WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005200120001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 29, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/11/04: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200120001-3
DIA review
completed , *
iState Dept. review completed
OFFICE O CURRENT INT LL GEN
Referral Review by F ,?
NGA...',
GROUP [ EX Fuded from N w uric
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EDT, 28 April. 1966)
VIETNAM
The political focus of both the South Vietnamese
Government and its Buddhist critics shifted last
week to preparations for constituent assembly elec-
tions, but the recent political disturbances are
still generating reactions which may end the present
period of calm. The easing of political tensions has
brought a gradual increase in South Vietnamese combat
operations a ainst the Viet Can .
North
Vietnamese fighter aircraft clashed seven times last
week with US raiders, indicating Hanoi's growing
concern over the impact of the stepped-up air strikes
in the northeastern DRV. Hanoi also has called
special meetings recently to spur party and government
officials into greater support of the war effort.
INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR SINO-SOVIET BORDER FRICTION
Peking's new regulations governing the activities
of foreign vessels on border rivers are clearly
aimed at the Soviet Union and will probably increase
tension along the Manchurian-Soviet border.
SINO-SOVIET TRADE
The pattern of trade under the 1966 agreement pre-
sumably will continue the trend begun last year of
expanding Soviet exports in order to keep Chinese
shipments at the level maintained while China was
paying off its debt to the USSR.
SECRET
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Europe
SOVIET INDUSTRY CONTINUES MEDIOCRE PERFORMANCE
The USSR has announced plan-fulfillment statistics
for the first quarter of 1966 which seem to reflect
its apparent provision for a year of retrenchment as
the new five-year plan gets under way.
NATO CRISIS CONTINUES BEHIND CLOSED DOORS
The US-UK-German working group has reached agreement
on a statement taking account of the issue of French
troops in Germany, while Paris is insisting talks on
removing US installations from France must start
soon.
YUGOSLAV PRESIDENT TITO VISITS RUMANIA
Tito's 18-23 April official visit underscored the
degree to which Rumania in recent years has shifted
toward the kind of independent nationalism first es-
poused by Tito.
--
25X1:
'E C E T
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NEW CYPRUS CRISIS MAY BE BREWING
Ankara has informed the US and UK that it is ready
to take unilateral action to relieve pressures on
the Turkish Cypriots and intends to give Athens and
Nicosia a virtual ultimatum within a few weeks.
EGYPT WITHDRAWS SOME TROOPS FROM YEMEN
The Egyptian press has announced that some troop
contingents returned from Yemen on 22 April, but it
is too early to tell whether these are part of a
rotation or part of a promised reduction in force.
UK-RHODESIAN TALKS IMMINENT AS PRESSURE FOR UN ACTION MOUNTS 19
Prime Minister Wilson has announced that British and
Rhodesian officials will soon hold informal talks to
see whether there is a basis for settling the five-
month-old crisis, while the Africans have called for
a UN Security Council meeting.
PROVINCIAL CONSOLIDATION COMPLETED IN CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)
New provincial officials were elected without violence
this week. Mobutu can now push ahead with his austerity
program.
ZANZIBAR STILL RESISTS CONTROL BY TANZANIAN CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
After two years of the Tanzanian union, Zanzibar con-
tinues to resist efforts by President Nyerere for
closer integration and is mounting new attacks on the
US presence.
Western Hemisphere
SECRET
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DOMINICAN REPUBLICS BALAGUER APPEARS LESS CONFIDENT OF
24
ELECTORAL VICTORY
Balaguer is said to be worried about a shortage of
campaign funds and to be privately admitting the pos-
sibility of defeat.
LATIN AMERICANS STALEMATED ON NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE
25
The current meeting in Mexico City aimed at setting up
a Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone seems destined to
end in stalemate like others in the past.
WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE MEETS IN PERU
The theme of the meeting was the contrast between
the Christian Democratic "revolution with liberty"
in Chile and the Marxist totalitarianism in Cuba.
United Nations
SPECIAL UN COMMITTEE AGAIN TACKLES PEACEKEEPING PROBLEMS 27
Secretary General Thant has re-emphasized the urgent
need for the Special Committee of 33 to find a workable
formula to replace the present unsatisfactory system
of voluntary financing of peacekeeping operations.
SECRET
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Nfto~
SECRET
The political focus in South
Vietnam shifted during the week
to preparations for constituent
assembly elections. There was
also evidence of a mounting reac-
tion among certain civilian and
military groups to recent Bud-
dhist political tactics.
Taking a small step toward
implementing its election decree,
the Ky government convened ameet-
ing of 47 notables and elected
officials to advise on election
procedures. The meeting, which
included several participants
sympathetic to the "struggle
movement" in I Corps, voted to
set up a 100-man council to draft
an election law and oversee the
elections.
