WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005200040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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w l A Aiarch 1966
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00I:No. 0279/66
Copy No.
cNTRAL., INTELLI1\IGE AGENCY
F`IC OF CURF ENT '1 11
LL N .
State Dept. review completed:
BARMY review(s) completed
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EST, 3 March 1966)
Page
VIETNAM
The continuing increase in Viet Cong activity in South
Vietnam has resulted in mounting casualties on both
sides. Communist propaganda exploiting the current US
debate over Vietnam policy has begun to appear. Hanoi
has not yet commented specifically on Senator Kennedy's
remarks on Viet Cong participation in a Saigon coalition
regime, but Peking has denounced the suggestion as a
"trick." British Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Moscow
failed to induce any movement in Soviet tactics on
Vietnam.
The Communist World
CHANGES IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS 4
Changes in assignments of party and government officials
since Khrushchev's ouster, although extensive, do not
at this time suggest a drastic alteration in the member-
ship of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Com-
mission at the party congress convening on 29 March.
USSR ESTABLISHES NEW RULES FOR MANAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISES 6
The detailed rules reveal no major changes in the new
system of planning and management as outlined in Sep-
tember by Premier Kosygin, and confirm that the system
will not have an immediate major effect on the economy.
SOVIET VENUS PROBES ARRIVE
The two Soviet Venus probes have completed their three- 7
and-a-half-month journey, but at least one did not en-
tirely fulfill its mission.
FUTURE TRENDS IN SOVIET SPACE OPERATIONS
The Soviets are developing new systems which foreshadow 8
further expansion of their already massive space pro-
gram.
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PEKING AND WEST AFRICA
The overthrow of Nkrumah and the attendant rapid ero-
sion of Peking's position in Ghana is probably the most
damaging setback the Chinese have sustained in the rad-
ical West African states in the past half-year.
NEW REGIME MAKING IMPORTANT CHANGES IN GHANA
The leaders of last week's coup have consolidated
their control and are moving to end Ghana's estrange-
ment from the West and the moderate African states.
SYRIA STILL UNSETTLED IN WAKE OF COUP
The situation remains volatile, although no military
opposition has yet developed and a new Baath government
was named on 1 March.
IRAQ STAGNATES AS KURDISH WAR CONTINUES
Despite promises of early reforms, the relatively moder-
ate cabinet of Premier Bazzaz has made little progress.
NASIR-FAYSAL DIALOGUE ON YEMEN FALTERS
Neither leader trusts the other, but both sides are
holding back from a renewal of Yemeni fighting iu the
hope that the deadlock can be broken.
BLOC MILITARY DELIVERIES TO INDIA RESUME
Tanks, surface-to-air missile equipment, naval equip-
ment, and aircraft recently have been delivered from
the USSR and Czechoslovakia
INDONESIA'S SUKARNO LIKELY TO RESUME LEFTIST POLICIES 17
Sukarno's recent moves against the army have met no
significant resistance. He has declared that Indonesia
is now back on its original revolutionary path.
Europe
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ELECTIONS MAY BE CALLED IN BELGIUM
The failure on 2 March of a second effort to re-estab-
lish a Catholic-Socialist coalition increases the like-
lihood that elections will be called.
WEST GERMANY'S NEAR EAST PROBLEM
It is trying to fulfill its commitments to Israel and si-
multaneously improve its relations with the Arab states.
Western Hemisphere
OAS COMMISSION STUDYING CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION'S STRUCTURE 23
Revisions approved by a plenary commission of the Organ-
ization of American States now meeting in Panama will be
acted on at a special conference in Buenos Aires in July.
REASSIGNMENT OF DOMINICAN MILITARY CHIEFS DRAWS BOSCH'S FIRE 23
Bosch charged that the compromise solution of this is-
sue was a betrayal of the left and a precedent for fu-
ture military disrespect for elected government which
made it "useless" to hold the 1 June elections.
URUGUAYANS CONSIDER CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 25
Substantial segments of both the governing Blanco Party
and the opposition Colorados favor moves to strengthen
the country's executive authority--now exercised by an
unwieldy nine-man National Council of Government.
EXPANSION OF CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY 26
Formation of a Labor Committee responsible to the Cen-
tral Committee is the latest indication of the party's
continuing drive to extend its influence over all as-
pects of Cuban life.
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The increase in Viet Cong
activity which began in late Feb-
ruary continued this week, with
enemy initiatives reported
throughout the country.
Two significant attacks on
US troops occurred in the Binh
Duong - Bien Hoa area of III
Corps. On 24 February, US forces
conducting Operation ROLLING
STONE in Binh Duong Province suc-
cessfully defended their command
post against three enemy battal-
ions, killing over 100 Viet Cong.
Two days later, a company of the
US 173rd Airborne Brigade on pa-
trol several miles north of Bien
Hoa sustained casualties of 14
killed and 76 wounded during a
two-hour battle with a force of
unknown size. US and Australian
forces searching this area have
failed to re-establish contact.
Other large-scale enemy as-
saults were reported in Binh Thuan
and Binh Tuy provinces, as were
coordinated attacks against out-
posts around district towns in
Long An and Dinh Tuong. Instal-
lations in the normally quiet
provinces of Quang Duc and Darlac
were also attacked by smaller
Viet Cong forces.
South Vietnamese troops in
Quang Tri Province reacted to
enemy activity earlier in the
week by launching an operation
several miles north of the pro-
vincial capital on 24 February.
In four days of intense fighting,
more than 350 Viet Cong were re-
ported killed. Government troops
and US marines operating south-
east of Hue in Thua Thien Pro-
vince killed over 150 Viet Cong
in the same period.
The higher tempo of military
activity has resulted in mounting
casualties on both sides. With
losses in some actions not yet
included, allied casualties of
more than 2,300--the highest of
the war--were reported for the
week ending 26 February. In the
first two months of this year,
Viet Cong losses have totaled
nearly 8,000 killed and captured.
