WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005200100001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONTENT S
(Information as of noon EST, 14 April 1966)
Far East
Page
VIETNAM
Buddhist pressure has forced the Ky government to call
for general elections within three to five months, but
it is still uncertain whether this concession will
satisfy the Buddhist leadership. Throughout the week
the Buddhists have tried to strengthen their control
of the demonstrators and have virtually pledged an
all-out attack on the government. Viet Cong military
action included a mortar attack on Saigon's Tan Son
Nhut Airfield and heavy resistance to US operation
ABILENE. !Hanoi and Peking propagandists are citing
the south's political turmoil as additional proof that
the US position is crumbling and that Communist victory
is inevitable.
INDONESIA'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA
Anti-Chinese activities in Indonesia have reached the
highest level since independence, and Djakarta seems
quite willing to let relations deteriorate.
Europe
SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES
The power balance within the leadership remains sub-
t
7
s
antially unaltered after the party congress.
IMPORTANT RAILROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN THE USSR
The 440-mile rail line between Tyumen and Surgut in
we
t
9
s
ern Siberia will have considerable economic
significance as well as opening up the sparsely develop-
ed Siberian area for further proliferation of ICBM
launch sites.
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENTS
Premier Kosygin favors developin
inc
10
g
reased export
trade with the West to increase foreign exchange earn-
ings. In 1965, exports to the free world rose by 15
percent while imports were kept to only a two-percent
rise.
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FIREBAR CRASH IN WEST BERLIN
The crash of the most modern operational fighter in
the Soviet inventory provided allied authorities with
a unique opportunity for a first-hand study of its
construction and equipment.
NATO ALLIES DEVELOPING COMMON POSITIONS
NATO members are developing agreed positions on re-
plies to the French aides-memoire of 29 March, French
troops in Germany, and relocating major NATO instal-
lations.
EEC COUNCIL MAKES LIMITED PROGRESS
The negotiating atmosphere in the Common Market has
been eased by the limited progress at last week's
Council meeting, but bargaining on agriculture and
the Kennedy Round in the next few weeks will be ex-
tremely critical.
EUROPEAN LABOR DEVELOPMENTS
Communist-controlled trade unions are making a bid for
representation on EEC advisory groups, a move which
is likely to have important implications for the
European trade movement.
Middle East - Africa
ABDULLAH YAFI FORMS NEW LEBANESE CABINET
Lebanon's new premier is a political moderate who
plans to continue programs of domestic reform and a
traditionally neutral foreign policy.
CONGO PRESIDENT MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE POSITION
General Mobutu made diplomatic gains at the recent
Nairobi conference and has announced a provincial
consolidation to aid administrative efficiency.
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IRAQI PRESIDENT KILLED IN AIR CRASH 17
President Arif's death on 13 April removes the one
stabilizing political factor in Iraq.
UN GIVES BRITAIN INCREASED POWERS IN RHODESIAN CRISIS 19
The Security Council finds Rhodesian oil imports a
"threat to the peace" and authorizes Britain to use
force to prevent oil from arriving at Beira in Mo-
zambique.
OBOTE CONSOLIDATING SUPREME POWER IN UGANDA
Prime Minister Obote has strengthened his control
since seizing supreme power seven weeks ago. The
influence of his radical. advisers is probably rising
as the moderate politicians become neutralized.
Western Hemisphere
BOSCH ACCEPTS DOMINICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION
He said extreme pressure prompted him to accept the nom-
ination, but significantly he left a way open to back
out of the campaign with his claims that a military
terror machine exists.
THE SITUATION IN ECUADOR
The general picture remains disturbing with irresponsible
politicians and businessmen working for their own and
the Communists showing signs of improving their
position.
JAGAN'S DILEMMA IN BRITISH GUIANA
Cheddi Jagan and his People's Progressive Party are
biding their time on deciding whether to undertake
peaceful or violent opposition to Prime Minister Burn-
ham's government and weighing their chances of success
in either course of action.
COLOMBIA TO ELECT PRESIDENT
Carlos Lleras, the government's candidate, is assured
of victory in the presidential election on 1 May. The
election is not expected to arouse much popular en-
thusiasm.
BARRIENTOS ANNOUNCES CANDIDACY FOR BOLIVIAN PRESIDENCY 24
The former co-president of the military junta will have
Luis Adolfo Siles as his running mate. The opposition
has until 3 May to file nominations.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Apr 66
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The political crisis in
South Vietnam continued unabated
this week as militant Buddhist
elements tried to force the Ky
government to hold immediate
elections for a constituent
assembly. On 14 April, the gov-
ernment tried to meet some of the
Buddhist demands by offering to
hold general elections within
three to five months. Whether
these concessions will satisfy
the Buddhist leadership is not
yet clear.
The Buddhist Institute on
9 April issued three communiqu6s--
two designed to tighten Buddhist
control over demonstrators in
Saigon, and a third demanding an
elected constitutional convention
in the shortest possible time.
A "leadership committee of
Buddhist forces" was organized
to wage a "more effective cam-
paign" for their objectives.
Institute leaders later spelled
out Buddhist demands in a mili-
tant hard line which virtually
pledged all-out attack on the
Ky government.
The Ky government itself
continues to face internal dis-
sension. Reports circulating
during the week indicated that
some military elements in the
government were highly dissatis-
fied with the premier's failure
to exert firm pressure against
the struggle forces in Da Nang.
His intention to replace National
Police Director Lieu drew the
disapproval of influential cab-
inet members who preferred a less
extreme course. Ky has now, at
least for the moment, reversed
his decision on Lieu. He may
have deferred to these officials
who view Lieu as an important
link with influential nongovern-
mental figures, including moder-
ate Buddhist leaders and General
Thi. The newly appointed I Corps
commander, General Dinh, has
apparently succeeded in exerting
at least partial authority over
antigovernment military units in
the Da Nang area without force,
but civil administration and the
radio station remain in the hands
of antigovernment elements.
