WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005200030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 25, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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0030001-3
COpY .No.;
State Dept. review completed '~- .' !-, v. / 5-'
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_
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VW
SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noc EST, 24 February 1966)
VIETNAM
Large allied forces continue to maintain pressure on
enemy strongholds throughout South Vietnam. Viet Cong
activity increased this week in northernmost I Corps.
South Vietnam's new cabinet--generally characterized
by the youth and southern origin of the new appointees
--should permit more effective handling of economic
problems, as well as stanch charges of undue northerner
influence in Saigon. Hanoi continues to attack peace
talk proposals in harsh terms, but not without showing
concern that its hard line is alienating its non-Communist
supporters,
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS
The major powers seem no closer to agreement on a non-
proliferation agreement. The nonaligned states now are
insisting that the nuclear powers make concessions if
they expect others to agree not to acquire nuclear arms.
The Communist World
USSR UNVEILS FAIRLY REALISTIC ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1966-70
The draft of the new Soviet five-year plan sets targets
for 1970 which are substantially lower than the gran-
diose ones promulgated by Khrushchev in 1961,
Page
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SECRET
BULGARIAN PREMIER MAY RESIGN FOLLOWING NATIONAL ELECTIONS 10
Todor Zhivkov, the only bloc leader still holding the
top jobs in both party and government, may use announce-
ment of a new government next month as a convenient
occasion to step down gracefully from the premiership.
11
HUNGARIAN REGIME ATTEMPTS TO BRAKE POPULAR DISCONTENT
The Kadar regime is engaged in a campaign to impress on
the population its intention to deal severely with any
threat to stability--without, however, discontinuing its
tolerance of criticism and differences of opinion.
SUKARNO STRIKES BACK AT INDONESIAN ARMY
General Nasution, leader of the army's anti-Communist
campaign, has been removed as defense minister, and
President Sukarno seems to have regained most of his
former authority.
FAYSAL AND NASIR RESUME CONTACT OVER YEMEN royalists and
Although the peace conference between rrepublicans failed to resume as scheduled last weekend,
a communication from King Faysal to President Nasir
has restored contact between the sponsors of the Yemeni
rivals.
ADEN NATIONALISTS MAY BE ABANDONING TERRORISM
No incidents have been reported in several weeks, a new
to have
political body
rarist group, ,
plans lessens the sense of conflict.
SECRET
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LEFTIST MILITARY FACTION SEIZES POWER IN SYRIAN CAPITAL 17
The move by followers of former army chief of staff
Jadid followed a series of actions by the relatively
moderate government to undermine them.
ARMY OVERTHROWS NKRUMAH REGIME IN GHANA 17
Officers long opposed to Nkrumah took advantage of his
absence abroad to move on 24 February. They are likely
to be less hostile to the West.
PRIME MINISTER SEIZES SUPREME POWER IN UGANDA 18
Obote acted on 22 February in response to growing ag-
gressiveness by critics within his party as well as
by political opponents.
Europe
THE EEC AND THE KENNEDY ROUND
Despite the settlement of the EEC crisis last month,
indications are that the community will make only lim-
ited and piecemeal advances on its Kennedy Round nego-
tiating position during the next few months.
PREMIER MORO FORMS NEW GOVERNMENT IN ITALY
The 33-day-old government crisis ended with formation
of Christian Democrat Moro's third center-left coali-
tion cabinet, but the disunity within his party which
precipitated the crisis has only been papered over.
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SECRET
AUSTRIA'S NATIONAL ELECTIONS
Parliamentary elections set for 6 March could bring im-
portant changes in the two-party coalition which has
ruled since World War -II. These in turn might bring a
more incisive government program for domestic affairs
but no change at all in foreign policy.
Western Hemisphere
DEATH OF COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA LEADER MAY REDUCE TERRORISM
Ex-priest Camilo Torres, killed last week in an ambush
of an army patrol, had been expected to attract support
for the guerrilla movement.
SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CHILE
-In-response to Chilean initiatives taken in pursuit of
the Frei administration's "independent foreign policy,"
the USSR in recent months has taken steps to increase
trade. Moscow is also trying to thaw relations be-
tween the Frei government and Chile's Communist Party.
SECRET
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``e SECRET
Large allied forces continue
to maintain pressure on enemy
strongholds throughout South
Vietnam. Viet Cong activity in-
creased this week in northernmost
I Corps.
Two Viet Cong attacks of
battalion strength were reported
in Quang Tri Province on 22 Feb-
ruary, resulting in some 68 gov-
ernment casualties. In Quang
Nam on the same day, several Viet
Cong companies attacked govern-
ment forces guarding a bridge
and battled reinforcements through-
out the day.
