WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005100060001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 17, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
(Information as of noon EST, 16 December 1965)
VIETNAM
The major military activity in South Vietnam this week
was in the central coastal region, where Allied forces
made sporadic contact with a Viet Cong regimental force.
Political developments in the South centered around the
annual conference of the Unified Buddhist Association.
Page
F Peking has renewed its prom-
ises of any aid "required" by Hanoi, but in the same
equivocal terms as in past such statements.
The Communist World
SOVIET BUDGET AND ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1966
Moscow's basic economic guidelines for next year indi-
cate a moderate shift in the allocation of resources in
favor of military and space programs, consumer welfare,
and the agricultural program adopted last March. Gains
in these areas will be at the expense of a recovery in
the rate of economic growth.
SOVIET TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON US MILITARY ATTACHES
The restrictions were imposed a month ago to show dis-
pleasure over publication of the Penkovsky papers, but
Moscow has refrained from other retaliatory moves.
SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS
Soviet military doctrine, which has always emphasized
surprise as a vital factor for battlefield success,
stresses that night operations must be conducted with
the same efficiency and in the same magnitude as day-
light operations. Military training in the USSR re-
flects this doctrine by great attention to night exer-
cises. Soviet science a uals the US ca abilit to de-
velop night vision aids.
SECRET
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SOVIET - EAST EUROPEAN LONG-TERM TRADE PACTS
The increasingly businesslike nature of Soviet trade
with Eastern Europe is reflected in recent trade pacts
for 1966-70, during which period trade will be less
favorable for Eastern Europe than in the past.
THE APEL AFFAIR IN EAST GERMANY
The unconfirmed West German accounts of East German
planning chief Apel's suicide are plausible enough to
be causing confusion in East Germany. The affair
could have repercussions within the party leadership
and in East German - Soviet relations.
POPULAR ATTITUDES AND MORALE IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The Peking regime, which once had the approval as well
as the obedience of the Chinese people, has been unable
to arouse the population from its political apathy since
the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" and the economic
disasters of the years 1959-1961. The regime's intense
indoctrination programs intended to recover some of the
former rev a
COMMUNIST CHINA'S 1965 ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM 10
During 1965 Peking gave new economic assistance to North
Vietnam and Albania but made available only about $45
million in new credits to free world countries--most of
it to Afghanistan and Uganda.
COMMUNISTS MAY STEP UP FIGHTING IN LAOS
The Pathet Lao radio has announced a "mobilization
order," and there are other signs of plans to move
against government forces.
INDONESIAN ARMY KEEPS INITIATIVE AGAINST SUKARNO
It has secured the removal of Foreign Minister Suban-
drio as deputy chief of the Supreme Operations Command,
and is trying to saddle Sukarno with blame for economic
problems.
SECRET
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YEMEN CONFERENCE IN DEADLOCK
After three weeks of intermittent conferring, Yemeni
republicans and royalists are still wrangling over the
interpretation of the agreement between their respec-
tive Egyptian and Saudi allies for establishing a joint
provisional government.
POLITICS REVIVING AFTER CONGO COUP
Some politicians, tribal groups, and army officers are
unhappy at General Mobutu's assumption of power for
five years.
AFRICANS GIVE BRITAIN MORE TIME ON RHODESIA ISSUE
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania have broken relations
with London, but most other African governments have
apparently decided to try other ways of pressuring Brit-
ain.
DISSIDENCE IN ETHIOPIAN BORDER PROVINCES
Government forces are encountering increasing trouble
in several outlying provinces, some of it stemming from
traditional sources of friction and some fanned by for-
eign agitation.
Europe
FINNISH PROPOSAL TO NEUTRALIZE NORTHERN SCANDINAVIA 18
President Kekkonen contends that a treaty between Fin-
land and Norway neutralizing their northernmost prov-
inces would alleviate tension, in the border area during
periods of international crisis. Oslo has not replied
formally, but unofficial reaction is largely negative.