The government's major con-
cession to the Buddhists, the
convening of the National Politi-
cal Congress on 12 April, was
initially unsuccessful. Only
about half of the 168 invited
delegates attended. Buddhist
and Catholic religious leaders
were notably absent. The coun-
cil's call for general elections
within four months, however,
appeared to meet many Buddhist
demands. However, the issue of
whether the Ky regime will func-
tion as a provisional government
is still in question.
Military Developments
in South Vietnam
Following a relative lull
in enemy activity during the
past two weeks, Viet Cong mili-
tary action picked up this week.
A mortar attack against Tan Son
Nhut Airfield some four miles
northwest of Saigon killed at
least seven US personnel and
wounded 106. In addition, 63
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C A N t B 0 I) I
PHNOM PENH
CA,PITAt MILITARY RLGION
'Ban Me
Thuot
SOUTH VIETNAM
.C'17P.171'T
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aircraft were damaged or destroyed
and numerous airfield structures
and POL storage facilities were
set ablaze. This was the second
major terrorist attack directed
chiefly against US forces in as
many weeks, each of which has
resulted in over 100 casualties.
The heaviest fighting of the
week, and the most costly for the
US in some time, occurred in Phuoc
Tuy Province some 40 miles south-
east of Saigon where six battalions
of the US 1st Infantry Division are
concluding the second week of Opera-
tion ABILENE. After several days
of facing only sporadic enemy re-
sistance in ground sweep operations,
following a series of B-52 Strato-
fortress strikes against suspected
VC training and base camp areas, a
US company on 12 April was engaged
by an estimated Viet Cong battalion
heavily armed with mortars, auto-
matic weapons, and small arms.
Thirty-four Americans were killed,
60 wounded, and four were listed as
missing or captured. Later in the
day a second US company skirmished
with an estimated VC platoon in the
same general area, bringing the
total losses for the operation to
date to 46 US killed and 120 wounded
as against 55 enemy killed, 22
captured, and 675 suspects appre-
hended.
Hanoi on Unrest in the South
and Negotiations
Both Hanoi and the Liberation
Front have used their propaganda
apparatus to encourage a continua-
tion of protest demonstrations,
hitting hard on the theme that the
present "urban struggle movement"
has the same goals as the Libera-
tion Front. It has also tried to
channel as much of the antigovern-
ment sentiment as possible into
anti-Americanism. The Communists
have singled out the more moderate
elements among the demonstrators as
traitors, probably in an effort to
forestall any compromise settlement.
Hanoi's reaffirmation of its
opposition to any settlement except
on its own terms reflects its con-
fidence of eventual victory.
After several weeks of only muted
discussions of negotiations, Hanoi
used the 8 April first anniversary
of the announcement of the "four-
point" stand to restate emphatically
its continued adherence to that
demand. Articles and editorials
appeared in all the major news
media, emphasizing that the four
points constitute a package and
that the US must accept all four,
particularly point three which
deals with recognition of the Lib-
eration Front.
Hanoi's determination to
press the war is also reflected in
the continuing dispatch of large
numbers of PAVN troops to South
Vietnam. The presence of 11 North
Vietnamese Army units of regimental
strength along with five separate
battalions, totaling some 20,000
men, has been confirmed. In addi-
tion, the presence of at least eight
to ten other PAVN units is sus-
pected. If confirmed, these units
would raise the total PAVN strength
in South Vietnam to over 30,000.
Available evidence indicates that
large-scale infiltration is con-
tinuing as the Communists prepare
for their rainy season offensive.
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In addition to infiltrating
regular units, Hanoi has recently
been forced to send in a consid-
erable number of replacements
for Viet Cong and PAVN casualties.
Many of these troops are being
assigned to what had once been
purely Viet Cong units as well
units.
timates o infiltration 965
reach almost 20,000 men, and pre-
liminary estimates for the first
ten weeks of 1966 total more than
3,500.
Peking on Vietnam
The political upheaval in
South Vietnam has probably also
strengthened Chinese faith in ul-
timate Communist victory. There
are no indications of a shift
away from Peking's sober view of
the over-all situation, however.
The main object of Peking's
policy is still to keep the Viet-
namese Communists in the fight
while holding Chinese risks at
as low a level as possible.
People's Daily on 10 April
asserted that popular unrest in
South Vietnam provides "fresh
proof" that the US position is
"fast crumbling," but an editorial
printed the next day took the
long view on revolutionary strug-
gle and warned that expecting vic-
tory in every battle "is asking
the impossible."
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INDONESIA'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA
Djakarta's current anti-
Peking orientation, superimposed
on traditional Indonesian dislike
of the local Chinese, is generat-
ing the highest level of anti-
Chinese demonstrations and seiz-
ures of Chinese property since
independence. Stringent restric-
tions and lack of protection by
Indonesian authorities have forced
Chinese Communist consulates in
Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes to
close. Chinese schools and asso-
ciations in wide areas of Indo-
nesia have either been confis-
cated outright or "placed under
the protection" of local military
authorities.
The current anti-Chinese
activity is being planned and
carried out primarily by anti-
Communist Moslem youth groups who
in many instances appear to re-
ceive varying degrees of covert
support from local military
authorities.
In the latest of a long
series of protest notes to Dja-
karta, Peking requested on 12
April that the Indonesian Govern-
ment immediately arrange for the
evacuation of all Chinese who
wish to leave for the mainland
and ensure protection and ac-
commodation at ports of embarka-
tion. This appears to be de-
signed to discredit the new gov-
ernment and improve Peking's
image among the Overseas Chi-
nese. If significant numbers
of Chinese should seek repatria-
tion, Indonesia would be in no
position to comply with Peking's
demand that transportation to
the mainland be provided.
25X1
Djakarta, for its part, ap-
pears entirely willing to let
relations deteriorate.