Meanwhile, South Vietnamese
troops operating near Hue in
Thua Thien Province encountered
stiff opposition from a possible
new Viet Cong regiment, and re-
ported 154 casualties in two
days of fighting. In neighbor-
ing Quang Tin Province, US ma-
rines launched an operation near
the provincial capital of Tam Ky,
where increasing enemy pressure
had recently been reported. Lit-
tle contact has resulted thus
far although the Viet Cong First
Regiment, the North Vietnamese
36th Regiment, and several inde-
pendent battalions are suspected
of being in the area.
Elsewhere, allied forces
continue to encounter pockets
of enemy opposition in Operation
WHITE WING, now in its fifth
week in northeastern Binh Dinh
Province. Cumulative enemy
losses have risen to more than
1,600 killed and 375 captured.
Allied casualties are 267 killed
(146 US), 1,040 wounded (691 US),
and 15 missing (all US).
South Vietnamese troops on
a routine search-and-destroy op-
eration in northern Darlac Prov-
ince this week established con-
tact with large Communist forces.
SECRET
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SECRET
Farther south, US forces
initiated a major operation
against Viet Cong forces and
installations in the border area
of Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and Hau
Nghia provinces on 20 February.
Little contact with Viet Cong
main forces has resulted F -
should offset criticism of the
government as being overly in-
fluenced by northerners. By
finding other jobs within the
government for the ministers he
replaced, Ky apparently avoided
the problem of disgruntled ex-
officials. The reorganization
should permit more effective
handling of growing economic
problems, and the US Embassy be-
lieves that the new cabinet may
provide stronger governmental
teamwork.
Hanoi on Negotiations
South Vietnam's New Cabinet
Premier Ky's cabinet reor-
ganization was announced on 21
February, after receiving the
approval of the ruling military
Directorate. The most signifi-
cant changes are the installa-
tion of a new minister of national
economy and the division of the
public works and communications
function into separate portfolios,
with new men to handle each one.
A ministry of veterans' affairs
was also established, as were
secretariats--attached directly
to the premier's office--for
montagnards, refugees, and in-
spection (corruption).
The new appointees are gen-
erally characterized by their
youth and southern origin, which
DRV propaganda continues to
attack current negotiations pro-
posals in harsh terms. The party
daily this week ran an article by
Chien Si which criticized "charita-
ble persons" in the world--
whether "governments, the UN, or
religious powers"--for urging
Hanoi to make concessions in its
terms for peace. The article
made it clear that no such con-
cession will be forthcoming.
Articles by Chien Si--whose name
is a pseudonym meaning "fighter"
--almost always contain some of
Hanoi's toughest language.
There are growing signs,how-
ever, of Hanoi's concern that its
continued rejection of negotia-
tion proposals is losing support
abroad, particularly in the non-
aligned countries.
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Ite SECRET
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SECRET
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SECRET
Earlier this month North Vietnam-
ese politburo member Le Due Tho
publicly criticized Foreign Min-
istry officials for failing to
generate significant world sup-
port for Hanoi's policies, and
many DRV ambassadors are believed
to be currently in Hanoi for
briefing sessions.
Hanoi had planned to play
host to President Nkrumah of
Ghana this coming week in an ef-
fort to drum up African support
for Vietnamese Communist policies.
Nkrumah's past efforts to mediate
the dispute had been politely
turned aside by the North Viet-
namese.
The coup against Nkrumah on
the eve of his arrival in Hanoi,
however, leaves the whole ques-
tion of his trip and its objec-
tives in some doubt.
Peking on War With the US
Peking on 20 February re-
sponded to Assistant Secretary
of State William P. Bundy's
speech of 12 February with an
authoritative People's Daily
article emphasizing Peking's
"peaceful nature" and attempting
to prove that it was the US
which was threatening China. In
asserting that an enemy such as
the US stimulated the Chinese
people to greater sacrifice,
unity, and accomplishment, the
Chinese came close to admitting
that Peking is consciously ex-
ploiting the specter of a Sino-
US war for domestic purposes.
The article clearly treated
war with the US as a contingency
rather than an inevitability and
conveyed little or no sense of
urgency. It concluded with a
repetition of Peking's standard
line implying that China will
not provoke a war with the US,
asserting that "should US im-
perialism dare to attack China,
it will be courting its doom."
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SECRET
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS
At the Geneva disarmament
talks the major powers seem to
have moved no closer to agreement
on a nonproliferation treaty.
The negotiations now are compli-
cated by the insistence of some
of the nonaligned states that the
nuclear powers must make conces-
sions if they expect other coun-
tries to agree not to acquire
nuclear weapons.
India, which usually acts
as the voice of the nonaligned
at Geneva, has publicly stated
that neither the Soviet nor the
US draft of a nonproliferation
treaty is acceptable. Not only
does India oppose "special dis-
pensation" for military alliances
in the context of nonprolifera-
tion, but its delegate has de-
clared that any treaty acceptable
to New Delhi must embody obliga-
tions on the part of the nuclear
states--such as a freeze on pro-
duction of nuclear weapons and
vehicles.