Western Hemisphere
COSTA RICA TO HOLD NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN FEBRUARY 21
The US Embassy predicts a close finish but gives a
slight edge for the presidency to Daniel Oduber, who
would not depart substantially from the pro-US cast
of the incumbent administration which his party heads.
SECRET
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LABOR UNREST AND POLITICKING IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 22
As mounting labor unrest threatens to provoke a new cri-
sis, the verbal exchanges between rival politicians
are eroding what little remains of the political truce
called for by the OAS peace terms.
VENEZUELAN REACTION TO COMMUNIST TERRORISM 23
A recent terrorist explosion which killed a congress-
man's wife has caused a loud popular and official out-
cry and dispelled hopes that the Communist Party and its
allies might soon abandon violence in favor of legitimate
political action.
URUGUAYAN LABOR TENS IONS EASE 24
A reported agreement between the government and both
state and autonomous-eacecybutemployees
Uruguaysselabor diffi-
culties brought a temporary peace,
culties are far from solved.
United Nations
UN FINANCING AND PEACEKEEPING PROBLEMS STILL AT IMPASSE 25
Following the failure of the current 20th session of
the General Assembly to find solutions, the whole prob-
lem has been dumped once again on the Committee of 33,
whose mandate has recently been extended.
SECRET
'RED
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- SECRET
The major military activity
in South Vietnam this week was in
the central coastal region, where
large Allied forces made sporadic
contact with a Viet Cong regimental
force which had battered two gov-
ernment battalions on 8-9 December
near the Quang Nam - Quang Tin
border. US B-52 Stratofortresses
supported US Marines and Vietnam-
ese ground troops by bombing
nearby Communist base areas four
times between 11 and 14 December.
Heavy fog and rain occasionally
impaired the effectiveness of
other tactical aircraft as well
as mobility on the ground. Al-
lied casualties during the ten-
day operation totaled nearly 600
killed, wounded, or missing. Con-
firmed Viet Cong losses were about
250 killed and captured, although
estimates of additional enemy
dead are as high as 1,250.
Government efforts elsewhere
during the week were highlighted
by generally successful search
operations in the IV Corps prov-
inces of Go Cong, Vinh Binh, and
Dinh Tuong, where more than 400
Viet Cong were killed, with only
moderate government losses. Con-
tinuing Allied operations north-
west of Saigon failed to engage
large enemy forces near the Binh
Duong - Tay Ninh border, although
a sizable Viet Cong facility was
discovered.
slightly, but incidents of
enemy harassment, sabotage, and
'terrorism rose to the second
highest level of the year. Re-
newed incidents of terrorism
were directed against Vietnamese
police in Saigon, and a large
number of reports have forecast
a spate of Viet Cong terrorism
against both Vietnamese and US
installations during the next
two weeks to coincide with Com-
munist anniversaries.
Political developments in
Saigon this week centered around
the annual conference of the
Unified Buddhist Association
(UBA). The opening address by
aged monk Thich Tinh Khiet ap-
parently did not contain the am-
biguous remarks previously
drafted by influential Thich Tri
Quang. However, the alleged
clesecration of a Buddhist pagoda
by US Marines in the Da Nang area
this month was discussed. A
statement by Ambassador Lodge
offering US assistance in restor-
ing the pagoda (without acknowl-
edging US culpability) satis-
fied most UBA leaders, but younger
and more militant monks are re-
portedly still demanding a US
apology. The conference re-
elected the moderate UBA leader-
ship.
Large-scale activity ini-
tiated by the Viet Cong declined
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IWAOI SECRET -"
The more recent impressions
of DRV.firmness are borne out
by propaganda which is apparently
laying the groundwork to dis-
credit any new pause in US bomb-
ings. Radio Hanoi declared on
10 December that the pause last
May was nothing but a trick to
cover up further escalation of
the war, and strongly implied
that Hanoi would interpret a sec-
ond pause the same way.
Chinese Support for Hanoi
Hanoi Set to Pursue the War
In a 14 December People's
Daily editorial Peking res a e. its
prom se to give the DRV whatever was
":required" to carry on with the
war. This was the first major
Chinese pronouncement on assist-
ance to Hanoi since early Octo-
ber and appears intended as a
reply to recent reports of US
plans to increase military
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pressure. The editorial skirted
the question of direct Chinese
involvement in hostilities.