Half of the members of the
new council, expected to be
formed in the next few weeks,
will come from the elected pro-
vincial councils and the other
half will represent various power
groups. Selection procedures
were not specified, and the gov-
ernment will presumably determine
the representation allotted to
the various power groups. It
will probably attempt to influence
the entire election process with
an eye to preserving a strong
military voice in any future
government.
The Buddhist hierarchy,
presently satisfied with the
government's election gestures,
has further toned down the mili-
tancy of its "struggle movement."
It reacted mildly to the violence
late last week between demonstra-
tors and troops in Da Lat, which
led to the death of seven persons
and the arrest of nearly 100
students. The combined efforts
of Buddhist leaders and I Corps
commander General Dinh have
restored a measure of calm to
the troubled cities of Hue and
Da Nang, although antigovernment
elements retain a substantial
degree of local authority.
Non-Buddhist groups, includ-
ing the Catholics, other prominent
religious sects, labor, and the
nationalist political party fac-
tions, are showing increased
concern over possible Buddhist
domination of an elected assembly
and of Communist infiltration
via the ballot. Conflict between
these groups and the Buddhists
could bring an end to the present
uneasy calm.
A new spate of coup rumors,
alleging possible action within
the next week, also points up the
fragility of the present situation,
The rumors may stem in part from
Premier Ky's decision last week
to install Military Security Serv-
ice chief. Colonel Loan, advocate
of a hard line against political
troublemakers, as National Police
director in place of Colonel Lieu,
an advocate of leniency toward
ousted I Corps commander Thi. The
rumors, although conflicting, indi-
cate considerable backstage maneu-
vering by Loan, possibly with Ky's
collusion, by Lieu, and by Deputy
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Apr 66
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SECtET
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11 CORPS
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Premier General Co and IV Corps
commander General Quang, who
have been criticized from all
sides because of alleged corrup-
tion.
DRV Domestic Action
Hanoi recently called two
special meetings to spur key
party and government officials
into greater support of the war
effort. One meeting of some
600 party cadres and a second
of more than 350 National Assem-
bly delegates heard some of the
top regime leaders explain Han-
oi's determination to prosecute
the war and its plans for more
intensive war effort.
President Ho Chi Minh ad-
dressed both sessions. He told
the party cadres that he was
concerned about the slow imple-
mentation of regime directives
in areas vital to the war effort.
He cited agriculture, transpor-
tation, and civilian air defense
activities as examples. An in-
dication of the degree of regime
concern over these problems was
reflected in Ho's unusually frank
and even caustic remarks to the
cadre conference. He called for
"harsh disciplinary measures"
against party members who con-
tinue to oppose the party's di-
rectives.
In his address to the Na-
tional Assembly session Ho de-
clared that the leadership is de-
termined to prosecute the war
in spite of the US buildup and
that there would be no negotiated
settlement unless the US accepted
the DRV's four points in toto.
Ho's tough line on a political
settlement was later reflected
in a Hanoi Foreign Ministry
statement which rejected Sena-
tor Mansfield's proposal that
the US confer with Hanoi, Pe-
king, and "elements in South
Vietnam essential to making and
keeping the peace."
DRV MIGs Challenge US Fighters
US and North Vietnamese
fighters have clashed seven
times since 23 April. The pri-
mary aim of the MIGs appears
to be to disrupt the mission of
the US aircraft rather than to
engage in random duels with
them. US fighters have downed
four DRV aircraft, including
two MIG-21 Fishbeds, and one US
F-105 Thunderchief may have been
lost. All of these MIGs have
been shot down by air-to-air
missiles. No North Vietnamese
fighters have been reported
equipped with these weapons.
Hanoi's decision to commit
part of its small but growing
air force is probably indicative
of concern over the impact of
the stepped-up US air strikes in
the northeastern DRV. Strikes
in this area were increased dur-
ing the first week in April.
Hanoi apparently believes its
air force now is well'enough
developed to risk US retalia-
tory strikes against North Viet-
namese jet bases. Further
clashes are likely, particu-
larly in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
25X1
SECRET
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`'w SECRET W
The Military Situation
In South Vietnam
US forces continued last
week to spearhead all major al-
lied offensives in South Vietnam,
although the easing of political
tensions has resulted in a grad-
ual increase in combat operations
25X1
by government forces. The larg-
est operation currently under
way is an eight-battalion sweep
by US and South Vietnamese
forces into the Viet Cong "War
Zone C" base area in northwest
Tay Ninh Province. (See map
on page two.) Contact with the
enemy has so far been limited
but numerous enemy base camps
and supply caches have been un-
covered and destroyed.
