WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005100100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 14, 1966
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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KIX41A fk~
- 14 January 1966
OCI No. 0272/66
Copy No,
3
VEEKL:gUM4AY.
EI IT AL INTELLIC;Eli > AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRE'`- N INT LUG NCE
State Dept. review.
completed,,
DIA review
completed.:
GROUP; f, excluded from nutortsatic
c{awngrtszling and deciasslficatiair.
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VW SECRET.:.
(Information as of noon EST, 13 January 1966)
Page
VIETNAM
Major military activity this week in South Vietnam was
concentrated in the III Corps area, although Communist
forces continued to chip away near the Quang Ngai provin-
cial capital. There are indications of astep-up in in-
filtration of North Vietnamese Army elements into South
Vietnam. There is no sign that the Shelepin mission to
Hanoi has resulted in new Soviet military aid or brought
any change in theDRV's terms for a peace,settlement.
Hanoi, with shrill propaganda backing from `Peking, con-
tinues to denounce the US peace offensive as deceitful.
COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO NORTH VIETNAM 5
North Vietnam, which has received more than.$I billion
in aid from other Communist countries in the
past
ten
years, has dispatched two delegations within
six months seeking still more assistance.
the
last
The Communist World
SOVIETS INCREASING CAPABILITY FOR AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE 6
Evidence that they are developing large, wheeled amphib-
ious landing craft for their marine corps is a further
indication of a program to achieve greater amphibious
assault capabilities.
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ORDERS STAY IN SLUMP
Although the USSR continues to survey the market for
Western plants and equipment and is encouraging Western
salesmen to visit Moscow, there are no signs that a new
round of Soviet orders will soon result.
POLISH CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS DETERIORATE
The regime's ban on travel abroad by Cardinal Wyszynski
--on the eve of his scheduled departure for Rome--seems
to preclude a papal visit to Poland this year, and sig-
nals a major deterioration in church-state relations,
SECRET
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Asia-Africa
DEADLOCK BETWEEN INDONESIAN ARMY AND SUKARNO PERSISTS 9
Sukarno continues to stall on banning the Communist
Party, but army leaders still reject any direct move
against him.
INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY SEEKS SUCCESSOR TO SHASTRI 10
Party leaders would like a quick decision, but the
selection may be more bitterly contested than in 1964
when Shastri was Nehru's heir-apparent.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN AGREE ON STEPS TO EASE TENSIONS 11
The Ayub-Shastri declaration in Tashkent eased several
issues stemming from the war of last autumn, but
skirted the Kashmir problem. The USSR gained prestige
for its successful sponsorship of the meeting.
COMMUNAL TENSIONS RISE IN CEYLON 12
A state of emergency has been declared to contain rioting
over legislation to allow greater use of the minority
Tamil language.
INSTABILITY IN FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA 13
New military regimes are consolidating their positions
in Upper Volta and the Central African Republic, but
tribal dissidence is rising in Chad and racial tension
in Mauritania. New infighting is building up in Congo
(Brazzaville). Burundi has expelled the US ambassador.
BREAKDOWN OF ORDER THREATENED IN WESTERN NIGERIA 16
Resistance to the regional government which rigged its
own re-election last October is increasingly violent
and may pose a long-range threat to the existence of
the Nigerian federation.
AFRICANS GIVE LONDON NEW BREATHER ON RHODESIA QUESTION 17
African representatives at the Commonwealth meeting in
Lagos have apparently agreed to give Britain's sanctions
program against Rhodesia several more months to work.
Europe
FRENCH CABINET CHANGES
The cabinet reshuffle is designed to create a more lib-
eral social and economic image for De Gaulle's govern-
ment in anticipation of the 1967 legislative elections.
SECRET
Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Iftoo, SECRET
THE FIVE TO CONFRONT FRANCE AT EEC MEETING NEXT WEEK
A special EEC Council session--the first since June
with French participation--wi.11 be held in Luxembourg
on 17 and 19 January to discuss ways of resolving the
Common Market crisis.
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN STALEMATE CONTINUES 22
Maneuvering continues in efforts to get certain regular
and rebel military officers into overseas assignments.
Tensions have temporarily easE!d following collapse of
a leftist-led general strike on 11 January.
BRAZIL'S WAR MINISTER ENTERS PRESIDENTIAL RACE 23
General Costa e Silva's candidacy has not been endorsed
by the present administration and could cause friction
among government leaders which. could in turn weaken
President Castello Branco's military support.
COLOMBIAN COMMUNISTS THREATEN PRE-ELECTION DISTURBANCES 24
Security forces are taking steps to counter expected
attempts by extremists to disrupt congressional elections
scheduled for 27 March and presidential elections on
1 May.
SE CRE T
Page iii WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Jan 66
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SECRET
The major allied effort
this week continued to focus in
Hau Nghia Province near Saigon.
After a successful operation in
the western part of the province
between 31 December and 6 Jan-
uary, nearly 8,000 US and Aus-
tralian troops on 8 January be-
gan a sweep of another Viet
Gong base area some 40 miles to
the northeast. Only sporadic
resistance has been encountered,
but extensive fortifications,
tunnel networks, and large
amounts of supplies have been
uncovered. By 12 January, 109
Viet Cong had been killed and
80 captured, with only light
allied casualties reported.
Large-scale enemy activity
was also concentrated in the III
Corps area. Viet Cong attacks
of battalion strength reported
in Long Khanh and Binh Long
provinces on 9 January resulted
in moderate government casual-
ties. An ambush of a govern-
ment convoy in Phuoc Tuy Prov-
ince the previous day resulted
in 34 killed (including three
US advisers), 30 wounded, and
10 missing.
Communist forces continued
to chip away at government posi-
tions southwest of the Quang
Ngai provincial capital. On 11
January, they overran a govern-
ment outpost--the fifth in this
area since mid-December. Small-
scale Viet Cong activity re-
mained at the high level of the
past six weeks and included acts
of terrorism in Saigon.