A sug-
gestion for a "counterattack"
by Radio Indonesia, made by In-
donesia's minister of informa-
tion on 8 April, may mark the
beginning of a concerted anti-
Peking propaganda campaign
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CHANGES IN SOVIET PARTY RULING BODIES
AT 23rd CONGRESS. 8 APRIL 1966
PRESIDIUM OF Title changed POLITBURO OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Members Members
BREZHNEV--------------------------------------------------------- BREZHNEV
KOSYGIN--------------------------------------------------------- KOSYGIN
PODGOR NY-------------------------------------------------------PODGOR PODGORNY
SUSLOV----------------------------------------------------------- SUSLOV
V ORONOV--------------------------------------------------------V ORONOV
K I RI LE N KO--------------------------------------------------------KI RI LE N KO
SHELEPIN--------------------------------------- ------------------- SHELEPIN
MAZUROV--------------------------------------------------------- MAZUROV
POLYANSKY------------------------------------------------------- POLYANSKY
SHELEST ------------------------SHELEST
SHVERNIK------------------- Replaced By ------------------------PELSHE
MI KOYAN------------------- Dropped
Candidates Candidates
DEMIC HEV---------------------------------------------------------DEMICHEV
GRiSHIN----------------------------------------------------------- GRISHIN
NADZE
MZHAVANADZE---------------------------------------------------- MZRASHIHAVAVA
RASHI DOV---------------------------------------------------------
USTINOV---------------------------------------------------------- USTINOV
SHCHERBITSKY
--------------------------------------------
----
---
Y
TS
Dropped
Added
-----------------------------KU NAYEV
Added
-----------------------------MASHEROV
SECRETARIAT OF SECRETARIAT OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
First Secretary Title changed General Secretary
BREZHNEV---------------------------------------------------------- BREZHNEV
Secretaries
Se 7etu,-ies
SUSLOV------------------------------------------------------------ SUSLOV
SHELEPIN----------------------------------------------------------- SHELEPIN
Added ----------------------------- KIRILENKO
DEMICHEV ------------------------------------------------- --------- DEMI C HEV
~JSTI NOV
USTI NOV---------------------------------------------------------ANDRO V
ANDROPOV--------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------- --
----PONOMAV
PO NOMAREV ---------------------------------------------------
KAPI T ONOV------------------------------------- -------------------KAPI TONOV
KULAKOV---------------------------------------------------------- KULAKOV
_____________________RUDAKOV
RUDAKOV PODGORNY------------------ Dropped
--
K
SHCHERBI
- YEFREMOV-------------------
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The composition of the new
party bodies elected last week
indicates that the power balance
within the leadership remains
substantially unaltered.
points of view among them, and
issues such as the treatment of
Stalin and the role of the party
in the life of the country re-
main unresolved.
Changes in the Presidium--
now renamed Politburo--and Sec-
retariat were minor. As expected,
Brezhnev received the title of
general secretary and emerged
from the 23rd Party Congress with
enhanced prestige. The two old
party veterans, Mikoyan and
Shvernik, were retired. The ad-
dition to the Politburo of three
republic party bossess--Pelshe
from Latvia, Kunayev from Kazakh-
stan, and Masherov from Belorus-
sia--placed greater emphasis on
regional representation. Pelshe
also replaced Shvernik as chair-
man of the Party Control Commit-
tee.
The retention on the Presid-
ium of those identified with a
moderately liberal position--
Podgorny and Kirilenko, for ex-
ample--is evidence that the more
orthodox faction has not fully
consolidated its position. In a
sharp break with past precedent,
few of the full members of the
Presidium spoke in the debate.
One of these, President Podgorny,
made a plea for greater democracy
within the party. The appeal was
distinctly out of key with the
generally hard tone of the other
speeches. It thus appears that
the members of the leadership
have, for now, agreed to accept
some airing of the differing
Brezhnev departed from the
recent practice of listing the
members of the Politburo and Sec-
retariat alphabetically. It ap-
pears from his listing that Sus-
lov ranks next after him on the
Secretariat, and that Shelepin
and Kirilenko rank below Suslov
in that order. Brezhnev, Kosy-
gin, Podgorny, and Suslov were
accorded protocol treatment
which appears intended to point
up the importance attached to
experience and to convey an im-
pression of a stable collective
leadership around this hard
core.
The changes in the composi-
tion of the two bodies elected
by the Congress--the Central Com-
mittee and Central Auditing Com-
mission--are the smallest since
the early 1930s before Stalin
began his great purge. The
changes suggest that Brezhnev
was the strongest single influ-
ence in the selection of new
members. No shift in the rela-
tive proportion of party and
government officials is appar-
ent. The military representa-
tion increased slightly (34 to
36), but the number of retired
or semiretired marshals almost
doubled (4 to 7). The re-
placement of cultural figures at
the two extremes of the political
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Trans-Siberian Railroad
Other rail lines
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spectrum by more moderate repre-
sentatives is indicative of the
over-all results of the congress.
The final resolution on the po-
litical program of the party, al-
though setting a line of greater
orthodoxy in party and cultural
affairs, was not especially
tough and Brezhnev's last speech
carried a conciliatory tone.
The net effect was to suggest
that the Soviet leadership had 25X1
taken a slight shift to the
right but by and'large was
still middle of the road.
IMPORTANT RAILROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN THE USSR
The USSR has recently started
construction of a railroad which
will span the 440 miles between
Tyumen and Surgut in an important
new oil-producing region in West-
ern Siberia.
The new line will have con-
siderable economic significance,
because access to this area for
freight now is solely by river
during the six-month navigation
season, and by a temporary road
built over the frozen ground in
winter. Pipelines now under
construction or already in use
will eventually handle the bulk
of the petroleum moving out of
the area, but a railroad is re-
quired to carry freight to sup-
port oil operations.
The new line will also have
some military significance. In
particular, it and other lines
now planned or under construction
will open up more of this vast,
sparsely settled region for the
further proliferation of ICBM
sites.
