WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005100080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/04/15: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100080001-9
30 December 1965
review(s) I GRQUP'l.ExclWdedfrom.autojnatic
completed_ dowr14rddirEq End dediassi-hcahon
Approved For Release 2008/04/15: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100080001-9
;State Dept. review completed
DCT No. 00322/65
Copy No.
ARMY review(s) completed.
DIA review(s) completed.
 Approved For Release 2008/04/15: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100080001-9
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 29 December 1965)
VIETNAM
A brief Christmas lull interrupted the continuing high
level of military activity. A further cease-fire was a
possibility for the lunar new year. The South Vietnamese
Government began to implement a hard-line policy towards
FULRO, responsible for the recent montagnard uprising.
The Directorate still plans to launch a civilian advisory
council next month. Hanoi's propaganda reaction to the
cessation of bombing in the North has been an attempt to
discredit the move. A top Soviet leader, party secretary
Shelepin, is scheduled to visit Hanoi to reassert the
USSR's presence. Hungary has granted some economic aid
to the DRV. The presence in North Vietnam of high-per-
formance MIG-21s was confirmed., Nine new SAM sites were
discovered.
PEKING BEGINNING BIRTH CONTROL PROGRAM IN RURAL AREAS
Communist China is apparently preparing to extend its
birth control program from the cities to the rural
areas, where the bulk of the population lives, but
there is little chance that the effect on population
growth will be significant in the near future.
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEFECTIONS OF GROWING CONCERN
The relatively high rate of escapes, especially of
professionally trained men, has caused both Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary to reimpose some restrictions on
their only recently liberalized travel regulations.
FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE IN THE USSR
The spread of foot-and-mouth disease may have been
checked, but the outbreak is still widespread and ef-
fects of the disease will reduce the output of Soviet
livestock products next year.
SECRET
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MOSCOW'S POSITION IN THE UPCOMING INDIAN-PAKISTANI TALKS 8
Realizing the necessity for caution in sponsoring the
4 January meeting, Soviet leaders hope to increase their
influence in Rawalpindi without jeopardizing their pri-
mary interests in New Delhi.
INDONESIAN ARMY PREPARING TO TRY PLOT LEADERS
Many prominent figures including some cabinet ministers
will be among the defendants. Sukarno has still not
banned the Communist Party, but the army's anti-PKI
campaign continues anyway.
CAMBODIA SEEKING TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR
Prince Sihanouk appears to be groping for a way to
keep the fighting from extending to Cambodian ter-
ritory.
YEMENI PEACE CONFERENCE RECESSES 12
Shortly after reaching their first substantive agreement
in a month of conferring, the royalists and republicans
called a break that may last until February.
ZAMBIA MAINTAINS PRESSURE FOR EMERGENCY SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS 13
President Kaunda is seeking to accelerate shipments of
oil and to prepare his country for a complete cut off of
trade with Rhodesia.
TRENDS IN SEKOU TOURE'S GUINEA
This radical West African state is subject to acute
internal tensions that could threaten the stability of
President Tourers regime. After seven years of inde-
pendence, the initial enthusiasm generated by the
country's single political party is wearing thin and
Tours has felt obliged to make sweeping internal changes
to preserve his dominance. Guinea has steadily in-
creased its ties with the US following the abrupt halt-
ing of large-scale Communist aid in late 1961. However,
current domestic political pressures could produce
ancther shift in orientation as sudden as that of four
years ago. (Published separately as Special Report
XI No. 0322/65A)
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Page ii WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Nave SECRET
Europe
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY
Despite the recent conclusion of some agreements on
interzonal trade, important issues remain unresolved.
BELGIAN PROBLEMS IN WALLONIA
Worsening economic conditions in the French-speaking
area could endanger the present coalition government
since the relative prosperity of the country's Flemish
section has heightened long-standing animosities between
the two linguistic communities.
GERMAN CHANCELLOR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
Bonn officials say they are satisfied with Chancellor
Erhard's mid-December visit to Washington despite the
public impression that results failed to equal the
expectations Bonn had permitted to build up.
PROSPECTS IMPROVE FOR ITALIAN SOCIALIST REUNIFICATION
Merger prospects for the Socialists and Social Democrats
have been gradually improving in recent weeks as leaders
of both parties seek a unified party able to compete
more effectively with Christian Democrats and Communists.
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN TENSICKS REMAIN HIGH
Following last week's firefight in Santiago, the two
contending factions are looking to the Provisional
President for vindication. Garcia Godoy has been tem-
porizing in evident hope that :passions will abate.
JAGAN RETAINS PARTY DOMINANCE IN BRITISH GUIANA
The People's Progressive Party reconfirmed Cheddi
Jagan's leadership by electing all of his choices for
party offices but did not seriously attack its basic
problem of deciding whether to oppose the Burnham
government peacefully or violently.
SECRET
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SECRET
NICARAGUAN ELECTION TEMPO ACCELERATES
With little more than a year to go before elections
that will probably bring a return of the Somoza "dynasty,"
hotheads on both sides appear likely to ensure dif-
ficult times ahead.
ECUADOREAN JUNTA ANNOUNCES ELECTION PLAN
The schedule calls for restoration of constitutional
government following a political campaign next June, but
most local politicians are apparently unenthusiastic
over the prospect.
CHILE: PROBLEMS FACING THE PDC IN THE YEAR AFTER VICTORY
Eduardo Frei's presidential election victory in September
1964 was widely heralded as the triumph of a freely
elected reform-minded government that would have a pro-
found effect on the economic and social development of
Latin America. Today, Frei and his fellow Christian
Democrats are facing the strains resulting from attempts
to initiate advances along somewnat traditional Western
lines while attempting to incorporate unique patterns
and unproven concepts of Christian democracy. (Pub-
lished separately as Special Report OCI No. 0322/65B)
'ECRET
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Dec 65
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NNO,
SECRET
The Viet Cong generally ob-
served its own conditional ces-
sation of hostilities on Christ-
mas eve, although guerrilla ac-
tivity resulted in allied casual-
ties in two instances. Enemy ac-
tivity picked up on Christmas
day well before the end of the
30-hour allied cease-fire, how-
ever, and allied forces resumed
combat operations early on 26 De-
cember.
Military activity before and
after the lull continued at the
comparatively high level sustained
during recent weeks. Communist
attacks in battalion strength oc-
curred in Quang Tri, Quang Nam,
and Quang Ngai provinces before
the holiday, and in An Xuyen and
Quang Duc provinces on 26 and 28
December. The most successful
government operation of the week
was in Chuong Thien Province.
US military officials in
Saigon report that 1,000 PAVN
troops may have crossed the Lao-
tian border into Quang Tri Prov-
ince on 25 December. In addition
to an enemy battalion-size attack
on 23 December, two bridges on
Route 9 were recently destroyed,
and large-scale enemy activity
may be imminent.
On 28 December, the Front's
central committee announced that
Viet Cong forces would observe a
cease-fire toward South Vietnamese
troops during the lunar new year
period from 20-23 January. Both
government and Viet Cong forces
sharply decreased their activi-
ties during this period last year.