SECJ'"i'T
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Saigon government in-
tends to publicize plans for its
rural construction program and
the eventual formation of a na-
tional civilian advisory council
during the important lunar new
year (Tet) holiday which begins
on 21 January. Although the
ruling generals were apparently
unanimous in approving these
new programs, personal friction
among t hem ma affect implemen-
tation.
PAVN Infiltration
Over 380 trucks were reported
headed south on Route 911,
through the Laos panhandle,
since 27 December.
The volume of traffic reported
thus far suggests that Route 911
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oounaanes
Rung Sat Special Zone (VNN)
SECRET
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25X1
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V"Oli SECRET
25X1
25X1
hit on 1 December, had been tem-
porarily restored and is prob-
25X1 ably operational,
25X1
is serving as an important al-
ternate to the northern section
of Route 23, which apparently
has been carrying less traffic
this year than last.
DRV Rail Lines Open
The DRV has apparently suc-
ceeded in opening all three of
its major rail lines to through
traffic despite repeated US air
strikes before 24 December Ac_
ora ion or a interdicted
points on the Hanoi - Lao Cai
rail line. Through traffic on
this line had been impeded since
the first US attacks in July,
although trains were moving on
uninterdicted portions. The
Hanoi-Haiphong line, never seri-
ously damaged, also appeared op-
Shelepin in Hanoi
There have been no private
reports on the substance of dis-
cussions between the North Viet-
namese leaders and the Shelepin
delegation, which left Hanoi on
13 January. Speeches by North
Vietnamese officials during the
visit suggested that the DRV ex-
pressed continuing confidence
in the Communist military pros-
pects in Vietnam and gave no in-
dication of any present willing-
ness to modify DRV terms for a
peace settlement. Hanoi's bel-
licose tone suggests that any
Shelepin soundings on negotia-
tions met a negative response.
The anti-Chinese thrust of
Shelepin's mission was increas-
ingly apparent in Soviet state-
ments. Shelepin laid particular
stress on the overriding need
for bloc unity and "joint practi-
cal steps" to support Hanoi.
Moscow has long used this theme
in attempts to discredit Peking
by emphasizing that China's un-
willingness to cooperate does
"serious harm". to the war ef-
fort. The USSR can also be ex-
pected to cite Premier Pham Van
Dong's expression of "deep
gratitude" for Soviet aid.
The Vietnamese, however, re-
mained extremely cautious in of-
fering any support for Moscow's
efforts to discredit Peking. The
premier in one speech pointedly
expressed satisfaction over the
"transportation" of Soviet aid
goods to Vietnam--a remark which
seemed designed to offset Soviet
charges that the Chinese had
been obstructing the USSR's aid.
There were other actions during
the visit which suggested Hanoi
was trying to assuage Chinese
irritation over the visit.
Neither Shelepin nor the
North Vietnamese leaders have
thus far made more than cursory
public mention of Soviet military
aid, which the DRV is probably
pressing to increase. Shelepin
has merely noted that Soviet-DRV
cooperation in strengthening the
defense potential of North Viet-
nam "continues to develop."
SE CRE T
Page 3
the Cao Nung bridge
WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Jan 66
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SECRET
The speeches betray a marked
divergence between Hanoi and Mos-
cow in their public treatment of
the stepped-un US "peace offen-
sive." Shelepin has not concurred
in the North Vietnamese leaders`
repeated denunciation of Washing-
ton's diplomatic efforts as "de-
ceitful and perfidious trickery."
However, he has pointed out, in
keeping with standard Soviet
propaganda, that the "so-called
peace initiative" coincides with
a continued US build-up in South
Vietnam. TASS reports have toned
down particularly abusive North
Vietnamese comments on US moves,
and Moscow has not replayed Pham
Van Dong's vituperative 8 January
speech.
Peking has not commented di-
rectly on Shelepin's visit to
Hanoi, but Chinese news media
have drawn on Western press ac-
counts in such a way as to depict
the mission as Soviet collabora-
tion with US peace efforts. The
icy treatment accorded Shelepin
in his day-long stopover at Pe-
king en route home further under-
scored China's disdain.
Peking has maintained a bar-
rage of propaganda attacks against
the US initiative all week. The
party daily on 7 January called
the 14-point US peace proposi-
tion a "gigantic fraud" and said
that the question now "is not one
of peace negotiations but rather
the inflicting of still heavier
blows on the US." The article
described the bombing pause as
another "blackmail" effort and
reiterated Peking's position
that withdrawal of all American
forces from South Vietnam "is
the prerequisite" for a political
settlement.
Peking's increasingly shrill
attack may reflect concern that
the US initiative could reduce
Afro-Asian support for the Commu-
nist position on negotiations.
Peking may also fear that Hanoi
will succumb to the peace moves.
DRY Central Committee Meeting
According to diplomats in
Hanoi, the North Vietnamese party
again convened its usual year-end
central committee session. There
has been no formal acknowledg-
ment that the meeting occurred,
but a communiqud may be forthcom-
ing around the middle of January.
The DRV politburo was largely out
the public eye durin the latter
art of December.
SECRET
Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
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COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID
North Vietnam's recent search
for additional aid in China and
the Soviet bloc, its second such
venture in six months, reflects
its dependence on Communist eco-
nomic and military assistance.
In mid-1965, following a two-
year lull in new economic aid,
Hanoi arranged new assistance
from every Soviet bloc country
except Czechoslovakia as evidence
of their support for North Viet-
nam's cause. In the last few
weeks, another North Vietnamese
delegation, led by Vice Premier
Nghi, has revisited China and the
bloc to seek more aid and post-
ponement of payments on earlier
credits, and probably to warn that
Hanoi would be unable to meet
many of its trade commitments.
During the past ten years
Hanoi has leaned on economic as-
sistance from other Communist
countries to the tune of roughly
$1 billion. Peking's assistance
accounts for almost 50 percent
of that and the USSR's about 40
percent. The bulk of this aid
serves to finance the import of
equipment for the DRV's long-term
economic development program.
