WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/02 CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
State Dept. review completed
OCI No. 0295/66
Copy No.
,Rd~JP,k Excfvdd fTOm utt~hat<
dpwngrd~d~n and' c(eafossj#icdttan.'
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7 ~, _ ''
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
SECRET
C 0 N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EDT, 23 June 1966)
Far East
VIETNAM
The Ky government has declared the problem of the Bud-
dhist "struggle" movement "solved," and several major
allied operations along the Cambodian border appear to
have delayed or disrupted an anticipated Communist sum-
mer offensive. The government, in addition to preparing
for election of a constituent assembly this September,
faces a host of administrative and economic problems--
as well as the danger that relaxation of Buddhist op-
position pressure will lead to a renewal of military
infighting.
Page
SOUTH KOREA: MOVES AHEAD UNDER PAK CHONG-HUI
The many accomplishments of President Pak's administra-
tion--normalization of relations with Japan, the dis-
patch of troops to Vietnam, reduction of inflation--
have engendered a new national pride and self-confidence.
The-progress made, however, is adding new dimensions to
old problems as well as creating new problems of its
own. In Korean-US relations, for example, Korea's
achievements are likely to be increasingly reflected
in a growing independence and assertiveness on the
Koreans' part. (Published separately as Special Report
OCI No. 0295/66A)
SECRET'
Page i WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 June 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
SECRET
WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING
The conference which ended in Moscow last week evident-
ly ran beyond schedule because of conflicting views on
Warsaw Pact structure and European security,
SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 June 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
SECRET
EEC MAKES PROGRESS ON KENNEDY ROUND
Last week's EEC Council decisions hold considerable
promise that serious Kennedy Round bargaining can
resume in September, but the EEC lacks negotiating
flexibility and France's more accommodating attitude
may not last.
NEW CYPRUS CRISIS FLARES
Turkey issued an ultimatum this week following a ban
on the movement of Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia, but
tension now has eased somewhat---with Makarios having
again demonstrated his power.
SECRET
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 June 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
SECRET
RECONSTRUCTION CONTINUING IN GHANA
Four months since Nkrumah was toppled, the moderate
military regime is functioning reasonably effectively,
but is under increasing pressure to return to popular
rule.
Western Hemisphere
SPECULATION SURROUNDS FIDEL CASTRO'S LACK OF ACTIVITY
The lack of conclusive supporting evidence has failed
to still speculation in Havana for the last two weeks
that Fidel Castro is either in political trouble or
seriously ill.
,EG'RET'
Page iv WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 June 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
SECRET
Far East
VI ETNAM
The South Vietnamese Bud-
dhists' capability for street
agitation was nearly eliminated
this week, as the Ky government
completed its sweep of Hue, re-
moved dissident leaders to Sai-
gon, and sealed off the Buddhist
Institute in the capital.
Buddhist political assets
in central Vietnam were further
reduced by arrests of other ci-
vilian officials and military per-
sonnel involved in the "struggle"
movement. In Saigon, the current
policy split between militant
and moderate Buddhist leaders
has even cast some doubt on the
future existence of the Buddhist
Institute itself, while the gen-
eral failure of agitation to gen-
erate popular support there has
revealed a relatively weak Bud-
dhist position in the country's
most strategic political center.
Despite this state of af-
fairs, however, it is rather
doubtful that Buddhist political
influence will stay at its cur-
rent low level as long as lead-
ers of the caliber of Tri Quang,
Tam Chau, and Thien Minh remain
active. Lingering resentment of
the Saigon government in the north-
ern towns and a general lack of
positive support for the Ky gov-
ernment may provide opportunities
for future Buddhist maneuvering.
After general declarations
that the antigovernment problem
had been "solved," Premier Ky
and other government leaders
turned their attentions to a cele-
Page 1
bration of the government's
first anniversary on 19 June,
which was marked by a full-dress
military parade, a major address
by Ky, and the promulgation of
the election law for a constitu-
tional convention.
According to the law, dele-
gates will be elected on 11 Sep-
tember only to draft a constitu-
tion. The draft will be subject
to modification by the govern-
ment, although the convention in
turn can overrule government
changes by a two-thirds majority
vote. Timetables for drafting,
promulgating, and implementing
the constitution will allow the
Ky government to remain in power
until at least mid-1967.
Buoyed by its success in
quelling the "struggle" movement,
the government appears relatively
unified at present, even though
its decision to move forcefully
against the dissidents emanated
from a relatively small, hard-
line faction in the armed forces.