This demand reflects the
growing feeling of insecurity
among Indian defense officials
in light of the recent Indian-
Pakistani difficulties and fur-
ther development of the Chinese
nuclear weapons program. There
is now increasing pressure on
the Indian Government to develop
its own nuclear weapons. India
has been supported by Japan,
whose foreign minister has taken
the stand that the nuclear powers
should not try to prevent non-
nuclear powers from obtaining
nuclear capability without re-
ducing their own nuclear resources.
Given the special concerns
of the nonaligned, Soviet Premier
Kosygin's recent proposal to pro-
hibit use of nuclear weapons
against nonnuclear states which
are parties to the nonprolifera-
tion treaty and which do not have
nuclear weapons on their terri-
tories appears to have been well
timed. His ideas quickly won a
sympathetic response from the
nonaligned, but the West sees in
them an obstacle to any nuclear-
sharing arrangements in NATO.
They also raise the question
whether the US and its Allies
would be allowed to continue to
station nuclear weapons in West
Germany.
A Western counterproposal--
perhaps one that simply offered
assistance from nuclear powers
to nonnuclear powers in case of
attack--is being considered but
no agreed draft has been produced.
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SECRET
THE NEW SOVIET FIVE-YEAR PLAN
Table I OVER-ALL INDICATORS
NATIONAL INCOME
Merest concept.'
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
'Western concept;
Gross Value of Output''
Net Value Added
Gross ?"
Net
Average Annual Percentage Rote of Growth
1961-65 (Actual) USSR's Figure for
USSR's CIA's 1966-70 (Plan)
2.2 4.6
2.3
The official measure excludes the value of services and overstates the
contribution of industry by including all indirect taxes.
Including double counting of raw materials and intermediate products.
Including double counting of livestock products and animal feed.
Average annual increase 1966-70 over 1961-65.
table II PLANNED RECOVERY of SOVIET INVESTMENT
Average Annual Rate of Growth
(rounded to nearest %7 percent)
1961-65 (Actual) 1966-70 (Plan)
Total Gross Fixed Investment 517
Industry, Transport,. and
67
Communications
Housing and Consumer
Services
Table 111 NEW, MORE REALISTIC 1414 GOALS
Claimed
1965
Item Output
New
1970
Goal.
Khrushchev's
1970
Goal"
w.ar
Oil (million metric torts)
Electric Power
(billion kilowatt-h1`51
507
845
950
Steel (million metric to'e)
91
127
145
Machinery (billion rubles)
60
99
115
Fertilizer
(million metric tons)
Plastics and Resins
(1,000 metric tons)
821
2.200
5,300
Chemical Fibers
(1
000 metric tons)
407
805
1,350
,
Cement (million metric tons)
72
103
127
Textiles (billion square meters)
7.5
9.7
13.6
Leather footwear
486
620
825
(million pairs)
Grain (million metric tons)
121
169
229
Meat (million metric tons) ---
9.6
11.8
75
Under the 1966-70 plan.
tinder 20-year program outlined in 1961.
Actual production estimated of IOU million metric tons of grain and
t34 million metric tons of meat.
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SECRET NW
USSR UNVEILS FAIRLY REALISTIC ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1966-70
The draft of the new Soviet
five-year plan is generally a
realistic projection of trends of
the recent past, although it in-
cludes factors that make its com-
plete accomplishment doubtful.
In all instances the new targets
for 1970 are substantially re-
duced from the grandiose goals
for 1970 promulgated by Khru-
shchev in 1961.
The plan is highlighted by
an increase of about 40 percent
in national income and a 36-per-
cent increase in the real income
of consumers--or a 30-percent
rise on a per capita basis.
Over-all investment is planned
to increase by 47 percent over
the 1961-65 total.
As in the past, the an-
nounced data are not precise
enough to give a clear indica-
tion of projected trends in de-
fense spending. The most direct
reference to defense is a state-
ment on the need to "ensure the
further growth of the defense
might of the Soviet Union."
A 50-percent increase in in-
dustrial output is expected to
result from an equivalent per-
centage increase in industrial
investment. This projection is
in line with the performance of
recent years. In contrast, a
25-percent increase in agricul-
tural production is expected to
require about a 95-percent in-
crease in agricultural investment.
The Brezhnev agricultural program
--which is retained in its en-
tirety--at least recognizes the
high cost of expanding food pro-
duction in the USSR. Even so,
the agricultural goal is probably
much higher than can be attained.
Within industry, the produc-
tion gap between capital and con-
sumer goods is expected to narrow,
but heavy industry is still favored
for the rest of the 1960s. Large
planned increases in the enumerated
industrial items appear attainable
in light of the projected growth
in investment and labor productiv-
ity. The so-called progressive
industries--electronics, engineer-
ing, chemistry, and metallurgy--
are singled out for especially
rapid development during 1966-70.
The 25-percent increase
planned for agriculture is well
in excess of the 12-percent rise
claimed for 1961-65. This also
holds for the projected 30-percent
increase in grain production.
