WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005100070001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 23, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO05100070001-0
23 December 1985
State Dept. review
completed
Copy No. 7.4
QEN1:RAL. INTELLIGE1`ICE ,AGEI ICY
' V Y
'OFFICE OF CURRENT If' IT LLIGENCE
25X1 to I / SECRET
downgrpdtng and,_declassifi25X1
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SECRET ~Wo
C O N T E 1:V T S
(Information as of noon EST, 22 December 1965
VIETNAM
Communist military activity this week was highlighted
by a campaign of terror within Saigon and small-scale
attacks in its outskirts. A Montagnard uprising--
quickly quashed by the governmEnt-.-nevertheless indi-
cated that the dissident tribal autonomy movement FULRO
has increased its political influence. Celebration of
the Liberation Front's fifth anniversary held the Com-
munist propaganda stage in both North and South Vietnam.
Hanoi has roundly denied making any negotiations probe
through the Italians. Chou En-tai has underscored Peking's
earlier warnings against being taken in by US "tricks"
such as a pause in bombings or offers of unconditional
talks.
The Communist World
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHIFT 5
Statements by high Soviet officials last week confirm
earlier indications that Podgorny, recently named tit-
ular chief of state, has lost ground, and suggest that
Shelepin is moving into a position of greater influence
in the party.
BULGARIA REVIEWS ITS NATIONAL POLICIES
There are signs that the heretofore conservative Bul-
garian 6
leaders, emulating. their Rumanian colleagues,
are beginning to alter their policies to further their
own national interests.
EAST GERMAN PARTY ASSESSES MAJOR PRO13LEMS
The party central committee plenum held last week dealt 7
mainly with domestic affairs and made several policy
changes. It shed little light on the suicide of eco-
nomic planning chief Apel earlier in the month.
PEKING RECALLS SENIOR DIPLOMATS
The past year has been one of serious 8
frus-
trations for Peking's policy problems and frus-
have been scheduled atthis time Eto.aoprnie the Consultations may
of present Chinese foreign policy san
operations. y tactics and
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Asia-Africa
CHIANG KAI-SHEK SHOWS FRUSTRATION OVER US POLICIES 9
He appears increasingly fearful that he may be losing
the chance of returning to the Chinese mainland.
INDONESIAN ARMY GAINS AS SUKARNO'S POSITION WEAKENS 10
The army continues to ignore Sukarno's strictures and
frequently contradicts him. A major reshuffling of
power is said to be close at hand.
AFGHANISTAN AND ITS EXPERIMENTS WITH REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
The first weeks of Afghanistan's latest experiment with
Western-style democracy were marked by unprecedented as-
sertiveness on the part of the newly elected legislators,
student rioting followed by repressive countermeasures,
and ultimately the downfall of the prime minister. With
the appointment of a new prime minister and the recess
of Parliament for the winter, the situation is calmer
and the royal family seems willing to continue cautiously
earl
N
y
o
in the direction of political liberalization.
change in Af ~hanistan's none
SUDANESE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES ANTI-COMMUNIST DRIVE
Khartoum is confident it can control the Sudan's out-
lawed Communist Party, but the Communists still retain
considerable potential for antiregime activity.
ALGERIAN PREMIER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
Boumedienne's 13-18 December trip probably signals
warmer Soviet-Algerian governmental relations. He
strongly endorsed Moscow's policies in the Afro-Asian
world and sought to ensure continued Soviet support for
Algeria's economic development plans.
NEW MILITARY TAKEOVER IN DAHOMEY
Army chief Soglo again seized power on 22 December.
His sweeping actions against all aspects of civilian
government seem to indicate that he intends to impose
direct military rule for a prolonged period.
,SSE GRET
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INCREASED ECONOMIC WARFARE PRESSES RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA 14
The Smith regime has countered the British oil embargo
of Rhodesia by halting oil shipments to Zambia and
levying a steep tax on coal shi.pmenrs to that country.
Zambian President Kaunda, who still believes British
armed intervention is the only L-7ution, may be driven
by frustration to institute a total embargo on Rhodesia,
with disastrous consequences for Zambia.
Europe
THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
The regular NATO ministerial review held in Paris from
14 to 16 December was highlighted by the substantial
agreement reached on military and nuclear planning.
THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
De Gaulle's goals will probably not change because of
the tepid support he received. He has already laid
claim to a national mandate to pursue his policies.
However, he may have to give more attention to domes-
tic social issues between now and the 1967 National
Assembly elections.
SOME PROGRESS MADE IN EEC-AUSTRIAN NEGOTIATIONS
Substantial problems remain to be solved, but enough
progress was made in the 6-10 December discussions on
Austrian association with the EEC to suggest that the
political ramifications may soon have to be faced.
Western Hemisphere
HAVANA READIES FOR TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE
Castro sees the gathering of Asian, African, and Latin
American delegations as a chance to build up his coun-
try's international image, attack US "imperialist. ad-
ventures," and enhance his pretensions to be the mentor
of world "national liberation movements."
SECRET
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BOLIVIAN ELECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS
Four political parties have agreed to form an electoral
front to support the presidential candidacy of junta
Co-President Barrientos. This should prod some of the
other 18 parties into similar pacts and thus ease polit-
ical tensions at least for the short run.
NEW VIOLENCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The country has experienced almost a solid week of re-
newed violence, and political and labor leaders are
warning of new calls for a general strike unless mili-
tary officers involved in a skirmish in the interior
city of Santiago on 19 December are punished.
SECRET
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Communist military activity
this week was highlighted by a
campaign of terror within Saigon
and small-scale attacks in its
outskirts. The terrorism--small-
scale incidents aimed chiefly at
US personnel and Saigon police--
prompted a dusk-to-dawn curfew
for Americans in Saigon. The
Viet Cong have promised a 12-hour
halt in military activity on
Christmas Eve, but evidence indi-
cates that terrorism will con-
tinue into the new year.
Small-scale enemy attacks
and harassments in the Saigon area,
which have steadily increased
in the past two months, may be
the work of a Viet Cong regiment
dispersed within 15-20 miles of
the capital. Although quickly
quashed by government troops, the
attacks have had a psychological
impact on area residents and
probably have eroded confidence
in the government to some extent.
A major allied effort con-
centrated along the Quang Nam -
Quang Tin border, which began on
8 December, ended this week after
only sporadic contact since its
initial stages. Confirmed Com-
munist losses during the operation
totaled some 422 killed and 53
captured. Allied casualties were
650 killed, wounded, or missing.
In Binh Tuy and Long Khanh
provinces, a long-term security
operation was successfully con-
located, 1,200 tons of rice were
harvested during the 24-day oper-
ation, and 207 Viet Cong sur-
rendered.
Government troops in the
delta region scored some success
in Kien Tuong Province, but suf-
fered relatively heavy losses in
two engagements in adjacent Hau
Nghia Province.
Montagnard Uprising
A Montagnard uprising in
four provinces of South Vietnam's
central highlands on 18 December
clearly indicated that the dis-
sident tribal autonomy movement
FULLRO has increased its political
and military influence among the
tribesmen. Although the rebellion
was quickly put down by regular
government troops, a surprising
degree of security and coordina-
tion on the part of the dissident
tribesmen was evident. The pre-
cise extent of FULRO support
among the Montagnard members of
the government's special forces
units is not clear, but reports
suggest that many tribesmen are
becoming sympathetic to the or-
ganization.