A relaxation of opposition pres-
sure over a continuing period
of time, however, could reopen
splits between previously well-
defined military cliques.
Aside from potential in-
fighting, the government faces
a host of administrative and
economic problems which have
been highlighted during the
past few months by a serious in-
flationary trend. Devaluation
and other reform measures put
into effect this week to combat
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
SEGRE'T
USA/ARVN
OPERATION
EL PASO II
KIEN \
PHON
HINH
LONG
VINH
BINH
Da Nang
QIJANG NAM
QUANG TIN
LONGI
KHANH
BINH
kTUY
PHU
BON
airfield attacked
SOUTH VIETNAM
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
SE CRE T
inflation risk a possible loss of
confidence by the business community.
Initially, entrepreneurs appeared
to adopt a "wait and see" attitude
while studying the new regulations,
and the full effects of the reforms
are not yet clear.
Southern Military Developments
Several major allied spoiling
operations along the South Vietnam/
Cambodia border appear to have de-
layed or disrupted an anticipated
Communist summer offensive in the
central highlands and north of Sai-
gon.
Border surveillance operations
in Pleiku and Kontum provinces are
particularly indicative of the ef-
fectiveness of the US/Vietnamese
"preventive action" campaign. Since
mid-May, these long-term ground
sweeps have resulted in more than
1,000 Communist troops killed and
may have disrupted the northeastward
movement of a North Vietnamese
(PAVN) division-level formation
into South Vietnam's high plateau
region. In addition, the 24th PAVN
Regiment operating in Kontum Prov-
ince is believed to have been put
out of combat for at least the next
two months.
In Binh Long Province, Opera-
tion EL PASO II has apparently
forced regimental-strength Viet
Cong/PAVN forces to postpone or at
least to modify their plans for ma-
jor action against the Loc Ninh
Special Forces Camp during the ini-
tial phase of the rainy season.
In the coastal lowlands, allied
operations have thwarted enemy op-
erations against rice harvesting ac-
tivities in the Tuy Hoa area of Phu
Yen Province.
These and other recent signifi-
cant allied successes have forced
the Communists to rely on hit-and-
run attacks on isolated, lightly de-
fended Vietnamese paramilitary po-
sitions, and US/allied lines of com-
munication and rear areas.
The pattern of Communist ac-
tivity suggests a strong disincli-
nation for the present to mount sus-
tained attacks or to engage in
fixed battles. Only one battalion-
aa.nd two company-sized attacks were
make against Vietnamese Government
regulars and paramilitary forces at
widespread points of the country
last week. Viet Cong units also
launched damaging mortar and recoil-
less rifle assaults against USMC
positions near Da Nang and Chu Lai,
and against a US airfield in the
delta province of Ba Xuyen.
On 19 June, US Coast Guard cut-
ters thwarted the second major Com-
munist maritime infiltration effort
in five weeks off the coast of south-
ern South Vietnam by intercepting a
125-foot steel-hulled trawler along
the Vinh Binh Province coast.
SECRET
Page 3 WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 June 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
Europe
WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING
The Warsaw Pact foreign min-
isters' conference which ended in
Moscow last week evidently was
drawn out beyond schedule because
of conflicting views about the
pact's structure and European se-
curity. It appears that the Ru-
manians, once again at odds with
the Soviets, were successful in
getting Moscow to modify its po-
sition.
The meeting ended with an an-
nouncement that the pact's high-
est ranking body--the Political
Consultative Committee--will meet
in Bucharest in early July. De-
spite the difficulties encoun-
tered in Moscow, therefore, the
foreign ministers found enough
common ground to proceed with the
much-rumored bloc summit confer-
ence. Rumania's foreign minister
indicated on his return from Mos-
cow that he was not at all dis-
satisfied with the results of the
meeting.
The Main problem seems to
have arisen from a Soviet attempt
to introduce greater cohesion
into the Warsaw Pact machinery. 25X1
The Moscow foreign ministers'
meeting overlapped a meeting in
East Germany of top defense offi-
cials of the USSR, Poland, East
Germany, and Czechoslovakia who
presumably discussed defense ar-
rangements of the pact's "Northern
Tier." Moscow has probably been
obliged to settle for something
less than its desired objectives
in the military as well as politi-
SECRET
SECRET
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 June 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
I%VI
SE CRE T
EEC MAKES PROGRESS ON KENNEDY ROUND
Last week's ESC Council deci-
sions hold considerable promise
that the bargaining stage of the
Kennedy Round negotiations will
be able to get under way in
Geneva in September. Community
officials are optimistic that
other important decisions on
farm prices will also be made in
time to enable the EEC to com-
plete its agricultural offers by
fall. Satisfaction among the
Six is tempered, however, by rec-
ognition that they lack negotiat-
ing flexibility and that France's
more accommodating attitude may
be temporary.
products of considerable inter-
est to the Scandinavian coun-
tries--as "totally inadequate,"
and has even predicted that the
Scandinavians might react by re-
ducing their own bargaining lists
"so massively as to amount to a
pulling out of the Kennedy Round."