However, Communist assistance now
being arranged probably will be
used mainly to meet rapidly ex-
panding needs for construction
materials, for transport, and for
the rehabilitation of war-damaged
facilities.
Soviet economic aid is di-
rected toward heavy industry, in
particular mining, power, and
manufacturing. The USSR is aid-
ing in the construction of eight
power projects and assisting in
coal mining and machine building
industries. Early Chinese aid
was concentrated on rehabilitat-
ing transportation and telecom-
munications facilities, but now
emphasizes heavy industrial proj-
ects, including the steel com-
plex at Thai Nguyen. Roughly
half of all imports from Commu-
nist countries are delivered un-
der assistance credits.
The Vietnamese military es
tablishment also relies on the
USSR and China for its hardware
and training in modern weapons.
This assistance has been supple-
mented only marginally by cap-
tured French weapons, limited
domestic production, and recently
by token deliveries from East
European countries.
In the last year, the scale
of military aid has increased
sharply. The value of deliver-
:Les from China and the USSR
through 1964 is unknown, but is
believed to have been small. How-
ever, Soviet deliveries of air-
craft, surface-to-air missiles,
and antiaircraft artillery dur-
ing the past year probably have
totaled about $100 million.
SECRET
Page 5 WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 Jan 66
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SOVIETS INCREASING CAPABILITY FOR AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
Evidence that the Soviets
are developing large, wheeled am-
phibious landing craft for their
marine corps (called naval in-
fantry) is a further indication
of a program to achieve greater
amphibious assault capabilities.
The operational deployment of
such craft would better enable
the Soviets to land large numbers
of troops and equipment necessary
for the establishment and devel-
opment of beachheads in seaborne
assault operations.
Details of the new landing
craft are not available. How-
ever, earlier this month a So-
viet colonel of engineer troops,
apparently involved in amphibious
vehicle development, told the US
service attaches in Moscow that
his research institute had been
working since 1 November on two
designs of large wheeled landing
craft specifically for the marine
corps. The colonel stated that
these projects were in line with
recent Soviet "basic decisions
to make a major expansion of sea-
borne amphibious capabilities."
He indicated that the new craft
would relieve the marines' pres-
ent reliance on the smaller am-
phibious carriers designed pri-
marily for river crossings. So-
viet press coverage of marine
corps activities to date has
consistently shown them to be
equipped only with the smaller
amphibious personnel carriers
designed for the ground forces.
In other developments the
colonel stated that a new medium-
class tracked amphibious vehicle
for the ground forces now is in
production. He claimed, however,
that the Soviets have decided
to concentrate on large-diameter
wheeled vehicles in the future
development of amphibious vehi-
cles. Wheeled vehicles, said
the colonel, offer better cross-
country mobility than tracked
carriers, have fewer breakdowns,
are easier to maintain, and re-
quire fewer spare parts.
In addition to the develop-
ment of new equipment, there
are indications of organizational
changes in the Soviet marines.
Some of the three or four marine
brigades may have been enlarged
to division-size units.
SECRET
Page 6 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ORDERS STAY IN SLUMP
Although the USSR continues
to survey the market for Western
plants and equipment, and is en-
couraging Western salesmen to
visit Moscow, there are no signs
that a new round of Soviet orders
will soon result. The lull in
imports of machinery and equip-
ment from the free world--dating
from 1963-64--is expected to con-
tinue at least through 1967;
Last year's marginal buying ac-
tivity amounted to only some $200
million worth of plants and indus-
trial equipment.
Moscow apparently views an
expanded import program as neces-
sary to support its efforts to in-
crease industrial output. How-
ever, the USSR's present foreign
exchange shortages, resulting
from heavy expenditures for grain
imports, as well as the continued
delay in completion of plans for
1966-70, apparently inhibit the
Soviet planners from giving a go-
ahead to their foreign traders.
These difficulties,.notwithstand-
ing the Soviet desire for more
Page 7
advanced Western tecnnology, re-
main apparent in its efforts to
buy know-how alone, or `to conclude
barter contracts for Western equip-
ment.
French, US, German, British,
Japanese, and Italian businessmen
have visited Moscow during the
past year. Italian firms hope
that several contracts under nego-
t iation for at least two "years
will be signed in 1966, but these
are relatively small. Exchanges
of Soviet 'and Italian missions
and technicians to discuss a pro-
posed $300-million Fiat automobile
plant deal are continuing, but
no firm arrangement is'expected
soon.` Other countries indicate
that orders are being discussed
and that the USSR continues to
seek bids on large projects such
as a petrochemical combine involv-
ing components from several West
European countries. None seems
hopeful, however, that there will
be any major growth of sales in
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 14 Jan 66
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SSE CRE T
POLISH CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS DETERIORATE
The regime's ban on travel
abroad by Poland's Roman Catholic
primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, is
apparently related to its desire
to keep Pope Paul from making a
trip to Poland this May, when he
reportedly was to attend the
celebration of the millennium of
Christianity in Poland. The re-
gime may also want to scuttle
the cardinal's own plans to visit
the US next fall. In any event
the ban--which may be of indefi-
nite duration--signals a major
deterioration in church-state
relations.
It came less than a day be-
fore Wyszynski's scheduled post -
Ecumenical Council trip to Rome
for the 13 January observances
of the Polish millennium at the
Vatican. His talks there were
expected to explore the implica-
tions of the deteriorating church-
state situation in Poland for the
pontiff's rumored visit. In a
prompt response to the ban, the
Vatican indicated that the re-
gime move "all but eliminates"
the possibility of a papal visit.
The ban culminated a month-
long vituperative campaign against
the cardinal's attempts--without
first consulting the regime--to
open a semipolitical dialogue
with the German Catholic episco-
pate. The announcement cited
the "antistate" nature of this
activity as the main reason for
the ban. The regime particu-
larly castigated the concilia-
tory 18 November letter sent by
Polish bishops to the German
hierarchy for its failure to
take cognizance of East Germany
or to take a stand against the
"revanchist elements" in West
Germany; for presenting postwar
Polish acquisition of the Oder-
Niesse territories as a neces-
sary adjunct of territorial
losses in the East instead of
"an act of historical justice";
and for its request to "forgive
and be forgiven."