The editorial noted that
another "pause" in US air attacks
would be nothing more than a
scheme to facilitate further es-
calation of the war. It then
restated the standard Chinese
line on negotiations calling
the Hanoi four-point formula and
the Liberation Front five-point
statement the "only correct
basis."
Premier Chou En-lai report-
edly took a similar line in talks
with French diplomat Jean Chauvel
on 30 November. Chauvel told
the US Embassy in Laos that, when
he pointed out that Hanoi's pre-
conditions made negotiation im-
possible, Chou indicated that
this was precisely why China sup-
ported them. Chou also report-
edly asserted that Peking would
take no initiative to widen the
SECRET
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SECRET
The basic economic guide-lines
the USSR has set forth for next
year indicate a moderate shift in
the allocation of resources in fa-
vor of military and space programs,
consumer welfare, and the agricul-
tural program adopted last March.
The increased efforts in these
areas will be at the expense of a
recovery in the rate of economic
growth, particularly in the in-
dustrial sector.
The increase in military and
space expenditures is signaled by
a 5-percent rise in the explicit
defense allocation in the state
budget. More persuasively, a
significant increase in production
of military and space materiel is
implied by the 9-percent increase
in machinery and equipment output.
When compared with a rise of less
than 5 percent in the supply of
such items to investment--the major
nonmilitary consumer of machinery
and equipment--it is apparent that
considerable increases in the sup-
ply of hardware to the defense es-
tablishment are contemplated.
Other appropriations for defense
are probably concealed in such
budgetary categories as science,
the outlay for which is almost
10 percent higher next year than
in 1965.
The regime's intention to im-
prove consumer welfare next year
is reflected in the 6.5-percent
rise planned in per capita real
income. There will also be a con-
tinued increase in pensions as
well as in expenditures for health
and education. Much of the im-
provement in consumer welfare,
Page 5
however, will depend on fulfilling
the planned increase of 8 to l0
percent in total farm output. Pres-
ent; indications are that an increase
of this magnitude will not be
achieved.
Production increases have been
scheduled for both soft goods and
consumer durables, but even if they
are realized it is doubtful that
next year will see any substantial re-
lief in the inf4ationary pressures
now present in the USSR. Although
money incomes of the population in
1965 grew by 10 percent, savings
deposits rose by 19 percent and in-
ventories of unsold consumer goods
continue to pile up in warehouses.
The leadership recognizes the in-
centive advantages involved in a
larger supply of acceptable consumer
goods, but it is apparently unwill-
ing or unable to provide more than
a modest improvement in 1966.
In addition to a healthy in-
crease of 16 percent in agricultural
investment scheduled for 1966, other
measures are consistent with the
farm support program promulgated by
Brezhnev in March. The relatively.,
low delivery quotas for the major
agricultural products approved last
March have been maintained, and
the I.2-percent rise planned in the
income of collective farmers is
probably aimed at increasing incen-
tives,,. Scheduled deliveries of farm
machinery and trucks in 1966 cor-
respond to the average annual rates
of increase needed to attain the
five--year goals contained in Brezh-
nev's program for 1966 to 1970.
With the focus of the Soviet
economy in 1966 on attacking
SECRET
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SE CR E T
1460-64 1965 1966
Actuall 11 Plan Actual Plan
1. INVESTMENT RATES . OF
Investment
6
9
9
6%
INCREASE COMPARED WITH
Consumer-oriented sectoW
314
N. A.
IN
13
?960-64 AVERAGE
Heavy industry
714
N. A.
5
thaatis4
CONSUMER - ORIENTED
Commissionings of new fixed
capital
8
12
6
614
UP
INVESTMENT--UP
INVESTMENT FOR
GROWTH-- DOWN
II. SHIFTING PATTERN IN
Total machl~ery production,
i
8
9
7
9
THE ALLOCATION OF
tary
including mil
CIVILIAN MACHINERY
allotlocat machinery
aed to:
