WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005200050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/05/21: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05200050001-1
State Dept. review completed
BARMY Review
Completed,
Copy No. ~5 3
,,C-E~NT INTELLIGENC 1 I Y
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completed.
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(Information as of noon EST, 10 March 1966)
Page
VIETNAM
Intense fighting and high enemy losses in three allied
operations highlighted the military situation this week
in South Vietnam. Although Communist-initiated activity
was down somewhat, there are indications of continued
infiltration and Viet Cong plans for large-scale actions.
Premier Ky, with the full support of the military
Directorate, removed I Corps commander Thi, potentially
one of Ky's strongest rivals for power. There is
evidence this week both of increased numbers of fighter
aircraft in North Vietnam and of greater aggressiveness
on the part of DRV fighter pilots. Hanoi has admitted
that manpower allocation problems are affecting food
production.
PROLONGED ABSENCE OF MAO TSE-TUNG
The Chinese Communist Party leader's unprecedented five-
month absence from public view has been accompanied by
idolatrous propaganda possibly intended to prepare the
people for a transfer of loyalties to a successor regime.
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EAST GERMANS AGREE TO NEW BERLIN PASS AGREEMENT
The East German regime's sudden pose of reasonableness
is probably timed to coincide with its petition for
UN membership.
RIFTS IN ALBANIA'S TOP LEADERSHIP
Serious factional disputes have appeared in the usually
close-knit leadership. Party leader Hoxha.,at least for
the time being, seems to have survived the challenge,
apparently posed by the defense minister, by adopting
some of the criticism as his own and making some con-
cessions.
Asia-Africa
INDONESIAN STUDENT AGITATION CONTINUES
The army is protecting President Sukarno's palace,
but is acquiescing in the demonstrations against Foreign
Minister Subandrio and other leftist cabinet ministers.
COMMUNISTS COhTDUE PRESSURE IN NORTHERN LAOS
They are probing in the Plain des Jarres area, are
offering strong resistance to government probes south
of Samneua, and are making gains against guerrillas
north of Luang Prabang.
GHANA TRANSFORMATION CONTINUES
The new anti-Communist rulers are dismantling key
features of Nkrumah's power structure. Relations with
radical African regimes will be complicated by their
emotional opposition to the coup.
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IVORY COAST STABILITY MAY BE DISTURBED 14
President Houphouet-Boigny, possibly disturbed by the
coups in neighboring countries, has been moving to contain
domestic discontent, but his action may result: in further
demands for change.
MODERATE AFRICANS DOMINATE OAU MEETING 15
Despite walkouts stemming from the Ghanaian and
Rhodesian issues, the moderates seem to have kept the
organization together with compromise resolutions.
UK TRYING TO STOP OIL SHIPMENT TO RHODESIA VIA MOZAMBIQUE 17
Britain is pressing the Portuguese Government to pre-
vent delivery of oil to Rhodesia from a tanker said to
be about to arrive at the Mozambique port of Beira.
Europe
FRANCE MOVES TO DISENGAGE FROM NATO
De Gaulle has been notifying the NATO countries that he
intends to renegotiate the agreements under which for-
eign military forces may remain in France, and to end
France's remaining participation in the alliance organ-
ization, although not in the alliance itself.
NATO INTEREST IN SOVIET PROPOSAL TO TRADE MILITARY OBSERVERS
20
London and Bonn see Moscow's proposal to exchange ob-
servers at military maneuvers with NATO or the US as a
means of improving relations with the Soviets in an area
which need not receive great publicity.
FINLAND'S NATIONAL ELECTIONS
21
Voter dissatisfaction with economic policies of Presi-
dent Kekkonen's long-dominant Center (Agrarian) Party
may help the Social Democrats end an eight-year polit-
ical isolation.
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MALTA TO ELECT NEW PARLIAMENT
The principal issues are economic problems and the NATO
presence. No party is likely to get an absolute major-
ity, and incumbent Prime Minister Borg Olivier probably
has the best chance of forming a coalition.
AUSTRIAN ELECTION UPSETS COALITION BALANCE
Although his People's Party now has an absolute major-
ity, Chancellor Klaus intends to re-establish its coa-
lition with the Socialists. The election results, in
any event, affect domestic far more than foreign policy.
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Tensions between President Garcia Godoy and the military
have lessened and preparations for the 1 June election
,
have begun. Juan Bosch continues to exaggerate the ter-
rorist threat to create an excuse to boycott the elec-
tion if he decides his party cannot win.
ELECTION BRINGS TENSION IN GUATEMALA 24
A confrontation may be imminent between Chief of Govern-
ment Peralta and restive conservatives fearful of a new
government headed by moderate leftist Mendez, apparent
presidential victor in last week's election. The con-
servatives insist that Peralta -annul the elections.
COLOMBIAN ELECTIONS MAY THREATEN NATIONAL FRONT SYSTEM 25
Factional quarrels are increasing within the two major
parties which, in a unique arrangement that has lasted
eight years, have shared all elective offices. However,
no serious election violence is anticipated.
ECUADOREAN POLITICIANS RESISTING JUNTA'S REFORM PLANS 26
They insist on a constituent assembly--which they
would control--to handle the transition to civilian
rule. The junta's only alternative to granting this
demand may be to impose a military dictatorship.
,5E `I ET
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Intense fighting and high
enemy losses in three allied op-
erations highlighted the military
situation this week in South
Vietnam. Although Communist-in-
itiated activity declined some-
what, there are indications of
continued infiltration as well
as Viet Cong planning for future
large-scale action.
Intelligence obtained during
a South Vietnamese operation)
led to a larger alli
on
ed
area, led to allied follow-up op-
erations which are continuing in
the general vicinity.
A Viet Cong battalion-size
attack against elements of a
South Vietnamese regiment in Bien
Hoa Province and a multibattal-
ion attack against the A Shau
Special Forces camp near the Lao-
tian border in Thua Thien Prov-
ince were the most significant
enemy actions reported during
the week. Two enemy soldiers
who surrendered before the as-
sault on the Special Forces gar-
rison in Thua Thien provided
some warning of the impending at-
tack. The soldiers claimed to
be members of a North Vietnamese
regiment which infiltrated last
month and was located about six
miles northeast of the special
camp.
opera ion the next day several
miles northwest of the provincial
capital, where the main force of
a suspected North Vietnamese
regiment was trapped. Fighting
continued and re-
sulted in nearly 600 enemy dead
as against allied losses of 113
killed (83 US) and 324 wounded
(205 US).