The major Viet Cong action
last week was the virtual an-
nihilation of a civic action
team near Dat Do in Phuoc Tuy
Province. The VC also launched
a relatively unsuccessful bat-
talion-strength attack on a
government battalion in coastal
Khanh Hoa Province. The Commu-
nists continued their harass-
ments of airfields, shelling the
new US airstrip at Pleiku in
concert with small probing at-
tacks on nearby troop positions.
The Viet Cong also stepped up
small-scale attacks on out-
posts and hamlets in the delta
and near Saigon, and increased
minor terrorism in the capital.
This increased activity in
the delta and around Saigon is
expected to.con.tinue, together
with sabotage of land routes.
There are also indications of
Communist plans to attack tar-
gets, particularly Special
Forces camps and district or
provincial towns, in the north-
ern coastal plains, the western
highlands bordering Cambodia,
and the provinces due east and
west of Sai
SECRET
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INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR SINO-SOVIET BORDER FRICTION
Peking's new regulations gov-
erning the activities of foreign
vessels on border rivers are clearly
aimed at the Soviet Union, since
the only major rivers concerned
are the Amur, Argun, Ussuri, and
Sungari along the Manchurian-So-
viet boundary.
The subjects covered by the
new regulations suggest that, there
may have been minor unpublicized
MANCHURIA- U.SSA
BOUNDARY
SECRET
page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY
MONGOL lq
incidents along the rivers. For
example, foreign ships entering
Chinese ports "on bordering rivers"
and "on Chinese rivers reaching
neighboring countries" must report
all weapons and radio and signal
equipment. When in a Chinese port,
all weapons and ammunition are to
be kept by the harbor superintendent
and the use of radio transmitters is
prohibited. Passengers and crew
members are forbidden to make
29 Apr 66
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sketches, take photographs, swim
or fish, or measure depths.
China claims that the reg-
ulations--published on 19 April
--were formulated to "safeguard
the sovereignty of the CPR," but
it seems likely that friction
over their implementation will
increase tension during the com-
ing shipping season which begins
in May and lasts until November
on most of the rivers. Like the
stiffer frontier inspection con-
trols instituted by the Chinese
in May 1965, the new shipping
regulations could be part of a
continued campaign of harassment
along the Soviet border.
Although agreements reached
in 1951 and 1957 on navigation
The cursory announcement on
19 April that negotiations on
Sino-Soviet trade in 1966 had
been completed suggests that
there will be little significant
change from the $400-450 million
level of recent years.
The pattern of trade this
year presumably will continue
Page' 7
of the boundary rivers removed
some of the potential causes for
friction, the increasing inten-
sity of the Si.no-Soviet dispute
resulted in renewed frictions
over the disputed portions of
the long frontier.
The disputed ownership of
a number of islands, particularly
the large one at the confluence
of the Amur and Ussuri rivers,
increases the possibility of new
difficulties. Border talks
reached an impasse in mid-1964
and were suspended. Following
Khrushchev's ouster, polemics
covering the border subsided.
Early this year, however, each
side began in private to accuse
the other of perpetrating new
provocations along the common
frontier.
the trend that began in 1965
when China no longer had to main-
tain a large export surplus to
pay off its debt to the USSR.
In 1964 China's exports had ex-
ceeded its purchases from Russia
by $180 million to cover a debt
repayment which virtually wound
up its obligation. In 1965 and
again this year, much of the
40
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 29'Ap-r 66
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negotiation probably centered on
expanding Soviet deliveries to
China to maintain the past level
of Chinese shipments to the
USSR.
Increased Soviet deliveries
last year of aircraft for China's
civil air fleet and its military
transport were undoubtedly part
of this effort.
it is clear that trade
Page 8
with the USSR continues to lag
and apparently was less than the
1964 level of $450 million while
China's trade elsewhere continued
to expand.
China gives every indica-
tion that it expects a continued
growth in its foreign trade,
which totaled $3.8 billion in
1965. Although Moscow may share
in increased Chinese orders for
complete plants, negotiations
with Western suppliers indicate
the source for most complete sets
of equipment is likely to be the
free world.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 29 Apr 66
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'-Nao' `411111111111111"
SECRET
Statistics published by the
USSR on plan fulfillment for the
first quarter of 1966 appear to
confirm earlier indications that
1966 is to be a year for indus-
trial reform and reorientation
of the economy that will initially
entail lower rates of growth.
Moscow's figures do not show any
great resurgence in economic per-
formance of the kind needed to
realize many of the 1970 goals
incorporated in the recently
adopted five-year plan (1966-70).
The apparent expectation is, how-
ever, that the present effort
will eventually lead to higher
rates which will result in ful-
fillment of the 1970 goals.