Soviet statistics on grain pro-
duction, which US intelligence
considers inflated since 1958,
show only a seven-percent rise in
the past five years.
The USSR apparently is count-
ing heavily on the incentives
contained in Brezhnevts agricul-
tural program for 1966-70 to
reach its 1970 goals for farm
products. Increased yields are
stated to be the major factor in
this growth, along with a huge
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 25 Feb 66
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planned increase of 40-45 percent
in agricultural labor productiv-
ity. A monthly guaranteed wage
for collective farm workers and
other steps to improve the rela-
tive economic standing of the
peasantry are to be primary means
for achieving this rise in pro-
ductivity.
Large increases are planned
in the production of consumer
durables, including an almost
fourfold rise in the output of
automobiles, but effective de-
mands for many of these items
probably will not be met during
the plan period. Even if the
automobile target is reached,
production in 1970 would still
total only about 750,000 units,
or less than ten percent of US
output last year. The major em-
phasis in consumer welfare will
be to narrow the gap in living
standards between the rural and
urban population. The incomes
of collective farmers, for ex-
ample, are planned to grow by
35 to 40 percent by 1970, com-
pared with a 20-percent rise pro-
jected for nonfarm incomes.
Achievement of the projected
increases in the per capita con-
sumption of food products would
mean a significant improvement
in the Soviet diet. Grain prod-
ucts and potatoes, which now
make up about 60 percent of the
Soviet citizen's daily caloric
intake, are to account for less
than half by 1970. The maximum
planned per capita consumption
of meat by 1970 is to be almost
100 pounds per year. This would
be an impressive increase on
a relative basis, but still less
than half of current US consump-
tion.
The plan directives speak
in generalized terms of the bene-
fits expected from technological
progress and the new system of
economic management now being
introduced into Soviet industry.
The regime apparently feels that
potential but unmeasurable de-
velopments in these fields should
be incorporated in planning for
the next five years.
The plan draft stresses re-
peatedly that the decisions of
the March agricultural plenum
and the September plenum on eco-
nomic management and administra-
tion underlie the achievement
of the 1966-70 goals. The reit-
eration of the continuing im-
portance of these meetings, which
are closely associated with Brezh-
nev and Kosygin respectively,
appears to emphasize their po-
litical strength as the USSR
moves toward its 23rd party con-
gress a little more than a month
away. The congress will un-
doubtedly approve the present
draft of the 1966-70 plan with
only peripheral adjustments in
some of the details.
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BULGARIAN PREMIER MAY RESIGN FOLLOWING NATIONAL ELECTIONS
Bulgarian party first secre-
tary Todor Shivkov may give up
his other position of prime minis-
ter following the proforma na-
tional elections on 27 February.
Rumors to this effect have per-
sisted since the ouster of Khru-
shchev and were particularly prev-
alent immediately following
last April's antiregimc conspir-
acy.
The first session of the
newly enlarged (416 deputies)
National Assembly next month, when
the old government formally re-
signs, would present a convenient
occasion for Zhivkov to withdraw
gracefully from the premiership.
On the other hand, the expected
division of party-government lead-
ership could be delayed until af-
ter the ninth party congress later
this year.
Zhivkov is the only Soviet
bloc leader still to hold both
the top party and government po-
sitions. The 54-year-old leader
had said he planned to retain
the two positions at least un-
til the elections. Last October
he told a visiting New York
Times correspondent tFe party
central committee wanted him to
keep both jobs, but that it was
too much work for one man. He
may have held on this long in an
effort to promote Bulgaria's new
image of self-determination
rather than once again be ac-
cused of being a Soviet syco-
phant.
First Deputy Premier Zhivko
Zhivkov, a capable and experi-
enced administrator, is the most
likely candidate to replace
Todor Zhivkov as prime minister.
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Deputy premiers Stanko Todorov
and Pencho Kubadinski are dark
horses. Because of the trend
toward splitting party-state
leadership, members of the party
secretariat would seem to be ex-
cluded from advancement in the
government hierarchy. Additional
leadership reshuffling may occur
during 1966 to fill long-standing
vacancies created by the death of
politburo member Dimitur Ganev
and the promotion of former first
deputy premier Georgi Traykov.
The Kadar regime is engaged
in a campaign to impress upon the
Hungarian population its inten-
tion to deal severely with any
threat to stability--without,
however, discontinuing its toler-
ance of criticism and differences
of opinion.
The regime is using a mix-
ture of frequent announcements of
arrests, explanatory editorials,
and speeches by prominent offi-
cials in an effort to discourage
criticism and to brake popular
discontent which rose when price
increases were announced 19 De-
cember in connection with pro-
posed economic reforms. As part
of this campaign, the party daily
commented on 19 February on the
rearrest over the past year of a
number of priests and laymen on
charges of conspiracy against the
state.
There is no evidence of a
drive aimed specifically at the
church. Nevertheless, relations
with the Vatican have deteriorated
because of these arrests.