Farther south in Phu Yen
Province, elements of the US
101st Airborne Division conduct-
ing Operation HARRISON engaged
a Viet Cong force in a day-long
battle on 4 March, raising enemy
losses there to nearly 200 killed
since 26 February.
US forces sweeping an area
in Binh Duong Province about 30
miles northeast of Saigon also made
contact with the emeny on 4 and
5 March and, with close air sup-
port, killed nearly 200 Viet Cong.
This engagement, along with other
evidence of the recent grouping
of large enemy forces in the
Another Viet Cong returnee
in Bien Hoa Province, claiming
to be a company commander of a
Viet Cong main force battalion,
listed several towns in Bien Hoa
and Long Khanh provinces as tar-
gets for future Viet Cong at-
tacks. US military officials
in Saigon have noted that there
are four Viet Cong regiments
which could launch large-scale
assaults in this area.
A substantial movement of
North Vietnamese troops--possibly
as many as 8,000-9,000--has been
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reported by a guerrilla unit lo-
cated in the northern section of
the Laotian infiltration corri-
dor. Large numbers of Communist
trucks--perhaps as many as 400--
moved south during the period
16-23 February. The trucks moved
nightly in two or three convoys
of 20-25 trucks each. This re-
port marks the first time in over
a year that sizable numbers of
Communist troops have been ob-
served moving south in trucks
through the Laotian infiltration
corridor.
There is no evidence as to
the destination of these troops,
and a second team located far-
ther south on the same route did
not confirm a movement of this
size. Normally, infiltrating
troops destined for South Viet-
nam enter Laos just north of the
Demilitarized Zone and move into
the southern panhandle on foot
trails.
I Corps Commander Dismissed
Premier Ky, who has recently
been concerned with the independ-
ence of his military corps com-
manders, yesterday received the
unanimous support of the ruling
military Directorate when he
called for the removal of the
strongest of them, I Corps com-
mander General Thi. Thi ac-
cepted the Directorate's deci-
sion and reportedly agreed to
submit a letter of resignation
for medical reasons. However,
he is said to have agreed only
reluctantly to leave for the
United States sometime next week,
and a certain amount of uneasi-
ness will probably characterize
the Saigon political atmosphere
until he actually departs.
The ousting of General Thi,
long considered Premier Ky's
strongest potential rival, will
probably serve to strengthen Ky's
position in relation to the other
corps commanders, at least two
of whom have also exhibited con-
siderable independence. In par-
ticular, there are indications
that IV Corps commander General
Quang will be next to go.
Improved DRV Air Defense
Additional MIG-21 Fishbed
fighters have been delivered to
North Vietnam. Drone photography
of Phuc Yen Airfield
revealed 14 Fishbeds and one pos-
sible Fishbed.
The
number of assembled MI -2ls seen
is an increase of four or five
since the last photography of
Phuc Yen
The drone photography also
revealed that construction activity
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UANG
.. At
PHU
BON
IV CORPS SOUTH VIETNAM
.B'E'CK J T
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at several of North Vietnam's
major airfields is continuing. A
large number of revetments have
been constructed or are in the
process of being constructed at
Phuc Yen and Kep airfields while
a major runway extension has ap-
parently been completed at Hanoi/
Gia Lam.
Concurrent with the increas-
ing number of aircraft appearing
in North Vietnam is a noticeable
increase in the aggressiveness
of Vietnamese fighter pilots.
On 4 March, DRV fighters
unsuc-
cessfully a temp e to intercept
a flight of F4C Phantoms.
Food Production Problems in DRV
Problems of food production
continue to plague the North
Vietnamese regime. In the past
month, official spokesmen have
expressed concern about the pro-
duction of both rice and pork.
Although pork constitutes a small
part of the North Vietnamese :diet,
it is the largest meat component
besides poultry.
Spokesmen for the Ministry
of Agriculture have admitted in
the past few months that a sig-
nificant amount of acreage de-
voted to the spring rice crop
had not been planted. A vice
minister said in December that
manpower shortages contributed
to production problems and esti-
mated that the remaining agri-
cultural workers would have to
increase their workdays 25-50
percent in order to make up for
the loss of manpower to the war
effort. The amount of land
which the spokesman said had not
been properly planted could nor-
mally yield about eight percent
of North Vietnam's total annual
rice production. Although such
a decline in production would
contribute to food problems, any
rice shortage could be overcome
by substituting other foods or
increasing imports.
The admission of manpower
shortages in agricultural pro-
duction, however, is the first
official suggestion that the mo-
bilization requirements of the
war have seriously cut into the
country's large unskilled agri-
cultural labor force. In re-
sponse to the air strikes, North
Vietnam has mobilized large seg-
ments of the population for mil-
itary service or related construc-
tion work. Although the manpower
reserves are substantial, the
regime is apparently experiencing
serious allocation problems. Con-
tinuation of these problems could
interfere with production of the
mare important fall rice crop.
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Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Mao Tse-tung, 72-year-old
chairman of the Chinese Communist
Party, may be nearing the end of
the road. He now has been out
of public view for five months,
exceeding his longest recorded
previous absence in the winter
of 1956-57 when he is believed
to have suffered a stroke.
After his last public ap-
pearance in Peking on 10 October,
Mao continued to receive an oc-
casional foreign visitor at an
undisclosed location--probably
his villain the East China resort
city of Hangchow--but his activ-
ities have gone unreported since
a meeting with a Cambodian del-
egation on 26 November.
His current absence has
been accompanied by an unprece-
dented and still growing out-
pouring of emotional and idola-
trous propaganda, suggesting
concern in top party ranks.
Hyperbole on the value of study-
ing Mao's works is the order of
the day. Mao's thoughts are ac-
claimed as the "Red sun in our
hearts," the "very heart and soul
of all work," and the "apex of
contemporary Marxist-Leninist
thought." Each of Mao's words
is said to be worth 10,000 words
of other men. The epochs of
Marx and Engels and of Lenin
and Stalin are proclaimed to have
been succeeded by the "epoch of
Mao Tse-tung" during which
"capitalism and imperialism...
will be sent to their tombs."