South Vietnam
Political ion
II Corps commander General
Vinh Loc last week issued two
communiquds that clearly indi-
cate a hardened government at-
titude toward FULRO, the dissi-
dent tribal organization respon-
sible for the recent montagnard
uprising in four central high-
lands provinces. One communique
states that any person caught
assisting a FULRO member will be
shot; the other allows FULRO
members 20 days to surrender or
face severe punishment.
Military trials have been
held in Pleiku for 39 members
of a regional force company that
participated in the rebellion.
Four were sentenced to death,
two of whom have already been
shot, 30 have received prison
sentences, and five have been
acquitted. Some 300 FULRO sym-
pathizers are now in government
]hands, and additional courts-
martial have been scheduled for
at least some of them. Defense
Minister Co in Saigon is report-
edly urging moderation, and cau-
tioning against mass executions.
Major General Chieu, secre-
tary general of the ruling mili-
tary Directorate, told US Embassy
officials last week that the Di-
rectorate still plans to launch
a 60-man civilian advisory coun-
cil, probably some time next
month. He said a majority of
the Directorate favored giving
the council some concrete re-
sponsibilities in addition to its
SECRET
Page 1 WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Dec 65
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SECRET
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23 DECEMBER 1965
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SECRET
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_ SE CRE 7'
advisory role. However, Chieu
was unable to indicate who the
council members might be, leav-
ing the impression that candi-
dates may be hard to find. He
also said his own efforts to es-
tablish a national front group-
ing of politicians who would sup-
port the military government had
been unsuccessful, and that this
project would be at least tem-
porarily postponed.
Rumors continue that Na-
tional Police Director Lieu and
I Corps commander General Thi
are attempting to undermine Pre-
mier Ky and Chief of State Thieu.
Although Thi and Lieu--long-time
close associates--are politically
ambitious and frequently critical
of Ky, there has been no firm
evidence that they are actively
preparing a coup.
Hanoi propaganda has al-
ready attempted to discredit the
current US cessation of the air
attacks against North Vietnam by
claiming that hostile US air ac-
tivity over the DRV is continu-
ing. The DRV has protested to
the ICC that "many formations of
US jet fighters repeatedly over-
flew the DRV and carried out re-
connaissance and provocative ac-
tivities on 25, 26, and 27 De-
cember." This is the same line
Hanoi took toward the five-day
cessation of the bombings last
May. Neither Peking nor the
Liberation Front has yet commented
on the current standdown.
Soviet Leader to Visit Hanoi
Moscow's decision to send a
top leader--party secretary
Shelepin--to Hanoi indicates a
clear intention to exert a strong
influence upon the North Vietnam-
ese. His trip is the first high-
level Soviet visit since the
Kosygin mission last February,
and the Soviets probably feel
that the current bombing pause
provides a good opportunity to
encourage Hanoi to seek political
alternatives to the war.
Announcement of the visit
coincides with increased Russian
material and political support
foil, the DRV and with renewed ex-
pressions of Hanoi's gratitude
for Moscow's "great assistance."
The visit represents a direct
challenge to China's influence,
however, and Hanoi appears to have
made an effort to placate Chinese
concern. The party daily on 28
December published a lengthy ar-
ticle praising the "broad and
tremendous support" Peking has
provided. Also cited were num-
erous examples of Chinese pledges
of support, including statements
by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.
An undertone in the article,
however, suggested Hanoi feels
Chinese aid has been more talk
than action. Although Peking has
insisted that it will "stand
shoulder to shoulder" with its
Vietnamese comrades, Hanoi may
SECRET
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inurn Li1aracterlstics and Performance
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as?mr m speed a opiimum As ., ?
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5-6 n.m.
SECRET
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"E.CRE1
feel Peking should provide addi-
tional material assistance and
cooperate more fully with Soviet
aid efforts.
Hungarian Economic Aid
Hungary has granted North
Vietnam a new long-term, interest-
free loan as well as a moratorium
on repayment of past loans, ac-
cording to a joint communique
signed by DRV Deputy Premier Le
Thank Nghi and Hungarian Deputy
Premier Fock on 28 December. A
separate agreement on "economic
aid of a different nature" was
also listed. The vague revela-
tions? on this agreement may indi-
cate that while Budapest is will-
ing to give Hanoi's war effort
minimum support, it does not wish
to publicly commit itself to any
specific military assistance. The
public announcements suggest that
the assistance offered is more
generous than Le Thanh Nghi was
able to arrange when he was in
Budapest early last summer.
The DRV delegation left for
Germany on the 28th, suggesting
visits to several East European
capitals. Hanoi's initial an-
nouncement indicated the trip
would include only Moscow, Pe-
king, and Pyongyang.
High-Performance Aircraft in DRV
The presence of new-genera-
tion, high-performance fighter
aircraft in the DRV was confirmed
last week by high-altitude drone
photography. Seven MIG-21 Fish-
beds were seen at Phuc Yen Air-
field. Four other canvas-covered
planes may also be MIG-21s. In
addition, a total of 63 MIG-15/17
fighters were seen at Phuc Yen
and Kep airfields, very close to
the accepted air order of battle.
New SAM Sites
Nine new surface-to-air mis-
sile (SAM) sites--numbers 53
through 61--were disclosed by
photography One 25X1
of the sites is still under con-
struction and missiles and mis-
sile-associated equipment were
noted at one other site.
SECRET
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Evidence is accumulating
that Communist China is preparing
to extend the birth control pro-
gram it has been conducting for
several years from the cities to
the rural areas, where over 80
percent of the estimated 763 mil-
lion population lives. There is
little chance that the effect on
the population's rate of growth
in the near future will be
significant. The practical dif-
ficulties of training personnel
to administer a nationwide pro-
gram and of providing enough con-
traceptives are severe. Moreover,
the regime seems still to be in-
hibited by ideological concerns
and by anxiety over the possibil-
itv of arousing the resistance of
the conservative peasantry.
China's population problem
is growing more acute. Food pro-
duction has been outstripped by
the growth of the population,
which during the past six years
has risen by an estimated 80-90
million. Rations are still near
the edge of subsistance despite
grain imports of 5-6 million tons
annually since 1961. Private
plots--allowed to revive during
the post - Leap Forward food dis-
aster years--have become a vital
and apparently permanent supple-
mentary source of food. In-
dividual food intake remains be-
low the level of 1957, the year
before the Great Leap, and there
is little chance that it will be
restored to that level, since ac-
complishing this would require
doubling grain output over the
next 20 years. Food reserves,
with the possible exception of
small stores for military con-
tingencies, are believed to be
nonexistent.
The information available so
far indicates that the spread of
birth control practices in the
countryside will be slow, and in
part contingent upon more-or-less
chance factors such as the pres-
ence of rural hospitals or par-
ticularly zealous cadres. No
preference has become discerni-
ble for any one device or method,
although the intra-uterine loop
has obvious advantages for China
in cost, ease of manufacture,
and administration.
Sufficient trained tech-
nicians are presently lacking
to administer even the simplest
methods in a nationwide program.
However, starting in the second
half of 1965, large numbers of
urban medical personnel h ve been
reassigned to rural work.