The Gomulka regime appar-
ently felt that church "meddling"
in one of the most sensitive
areas of Polish foreign policy
was the direct result of its
cautiously warm response to Car-
dinal Wyszynski's public support
in early September for the offi-
cial position on the Oder-Niesse
frontier.
Cardinal Wyszynski--who had
traveled to Rome 11 times since
his release in 1956 from three
years of house arrest--denied on
9 January that he has been guilty
of political malfeasance and
promised silence on the issue.
While there is little evidence
of public alarm over the deteri-
orating church-state situation,
this could be changed if the
cardinal takes his case to the
people.
r5E CRE 1
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DEADLOCK BETWEEN INDONESIAN ARMY AND SUKARNO PERSISTS
The present deadlock between
Sukarno and the Indonesian Army
has brought a near halt to sig-
nificant economic and political
moves, as army leaders continue
to reject a direct thrust against
the President.
Sukarno has
refused to ban the Communist
Party unless all other political
parties are banned as well. The
army is apparently willing to ac-
cept such a measure, but only if
Sukarno agrees to a sweeping gov-
ernmental reorganization and cer-
tain policy changes.
In the face of the political
impasse, efforts to grapple with
Indonesia's pressing problems are
faltering. The Supreme Operations
Command (KOTI) apparently hesi-
tates to exercise its authority,
lest its efforts be countermanded
by Sukarno's regular cabinet. Al-
though a deputy supreme commander
for economic affairs was appointed
to KOTI last month, Defense Minis-
ter Nasution has publicly an-
nounced that the regular cabinet
presidium retains full responsi-
bility for economic measures.
The country's galloping in-
flation and other economic troubles
remain largely unchecked by any
recent measures. The army pre-
sumably hopes to fix the blame on
Sukarno. Nevertheless, Nasution
is said to fear that the Presi-
dent will capitalize on the situa-
tion by waiting for total economic
chaos and then issuing a call f25X1
national unity.
Nasution feels that the army
is vulnerable on other scores as
well. Sukarno may attempt to ex-
ploit the mass killings of Commu-
nists in Java and Bali, as well
as growing corruption in the army.
Army leaders continue to feel that
an overt move against Sukarno
would split the army and generate
difficulties even more grave than
those facing it now.
Sukarno's expulsion of US
correspondents from Indonesia this
week points up his sensitivity to
speculation about his political
future. He feels the American
press has been applauding his
weakened position at the hands of
the army. Ousting the correspond-
ents gives vent to his irritation
and reasserts his claim to leader-
ship.
SECRET
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INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY SEEKS SUCCESSOR TO SHASTRI
Ranking members of India's
Congress Party are scheduled to
meet on 14 January in New Delhi
to pick a successor to Lal Bahadur
Sha.stri. The party leadership,
eager to preserve an image of
unity at a time when the nation
faces major economic and foreign
policy problems, reportedly hopes
to reach a decision quickly. The
selection may be more bitterly
contested, however, than in 1964
when Shastri was Nehru's heir
apparent.
Home Minister G. L. Nanda,
who as second-ranking cabinet
member was sworn in as interim
prime minister immediately after
Shastri's death, probably lacks
the political backing necessary
to continue on in his own right.
A far stronger candidate is
Defense Minister Y. B. Chavan.
A former chief minister of Maha-
rashtra State, Chavan took over
the defense portfolio at the
height of the 1962 Chinese in-
vasion and has presided over a
major build-up of India's armed
forces. He shared with Shastri
widespread acclaim for what the
Indians regarded as a strong
military showing in the recent
war with Pakistan.
Chavan has several liabil-
ities. At 51, he may be con-
sidered too young by senior
colleagues who would be dis-
tressed at the thought of his
acquiring a long-term lease on
the premiership. He is not on
good terms with fellow Maharash-
trian S. K. Patil, who played
an important role in the Shastri
succession. Nevertheless, Chavan
as a major force in western India
may be able to make a deal with
other regional bosses, such as
Congress Party president Kamaraj
(the south) and Atulya Ghosh
(the east).
Former finance minister
Morarji Desai, who lost a major
bid for the office in 1964, will
probably try again this time.
His once-impressive political
base has dwindled since he left
office in August 1963. His major
assets--an ability to get things
done and firmness toward Pakistan
--have been pre-empted during the
past year by Shastri and Chavan.
His best hope appears to lie in
the slim possibility that Chavan,
finding his own path blocked,
would defer to the older (70)
Desai and persuade other party
powers to go along.
There is an outside chance
in event of a deadlock that
Kamaraj, probably the strongest
figure in Indian politics, de-
spitehislimited linguistic and
educational background, would
take on the premiership. A dead-
lock among the leading aspirants
might also favor the chances of
several other candidates, includ-
ing Steel Minister Sanjiva Reddy,
Agriculture Minister Subramaniam,
and Nehru's daughter. Indira
Gandhi.
EGRET
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN AGREE
The Tashkent Declaration of
10 January eased several of the
problems which had resulted from
the Indo-Pakistani war of last
autumn but solved no basic quar-
rels. The status of Kashmir,
primary cause of the conflict
and the overriding issue between
India and Pakistan, was mentioned
only briefly. Inclusion of even
this reference presumably was a
concession to Pakistani President
Ayub, but his acceptance of the
other provisions in the declara-
tion without substantial progress
toward a Kashmir settlement must
be considered a victory for the
late Prime Minister Shastri.
ON STEPS TO EASE TENSIONS
be discouraged, and measures for
restoring economic and trade re-
lations will be considered.
Shastri failed to secure a
no-war pact. Ayub insisted that
such a pact could only follow de-
cisive action on the major is-
sue (i.e., Kashmir). Instead, in
a nod to the UN Charter, the two
leaders reaffirmed their nations'
obligation to settle all disputes
without recourse to force. They
also pledged to continue meet-
ings "both at the highest and at
other levels"; the possibility
of further summit meetings will
depend on the attitude of S'-.-s-
tri's successor.