FULRO leaders may have hoped
to prod the government into con-
cessions in negotiations which
have dragged on for months, and
to focus international attention
on long-standing Montagnard griev-
.
eluded this week. Although lit- the government is 25X6
tie fighting occurred, nearly planning to take severe measures
14,000 civilians were safely re- against FULRO, including execution
SECRET
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of those responsible for the up-
rising.
NFLSV'S Fifth Anniversary
Celebration of the Libera-
tion Front's fifth anniversary
on 20 December held the propa-
ganda stage in both North and
South Vietnam this week. The
official communiqud went beyond
the front's usual claims to be
the "sole legitimate represen-
tative of the South Vietnamese
people" and asserted that it was
"in practice now assuming the
functions of a strong, stable,
really democratic state." How-
ever, it stopped short of claim-
ing that it had established a
national government.
Cuba gave a strong assist
to the Front's claims to "exer-
cise a broad influence...in the
international arena" by raising
its Havana mission to an embassy.
Like the Front communique, how-
ever, the Cuban Government an-
nouncement avoided the question
of whether the Front was the
legitimate government of South
Vietnam. This is the first time
that an overseas front mission
has been formally accredited to
a government rather than to an
unofficial front organization
of the host state.
DRV politburo member Le
Thanh Nghi signed an aid agree-
went with Soviet officials on 21
December in which the USSR ex-
tended supplementary technical
assistance, additional "free eco-
nomic aid" in 1966, and a credit
to balance the clearing account
for 1965. The Soviet pledges ap-
pear more generous than the 1966
loan agreement signed by Nghi
with the Chinese two weeks ago.
The Soviets pledged continued
support for the DRV in the "mili-
tEiry, economic, and political
spheres."
DRV-Chinese Relations
Peking's propaganda treat-
ment of the Liberation Front
anniversary reflected concern
that Hanoi's resolution may falter,
but carefully avoided any strength-
ened commitment to assist the DRV.
Chou En-lai's speech included a
renewed attack on those who were
giving only "sham assistance" to
the Vietnamese while actually
supporting the "imperialist plot
of peace talks" and seeking to
make a "dirty deal with the US."
His statement suggests that the
Chinese feel the USSR's efforts
to expand its influence in Hanoi
are having some success and be-
trays growing concern over the
possibility that Moscow might be
able to call the tune in Hanoi
some time in the future.
Chou underscored Peking's
earlier warnings against being
taken in by US "tricks"--such
as a pause in the bombing and
offers of unconditional talks--
and exhorted the Vietnamese to
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hold fast to Pham Van Dong's
"four propositions" and the five-
point statement by the Front last
March. He asserted that the only
course is to fight on.
Hanoi itself demonstrated
this same resolve this week in
its denunciation of US state-
ments on the Fanfani - La Pira
peace initiative. On 1-8 December,
Hanoi denied making any negoti-
ations probe through the Italians,
and on the 20th chastised La Pira
for misinterpreting what Viet-
namese leaders had told him.
Chou's speech also contained
a long discussion of alleged US
plans for escalation of the war.
He asserted that the US was pre-
paring to step up the pace of the
war in South Vietnam but was
ready at the same time to begin
"saturation bombing" of North
Vietnam--including strikes at
Hanoi and Haiphong--in order
Page 4
to break the spirit of the Viet-
namese people.
Other possible US actions
cited by Chou include a sea
blockade of the DRV, bombing and
invasion of Laos, and subversive
action in Cambodia by Thai and
South Vietnamese "puppets"--all
designed to cut off outside
assistance to the "people" of
South Vietnam and thus avert a
US defeat. Chou declared that
such US efforts were "bound to
fail" but he said nothing about
any Chinese moves to assure the
outcome.
US aircraft losses were
particularly heavy this week.
Eleven aircraft were lost during
strikes in the Haiphong area, in-
cluding two to surface-to-air
missiles. Ten US aircraft now
have been shot down by SAMs.
'EGRET
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SECRET
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHIFT
Statements by high Soviet
officials last week confirm
earlier indications that Nikolay
Podgorny,_recently named titular
chief of state, has lost ground
in the Soviet leadership. They
also suggest that Aleksandr
Shelepin is moving into a posi-
tion of greater influence in
the party command.
Deputy Foreign Ministers
Kuznetsov and Semenov informed
several Western ambassadors that
Podgorny has given up his duties
on the party secretariat. This
would appear to open the way for
Shelepin to broaden his activi-
ties and authority within the
party and perhaps move into the
second-ranking position behind
Brezhnev. At the time the Su-
preme Soviet released Shelepin
from his government posts "to
devote all his time and energies
as a party secretary to central
committee work," it was rumored
in Moscow that he was to take
over "Podgorny's place as sec-
ond in command in the party
secretariat."
Brezhnev, Shelepin, and
Suslov are the only remaining
secretaries who are concurrently
full members of rty presid-
ium. Suslov, 25X6
who is a ve eran of 18
years' continuous service on the
secretariat, is.a specialist in
ideological matters and rela-
ti+,ons with foreign Communist
parties and probably does not
aspire to a position of greater
influence and authority in the
party hierarchy. Thus, as the
party congress scheduled for
next March approaches, it appears
that Shelepin now is in a bet-
ter position to build up his
power base and leader image in
the professional party apparatus,
traditionally the avenue to po-
litical dominance.
Shelepin's new duties may
include administration of party
organizational and personnel pol-
icy, which he will oversee while
new party. secretary.Kapitonov
takes care of the day-to-day re-
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BULGARIA REVIEWS ITS NATIONAL POLICIES
Bulgaria's long-held con-
servative foreign and domestic
policies appear to have been
under intensive study by the
regime, and there are indica-
tions that some revisions have
already been made. In a dra-
matic speech to the National
Assembly on 8 December, Bul-
garia's party chief and premier,
Todor Zhivkov, pledged to employ
-all means "to develop economic
and cultural relations with all
countries and peoples on the
basis of equality, mutual ad-
vantage, and noninterference in
domestic affairs."
Zhivkov's use of this "Ru-
manian-style" policy formulation
probably reflects the Sofia
leadership's intention to alter
its foreign policy to further
its own national interests. Some
signs of this have already ap-
peared in recent reports of
Bulgarian political and economic
overtures to the West. Zhivkov
first publicly associated him-
self with this aspect of Rumanian
policy in the communiqud issued
on 19 September at the conclusion
of Rumanian party chief Ceauses-
cu's visit to Sofia.
in Bulgaria's cultural sector.
An "anti - cult of personality"
play, The Prosecutor, was re-
cently aTlOwe to a staged
in Sofia and enjoyed consider-
able success among the people.
The regime also has somewhat re-
laxed its controls over writers.
In addition, the long-
awaited theses on Bulgaria's new
economic planning system were
published on 4 December and
will be considered at a party
central committee plenum in late
January. Under the new system,
added attention is -to be given
to the means of increasing the
quantity, quality, and mar-
ketability of production, through
the application to enterprises
of such concepts as profit,
price, and credit.
To gain support for such
ideas, top-level party figures
have recently gone on speaking
tours and have authored articles
on the new ideas in the central
press. Many of these articles
and speeches seem principally
designed to assure the loyalty
of the army--a loyalty put in
doubt by the military support
Recent months also have wit-
nessed a limited liberalization
for the abortive antiregime
conspiracy last April.
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The eleventh plenum of the
East German party (SED) central
committee, held last week,
adopted several changes in do-
mestic policy, but shed little
light on the suicide of economic
planning chief Apel earlier in
the month. The plenum devoted
very little attention to foreign
affairs, concentrating instead
of economic and cultural affairs.