As a further harbinger of
developments to come, the recent
nationalconference of gynecolo-
gists and obstetricians--Commu-
nist China's first--announced
that large numbers of rural part-
time health workers will be
trained and that among their newly
adopted textbooks will be one en-
titled "Modern Methods of Child-
birth and Birth Control."
SECRET
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25X1
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SECRE'
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEFECTIONS OF
Czechoslovakia and Hungary
have become increasingly concerned
with the rising number c.' defec-
tions--a consequence of the liber-
alization of travel restrictions--
of professionals such as physicians,
scientists, and engineers. The
problem also has had repercussions
in the recipient countries of
France, Austria, and--possibly--
West Germany, and transit countries
such as Yugoslavia.
Critical comments have ap-
peared in Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary recently, culminating in Hun-
gary in a speech to parliament by
Premier Kallai. Kallai admitted
that .005 percent of the Hungarians
traveling to the West this year had
chosen not to return. The figure
in the Czech party press was 0092
percent for Czechs choosing the
West. The percentages may appear
low, but the loss of 3,000 Hungar-
ians and at least a similar number
of Czechs for a nine-month period
must be disturbing, particularly
since these figures include a large
proportion of professionals and
represent only the totals publicly
admitted by the regimes without
reference to secret escapes across
the border.
The regime's solutions have
been to revert to a limited reim-
position of restrictions. The
Czechs have revived the "hostage"
system whereby at least one member
of the family must remain home,
while Hungary reportedly has been
placing stricter limitations on
travel by professional men.
Recipient countries have been
unhappy about the situation also.
Austria and France, for example,
are interested in improving rela-
tions with the East, but find them-
selves faced with accommodating
ever greater numbers of refugees
from these countries. Austria has
upon occasion returned would-be de-
fectors, who have then been sen-
tenced to at least three years im-
prisonment. France, once the eas-
iest European country in which to
find refuge, reportedly has been
refusing to grant asylum or work
permits. Recently the Bavarian
Government returned a would-be Hun-
garian defector, but this may have
been an isolated incident rather
than a reflection of a change in
West German refugee policy.
Now that travel to Yugoslavia
has been made easier, that country
is being used as a jumping-off point
for the West. Belgrade has promised
-to cooperate with its Eastern Euro-
pean neighbors, however, and in many
cases has thwarted defection at-
tempts. The Yugoslav borders with
the West nevertheless remain a much-
used roadway for illegal travel to
the West.
Defections are not a serious
problem to the Polish regime, prob-
ably because the population feels
relatively secure in the knowledge
that the right to travel has become
more or less established since 1956.
Rumania and Bulgaria are not faced
with the problem because they do not
permit travel to the West except by
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 Dec 65
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25X1
The spread of foot-and-
mouth disease may have been
checked, but it is still wide-
spread in the USSR. The cur-
rent outbreak, which began in
late October - early November,
will adversely affect the out-
put of livestock products next
year.
Control and prevention
measures were still in force as
of mid-December. It has been
reported that the disease has
infected humans, and notices
urging the population not to buy
noninspected meat and milk
Precautions against the disease
have been noted as far north as
the Baltic republics and as far
west as Moldavia.
Although the extent of the
disease is not known at this
time, output of meat and dairy
products next year will probably
be less than was envisaged when
the 1966 plan was drafted. The
effects of the disease--along
with other factors--make unlikely
the fulfillment of the planned
increase of 8-10 percent in
total agricultural production
MOSCOW'S POSITION IN THE UPCOMING INDIAN-PAKISTANI TALKS
Moscow is probably approaching
tue 4 January meeting at Tashkent
between Indian and Pakistan
leaders with the expectation
that about the best that can be
achieved is an easing of the
hostility between the two coun-
tries and perhaps an agreement to
hold further discussions. So-
viet leaders could consider it
a net gain simply to have brought
Ayub Khan and Shastri together
under the aegis of their "good
offices." They view the forth-
coming meeting both as a step
forward in their efforts to win
a firm diplomatic foothold in
Pakistan, and as a move to de-
prive the Chinese of an oppor -
tunity to exploit discord in
South Asia
Over the past year, Moscow
has worked at improving its re-
lations with Pakistan and re-
cently has adopted a more non-
committal attitude on the ques-
tion of Kashmir in order to win
greater influence in Rawalpindi.
However, the USSR doubtless feels
that it can retain the confidence
of the Indians on the strength
of its past record of support
for New Delhi's claims. The
Soviets appear so far to have
satisfied the Indians that
Moscow's recent tactics have
been designed to frustrate the
Chinese and to exert a moder-
ating influence in Rawalpindi.
SECT .ET
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The flow of Soviet military
equipment to the Indians is un-
diminished, as is Moscow's over-
riding interest in maintaining
its position in New Delhi.
The USSR reportedly has in-
formed India that the Soviet
leaders hope that India and
Pakistan will agree to forego
the use of force as a means of
settling their problems and to
disengage their respective forces
This is probably about the max-
imum Moscow hopes to obtain from
the meeting, and it is question-
able whether Soviet officials
intend to push either side very
hard even for these limited goals,
vention during the negotiations
Soviet leaders appear to
have a realistic view of the 25X1
risks posed by any direct inter-
New Delhi believes that the
Russians want to reduce tensions
on the Asian subcontinent, but
presumably not at the expense of
India. Consequently, they in-
tend to appear cooperative with
Moscow and to remain in a posi-
tion to put the onus on Rawal-
pindi should the Tashkent talks
fail to break the stalemate. The
Pakistanis, for their part, want
some movement toward a solution
of the Kashmir problem and hope
that Moscow will maintain its
recently adopted noncommittal
Stance on the issue. None of
the parties to the meeting in
Tashkent, however, appear overly
optimistic about a basic Indian-
Pakista.ni accommodation.
SECRE'T'
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Asia-Africa
INDONESIAN ARMY PREPARING TO TRY PLOT LEADERS
With the Indonesian Commu-
nist Party (PKI) above ground or-
ganization almost totally de-
stroyed throughout the country,
the army appears to be concen-
trating on preparations for the
trial of alleged leaders of the
30 September movement. tspe-
c ial military court will begin
the trials sometime after 24
January, when Ramadan, the
Muslim month of fasting ends.
battle against the army's grow-
ing power. His speeches charge
that the army-directed anti-PKI
campaign is creating dangerous
divisions within Indonesian
society and emphasize the "posi-
tive contribution" of the PKI
to the Indonesian revolution.
Heavy editing of these speeches
by the army-controlled news medi
however, has greatly reduced
their impact.
Army commander General
Suharto has announced that some
cabinet ministers will be among
the defendants. Apparently even
dead Communist leaders will be
tried. One of the most promi-
nent figures likely to be brought
before the court is Marshall
Omar Dani, former air force
chief and air force minister,
who was deeply involved in the
coup attempt. Uani, who was
earlier sent out of the country
by Sukarno on an official mis-
sion, reportedly returned to
Djakarta on 19 December and now
is in jail.
President Sukarno is con-
tinuing his apparently losing
Army leaders have been
sharply provoked by Sukarno's
failure to ban the PKI by 24
December as he had earlier led
them to believe he would.