Adding to the aura of mys-
tery surrounding Mao's whereabouts
is the unusual absence of public
activity by other leaders during
the last three months. The party's
number two leader, Liu Shao-chi,
showed up only once in 11 weeks
from late November to early Feb-
ruary. Lo Jui-ching, army chief
of staff and the Chinese equiv-
alent of chief of secret police,
has been out of view as long as
Mao. In an apparently unprec-
edented wholesale absence, not
one of the 150-odd top central
party or government figures
made public appearances during
a nine-day period at the end of
January.
This gap in leadership ap-
pearances was followed in early
February by the issuance of di-
rectives throughout China order-
ing middle and senior level
party and military officials to
study Mao's works and emulate
Maoist folk heroes. These offi-
cials were told to spend four
days a month and one month a
year, in rotation, in full-time
seminars studying Mao's writings.
This extraordinary atten-
tion to Mao Tse-tung seems to
exceed what would be useful for
indoctrination purposes, and
could be an effort to prepare
the way psychologically for a
transfer of loyalties to a suc-
cessor regime. Mao's charisma
is one of the regime's few do-
mestic political assets, and any
successor--especially the color-
less Liu Shao-chi--probably would
try to exploit Mao's name by
representing himself as an ultra-
loyal Maoist.
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The new wave of propaganda
on the cult of Mao has contained
several reminders that Liu Shao-
chi is still the designated heir
to Mao's authority. Not only
Mao's works but also Liu's [low
To Be a Good Communist reportedly
were foun un cr the pillow of
Chiao Yu-lu, a deceased minor
party official who became the
latest addition to the Maoist
pantheon of the folk heroes.
Similarly, Peking announced on
19 February that it was "equally
necessary" for top generals to
study three of Mao's works and
this work by Liu. A long encom-
ium to Mao published on 2 March
pointedly included a statement
that Liu Shao-chi had for decades
held up Mao's thinking as the only
effective source of guidance for
the revolution.
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East Germany's sudden will-
ingness to conclude a reasonable
short-term Berlin pass agreement
on 7 March was probably prompted
in large part by its desire to
adopt a moderate and humanitarian
pose while petitioning for UN
membership. The East Germans
derive other political advantages
from limited pass agreements,
moreover, and will probably agree
to more in the future.
East German negotiator
Michael Kohl originally took an
extremely rigid position when
the pass talks began in January.
He rejected West Berlin's propos-
al for a year-long agreement and
offered instead a draft contain-
ing several unacceptable provi-
sions. The East German position
at that time appeared so harsh
that Mayor Willy Brandt publicly
warned West Berliners not to ex-
pect any agreement.
The day before East Germany's
petition for UN membership was
presented in New York, however,
Kohl informed his West Berlin
Senat counterpart, Horst Kerber,
of his government's willingness
to conclude a short-term agree-
ment almost identical to the one
at Christmas and New Year's.
Despite their earlier hopes for
an agreement of longer duration,
the Senat and West German Govern-
ment accepted the East German
offer.
The new agreement provides
West Berliners the opportunity
to make one visit to relatives
in East Berlin over the Easter
(7 to 20 April) and Pentecost
(23 May to 15 June) holidays. It
also extends the arrangement for
issuance of emergency hardship
passes from 31 March to 30 June.
One reason for concluding
a short-term agreement appears
to be a desire on the East Ger-
mans part to keep the Senat
negotiating. By doing this, they
can claim that their theory on
the existence of three German
"states" is supported by West
Berlin. Pass agreements also
imply recognition of the Berlin
Wall as a legal boundary.. In
addition, the East Germans de-
rive a fairly large amount of
needed hard currency from their
requirement that each visitor
exchange five West German marks
for five East German marks.
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Serious factional differences
have come to light within Albania's
top leadership. Opposition ele-
ments, reportedly led by Defense
Minister Balluku, apparently were
disturbed by lack of economic prog-
ress and Albania's international
isolation. At least for the time
being, party boss Enver Hoxha has
retained his authority through
adroit maneuvering and some con-
cessions.
Hoxha, in an effort to save
his neck, is adopting the opposi-
tion's criticism as his own. As
a result he has been compelled to
subscribe in principle to some de-
centralization of the economic
planning apparatus and the state
administrative authority and to
limited moves to end Albania's iso-
lation. He also appears prepared
to make a scapegoat of his long-
time colleague and governmental
chief, Premier Shehu.
Hoxha has also instituted
measures to reassert his own and
the party's authority over the
army. He undoubtedly recalled the
abortive coup attempt in 1960 led
by senior naval officers and in-
cluding several senior army offi-
cers.
The struggle within the lead-
ership is revealed in an unusual
open letter to the population--the
full text of which is not yet
available--from the party central
committee. Broadcast on 6 March,
the letter admitted party errors,
strongly attacked the government
bureaucracy, and recommended re-
forms. The letter called for a
"determined struggle against ap-
pearances of warped methods of giv-
ing orders" and, unprecedentedly for
Albania, indicted the "very cen-
tralized form of leadership." It
recommended a reorganization of
the "system of leadership" in which
lower party-state bodies would have
greater authority.
Following the open letter, the
regime issued a decree on 7 March
reinstating in all military units
and institutions the political com-
missar system abolished in 1955.
Another decree abolishes as of 1
May the rank system in the armed
forces and the secret police.
These steps were influenced by
changes in 1965 in the Chinese Com-
munist armed forces intended to
strengthen party control over the
military.
Previous reports of friction
between Defense Minister Beqir
Balluku and Interior Minister Kadri
Hazbiu suggest that the army spear-
headed the Albanian opposition.
This friction apparently derived
in some part from long-standing in-
terservice rivalry. Also involved,
however, were serious differences
between those with rigid pro-Chi-
nese views, probably represented
by Hazbiu, and Balluku and his ad-
herents, who wanted to reduce Al-
bania's dependence on the Chinese
and its isolation from the rest
of the world, and to resume partic-
ipation in the Warsaw Pact.