However, US military officials
in Saigon have estimated that the
enemy has the capability--through
infiltration and local recruit-
ment--to put some 8,000 new troops
in the field each month.
The Saigon government is ap-
parently planning to hold provin-
cial and municipal elections this
spring. Government officials
had considered extending for two
years the terms of present coun-
cil members, elected last May
under the Quat government. The
recordof.these councils has varied
depending upon the local situation
and individuals involved. US of-
ficials feel that they have been
more responsible than originally
expected. The holding of local
elections this spring may temporar-
ily abate popular demands for na-
tional elections.
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Candidates for the "democracy
building" council, an appointive
national civilian advisory group,
are reportedly being reviewed by
the ruling military Directorate,
and a complete council of about
100 may be made public next week.
Directorate Secretary General
Chieu, responsible for the nomi-
nation of candidates, has report-
edly reversed his earlier posi-
tion and decided to permit cer-
tain members of elected provin-
cial councils to serve on the
advisory council.
The US Embassy has reported
that Catholics, business circles,
and ethnic southerners were gen-
erally appeased by Premier Ky's
recent cabinet reorganization.
Although Buddhist circles were
unhappy about some of the changes,
the embassy sees no sign of any
early Buddhist opposition.
Reaction to US Debate on Vietnam
Communist propaganda reac-
tion to the current debate over
American policy in Vietnam has
begun to appear. Hanoi Radio
quoted extensively from Western
press reports to prove that public
opposition to US policy is grow-
ing rapidly and that the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hear-
ings were bringing the "truth"
to the American people. Hanoi
broadcast a lengthy statement on
the "legal" status of the Liber-
ation Front in an apparent at-
tempt to support the critics of
US policy.
A DRV press attache in Paris
reportedly elaborated somewhat
on Communist terms for Front
participation in a coalition gov-
ernment: North Vietnam could ac-
cept a coalition government with
"some Ky people as a transitional
move" but "both Premier Ky and
the Americans would have to go."
Hanoi has not commented specifi-
cally on Senator Robert Kennedy's
remarks on Viet Cong participa-
tion in a coalition government
in South Vietnam. Peking, how-
ever, reacted immediately in a
27 February broadcast implicitly
advising the Viet !Gong not to
settle for anything less than
total control of the government.
Peking termed Kennedy's suggestions
a "trick" and declared that the
Front would never play the "walk-
in part" of a "showpiece in a
puppet regime fostered by the US."
British Prime Minister Wil-
son's visit to Moscow failed to
induce any movement in Soviet
tactics on Vietnam. The British
got the distinct impression that
the Soviet Union sees no door
open to negotiations, and accord-
ingly is unwilling to take any
initiative. Although worried by
the dangers of escalation, the
Soviet leaders evidently believe
that any Russian move at this
time in favor of a negotiated
settlement would be ineffective
and seriously detrimental to their
own interests in the Sino-Soviet
dispute.
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Western press reports of
Lord Chalfont's discussions with
the DRV charge in Moscow--which
implied that the charge would
seek clarification of Hanoi's
four-point program for a negoti-
ated solution--were also quickly
quashed by Hanoi. Hanoi main-
tained that the charge had clearly
explained the DRV Government's
four-point stand, had condemned
British support for US policy, and
had unmasked the "wicked US
schemes" in proposing "so-called"
unconditional negotiations. The
North Vietnamese party daily on
26 February attacked the Brit-
ish prime minister for his sup-
port of the US.
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CHANGES IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS
Changes in assignments of
Soviet party and government offi-
cials since Khrushchev's ouster,
although extensive, do not at
this time suggest a drastic al-
teration in the membership of the
Central Committee and Central
Auditing Commission at the 23rd
party congress which convenes on
29 March. Indications are that
approximately two thirds of the
current membership, a fairly high
proportion, will probably be re-
elected.
Relatively few new men have
been appointed to jobs which cus-
tomarily warrant membership in the
Central Committee. The political
connections of most of these are
not clear. Although more of them
appear to have identifiable polit-
ical connections with First Sec-
retary Brezhnev than with any
other leader, there are not yet
enough of them to demonstrate
an extensive rigging of the Cen-
tral Committee by Brezhnev.
In
the central
party appa-
ratus,
a few new men
associated
either
with Brezhnev
or with
Deputy
Premier Mazurov have been
brought
into jobs in the ideo-
logical
and propaganda field
which are likely to give them
membership on the new Central
Committee for the first time.
Most of the recent appointments
to the central party apparatus,
however, are already members of
the Central Committee elected
in 1961.
Appointments in the various
republics seem to reflect the
preferences of Presidium members
closely associated with those
Soviet Party Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission
TABLE i
Membership According to Major Occupational Categories
ELECTED AT RECENT
CONGRESSES RETAIN NEW TOTAL
1952 1956 1961 ESTIMATE FOR 1966 CONGRESS
Party Officals 144 158 192 115 59 174
of/whkh-Cemroi Apparatus 27 23 36 23 16 39
Government Officials 131 148 171 112 54 166
of/which - Militory 28 21 34 14 6 20
Police 10 4 2 2 1 3
Diplomatic 9 17 21 14 5 19
Miscellaneous 17 23 44 10 8 18
TABLE 2
Members Dropped as Percentage of Membership Elected
at Preceding Congress
Months Between Dropped
Congresses
Rate of
Attrition
15th (19271 24 1796 .70/m0
16th (1930) 31 17% .55/mo
17th (1934) 43 32% .74/mo
18th (1939) 61 84% 1.39/MO
19th (1952) 163 63% .39/mo
20th (1956) 40 35% .89/mo
21St (1959)`
22nd (1961) 68 50%
23r'd (1966) 53 3246
(to date)
.74/m0
.60/mo
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areas. Men associated with Brezh-
nev have also fared well at the
republic and province levels, but,
again, most are already Central
Committee members. A number of
appointments in agriculture, an
area in which Brezhnev has shown
a special interest, probably re-
flect his preferences as well as
those of Polyansky, the Presid-
ium member most directly con-
cerned with agriculture.