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CAMBODIA SEEKING TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR
Prince Sihanouk evidently
is groping for a diplomatic ri-
poste to meet what he presumably
views as a grave threat to Cam-
bodia contained in recent public
statements concerning possible
US military ground operations on
Cambodian territory. So far,
the Cambodian Government's reac-
tion has been confined to ap-
peals to the international com-
munity and standard denunciations
of US policy in Indochina.
Several official communi-
ques issued over the past week
suggest that at least for the
present Sihanouk's principal
tactic will be to portray Cam-
bodia as the innocent victim of
the escalating war in South Viet-
nam. He has called on the Geneva
co-chairmen to take a "clear
position" on the US decision to
authorize the violation of Cam-
bodia's borders. He also has
hinted that Cambodia may appeal
to the United Nations in an at-
tempt to win international sym-
pathy.
Sihanouk is attempting to
put the onus on the US for the
tense situation along the bor-
der. He has forcefully reiter-
ated denials that the Viet Cong
use Cambodia for sanctuary or
as a source of arms and ammuni-
tion. At the same time, he has
renewed calls for an expanded
International Control Commission
(ICC) to inspect and "control"
the border area. An ICC inspec-
tion team is currently in Siha-
noukville at Sihanouk's invitation,
trying to determine the number
of personnel it would take to
"control" the port effectively.
disposal."
Thus far, Sihanouk has been
circumspect concerning the pos-
sibility of calling for outside
support in the event of a US or
South Vietnamese "attack." A
government communique issued on
26 December referred to a "pos-
sible appeal" to "all nations"
for assistance and support. Two
days later, however, a resolu-
tion submitted by Sihanouk to a
meeting of the National Congress
omitted any reference to outside
aid and asserted only that Cam-
bodia reserved the right to de-
fend its own territory and to re-
taliate to "aggression" with all
the "laughable (sic) means at its
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The Harad peace conference
between Yemeni royalists and re-
publicans has been recessed, pos-
sibly until late February, and
bothsides are prepared for out-
breaks of trouble during the in-
terim.
A month-old conference, born
out of the agreement last August
between King Faysal and President
Nasir, has been called off at
least until the end of the holy
month of Ramadan, and it is un-
clear when the talks will resume.
The Ramadan fast has provided a
logical excuse to break off the
deadlocked attempt to form a
caretaker all-Yemen government.
Shortly before the recess, the
republican side had finally ac-
cepted the royalist view that the
caretaker government be neither
royalist nor republican in form.
This first agreement of any sub-
stance added a note of optimism
that the meeting would, in fact,
be reconvened.
Both Nasir and Faysal will
actively encourage renewal of
talks. Despite their individual
efforts to obtain the most favor-
able terms possible, there is lit-
tle doubt of their desire for
peace in Yemen. Ever since their
August agreement on steps to end
the three-year-old civil war, they
have done their best to discourage
clashes between the naturally
fractious tribes and surprisingly
few incidents have occurred. The
two leaders have been less suc-
cessful in damping inflammatory
propaganda and rash partisan
statements.
The Saudis have apparently
lived up to their agreement to
suspend arms support to the roy-
alists, and are now attempting
to persuade the Egyptians to be-
gin troop withdrawals without
waiting for the formation of an
interim government. The start of
Egyptian troop movements would
almost certainly stimulate a new
interest on both sides in renew-
ing the Harad conference.
The republicans appear re-
signed to eventual Egyptian with-
drawal. They have attempted to
set up several defense organiza-
tions to protect themselves from
the expected postwithdrawal rav-
aging by fierce royalist tribes.
The royalists, despite alarmist
press reports that they were
ready to attack, have been bel-
ligerent only in isolated cases.
Nevertheless, both sides still
regard each other with suspicion
and are making contingency plans
in case the talks fail. Nasir
has announced he will strike back
against any royalist attack, and
the Saudis continue to stockpile
weapons along the Yemen border.
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ZAMBIA MAINTAINS PRESSURE FOR EMERGENCY SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS
Zambia's President Kaunda.
is maintaining high pressure on
Britain and others to accelerate
the flow of emergency oil ship-
ments into his country and to
prepare Zambia. to invoke a com-
plete economic embargo against
Rhodesia..
Numerous operational dif-
ficulties, such as a shortage
of oil drums, threaten to de-
plete Zambia's low petroleum
reserves. The joint UK-US con-
tingency planning committee in
Lusaka, however, remains op-
timistic that over 11,000 tons
of oil can be sent to Zambia in
January and that deliveries will
eventually approach the UK goal
of 17,000 tons per month. This
would be close to Zambia's nor-
mal consumption before Rhodesia
cut off Zambia's supplies. Gas
rationing has begun in both
countries.
Kaunda is disappointed with
the UK-US-Ca.nadia.n effort thus
far. Unless the supply opera-
tion becomes quickl and visibly
effective, Kaunda.
might yet institute rash eco-
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia.
Such action could wreck the Zam-
bian economy and increase the
possibility of a large-scale
flight of essential European
workers.
On 22 December, Kaunda's
threatened move to bar imports
of vital Rhodesian coal supplies
was averted at the last minute
only by Prime Minister Wilson's
reminder of the disastrous con-
sequences of such a move for the
Zambian economy
In London, Wilson obtained
parliamentary approval for in-
stituting oil sanctions, but at
the price of reaffirming his gov-
ernment's opposition to the use
of military force in the Rho-
desian crisis.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE
Despite the recent conclu-
sion of some agreements between
East and West Germany on inter-
zonal trade (IZT), important is-
sues remain unresolved.
Europe
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY
Under the new agreements,
West Germany will transfer 50 mil-
lion DM from the East's surplus
balance in the consumer goods
and food account to its deficit
strategic goods account. As a
counterconcession, East Germany
in 1966 will buy coal valued at
40 million DM, almost 50 percent
above such purchases thus far in
1965.
Discussion of the main un-
resolved issues--FRG compensation
for elimination of the petroleum
products subsidy, and the method
of signing basic modifications
of the IZT agreement--will resume
at the next regular meeting sched-
uled for 10 January.
Despite the current impasse,
trade in the near future is ex-
pected to continue at the record-
high levels apparently achieved
in 1965.
BELGIAN PROBLEMS IN WALLONIA
The Belgian Government is
assigning highest priority to ac-
tion to counter the growing eco-
nomic deterioration and political
alienation in Wallonia, the coun-
try's French-speaking area.
The Wallonian problem is
acute at this time because of the
difficulty that the coalition
parties are having over next
year's budget. Prime Minister
Harmel's Social Christian Party
(PSC) is seeking cuts in expend-
itures for social security and
education as the price for hav-
ing supported some Socialist pro-
posals for increased taxes. The
PSC's acceptance of higher taxes
was not enough, however, to se-
cure the support of a majority
of the Walloon Socialist deputies,
who broke party discipline to
vote against the government's
revenue bill. These dissidents
may be joined by others of both
parties in opposing the govern-
ment's attempts to reduce expend-
itures.
The parties have reluctantly
agreed that a number of uneconomic
coal mines, representing 12 per-
cent of the nation's total pro-
ducing capacity, will be closed
as an added economy measure. Gov-
ernment subsidies to the remain-
ing mines will be increased, but
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the mine closings will seriously
hurt the economies of the affected
areas, most of which are in Wal-
lonia.