Although the only reference
to Apel by name was favorable,
the major addresses implicitly
criticized the views he al-
legedly held. In his speech,
politburo rapporteur Honecker
painted an unusually frank pic-
ture of East German (GDR) de-
pendence on the Soviet Union.
His defensive justification of
the 3 December Soviet-GDR trade
agreement indicates the regime
believes it must counter ener-
getically the view attributed
to Apel that Moscow was failing
to cooperate with the GDR.
Party boss Ulbricht also
praised the trade agreement,
endorsed the new economic sys-
tem, and announced several eco-
nomic reorganization measures.
The high-level National Eco-
nomic Council, which Ulbricht
described as "superfluous," was
replaced by seven industrial min-
istries. Their responsibilities
are not clearly delineated, but
they may play a greater role in
planning than did the council.
This appears to be a step away
from the decentralization of
planning envisioned when the pub-
licly owned enterprises were
given expanded powers in 1963.
Plans were also announced
for alternating the present six-
day world week with a five-day
week, beginning in April 1966,
without any reduction in pay
for workers. This highly un-
economic move in a labor-scarce
economy may be designed to off-
set the regime's failure to im-
prove other aspects of consumer
living standards.
The plenum also considered
problems in the ideological and
cultural fields. Honecker's
frank and detailed. account of
the regime's difficulties with
the youth and intellectuals sug-
gested that the SED will take a
much firmer line with these
groups.
In touching on foreign pol-
icy issues the plenum moderately
restated East Germany's support
for the USSR in its dispute with
Communist China, and announced
the creation of a new govern-
mental position--a state secre-
tariat--to coordinate all deal-
ings with West Germany.
The new state secretary for
A11-German Affairs is Joachim
Herrmann, a former editor of the
Berliner Zeitung and Junge Welt,
wfib apparen y is not an EIS "
member.. The appointment of a
nonparty member to this position
may have been designed to make
the new office more acceptable
to the West Germans.
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Communist China is recall-
ing many of its senior diplomats,
apparently for a major foreign
policy review. Comprehensive
briefings on tactics, if held
at this time, could be an out-
growth of the major high-level
party meeting held in Peking in
October. At that meeting, which
may have in part been catalyzed
by recent international policy
problems, Chinese leaders appar-
ently reaffirmed their determina-
tion to pursue a rigid foreign
policy line.
Chinese Communist envoys
to about a dozen African, Asian,
West European, and Communist
capitals are scheduled to arrive
in Peking by the end of Decem-
ber. There are indications that
other Chinese diplomats may also
Peking has in the past sum-
moned many of its diplomats to
China at one time for briefings
and a foreign policy assessment.
The war in Vietnam will undoubt-
edly loom large in the present
series of discussions.
In addition, the past year
has been one of serious problems
and frustrations for Peking's
policy makers. The Indonesian
Army's suppression and destruc-
tion of much of the pro-Peking
Indonesian Communist Party dur-
ing the past three months is
perhaps the most serious setback
to Peking's expectations. The
recent Chinese Communist failure
in Algiers to marshal the Afro-
Asian bloc in support of Peking's
policies heightened a feeling of
isolation among China's leaders.
In the past year also Peking's
drive to expand its influence
in Communist parties around the
world appears to have been some-
what blunted, and the Chinese
are undoubtedly especially con-
cerned over Cuba's recent shift
to more explicit support of many
Soviet policy positions.
Consultations may have been
scheduled at this time to ap-
praise the effectiveness of pres-
ent Chinese tactics and opera-
tions abroad in support of Chi-
nese foreign policy strategy.
SEC'RXJT
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Asia-Africa
CHIANG KAI-SHEK SHOWS FRUSTRATION OVER US POLICIES
Chiang Kai-shek feels frus-
trated by US policy in Asia and
appears increasingly fearful
that he may be losing the chance
of returning to the Chinese
mainland.
Growing tensions in South-
east Asia and the strong US
commitment in South Vietnam
had raised Chiang's hopes ear-
lier this year that prospects
for returning to the mainland
were improving. Both Madame
Chiang and the President's son,
Chiang Ching-kuo, were sent to
the US to drum up more support
for the Nationalist cause.
Chiang Ching-kuo had wanted
to establish a mechanism for a
continued dialogue on US policy
in Asia and for planning an ex-
panded war with Communist China.
The failure of these talks to
materialize-, and the continued
delay in sending the new US am-
bassador to Taipei, have rein-
forced President Chiang's suspi-
cions that the US is losing in-
terest in the Nationalists as
an ally.
Chiang's feeling of isola-
tion and frustration has been
exacerbated by a rash of small
problems which have developed in
US-Nationalist relations.-Mili-
tary aid for Taiwan was cut ten
percent for fiscal year 1966,
and Congress has refused to pass
a ship loan bill that would have
given Chiang a destroyer and
.two destroyer escorts. Chiang
Is also concerned over a US
decision to reduce Taiwan's
stock of ammunition and a US
proposal to withdraw 18 F-104
aircraft. Friction has also
been caused by the issue of
criminal jurisdiction over US
military personnel visiting Tai-
wan on rest and rehabilitation
leave from South Vietnam.
Chiang still hopes that the
war in Vietnam will continue to
escalate and eventually bring the
US and Peking into direct con-
flict. He has not offered to
send Nationalist troops to Viet-
nam, but would probably welcome
the chance in the expectation
that Peking would retaliate in
kind. Chiang's first choice,
however, would be US air and
sea support for a Nationalist
assault on the mainland. .
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INDONESIAN ARMY GAINS AS SUKARNO'S POSITION WEAKENS
The decline in President
Sukarno's position vis-a-vis
the Indonesian Army is accelerat-
Any unwelcome utterances
by Sukarno are simply ignored
by the army, and recent state-
ments by Generals Nasution and
Suharto have frequently contra-
dicted those of the President.
Sukarno's increasingly shrill
speeches are heavily edited and
often distorted by the Indone-
sian press. According to the
US Embassy, most Indonesians
give the impression of turning
a deaf ear to the President's
tirades. There are frequent
comments which discount Sukarno
as an active political force
after the first of the year and
imply that a major reshuffling
of power is close at hand.
Sukarno's protection of
his political allies may also
be breaking down. The left wing
of the Indonesian National Party
--once actively supported by
Sukarno--may be facing a purge
by right-wing elements. Foreign
Minister Subandrio is said to
be distressed and nervous and
may soon leave the country. More-
over, at least five cabinet min-
isters are to be among those
brought before a military tri-
bunal set up to deal with per-
sons implicated in the abortive
30 September coup.
Mopping up of the Indone-
sian Communist Party (PKI) con-
tinues. First Deputy Chairman
Lukman has been reported cap-
tured and shot. The banning of
the PKI in South Kalimantan and
the party's self-dissolution
in Djogjakarta bring the total
number of regions or provinces
barring the party to 14; eleven
regions remain.
The city of Surabaya in East
Java--where PKI remnants have
been seeking refuge--has been
declared a "closed city." Per-
sons unable to prove some occupa-
tion in the city are forbidden
entry, and present inhabitants
are to be screened. A massacre
of the PKI has apparently been
launched in Bali, where
many head----
less bodies can be seen on the
roads.
.SECRET
rage 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Dec 65
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SUDANESE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES ANTI-COMMUNIST DRIVE
The Khartoum government is
moving ahead to implement recent
legislation dissolving the Sudan
Communist Party (SCP).
