the
belief that the armed forces would
be-loyal to the constitution they
had created, reminding them that
the law makes him commander in
chief. He singled out economic
issues and internal security as
being especially grave among the
many problems facing the country.
Mendez invited guerrillas
and terrorists to make peace but
warned them not to misinterpret
his remarks as weakness. This,
he said, would cause his ex-
tended hand to "become a strong
fist" to defend the interests of
the entire community.
Mendez' first decree was
to lift the state of siege which
had been in effect since early
May. It is too early to tell
what, if any, effect this decree
will have on the guerrilla-ter-
rorist situation. However, Luis
Turcios Lima, the chief of the
Communist Party's action arm,
stated some weeks ago that his
people would continue the battle
until the government was toppled.
SURFACE CALM RETURNS TO BRITISH HONDURAS
With surface calm returned
at least temporarily to British
Honduras, Governor Stallard on
4 July lifted the curfew imposed
during last week's rioting. Dur-
ing the curfew period over 60 ar-
rests were made. Public servants
mounted a sit-down strike on 1
July; participation was 50 per-
cent or better in Belize City.
Most essential services were con-
tinued during the strike, however
The recent demonstrations
stemmed from public concern that
mediation of problems connected
with independence for British
Honduras might open the country
to excessive influence from
neighboring Guatemala, which has
long claimed the area. Stallard,
in a radiobroadcast on 1 July,
tried to allay this fear. He
stated that the US mediator had
not yet terminated his investiga-
tion and that only suggestions had
been offered thus far in the UK-
Guatemalan discussions. The gov-
ernor assured the people that they
would have full opportunity to dis-
cuss the final proposals once they
were made, adding that the UK would
not impose a solution against the
desires of the people.
Past statements by UK offi-
ci~~ls have not reassured the pop-
ul;~ce and further pronouncements,
perhaps even by the US mediator, 25X1
many be necessary to prevent
an~~ther outbreak in Belize City.
SECRET
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VELASCO FALTERING I N ECUADOR
Former L'cuadorean president
Velasco Ibarra's arrival in Quito
on 2 July failed to live up to
advance billing. A maximum of
5,000 persons turned out to wel-
come him. Although there were
sporadic clashes between his
supporters and anti-Velasqu.i.sta
elements, there was less violence
than ex ected.
Velas_co's poor showing in
Quito duplicates performances in
Guayaquil on 24 May and Ambato
government of President Clemente
Yerovi, Yerovi himself has shown
greater vigor of late. Last week
he turned. back an effort of the
Electoral Tribunal to postpone
the September elections for the
j constituent assembly scheduled
to convene 3 November. Most ma-
j jor parties favor election of
j the next president by the consti-
tuent assembly, but a number of
minor parties and the Velasquistas
~ demand direct presidential elec-
tions. In his 2 July speech,
Velasco stated that, constituent
assembly or not, he will be pres-
ident again.
in late June. In all three places I Although. Velasco's perfor-
Velasco has failed to display his ~ mances since returning from exile
old charisma and been unable to ( have dareaged his prestige, he is
excite the masses as he once did. ~ still the most important politi-
F~is former financial backers have i cal fi ure in Ecuador.
not been willing to underwrite I
his thrust for power and he has
been unable to create a bandwagon
effect among the politicians and
the military.
The determination of the
military high command and most
students to prevent Velasco from
gaining power and the announce-
ment on 30 June of a US loan of
$10 million for budget support
have bolstered the weak interim
~Velasco's will-
?~ngness to accept support from
any quarter and his determination.
to regain power by any means will
~ political stability.
i
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S'E CRE ~!'
BOLIVIA ELECTS A NEU11 GOVERNMENT
With 75 percent of the vote
counted from last Sunday's na-
tional elections, Rene Barrientos
and his Bolivian Revolutionary
Front (FRB) have a commanding-lead
over all other parties. According
to official returns, Barrientos
and the FRB have won 61 percent of
the total vote, virtually assuring
Barrientos of the presidency, and
the FRB has a majority of seats in
both houses of congress.
The Christian Democratic Com-
munity, a front for the rightist
Bolivian Socialist Falange, and
Victor Andrade's faction of the
Nationalist Revolutionary Move-
ment are running second and third
respectively in a close tally.
The Barrientos regime, sched-
uled to be inaugurated on 6 Aug-
ust, will face a variety of new
and inherited problems. The FRB
is not a cohesive, disciplined po-
litical force and may disintegrate
in the near future. Thus the new
president will have to rebuild his
political base, possibly moving
closer to the right because of
military pressure. Barrientos will
also be faced with several chronic
economic problems, including a bud-
get deficit. The unfamiliarity of
thE~ new leaders with these prob-
lerns may cause considerable delay
in developing an economic program.
The major problem for Barri-
entos is to restrain the armed
fox:ces from trying to regain active
corxtrol of the government. As in
thE~ past, junta chief General Al-
fredo Ovando is the key to future
government-military relations.
Ov~~ndo reportedly told foreign
cox:respondents on Monday that '?the
arrled forces will observe the new
go~rernment and will act again if
thE~y think that the interests of
thE: people are not well served."
Ov~indo did not set a limit on how
long the military would give Bar-
rientos to prove himself.
Before the elections Ovando,
in a candid conversation with the
US ambassador, said that he was
pe:~simistic about Barrientos' suc-
ce:~s in governing the country. He
al:~o made it clear that he would
as:~ume power if the Barrientos gov-
ernment brake down. Thus, if an
is:~ue develops between the two
men, there could be trouble..
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