Former Hungarian citizens,
generally urged by the regime to
return for visits, have also come
under editorial fire and in some
cases have been summarily ex-
pelled for "incitement."
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President Sukarno this week
inflicted a major defeat on the
Indonesian Army and now appears
to have largely completed the
restoration of his former author-
ity.
In a cabinet reshuffle an-
nounced on 21 February, General
Nasution, leader of the army's
anti-Communist political campaign,
was removed as defense minister.
His other post as chief of the
armed forces staff was abolished.
The new defense minister is Major
General Sarbini, an anti-Communist
regarded in the past as loyal to
Nasution. Sukarno presumably
feels he will be able to exert
considerable influence over Sar-
bini.
The cabinet changes also
included replacement of several
moderate members by leftists,
and the general complexion of
the 100-man body has now shifted
leftward. Sukarno also abolished
the Supreme Operations Command
(KOTI) which the army during a
brief period several months ago
tried to expand into a super-
cabinet and which it had con-
tinued to use as a channel for
political action. He replaced
it with a new organization whose
mission will be confined to mili-
tary operations against Malaysia.
Initial statements by army
leaders expressed strong opposition
to Sukarno's countermoves. Nasu-
tion, however, continues to main-
tain that a direct confrontation
between the army and Sukarno
would end in disaster, and the
military now seems willing to
accept Sukarno's latest actions
without a contest.
Following the announcement
of 21 February both leftist and
anti-Communist students began
demonstrating in Djakarta. On
23 February leftist students
staged a brief attack on the US
Embassy. The following day right-
wing students staged a massive
demonstration in front of the
palace in a futile attempt to
prevent the installation of the
new cabinet. The army did not
connive in this, and for the
present appears unwilling to
give strong encouragement to its
student partisans.
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 Ssu maof
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The Harad peace conference
between Yemeni royalists and re-
publicans failed to reconvene on
20 February as scheduled, but the
dialogue has been resumed between
the rivals' backers, Saudi Arabia's
King Faysal, and Egypt's President
Nasir.
Faysal has also been seeking
international support in case
the renewed relationship with
Nasir breaks down completely.
He has sent Prince Sultan to the
US to warn of what the Saudis see
as a Communist menace in the
Red Sea area.
Both republicans and royal-
ists still seem prepared to re-
sume their talks--recessed in
December--although neither side
has indicated a readiness to al-
ter previous positions which
caused a deadlock. An important
reason for the lack of progress
is a growing alienation between
Nasir and Faysal over the inter-
pretation of their Jidda agree- 25X1
ment of last August which out-
lined the steps for achieving
peace in Yemen.
As before the Jidda Agree-
ment, Cairo does not seem to be
consulting the present Yemeni
Government for suggestions or
approval of actions.
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ADEN NATIONALISTS MAY BE ABANDONING TERRORISM
There are increasing signs
that the terrorist campaign against
British rule in Aden and the South
Arabian Federation is being aban-
doned. Since early last month,
when Egypt merged the two chief
nationalist groups into a new or-
ganization, no terrorist incidents
have been reported. London's an-
nouncement on 22 February of its
intention to abandon the Aden mil-
itary base in 1968 deprives the
Cairo-backed nationalists of their
prime cause.
Previously the principal out-
lets for anti-British activity
had been the National Liberation
Front (NLF), a terrorist organi-
zation, and the People's Socialist
Party (PSP), which had stuck to
legal political methods. Despite
the success of its mounting acts
of violence, which led the Brit-
ish to suspend the constitution
last September, the NLF had failed
to get along with either its Egyp-
tian sponsors or moderate national-
ists like the PSP.
The new movement, the Front
for the Liberation of Occupied
South Yemen (FLOSY), is an at-
tempt by Cairo to bridge the gap
between terrorism and political
action. FLOSY, in meetings in
Cairo, is currently trying to get
its organizational structure set.
It has already attracted the at-
tention of political groups which
had shunned the NLF. Even dis-
sident tribal leaders and the
South Arabian League, whose
strength lies in the federation,
have observers at these meetings,
despite their opinion that FLOSY
is more likely to aid Aden alone
than the broader based federa-
tion.
FLOSY may be preparing to
set up a government in exile,
although the leadership is in
dispute. Former Aden premier
Makkawi, whom the British de-
posed in September, is the nat-
ural candidate. The Egyptians,
however, apparently prefer Ab-
dulla Asnag, the Adeni labor
leader who heads the PSP.
London's evacuation plans
were met with initial bitterness
in the British-backed federation.
Its foreign minister stated, how-
ever, that evacuation would give
the Federation a basis for a
reconciliation with Egypt and
with moderate Adeni nationalists
like Asnag. The failure of the
Asnag group to join recent dis-
cussions of constitutional pro-
posals nevertheless suggests
that the Adeni nationalists have
not yet made up their minds as
to whether they want a completely
independent Aden or to associate
with the federation,
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A dissident hard-line mili-
tary faction of Syria's Baath
Party seized power in Damascus
early on 23 February. The move
was led by followers of Major
General Salah Jadid, a former
army chief of staff who was
ousted by more moderate Baath
leaders in December.