Some Soviet authorities
have suggested that the Tyumen-
Surgut link may eventually be-
come part of a second rail con-
nection across Siberia to the
Pacific, in addition to the ex-
isting Trans-Siberian line. Even
the most optimistic Soviet writ-
ers, however, believe that 15
to 20 years would be required
to complete such a system. Even
when completed, it would not be
economical for a much longer pe-
riod, because this would depend
on the exploitation of a huge
undeveloped area. In view of
the continuing competition over
the allocation of industrial re-
sources in the USSR, it is ques-
tionable whether the Tyumen- 25X1
Surgut line will ever be extended
to the Soviet Far East and the
Pacific .
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FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENTS
Premier Kosygin's report on
foreign trade to the 23rd party
congress catalogued the fundamental
problems the USSR faces--primarily
a need to expand exports. He ex-
horted Russians, from laborer to
factory manager, to seek solutions.
The presentation differed from that
given during the Khrushchev regime
when expansive goals were stated
with little attention to the means
of accomplishment.
Kosygin directed attention
mainly to trade with the developed
West, and dismissed trade with
underdeveloped countries with lit-
tle more than cursory consideration,
pointing out its primarily politi-
cal character. Trade with develop-
ing nations is largely dependent
on Soviet deliveries on credit un-
der aid programs and has shown lit-
tle vitality in recent years.
Kosygin detailed exchanges
with Western industrial countries,
linking imports from them to Soviet
earnings.there. He indicated that
more salesmanship is needed to pro-
mote Soviet "first-class equipment"
which fails to reach Western mar-
kets because of lack of advertis-
ing and proper equipment servicing.
The prospects for more licensing
agreements for technological know-
how which could save "hundreds of
millions of rubles" on scientific
research also was emphasized.
During the past year under
the direction of the Brezhnev-Kosy-
gin regime, the USSR has paid strict
attention to the need for expanded
foreign exchange earnings. Tightly
managed foreign trade last year
enabled the USSR to cut hard cur-
rency outlays to about one half the
record expenditures of 1964, thus
reducing the impact of the large
grain purchases since 1963 on finan-
cial reserves. Recently released
trade results for 1965 show that So-
viet exports to the free world rose
by 15 percent while imports were
kept to a two-percent rise, revers-
ing the trend of recent years. Gold
sales in 1965 dropped to $310 mil-
lion from the $520 million per year
in 1963 and 1964. Testifying to the
continuing Soviet efforts to "pay
as you go," recent evidence suggests
that the USSR plans to refrain from
its usual spring gold sales this
year, which in recent years have
been used to meet the costs of wheat
purchases.
Kosygin reiterated that seri-
ous attention must be paid to the
most effective use of imports. He
suggested that the "cap" will re-
main on the Soviet industrial plant
import program, which has hitherto
been financed in part by Western
credits, until a significant expan-
sion of export earnings occurs.
Soviet purchases from the free
world, however, approach $2.5 bil-
lion annually, some 30 percent of
all imports. The USSR continues se-
lectively to buy plants and machinery
from the West. Such purchases were
about $250 million last year. Some
contracts already have been signed
this year and the USSR now is nego-
tiating with Fiat of Italy for an
automobile production facility which
may cost several hundred million
dollars.
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FIREBAR CRASH IN WEST BERLIN
The Firebar, twin-jet,high-
performance fighter which crashed
in the British sector of West Ber-
lin on 6 April, is the most mod-
ern operational fighter in the
Soviet inventory.
This aircraft, built in Jan-
uary 1966, belonged to the Soviet
24th Tactical Air Army in East
Germany. It crashed for unknown
reasons during a probable deliv-
ery flight. Salvage operations
have provided a unique
opportunity for first-hand study
of this aircraft. It is believed
to carry the best operational
electronic and other equipment
available on any fighter in the
Soviet air forces. Prior to the
crash, Firebar prototypes had
been observed only in a fly-by
at the 1961 Tushino Air Show.
Recently Firebars were shown on
Soviet television and appeared
in photography after their ini-
tial delivery to East Germany
about three weeks ago.
Soviet desire to prevent
Allied intelligence exploitation
of the Firebar was apparent short-
ly after the crash when the So-
viets demanded that their salvage
teams be allowed to raise the
plane. The British refused, re-
plying that the plane was in
their sector and it was their
responsibility to recover it.
Soviet divers at the crash site
were not allowed to enter the.-
water and Soviet observers were
required to-remain about 200
yards from the salvage barge.
From the beginning the So-
viets showed no intentions of
challenging British jurisdiction,
and only once made any threats.
They told the British that if
their demands were not met they
would take "appropriate measures"
the responsibility for which
would rest with the British.
This position was later softened
and subsequent Soviet protests,
while frequent, avoided further
threats. In the public media,
the Soviets have said little
except for a statement released
shortly after the crash proclaim-
ing the aircraft crew as heroes
for flying the disabled plane
into an unpopulated area.
Having failed to prevent
the exploitation of the Firebar,
the Soviets apparently lost in=
terest in the expeditious return
of the aircraft. On 9 April,
when the British offered to re-
turn the already recovered por-
tions of the aircraft, the So-
viets refused and insisted that
the British return the complete
aircraft. Finally on 13 April,
after the British threatened to
move the aircraft because it was
creating a hazard for river traf-
fic, the Soviets agreed to trans-
fer conditions'and accepted the
aircraft.
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NATO ALLIES DEVELOPING COMMON POSITIONS
In the meeting of Atlantic
Council representatives on 7
April, America's 14 NATO allies
insisted on close consultation
over any major moves in response
to French actions in withdrawing
from the NATO military structure.
Substantive objections also were
raised about the draft of a US
reply to the French aide-memoire
on 29 March. The main complaint
was the lack of time for consulta-
tion on the situation. The US
note was modified to take the
substantive objections into ac-
count and was presented to the
French Government on 12 April.
Belgium and the UK also submitted
drafts of their proposed replies
for further consideration by the
other allies.