Changes in the government
bureaucracy have affected few
occupants of positions which tra-
ditionally carry high party sta-
tus. Many newly appointed minis-
ters had previously chaired re-
lated state committees before the
ministerial reforms and are al-
ready Central Committee members.
A number of other new ministers
also already have this status,
having served elsewhere in im-
portant government positions.
Few of the new faces brought into
the government since Khrushchev's
ouster are likely to be elected
to the new central party organs
at the forthcoming congress, and
the government's weight in the
party's central organs is thus
likely to remain almost unchanged.
Since 1961, several military
officers have gained positions
which probably entitle them to
membership on the Central Com-
mittee. It is more difficult to
predict military members to be
dropped; possibilities include
one or another of the inactive
marshals in the Inspector Gen-
eral Group and wartime asso-
ciates of Khrushchev presently
occupying secondary positions
in the high command.
A few Foreign Ministry of-
ficials, mostly ambassadors to
East European countries, are
Central Committee members. The
present Soviet ambassadors in
Peking, Hanoi, and Pyongyang
are not members but the latter
two in particular may be given
the status as a mark of the im-
provement in party relations
achieved by Khrushchev's succes-
sors. The ambassadors to the
United States and Britain may
also be elevated to membership.
Over-all, assignments in-
volving the top layer of party
officials made since Khru-
shchev's ouster suggest that a
rather delicate political bal-
ance, somewhat weighted in Brezh-
nev's favor, now exists. Changes
in assignments in many cases have
been part of the process of re-
versing the organizational in-
novations imposed during the
last two years of Khrushchev's
regime and of restoring the
status quo ante. This process
is now largely accomplished, and
appointments from now on are
likely to be more directly a 25X1
product of political competition
among Khrushchev's successors.
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USSR ESTABLISHES NEW RULES FOR MANAGEMENT OF ENTERPRISES
The USSR's major economic
journal recently published de-
tailed regulations for enter-
prises converted to the new sys-
tem of planning and management
proposed by Premier Kosygin last
September. This system, aimed
at improving efficiency and prod-
uct quality, provides new incen-
tives and somewhat increased
freedom of action for the indi-
vidual enterprise. The published
rules reveal no gross changes in
Kosygin's outline, and confirm
that the new system will not have
an immediate major effect on the
economy. Apparently only a small
number of plants will be affected
this year.
Central planners will con-
tinue to give each enterprise "as-
signments" governing level of
sales, profit, assortment of
products, total wage fund, new
investment, supply of materials
and equipment, and introduction
of new technology. All other
factors--such as number of em-
ployees, labor productivity, and
average wage--are left to the
enterprises themselves. The
rules make clear that enterprises
converted to the new system will
still be bound by a tight system
of control.
During the first half of
1966 only plants which work well
and are highly profitable under
present prices will be transferred
to the new system. Thereafter,
primarily whole branches of in-
dustry will be converted. Con-
version of all industrial enter-
prises to the new system is sched-
uled to be completed by the end
of 1968. The partial transfer
this year is aimed at testing the
practical effects of many details
of the new system. The Council
of Ministers has recently shown
concern that this conversion not
be bogged down by bureaucratic
detail.
Under the new rules, the en-
terprise may keep for its enter-
prise fund all of its profits af-
ter paying out a capital charge
set temporarily at six percent of
the book value of fixed and work-
ing capital. Use of this fund
by enterprises is to be subject--
as in the past--to close regula-
tion by planning authorities. It
will be apportioned for manage-
ment bonuses, social-cultural
measures, workers' housing, and
plant modernization and now is
to be sharply increased. In en-
terprises scheduled for rapid
growth, bonuses from the fund
will be paid to managers for ful-
fillment and overfulfillment of
the sales plan if the profit and
assortment plans are met. In
all other enterprises profit will
become the most important cri-
terion for bonuses.
These new incentives may re-
sult in scattered improvements
in efficiency and in the quality
of some products. The high de-
gree of central planning re-
tained suggests, however, that
the Kosygin program will prob-
ably not produce major gains .
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The two Soviet Venus probes
have completed their three-and-a-
half-month journey, but at least
one did not entirely fulfill its
mission.
According to the Soviet an-
nouncement, Venus 3--carrying the
emblem of the USSR--impacted on
the planet's surface early on 1
March. The Soviets admitted, how-
ever, that they lost communica-
tions from the probe during the
last portion of its flight. There-
fore, it is not known whether
Venus 3 obtained any data on the
planet, although it probably re-
layed information about conditions
in space during its journey.
Moscow also announced that
Venus 2 flew by the planet at a
distance of only 13,000 nautical
miles on 27 February. Venus 2
--like Venus 3--carried instru-
ments to measure a number of
physical conditions, including
temperature, radiation, and at-
mospheric composition. In this
respect Venus 2 was similar to
the fly-by of Venus in December
1962 by the US Mariner 2. How-
ever, the Soviets have made no
recent reference to communications
with Venus 2, and it is unclear
whether it has transmitted any data.
Spacecraft failures have
consistently plagued the Soviet
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The Soviets are developing
several new systems apparently to
meet the growing demands of a
more diversified space program.
Cosmos 110 was launched on
22 February with two dogs and a
sophisticated package of biolog-
ical specimens on board. This
satellite is similar in many re-
spects to the Voskhod vehicles
but may be testing a life sup-
port system considerably modified
from that used in previous dog
flights. Recent TASS statements
support the belief that Cosmos
110 is studying effects of pro-
longed radiation, weightlessness,
and other space factors.
Cosmos 110 could remain in orbit
until at least 20 March, after
which daylight recovery within
the Soviet Union will be possible.
The flight of Cosmos 110 may
be the forerunner of a manned
space flight of extended dura-
tion, possibly 30 days, and un-
derscores the careful attention
Soviet scientists have always
given to the biomedical aspects
of manned flight.