The military clique pro-
claimed a curfew, closed Syria's
borders, and announced the ar-
rest of Presidential Council
Chairman Hafiz and the party's
key civilian leaders, including
Prime Minister Salah al-Din Bitar.
Radio Damascus announced that a
new "provisional regional command"
of the party would rule until a
permanent new command could be
established.
The extent of the group's
support is still uncertain, how-
ever. Radio Aleppo, in the north,
announced on 23 February that
army units in Aleppo and central
Syria had remained loyal to Hafiz
and Bitar. The key southwest
frontier command also apparently
opposed the coup initially.
Units there, however, had made no
move as of 24 February.
The radicals in Damascus,
for their part, claim the loyalty
of all important units, and on
24 February Radio Aleppo began
stating that northern military
units supported the coup although
the situation there remains con-
fused. Damascus has announced
the appointments of a new chief
of staff and a minister of de-
fense. Jadid's role was not clari-
fied. The known leaders of the
group are considered radicals,
but how far to the left of the
socialist Bitar regime they would
shift is still uncertain.
The conflict had been build-
ing up since December, when the
moderates dissolved the Jadid-
dominated regional organization
of the Baath and appointed Bitar
to form a new government. The
Jadidists' influence had been
further dissipated last week when
the regime purged the party's
legislative body of its military
members.
ARMY OVERTHROWS NKRUMAH REGIME IN GHANA
Ghanaian Army and police of-
ficers long opposed to President
Nkrumah took advantage of his
absence on a trip to Asian Commu-
nist capitals to end his radical
regime on 24 February. His dis-
missal was announced by Colonel
Kotoka, commander of one of the
army's two brigades. Ghana's
only political party has been
disbanded, and other offices and
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institutions abolished, including
the cabinet and parliament.
Most of the military--par-
ticularly in the capital area--
appear to be supporting the coup,
including Colonel Ocran, com-
mander of the other brigade. The
top army officer, Chief of Defense
Staff Aferi, is in Addis Ababa
on OAU matters. Nothing has
been heard from chief of staff
Barwah. The air force and navy
commanders were arrested at once,
probably for vacillating, and
General Hassan, the military in-
telligence chief believed loyal
to Nkrumah, has also been de-
tained.
The initial outlines of the
new regime are beginning to take
shape. The coup leaders have
recalled General Ankrah--dis-
missed as deputy defense staff
chief by Nkrumah for suspected
disloyalty last summer--and have
named him commander of the armed
forces. They seem generally in-
clined toward a more moderate re-
gime which will at least be ap-
preciably less hostile to the
West than Nkrumah's.
Nkrumalh apparently was still
unaware of the coup when he ar-
rived in Peking on a flight from
Rangoon. lie is unlikely to try
to return to Ghana immediately
in a bid to reverse the coup, but
he will surely plot a comeback
from wherever he lights.
Prime Minister Obote seized t The well-disciplined, apo-
supreme power in Uganda on 22 I litical special police who are
February in a desperate bid for
political survival. His sudden
move, executed almost single-
handedly, appears to have neu-
tralized all opposition.
Five moderate southern min-
isters of Obote's own party are
under detention in the north.
The police are searching for lead-
ers of the opposition parties,
but most of them, including Presi-
dent Mutesa, are unaccounted-for.
To justify his move Obote has
charged the arrested ministers
with plotting to overthrow him,
and he may also claim they re-
ceived foreign financial aid.
responsible to the prime minis-
ter and commanded by a northerner
accounted for Obote's initial
success. Next day he ensured
control of the faction-ridden
army by restoring Chief of Staff
Amin to active command.
Obote's increasingly ag-
gressive foes had previously
backed him into a corner. Last
week the cabinet's moderate ma-
jority forced him to agree pub-
licly to court-martial Colonel
Amin and to set up an interna-
tional commission to investigate
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`Vol SECRET
government corruption. These
boards would almost certainly
have incriminated Obote, Amin,
and two other radical northern
ministers for pocketing some
$300,000 from the Congolese
rebels last year.
Obote and the very few radi-
cal cronies in on his plan have
set themselves against almost
every important element in Uganda
politics. Obote can be expected
to abolish the cabinet, parlia-
ment, and political parties to
eliminate the power of the tradi-
25X1
tional southern tribal leaders.
He will also try to remove from
the scene all influential poli-
ticians who might serve as a
rallying point for the country's
conservative majority.
Obote's regime will almost
certainly veer to the left in
African and international af-
fairs and probably seek increased
military aid from the USSR. The 25X1
British military attache has
been advised that he is persona
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The EEC Council will resume
a semblance of normal activity
when it meets next week, but in-
dications now are that the com-
munity will make only limited
and piecemeal advances on its
Kennedy Round negotiating posi-
tion during the next few months.