The official also speculated,
however, that the EEC might even-
tually offer what would amount
to a preferential trade deal in
these products between Norway
and the Six.
By agreeing to the EEC Com-
mission's proposal for an inter-
national grains agreement, the
French have permitted the EEC
to take a negotiable position
toward the US and other major
grain exporters. The community
in effect has conceded that grain
importers should share with ex-
porters the burden of food aid
to less developed countries.
However, the EEC proposal en-
visages a high ratio (90 percent)
of internal production to con-
sumption, and the Six are not
committed to automatic correc-
tive measures when EEC produc-
tion exceeds agreed limits.
A West German concession
will enable the Council to offer
a 50-percent reduction of the
EEC's tariff on paper pulp when
the Kennedy Round talks resume.
However, the positions to be
taken on newsprint and aluminum
are not very liberal. A Nor-
wegian official has characterized
these proposed EEC offers--on
The ix remain is
a US offer to consider revising
its tariff valuation procedures,
which have been a long-standing
complaint of the Europeans and
others. Although some community
officials probably would prefer
to take advantage of this offer,
one Commission official opined
that "protectionist elements" in
the EEC would welcome an excuse
to withdraw chemicals from the
Kennedy Round entirely.
According to a Dutch offi-
cial, Foreign Minister Luns--af-
ter the Netherlands assumes the
Council chairmanship on 1 Ju'ly--
will "make full use of his of-
fice" in getting EEC action on
Kennedy Round decisions. Luns
reportedly is willing to put is-
sues to a vote if necessary, again
raising the possibility of a
confrontation with the French on
this basic political issue.
SE C.1%.
Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 June 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02: CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
NEW CYPRUS CRISIS FLARES
Tension remains high in
Cyprus following the most recent
crisis between President Makarios'
government and the Turkish Cyp-
riots.
The crisis atmosphere began
to build up in early June when
Makarios briefly imposed new
restrictions on the movement of
Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia.
Makarios probably wished in part
to show Athens and Ankara that
he remained the dominant figure
on the island and to convince
them that no solution of the Cyp-
rus problem could result from
the coming Greek-Turkish dialogue
without his concurrence.
During the succeeding three
weeks, incidents increased. There
were scattered bombings, both the
Greek and Turkish communities
seized hostages, and the Greek
Cypriots increased their har-
assing tactics. A new con-
frontation developed last week
over Greek Cypriot efforts to
build a road through an area
dominated by the Turkish Cypriots.
Military commander Grivas threat-
ened to use force to eliminate
new armed Turkish Cypriot posi-
tions, but Athens advised re-
straint.
On 21 June, following a
bomb explosion in the capital,
Makarios reimposed a strict
blockade on the Turkish Cypriot
community in Nicosia which was
to have lasted until the 24th.
Almost immediately, Ankara issued
a demarche demanding that he
lift the ban within 24 hours or
face unspecified "countermeasures."
Greek intervention apparently
resulted in the lifting of the
ban soon after the Turkish-
imposed deadline passed, but not
before Makarios had demonstrated
his ability to stand up to a
Turkish ultimatum.
Despite their threat of re-
taliation the Turks gave no in-
dication of preparing to take
overt military action against
the island. Their failure to
act may have resulted from a
lack of coordination between
Turkish political and military
leaders, who were probably some-
what embarrassed by their general
lack of unpreparedness to take
immediate forceful action after
having just completed major mil-
itary exercises along the south-
ern coast of Turkey. Most of
the amphibious force had dis-
persed to home stations and
probably could not be reassembled
in effective numbers on such
short notice. Ankara may also
have received assurances from
Athens that it would press
Makarios to lift the ban and
keep the situation from getting
out of hand.
Out of the crisis Makarios
has demonstrated more clearly
than ever before his firm con-
trol of the situation on Cyprus. 25X1
He apparently has failed, however,
to drive a new wedge between
Athens and Ankara.