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The spent second stage is
apparently intended to fall into
a Northern Pacific impact area
set up by the Soviets on 16 De-
cember. According to the Soviet
announcement, the area would be
used for testing "variants of
systems for landing space vehi-
cles" and parts of booster rock-
ets would fall into it.
The Soviets have also tested
a very large space booster which
may ultimately be used for large
space stations and lunar missions.
Development of these new
systems could be related to manned
orbiting laboratories, scientific
and interplanetary exploration,
or orbital weapons systems and 25X1
indicates that the Soviets plan
to expand their alread massive
space program.
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The overthrow of Nkrumah's
leftist and violently anti-West-
ern government (see next article)
and the attendant rapid erosion
of Peking's position in Ghana is
the most recent and probably most
damaging setback the Chinese Com-
munists have sustained in the
radical West African states in
the past half year.
Although Guinea and Mali
can still be ranked as Communist
China's closest friends in Af-
rica, their willingness to sup-
port Peking's international ob-
jectives and to facilitate its
African programs has been con-
siderably reduced. These coun-
tries are increasingly equating
their own best interests with
ties to the West and the USSR.
Chinese relations with Congo-
Brazzaville also appear to have
chilled somewhat. The drift away
from Peking of these radical
states is due in part to the
steamroller tactics China used
in preparing for the postponed
Afro-Asian Conference and to the
over-weening advice Foreign Minis-
ter Chen Yi dished out during his
African circuit last September.
While the Chinese had grown
increasingly concerned at Nkru-
mah's pretensions to the role of
international peacemaker, they
have long viewed Ghana as a use-
ful base country for supporting
revolution in West and Central
Africa. Peking's guerrilla ex-
perts have been training African
"freedom fighters" in Ghana. The
new government of General Ankrah
has declared "Ghana will no
longer be a haven for 'freedom
fighters' and subversives ousted
from their own countries." Re-
portedly the new leaders in Accra
intend to send home all Chinese
technicians and "teachers"--about
50--allowing only Peking's embassy
staff to remain. Thirteen or so
Chinese have already left.
The current standing of the
Chinese in Congo-Brazzaville is
somewhat ambiguous, although the
Chinese once regarded this coun-
try as one of their major Afri-
can bases. They have had con-
siderable successes in cultivat-
ing the regime and individual
Congolese leaders have seemed to
regard Peking as their principal
foreign benefactor.
In both Guinea and Mali, the
latter rabidly pro-Chinese in
early 1965, Peking's extremist
stance, attempts at arm-twisting,
and inability to satisfy local
African economic aspirations have
caused presidents Toure and Keita
to moderate sharply their propa-
ganda support for Peking. This
reduction in political backing
for Peking has not, however, been
accompanied by a perceptible re-
duction in the Chinese aid pres-
ence in either country. Mali
continues to have the greatest
number--about 1,200--of Chinese
aid personnel of any black Afri-
can country.
The trend toward signifi-
cantly reduced political support
for Peking among China's former
African allies and the concomitant
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upgrading of ties with the So-
viets and the US undoubtedly up-
set the Chinese considerably par-
ticularly since these events oc-
cur at a time when Peking is ex-
periencing losses elsewhere.
These four radical states, to-
gether with Algeria, and possi-
bly Tanzania represented China's
greatest hopes in the continent.
The Chinese have attempted to ra-
tionalize these setbacks by stat-
ing in a People's Daily article
of 1 Marc ,mat i_n the world-
wide struggle for liberation "vic-
tory is frequently mingled with
reverses and advance in movements
with retreat."
NEW REGIME MAKING IMPORTANT CHANGES IN GHANA
The pro-Western army and po-
lice officers who toppled Kwame
Nkrumah's radical regime last
week have consolidated their con-
trol of Ghana and are implement-
ing some basic policy changes.
The effect will be to reverse
Ghana's progressive estrangement
from the West and to transform
it into a moderate African state.
Most of the widespread pub-
lic expressions of support for
the army take-over appear genuine.
Although Nkrumah's popularity was
massive when he led Ghana to in-
dependence nine years ago, in re-
cent years major segments of the
country's society had become
alienated by his oppressive rule
and a tightening economic squeeze.
Ghanaian affairs are now in
the hands of a National Libera-
tion Council (NLC) of eight army
and police officers. It is
headed by popular General Ankrah,
fired by Nkrumah last summer, and
includes police chief Harlley as
well as Colonel Kotoka--now ma-
jor general--who lined up the
military support essential to the
coup. Civil servants, who in
general adapted quickly to the
new situation, have been given
wider latitude in running the
government.
Detailed policy formulation
apparently will be the responsi-
bility of several new committees
staffed by senior civilian spe-
cialists, most of whom are com-
petent and Western oriented. This
is particularly true of the com-
mittee charged by the NLC with the
priority task of steering Ghana's
currently severely strained--but
basically rich--economy onto a
sound course again. The commit-
tee, which is reported already
developing new austerity programs,
has made preliminary approaches
for major Western assistance. On
2 March Ankrah indicated that hence-
forth free enterprise would be
given wider scope in Ghana.
The new leaders have prom-
ised a new constitution, free elec-
tions, and a return to representa-
tive civilian government.
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For the
present, all politica parties
and political activity are banned.
Although Nkrumah's prospects
for a comeback now appear very
dim, he evidently has not aban-
doned such hopes. Before leav-
ing Peking on 28 February he an-
nounced his intention to fight
back and took steps to rally sup-
port among Ghanaians and other
Africans. However, this netted
him little more than expressions
of solidarity from other radical
African leaders, notably Presi-
dent Toure of Guinea. Nkrumah
arrived in the Guinean capital
on 2 March still claiming to be
"on my way back." Toure''s welcom-
ing gesture designating Nkrumah
the new "President of Guinea" pro-
vides some indications of the po-
litical gyrations Toure is pre-
paring on Nkrumah's behalf.