To counter the growth of
federalist sentiment in Wallonia,
the government hopes initially
to attract American investment
to provide employment there. The
minister of economic affairs told
US officials in Brussels that un-
less several large American firms
are brought into the area within
the next six months to offset the
effect of the mine closings, there
is a serious danger the Socialist
Party will break into Walloon and
Flemish wings. In such an event
the Socialists could no longer
Liege
L I E G E
participate in the coalition,
which would mean the downfall of
the present government.
In contrast to historically
dominant Wallonia, the Dutch-
speaking Flanders portion of Bel-
gium has shown increasing pros-
perity in recent years, partly
as a result of receiving since
1959 some 80 percent of all for-
eign investment in Belgium. This
reversal of economic roles has
heightened long-standing animosi-
ties between the two linguistic
communities. For example, some
50 persons were injured at Fouron
on 19 December in the latest of
a series of clashes between the
two groups.
E _.L A N D E R S
Linguistic frontier
Province boundary
Remaining bilingual
area
,. E G I L
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GERMAN CHANCELLOR'S
Bonn officials are express-
ing satisfaction with Chancel-
lorhard's mid-recember visit
to Washington despite the pub-
lic impression that results
failed to equal the expectations
Bonn had permitted to build up.
On the key question of nuclear
sharing in NATO, the Germans
have acknowledged that no de-
cisions were taken, but they are
looking to further discussions
among the interested governments
and in the recently established
NATO Special Committee on nu-
clear questions.
Bonr press spokesman Karl
Guenther von Hase told newsmen
on 22 r:ecember that Bonn's ob-
jective during the Washington
talks was to set forth "prin-
ciples" concerning an "appro-
priate share" in nuclear defense
and not to seek agreement on a
specific project at this time.
As outlined by lefense Min-
ister von Hassel, Bonn now an-
ticipates two general fields
of action on nuclear sharing:
consultation on strategy and plan-
ning as foreseen for the NATO
Special Committee, and "quiet
discussions" among alliance mem-
bers aimed at establishment of
a common weapons system. Bonn
presumably hopes to gain even-
tual acceptance of a NATO sub-
marine fleet along the lines of
the British proposal for an At-
lantic Nuclear Force.
Erhard's expression of
satisfaction with the talks was
mirrored in the optimistic state-
ment issued by his Christian
VISIT TO WASHINGTON
Democratic Party's press service
that a way out of the impasse
on nuclear sharing has been
found. The independent, influ-
ential newspaper Die Welt saw
the ,understanding on principles"
as a good beginning, the poten-
tial of which should not be un-
derestimated. The press service
,of the opposition Socialists,
'however, took the view that the
'appropriate share in nuclear
!defense" envisioned in the com-
munique was the "least binding"
of possible declarations and
concluded that all projects for
physical participation in weap-
ons systems must now be written
off.
On other questions, Von
Hase expressed Bonn's satisfac-
tion with the "understanding
shown by US officials of the West
German view that the effects of
a nonproliferation agreement on
the alliance should be studied
carefully before concluding any
such agreement. Political par-
ties and the press also welcomed
the American invitation to par-
ticipate in US space projects
as a highly significant oppor-
tunity for German science and in-
dustry. The US ambassador to
NATO feels the American initia-
tive on space cooperation comes
at a most propitious time, since
European countries increasingly
are concerned about the techno-
logical gap between themselves
and the US. He feels Germany is
one of the countries ideally
suited to cooperate effective!
such space endeavors.
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PROSPECTS IMPROVE FOR ITALIAN SOCIALIST REUNIFICATION
Prospects for reunification
of Italy's Socialist (PSI) and
Social Democratic (PSDI) parties
have been gradually improving in
recent weeks and are expected to
receive another boost from the
8-11 January PSDI national con-
gress. The issue is crucial for
future political developments be-
cause leaders of both parties
feel that a reunified party--
representing some 18 percent of
the total vote--would be able
to increase its leverage on the
dominant coalition partner, the
Christian Democrats, and to com-
pete effectively with the Commu-
nists for the allegiance of
Italy's large leftist electorate.
PSDI Secretary Mario Tanassi
--who until recently had serious
reservations about reunification
--has declared that the merger is
now "inevitable." He believes
a majority of over 95 percent at
his party's congress will approve
prompt acceptance of the PSI's
proposal for immediate launching
of "common action at all levels"
between the two parties. PSI-
PSDI caucuses in both houses of
the Italian Parliament have al-
ready developed plans for joint
action and close cooperation.
An important early test of PSI-
PSDI harmony may be provided by
the expected post - PSDI congress
meeting of Italy's governing
coalition partners to consider
the status of the government's
legislative program.
Tanassi also expects his
party will place no conditions
on the merger despite the ob-
stacles that the PSDI has cited
in the past. These included the
issue of PSI ties with the
Italian Communists at the local
administrative level and in the
labor field, the relationship of
the PSI to the Socialist Inter-
national, and the PSI's adher-
ence to what some Socialist Demo-
crats describe as an obsolete
concept of "neutralism and in-
ternationalism" in foreign pol-
icy. Leaders of both parties,
however, now appear willing to
seek compromises, and the PSI
has already taken positive steps
to meet PSDI reservations.
Beyond these obstacles,
the question of the timing of So-
cialist reunification remains
the most difficult to resolve.
Both Italian President Faragat
and Deputy Prime Minister Nenni
are committed to the merger as
soon as practicable and report-
edly hope to accomplish the
process by next fall--well in
advance of the 1968 national
elections.
The PSI, however, is also
concerned that the merger not
occur before "other democratic
socialist forces" can be included
so as to give the party a broader
base. Therefore, the Socialists
--with an eye to their eroding
electorate--are likely to move
cautiously toward reunification,
and the actual merger, if all
goes well, may not be realized
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Western Hemisphere
Although Christmas passed
peacefully enough, underlying
tensions continue in expectation
of action Garcia Godoy may take
after last week's firefight be-
tween the rebels and regular
military in Santiago. The Pro-
visional President appears con-
vinced that both sides share re-
sponsibility for the conflict
and may feel compelled to take
some punitive measures. The two
contending factions, however,
have developed their own versions
of the event and neither is likely
to be satisfied with less than
complete vindication. If recal-
citrants on either side object
to the presidential decision,
the provisional regime will prob-
ably again have to fall back on
the Inter-American Peace Force
(IAPF) .
Under pressure from younger
officers, Defense Minister Rivera
has been taking a harder line,
charging that presidential ad-
viser Buenaventura Sanchez has
attempted to split the President
from the regular military. Ri-
vera.has also issued in the name
of the Defense Ministry a mani-
festo blaming the rebels for the
Santiago fighting. The US De-
fense attaches report that com-
pany-level officers and NCOs are
agitated over the provisional
government's continued toleration
of Caamano's "army." Before the
holidays, they reported that "most
military are spoiling for a fight"
and this view still holds.