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INDONESIAN STUDENT AGITATION CONTINUES
Indonesia's non-Communist
students remain alone in openly
opposing Foreign Minister Suban-
drio and other leftist cabinet
ministers and indirectly criti-
cizing President Sukarno. Al-
though the army refuses to let
them demonstrate against the pal-
ace, it has been relatively leni-
ent about activities directed
against Subandrio and the crypto-
Communist Minister of Basic Educa-
tion, Sumardjo. The students ex-
tended their activity on 9 and
10 March to Chinese Communist
targets--the consulate general,
the trade office, and the news
agency.
Sukarno's ban on demonstra-
tions by students, announced on
26 February, applied only to those
from universities.. The burden
of present activity is being
carried by high school youth,
although the more advanced stu-
dents are reported to be still
participating. Despite the gov-
ernment order closing the Uni-
versity of Indonesia in Djakarta,
students apparently continue to
use its buildings as a general
headquarters. A student radio
which recently has begun broad-
casting apparently operates from
Bandung, 75 miles from the capi-
tal,.
Army officers. at various
levels are said to be discuss-
ing a variety of possible plans
against Sukarno and those who
support him. The army appears
to be pleased with the students'
action but at the same time will
not support them openly and ap-
parently wishes to avoid serious
disorder or violence specifically
directed against Sukarno.
The President is engaged in
a series of meetings with civil-
ian and military leaders. The
sessions are scheduled to con-
clude on 12 March and may pro-
duce new initiatives against the
students and the army. He and
Subandrio apparently directed
their own followers to take to
the streets on 8 March. The US
Embassy experienced a small but
violent demonstration by about
300 leftist youth.
Also, at Sukarno's orders,
a number of leftists and pro-
Communists who had been dis-
missed from the various govern-
ment departments after the 1
October coup attempt are being
reinstated. The President has
transferred trials of civilians
involved in the coup attempt
from the army to the attorne
eral,
Communist forces continue to
exert pressure against government
positions in northern Laos.
In the Plaine des Jarres area,
several Communist probes have been
mounted in the past week against
neutralist positions east of Muong
Soui. Some enemy shelling of Muong
Soui itself has been reported. Com-
munist activity in this area is prob-
ably in reaction to an unsuccessful
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Muong Sori',Samneua
inh ginh
Chang hsi
c }{
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operation which was conducted by
Kong Le's neutralist troops last
month.
In the Samneua area, a Com-
munist thrust against Muong Hiem,
which has been anticipated since
Na Khang fell on 18 February,
has thus far failed to materialize.
The enemy, having reportedly
suffered heavy losses in taking
Na Khang, apparently is regroup-
ing before pursuing the year-old
campaign to clear government en-
claves south of Samneua town.
Government probes in the vicinity
of Na Khang have encountered
strong resistance. However
Pathet Lao troops have been
driven from Muong Son, a posi-
tion some 30 miles to the north.
Farther west, Communist forces
continue to make gains against
government guerrillas north of
Luang Prabang. Two positions
have been lost to Pathet Lao and
North Vietnamese troops since
late February. Reports from
civilian refugees indicate that
the Communists, in contrast to
past practice, are to hold can-
tured positions.
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Ghana's new anti-Communist
army and police rulers are rapidly
dismantling key features of
Nkrumah's power structure and
pressing ahead with reconstruc-
tion measures amid further signs
of popular approval of the re-
cent coup. Their intra-African
relations will be complicated,
however, by the more radical Af-
rican regimes' emotional opposi-
tion to Nkrumah's ouster.
On 7 March the ruling Na-
tional Liberation Council (NLC)
abolished the Ghana Young Pio-
neers, a Communist-supported or-
ganization established in 1960
to indoctrinate youth in a variant
of Marxism. The coup leaders had
earlier closed down the Ideolog-
ical Institute at Winneba, near
Accra, where successive groups of
adult cadres of Nkrumah's now
dissolved party had been exposed
to foreign Communist instructors.
Nkrumah favorites who headed uni-
versities have been replaced by
respected nonpolitical figures.
The new regime is evidently
encouraging the early re-emer-
gence of a free, Western-style
labor movement within the frame-
work of the Ghana Trades Union
Congress (GTUC). Nkrumah had
long ago converted this important
mass organization into a docile
appendage of his party and also
opened it wide to Communist pene-
tration. Now, under a newly in-
stalled anti-Communist leader,
who seems to have rank and file
support, a basic reorganization
is about to be launched through
a series of union elections. The
GTUC's extensive ties with the
Communist world are apparently
being severed. According to the
new GTUC chief, this will include
withdrawal from the Communist-
backed All-African Trade Union
Federation, a primary instrument
of Nkrumah's African subversion
program.
The evacuation of the ex-
pelled Chinese advisers--evidently
some 175 were in Ghana--was sub-
stantially completed by 3 March.
The Soviet exodus, involving ap-
proximately 500 technicians and
their families, will probably
continue for about another week.
Both Communist powers are being
restricted to 18-man embassies.
The new regime has already
resumed diplomatic relations with
Britain, which Nkrumah had severed
last December over Rhodesia. It
appears determined to press
ahead with economic reforms keyed
to earlier recommendations of the
World Bank and International
Monetary Fund.
Although the NLC continues
to fear that Nkrumah may soon try
to return to Ghana, the ousted
leader now appears to have ac-
cepted his present inability to
reverse the coup. He is still in
Guinea but may move on soon to
Cairo. Despite the large number
of African states which have recog-
nized the new Ghana regime, Nasir
now appears inclined to play a
leading role in organizing fur-
ther African expressions of dis-
approval of the coup. Zambia has
moved formally to terminate ac-
tive relations with Accra, while
the NLC has itself initiated a
rupture with Guinea.
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Ivory Coast, which has been
markedly stable since 1963, may
be heading into a period of do-
mestic agitation. President
Houphouet-Boigny, reportedly un-
nerved by the recent rash of
coups in neighboring West Afri-
can countries, has attempted to
head off his critics in a manner
which may instead encourage them
to make further demands,
Ivory Coast's prosperity is
unmatched in black Africa. This
has somewhat obscured the exist-
ence of impoverished rural areas,
tribal hostilities, and large
numbers of frustrated and rest-
less young Ivorians who crave
positions of power. By mid-1965
there were indications that the
rate of economic growth was slow-
ing and that the country's cash
crops, coffee and cocoa, faced
serious marketing problems. These
factors, combined with the coups
in Dahomey and Upper Volta, which
had extremely close ties with the
Ivory Coast Government, apparently
prompted Houphouet-Boigny to face
up to several issues which threat-
ened to undermine his regime.