Page 17
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 June 66
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
1WW SECRET
RECONSTRUCTION CONTINUING I N GHANA
Ghana's moderate military re-
gime,?in power since the coup
Which toppled Nkrumah last February,
is functioning reasonably effec-
tively and has retained broad popu-
lar support. It is under increas-
ing pressure from former opposition
politicians, however, to speed a
return to civilian rule.
So far General Ankrah and the
seven other army and police of-
ficers of the ruling National Lib-
eration Council (NLC) seem to be
cooperating fairly well. Formal
probes into official corruption un-
der the old regime are continuing,
but the NLC has shown itself
anxious to stem vindictiveness
against former Nkrumah supporters.
In the face of strong disapproval
from Nkrumah's old political foes,
the new leaders have begun to re-
lease from detention persons found
not to be criminally liable for
their past actions. Former foreign
ministers Quaison-Sackey and Botsio
were both recently freed.
The struggle to rehabilitate
Ghana's nearly bankrupt economy
has led-to new cuts in spending in
various areas and an initial group
of nonpaying state enterprises is
being transferred to private man-
agement. The new regime has been
notably successful in obtaining a
$37-million stabilization credit
from the International Monetary
Fund and in winning at least a
three-month respite on heavy for-
eign debt payments. The new budget
coming out next month will prob-
ably include further austerity
measures.
Despite the NLC's continuing
ban on political parties and ac-
tivity, a good deal of politicking
is going on, especially by former
top opposition leader K. A. Busia,
His public "lectures" around the
country clearly have been designed
to build grass-roots support for
himself and bring pressure on the
NLC to give former opposition poli-
ticians a voice in the new govern-
ment. Ankrah, in a recent speech,
rebuked such activity, but at the
same time announced formation of
an advisory political committee
and promised early establishment of
a constitutional review commission
--two of Busia's recommendations.
Busia; who is included among the
18 prominent citizens tapped the
the political committee, can be ex-
pected to press his drive for a re-
turn to civilian rule much sooner
than the "two or three" years still
cited by the NLC.
Ghana's new rulers continue
to suspect the USSR of helping
Nkrumah to prepare a comeback at-
tempt from his refuge in Guinea.25X1
For economic reasons, however,
they have extended Soviet deliver-
ies of crude oil
Al-
bania and North Vietnam have both
closed their Accra embassies and
the North Koreans apparently will
depart soon. The East German trade
mission is also gone--as is`Ghana's
from East Berlin--amid hard feel-
ings generated by a wrangle over
an East German espionage expert
detained by the NLC for almost
three months
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927A005300080001-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
IWV SECRET
SPECULATION SURROUNDS FIDEL CASTRO'S LACK OF ACTIVITY
The lack of conclusive sup-
porting evidence has failed to
still speculation in Havana for
the last two weeks that Fidel
Castro is either in political
trouble or seriously ill.
Castro's uncharacteristic
withdrawal from the center of po-
litical activities and his lack-
luster bearing during his last
public appearance on 4 June have
provoked the speculation. Presi-
dent Dorticos' governmental role
has obviously risen sharply in
recent weeks. There is no indi-
cation, however, that Castro's
withdrawal from the limelight
will be more than temporary.
Castro has not delivered a
public speech since 1 May, hav-
ing missed several occasions on
which he normally would have
spoken. He appeared on the plat-
form during President Dorticos'
4 June speech at a reservists'
rally, and looked "tired, de-
pressed, and dejected," accord-
ing to observers.
Some rumors hold that he has
become physically or mentally in-
capacitated. Others claim the
Cuban Communist Party political
bureau removed him from power on
7 June because of his alleged
intention to send military forces
against the US naval base at
Guantanamo.
There is no evidence to sub-
stantiate the persistent rumors.
Castro held a lengthy interview
with the director general of
UNF&(O on 13 June.
LFNevertheless, Cuban press
coverage of his activities has
been notably scanty in the past
two or three weeks, and it is
highly unusual for him to be so
:Little in the public eye for so
:tong a period. It is also un-
usual that neither Castro nor
any other regime official has
seen fit to rebut the rumors, as
has happened in similar situa-
tions in the past.
In the absence of more sub-
stantial information it is rea-
sonable to assume that Castro
may be temporarily ill or fa-
tigued. This would explain his
general withdrawal from activi-
ties and his condition as de- 25X1
scribed on 4 June. It would
also point to a return to his
normal role upon recovery.
SE CR.E' T
Page 27 WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO05300080001-7