The most important statement
in the declaration provides for
withdrawal, not later than 25
February, of all armed personnel
to positions held prior to 5 Au-
gust 1965--the date on which
Pakistani-trained infiltrators
began to cross the cease-fire
line into Indian-held Kashmir
in large numbers. This means
that India now must give up areas
controlling access routes used
by the infiltrators--which it has
been most reluctant to evacuate.
Moreover, it probably would have
preferred stronger assurances
against future infiltration than
the pledges the two countries
made to base their relations on
the principle of noninterference
in the internal affairs of each
other.
According to other provisions,
the high commissioners (ambassa-
dors) will be sent back to their
posts, prisoners of war will be
repatriated, propaganda directed
against the other nation will
Shastri's death does not ap-
pear likely to prejudice imple-
mentation of the agreement unless
he is succeeded by a hard-liner
on Pakistan questions, such as
former finance minister Morarji
Desai. Interim Prime Minister
Nanda has announced that his gov-
ernment will abide by the deci-
sions taken at Tashkent. Imme-
diate press comment in both coun-
-tries has been generally favor-
able, although public reaction
in Pakistan has been described
as uniformly adverse and right-
wing opposition leaders in India
have been critical. Pakistani
Government officials, however,
view Tashkent as an important
step toward securing "objective"
Soviet treatment of Kashmir, as
opposed to Moscow's previous pro-
India position.
Premier Kosygin can be satis-
fied that he achieved the limited
objectives the USSR sought when
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convening the meeting. The agree-
ments underscore his success in
bringing India and Pakistan to-
gether, apparently without irri-
tating either party. Soviet re-
lations with Rawalpindi were im-
proved, and Pakistani leaders
will, in the future, give more
weight to Moscow's potential
role in resolving the Kashmir dis-
pute.
The USSR was also able to
strengthen its position as an Asian
power and lay claim to the role of
peacemaker in contrast with the
"incendiary" attitude of Peking
throughout the crisis. The coinci-
dence of the Tashkent talks with
Shelepin's trip to North Vietnam
and Brezhnev's visit to Mongolia
further highlighted the USSR's pres-
ent efforts to isolate Peking.
COMMUNAL TENSIONS RISE IN CEYLON
The introduction and enact-
ment of legislation allowing
greater use of the minority Tamil
language in certain circumstances
have heightened communal tensions
in Ceylon. Recognizing that se-
rious communal riots--such as
those of 1958--could bring down
his government, Prime Minister
Senanayake is determined to sup-
press any civil disorder.
The new regulations, which
Parliament passed on 11 January,
are designed to implement the
spirit of language legislation
enacted by the former socialist
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)
government. They permit the use
of Tamil rather than the official
Sinhala tongue for transactions
between the government and the
minority Tamils, who make up about
22 percent of the population. The
leftist opposition, led by the
former SLFP prime minister Mrs.
Sirimavo Bandaranaike, now main-
tains that the new regulations
are prejudicial to the majority
Sinhalese interests and will di-
vide the state.
Following the government's
introduction of the proposals on
8 January, leftist-inspired com-
munal rioting broke out in Co-
lombo. Clashes between police
and demonstrators resulted in the
declaration of a state of emer-
gency. Strict curfews were im-
posed, public meetings banned, and
broad press censorship instituted.
Although the coalition gov-
ernment had sufficient parlia-
mentary strength to pass the new
regulations, some discord has
arisen within the coalition ranks.
Senanayake, moreover, depends on
the continuing support of the
Federal Party, which is not tech-
nically a member of the coalition
and has traditionally represented
the more extreme Tamil demands.
The intensified leftist campaign to
discredit the pro-West government
probably will continue to cent
explosive communal issues.
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INSTABILITY IN FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA
Unstable conditions continue
to prevail in a number of former
French African territories. Re-
cently installed military re-
gimes are consolidating their po-
sitions in Upper Volta and the
Central African Republic,. while
political and military infight-
ing appears to be building up in
Congo (Brazzaville). Tribal dis-
sidence in Chad and racial ten-
sion in Mauritania threaten sta-
bility in those countries.
In the Central African Re-
ppubl~~ic (CAR) army c xe o assa
drying to entrench himself in
power. He has abolished the con-
stitution and dissolved the Na-
tional Assembly with no mention
of new elections. He has also
promised to create a society in
which differences of wealth and
position are abolished. Although
most of his pronouncements have
been greeted with enthusiasm so
far, decrees abolishing polygamy
and providing for mobilization of
unemployed into "collective work
brigades" may check his popular
appeal.
The new government named in
Upper Volta on 8 January excludes
holdovers from the old regime as
well as the leaders of the labor
agitation which triggered the
coup. Col. Lamizana, now Presi-
dent, and his military colleagues
have retained direct control of
2l1 key ministries, and he has
announced that the army plans to
retain power until the situation
is normal and the national fi-
nances are straightened out.
Voltaic political factions prob-
ably will soon seek to reassert
themselves, but they now seem
to be concerned primarily with
the fate of ousted President
Yameogo, who is "under army pro-
tection" near the capital.
Political infighting, pos-
sibly involving the military, ap-
pears to have reached a new peak
gime.
25X1
Ja cabinet reshuffle was
announced on 31 December. For
the most part the ministers merely
changed their responsibilities,
but a leader of the pro-Peking
faction, Secretary for Youth and
Sports N'Dalla-Graille, was
dropped entirely, and the able
gendarmerie commander also lost
his position. The over-all ef-
fect seems to be to strengthen
the hand of President Massamba-
De ba t .
Chad's Christian President
Tombal55ye faces mounting unrest
in the predominantly Muslim east-
ern and central areas of his coun-
try. Dissident tribesmen who
have been openly defying the au-
thorities since October recently
stepped up their attacks on secu-
rity forces. Some wear military
insignia, and they are showing
signs of improved organization.