A major cabinet shake-up on
21 January epitomized the new
approach. Portfolios were shifted
and total membership was enlarged
to bring in several younger men
not closely identified with past
policies. To reduce the risk of
subversion, no one with a base
of local support was dismissed.
Several days later, a new minor
post was created to permit a
large and occasionally dissident
tribe to be represented.
By far the most important
ministerial change was the dis-
missal of Raphael Sailer, the
French national who, as minister
of finance since 1960, had be-
come the symbol of the govern-
ment's encouragement of French
domination of the economy. Al-
though Houphouct-Boigny always
paid lip service to the princi-
ple of opening economic oppor-
tunities to Ivorians, Saller's
policies in effect negated these
promises.
The President has also con-
ceded to public opinion by finally
burying his proposal to establish
dual nationality for citizens of
the states adhering to the Entente
which Ivory Coast concluded with
several of its neighbors in 1959.
Many Ivorians had feared that
this would permit natives of Da-
homey, who are particularly hated,
and of Upper Volta, Niger, and
Togo to compete on equal terms
for choice government jobs and
other positions.
Houphouet-Boigny apparently
was taken aback when he belatedly
learned of the intensity of Ivorian
feeling on some of these issues.
Ile is responding in various ways.
He has decreed clemency measures
for political prisoners, reportedly
is planning to revive an armed
party militia, and is in the
process of opening new channels
for controlled political expres-
sion. These steps, instead of
protecting his regime against
dissidence, may actually encourage
his critics to press for even
more concessions.
BEGET
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V"'l~ SECRET Now
The delegations from moder-
ate states managed to keep the
Organization for African Unity
(OAU) together at the Sixth Ses-
sion of the OAU Ministers' Coun-
cil in Addis Ababa last week,
despite the divisiveness of Gha-
naian and Rhodesian issues.
The session was almost
scuttled by the refusal of the
delegations from the Brazzaville
Congo, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania,
and Egypt to sit with the repre-
sentatives of the new Ghanaian
regime. Algeria and Somalia
withdrew in protest over the ac-
ceptance of a moderate resolu-
tion on Rhodesia. However, all
eight departing delegations em-
phasized that they were leaving
only this meeting and not with-
drawing from the OAU.
In its resolutions the
council called on Britain to ap-
ply "effective measures, includ-
ing the use of force" to oust
the Smith regime in Rhodesia.
The question of relaxing the De-
cember resolution under which
nine African states broke rela-
tions with Britain was raised by
Tunisia, but not approved in the
plenary session. African nations
were called upon to work for UN
Security Council examination of
the situation in Rhodesia under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
and a five-nation Committee of
Solidarity With Zambia was set
up to seek economic and technical
relief for the nation which would
bear the brunt of any complete
break with Rhodesia.
The council avoided action
on the rival Rhodesian national-
ist organizations by recommend-
ing that aid be given only to Af-
ricans who become actively en-
gaged in fighting inside Rhodesia.
The OAU's radical secretary
general,Diallo Telli of Guinea,
was shorn of some of his power.
The council reduced the secretar-
iat's budget from a requested
$2.3 million--which was only half
of last year's expenditure--to
$1.7 million. Many of the dele-
gates resented Telli's freewheel-
ing use of his office for personal
gain, and his attempts to exclude
the delegates from Accra.
The council is not scheduled
to meet again until just before
the annual African summit confer-
ence in November. Before then, how-
ever, the dissident factions are
likely to get together to plan
their next move. There are indi-
cations that these nations and
certain other nonaligned states
month.
A map of Africa is printed on the back of this page.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 Mar 66
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SPANISH
SAHARA
GUINEA
LIBERIA
ER VOLTA
OAHVNEY
NIGERIA
TC?Sfl
COAST
AFRICA
61418
CFNTNI, AFRICAN
M,WLK
DEMOCRATIC
IBEPUBUC
- _-OF THE
Vile CONGO
REPUBLIC
Of
SOUTH AFRICA
SECRET
UNITED
ARAB
--R PUBLIC
- -SOMALI
REPUBLIC
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British and Rhodesian atten-
tion is focused on rumors of the
imminent arrival in Portuguese
Mozambique of a tanker with oil
for Rhodesia. Salisbury is mak-
ing arrangements at the port of
Beira to bypass British-owned
facilities, and has ordered the
pipeline company to be ready to
pump oil from Beira to the Umtali
refinery in Rhodesia.
London, on the other hand,
is pressing the Portuguese Gov-
ernment and the private companies
involved in the complex Beira-
Umtali link to prevent delivery
of the oil to Rhodesia. It also
hopes to mount an air and sea
surveillance intended to intimi-
date suspect tankers and deter
their docking at Beira.
A taAker full of oil would
tremendously boost the will of white
Rhodesians to hold out. It also
would increase conflicting pres-
sures on Britain's Prime Minis-
ter Wilson--domestic pressure to
negotiate with the Rhodesian re-
gime, and demands from Africans
that he take more militant action
against it.
A break in the oil embargo
also would increase pressures
on Zambia's President Kaunda to
impose a boycott of Rhodesian
goods or sanction use of Afri-
can troops or guerrillas against
Rhodesia. Any move in this di-
rection would exacerbate internal
racial friction and might result
in the flight from Zambia of
skilled white workers essential
to the country's economy.
Labor tension with racial
overtones, which had been in-
creased last week by a confron-
tation between white miners and
the government over mineworkers'
demands for large increases in
wages and allowances, has at
least temporarily eased. The
government and the few local
union groups involved backed
away from their earlier antago-
nistic attitudes. The miners
apparently have won little sym- 25X1
pathy from the white population
at lar e.