On 4 April, the 14 agreed
that the US, UK, and West Ger-
many should take the lead in pre-
paring a coordinated position
on the question of the continued
presence of French troops in Ger-
many. A meeting of the represent-
atives of these three govern-
ments has been scheduled for 15
and 16 April in Bonn. On 18
April, French Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville will arrive for
exploratory talks with the Bonn
government. Despite the concilia-
tory tone of Bonn's recent cabi-
net statement, German insistence
that French forces cannot remain
in Germany merely on the basis
of the 1954 convention once "in-
tegration is broken up" indicates
that this question is far from
settled as De Gaulle wishes.
The Benelux governments fore-
see difficulties in relocating
major NATO military commands now
in France in their small and
crowded countries, but reportedly
concluded that there was no al-
ternative. They foresaw consider-
able domestic political opposi-
tion, however. Italy, on the
other hand, appears more eager
to receive some of the instal-
lations, and a Ministry of De-
fense study is reported to have
recommended a military school at
Turin as a site for the NATO War
College.
Belgium probably would wel-
come the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) political headquarters for
prestige reasons, but it probably
would prefer not to have SHAPE,
with its 3,000-member staff. The
UK has also offered to receive
NAC headquarters, but recognizes
the need to keep the military head-
quarters on the continent. The
14 disagree over whether the NAC
political headquarters should be
moved if the French do not require
it. The UK, West Germany, Belgium,
Turkey, and Iceland are reported
to feel that NAC could not oper-
ate efficiently in Paris.. Italy,
Denmark, and Portugal oppose any
move for fear it would endanger
cooperation in other fields and
make resumption of French partici-
pation in NATO more difficult.
The Netherlands and Luxembourg,
although expressing their neu-
trality, probably would agree to
a move.
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The French permitted the
council at last week's meeting
to define the EEC's negotiating
position on several Kennedy
Round issues apparently in re-
turn for German agreement that
the financial regulation for the
community's agricultural policy
be settled no later than 10 May.
The Kennedy Round advances--
principally in the chemicals and
aluminum sectors--were in fact
slight, but the Five were appar-
ently gratified by the French
On the financing of agri-
culture, the council reached
agreement in principle on almost
all the major issues. Some of
these agreements, however, remain
somewhat vague and imprecise--
notably on the date for the farm
fund to assume responsibility
for subsidizing products other
than grain, on the member-state
contributions to the fund for
the "transitional" period up to
30 June 1967, and on the level
of certain fund expenditures.
The US mission has noted that
some of the agreements could be-
come "unstuck" in the process
of filling in the many details.
Bonn has been insisting
that agreement on agricultural
financing be contingent on paral-
lel progress on the Kennedy
Round. Should the financial reg-
ulations be settled in May,
however, it is unlikely that the
community will have been able
substantially to advance its
Kennedy Round position by that
time. The Belgians and Dutch
are concerned that foot-dragging
by Bonn on agricultural financing
would--in view of French insist-
ence on its priority--be even
more damaging to Kennedy Round
prospects.
Settlement of the financing
question would further reduce
the credibility of future French
threats to abandon the Common
Market. It is, however, uncer-
tain whether the Five would feel
strong enough to resist if France
later proves reluctant to ad-
vance the Kennedy Round. The
complexity of Kennedy Round in-
terests--both in and out of the
community--could in any case
enable Paris to avoid the onus
for delays.
At last week's meeting, the
commission's proposal for a world
wheat agreement was backed by
the Five, but opposed by France.
The French plan calls for a
higher world price which, in ef-
fect, would generate funds--prin-
cipally from the major commercial
importers, the UK, Japan, and
Germany--to finance noncommercial
exports to underdeveloped coun-
tries.
Some of the Five have the
impression that Paris will be
flexible despite the fact that
its plan would be extremely bene-
ficial to France and reflects
Paris' long-standing views on
surplus financing. Paris ap-
pears,moreover, to interpret 25X1
present US production trends as
giving the US reason to favor
the French lan.
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The current campaign by Com-
munist-controlled trade unions
for representation in EEC con-
sultative bodies is likely to
have important implications for
the European labor movement.
Last November the French and
Italian General Confederations
of Labor (CGT and CGIL)--the two
largest Communist-dominated trade
unions in Europe--resolved jointly
to seek community representation
and establish a committee to work
for a common front of Western
European trade unions.
The immediate aim of the
unions is to gain seats on the
advisory Economic and Social Com-
mittee (ESC) scheduled for re-
appointment on 24 April. ESC
membership legally is decided
unanimously by the Council, but
the ultimate decision on each
national delegation rests with
the member state concerned.
In Italy, the decision of
the coalition parties is likely
to be a difficult one, especially
in view of the fact that the So-
cialists are the second major
party both in the government and
the CGIL. Unions oriented to
the Social Democrats and the
Christian Democrats--but not
necessarily all elements of the
two parties--are opposed to the
CGIL's representation. A nega-
tive decision in Rome could em-
barrass the center-left govern-
ment if the French subsequently
acceded to the CGT's demands.
The French decision appar-
ently now rests with De Gaulle.
The government already permitted
CGT delegates to represent labor
interests--in rotation with
other French unions--at the ILO,
but it is reportedly divided
over sending them to the EEC.
The Socialist Workers' Force is
strongly opposed. The Democratic
French Confederation of Labor
does not favor CGT representa-
tion, but doubts that, if pres-
ent, the CGT could exert much
influence on the free trade
unionists dominating the ESC.
The joint CGT-CGIL line re-
flects the increasing emphasis
which the Italians place on re-
gional labor cooperation, as
opposed to ties with the Commu-
nist World Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU). It also parallels
increasing Communist "acceptance"
of the EEC itself, and the recog-
nition that the Italian Govern-
ment may, in fact, soon seat
some Communist deputies in its
delegation to the European Par-
liament.