The anti-Communist campaign
was sparked in early November
when a Communist student com-
mitted a public affront to Islam
and the wife of the prophet Mo-
hammed. The fanatical Muslim
Brotherhood led demonstrations
against the Communists and
urged. the government to pro-
scribe the party immediately.
The moderate Islamic Umma Party
and its governing coalition part-
ner, the National Union Party,
took-advantage of the wide-
spread anti-Communist fervor
and initiated the required
legislation in the Constituent
Assembly.
To maintain a facade of the
democratic process, the as-
sembly first passed, by over-
whelming majorities, two amend-
ments to the transitional con-
stitution. The first banned
the propagation of "either local
or international Communism" and
added that no person should
propagate "nonbelief in celes-
tial religions." The second,
passed two weeks later, disquali-
fied members of the Communist
Party from membership in the
assembly.
The assembly then on 9 De-
cember passed an "Act to Dissolve
the Communist Party," confiscated
party newspapers, and closed
down SCP clubs and offices.
The Communists. reacted by
challenging the legality of the
assembly's actions and have at-
tempted to gain a Supreme Court
hearing for their case.. The gov-
ernment has not yet arrested
party. leaders, many of whom are
members of Khartoum's small but
influential intelligentsia.
Leftist front organizations
will almost certainly develop
increased importance as the Com-
munists shift their energies
into new channels. The Democratic
Socialist Alliance, an amor-
phous group sponsored by.the pro-
Egyptian People's Democratic
Party but including the Commu-
nists as well as a number of
leftist professional associa-
tions, will probably be'a major
vehicle. The Communists have
also supported the "Conference
for the Defense of Public
Liberties," a new leftist group-
ing organized in November to
protest the government's anti-
Communist maneuvers.
The Khartoum government is
confident that it can exercise
firm control over the SCP.
Nevertheless, the Communists'
continuing influence in trade
unions, student groups, and
professional associations will
leave them considerable potential
for antire i vity.
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ALGERIAN PREMIER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
During his visit to the So-
viet Union from 13 to 18 December,
Algerian Premier Boumedienne
strongly endorsed Moscow's poli-
cies in the Afro-Asian world and
at the same time sought to en-
sure the USSR's continued support
for his country's economic devel-
opment plans. The trip probably
signals warmer relations between
the two countries on the govern-
ment level.
Since Ahmed Ben Bella's over-
throw in June 1965, Moscow's pub-
lic attitude toward Algeria has
been very restrained although the
Soviets have continued to honor
existing military aid agreements.
It has been increasingly apparent
that the close party-to-party re-
lationship enjoyed during Ben
Bella's reign has ended. The
great majority of the Soviet
dignitaries with whom Boumedienne
met were government officials,
and the communique which followed
the visit also emphasized its gov-
ernmental nature.
Boumedienne may have hoped
his trip would improve his posi-
tion with the Algerian left and
offset the damage caused by cer-
tain anti-Communist measures
which his regime has taken. His
entourage consisted of many of-
ficials from the economic field.
The Soviets were apparently un-
willing, however, to commit them-
selves to a significantly greater
contribution to Algeria's develop-
ment at this time. The com-
muniqud noted that both countries
discussed the implementation of
bilateral agreements already "con-
cluded," and mentioned the "im-
portance" of expanding economic,
scientific, and technical coopera-
tion and "mutually profitable
trade contacts." Moscow has
previously extended over $200
million in economic credits but
only about $7 million has been
drawn.
Partially because of Bou-
medienne's desire for Soviet as-
sistance, Moscow was able to
secure from him a fairly warm en-
dorsement of a wide range of So-
viet foreign policy positions.
The communique stated that both
governments noted "with satisfac-
tion" their "identity or similar-
ity of views." Among other points
the US was sharply criticized for
its "aggression" in Vietnam, a
position consistent with Boume-
dienne's past statements.
Algeria supported the USSR
on a number of contentious Sino-
Soviet issues. The Russians ex-
pressed their appreciation of Al-
gerian support for "Soviet par-
ticipation" in the Second Afro-
Asian Conference, and the Alge-
rians welcomed the Soviet offer
of "good offices" between India
and Pakistan. Boumedienne also
expressed his willingness to "co-
operate" in the Rhodesian crisis,
stressing his full support of the
decisions made by the Organization
of African Unity. On the whole,
Moscow's position in the Afro-
Asian world was somewhat en-
hanced.
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NEW MILITARY TAKEOVER IN DAHOMEY
General Christophe Soglo,
Dahomean Army chief of staff,
seized power in a bloodless mil-
itary coup on 22 December. He
immediately announced the dis-
solution of parliament, local
government bodies, and all po-
litical parties and the suspen-
sion of the 1963 constitution.
Soglo's action appears to
accord with the desires of sev-
eral of the principal civilian
politicians, especially ex-
Presidents Maga and Apithy. They
feared that the early elections
called for by the provisional
government installed after a
military coup in November would
favor the more entrenched po-
litical machine of former pre-
mier Ahomadegbe. Soglo will be
reluctant to surrender power
again, however, and his sweep-
ing actions against all aspects
of civilian government seem to
indicate that he intends to im-
pose direct military rule for a
prolonged period.
little progress in solving its
very serious economic problems.
Soglo had previously hinted that
he planned to rescind the 25-
percent pay cut imposed last sum-
mer on government employees, who
constitute about half of the coun-
try's wage earners. He also has
persuaded Nationalist China to,
seek re-establishment of diplo-
matic relations, although the
Chinese Communists currently
maintain an embassy in Cotonou.
The French, who still provide
massive budgetary support to
their former colony, appear will-
ing to go along with General
Soglo's undertakings, although
their ambassador evidently tried
to discourage an outright mili-
tary regime.
If Soglo plans to extend the
duration of his personal power,
he risks a sps.it in the army.
Military rivals, particularly
third-ranking Major Alley, may. 25X1
dispute his authority and try
to set up another type of regime.
The government of Dahomey
has long been stalemated by fac
tiona.l.maneuvering and has made
SECRET
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-ECRET
INCREASED ECONOMIC WARFARE PRESSES RHODESIA AND ZAMBIA
Economic sanctions against
Rhodesia were stepped up this
week with the British announce-
ment of an oil embargo against
the Smith regime. Rhodesia
countered by immediately halt-
ing oil shipments into Zambia
and levying a high tax on coal
shipments to that country.
Normally, Rhodesia and Zam-
bia get almost all of their pe-
troleum requirements from the
Umtali refinery in Rhodesia. The
refinery receives its crude oil
via pipeline from the Mozambique
port of Beira. Rhodesia is
thought to have several months'
reserves of petroleum, but Zam-
bian reserves are only 8,200
tons, about two weeks' normal
consumption.
The UK is instituting an
emergency airlift which it hopes
will be carrying 700 tons of oil
weekly to Zambia by the first
week of January. However, this
amount and the supplies being
brought in by surface routes will
fall far short of satisfying Zam-
bia's current needs. President
Kaunda, fearing an exodus of
whites should severe rationing
become necessary, has insisted
that the costly emergency supply
program be stepped up to meet
at least 80 percent of the coun-
try's normal consumption.
The new tax on Rhodesian
coal shipped to Zambia is $14
per ton. This should yield Rho-
desia some $15 million annually.
The financial advantages to
-Rhodesia of Smith's insistance
that all Zambian purchases of
Rhodesian goods be paid for in
nonsterling hard currency has
been partially offset by Brit-
ish demands that all Rhodesian
purchases through London be
paid for in nonsterling converti-
ble currency such as dollars.