Isolated acts of terrorism
by extremists on both the right
and left have further aggravated
the situation. Homes and busi-
nesses--including two radio sta-
tions--owned by rebel supporters
have been shot up or bombed, prob-
ably by the right. On the left,
terrorism is being spearheaded
by the pro-Pekin Dominican Pop-
ular Movement
In this delicate situation,
the Provisional President has
abandoned his earlier view that
the public "demands" quick retri-
bution for the Santiago fighting
and has been temporizing in evi-
dent hope that passions will cool.
He postponed a public report on
the Santiago incident slated for
last week, and now says he will
make one on the night of 29 De-
cember. Garcia Godoy has told
Ambassador Bennett he intends to
Jo something drastic "before
that t."
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Garcia Godoy will probably
attempt to moderate the impact of
whatever course of action he
chooses by consulting beforehand
with all interested parties, in-
cluding the OAS ad hoc committee.
Under present circumstances
violence could break out without
warning and an unplanned incident
could escalate into a major con-
frontation, a development that al-
most inevitably would involve the
IAPF. The Communists would almost
certainly attempt to exploit such
a situation through their ability
--demonstrated during the past two
weeks--to manipulate street mobs 25X1
and rioters. This, combined with
a widespread availability of arms,
poses a continuing danger to secu-
rity.
Although the British Guianan
People's Progressive Party (PPP)
and its December special congress
concentrated on electing new of-
ficers and did not decide whether
to follow a policy of peaceful
or violent opposition to the Burn-
ham government, Cheddi Jagan's
undisputed leadership of the
party was reconfirmed,
The PPP's last regular con-
gress, held in April 1965, broke
down because party leaders could
not decide whether to elect a
moderate or an extremist as party
chairman--the number two position
in the PPP. In order to prevent
an open rift, Jagan postponed
elections and assumed sole interim
responsibility for PPP administra-
tion.
All of Jagan's choices for
party officers were elected at
the December congress. Cedric
Nunes, an activist currently
detained for suspected complicity
in the June bombing of the US
Consulate office, was elected
chairman. Since Nunes is in
prison, he is unlikely to play a
major part in policy formation
at present. Jagan's support for
Nunes' candidacy may have been
one of many strategic moves de-
signed to satisfy all factions
in the party and thereby paper
over the moderate-extremist split.
It is likely that PPP lead-
ership will continue to be divided
and that the party will drift in-
effectually until Jagan stops
vacillating and clearly opts for
a policy of moderation or extrem-
ism. He is currently on a trip
abroad that is scheduled to in-
clude stops in Prague, Havana,
and Moscow, and he will probably
return home in February. No im-
portant policy decisions are
likely to be made in his absence.
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With the February 1967 election
little more than a year away, Nic-
araguan political activity is gain-
ing some momentum. General Anas-
tasio Somoza, commander of Nic-
aragua's National Guard, has left
no doubt about his intention to
run as the candidate of the ruling
National Liberal Party (PLN). How-
ever, the opposition conservative
parties are still primarily en-
gaged in internal feuding and have
been unable as yet to organize an
effective campaign against the
Somocistas.
During the past month, Gen-
eral Somoza has engaged in a
veritable whirlwind of activities
to enhance his reputation prior
to the PLN convention. These
noisy events have been widely pub-
licized by the Somoza press, with
editorials and poems lauding the
general in effusive terms as a
"condor soaring over the Andes"
and with other hyperboles. Dur-
ing 'the festivities for the gen-
eral's 40th birthday, Chamber of
Feputies President Orlando Mon-
tenegro actually proclaimed Somoza
a candidate for the presidency.
The general acknowledged the trib-
ute, but remarked that he could not
accept a nomination while he re-
mained in the army.
Discord in the opposition
camp is highlighted by the dilemma
facing Traditionalist Conservative
Party (PCT) leader Fernando Aguero,
who finds it difficult to maintain
even a facade of party unity. While
denouncing the PLN and the "Somoza
dictatorship," Pugero has in turn
been denounced by members of his
own party. Jose Cuadra Cardenal,
prominent PCT official, recently
resigned his post as technical
secretary of the party and an-
nounced his intention to fight
against "bad leadership." US Em-
bassy observers believe former
president Luis Somoza could be be-
hind Cuadra's resignation., Since
Aguero's dictatorial tactics have
alienated many conservatives, there
is a possibility that Cuadra might
serve as a rallying point for
dissenters
However, at present Cuadra has
chosen to remain within the PCT.
In addition, the PCT has had
several other setbacks. For ex-
ample, interparty negotiations on
electoral reform came to a sudden
halt when the present Schick gov-
ernment refused to accept any of
the substantive changes requested
by the PCT. The party must now un-
dertake an expensive and cumber-
some petition process if it is to
be legally reinstated.
The embassy has noted that
with the failure of political con-
ciliation efforts, hotheads on both
sides may force a return to tradi-
tional intransigence. Moreover,
ill-feeling against the Somozas re-
mains alive, and the probability of
a return to the Somoza "dynasty"
could revive old hatreds and create
additional domestic turmoil. In
any case, the outlook for the
coming year appears to be an in-
creasing deterioration of the re-
laxed atmosphere fostered by Presi-
dent Schick.
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The military junta has an-
anounced its plan to restore con-
stitutional government in 1966
through presidential elections to
be held on 5 June. A two-month
campaign in which the political
parties are promised -full free-
dom within the limits of public
order would precede the contest.
The president-elect would take
office on 1 September.
Constitutional changes to
be made before the campaign will
probably include a ban on re-
election of aspiring former pres-
idents such as four-time presi-
dent Josd Maria Velasco Ibarra
and e..-President Camilo Ponce
Enriquez. The office of vice
president probably will be sup-
pressed and the legislative branch
reformed.
The junta's plan reflects
determined opposition by the
armed forces high command to both
an interim civilian president and
a constituent assembly--steps
desired by most politicians who
fear that otherwise the military
will impose a president. The
armed forces are aware, however,
that in the past such arrangements
have tended to exacerbate insta-
bility.
The politicians have dis-
played negligible energy since
the failure of attempts to over-
throw the junta last July, and
are unprepared for a presidential
race. They probably will con-
tinue to urge a constituent as-
sembly that they could control,
but may also attempt to concert
ephemeral "fronts" or coalitions
in hopes of developing a winning
combination. Lack of provision
by the junta for election of a
congress--historically the least
stable or effective branch--thwarts
the ambition of many politicians
and may further inhibit their cam-
paign enthusiasm.
Minister of Government Garcia
Velasco, who favored a constituent
assembly, has left the government,
and for the moment, other parti-
sans of this approach are muted.
Ex-junta member Freile has found
no response to his plaints against
the government from hiding, and
he now lacks the organized fol-
lowing to give his presidential
ambitions more than a remote
chance. Little has been heard
from exiled Velasco Ibarra, al-
though some of his partisans an-
nounced that he would be a can-
didate regardless of the govern-
ment's attitude. The other nomi-
nees, Raul Clemente Huerta and
Carlos Guevara Moreno, remain
silent.
There are persistent rumors
that some opponents of the tran-
sition plan have found military
support and may attempt to es-
tablish a new junta or a single
executive. Embassy sources indi-
cate that ex-President Ponce is
behind efforts to concert a civil-
military coup in order to prevent
his being barred from the June
contest. Pressures for such an
attempt will likely become most
serious near the 29 January anni-
versary of the widely hated Rio
Protocol which defined Ecuador`s
boundaries with Peru.