The announced rate of in-
dustrial growth in the first
three months of 1966 is below
both the one for the first quar-
ter of last year and that for
all of 1965. This is due in
large part to the poor harvest
which reduced the supply of some
industrial raw materials. In
1964, achievements in industry
were similarly affected by a
poor showing in agriculture dur-
ing 1963.
In contrast to the relatively
low 7.9-percent growth in gross
industrial production, the out-
put of machinery increased by 11
percent. This sharp recovery
from a 7-percent rise registered
a year ago means that this branch
of industry has at least tempo-
rarily returned to the level
achieved in 1964. Production
of military and space hardware
appears to be the major bene-
ficiary of this sector's recov-
ery, inasmuch as Moscow's sta-
tistics indicate a slowdown in
~S~VI#T~AN X00
{Percen_ tyge_Cl<
than CIA and other Western estimptes.
Planned figures for .1966 ate rounded to nearest half-Percent.
SECRET
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Al1TER '.fi, "AR , MAT R
719" 1
6.7
Indu
strial Materials**
Electric~war**?
9
Natural gas
Cool
a 1/2
Rolled steel
7
6
6.
7
Steel pipe
J1
11
10,..,
9"i/2
27
2
14
-:16
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Chemical Fibers
Cement
11
it
13
Commercial timber
-1 _
-3
,a 1/2
Paper
12
14
10,1/2
Civi
lian Machinery
Chemical equipment
21
12
`Petroleum equipment
25
0
_
Aoi cuitural_equipment
Cons
umer Goods
Television sets
Washing machines
Refrigerators
Cotton Fabrics
Leather footwear
As 2
0
2
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Meat (state slaughter)
IS
16
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Dairy products
26
12
6
10
11
10
Fuels
7
7 "
6
Ferrous and nonferrous
7
9
9
14
14,
12
Machine building and
metalworking
Lumber, wood-processing,
smd cellulose-paper
4
Construction materials
10
Light
Food
10
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r-11 "W
SECRET
the growth rates of many civil-
ian machinery items. Percentage
increments in the output of both
petroleum and chemical equipment
during the first quarter are off
considerably, as are the growth
rates of the larger, more com-
plex types of agricultural ma-
chinery. Some consumer durables
continue to show impressive rates
of growth, but in absolute terms
they hardly represent an impor-
tant claim on the output of the
machinery branch of industry.
The lower rates of increase in
investment that are planned for
1966 imply a reduction in the
relative share of machinery pro-
duction for this purpose.
Despite the necessity for
increased industrial support for
Soviet agriculture, farm machin-
ery in the first quarter of 1966
was produced at a considerably
lower rate than the 11- to 12-
percent annual average implied
in the 1970 goals. The January-
March results, however, are ap-
parently in keeping with the
1966 plan. New production fa-
cilities planned for the latter
half of the five-year plan pe-
riod are expected to permit
greater increases in output
then. Meanwhile, there is no
indication the Soviets are be-
ginning to use idle capacity in
agricultural machinery plants
to which explicit reference was
made at the March 1965 plenum.
The announced increase of
nearly 50 percent in meat pro-
duction under state auspices
suggests increased slaughtering
due to foot-and-mouth disease
and to shortages of feed in some
areas. Animals marketed from
collective and state farms were
probably augmented by the diver-
sion of privately held live-
stock to state industry in the
face of restrictions on the free-
market sale of animal products
in disease-infected areas.
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The major participants in
the NATO crisis have been prepar-
ing bargaining positions for the
coming round of negotiations.
The US - UK - West Germany work-
ing group reached agreement on
a statement to be directed to
France taking account of the is-
sue of French forces in Germany,
which will come up first, the
French have insisted that negotia-
tions should start quietly on
I the removal of US installations
j from French soil.
The British have had reserva-
tions about whether the Germans
should be permitted to tell the
French that their right to station
forces in Germany would lapse once
the French separate their troops
from NATO. The British maintained
that an overly explicit German legal
stand would only give the French
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grounds for counterarguments.
The British also appeared wary
of supporting a German position
which later could be used
against British and US troops in
Germany. The compromise text,
little changed on other points
from the original German draft,
now informs the French that they
will no longer be able "to exer-
cise the right to station forces."
The German draft has been
circulated to the NATO fourteen
for discussion by their Paris
representatives. Some of the
smaller NATO states, wishing to
avoid an overly bitter first
round in the coming confronta-
tion between the French and the
Germans, may try to tone down
what they may feel is an exces-
sively aggressive approach in
Bonn's proposal.
French Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville on 22 April
delivered to Ambassador Bohlen
the latest French aide memoire
urging that Paris and Washington
immediately enter into bilateral
talks on the method to be em-
ployed for the withdrawal of US
troops and facilities from France.