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AFRICA
Country maintaining diplomatic
relations with Communist China
Country maintaining diplomatic
relations with Nationalist China
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Tombalbaye has strengthened
the security forces by placing
French officers in command, and
France, which still keeps 1,000
troops in Chad, has promised in-
creased military aid. Neverthe-
less the government troops would
be hard pressed if the dissidents
got more arms.
Mauritania appears to be
entering a period of acute ten-
sion between the 25-percent Negro
minority and the politically
dominant Arabic-speaking Maures.
On 5 January Negro secondary-
school students struck in pro-
test against a new requirement
that they study Arabic. Faced
with a scheduled sympathy strike
of civil servants, about 80 per-
cent of whom are Negroes, Presi-
dent Moktar Ould Daddah announced
the suspension of all top civil
servants involved.
Although the relatively
well-educated Negroes provide
the bulk of Mauritania's skilled
25X1
manpower, they have little rep-
resentation in the cabinet and
in the ruling party. Over the
past year the influence of radi-
cal Arabs has been growing, es-
pecially in foreign policy.
Mauritania has established dip-
lomatic ties with several Commu-
nist countries, including China,
and has lined up with radical
African states on such issues as
Rhodesia.
The Chinese Communists al-
most certainly regard their re-
cent expulsion from Dahomey and 25X1
the CAR as temporary and rela-
tively minor setbacks.
In Dahomey, in fact
e ng s re uff has been atten-
uated by the fact that its New
China News Agency man is being
permitted to remain. In the
CAR, however, the Chinese dip-
lomats were accused of attempt-
ing to organize a militia force
and the NCNA man was also sent
home.
On the other hand, Burundi
expelled the US ambassador on
10 January, and the Chinese may 25X1
soon be invited to re-establish
diplomatic relations.
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Law and order are crumbling
in Nigeria's Western Region and
may soon break down completely
in the face of violent resist-
ance to the government which
rigged its own re-election in
October. Prospects for a com-
promise appear dim.
Violence has intensified in
the past six weeks. Government
functionaries have been murdered
and much of their property has
been destroyed. In some local-
ities essential services have
been interrupted, taxes are not
being collected, and business
activity is impaired. Ordinary
criminals are taking advantage
of the situation. Cars driven
by Americans and Britishers and
US AID vehicles have been at-
tacked, lending substance to reports
that the dissidents now consider
Americans fair game on the grounds
that the US is subsidizing the in-
cumbent regime. Rioting with
ugly intertribal overtones oc-
curred on the outskirts of Lagos,
the federal capital, as dissidents
tried to capitalize on the atten-
tion focused on Nigeria during
the Commonwealth conference on
Rhodesia held there this week.
Federal security forces in
the Western Region may lose con-
trol of the situation. The mo-
rale of the police, a number of
whom have been killed, is low and
the army is reportedly unhappy
over its role in maintaining the
unpopular regime.
have balked at all efforts to
bring them together. The impasse
is part of the wider struggle
between progressive, predominant-
ly non-Muslim southerners and
the tradition-bound Muslim north-
erners who have controlled the
federal government since before
independence in 1960. The north-
erners and the unpopular Yoruba
faction now in control of the
Western regional government have
been allied since early 1964.
The dissident Yorubas, for their
part, are allied with the ruling
elements of the other two south-
ern regions who are helping to
fuel the current disorder.
The US Embassy in Lagos be-
lieves federal Prime Minister
Balewa, a moderate northerner who
has so far treated the Western
difficulties as a matter for the
regional government to handle,
must take some dramatic action if
he is to pacify the fighting
Yorubas. Late last week Balewa's
secretary implied that decisive
measures could be expected soon.
However, the northern-controlled
parliament, which convened this
week, may do no more than permit
a brief airing of the discontent
and then proceed to endorse
harsh police measures which are
already under way in the region.
There are also indications that
the regional government intends
to move against non-Yoruba resi-
dents from the other two south-
ern regions. Such action would
almost certainly add to the re-
gional strains which threaten
the longer range future of the
The political opponents, who
represent rival factions of the
region's predominant Yoruba tribe,
federation.
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Britain has obtained the
temporary acquiescence of most
African governments in its Rho-
desian policy.
African representatives at
the recent Commonwealth meeting
in Lagos have apparently agreed
to give Britain's economic sanc-
tions program against Rhodesia.
several more months to work.
Although members of a, new sanc-
tions committee can recommend
another Commonwealth meeting
"when they judge that this is
necessary," July is the only dead-
line suggested in the Lagos com -
muniqud for success of Britain's
present policy. Another Common-
wealth meeting will take place
if the Rhodesian rebel regime is
not toppled by then. Meanwhile,
the plans of some African govern-
ments for another OAU conference
on 21 January on the Rhodesian
question appear to have been
dropped for lack of a quorum.
The July date gives Britain
more time to develop emergency
supply routes to Zambia sufficient
to enable Zambia to join in sanc-
tions against Smith. US officials
believe, however, that it may
take until July to establish those
routes. This would delay until
after July the time when Zambia,
in line with Britain's strategy,
can give the final thrust to the
'quick kill" sanctions program.
Any appreciable delay in the new
extension given to British policy
by the Africans at Lagos would
lead those countries to increase
pressure on Britain for more im-
mediate and forceful action
against Rhodesia.
Political and economic sta.-
bility.within Zambia, upon which
Britain's Rhodesia policy depends,
is potentially threatened by a
conflict between the government
and the Zambian Mine Workers'
Union (ZMU). The union, which
represents 32,000 African mine
workers, is resisting attempts
at control by the governing po-
litical party. Complications
could arise from the reported
support of the ZMU in this dis-
pute by pro-Rhodesian Europeans
in the Copperbelt who want to
foment trouble for the Zambian
Government. President Kaunda in-
tends to deport any Europeans in-
volved, and that might lead to
the exodus of other already jit-25X1
tery whites whose skills are im-
portant in Zambia's economy.
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Europe
The cabinet changes effected
in France at the time of De
Gaulle's presidential inaugura-
tion on 8 January are designed
to create a more liberal social
and economic image for the gov-
ernment in anticipation of the
1967 legislative elections. In
the cabinet reshuffle, 11 members
were added, nine were removed,
and six were shifted from one
post to another.