Moderate African states have
now begun to extend recognition
to the new regime. This has been
facilitated by the seating of the
NLC's delegation at the current
Organization of African Unity
meeting in Addis Ababa after a
heated wrangle provoked by Nkru-
mah's radical allies. The NLC's
measures to liquidate Nkrumah's
African subversion program--the
secret Chinese-supported guerrilla
training camp was closed the day
of the coup--and to mend Ghana's
long-troubled relations with
neighboring moderate states should
further strengthen the new re-
g;ime's African position.
Soviet reaction to Nkrumah's
ouster has been cautious and
noncommittal. The expulsion of
the technicians can be expected
to elicit a negative response,
but this will probably be tem-
pered by a desire to maintain
some presence in Ghana. Soviet
press reaction has implied West-
tern intelligence involvement,
but the new regime has not been
attacked directly.
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SYRIA STILL UNSETTLED IN WAKE OF COUP
Syria remains volatile in
the wake of the 23 February coup,
but no military opposition has
yet developed and a new Baath
government was named on 1 March.
Infighting has already be-
gun among the radical military
leaders of the new regime. Ri-
alries between the majority Sunni
Muslims and members of the minor-
ity Alawite and Druze sects will
probably be a particularly divi-
sive factor in the conflict.
There is still no evidence that
the 16,500 troops on the Israeli
border have yet come over in sup-
port of the new regime.
Civilian Baathists seem
equally reluctant to commit them-
selves, and Premier Yusuf Zuayyin
reportedly had difficulty in
forming his government. The new
19-man cabinet is made up pri-
marily of civilians, many of
whom have served in previous
Baath governments, and contains
at least one member of the Com-
munist Party of Syria (CPS). This
is the first CPS member to hold
a portfolio in three years of
Baathist rule. The deposed Hafiz
government, however, had pro-
claimed its aim of cooperation
with all "progressive forces"
and named several Communists or
sympathizers to the Syrian legis-
lative body last August.
If the new regime does man-
age to stay in power, it may be
forced to compete with another
"official" Baath organization
based outside Syria. The Damascus
clique will have difficulty main-
taining its legitimacy as a Baath
government in the face of opposi-
tion from such party leaders as
founders Salah al-Din Bitar and
Michel Aflaq or Secretary Gen-
eral Munif Razzaz, who presum-
ably escaped in the confusion of
the coup. As one observer has
commented, "The Baath without
Aflaq would be like Christmas
without Santa Claus."
The regime will probably
adopt a strong anti-Nasir stance
and heighten anti-US propaganda.
What other policy shifts will
occur, however, is not yet cer-
tain.
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IRAQ STAGNATES AS KURDISH WAR CONTINUES
Despite promises of early
reforms and a "new look" at Iraq's
many economic, administrative, and
social problems, the relatively
moderate cabinet of Premier Bazzaz
has made little progress to date.
The sense of realism, enthusiasm,
and movement that Bazzaz attempted
to inculate when he succeeded Arif
Abd al-Razzaq--following the lat-
ter's ill-considered coup attempt
last autumn--has almost wholly
dissipated.
Bazzaz and his cabinet have
found that they have had to devote
most of their attention to the
inconclusive war against the rebel
Kurds in northern Iraq. The pre-
mier made a few conciliatory ges-
tures toward the rebels when he
first took office, but he soon
discovered that the differences
between the two sides were virtu-
ally irreconcilable, and in De-
cember and January the largest
battles since 1963 were fought in
Kurdistan. The war has also in-
volved Iraq in a nasty dispute
with Iran, whose "covert" aid to
the rebels has been open knowl-
edge in Baghdad for some time. In
addition, differences regarding
the proper approach to the Kurd-
ish problem have caused strains
within the cabinet itself.
Kurdish leader Barzani has
been occupied with numerous prob-
lems of his own. He faces dis-
sension within his own ranks, and
must deal with an increasing war-
1V ariness among the inhabitants
of Kurdistan. The government,
however, still lacks the mili-
tary strength to impose its will
on the north, although it did
gain some verbal support for
its policy at the recent meet-
ing of the Iraqi-Egyptian "uni-
fied political command" in
Cairo.
Egypt, however, continues
to show a marked reluctance to
become overly involved in Iraqi
domestic matters. Bazzaz also
has shown no real desire to push
toward unification of the two
countries, although he is care-
ful to pay lip service to this
ideal. Iraqi pro-Nasirists
were considerably discredited
by Abd al-Razzaq's abortive
coup, but the premier is still
anxious to protect his weak and
narrowly based government from
renewed pressure on the part of
advocates of early union with
Egypt.
Pro-Nasirists, Baathists,
and various stripes of conserva-
tives are all plotting against
the regime, but none of these
groups appears to have sufficient
assets at the moment to bring
it down
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NASIR-FAYSAL DIALOGUE ON YEMEN FALTERS
The renewed dialogue over
Yemen between Egypt's Nasir and
Saudi King Faysal is faltering.
Both leaders have almost com-
pletely lost confidence in the
intentions of the other. How-
ever, both sides are holding
back from a renewal of Yemeni
fighting in the hope that the
deadlock can be broken.
This crisis of confidence
has deepened during recent days.
On 22 February Nasir made a
speech in which he reacted to an
otherwise unnoticed interview
given by Faysal in which the lat-
ter remarked that Egypt was busy
solving its important internal
problems. Nasir, apparently
pricked by an imputation of weak-
ness, responded that Egypt would
not withdraw its troops from
Yemen until an interim government
was formed to conduct the plebis-
cite on the future of Yemen, even
if it took five years.
On 24 February the Saudi am-
bassador to Cairo delivered the
long-delayed reply by King Faysal
to Nasir's four-point proposal
of 11 January. It was received
without enthusiasm and described
by Egyptian officials as "unre-
sponsive and indicative of the
hardened position the Saudis are
taking."
conces-
sions by o i par ies ave failed
to soften the hardened stance
taken by each side.
ger the general peace.