When Ambassador Bohlen restated
the US position that the one-
year time limit for withdrawal
was not acceptable, Couve indi-
cated that the 1 April 1967 dead-
line was not intended to be an
absolute fixed date in all cases.
However, it is not clear how
I flexible the French intend to be
in the matter.
est in early bilateral talks
with the US is that talks would
serve to blunt further the charges
made by De Gaulle's domestic op-
ponents that he is unilaterally
severing ties with his allies.
Even as matters stand, however,
the opposition is having diffi-
culty in exploiting the NATO is-
sue. Last week in the National
Assembly, a Socialist-sponsored
censure motion on Do Gaulle's
NATO policy received only 137 of
the required 242 votes and failed
to win the support even of all
those deputies who normally op-
pose the government. In terms
of votes, this was one of the
least successful of the ten at-
tempts that have been made to
censure the government of the
Fifth Republic.
The Communist Party did
not support the motion, nor did
more than a third of the Demo-
cratic Center, the parliamentary
grouping composed primarily of
supporters of former presidential
candidate dean Lecanuet. At the
same time, there were no defec-
tions from the usual Gaullist
majority. The result reflects
the continuing division among
factions and parties on substan-
tive issues and makes it more dif-
ficult for them to influence the
government on the NATO issue.
0AU,U1%
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The official visit to Ruma-
nia by Yugoslav President Tito
from 18 to 23 April--his first
in ten years--reflects the degree
to which Rumania's external course
has shifted in recent years toward
the kind of independent national-
ism first espoused by Tito.
Tito's trip underscored the gen-
eral similarity of the two coun-
tries' views on foreign policy
and dramatized his desire to im-
prove cooperation with Rumanian
party chief Ceausescu.
Although the joint communi-
que summarizing the visit con-
tained no startling disclosures
and omitted any direct references
to the Sino-Soviet dispute, it
provided a new forum for the two
governments to stress their be-
lief that the principles of equal-
ity and independence of action
must be respected by each Commu-
nist party. In so doing they
again implicitly denied that lead-
ership in Communist affairs is
solely the province of Moscow
or Peking. The communiqud also
called for improvement in Yugoslav-
Rumanian economic relations and
in Balkan relations generally,
and espoused a stronger United
Nations, friendlier relations
among all European countries,
and disarmament.
The Yugoslav leader appeared
generally to appreciate that the
Rumanians are carefully using the
political flexibility offered
them by the Sino-Soviet dispute
to strengthen their independent
position. On 18 April, however,
Tito lashed out at the Chinese
Communists, without naming them,
for placing "their own narrow
interests and objectives before
the fundamental interests of the
struggle for peace and socialism."
Confronted with this embarrassment
to their "neutrality" and un-
deterred by their guest's sensi-
bilities, the Rumanians censored
this passage from all their pub-
lications.
The visit also was the oc-
casion for the first meeting be-
tween Tito and Ceausescu since
the latter succeeded the late
Gheorghiu-Dej as secretary general
of the Rumanian party in March
1965. Ceausescu's prestige prob-
ably was at least indirectly en-
hanced by Tito's remarks praising
the country's "young and capable"
leadership.
Although it is too early
to assess the domestic implica-
tions of Tito's stay in Rumania,
his reported intention to review
Yugoslav domestic developments
with Ceausescu may lead to some
relaxation in Bucharest's rather
cautious and hesitant attitude
toward internal liberalization.
It seems mainly a matter of time
before the Ceausescu regime, here-
tofore intent on pursuing a
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liberalized course in its foreign
relations, can be expected to
gain the confidence necessary to
introduce greater domestic lib-
eralization. Moreover, inasmuch
as the communique calls for in-
creased tourism between the two
countries as well as greater em-
phasis on party and scientific-
cultural exchanges, the Yugo-
slav model of national Commu-
nism may prove increasingly at-
tractive to Rumanians.
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NEW CYPRUS CRISIS MAY BE BREWING
The Turkish Government has
called for new consultations with
Washington and London over the
Cyprus situation, warning that it
is prepared to take action on its
own if necessary to relieve the
Turkish community on Cyprus of
what Ankara regards as economic
repression and harassment.
The aide memoire, passed
to US and British officials on
19 April, indicates a new deter-
mination by Ankara to end its
frustration over Cyprus. The
prevalent pro-Greek attitude of
UN members, as demonstrated by
the Cypriot resolution last De-
cember, and the apparent inten-
tion of President Makarios to
allow time to erode Turkish Cyp-
riot resistance apparently have
convinced Ankara that it must
act soon.
In addition to their urgent
request for consultations, the
Turks say they intend to issue
a virtual ultimatum to Athens
and Nicosia within the next few
weeks. Furthermore, under the
guise of training exercises and
maneuvers, they have gradually
concentrated a substantial am-
phibious force near Turkey's
southern coast to back up their
demands.