25X1
De Gaulle has been notifying
the NATO countries that he in-
tends to renegotiate the agree-
ments under which foreign mili-
tary forces may remain in France,
and to end France's remaining
participation in the alliance
organization, although not in
the alliance itself. In their
initial reaction the other NATO
members have taken the position
that an integrated NATO even
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France's Importance to NATO and US Military Posture
2 Ar;riy diviyons arW_1 independent brrode
16 Airforce squadrons
8 Tactical strike/attack
3 Reconnaissance
5 Air defense
French Forces Assigned to NATO
(All stationed In France or West Germany)
5 Submarines earmarked for SACLANT
Etain
Verdunt J ~Mety-
_
Chambley Phalsbourg,
Toulhancy
Chaumont
US Installations in France*
(31,000 Military personnel)
4 Major army depot headquarters
23 Army depot facilities
65,000 French troops
"Including Berlin)
Military communications system SHAPE
{
Petroleum distribution system
Active air bases
Stand-by air bases
Air force communications depot
Army aerial support
Navy support center
*By 31 March 1966, at US initiative, 3 installations
will be closed and certain depots reorganized.
FEDERAL
REPUBLIC
OF
GERMANY
NATO subcommands
`ks US commands
Headquarters, French forces in Germany
US air installations
? Other installations
5aumur-*_Chinon
?
Ingrandes??
tenay.
;Potiers
,Chtze
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Vfte, SECRET %to
without France is preferable to
the series of loose bilateral
agreements Paris favors.
By insisting that all for-
eign troops and bases in France
be brought under French control,
Paris has directly challenged
the extensive US military struc-
ture in France. Eight basic
agreements now govern the US pres-
ence there. Five of these are
bilateral, covering lines of com-
munication, air bases, pipelines,
and headquarters for the commander
of US forces in Europe. The US
also is party to three multilat-
eral agreements: The North At-
lantic Treaty (NAT), a status-
of-forces agreement, and an agree-
ment concerning the juridical as-
pects of NATO, its staff, and
representatives from member states.
To terminate the bilateral
agreements before 1969 without
ending its participation in the
NAT, France may seek legal. jus-
tification in the doctrine of
international law (rebus sic
stantibus) which provides that
a change in the conditions pre-
vailing at the time an agreement
was signed voids the agreement.
De Gaulle has consistently held
that changed conditions neces-
sitate a change in France's role
in the formation and implementa-
tion of Western political and
military policies. Even if France
does not unilaterally withdraw
from the NAT or the bilateral
agreements, it could legally end
the status-of-forces agreement
after one year's notice and
thereby raise practical difficul-
ties for the continued presence
of US forces.
France also intends to with-
draw its forces and personnel
from NATO's integrated command
structure. This will be the
final step in a process which
began in 1959 when the French
Mediterranean fleet was placed
under national command. Since
that time, Paris has excluded
most of French territory from
NATO's integrated air defense,
has refused to restore to NATO
control three divisions removed
from Europe for use in Algeria,
has withdrawn the bulk of France's
Atlantic fleet from NATO, has
withdrawn French representation
on the NATO naval Channel Com-
mand and three subordinate naval
commands, and since 1965 has
made clear that French forces
will not participate in any NATO
exercises which do not conform
to French strategic views.
France may intend, however, to
maintain its representation on
the North Atlantic Council and,
though this is less likely, in
the Standing Group.
France probably intends that
the 65,000 French troops now in
Germany under NATO remain there
under. French control through a
bilateral agreement with Bonn.
The US Embassy in Bonn believes
as a "theoretical possibility."
there is a legal basis for such
an arrangement, deriving originally
from occupation rights and then
from the 1954 Convention on Re-
lations. Chancellor Erhard has
acknowledged such an arrangement
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NATO INTEREST IN SOVIET PROPOSAL TO TRADE MILITARY OBSERVERS
The Soviet proposal late
last year for NATO - Warsaw Pact
or US-Soviet exchanges of ob-
servers at military maneuvers
has generated some interest in
NATO. UK and West German plans
for bilateral exchanges with the
USSR have been outlined in recent
NATO and US discussions of the
proposal. The British and West
Germans are interested in pro-
moting such exchanges as a means
of improving relations with the
Soviets in an area which need
not receive great publicity.
The question of exchanging
military maneuver observers was
raised with the US Army attache
in Moscow last October by Soviet
First Deputy Minister of Defense
and Warsaw Pact chief Grechko
and has been subsequently refer-
red to by other Soviet Ministry
of Defense officers. Grechko
suggested that qualified US and
NATO military personnel attend
large bloc military exercises.
He said that the purpose of these
exercises was to let the West
know that the Warsaw Pact forces
were combat ready and well equipped,
and suggested that the ex-
change would serve to prevent
Western underestimation of Eas-
tern strength and consequent mis-
calculation. Grechko stated
that exchanges would be accept-
able either between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact or between the US and
the USSR. In the latter case,
he said that it was important for
both sides to have a sober appre-
ciation of the "capabilities of
the possible enemy." Subsequent
NATO Council discussions have
ruled out a Warsaw Pact - NATO
exchange because of the problem
posed by East German membership
in the pact.
The UK revealed in NATO
Council meetings in mid-February
that it has issued invitations
to "Warsaw Pact countries" to
send observers to a military exer-
cise in the UK in April. Those
governments which accept will
guarantee reciprocity. The Brit-
ish emphasized that such ex-
changes offered the political ad-
vantage of "chipping away at the
Soviet closed society" and that
the Soviet initiative in this
area should not be rebuffed.
West Germany has as yet
made no approach to the Soviets.
The West German response in NATO
was probably sparked by earlier
discussion of the possibility of
a bilateral US-Soviet exchange
of observers on German soil as
one of several alternatives. The
West Germans have opposed this
alternative since it would appear
that the US and the USSR were
cooperating without regard to
Bonn's interests and ignoring
the hostile Soviet attitude to-
ward West Germany. Nevertheless,
the West Germans believe that
it might eventually be possible
to work out an exchange of their
observers with the Soviets in
pursuit of the "normalization"
of their relations with the USSR.
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Nwop/ SECRET `'0
FINLAND'S NATIONAL ELECTIONS
National elections on 20 and
21 March may result in a fundamental
shift in power relationships on the
Finnish political scene. Most
deeply affected will probably be the
relative strengths of the two prin-
cipal contending non-Communist par-
ties--the long-dominant Center (Agra-
rian) Party of President Kekkonen
and the Social Democrats, who for
almost eight years have endured po-
litical isolation imposed by Kek-
konen with Soviet support.