Kaunda remains convinced
that only military force or a
complete embargo of Rhodesian
goods and services will bring
down the Smith government. He
has rejected an offer from the
International Bank to place an
inspection team, but no troops,
at the Kariba power complex.
British Prime Minister Wil-
son, however, still hopes to
avoid the use of force
Despairing of armed inter-
vention by the British, Kaunda
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V
SECRET
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Ile Europa
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CI Ll ;V:VET
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SECRET
is groping for means to lessen
Zambia's dependence on Rhodesian
power, coal, and transporta-
tion facilities and to pressure
the UK, the US, and Commonwealth
countries into increased commit-
ments that will carry Zambia
through a complete rupture with
Rhodesia. The US Embassy in
Lusaka feels that as the criti-
cal pressure point shifts from
oil to the indispensable Rhode-
sian coal, frustration may drive
Kaunda into a premature total
embargo with disastrous conse-
quences.
Algeria's break with Lon-
don on 18 pecember completed a
show of solidarity by all the
more militant members of the Af-
rican Unity Organization (OAU).
Further response to the 3 Decem-
ber OAU resolution is unlikely
unless key moderates, such as
Ethiopia--where there are in-
tense pressures--follow suit.
Many African nations are un-
certain how to proceed and are
further confused by a spate of
calls for urgent meetings of
African states. The most
likely meeting appears to be
a conference of Commonwealth
nations in Lagos next month.
THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
The regular NATO minis-
terial review held in Paris
from 14 to 16 December was high-
lighted by the substantial
-agreement reached on military
and nuclear planning.
The ministers confirmed
an earlier tentative agreement
on rationalization of 1970 force
goals planning, and agreed on
a five-year planning program,
beginning in January 1967, which
presumes that NATO will still be
going ahead in its twenty-first
year. They also agreed to re-
appraise the mobile force of the
Allied Command, Europe--now
crippled by costing differences.
Long-standing cost-sharing
problems on the military head-
quarters budget and the common
infrastructure program, however,
were again deferred. These are
to be considered next month by
a special meeting of "senior of-
ficials."
A French attempt to limit
the activities and term of the
new committee on NATO nuclear
affairs was rejected by the other
members, who confirmed the com-
mittee's legality and mandate.
Although easily beaten off, the
French maneuvering reportedly
ngs
d some hard fee
cause
the Germans in particular.
SECRET
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY
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THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL
The tepid support given De
Gaulle in the two rounds of
France's presidential election
indicates that, with stability
and relative prosperity, the
French voter no longer conceives
of De Gaulle as the indispensable
man. In the second round De
Gaulle was opposed by virtually
every political and quasi-
political organization except
those which are avowedly Guallist.
He was able to increase his first-
round support primarily because
fundamentally conservative
voters who had voted for Jean
Lecanuet now liked the Commu-
nist-backed candidate, Francois
Mitterrand, even less than they
did De Gaulle.
Prior to the second round,
all government sources were in
agreement that the size of De
Gaulle's victory would not alter
the goals or directions of his
policies, particularly his
foreign policy. Gaullist po-
liticians played down the sig-
nificance of foreign policy
issues, and the variety of other
reasons for De Gaulle's failure
to do better gives ample support
for their argument. In his
first postelection statement,
De Gaulle laid claim to a na-
tional mandate for his policies
and said he would continue his
efforts for "independence and
peace." Particularly on domes-
tic social issues, however,
the opposition within France
has attracted attention which
may force De Gaulle to place
more emphasis on these areas
prior to the National Assembly
elections in 1967.
Page 17
There is a good chance that
some cabinet changes will follow
De Gaulle's inauguration on 8
January. This in itself, how-
ever, would not affect funda-
mental French policies.
The heavy voter turnout,
which brought the abstention
rate to its lowest point since
the immediate postwar years,
indicates not only a reawakening
of political forces, but also a
public awareness of the impor-
tance of the office of the
presidency in the Fifth Republic.
Mitterrand and Lecanuet
have already sought to profit
from the wide publicity they
gained during . the. campaign to
construct broader political
groupings that they hope will
'become meaningful political
alternatives to Gaullism.
]Both, however, face substantial
problems. Mitterrand intends
formally to exclude the Commu-
nist Party (PCF) from his group,
although the PCF has already
called for extending its elec-
torial cooperation to the formu-
]Lat ion of a common program for
the future.
Lecanuet must win some sup-
port from the non-Communist left
in the face of Mitterrand's ef-
forts to hold the left together.
Lecanuet will also have to make
inroads into the Gaullist sup-
port; although he can expect
some gains as the 1967 National
Assembly elections approach, an
identification with De Gaulle is
probably still the best hope for
most Gaull e holders.
SECRE'[
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SOME PROGRESS MADE IN EEC-AUSTRIAN NEGOTIATIONS
Both Austrian and EEC
sources are satisfied with the
6-10 December discussions on
Austria's possible association
with the Common Market. Con-
siderable progress was appar-
ently made despite the continu-
ing EEC crisis and the caretaker
status of the Klaus government
in Vienna. Paris has reportedly
assured the Austrians that it
is generally in favor of Austrian
association, and the Soviet bloc
has refrained since October from
attacking the talks.
The latest round of dis-
cussion focused on the extent
to which Austria will have to
reconcile its national policies
with those of the community and
how this could be done without
violating its neutrality com-
mitments. Some measure of agree-
ment was apparently reached to
formulate a "neutrality clause"
which would excuse Austria in
some circumstances from the gen-
eral obligation to conform to
Common Market policies.
This neutrality question
will be an issue again in Feb-
ruary, when the delicate ques-
tion of institutional ties be-
tween an associated Austria and
the EEC is scheduled for dis-
cussion. Another question only
partially resolved is what rights
the community will have in tak-
ing compensatory measures if it
believes Austrian policies re-
main too far out of line.
Although substantial prob-
lems remain to be solved, the
talks may shortly reach a point
where their political ramifica-
tions have to be faced. Among
these, and in addition to the
possible Soviet reaction to in-
creased Austrian ties to West-
ern Europe, are the eastward
extension of the EEC's direct
economic influence and the weak-
ening of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA).
Within Austria's coalition
government, the Socialists will
be more reluctant than the Peo-
ple's Party to choose EEC mem-
bership over the more socialist-
oriented EFTA. There are also
differences of opinion on how
far Austria can afford to go in
offending the Soviets. Finally,
it will be difficult for the
Austrians to adapt their deli-
cately balanced coalition system
to permit Austria to speak ef-
fectively in the joint EEC-Aus-
trian institutions resulting
from association.
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HAVANA READIES FOR TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE
Extensive preparations are
under way in Havana as the Cas-
tro regime prepares to host the
scheduled 3-10 January Tri-Con-
tinent Conference. Special party
delegations have been sent to a
number of African and Asian
countries to publicize the gath-
ering. Downtown Havana is being
renovated in an effort to impress
the visiting dignitaries.
The Cubans view the confer-
ence as an unparalleled oppor-
tunity to build up the country's
international image as well as a
forum for attacking US "imperial-
ist adventures" around the world;
Castro will also try to enhance
his pretensions to be the mentor
of world "national liberation
movements." Havana hopes the
conference will pave the way to-
ward an eventual replacement of
the present Afro-Asian Peace and
Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)
with a "tri-continent" organi-
zation including representatives
from Latin America.