In Yemen unruly tribesmen
have seized upon the period of un-
certainty to enlarge their own
area of influence. Public secu-
rity and self-defense measures
have brought Egyptian forces into
action, albeit to a limited de-
gree. The joint Saudi-Egyptian
peace commission has generally
failed to effect a lasting truce
during these disturbances, and 25X1
it seems inevitable that a series
of clashes will continue to endan-
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BLOC MILITARY DELIVERIES TO INDIA RESUME
The first major bloc mili-
tary shipments to India since the
India-Pakistan confrontation last
August are arriving. Tanks, sur-
face-to-air missile (SAM) equip-
ment, naval equipment, and air-
craft recently have been delivered
from the USSR and Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet freighter Mezh-
durechensk docked in Bombay on
14 February and unloaded at least
ten PT-76 amphibious tanks and
SAM-related equipment. Two other
Soviet ships have been sighted
en route to Bombay and are sus-
pected of carrying some military
cargo. These ships are deliver-
ing at least 58 aircraft crates.
They may contain AN-2 Colt single-
engine transports. It also is
possible they contain components
of MIG-21 Fishbed fighters for
25X1 assembly.
Negotiations in recent
months under what appears to be
the open-ended Soviet-Indian
military pact have resulted in
arrangements for additional
military hardware. The value
of military contracts with the
USSR since 1960 now exceeds $600
million, making India the third
largest non-Communist recipient
of Soviet military aid (after
Egypt and Indonesia).
Czechoslovak-Indian mili-
tary contracts also are being
implemented.
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President Sukarno's recent
moves against the Indonesian Army
have met no significant resist-
ance, and he now seems likely to
resume the leftist policies he
pursued prior to the 1 October
coup attempt.
Only the students openly op-
posed Sukarno's latest moves, and
they were notably unsuccessful.
When student demonstrators tried
to prevent the installation of
the reshuffled cabinet on 24 Feb-
ruary by blocking access roads
to the palace, Sukarno ordered
helicopters to ferry the minis-
ters over the roadblocks and mobs.
The following day he banned KAMI,
the anti-Communist student con-
federation that had organized the
resistance, and prohibited fur-
ther university student demon-
strations. On 3 March the higher
education minister ordered the
University of Indonesia temporar-
ily closed and banned student
"university and nonuniversity ac-
tivities."
At the cabinet installation
ceremony, Sukarno announced that
Indonesia would concentrate on
destroying the "remnants of feud-
alism" within the nation and on
crushing "imperialism," with em-
phasis on Malaysia. He told a
leftist student rally on 28 Feb-
ruary that the "revolution" had
been off the track since 1 Octo-
ber but that now Indonesia had
returned to its "original pro-
gressive revolutionary rails."
At the same rally, Foreign
Minister Subandrio urged left-
ists not to await government le-
gal action but to act on their
own to root out "counterrevolu-
tionaries." He said victory
must be fought for by eradicat-
ing those "who are using terror
against us by facing them with
counterterror."
Army leaders, although con-
tinuing their policy of showing
no open resistance to Sukarno,
are said to be discussing vari-
ous ways to protect or even ad-
vance their political position.
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The UK and Zambia are head-
ing toward a more protracted
struggle with Rhodesia as the
possibilities for London's "quick
kill" through economic sanctions
wane.
Rhodesia may be on the verge
of puncturing, if not smashing,
F3LUIIL'ANALANI
(U.K.)
the oil embargo, presently Brit-
ain's main economic lever. The
leakage of oil products to Rho-
desia through South Africa or
Mozambique may not supply signif-
icant amounts of petroleum
goods over a long period of
time. However, South African
and Portuguese governments do
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N"Pe SECRET
not appear to have stopped the
flow, which could permit Rhode-
sian oil stocks to last until
summer.
Before then Salisbury may
be able to reopen the pipeline
from the Mozambique port of Beira
to Rhodesia. The first of six
storage tanks under construction
to permit crude oil to be trans-
ferred from the docks to the
pipeline, bypassing British-con-
trolled facilities, reportedly
will be completed this weekend.
Portugal has already announced
that it will permit oil to be
pumped through the line if it
reaches Beira, thus breaking the
embargo. Numerous past reports have
indicated that "'pirate" oil firms
are willing to ship oil to Beira
for sale to Rhodesia. However,
to date Britain has been able to
persuade suspect ships on the
high seas to stay away from
Beira.
Zambian leaders are convinced
that economic sanctions alone will
not bring down the Smith regime,
and that military force, prefer-
ably British, will be necessary.
Britain's election campaign,
through 31 March, should help
forestall African pressures for
more militant action, but Presi-
dent Kaunda has warned the Brit-
ish that after the elections
Zambia will apply all possible
pressure to force British mili-
tary action.
Zambia went to this week's
OAU foreign ministers conference
still opposed to an OAU presence
in Zambia or a major Rhodesian
guerrilla effort. Either alterna-
tive would introduce racial ten-
sion and risk the departure of
white workers essential to the
Zambian economy, many of whom
sympathize with Smith.
The risk of a white exodus
was increased by renewed labor
strife in the copperbelt. Govern-
ment overreaction to wildcat
strikes has inflamed the white
mineworkers, who remain in the
country only because of financial
inducements. According to a white
Zambian official, Kaunda expects
a general strike by the miners
and is prepared to declare a
state of emergency and use army
and police units to prevent a
work stoppage.
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SECRET
The failure on 2 March of a
second effort to re-establish a
Catholic-Socialist coalition in
Belgium increases the likelihood
that elections will be called.
Political leaders have been able
to agree thus far on approaches
to only a few of the country's
economic, social, and ethnic
problems.