The seating of CGT and CGIL
delegates in community bodies
is also likely to raise problems
for the two free trade-union
internationals--the International
Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) and the Interna-
tional Federation of Christian
Trade Unions (IFCTU). The Sec-
retariat of the EEC organiza-
tion of free trade unions has
already had to reject an appeal
that the ICFTU propose a common
program -for its European affi-
liates and those of WFTU.F__~
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Middle East - Africa
ABDULLAH YAFI FORMS NEW LEBANESE CABINET
On 9 April, Lebanese Presi-
dent Hilu announced that a new
cabinet had been formed under
Abdullah Yafi. Yafi is an ardent
Arab nationalist but a political
moderate. He has not been prom-
inent in local politics since
1958, when he was one of the
principal Muslim leaders of the
antigovernment forces in the
"civil war." Although he is not
himself a member of the legis-
lature, Yafi has been able to
put together a cabinet of eight
members of parliament and one
nonmember, in addition to him-
self. Formal parliamentary ap-
proval of the new cabinet is ex-
pected within two weeks.
The new cabinet represents
a broad spectrum of Lebanese
political opinion and is essen-
tially a coalition of the so-
called "majority" and "minority"
factions in the legislature.
The previous two cabinets, formed
by Rashid Karami in July and De-
cember 1965, had been made up
entirely of nonpolitical techni-
cians, since the majority and
minority had not been able to
agree on the composition of a
coalition government.
Yafi says he will continue
the reform policies of the out-
going cabinet, which include a
clean-up of the administration
and the implementation of eco-
nomic development and social
security programs. These pro-
grams, however, are likely to
be impeded by the inability of
the politicians in the cabinet
to agree on specific measures.
The new cabinet will also
continue the traditional Leba-
nese policy of neutrality among
the Arab states, and between the
East and West. This policy has
always coincided, however, with
close relations with the US.
Yafi has stated specifically
that Lebanon will not become a
member of any "alliance," an
obvious reference to the "Is-
lamic alliance" proposed by King
Faysal of Saudi Arabia, which
Arab nationalists in Lebanon
and elsewhere regard as an anti-
Nasir plan supported by the US.
Yafi's statement was apparently
required to encourage more radi-
cally nationalist and socialist
groups, like that headed by 25X1
left-leaning Druze leader Kamal
Jumblat, to partici ate in the
new government.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 Apr 66
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CONGO (Leopoldville): Provincial Consolidation
ANGOLA
(Port.)
p National capital
Consolidated province boundary
Province capital
Former province boundary
z ' Administration unresolved
zuc
Slalute Miles
Bu'kavu~ I' DA
SUD-KIVU
Albertville
T (/7 Mbuy Mayi
Luluabourg (Bakwangj,,,
~? Elisabethville
SUD-KATANGA
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Congo's President Mobutu, now
in his fifth month in power, is mov-
ing to strengthen his domestic posi-
tion and to end his diplomatic iso-
lation.
General Mobutu, who was almost
unacceptable to neighboring African
rulers when he seized power last No-
vember, made great gains at the re-
cent Nairobi conference of leaders
of 11 east and central African na-
tions. He made points by emphasiz-
ing that he had repudiated exces-
sively pro-Belgian policies of the
despised Tshombe regime, and he
secured commitments from neighboring
states to end all aid to the few re-
maining rebel forces. Visits he
paid to the capitals of Uganda and
Burundi may help make the commit-
ments stick.
Congolese military forces, with
mercenaries in the van, continue to
make progress against rebels in the
northeastern provinces and west of
Lake Tanganyika.
On the domestic front, Mobutu
is trying to use the Congo's meager
administrative talents more effec-
tively by consolidating provinces.
On 5 April he announced that the
21 provinces would be realigned into
12 new ones--a step back toward the
preindependence arrangement. The
announcement has stirred up those
provincial bureaucrats who fear a
loss of position and those tribes
which dislike their new affilia-
tions. Opposition from these
sources, and general Congolese in-
ertia, may prevent implementation
of the program.
One of the changes may pro-
vide a new indication of how much
strength Tshombe retains in his
old Katanga stronghold. Two prov-
inces, one of them now ruled by
Tshombd's old henchman, Munongo,
are being combined into a new Sud-
Katanga. While Tshombd watches
from his self-exile in Belgium, the
two old provincial legislatures
are to meet jointly on 25 Ar=il to
select a governor of the new prov-
ince. In the meantime, political
infighting will prevail over per-
formance of administrative duties
in all areas subject to the changes.
IRAQI PRESIDENT KILLED IN AIR CRASH
The death of President Arif in
an air crash on 13 April removes
the one stabilizing political factor
in Iraq. No other Iraqi in or out
of the government has comparable
stature and influence. Rival mili-
tary factions within the regime al-
most certainly now will maneuver
for control, and Baathist, pro-Nasir-
ist, and other nationalist groups
now will be encouraged to try to
seize power.
According to the constitution,
the cabinet and the National De-
fense Council must elect a succes-
sor within a week. Prime Minister
Bazzaz, who is temporarily serving
as president, seems the least con-
troversial of the likely candidates
and hence may get the office. How-
ever, the chances for maintaining
order for very long appear to be
slim in view of the government's
internal differences and the plot-
ting against it.
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RHODESIA: Oil Supply Lines
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UN GIVES BRITAIN INCREASED POWERS IN RHODESIAN CRISIS
The UN Security Council,
after the unprecedented delay
caused by its African chairman,
authorized Britain on 9 April to
use force to prevent oil ship-
ments to Rhodesia through the
Port of Beira in Portuguese
Mozambique. The resolution--
approved by ten Council members,
with the Communist members,
France, Uruguay, and Mali ab-
staining--states that the Secur-
ity Council finds the situation
a "threat to the peace."