Fireworks resulting from the
Sino-Soviet dispute may well seri-
ously disrupt the conference,
however. The recent arrival of
the Chinese delegation in Havana
makes it clear that Peking is
prepared to make its presence
felt at the conference. Peking
will have some allies in attend-
ance such as the Cambodians and
the Japanese Communists despite
the fact that a majority of the
delegations--particularly from
Latin America--will line up with
Moscow.
Moscow apparently has taken
an active part in arranging
transportation to Havana for
African delegations. The Soviets
have also sent members of their
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee
to selected African countries to
line up support in advance should
the Chinese initiate an anti-
Russian offensive in Havana.
AAPSO officials as well as
Cuban propaganda media have re-
iterated that the main business
of the conference will be to
discuss ways to "combat imperi-
alism in all its forms," and
provide "effective assistance"
to liberation movements on the
three continents. The main
thrust of the conference's final
communiqud, however, undoubtedly
will be a ringing indictment of
Washington's actions-from the
Dominican Republic to Vietnam.
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NWV SECRET lftv~
BOLIVIAN ELECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS
After weeks of sporadic ne-
gotiations, four Bolivian polit-
ical parties agreed on 15 Decem-
ber to form an electoral front
to support the presidential can-
didacy of junta Co-President Rene
Barrientos Ortuno. The coalition
to be called the Front of the Bo-
livian Revolution, is made up of
the Authentic Revolutionary Party
(PRA), the Leftist Revolutionary
Party (PIR), the Popular Chris-
tian Movement (MPC), and the
Social Democrat Party (PSD).
These are all minor parties, but
if their front survives it will
at least give Barrientos the
appearance of having national
political support in addition to
his strong personal appeal.
Luis Adolfo Siles of the PSD
has agreed to be the front's vice-
presidential nominee. He is the
half-brother of former president
(1956-60) Hernan Siles Zuazo,
and is a political moderate. The
front has already decided how
many congressional seats each
party will have, but disagreement
over who should run in what dis-
trict could cause the front to
break up.
The formation of the pro-
Barrientos front should prod some
of the other 18 parties into sim-
ilar pacts and thus ease politi-
cal tensions at least for the
short run. Plotting will continue,
however, since the major parties,
such as the Nationalist Revolu-
tionary Movement, the Bolivian
Socialist Falange, and Juan Lech-
in's National Leftist Revolu-
tionary Party, are unlikely to
agree on a candidate and have
little chance of winning the
election individually or collec-
tively.
In the meantime, the junta
faces some problems, particularly
in the tin mines. The miners
have been temporarily pacified
by wage increases, but these are
due to lapse the first of the
year. Extremists are working
hard to stir up discontent]
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The rominican Republic has
experienced almost a solid week
of violence, and further trouble
threatens for the week ahead.
Political and labor leaders are
warning of renewed calls for a
general strike unless military
officers involved in a skirmish
in the interior city of Santiago
on 19 December are punished.
The violence began on 16
December with riots in Santo
Domingo over the Christmas bonus
issue. Rioting was brought under
control next day, but the sub-
sequent brief interlude of calm
was shattered on 19 December
during memorial services in
Santiago for a rebel "martyr."
Former "constitutionalist" Presi-
dent Francisco Caamano, accompa-
nied by an estimated 150 supporters,
had traveled to the north-central
city, ignoring warnings from
President Garcia Godoy that such
a trip might provoke trouble.
Despite the uncertainty
over who fired the first shots,
it is clear that both sides were
spoiling for trouble. The con-
sensus is that unidentified
persons fired several shots
during the cemetery observance,
and that shots were fired by
the former reels during their
trip to the Hotel Matum on the
outskirts of the city, Military
forces then fought a pitched
battle with rebel personnel in
the hotel--where Caamano held the
US consul and other Americans as
hostages--until a contingent of
the Inter-American Peace Force
hurriedly airlifted to the city
interposed itself between the
forces.
Caamano's supporters in
Santo Domingo reacted to the
incident and to erroneous reports
of his death by turning out in
the streets and trying to organize
mobs and further violence.
The Dominican military has
been pressing Garcia Godoy to
prevent Caamano and his followers
from traveling around the country
especlaiiy Turk officers
and NCOs--also have been disturbed
by the government's continuing
delay in disarming the rebels
and disbanding their camp.
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Garcia Godoy has privately
informed Ambassador Bunker that
he believes responsibility for
the Santiago incidents is shared
by the former rebel leaders and
regular military personnel. The
President said he realizes he
must punish those involved.
Garcia Godoy believes air force
Chief Juan de los Santos bears
a great deal of the responsibil-
ity but he fears that the mili-
tary would strongly oppose any
move against De los Santos. On
the other hand, Garcia Godoy
feels--probably too optimis-
tically--that Caamano would sup-
port action against rebel per-
sonnel involved in the inci-
dents.
Garcia Godoy hopes for a
standdown in violence until
Christmas, which would permit
tempers to cool and promote a
climate in which constructive
action could be taken to punish
those responsible for the Santi-
ago incidents and work toward
preventing a recurrence. How-
ever, commenting on the week's
violence, the US Embassy stated,
"excessive concessions granted
to the constitutionalist camp in
the early weeks of the provisional
government are reflected here
without any doubt."
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 23 Dec 65
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 Copy No. 5 4
AFGHANISTAN AND ITS EXPERIMENTS WITH REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
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Nowe *40
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The latest phase in Afghanistan's experiment
with representative democracy has gotten off to a
boisterous start. Elections held last August and
September--the first conducted under universal
suffrage--returned a legislative assembly which
was generally seen as conservative and docile. To
the astonishment of most observers, however, the
People's Council (the lower house of parliament)
asserted its independence by refusing for more
than a week to confirm the reappointment of Prime
Minister Yusuf.
Meanwhile, virtually unprecedented rioting
by politically oriented students led the alarmed
government to take overly repressive counter-
measures, resulting in a number of student deaths.
Given a new issue, the legislators redoubled their
criticism of the Yusuf regime, and the prime minis-
ter was forced to step down just four days after
receiving a vote of confidence.
With the subsequent appointment of Prime Min-
ister Maiwandwal and the recess of parliament for
the winter, the situation now seems reasonably well
in hand. The King and the powerful royal family
appear willing to continue In the direction of po-
litical liberalization, but they are probably dis-
turbed by the new forces that seem to have been set
in motion and more determined than ever to proceed
cautiously. No early change in Afghanistan's non-
aligned foreign policy is likely.
Constitutional Reform
King Zahir's cautious pro-
gram of political reform began
in 1963 with the ouster of his
strong-man cousin, Mohammed Daud,
from the office of prime minister.
Daud's ten-year-old regime had
seen the beginning of an ambi-
tious economic development pro-
gram aided by the US and the
USSR. Political power, however,
had become strongly concentrated
In the hands of the prime minis-
ter and a coterie of his support-
ers, nearly all of whom were mem-
bers of the Mohammedzai--the ex-
tended royal family. Control was
authoritarian, enforced when nec-
essary by political imprisonments.
Throughout most of Daud's regime,
the King, valuing the prime minis-
ter's role in speeding Afghanistan's
economic modernization, remained
relatively detached from policy
questions.
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Daud's downfall came largely
as a result of a growing concern
among influential members of the
royal family over the consequences
of his vigorously anti-Pakistan
foreign policy. Ever since Pak-
istan gained independence in
1947, the Afghans have insisted
that the Pushtoon tribes in the
hill areas adjacent to Afghanistan
be given an opportunity to deter-
mine for themselves their national
alignment.