Neither Athens nor the Greek
Cypriot government in Nicosia
is likely to bow to a new Turk-
ish ultimatum. The Stephanop-
oulos government is probably
too weak to take such an unpop-
ular action, and any gesture
designed to ease Turkish appre-
hensions is out of the question
as far as Makarios is concerned.
Both Stephanopoulos and Makarios
have said recently, however,
that the US should again take
a more active role in seeking
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EGYPT WITHDRAWS SOME TROOPS FROM YEMEN
The Egyptian press has an-
nounced that contingents of Egyp-
tian troops began to arrive home
from Yemen on 22 April. It is
too soon to determine, however,
how many of these troops are part
of the routine Egyptian rotation
pattern and how many are part of
Nasir's announced plan to reduce
forces and expenditures in Yemen.
The withdrawal of some
troops might contribute to Kuwait's
current effort to bring the
Saudis and Egyptians together
for peace talks. This may ac-
count for the unusual publicity
given to the first troop debar-
cation in Egypt. Saudi King
Faysal was recently reported to
have accepted Nasir's offer to
send a top Egyptian official to
Saudi Arabia in the company of
the Kuwaiti foreign minister.
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UK-RHODESIAN TALKS IMMINENT AS PRESSURE FOR UN ACTION MOUNTS
Following several diplomatic
moves, UK Prime Minister Wilson
has announced that British and
Rhodesian officials will soon
hold informal talks to determine
whether there is a basis for ne-
gotiations to end the five-month-
old crisis. Wilson told Parlia-
ment that his former private
secretary and intermediary, Oliver
Wright, had talked with Rhodesian
Prime Minister Smith during a
recent trip to Salisbury and South
Africa.
On 26 April, Smith publicly
indicated his willingness to re-
open communication with the Brit-
ish, with a view of reaching a
settlement. Evan Campbell, the
former Rhodesian High Commissioner
in London, spoke with Smith in
mid-April and found him to be
more amenable than he had been
at their last discussion in Feb-
ruary. Smith emphasized, however,
that he had his "wild men" to
contend with among Rhodesian pol-
iticians.
In the meantime, African
pressures for strong UN moves
against Rhodesia continue to
mount. African members have de-
cided to call for a Security
Council meeting not later than
10 May to press for enforcement
of mandatory sanctions and the
use of force against Rhodesia if
necessary.
The African reaction at the
UN to the announcement of the
London-Salisbury informal talks
was one of caution, with many
expressing the view that the
talks would be a waste of time.
A special committee has been set
up by the Africans to draft a
resolution embodying their de-
mands. The UN Committee on Colo-
nialism has already adopted a
resolution calling on Britain to
use military force in Rhodesia
and recommending that the Security
Council consider what further ac-
tion is needed to enforce previous
UN resolutions.
Britain hopes that any future
council resolution would be con-
fined to extending Britain's pres-
ent authority to stop oil ship-
ments to Rhodesia. This authority
now is specifically restricted to
shipments bound for the Mozambique
port of Beira. London is consid-
ering asking the Security Council
for authority to stop shipments
to Mozambique as a whole. Lon-
don's principal concern is to
avoid a resolution including South
Africa which would affect Brit-
ain's important economic ties
with Pretoria. Sufficient sup-
plies are flowing into Rhodesia
from both South Africa and Mozam-
bique to cover current rationinff
requirement-
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PROVINCIAL CONSOLIDATION COMPLETED IN CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)
President Mobutu has appar-
ently pushed through the provin-
cial reorganization of the Congo
(Leopoldville) and is moving to
neutralize former premier Tshomb6ls
troublemaking potential.
Province. This new demonstra-
tion of Tshombe's strength, added
to reports of his continuing
plotting, appears to have made
his self-exile in Belgium intol-
erable to Mobutu.
The legislatures of the con-
solidated provinces elected pro-
vincial governors and other of-
ficials on 25 April under army
supervision. The anticipated
violence on the part of displaced
officials and their supporters
did not materialize. Mobutu
now has a chance to move ahead
in his plan to trim the bureauc-
racy and pursue his austerity
program.
Tshombe's long-time asso-
ciate Godefroid Munongo defeated
the Mobutu-backed candidate for
governor of the new Sud-Katanga
After two years of the Tan-
zanian union, Zanzibar continues to
resist efforts by President
Nyerere for closer integration
and is mounting new attacks on
the US presence.
Mobutu is apparently hyper-
sensitive about the ability of
Tshombe and his private Belgian
associates to intrigue against
the Leopoldville regime.
(Tshombe", however, is
not likely to return to the Congo
until he feels assured of a posi-
tion of national leadership.