De Gaulle's desire to pro-
ject a "new look" internally is
reflected in the establishment
of a new "superministry" for eco-
nomic and financial affairs under
former premier Michel Debrg. He
reportedly will supervise the
work of eight other cabinet-level
posts, including several new ones
which were created in such fields
as education and housing. The
precise role Debrd is to play in
the functioning of the government,
however, particularly his rela-
tionship with Premier Pompidou,
probably still remains to be
worked out.
The most important figure
to leave the government was fi-
nance Minister Giscard d'Estaing,
who had been personally identi-
fied with the economic stabiliza-
tion plan which is widely con-
sidered to have cost De Gaulle
votes in December. While Giscard
was personally expendable, De
Gaulle is not likely to alter
fundamentally an economic policy
that has limited inflationary
tendencies in France and built
monetary reserves to record lev-
els.
The cabinet changes do not
seem to have significantly af-
fected the government's support
in the National Assembly. With
Giscard's ouster, the bloc of
35 Independent Republicans which
gave the government an absolute
majority might become somewhat
less consistent in its support
of government policies and pro-
grams. Three members of the
Independent Republican Party are
in the new cabinet, however, and
the recognition that Gaullist
support could be vital to the
party's electoral success in
1967 will probably forestall any
mass defection. On the other
hand, De Gaulle's failure--or
inability--to add any important
new names to the cabinet except
for Fourth Republic Premier Ed-
gar Faure lessens the chance that
the government can garner much
support from the opposition.
Retention of both Pompidou
and Foreign Minister Couve de
Murville is in line with De
Gaulle's argument that no basic
changes in his foreign policy
were necessitated by the presi-
dential election and that none
are intended.
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Newly established post
DE GAULLE'S NEW GOVERNMENT
(Announced 8 January 1966)
FORMER MINISTER
Dropped from this cabinet
Departments and Territories
Minister of State in Charge of
Administrative Reform
Minister of We for Justice
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Interior
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs
Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs in Charge of Cooperation
Minister of National Education
Minister of Public Works and Housing
Secretary of State for Transport ._
Minister of Agriculture
Jean FOYER
Maurice COUVE DE MLIRVILLE
*NEW MINISTER
Newly appointed to this cabinet
Valery GISCARD D'ESTAING
Raymond TRIBOULET
Christian FOUCHET
Marc JACQUET (Public
Works and Transport)
Edgard PISANI
Gilbert GRANDVAL (Labor)
Minister of Veterans & War Victims Affairs
Minister of Post & Telecommunications
Secretary of State Attached to the
Premier for Information
Secretary of State Attached to the
Premier for Relations with Parliament
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Secretary of State for the Budget
Minister for Youth & Sports
Minister Delegate to the Premier
for Scientific Research,
Atomic Energy, and Space Questions
Secretary of State for Foreign Trade
and Population)
Jean SAINTENY
Jacques MARETTE
Alain PEYREFITTE
(Minister of Information)
Robert BOULIN
Maurice HERZOG
Yvon BOURGES
SECRET
(No party)
Louis JOXE
(No party)
Jean FOYER
(No party)
Roger FREY
Pierre MESSMER
9&R
Christian FOUCHET
Edgard PISANI
(No party)
tJ dr : LABEL COURTpublica
Raymond MARCELLIN
(Independent Republi
'Padicp _ _
r'"U IN E TI
Jacques MARETTE
Yvon BOURGES
Jean DE BROGLIE
(Independent Republican)
Robert BOULIN
Alain PEYREFITTE
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i%o
A special EEC Council session--
the first since June with French
participation--will be held in Lux-
embourg on 17 and 18 January to dis-
cuss ways of resolving the Common
Market crisis. The French are
expected to raise the questions of
majority voting and the role of the
EEC Commission, and prospects are
uncertain at best.
Belgian Foreign Minister Spank
believes that France is still bent
on "emptying the Rome Treaty of its
political content and significance"
and is unlikely to be satisfied with
any proposal the Five are likely to
make. He insists that he will not
accept any compromise which will
weaken the EEC, and is deeply con-
cerned, therefore, lest a "showdown
fight" catch the Five without con-
tingency plans. The Five have appar-
ently not reached any coordinated
position on issues likely to be dis-
cussed, but are committed to resist
concessions which would violate
treaty provisions.
Some reports indicate that a
formula to bridge the majority rule
question is still being sought.
Bonn, for example, is reportedly
considering a procedure whereby a
member country could claim "vital
interest," thereby presumably open-
ing the applicability of majority
vote to debate. The Foreign Ministry
official who explained this idea
cited Bonn's desire, however, to get
on with community decisions on Ken-
nedy Round negotiations "regardless
of the outcome of the Luxembourg
meeting." Another German official
has insisted that his government
would not "dream" of giving the
French a veto in this area.
Should the French push extreme
demands in Luxembourg, the Five are
likely to reaffirm their adherence
to community principles and feel
freer to move ahead without the
French. The permanent Brussels
representatives of the Five have
reportedly already agreed to hold
the "normal" council session at the
end of January, when the community
budgets and the Kennedy Round would
be the principal topics. Any deci-
sions on these issues without the
French would undoubtedly move the
community close to a complete break.
French tactics remain unclear.
Paris' agreement last week to go
along with the 1 January 10-percent
cut in the EEC's internal tariff
and its proposal to postpone for
four months a decision regarding
the common external tariff may indi-
cate a desire to avoid a confronta-
tion with the Five at this time. A
French spokesman hinted that a delay
could be used "for surmounting dif-
ficulties of all kiLis which have
arisen from the present situation."
A more recent report indicates
Paris may attempt at Luxembourg to
reopen the whole question of Europe's
organization. A French official in
the EEC Commission stated that a
cabinet-level group in Paris was
considering a revival of past French
proposals for a confederal political
and military arrangement in Europe.
Such a tactic would seem to have
little chance of success without 25X1
a simultaneous offer of some role
for the British.