This period in opposition is
redounding to the advantage of the
Social Democrats, as the party is
now riding a groundswell of dis-
satisfaction with the pro-farmer eco-
nomic policies of the succession of
Center-dominated cabinets which have
governed Finland in recent years.
The campaign is centering on domes-
tic issues, particularly the unpopu-
larity of continued heavy subsidiza-
tion of marginal agriculture, the
need to industrialize more rapidly,
and the government's seeming inabil-
ity or unwillingness to face the
wide range of economic problems.
The Center and the Communists
have sought to divert public atten-
tion from these issues by reviving
the old canard that the Social Demo-
cratic leadership does not fully
support Finland's official policy of
friendly relations with Moscow, but
these charges do not appear to have
been given much credence by the pub-
lic. Many observers predict that
the Social Democrats will gain a
minimum of seven and perhaps up to
16 additional seats in the 200-mem-
ber parliament. These gains are ex-
pected to be made principally at the
expense of the Center and its coali-
Social Democratic
Party
\ 38
Finnish People's
Democratic League
(Communists)
47
Conservatives
32
tion partners--the three so-called
"bourgeois" parties--but there is
a good chance that the Communists
too will slip somewhat, reflecting
the dissension that has plagued
their party for the past year or so.
No responsible political party
leader has ventured to suggest
what the political complexion
of Finland's postelection govern-
ment will be. A logical result of
extensive Social Democratic gains
would be a resumption of cabinet co-
operation between the Center and
the Social Democrats which was the
basis for almost every Finnish gov-
ernment in the postwar years up to
1958. However, this would require
considerable compromise by the two
parties on an economic program.
It is uncertain whether Mos-
cow would choose to try to pre-
vent the Social Democrats from
gaining cabinet representation.
Aside from the usual press attacks
against the Socialist leadership,
the Soviets have thus far taken a
relatively restrained attitude to-
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25X1
G~D XI
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MALTA TO ELECT NEW PARLIAMENT
The campaign for Malta's 26
March election centers on Prime
Minister Borg Olivier's handling
of economic ills since independence
and the related question of whether
Malta is getting adequate return
for allowing NATO forces on its
soil. Borg Olivier set the elec-
tion for March to get it over with
before the Maltese learn from the
April budget that Britain is end-
ing its budgetary support. London
is impatient with Borg Olivier's
failure to use aid already granted,
and his unwillingness to help solve
Malta's economic problems by, for
instance, increasing or even en-
forcing the income tax.
In addition to attacking this
record, opposition leader Dom Min-
toff is accusing Borg Olivier of
failing to get an economic or de-
fense agreement from NATO commen-
surate with Maltese sovereignty.
Mintoff used to denounce the pres-
ence of Western forces in the is-
lands but, with the prospect of re-
gaining power, recognizes their
economic value and apparently has
no desire to kick NATO out. He
nevertheless wants to increase
Malta's ties with Communist and Af-
ro-Asian countries, to increase his
bargaining power with NATO, and to
make Malta appear neutral.
Mintoff, who is playing down
his politically costly quarrel with
the Roman Catholic hierarchy in
Malta, is expected to take some of
Borg Olivier's 25 seats in the 50-
seat Parliament, but probably will
not win an absolute majority. Borg
Olivier would probably have a bet-
ter chance than he of forminga
shaky coalition government.
AUSTRIAN ELECTION UPSETS COALITION BALANCE
Austria's elections on 6 March
upset the equilibrium which has
prevailed between its two major
parties since the end of the Al-
lied occupation in 1955. The cen-
trist People's Party's gain of two
seats from the Socialists and two
seats from the right-wing Liberal
Party gives it an absolute majority.
Political leaders are "shocked"
by this upset of the tradition of
equilibrium between the two par-
ties, according to the American
Embassy in Vienna. The voters
have previously tended to swing
votes to the weaker party to main-
tain the balance regarded as an es-
sential shield against a renewal of
the civil disorders of the 1930s.
Reaction against Communist support
for the Socialists and internal
party dissension appear to have
been the major causes of Socialist
losses. These losses mostly bene-
fited ex-Socialist Olah, who never-
theless won no seats for his new
party.
Chancellor Klaus has promised
to re-establish his People's Party's
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coalition with the Socialists.
Klaus may require them to forfeit
some cabinet and subcabinet posts
as well as to allow much greater
parliamentary initiative and deci-
sion--conditions which may prove
too stiff for acceptance. In any
event, the election results will
--at least in the short term--af-
feet domestic far more than foreign
policy.
A lessening of tensions be-
tween the Dominican military and
Provisional President Garcia Godoy
has been largely responsible for
a calmer political atmosphere in
the past ten days. The Provisional
President publicly has praised
what he calls the "changed mental-
ity" of the new service chiefs and
even has endorsed the military's
contention that unknown plotters
are seeking to implicate the armed
forces in whatever sporadic vio-
lence occurs. In return, Minister
of Defense Perez y Perez has threat-
ened to discipline or discharge
any member of the armed forces who
disregards the strictures against
partisan political activity.
Garcia Godoy has appealed for
"moderation" during the political
campaign and has~continued to re-
place some of Juan Bosch's adher-
ents in municipal and provincial
government posts--generally with
backers of Joaquin Balaguer or in-
dependents--in order to establish
some measure of parity among the
parties. Registration of voters
eligible to cast ballots in the 1
June election has begun throughout
the country.
Several incidents have marred
the calm. Troops of the Inter-Amer-
ican Peace Force have been involved
in several scraps with gangs of
juvenile toughs, and one of Bosch's
bodyguards was killed by a police-
man during what appears to have
been a personal quarrel on 6 March.
After learning of the shooting, a
group of Bosch's bodyguards as-
saulted several police in downtown
Santo Domingo. Such incidents un-
derscore the lack of effective po-
lice measures, the prevalence of
weapons among the populace, and
the bitter enmities left by the
revolution.
Bosch seized on the recent
shootings to reiterate his charge
that the country is not ready for
elections--a claim seconded by
militant Social Christians. Bosch
alleges that "hundreds" of members
of his Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD) have been murdered and
that the Dominican military are
otherwise intimidating his follow-
ers. While there has been some
right-wing terrorism directed
against Bosch's followers, the
PRD leader has exaggerated the
danger, apparently in order to
build a position from which he can 25x1
boycott the elections if he de-
cides the PRD cannot win.