Zanzibar's pro_Communists in
the island's ruling Revolutionary
Council are accelerating their ef-
forts to force the removal of the
US Consulate. The extremists
have spread rumors that the US
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is backing the former Arab sultan
in a counterrevolutionary plot
and have produced "evidence" that
US Consulate personnel are in-
volved. Earlier this month their
pressure caused the closing of
the USIS library and the removal
of the US public affairs officer.
A similar technique was used to
force the ouster of three US
diplomats last year.
The Zanzibaris argue that
the Americans were responsible
for the coups in Ghana and Indo-
nesia and have established a firm
grip on Kenya. Many Tanzanians
expect the next imperialist blow
to fall on them, as leaders in
the effort to eliminate white
rule in southern Africa.
ning. On 24 April, Karume and
all other council members made
a hasty trip to the mainland to
The Zanzibaris' anti-US tack
may also be designed to disrupt
Nyerere's efforts to consolidate
the union. In recent visits to
Zanzibar, Nyerere has reportedly
pressed Vice President Karume--
who heads the island government--
and the council to accept an ex-
tension of the Tanzanian constitu-
tion to cover Zanzibar and to
relinquish their control of
civil service matters. Exten-
sion of the constitution would
provide for eventual free elec-
tions which the Zanzibar rulers
would stand little chance of win-
discuss these problems.
25X1
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SE CR E T
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC'S BALAGUER APPEARS
Joaquin Balaguer now ap-
pears somewhat less confident
that he once was about his
chances of victory in the Domin-
ican Republic's elections on 1
June. He recently responded
vaguely when US Embassy offi-
cials questioned him regarding
his current strength, saying he
was counting on the "silent
vote." According to top offi-
cials in the Reformist Party,
Balaguer is seriously concerned
over a shortage of campaign
funds and is privately acknowl-
edging the possibility of de-
feat. Although these remarks
were probably made for the bene-
fit of US ears, to some degree
they reflect the low state of
morale in the party.
Balaguer has started thrice-
weekly broadcasts to counter Juan
Bosch's use of radio and tele-
vision. He also has stepped up
his attacks on the pro-Bosch ad-
ministrators of the government-
owned Dominican Sugar Corpora-
tion (CAD)--the country's larg-
est employer--for alleged polit-
ical favoritism. There has
been some evidence that CAD re-
sources have been used to bene-
fit Bosch's Revolutionary Party.
Nevertheless, even such a re-
spected conservative as Minis-
ter-without-Portfolio Mendez has
defended the CAD management
against the accusations of fa-
voritism.
Within his own party Bala-
guer has heard dissent from
LESS CONFIDENT OF ELECTORAL VICTORY
"young Turks" who fear that if
elected he may bring people who
do not "reflect the present
times" into his government. Al-
though this criticism was de-
signed to register the dissi-
dents' claim to a share of fu-
ture patronage, the US Embassy
notes that their complaints
merit attention.
Despite what may be a sag-
ging campaign, Balaguer has yet
to come to terms with Rafael
Bonnelly's conservative and
right-wing National Integration
Movement (MIN). He has pro-
tested that Bonnelly's backers
demand too much--even the vice-
presidential slot on a combined
ticket. Balaguer's present
strategy is to draw support
away from Bonnelly. He seems
to have had some success in ob-
taining the support of a small
conservative party and gaining
a pledge of eventual support
from at least one major MIN
leader.
Bosch has been publicly si-
lent for the past week. On 19
April he voiced to US Embassy
officials concern over an al-
leged deterioration in campaign
conditions and his chances of
governing in the face of a
hostile military and serious
social and economic problems.
Although there has been
some increase in politically
generated violence, the passage
of the 24 April anniversary of
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The revolution with only noisy
demonstrations has encouraged
hopes that elections can be held
on schedule. However, events
scheduled for 28 and 30 April
still could produce trouble,
particularly in view of the ac-
cidental shooting of a Domini-
can boy by a US sentry on 27
April.
The group of wounded Domin-
icans which left for Europe last
week has been given considerable
publicity in Hungary with ap-
pearances over television and at
a mass meeting in Budapest on
26 April.
LATIN AMERICANS STALEMATED ON NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE
It is becoming increasingly
apparent that the delegates to
the preparatory commission which
began meeting in Mexico City on
19 April to draft a treaty set-
ting up a Latin American Nuclear-
Free Zone (LANFZ) will be unable
to reach agreement on a defini-
tive text.
The idea for a denuclear-
ized Latin America originated
several years ago with Mexico
and was enthusiastically sup-
ported by the Goulart government
in Brazil. Since then the Latin
American countries have held
numerous meetings in their at-
tempt to make the LANFZ a real-
ity. Progress has been slow and
the Brazilian Government under
Castello Branco has shown no
genuine interest in the project.