The two parties are unable
to agree on the education budget
or on the medicare issue which
brought the government down on
11 February. The Socialists
are holding out for insured
treatment with no supplementary
fees in certain Socialist hos-
pitals. The Catholics, on the
other hand, are supporting the
doctors, who insist on fee pay-
ments by individual patients.
The most recent negotiations
concentrated on government
finance and the threat of infla-
tion posed by the unbalanced
government budget. A committee
of experts, headed by national
bank president Ansiaux, has
recently pointed out that, un-
less corrective action is taken,
the budget deficit for 1966 will
be $820 million, equal to 20
percent of projected total
receipts. Ansiaux's projection
for 1967 is still gloomier, and
his report notes that between
1959 and 1964 the Belgian public
debt increased 20 percent as
compared with an average 8 per-
cent for the other EEC countries.
Catholic and Socialist
leaders agree on budget balanc-
ing, but the Socialists face
serious grass-roots opposition
on proposed budget cuts. The
Catholics are more nearly in
agreement on economic issues
with the Liberals--who make up
Belgium's third-ranking party--
than with the Socialists, and a
Catholic-Liberal coalition is
technically possible. Its
greatest practical difficulties
would arise from disagreement on
how to deal with relations be-
tween Dutch-speaking northern
Belgium and the French-speaking
south.
If elections are held, and
if the voters stick to the usual
Belgian pattern of favoring the
opposition, the Liberals are
likely to increase their present
23 percent of parliamentary
seats and substantially enhance
their prospect of being included
in the government.
25X1
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WEST GERMANY'S NEAR EAST PROBLEM
The West German Government has
resumed the difficult task of ful-
filling its commitments to Israel
and simultaneously improving its
ties with the Arab states. On 23
February, German and Israeli offi-
cials, meeting in Bonn, began draft-
ing an economic aid pact which is
expected to funnel large sums of
assistance to Israel for many years.
Two days later, Chancellor Erhard
told a press conference that he
would welcome any opportunity to
renew diplomatic relations with
those Arab states that broke with
Bonn last May, when it recognized
Israel.
The Bonn negotiations--which
aim at finding a replacement to
the reparations agreement under
which Israel received nearly $900
million--have already run into dif-
ficulties. German officials agree
that their nation has not yet com-
25Xlpletely repaid its moral debt, but
they view that debt in monetary
terms, as far smaller than does
Israel.
Israel is asking for a
minimum of $87.5 million annually
for four or five years.
Also implicit in the Israeli
argument is the contention that
West Germany should feel a sense
of responsibility for Israel's ter-
ritorial security. Bonn fears that
acceptance of this thesis, with its
implication of renewed military as-
sistance, would destroy its chances
for regaining Arab diplomatic ties.
The economic talks could thus
further sour relations which have
failed to live up to the expecta-
tions of either party. From time
to time, each has shown a remark-
able insensitivity to the other's
feelings. Bonn, for instance,
chose as its first ambassador Rolf
Pauls, a Wehrmacht veteran, and
appointed Alexander Toeroek, a
diplomat in the Nazi era, as his
deputy. Israel, in turn, chose
as its ambassador Asher Ben-Nathan,
a former Defense Ministry official
By failing thus far to build
a solid relationship with Israel,
the Erhard government has, in ef-
fect, left the door open to eased
relations with the Arab states, all
of which except Libya, Morocco,
and Tunisia severed political ties
with Bonn last spring. Trade ap-
parently has not suffered, although
Germany terminated economic aid
not already in the pipeline. Er-
hard has made it a point to com-
pliment the Arab states for not
establishing diplomatic ties with
East Germany.
West German representatives
have gone
to various Arab capitals to take
soundings on prospects for a new
ambassadorial exchange, and return
visits have been paid to Bonn.
Arab expectations of large sums of
economic aid have proven a major
stumbling block thus far, but Er-
hard seemingly remains hopeful.
His friendly words in recent days
apparently were timed to have an
impact on the meeting of the Arab
league this month.
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Western Hemisphere
A plenary commission of the
Organization of American States
(OAS) has been meeting in Panama
since 25 February to consider
proposals for strengthening and
modernizing the structure of the
OAS. The revisions approved in
Panama will be formally acted
upon at a special conference
scheduled for Buenos Aires in
July.
One change which is sure to
be adopted is the introduction
of some type of annual meeting
as a substitute for the irregu-
lar meetings of the OAS' highest
organ, the Inter-American Con-
ference.
Among major projects being
considered are enhancing the pow-
ers of the present council--the
standing body of the OAS--to en-
able it to deal more rapidly with
threats to hemispheric peace and
security, and a plan to create
two additional coequal councils to
deal with growing economic, so-
cial, and cultural activities.
The Inter-American Peace
Force is unlikely to be formalized
at this session. Also controver-
sial is a charter amendment con-
cerning the peaceful settlement
of disputes. Favored by Ecuador
and other countries which are dis-
satisfied with existing boundaries,
this item will draw staunch re-
sistance from countries such as
Argentina, Peru, and Chile which
are dedicated to preserving the
sanctity of treaties.
While not definitive, the
commission's efforts will furnish
an indication of the course that
the OAS will probably take in
REASSIGNMENT OF DOMINICAN MILITARY CHIEFS DRAWS BOSCH'S FIRE
The outgoing Dominican Air
Force and Army chiefs were sworn
in on 26 February as vice minis-
ters of defense, positions with
no responsibility. Their deci-
sion to accept the shift was made
reluctantly partly as a result
of arguments by newly designated
Defense Minister Perez and other
military moderates that the mili-
tary was harming itself by con-
tinued defiance of civilian au-
thority.
President Garcia Godoy was
equally unhappy about this
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compromise solution. However,
having said he wanted a "Domini-
can solution," he was not prepared
to call on the Inter-American
Peace Force to exile the old
service chiefs to overseas as-
signments by force.