In a preliminary discussion
last week by the permanent rep-
resentatives of preparations for
Kennedy Round negotiations--the
first serious one since France's
return to the EEC bodies in Brus-
sels--there were signs the French
intended to drag their feet. The
French representative, for ex-
ample, rejected a procedural sug-
gestion of the Commission which
he argued would imply that the
EEC's list of items to be ex-
cepted from tariff reductions was
negotiable. On another point,
the French made it clear that
discussions the Commission was
authorized to begin on chemicals
in the Kennedy Round talks in
Geneva could only be "exploratory."
Although the Six agreed in
the January "settlement" of the
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SF "RE T
crisis that Kennedy Round ques-
tions should be taken up con-
currentig with EEC agricultural
financing and regulations for
marketing and pricing of indi-
vidual commodities within the
community, it is uncertain
whether this will in fact be
possible. Both the French and
Italians are hesitant about a
German suggestion to proceed
commodity by commodity in Geneva
as the EEC resolves each agri-
cultural regulation, rather than
to wait until the community can
present an agreed complete agri-
cultural package balancing the
individual priorities of the
Six. A Luxembourg official has
remarked that German pressure
for "premature" consideration
of Kennedy Round issues might
renew or increase tensions with
France and thereby result in
slower rather than more rapid
progress toward community agree-
ment on Kennedy Round offers.
High French officials, mean-
while, have been making state-
ments skeptical of the urgency
of "early" tariff reductions and
emphasizing the vulnerability
of French industry to rapid lower-
ing of tariffs. They have also
revived political arguments
against the Kennedy Round which
were associated with the period
preceding the collapse of the UK
accession talks in 1963. Thus
1 several recent speeches Agri-
ci'ture Minister Faure has played
on the alleged danger to Euro-
pean unity of a weakening of the
community's protective external
tariff. What is rapidly assum-
ing the proportion of a new
French campaign holding out trade
liberalization only as a long-
term goal is probably due in part
to the influence of Michel Debr?,
the new minister of economy and
finance, but it may also corres-
pond to a French desire to ap-
pear as the best defender of Eu-
ropean interests.
While the EEC wrestles
with the problem of meeting
Kennedy Round deadlines, there
are growing indications of Scan-
dinavian, and possibly even
some cautious British, specu-
lation that the time may be ap-
proaching when circumstances
will favor an application to
the Common Market. Although it
is not clear that such thinking
is related mainly to pessimistic
prognoses about the Kennedy
Round, several reported state-
ments by Norwegian officials,
in particular, indicate that
it is skepticism over French
intentions which may be spur- 25X1
ring a round of "contin enc
lannin
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PREMIER MORO FORMS NEW GOVERNMENT IN ITALY
Italy's 33-day-old govern-
ment crisis ended on 22 Febru-
ary with the formation of Chris-
tian Democratic Premier Moro's
third center-left coalition cabi-
net. Allocation of subministerial
posts is likely to continue
through next week, and the new
government probably will be in-
vested before 10 March.
Major changes in the new
cabinet are the assignment of
two posts to members of the right
wing of the Christian Democratic
Party (CD) and the appointment of
former finance minister Tremelloni,
a Social Democrat, as minister of
defense. Tremelloni replaces
Christian Democrat Giulio Andre-
otti, who becomes minister of
industry and cnmmcrce. The US
Embassy believes Tremelloni's
appointment does not presage any
changes in Italy's defense poli-
cies. Amintore Fanfani, a Chris-
tian Democrat, returns as foreign
minister.
Tromelloni's appointment
satisfies the demand of the CD's
principal coalition partners,
the Socialists (PSI) and Social
Democrats (PSDI), that one of
their members be given a key
"political" ministry. The PSI
also received an additional full
ministry (Foreign Commerce). In
return the CD won representation--
for the first time--for all its
factions in the government. The
deadlock over right-wing leader
Mario Scelba's demand for a cabi-
net post was broken when Scelba
was given presidency of the CD
national council and the lay
partners accepted members of his
faction in the Agriculture and
Transport posts.
The new government's program
gives priority to parliamentary
action on the five-year economic
plan, establishment of additional
regional governments, school re-
form, and urban legislation.
Controversial elements of the
program will be difficult to put
through, as in the past.
Several coalition leaders
reportedly believe the new Moro
government will be more stable
now that all CD factions are
represented. However, the dis-
unity within the CD party which
produced the crisis has only been
papered over, and intraparty power
struggles are likely to continue
to plague the coalition. In
particular, Fanfani can be ex-
pected to seek new opportunities
to wrest the premiership from
Moro. The fear of some CD lead-
ers that their party's dominance
will be weakened by the impending
reunification of the PSI and PSDI
is also likely to be a source of
further trouble between the coali-
tion partners.