At the current commission
meeting the Brazilians, supported
in varying degrees by Argentina,
Colombia, and Venezuela, main-
tain that all Latin American
countries and territories includ-
ing Cuba, which has refused,
must agree to participate in the
LANFZ before it could be put into
effect. They argue in addition
that all nuclear powers, includ-
ing France and Communist China,
must formally commit themselves
to respect the treaty, and that
a tight control and inspection
system must be agreed to.
Most of the other delegates
tend to disagree. They accept
Mexico's view that the LANFZ
should become effective among
whatever states ratify the treaty
on the date that the instruments
of ratification are deposited.
They argue that the zone could
later be enlarged to include Cuba
and other countries by a step-
by-step approach which would put
pressure on them to join and on
the nuclear powers to give nu-
clear guarantees.
At the moment neither side
seems disposed to make any sig-
nificant compromise. If the
stalemate at Mexico City contin-
ues, the whole subject, as in
the past, will be held over for
still another session.
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WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE MEETS IN PERU
Delegates to the Fifth World
Conference of Christian Democra-
tic Parties which met in Lima,
Peru, this week analyzed methods
of combating the "basic triangle"
of oligarchy, imperialism, and
militarism and Fidel Castro's
totalitarian Marxist regime. The
theme of the meeting was the con-
trast between the Christian Demo-
cratic "revolution with liberty"
in Chile and Cuban developments.
Preliminary reports indi-
cated the congress' final reso-
lution would condemn any form of
intervention such as that "exist-
ing in Santo Domingo, Cuba, Viet-
nam, East Germany, and Central
Europe." The West European par-
ties, however, were expected to
help mute criticism of US poli-
cies, while allowing the Latin
Americans to have a free hand
in attacking the Havana Tri-
Continent Conference.
The Lima conference graph-
ically contrasted the "more
mature status" of the European
parties with the aggressive and
more revolutionary Latin Ameri-
can groups. A Peruvian pro-
government newspaper suggested
that Christian Democrats in
Latin America still form poli-
tical elites that have not yet
had an opportunity to demon-
strate the applicability of
their principles. The Chileans,
in spite of their revolutionary
fervor, indicated a recognition
that principles cannot always
be adhered to when there are
practical problems to be solved.
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SPECIAL UN COMMITTEE AGAIN TACKLES PEACEKEEPING PROBLEMS
The Special UN Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations, called
the Committee of 33, resumed
meetings this week despite a lack
of enthusiasm on the part of many
of its members for tackling the
constitutional issues underlying
the UN's persistent financial
problems. Secretary General
Thant has re-emphasized the ur-
gent need for a workable formula
to replace the present unsatis-
factory system of voluntary fi-
nancing of peacekeeping operations.
Sharp differences remain
between those who hold that the
Security Council has the exclu-
sive power in peacekeeping and
those who maintain that the Gen-
eral Assembly may undertake a
peacekeeping role when the coun-
cil is blocked by a veto. Since
there is little prospect of agree-
ment on this question, the com-
mittee's proceedings will con-
centrate on the issue of how to
finance peacekeeping operations.
Several proposals on financ-
ing have been suggested, includ-
ing voluntary contributions, com-
pulsory assessment, apportion-
ment among all members, and spe-
cial arrangements among the par-
ties involved. The Committee of
33 is required by a resolution
passed by the last General As-
sembly to consider an Irish pro-
posal which would establish a
special scale for financial con-
tributions by which the perma-
nent security council members
supporting an operation would
pay up to 70 percent of the
costs and the less developed
countries a very small percen-
tage.
In consultations with the
US last week, the French indi-
cated their desire to get to
work on the finance problem,
suggesting a plan to be used in
any operation approved by the
Security Council. This plan
calls for the establishment of
a finance committee consisting
of all the members of the Se-
curity Council plus additional
members representing less de-
veloped countries and major con-
tributors. Members of this com-
mittee would agree to pay an
agreed percentage of the cost
and the General Assembly would
apportion the remainder. Since
the French do not accept the
assembly's authority to conduct
peacekeeping operations, the
scheme would not apply in oper-
ations initiated by it.
The UK has proposed a some-
what similar method in the form
of an "underwriters' club," con-
sisting of members who usually
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are expected to support financial
UN peacekeeping activities. By
some form of an underwriting
contract the parties would pledge
themselves to provide finances
for peacekeeping activities
properly authorized by the UN,
the costs for which the member-
ship as a whole had refused to
pay.
Secretary General Thant is
extremely concerned about present
financial difficulties in the Cy-
prus and Middle East peacekeeping
operations. The Scandinavian
countries and Ireland are threaten-
ing to withdraw their troops from
these operations unless they are
reimbursed for their expenses, and
Canada too may soon press for re-
imbursement.
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