Nearly half of Afghanistan's
population--including the royal
family--is Pushtoon, and the emer-
gence of Afghanistan as a nation
was, in fact, the result of a
union of Pushtoon tribes in the
mid-eighteenth century. The
"Fushtoonistan" issue is thus a
highly emotional one among Kabul's
power elite.
Nevertheless, criticism of
Daud began to mount when a series
of border forays by Afghan irreg-
ulars led Pakistan to close Af-
ghan trade missions and consulates
in mid-1961. Disapproval deepened
when the subsequent breach of
diplomatic relations and abandon-
ment of Afghan transit rights
through Pakistan made the Afghans
entirely dependent on the USSR
for access routes to free world
markets.
Although the Soviets were
accommodating in their efforts
to ease the impact of trade dis-
location, Afghanistan's export
earnings fell off. Government
revenue, heavily dependent on
customs levies, also declined
sharply, forcing budgetary cuts.
Finally, in March 1963, King
Zahir stepped in to replace Daud
with Minister of Mines and In-
dustries Mohammed Yusuf.
Page 3
The appointment of Yusuf, a
commoner, signaled the beginning
of a gradual move toward liberali-
zation of Afghan political insti-
tutions with the King playing a
leading role. The King was prob-
ably motivated in part by a recog-
nition that a political awareness
was beginning to evolve, and that
explosive forces could develop
unless the citizenry were given
a greater sense of participation
in the affairs of state. Authori-
tarian measures were relaxed, and
in September 1964 a new constitu-
tion was ratified by the Loya
Jirgah, a traditional assemblage
of tribal elders and notables. A
key provision of the new consti-
tution prevents the King's close
relatives from holding high gov-
ernment office. Prince Daud, to
whom the measure applies, unsuc-
cessfully attempted to prevent
its inclusion.
The constitution establishes
a bicameral legislature comprised
of a 215-member People's Council,
directly elected under universal
suffrage and by secret ballot,
and an 84-member Council of El-
ders. One third of the Council
of Elders is appointed by the
King, while the remainder repre-
sents the various provinces--one
member elected by the citizens of
each province and one appointed
by provincial councils which are
to be established as soon as en-
abling legislation can be passed.
Government officials, including
cabinet ministers, are banned
from membership in the parlia-
inent. Legislation must be ap-
proved by the King before becom-
ing law, and there is no provi-
sion for overriding a royal veto.
The second step toward rep-
resentative government was the
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promulgation of an election law.
Its provision that candidates be
literate automatically limits
eligibility to about ten percent
of the populace. Election com-
missions, composed primarily of
educators and jurists, are es-
tablished in local areas to over-
see campaigning and balloting.
the parliamentarians demanded
that Yusuf present his proposed
cabinet in person to the lower
house, and that each potential
minister issue a statement of
personal assets. Charges of
maladministration and corrup-
tion were leveled at Yusuf and
his cabinet colleagues.
On paper at least, the con-
stitution and the election law
provide the basis for a free
selection of legislators, but
without tampering unduly with
traditional local power struc-
tures.
The parliamentary elections
concluded last September produced
a legislature that was, for the
most part, an unknown quantity.
Most members of the lower house
were new to national politics.
Only about 20 percent had any
significant background in national
public life. Of the 99 candidates
who had been members of either
the previous legislative assembly
(a rubber-stamp body) or of the
Loya Jirgah, only 29 were elected.
The absence of political parties,
which are envisaged at a later
stage of the liberalization pro-
gram, made it all the more dif-
ficult to assess the political
views of the new membership.
Parliament convened on 14
October, its first task being to
consider the King's reappointment
of Yusuf as prime minister. From
the outset the new legislators
proved unexpectedly assertive.
Spurred on by leftist members
from Kabul and by conservative
elements who disapproved of sev-
eral of the cabinet assignmemts,
The prime minister, dis-
turbed by the vocal opposition
to his cabinet, reportedly twice
tendered his resignation to the
King, but was urged to persevere.
On 21 October he entered the
chamber unexpectedly to defend
his position, only to be chal-
lenged by several legislators who
questioned his right to attend
parliamentary sessions without
the permission of the members.
Yusuf stormed out of the hall,
but was pursued by more moderate
members who urged him to proceed
with his presentation.
Meanwhile, the Kabul popu-
lace--particularly students from
Kabul University and a high
school near the parliament build-
ing--were beginning to show great
interest in the proceedings.
Student interest appears to have
been deliberately stimulated by
both leftist and progovernment
elements attempting to stir up
popular enthusiasm for their
respective factions. A number
of students were in the galleries
when Yusuf gave his 21 October
sl.eech, and their vociferous ap-
proval of his remarks suggests
they may have been planted there
by sufl.orters of the Yusuf re-
gime.
On 24 October, when Yusuf
returned to Iresent his cabinet
to the assembly, throngs of the
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curious and confused citizenry
crowding the Council chambers and
the streets outside so obstructed
the proceedings that the president
of the lower house was forced to
postpone the session. The specta-
tors--mostly students--were finally
dispersed with help from the army.
To forestall further con-
fusion, the People's Council met
in closed session the following
day. Loudspeakers outside the
parliament building, which had
broadcast previous sessions to the
crowds, were turned off. As a
precaution against further dis-
orders, several truckloads of
troops and six armored cars were
positioned outside. Students
who had turned out for the ses-
sion were incensed at their ex-
clusion from the Council chamber.
Scuffling with security forces
quickly mushroomed into wider
rioting in which government forces
fired upon the crowd. Several
dozen civilians and a number of
policemen reportedly died in the
clashes.
Under heavy pressure from
King Zahir the People's Council
hastily gave a vote of confidence
to the Yusuf government on the af-
ternoon of 25 October. Rioting
continued into the evening, how-
ever, now centering on protests
against excessive government bru-
tality and demands that students
arrested during the day be re-
leased.
These protests were echoed
in parliament in the days that
followed. Yusuf appeared before
the lower house on 27 October,
but was received coolly.
These discordant develop-
ments must have alarmed King
Zahir and the Mohemmedzai, whose
interest in political reform is
strongly tempered by a determina-
tion not to let matters get out
of hand. On 29 October the King
asked for and received Yusuf's
resignation, appointing in his
stead Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal,
formerly minister of press and
information.
Maiwandwal is a relative
newcomer to cabinet-level poli-
tics, having spent much of his
official career in diplomatic
posts abroad. He was first ap-
pointed to the cabinet last Jan-
uary, after having served as am-
bassador to the UK, the US, and
Pakistan. Although not the most
politically influential of Yusuf's
cabinet colleagues, Maiwandwal
may well be stronger now than
Yusuf was when he assumed office
in 1963. Like Yusuf, Maiwandwal
has the backing of the King, and
with the perquisites of high of-
fice now at his disposal, Maiwand-
wal is in a good position to im-
prove his stature.
The cabinet presented to
parliament by the new prime min-
ister represented a substantial
revision of the Yusuf government.
In general, most of the cabinet
members have had extensive ex-
perience in their fields, but
they do not--at least at the out-
set--command much political mus-
cle.
Maiwandwal moved quickly and
effectively to reduce both par-
liamentary and student restive-
ness. He appeared unescorted at
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Kabul University on 4 November
to express his condolences for
the student fatalities and to
listen to student grievances
while Maiwandwal was heckled by
the leftist fringe; most stu-
dents were receptive, and as the
visit ended he was carried to
his car on the shoulders of sev-
eral enthusiastic students.