The new service chiefs,
Folch of the air force and Per-
domo of the army, were selected
by Garcia Godoy from candidates
put forward by the military, and
their political orientation is
as unacceptable to the left as
that of their predecessors. Bosch
strongly criticized this com-
promise solution in a radio ad-
dress on 28 February. He charged
that Garcia Godoy had "ignored"
his promise to the left and had
set a precedent for future mili-
tary disrespect of any elected
government. This, Bosch charged,
made it "useless" to hold elec-
tions on 1 June. Although Bosch
avoided calling for a renewal of
the general strike, ended on 16
February, to obtain military com-
pliance with the government's
original order, he clearly left
this course open. He was par-
ticularly critical of Garcia
Godoy's leadership abilities,
saying that he "bobbed like a
cork" and that while the provi-
sional regime "crowed like a
rooster" it "laid eggs like a
hen."
Garcia Godoy has not re-
sponded to Bosch's criticism,
but he apparently considers his
battle for military command
changes ended. He evidently was
heartened by Bosch's failure to
attack either the specifics of
the agreement with the military
or the new chiefs. To appease
the left for his decision on the
military issue, he has recognized
the election of a university coun-
cil controlled by radical leftists
and Communists--a concession which
will have detrimental long-term
effects. in doing this, he is
probably trying to avoid prolonga-
tion of the civil-military impasse,
which would seriously jeopardize
the holding of elections on sched-
ule.
Bosch, in his speech, focused
attention on the election by al-
leging that the government had
failed to create a proper climate
and implying that for this reason
he may not be a candidate. He
will probably run if he feels he
can win and assume office, but he
is likely to continue his threats
to boycott the election in the
hope of forcing the government to
honor his demands for security of
himself and his supporters during
the election campaign.
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Reform of Uruguay's unwieldy
nine-man executive--the National
Council of Government (NCG)--has
become a major concern of both the
governing Blanco Party and the op-
position Colorados. Originally
unresponsive to the public demand
for reform, substantial segments
of both parties have now gone on
record as favoring constitutional
measures to strengthen the execu-
tive. They hope this will provide
the firm leadership needed to halt
the increasing political and eco-
nomic deterioration.
The two largest Blanco fac-
tions are in basic agreement on a
proposal to create a presidential
system under which the president,
vice president, senators, and depu-
ties would be elected by straight
majority vote rather than by the
present complicated summing of votes
for each party faction. A contin-
uing point of difference between
the two groups, however, is the
Herrerista faction's desire to con-
tinue the present bipartisan repre-
sentation on the directorates of
the autonomous government agencies
--thus assuring itself a share in
high-level political spoils even
if the Blancos do not win the No-
vember elections.
Portions of the Colorado
Party's three largest factions
have agreed on a common reform
project--fairly similar to the
Blanco proposals--but have not suc-
ceeded in getting support from
other Colorados. Some of the lat-
ter adamantly oppose altering the
party's traditional support for the
bipartisan plural executive system
which the Colorados introduced and
have historically fought for; others
favor a one-party five-man NCG.
Some politicians dislike the pro-
posal that current NCG members be
made ineligible for the first presi-
dency, as several councilors con-
sider themselves leading presiden-
tial contenders.
The influential Uruguayan
Communist Party (PCU) opposes all
reforms which would lead to a
strong executive able to halt the
Communists' exploitation of the cur-
rent slump and to reduce their
present freedom of operation. The
PCU is sponsoring its own radical
reforms, more in hopes of splitting
votes than in expectation of having
its proposals adopted.
The mechanics of reform are
complicated and prospects for a
change before November seem slim.
If the Blancos and Colorados cannot
reach a compromise and decide to
submit separate proposals to the
voters, it is probable that no one
project will receive the necessary
majority. Frustration of the
strong desire for reform would en-
courage those who feel change must
come, by unconstitutional means if
no others are available. Even if
Uruguay adopts a presidential sys-
tem, there will be no cure for the
country's economic and political
distress unless the president is
prepared to make and enforce diffi-
cult decisions and is able to over-
come Uruguay's unfortunate tradi-
tion of putting partisan advan-
tage ahead of the national wel-
fare.
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The Cuban Communist Party
(CCP), formally constituted at
the national level late in 1965,
is continuing its drive to in-
crease its membership and to ex-
tend its influence over all as-
pects of Cuban life. The general
structure and organization of
the party presumably will have
been completed by the end of this
year when a "socialist" constitu-
tion is to be promulgated.
On 23 February the Political
Bureau announced the formation
of a Labor Committee to advise
the Central Committee "on every-
thing concerning labor and social
policies." Lazaro Pena, Cuba's
most prominent labor leader and
a member of the pro-Castro Commu-
nist Party, has been appointed
chairman, and three of the four
other members are also "old" Com-
munists. The creation of the
Labor Committee for the first
time brings labor affairs under
direct party control but leaves
power in the hands of the same
men. Nevertheless, the move
again emphasizes the decline of
friction between Cuba's "old" and
"new" Communists, and demonstrates
that the leadership now functions
with a greater unity than at any
time since Castro came to power.
Five other standing commit-
tees, set up in October 1965 when
the Central Committee was created,
have assumed wide responsibility
for domestic and foreign affairs.
This shift of power from govern-
ment to party was underlined on
24 February when Osmani Cienfue-
gos, chairman of the party's For-
eign Relations Committee, was
relieved of his duties as minis-
ter of construction to devote
full attention to foreign policy
and party affairs. The appoint-
ment of Ramon Darias Rodes to
replace him reflects the policy
evident during the past year or
so of placing young and skilled
technicians in high ministry po-
sitions.
There now are probably
about 55,000 party members, as
many as one third of whom may
be from the Cuban armed forces.
Party cells are still being or-
ganized in military units, and
on 24 February the first cell
in an artillery unit was estab-
lished. The Union of Communist
Youth (UJC), the party's youth
wing, has also considerably
expanded its membership in the
military, and the regime hopes
to include about one third of
the military in the two organi-
zations. In so expanding the
role of the military in the
party, Castro's objective is
to amalgamate the regime's two
most important forces.
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