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AUSTRIA'S NATIONAL ELECTIONS
Austrian parliamentary elec-
tions scheduled for 6 March could
result in important changes in
the modus operandi of the coali-
tion of the People's and Socialist
parties which has ruled since
World War II.
The centrist People's Party,
which represents the farm vote
and private business, believes
it may win two additional seats
(see chart) and thus establish
itself as the majority party.
People's Party Chancellor Klaus
says that his party in this event
would not abruptly terminate the
partnership with the Socialists
but would tale incisive steps to
end the government inaction of
recent years. He believes that
a People's Party majority would
permit greater legislative ini-
tiative and decision and result
in an attack on certain prob-
lems which the coalition has
so far been unable to handle.
Stimulation of production
and curtailment of inflation
would probably be among the
targets.
The Socialists stress
that, if they win a majority,
they too will maintain the
coalition. They intend to
keep it operating approxi-
mately as it has been for
the past 21 years. However
to emphasize the dangers of
change, they raise the spec-
ter of 1934, the year of Aus-
tria's civil war, when the
predecessor of the People's
Party ordered machine guns
used against Socialist civil-
ians.
The Socialists are concerned
that they may be weakened in the
election by the loss of popular
labor leader Franz Olah, who has
established an independent polit-
ical party. To counter Olah's
inroads, the Socialists are ex-
pected to pick up a substantial
number of votes from the Commu-
nist Party, which for the first
time in a parliamentary election
has ordered its members to vote
Socialist in 24 of Austria's 25
voting districts. The Communists,
who normally poll 3 percent of
the total Austrian vote but are
unrepresented in parliament,
hope Socialists will reciprocate
by helping them to elect Commu-
nist secretary general Muhri in
the 25th district. Communist
support gave the Socialists their
margin of victory in last May's
closely contested presidential
election.
AUSTRIAN NATIONALRAT
LOWER HOUSE
VOTES-1962 ELECTIONS
The Communist Party's 135,520 votes were insu icien
11142
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Austria's Liberal Party,
predominantly a pan-German group-
ing, is expected to lose seats
in the 6 March elections.
Whatever the election re-
sults, Austrian foreign policy
is not expected to undergo any
immediate change. Austria's con-
tinuing drive to win association
with the EEC and its attempt to
improve relations with Eastern
Europe both have bipartisan
support.
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DEATH OF COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA LEADER MAY REDUCE TERRORISM
The death of ex-priest Camilo
Torres on 15 February, while par-
ticipating in an ambush of a
Colombian Army patrol by the Army
of National Liberation (ELN),
will probably weaken the ELN's
capacity for carrying out armed
guerrilla action. Torres, as the
only figure with prestige in the
ELN, had been expected to attract
support for the guerrilla move-
ment. About seven other ELN mem-
bers were killed in this clash
and another the following day.
These clashes coincide with
an outbreak of small-scale guer-
rilla actions in northern Colom-
bia, which have been attributed,
but without confirmation, to the
ELN. They are the first follow-
ing a year's silence after the
raid on Simacota in January
1965.
Public reaction to Torres'
death has, so far, been limited
to noisy but small-scale stu-
dent demonstrations in Bogota, 25X1
Medellin, and Bucaramanga. Fu-
ture demonstrations are not
likely to be serious.
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SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CHILE
tial
Frei
After the Chilean presiden-
elections in 1964, the new
administration made it known
that Chile was not to be isolated
politically or commercially from
the Communist bloc. In order to
dramatize this "independent for-
eign policy," it restored full
diplomatic relations with the So-
viet Union, Hungary, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. In
recent months, in response to
Chilean initiative, the USSR has
offered credits for Chilean pur-
chases of machinery and equipment
in competition with US offers
through the Alliance for Progress.
Soviet efforts to bring about
a thaw in the relations between
the Communist Party of Chile
(PCCh) and the Chilean Government
were highlighted in October 1965
when Moscow sent a high-level
delegation to Chile to attend the
party's 13th National Congress.
This delegation, led by presid-
ium member Andrei Kirilenko, was
the highest level Soviet delega-
tion ever to visit a Latin Ameri-
can country other than Cuba. Kiri-
lenko sounded strong approval of
the PCCh doctrine of "via paci-
fica"--the peaceful way to power
--and endorsed the PCCh's posi-
tion of cooperation with the Frei
government on matters of mutual
concern.
The USSR had already dis-
played some interest in commer-
cial ties with Chile, but its
small efforts yielded little. In
October, however, the USSR took
part in the Santiago International
Trade Fair. Its exhibit reportedly
was the most impressive there and
drew immediate orders for a mil-
lion dollars' worth of machine
tools and agricultural equipment,
The USSR and Chile are also
cooperating in the field of
science. They have collaborated
in the establishment of one of
the world's largest astronomical
observatories on a mountain be-
tween Valparaiso and Santiago,
and both Soviet and Chilean
scientists will be taking part
in its activities.
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