Maiwandwal has also been fa-
vorably received by parliament.
This may be due in part to heavy
pressure from the King, but it
also reflects satisfaction with
the new prime minister's willing-
ness to cooperate with legisla-
tive committees set up to inves-
tigate corruption in government
and other matters.
Problems and Prospects
After three of the most
eventful and turbulent months in
recent Afghan history, affairs
finally seem fairly well under
control. The legislature, eager
to avoid the rigors of a Kabul
winter in the unheated parliament
building, has recessed until next
March.
Student protests continue,
but they are--temporarily. at
least--on such relatively nonpo-
litical issues as difficult exam-
inations, the lolicy of eliminat-
ing students who have flunked
three times running, and German
professors whose lectures are
too obscure. The prime minister
is therefore reasonably free to
concentrate on the longer range
problem of consolidating his
political position and setting
his new government to work at
the major administrative tasks
involved in ,Afghanistan's polit-
ical and economic modernization.
Maiwandwal's longevity as
prime minister will depend on his
ability to retain the suEport of
the traditional sources of power--
the King, the royal family, and
tribal elements--while contend-
ing successfully with the growing
influence of newer elements, such
as the urban educated elite, the
students, and an independent-
minded parliament.
At present there is every
indicaLion that the King's in-
terest in continued political re-
form has not been significantly
dampened. He is probably more
sensitive than before, however,
to the danger that liberaliza-
tion will lead to unrest. Re-
newed and protracted disorders
would alarm the royal family and
strengthen sentiment favoring a
return to Daud's repressive
methods. Rumors circulating in
Kabul have, in fact, linked Daud
with the recent disturbances,
but they are thus far unsubstan-
tiated.
It is therefore imperative
that the new prime minister prove
his ability to maintain control,
and student agitation could well
develop into a major test. The
Kabul University students have
long nursed a number of grudges,
some legitimately and some in
largely unjustified reaction to
administration efforts to raise
standards. The students did not
become politically involved until
the recent parliamentary election
campaign. At that time, many
students, under thestrong in-
fluence of Kabul's small urban
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intelligentsia, actively supported
the candidacy of several leftists.
A small but vocal segment of the
student body now seems determined
to keep this political conscious-
ness alive. They are helped by
the heady feeling of the students
that they were largely responsi-
ble for the fall of the Yusuf
government.
In his effort to bring these
forces under control, Maiwandwal
has selected as education minis-
ter Dr. Mohammed Osman Anwari,
a conservative and a strict dis-
ciplinarian who was formerly rec-
tor of Kabul University. The
government has considerable
leverage over the students through
its authority to control enroll-
ments. Because a university de-
gree virtually guarantees the
graduate a good job, the fear of
dismissal can be an effective
deterrent to unauthorized be-
havior. Seven students were ex-
pelled on 10-12 December for
their part in campus demonstra-
tions. One campus agitator, a
junior mathematics instructor,
has been summarily fired and
sentenced to two years' im-
prisonment for 'crimes against
the public interest and security."
Control of parliament may
prove to be a somewhat more elu-
sive goal. Although political
parties have not yet been author-
ized, members of the lower house
already appear to be drifting
into several distinct groups. By
far the largest of these is ex-
tremely conservative, loyal to
the King, and resistant to any
changes that would disrupt their
traditional Islamic society. For
the most part members of this
group were elected to parliament
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*40
from outlying constituencies
where their selection was strongly
influenced by the local leader-
ship structure. Although this
group probably would support pro-
grams publicly endorsed by the
King, it is unlikely to feel as
receptive toward those identi-
fied solely with Maiwandwal.
At the opposite political
pole is a small but vocal group
of Marxists representing several
Kabul constituencies. Their
following is not large--they
have no influence outside Kabul--
but they are better organized
and more active than the conserv-
ative deputies. They are also
capable of evoking the support
of some student groups.
More or less in the political
center, but divided into rightward
and leftward leaning factions,
is a group of moderates who were
senior officials in the Yusuf
government or who have ties with
former Yusuf cabinet ministers.
The president of the People's
Council, Dr. Abdul Zaher, who was
deputy prime minister in the Yusuf
government, is influential among
the more conservative centrists,
while former deputy planning min-
ister M. S. Farhang leads a small
:socialist faction. The moderates
generally favor the King's gradual
approach to reform, but personal
rivalries are strong and many
disapprove of the appointment of
Maiwandwal. A number of opponents
of the new prime minister presum-
ably would have preferred the
selection of Dr. Zaher.
Maiwandwal risks having his
position subtly undermined if he
fails to conciliate the rival
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elements in the political cen-
ter, both within and outside par-
liament. He has already taken
a first step to guard against
this by appointing several former
members of Yusuf's cabinet as
key advisers.
Just what effect the even-
tual formation of political par-
ties will have remains to be
seen. Several members of parlia-
ment with varying political lean-
ings appear eager to form and
lead such parties. The passage
of enabling legislation must
await the reconvening of parlia-
ment next March. Even then, the
political parties law proposed
by the government may well be
couched in language designed to
minimize the initial impact of
the parties, allowing them only
gradually to assume a meaning-
ful role in the political sys-
tem.
Apart from the immediate
problem of staying in office,
the Maiwandwal government must
cope with the major task of ad-
ministering Afghanistan's various
development programs. Cabinet
reshuffling has eliminated a
number of key administrators and
the promotion of several deputy
ministers to the cabinet has
left a number of second-ranking
posts vacant. The dearth of ad-
ministrative talent is felt even
more severely at lower levels
of government. These personnel
deficiencies point up the press-
ing requirement for greater ad-
vances in education, a need that
will be felt with increasing
urgency as economic development
enters more advanced stages.
The Afghan economy seems
reasonably well in hand for the
time being, although serious prob-
lems may lie ahead if the gov-
ernment's fiscal affairs are not
handled prudently. A foreign-
exchange crisis earlier this year
forced the government to turn
to the International Monetary
Fund for help. The IMF agreed
to provide $6.75 million in for-
eign exchange, but only after
Kabul committed itself to rais-
ing tax and customs rates and
curbing inflationary government
borrowing from the central bank.
As a result, the steady deprecia-
tion of the Afghani ceased in
May, and its free market value
has since remained relatively
stable. Inflationary pressures
may still prove troublesome, how-
ever, if local currency expendi-
tures for development generate
more purchasing lower than can
be adequately absorbed.
In foreign policy matters
Maiwandwal will probably pursue
the nonaligned course set by his
predecessors. Many of his cab-
inet colleagues are US educated
and seem generally well disposed
toward the US. Nevertheless, the
proximity of the USSR, and the
major Soviet contributions of
military and economic aid, argue
for continued close ties with
Moscow.
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Strains may again develop
in Afghanistan's relations with
Pakistan, but a repetition of
the 1961 diplomatic rupture is
unlikely. During the recent
India-Pakistan hostilities, Kabul
remained neutral and refrained
from taking advantage of Paki-
stan's commitment of nearly all
its regular troops to the Kash-
mir and Punjab war zones. There
are indications, however, that
Afghanistan now intends to press
hard for some Pakistani conces-
sions on the Fushtoon question.
The new Afghan foreign minister,
Nur Ahmed Etemadi--until recently
ambassador to Pakistan--has ap-
peared in the past to be in
sympathy with Prince Daud's hard
line and can be expected to pre-
sentAfghanistan's case forcefully.
The King and the Mohammedzai, 25X1
however, will probably not allow
a repetition of anything like
the unhappy developments that
ended the Daud re im
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