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Seven years after independence, the radical
West African state of Guinea is subject to acute
internal tensions that could threaten the stabil-
ity of President Sekou Tourd's regime. The polit-
ical enthusiasm initially generated by the coun-
try's single party, the Democratic Party of Guinea
(PDG), is being stifled by local, tribal, and in-
dividual. interests. Despite Tourd's attempts to
blame many of Guinea's difficulties on foreign med-
dling, he has already felt obliged to make sweep-
ing internal shifts.
For a country of its small size and relative
lack of development, Guinea exercises a dispropor-
tionate amount of influence among the more radi-
cal African states. This, together with its poten-
tial economic importance as possessor of over 40
percent of known world reserves of bauxite, has
tended to make it a focus of international inter-
est. An influx of Communist aid and advisers
shortly after independence made it appear that
Guinea was being drawn irreversibly into the Com-
munist sphere. However, this trend was abruptly
halted following exposure of an allegedly Soviet-
inspired plot in late 1961. Since 1962, Guinea has
steadily increased its ties with the US, which is
now the principal donor of economic and technical
aid. Close relations have never been resumed with
France despite the example of other French-speaking
African states and the desires of many influential
Guineans. Domestic political pressures could pro-
duce another shift in orientation as sudden as
that of four years ago.
When Guinea abruptly voted
its independence in September
1.958, its chief asset was its
highly organized political party,
the PDG, which had a revolution-
ary, egalitarian, and somewhat
puritanical outlook. During the
final years of French rule, Tourd
and his associates used the party
to fuse Guinea's normally antagonis-
Page 1
tic tribes and social classes into
a unified anticolonial force,
and the momentum of this effort
carried over into the early pe-
riod of independence. After
seven difficult years, however,
the PDG's ability to engage all
the people in a selfless nation-
building effort is showing signs
of fraying.
On the positive side, Tourh's
regime, by creating a widespread
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sense of civic responsibility,
has accomplished far more than
have most other newly independ-
ent African states. His regime
is well ahead of others in the
field of social development, es-
pecially in terms of education,
status of women, and the eradi-
cation of tribalism. Neverthe-
less, these things represent good
beginnings rather than final ac-
complishments, and they are sub-
ject to undermining by internal
rivalries, foreign manipulation,
and economic difficulties.
In fact, economic conditions
in Guinea have been deteriorating
ever since independence. Although
Communist countries soon stepped
in to replace the suddenly ter-
minated French support, many of
their initial aid projects proved
to be ill-conceived and unproduc-
tive. During the past few years,
foreign aid to Guinea has come
from more diversified sources and
has been somewhat better suited
to the country's needs. It has
contributed a modest variety
of processing plants and a lim-
ited improvement in such fields
as communications and transporta-
tion. Simultaneously, however,
vital agricultural production
has declined in both the subsist-
ence and small plantation sectors,
and there have been intermittent
food shortages.
The country's economic prob-
lems are rooted in the govern-
ment's capricious domestic poli-
cies, which are more often promul-
gated to satisfy nationalist sen-
timent or to follow a socialist
pattern than to deal with the sit-
uation at hand. In 1960, for ex-
ample, Guinea adopted its own cur-
rency as a manifestation of polit-
ical independence, but the cur-
rency is now virtually worthless
and nonconvert ible . Moreover,
shortages of foreign exchange have
cut deeply into supplies of con-
sumer goods and have prompted var-
ious clandestine trading arrange-
ments. There has been a mounting
incidence of farmers' withholding
their produce, of illicit deals
in foreign currency, and of
b]tackmarketing and smuggling.
In 1964 an estimated 60 percent
of Guinea's exportable products
were smuggled out for hard cur-
rency and even most goods legally
imported were smuggled out be-
fore they could reach local con-
sumers. It was general knowl-
edge that police and party of-
ficials participated extensively
in these activities.
For several years the gov-
ernment attempted directly to
conduct most retail trade in
Guinea. In November 1964, after
a year of experimenting with a
more liberal commercial system
and attempting persuasion through
PDG channels, it resorted to
force to induce observance of
stringent new economic regula-
tions. Smugglers were arrested
and many independent merchants
and peddlers were put out of
business as retail trade in
staple goods reverted to direct
government operation. A special
party commission was set up to
investigate possible economic
wrong-doing on the part of of-
ficials.
Other economy measures in-
troduced in 1964 added to the gen-
erral discontent. Of these, the
most unpopular appears to have
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been a rigid restriction on the
number of students permitted to
go on to secondary schools in
Guinea or to continue their ed-
ucation abroad.
One dramatic result of all
these measures has been a massive
emigration from Guinea to neigh-
boring countries, especially to
relatively prosperous Ivory Coast
and Senegal. Conakry officially
closed the borders in November
1964 and used security forces to
enforce the closure; some of the
restrictions were lifted during
1965, but controls remain tight
and certain categories of indi-
viduals such as soldiers, stu-
dents, and unmarried girls are
still not permitted to leave. In
all, about ten percent of the
Guinean population is estimated
to have departed, mostly during
the past two years.
SEKOU TOURS
Politically, Tourd has never
been an absolute master in Guinea,
and as contradictory pressures
build up, his policy decisions
tend to become more erratic. PDG
doctrine, for which Tourd is ul-
timately responsible, emphasizes
broad participation in govern-
ment affairs and the use of the
consensus method for determining
policies. Tourd probably cannot
arbitrarily impose his will even
within the PDG's 15-member polit-
buro,and he has not been able to
generate real forward movement
at several of the recent specially
called sessions of the party's
national council. Although Tourd
has a unique ability to artic-
ulate the needs, emotions, and as-
pirations of the Guinean people,
there are also a number of other
top figures who are politically
important in their own right
and can probably delay or reshape
policies they oppose.
There is good evidence that
Tourd has long been dissatisfied
with some of his colleagues. How-
ever, his efforts to purge the
politburo--dating back to 1962--
have been notably unsuccessful.
As president, he has a freer
hand to reshuffle the government
than the party, but even there
certain individuals apparently
are virtually untouchable.
Local complaints recur about
party and government officials
practicing tribal discrimination
or using their positions for
personal gain. Over a year
ago, Tourd accused unspecified
officials of improper conduct in
their dealings with foreign
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embassies. More recently, exten-
sive transfers have been carried
out in the security forces, in-
cluding the dismissal of the com-
mander of the large military camp
near Conakry and the replacement
of the defense minister. The
general atmosphere of suspicion
and recrimination appears to have
intensified as conditions within
the country have worsened.
Tribal antagonism to the re-
gime has occurred primarily among
the Fulani, who make up over a
third of the population, and among
the Malinke, the second largest
group. The Fulani enjoyed a
privileged position under French
rule and have never been fully
reconciled to the present system.
The Malinke, on the other hand,
are the dominant tribe in the
PDG and the government, but many
of them are also members of the
traditional merchant class that
has been badly hurt by the con-
trols on commerce.