The resolution calls on
Portugal not to receive oil at
Beira destined for Rhodesia nor
to permit oil to be pumped through
the pipeline from Beira to Rho-
desia, asks all states to divert
vessels believed to be carrying
oil to Rhodesia, and authorizes
Britain to arrest and detain the
Joanna V presently docked in
Beira, if it discharges its cargo
of oil there. Britain is em-
powered to act only on the high
seas, however, and if the Joanna
unloads oil it may be stopped
only after it is beyond Mozam-
bique territorial waters.
The UN's African members
tend to view the resolution in
general as too limited in scope,
and will probably continue to
press for stronger measures.
Meanwhile, the UN General
Assembly Committee on Colonial-
ism is continuing its debate.
African states may again seek
the broad sanctions which were
voted down on 9 April. One calls
on South Africa to prevent oil
from being shipped to Rhodesia;
another urges the UK to take all
means to prevent the transpor-
tation of oil into Rhodesia,
and a third requests all states
to apply measures for complete
interruption of economic rela-
tions.
More moderate Africans want
to await the results of the pres-
ent resolution and then call
for a Council meeting in May for
a wide-ranging debate. However,
the arrival at Durban this week
of the tanker Manuela, which
probably was destine for Beira
until a British frigate inter-
vened, could impel some African
governments to call for an ex-
tension of the Security Council's
recent action to include blockad-
ing the arrival of suspect tankers
at South African ports.
South Africa has officially
protested to London, raising the
spector of a confrontation in-
volving all of Southern Africa
as a result of Britain's resort
to the use of force with UN
authorization. Pretoria also
emphasized its determination to
adhere to its anti-embargo
policy.
Portugal has delayed its
official reaction, but the press
and popular sentiment in Lisbon
and Mozambique are strongly anti-
British. Although the tanker
Joanna V may offload at least
part of its cargo into newly
constructed facilities at Beira,
Lisbon is likely to delay a de-
cision on permitting the oil to 25X1
be pumped through the pipeline
to the Umtali refinery in Rho-
desia.
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OBOTE CONSOLIDATING SUPREME POWER IN UGANDA
In the seven weeks since
Prime Minister Obote seized su-
preme power in Uganda, he has
consistently outmaneuvered his
moderate opponents and is grad-
ually consolidating his authority.
With the pressure of the moder-
ates diminished, the influence
of Obote's several radical advis-
ers will probably increase.
Obote has added the powers
of the president and vice presi-
dent to those he holds as prime
minister. However, he has been
careful to avoid any direct at-
tack on the former president's
continuing role as prestigious
and hereditary ruler of Uganda's
dominant tribe, the Baganda.
Obote remains dependent on
the police and army to retain
control, but he now is planning
to revise the constitution in
order to strengthen his central
government--apparently with him-
self as an executive president--
at the expense of the semiauton-
omous kingdoms, particularly
Baganda. To get his revisions
through parliament, Obote hopes
to isolate the elite Bagandans
by exploiting the hostility to-
ward them that revails in most
other regions.
He apparently intends
keep the vociferous parliament
in recess until he has lined up
the necessary two-thirds majority.
Obote's new army commander,
Colonel Amin, has broken up the
dominant southern officer group
in army headquarters and has re-
placed them with fellow northern-
ers. Former commander Opoloto
has been relegated to a staff func-
tion, and officers loyal to him
have been dispersed throughout
the army's four battalions. Amin
has increased his own popularity
with the enlisted men by promot-
ing many of them to officer status.
For the short term these tactics
have thwarted any possible counter-
move against Obote.
Obote's political opposition
remains vocal but ineffective.
With most of their leaders in
prison or in hiding, they have
chosen to challenge Obote's acts
in the courts, so far with little
success. Their earlier allega-
tions of corruption against Amin,
Obote, and two northern ministers
were not proven before the judicial
commission of inquiry, perhaps
because opposition lawyers were
not allowed to cross-examine key
witnesses, some of whom had been
intimidated by the police.
Military aid agreements
which Obote signed last year to
lessen Uganda's dependence on
Western sources are being imple-
mented.
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iJUlVE 1
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%lomw 3PJ UK.G l
Western Hemisphere
Juan Bosch accepted the
presidential nomination of the
Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD) on 10 April despite his
statement three days earlier
that he would not run. Bosch
told a US official that his re-
versal was caused by the "ex-
treme pressure" brought to bear
on him by PRD functionaries.
Before changing his mind,
Bosch was in a period of intense
depression probably brought on
by the need to make a major de-
cision and by his reluctance to
enter the race. Significantly,
Bosch left a way open to back
out of the campaign later. He
claims that a "military terror
machine" remains in existence
and says that he does not believe
the armed forces will allow him
to govern if elected. Only a
few days before his nomination
Bosch proposed to a leader of
Balaguer's Reformist Party that
he and Balaguer agree on a new
provisional regime and postpone
elections. He may again bring
up this idea.
The PRD convention was
characterized by relative moder-
ation. In his acceptance speech
Bosch lashed out at the US "Go-
liath," but he said relations
with the US must be conducted
with intelligence. The PRD plat-
form sounded no note of urgency
in calling for the departure of
foreign troops.
Bosch's running mate is
Antonio Guzman, a businessman-
farmer and stalwart supporter
of Bosch. One of those proposed
last May as the head of a pro-
visional government, Guzman has
little personal following but
will lend an aura of respecta-
bility to the ticket. The tone
of the convention and Guzman's
selection suggest that Bosch
may conduct a moderate campaign
aimed at swaying voters who
fear that his election will
lead to instability and violence.
Revolutionary Social Chris-
tian Party (PRSC) leader Caonabo
Javier said after the PRD con-
vention that the situation "de-
mands" that his party and the 25X1
PRD "go together to the elec-
tions"--a development that would
give Bosch a boost.
It seems likely that Hector
Aristy's nascent "24th of April
Movement" will not run its own
man, but instead will back
Bosch. The Dominican Communist
Party announced its support of
the PRD leader but cautioned
that this does not mean "bour-
geois democracy" has become a
party objective. Thus, if the
PRSC backs Bosch, the "unity of
the left," nonexistent since
the installation of the provisional
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government, will be re-established
and Bosch's chances for election
will be considerably improved.