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A confrontation could be in
the offing between Guatemalan
Chief of Government Peralta and
restive conservatives who are
fearful of a new government headed
by Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro.
As of late morning on 10 March,
Peralta was to meet with his top
military commanders, following a
reported ultimatum that he step
down in favor of a new junta or
be deposed.
Mendez, of the left-of-cen-
ter Revolutionary Party (PR), was
the front runner for the presi-
dency in Guatemala's 6 March elec-
tions. Although the full tally is
not in, it is evident that none of
the three candidates won the ma-
jority necessary for direct elec-
tion. Returns so far indicate,
however, that the PR has captured
a majority--perhaps 29--of the 55
congressional seats. Because the
"second-level" election entails
selection of the president by the
legislature after it meets on 5
May, the PR's candidate seems
likely to be the eventual victor.
Since the election, Peralta
has continued to maintain that
the army will keep its word and
deliver power to the elected party.
Mendez has made a concerted effort
to convince military leaders of
his own and his party's anti-
Communist bent and to assure them
he has no plans to interfere with
the command structure of the armed
forces. Which appeal--that of the
conservatives or that of Peralta
and the PR--will prove effective
with the military high command
remains in doubt. Should Peralta
resign, his successor would be
chosen by the military command-
ers, according to the operative
"laws" of the present regime.
There is still danger that
both sides will harden in their
determinations and bring a di-
rect clash between the bitterly
ant i forces in the coun-
try
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Elections for congressmen
and departmental and municipal
representatives are to take place
in Colombia on 20 March. Presi-
dential elections will be held
on 1 May.
Under Colombia's unique Na-
tional Front system, which pro-
vides for a 16-year coalition of
the two principal parties, half
of all elective offices are
awarded to the Conservative Party
and half to the Liberal Party,
and the presidency is alternated.
There are no issues, therefore,
between the two parties, but only
among contending factions within
them. Ideology and policy are
subordinate to group and personal
interests.
The major factions competing
for votes in the coming elections
are the Official Liberals and
the Ospinista Conservatives, which
make up the government coalition,
and the National Popular Alliance
(ANAPO), the Liberal Revolutionary
Movement, and the Lauro-Alzatista
Conservatives, which are expected
to join after the congressional
elections to oppose the government
coalition. The Ospinistas and
Lauro-Alzatistas are so designated
after their founders: Mariano
Ospina Perez, Laureano Gomez, and
Gilberto Alzate Avendano.
The Liberal Party is up for
the presidency this time, and
the Official Liberals and the
Ospinistas have already launched
the candidacy of that party's
Carlos Lleras Restrepo. One or
more candidates representing op-
position interests will be
selected in the light of the re-
sults of the congressional elec-
tions and the political maneuver-
ing that follows them.
The National Front govern-
ment must command two thirds of
the votes in-the congress to pass
most important legislation, and
there is some doubt among observ-
ers that it will be able to mus-
ter even a majority after the
elections. This would force the
government to rule by decree and
perhaps lead to a radical modifi-
cation of the National Front sys-
tem. ANAPO, the Conservative fac-
tion of rabble-rousing former
president Gustavo Rojas Pinilla,
is expected to make the greatest
gain and is considered the most
serious threat to continuation
of the National Front system.
Although the government has ef-
fected some basic reforms, their
impact has not yet been widely
felt by the people, and Rojas
has based his campaign on the
charge that the National Front
government is responsible for
the significant increase in the
cost of living.
Considerable voter apathy
will probably be reflected in
large-scale abstention from the
polls. The prevailing mood among
the Colombian voters seems to
favor orderly, legal political
processes, rather than violent
change, and no serious violence
during the elections is antici-
pated. Electoral fraud is not
expected to be a significant fac-
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ECUADOREAN POLITICIANS RESISTING JUNTA'S REFORM PLANS
Ecuador's military junta an-
nounced its long-awaited consti-
tutional reforms on 2 March and,
by the weekend, resistance from
the politicians had combined with
adverse economic developments,
labor and student unrest, and a
spate of plots to produce tension
and widespread uneasiness.
The decree banned presiden-
tial re-election and consecutive
congressional re-election, in-
creased the powers of the National
Security Council, and reduced
the powers of congress. It made
insurgents subject to military
justice, thus bypassing the
courts, whose unwillingness to
prosecute subversives has been
notorious. Elections were post-
poned from 5 June to 3 July in
order to complete lagging voter
registration.
Leading politicians, who ac-
cording to the US ambassador have
a "blind and almost fanatical
devotion" to ousting the military
junta, responded by forming a
new front, a characteristic Ecua-
dorean tactic, aimed at assem-
bling most parties and forces,
including Communists, for a sin-
gle objective. The front reas-
serted the politicians' persist-
ent demands for a constituent as-
sembly--which implicitly they
would control--to handle the
transition to constitutional
rule. Such assemblies are in
harmony with Ecuadorean history,
but have been chaotically inept,
and the junta fears that reform
programs would be lost in the
shuffle.
to cooperate in the elections
have now vowed intransigence.
Some observers believe that the
junta's program will thus become
unworkable and leave it only two
choices: yielding to a constitu-
ent assembly, or imposing a true
military dictatorship.
Concurrently there have been
several adverse economic develop-
ments. Foreign exchange reserves
continued to fall, and imports
to rise. A serious budget defi-
cit threatens, and the usually
stable currency has fallen. As
a remedy the junta decreed an in-
crease in import duties which,
if vigorously implemented, could
bring the budget under control.
A storm of protest has come from
foreign trade interests which
last year fomented major disor-
ders to resist tariff reforms.
The populace seems to fear that
the cost of living, which has
been inching upward, will break
away.
These circumstances--and
greater unity--improve the poli-
ticians' prospects and present
the junta with a severe challenge.
On the hopeful side are failure
of planned weekend demonstrations,
a slight diminution of labor
problems, and continuance of the
military unity on which stability
depends.
If the junta vacillates, its
plans for transition will fail,
and changes in the executive may
result; if it acts firmly, it may
achieve an orderly return to ci-
vilian rule, with a new president
taking office on 1 September.
Parties which had indicated
present or ultimate willingness
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