Other political tensions ap-
pear to arise from various domes-
tic factions siding with different
foreign powers. Prominent Fulani,
for instance, have been critical
of Toure for the exclusion of
France from Guinea's economic de-
velopment since 1958. Some other
leaders would prefer to see the
Soviet Union or Communist China
in the place of the US, which
Toure has now accepted as the
leading partner in Guinea's eco-
nomic development.
In this atmosphere, rumor
campaigns of the wildest kind
have developed. Some of the
stories circulated include re-
ports of gross police brutality
against people picked up for mi-
nor infractions of economic regu-
lations, of a supposed US-insti-
gated plot to overthrow Toure,
and of the alleged mysterious
death in the Soviet Union of the
regime's most prominent Fulani
personality.
November "Plot" Expose
Sekou Toure's dramatic pub-
lic charges last November that
domestic enemies and foreign
powers were plotting against him
brought some of the smoldering
dissidence out into the open. It
Is unlikely that those accused
actually possessed a serious po-
tential for overthrowing the
government. Nevertheless, the
"exposure" of the plot provided
the occasion for sweeping person-
nel changes. Party activity was
ELlso stepped up to demonstrate
public solidarity with the re-
gime. Announcements that inves-
tigations are continuing in order
to establish evidence against ad-
ditional plotters may be designed
to intimidate other malcontents.
As elaborated thus far, the
plot supposedly was planned by
Ivory Coast President Houphouet-
Boigny with the support of two
French cabinet ministers and the
presidents of several other
moderate African countries. The
principal agent identified in-
side Guinea was Mamadou "Little"
Toure, a Malinke cousin of the
President and the former head of
the state textile trading company.
His role allegedly was to hire
"commandos" who would create dis-
turbances as a cover for the as-
sassination of Toure. According
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to government accounts, three
such assassination attempts have
failed, including two on the 2
October national holiday.
The money involved was al-
legedly brought in from Abidjan
by Francois Kamano, head of the
Ivory Coast Social Security Of-
fice, who has family ties in
Conakry and visited there often
as Tourd's guest. Both "Little"
Tourd and Kamano seem to be free-
wheeling operators well known in
Ivory Coast as well as Guinea.
The latter was arrested briefly
in 1963 in connection with a
plot against Houphouet-Boigny.
on President .Houphouet-Boigny,
under whom Tourd began his po-
litical career in the 1940s. They
broke in the 1950s over ideolog-
ical issues, and currently are
rival spokesmen, respectively,
for radical, anticolonial, and
socialist Africa and for moderate,
pro-Western, and capitalist Af-
rica. Tourd's quarrel with Ivory
Coast is of such emotional in-
tensity that it may be partially
responsible for Guinea's recent
militancy regarding the Organi-
zation of African Unity and the
Rhodesian issue. Guinea was the
first of the nine states that
broke diplomatic relations with
Britain over this question.
This and other prevailing
conspiracy stories reflect a com-
bination of normal Guinean dis-
trust of foreigners, tribal an-
tagonisms, echoes from two plots
exposed some years ago, and gen-
eral suspicions aroused by Guinean
feelings of frustration and iso-
lation. Guineans are also likely
to confuse foreign contact with
plotting, and criticism with sub-
version. Thus far, government
and party surveillance has been
adequate to detect and neutralize
any serious threat.
External Repercussions
One immediate result of the
November plot charges was a
break in diplomatic relations
with France. The two embassies
were promptly closed and economic
negotiations, which had seemed
to be progressing, were called
off.
Tourd's charges against
French-oriented Ivory Coast were
accompanied by a stinging attack
In any case, the pro-French
and pro-Ivorian group within the
Guinean regime is currently in
eclipse. There are some indica-
tions that in order to bring
this about, Tourd may have felt
obliged to ally himself with pro-
Soviet elements, thereby increas-
ing their weight in the Guinean
political equation. Although
the President presumably be-
lieves that he can remain their
master, their influence may prove
more than he bargained for in an
essentially fluid situation.
A new rapprochement with Mos-
cow was under way even before the
recent plot disclosures. In July,
President Tourd made his first
official visit to the Soviet
Union since the 1961 episode in
which the Soviet ambassador was
sent home for his alleged sub-
versive activity. Before leaving
Conakry, Tourd implied to US of-
ficials that the visit was a ges-
ture meant to please PDG elements
dissatisfied with the results of
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the priority given to Western aid
over the past few years.
Moscow may have offered to-
ken commitments to Tourd, but
no new aid agreements are known
to have been signed. However,
Guinea has persisted in claim-
ing that the USSR "would assure"
construction of the long-pro-
jected Konkoure dam, hydro-
electric plant, and aluminum
smelter, as well as a detailed
list of other projects. The ag-
gressive handling of the subject,
both in the news media and at a
special meeting of the top party
council, may have been aimed at
putting additional pressure on
Moscow, but was more likely in-
tended to satisfy the pro-Soviet
faction within the regime.
Many Guinean leaders would
welcome Soviet entry into the
aluminum picture either for its
own sake or as a form of pres-
sure on the Western companies to
step up their activities. Guin-
eans tend to view rapid develop-
ment of the bauxite industry as
their chief hope for overcoming
their present economic diffi-
culties.
Current production is pro-
vided mainly by Fria, a consor-
tium of Western companies in
which the US firm, Olin Mathie-
son, is the principal shareholder
and a French firm has operational
responsibility. Another American
firm, Harvey Aluminum, has an
exclusive concession for exploi-
tation of the massive reserves
at Boke and has formed a mixed
company with the government of
Guinea. Last June, US AID pro-
vided the proposed Boke opera-
tion with a loan guarantee, but
arrangements for financing have
not been completed. The Guinean
Government, which nationalized
a French concession on these
reserves four years ago because
of nonperformance, presumably is
becoming impatient at the delay
in beginning work on the proj-
ect.
Although the Chinese Commu-
nists are active in Guinea and
their aid programs are generally
well received, they do not ap-
pear to have any significant
group of supporters among PDG
or government leaders. Tourd
himself appears to have been so
upset by the militarist and
racial doctrines expounded by
Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi
while visiting Conakry last Sep-
tember that he is unlikely to
develop closer relations with
Peking in the foreseeable future.
The current tense situa-
tion in Guinea could continue
indefinitely. The country's
economic problems and political
tensions have already been build-
ing up over a span of several
years and there is little indi-
cation that a dramatic denoue-
ment is in sight. Moreover, it
appears unlikely that Tourd's re-
gime could be overthrown by do-
mestic dissidents in the near fu-
ture.
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Sudden shifts in Guinea's
domestic and foreign policy can-
not be ruled out, however. Guinea
already has moved from a close
identification with the Communist
bloc in 1961 to a primary reli-
ance on US aid in 1965. The per-
manence of present and future al-
liances will be equally depend-
ent on the views of Guinea's
leaders as to where their best
interests lie.
It is an important article
of Sekou Tourd's political faith
that his regime should reflect
the wishes of the people. If
competing pressures should be
resolved and a new consensus
produced within the PDG in fa-
vor of different policies, Tourd
might be expected to adjust
his programs with little or no
r ins
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 Q.QI No. 0322/65B
Copy No. .53
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