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Western Hemisphere
Leaders of the Dominican Repub-
lic's regular military forces have
made it clear they will not obey
President Garcia Godoy's order to
leave the country until Francisco
Caamano departs for an overseas as-
signment. The rebel leader says he
will not leave until he has guaran-
tees to protect those rebel military
who remain behind. Tensions have been
eased temporarily by the collapse of
a leftist-led general strike late
on 11 January and the departure of
six second-echelon rebel officers to
attachd posts abroad, but agitation
by the extreme left or extreme right
could touch off violence with little
warning.
On 6 January Garcia Godoy is-
sued a decree assigning Minister of
Defense Rivera, the army and air
force chiefs, and nine leading rebel
military personnel to overseas posts
and naming navy chief Jimenez to re-
place Rivera. The action came as
the result of the regular officers'
refusal to obey an earlier presiden-
tial edict and followed an all-out
leftist campaign to press the Presi-
dent to oust top military leaders.
The campaign included a threat by
Juan Bosch's party to "paralyze the
nation" with a strike.
The military refused to obey
and seized key communications in-
stallations throughout the country,
and Jimenez rejected his new post.
Most military leaders are sincere
in the belief that changes in com-
mand would seriously impair morale
and effectiveness since the shifts
would appear to be the result of a
capitulation to leftist demands. It
is also evident that they see the
action as a threat to the tradi-
tional autonomy of the armed forces.
the President intends to name him-
self as defense minister, an action
that would also exacerbate civilian-
military hostility. The regular
military now say they will "con-
sider" leadership changes once rebel
military leaders--particularly Ca-
amano--depart. Rivera says he is
under considerable pressure from
the army, air force, and civilian
rightist groups to stay. Neverthe-
less, he would probably go once Ca-
amano leaves, if he were permitted
a dignified exit.
In an attempt to press Garcia
Godoy into keeping the rebel mili-
tary leaders in the country, Commu-
nists and extreme leftist labor or-
ganizations joined forces with radi-
cal firebrands in the rebel camp in
calling a general strike beginning
on 10 January. The strike was only
partially successful, however, as
Bosch's party refused to join in
and the general public remained in-
different. During the strike, how-
ever, Communist-led youths once
again demonstrated their ability to
tie up Santo Domingo with demonstra-
tions and disturbances. Bosch has
become increasingly critical of
Caamano and probably would not be
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unhappy to see him go. This atti-
tude arises from Bosch's feeling
that if Caamano stays he might head
a rejuvenated "constitutionalist"
movement.
The President will probably
exhaust other alternatives before
asking the Inter-American Peace
Force (IAPF) to enforce his edict.
The President demonstrated his
willingness to call on the IAPF when
on 7 January he asked it to regain
control of Radio Santo Domingo from
the regular military. Genral Alvim,
the.IAPF commander, refused, and
Rivera voluntarily turned the
radio back to the government, on
condition that it not be used to
press for changes in the military
hierarchy.
The regular military are
probably encouraged by Alvim's re-
luctance to use the IAPF against
them. The estranged relations be-
tween the IAPF and the OAS Commit-
tee may improve shortly, as Alvim
is to be replaced by Brazilian Ma-
jor General Braga on 17 January.
BRAZIL'S WAR MINISTER ENTERS PRESIDENTIAL RACE
Brazil's war minister, General
Arthur Costa e Silva, confirmed in
a 4 January press conference that
he will be a candidate in this
year's presidential election. Some
time before 3 October, Congress is
to elect the successor to President
Castello Branco, who is himself
barred from re-election.
Costa e Silva hopes for en-
dorsement as the government's can-
didate, but has hinted that he would
consider running on an opposition
ticket if Castello Branco does not
support him. Costa e Silva appar-
ently believes that he has a good
chance of receiving the backing of
major opposition groups because
they lack a strong candidate. The
President and his close advisers
seem to prefer someone with a broader
understanding of political problems,
but they apparently are still un-
decided on a choice.
Costa e Silva's sudden an-
nouncement may have been intended
to pressure Castello Branco into
deciding in his favor. The ad-
ministration's public reaction
thus far has been confined to a
statement by Justice Minister Ma-
galhaes that any candidate must
be nominated by a political party
and that no new parties have been
formed to replace those abolished
last October.
Differences of opinion over
a successor to Castello Branco
could lead to serious friction be-
tween the war minister and other
administration leaders. This in
turn might weaken Castello Branco's
military support, since Costa e
Silva has been the decisive ele- 25X1
ment in maintaining the loyalty of
the armed forces behind the gov-
ernment.
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The Colombian administra-
tion and its security forces
are taking steps to counter pos-
sible attempts by extremists
to disrupt congressional elec-
tions scheduled for 27 March
and presidential elections set
for I May.
The Chinese-supported Co-
lombian Communist Party/Marxist-
Leninist (PCC/ML) began a propa-
ganda campaign in mid-December
urging a boycott of the elec-
In addition to terrorism,
extremists may also try to ex-
ploit strikes in several parts
of the country. The threat is
especially great in the petro-
leum industry and in major ports.
The petroleum workers' union,
long under the control of Commu-
nists, includes many members who
have been trained in rabble-rous-
ing and sabotage techniques.
They caused damage exceeding $2
million to US and Colombian oil
installations in the strike of
August 1963.
tions.
The groups participating
in this effort are all quasi-
independent offshoots of the
Colombian Communist Party (PCC).
They may be joined by the so-
called Hard Line (Linea Dura)
of the Liberal Revolutionary
Movement (MRL/LD). This is one
of the dissident groups in the
Liberal Party. The PCC has al-
ready gone on record in its news-
paper as opposed to a boycott,
claiming that voting against the
governing National Front is a
more effective protest.
Any serious upsurge of guer-
rilla activity or terrorism
would be a great embarrassment
to President Valencia and the
National Front government. One
of the administration's achieve-
ments to which National Front
candidates are expected to point
with pride is the successful
campaign against banditry and
Communist guerrilla bands.
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