Meanwhile, Balaguer and
Rafael Bonnelly have publicly
denied that a deal for a joint
slate is afoot and each has ac-
cused the other of soliciting
support from the far right. Talks
between their supporters appear
to have made no progress.
In other electoral develop-
ments, Garcia Godoy legalized
the pro-Communist 14th of June
Revolutionary Movement. Four
other minor parties also were
recognized as able to partici-
pate in the election. Garcia
Godoy believes the groups will
cause less trouble if they are
allowed to take part in the
campaign.
Garcia Godoy has called
for peaceful celebration of the
24th of April anniversary of the
revolution. To mark the event,
the extreme left is planning
demonstrations that could spark
disturbances. The first is set
for 17 April.
Although momentarily calm
due to the Easter holiday, the
general situation in Ecuador re-
mains disturbing. Irresponsible
politicians now are preparing for
a struggle to control the even-
tual constituent assembly. Guay-
aquil business interests have
gained considerable influence in
the new regime but have shown no
desire for constructive action.
The military, the nation's most
important institution, is lying
low but could lose patience with
the weak government.
Communists are enjoying
unrestricted freedom and will
continue to gain strength under
provisional President Yerovi.
There is increasing evidence of
Communist infiltration of the
administration through lower
echelon appointments.
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JAGAN'S DILEMMA IN BRITISH GUIANA
Cheddi Jagan has shown no
sign of having found a definite
program for returning to power
in British Guiana since his re-
turn there in early March, fol-
lowing a trip to London as well as
to Cuba, Moscow, and other points
in the Soviet bloc.
During his travels the leader
of the opposition People's Pro-
gressive Party (PPP) spoke like
a revolutionary leader. Jagan
was quoted as saying in Havana
that the "highest form of revo-
lutionary struggle is the armed
struggle." In various anti-
American speeches made in the
Soviet Union and later broadcast
to the Caribbean and Latin America,
he said that when British Guiana
receives its independence on 26
May "one type of colonial domina-
tion will simply be substituted
by another and the phase of US
neocolonialism will begin."
Despite its leader's brave
words, the PPP has done little
more than continue its ineffectual
obstructionism in the legislature.
The party has refrained from
large-scale violence and now may
be waiting for independence and
the subsequent departure of Brit-
ish troops in October before mak-
ing its move. Then, Jagan's de-
cision on peaceful or violent op-
position to the government of
Prime Minister Forbes Burnham
will depend on his assessment of
the government's security forces,
the temper of his East Indian
followers, and the possibility
that elections now scheduled for
1968, will be conducted fairly.
If Jagan believes he has a
chance of returning to power via
elections, he will probably re-
frain from violence. However,
Jagan probably doubts that Burn-
ham would hold an election he
was fearful of losing, much less
step down should the PPP somehow
win. This would tend to encour-
age Jagan to adopt a violent
course to overthrow the govern-
ment. On the other hand the very
good possibility that Burnham
would move swiftly and ruthlessly
to crush any large-scale PPP-in-
spired violence places Jagan in
the frustrating position of prob-
ably coming out loser no matter
what course he adopts.
For his part, Burnham is
anxious to find an excuse to dis-
pense with his powerful political
rival. Although the PPP is tem-
porarily in check, Burnham fears
that Jagan cannot be kept down
forever and that eventually the
numerical superiority of Jagan's
followers may return him to power.
For this reason Burnham would
be pleased if frustration should 25X1
drive Jagan to some drastic ac-
tion which would give Burnham the
excuse to imprison him.
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COLOMBIA TO ELECT PRESIDENT
Carlos Lleras, the govern-
ment-backed candidate, is assured
of victory in the 1 May presiden-
tial election. In general, he
will continue the policies of the
present government. The active
political opposition has selected
Jose Jaramillo Giraldo, the dark-
est of the dark horses, as its
candidate.
The opposition Liberal Rev-
olutionary Movement (MRL) and
Lauro-Alzatista Conservatives
are badly disorganized and will
not participate in the electoral
campaign. Only the National Pop-
ular Alliance (ANAPO), which re-
ceived about 20 percent of the
votes in the March congressional
elections, is sponsoring Jara-
millo's candidacy. ANAPO realizes
Jaramillo has no chance of win-
ing, but by running a candidate
it keeps itself before the pub-
lic eye and has a chance, if it
receives enough votes, of increas-
ing its prestige.
Jaramillo, a 51-year-old
lawyer, has been a deputy, a
senator, and president of the
Supreme Court. However, he has
been out of politics for the
past nine years. He is a Lib-
eral and has been closely as-
sociated with Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla, leader of ANAPO.
The election is not ex-
pected to arouse much popular
enthusiasm and will probably
take place in a peaceful atmos-
phere.
BARRIENTOS ANNOUNCES CANDIDACY FOR BOLIVIAN PRESIDENCY
Rene Barrientos Ortuno, for-
mer co-president of the military
junta and co-commander of the
armed forces, on 9 April publicly
declared himself a presidential
candidate for the 3 July national
elections. He will run as the
candidate of the Front of the Bo-
livian Revolution (FRB), the four-
party alliance he put together
last November.
Barrientos assumed the presi-
dency of the FRB on 11 April.
Luis Adolfo Siles, a respected
but colorless person with little
political stature, is to be Bar-
rientos' vice-presidential run-
ning mate. The FRB plans to hold
a convention on 28 and 29 April
to choose candidates for Con-
gress and to register Barrientos
and Siles with the electoral
court.
None of the other political
parties have named candidates
for president or congress, and
there are only three weeks re-
maining before the 3 May dead-
line for nominations. They may
still try to come up with candi-
dates of their own, jump on the
Barrientos bandwagon in exchange
for postelection spoils, press
for a postponement of the elec-
tions in order to gain time to
organize, or abstain from the
elections altogether.
SE RET
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