leas
Investment
10
12-13
12
than 5
Consumer durables
8%
N. A.
N. A.
11
III. INDICATIONS OF
Real incomes
4
734
N. A.
614
CONTINUED REGIME SUPPORT
Consumption
214
N. A.
N. A.
N. A.
FOR CONSUMER WELFARE
Retail trade
6
7
8
6
(Per capita rate of change)
Money savings in banks
714
N. A.
17'x4
N. A.
SELECTED INDICATORS OF SOVIET
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 1960-66
1966 TRENDS ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES OF GROWTH`
Rounded to nearest half-percent.
Aversye ennuaf rate of growth.
Includes investment in egricufturf,
housin and consumer goods Industries.
Excludes collective farms and private housing.
N. A. i Not available)
pressing, immediate problems--
agriculture and living standards
--and on supporting existing and
prospective programs in the mili-
tary and space fields, the re-
gime has had to divert its at-
tention from the basic problem
of declining growth rates and
of relatively low levels of in-
vestment, especially since 1960.
The over-all 1966 investment data
indicate that the goals for ex-
panding plant and equipment next
year will be the lowest since
the war, and about one half the
planned increments for 1965.
Most of this modest increase in
investment, moreover, will be
channeled into housing, agricul-
ture, and consumer goods pro-
duction where additions in in-
vestment are planned at 10, 16,
and 15 percent respectively.
In contrast, investment in heavy
industry is scheduled to rise
by less than 4 percent next year.
Industrial production is
planned to grow by 6.7 percent,
almost 2 percentage points below
the increase actually claimed
for 1965 and unusually low by
SECRET
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Soviet standards. In addition
to the apparent decline in the
rate of expanding new capacity,
this projected decline reflects
the mediocre 1965 harvests,
which will deprive the light and
food industries of some of their
expected raw materials. Although
the current campaign for quality
instead of quantity production
may have contributed to the low
industrial target, the industrial
reform program approved in
October for 1966 through 1968
will not be a major disrupting
factor next year. Only selected
branches of the light and food
industries will be operating on
the new system by the end of
1966.
Restrictions on the travel
of US military attachds in the
USSR, imposed by Moscow because
of its displeasure over publica-
tion of the Penkovsky papers,
are continuing into their second
month. Earlier this month, in
a meeting with a high Defense
Ministry official, the US at-
tachds gained the impression
that Soviet irritation over the
papers was on the wane. On 13
December, however, when they asked
when the travel ban would be
lifted, they received a negative
reaction.
The restrictions were im-
posed on 18 November. Although
the Soviets officially protested
the publication of the papers,
they have carefully limited
retaliatory action to the mili-
tary sphere. In so doing, Mos-
cow has chosen an approach that
is relatively free from publicity
and not so provocative as to
cause Soviet-US relations to
fall into complete disrepair.
The reaction to the papers
disrupted a four-month period
of unusual cordiality noted by
the US Army atta.ch8 in his con-
tacts with high-level Soviet
officers in Moscow. The attache
stated that "even Malinovsky has
been pleasant." He concluded
that although the Soviets prob-
ably desired to keep to a minimum
public displays of US-Soviet
friendship because of Vietnam,
they wished to remain amicable
in military relationships and
other areas. Shortly before
publication of the papers, the
Soviets had proposed that the
USSR and the US exchange military
information and maneuver observers.
There are as yet no indications
that the Soviet position on
these exchanges will be affected
by the papers' publication.
The Soviet military attaches
in Some, Ankara, Vienna, and
Parris have also suddenly become
friendlier to their US counter-
parts. The US attachds in these
capitals have been impressed by
the unusual frankness and friend-
liness of the Soviets. In one
instance a Soviet assistant
attache in Paris stated on 9
November that his personal mis-.
sion in Paris was to try to pro-
mote closer ties between the US
SECRET
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SOVIET - EAST EUROPEAN LONG-TERM TRADE PACTS
The increasingly business-
like nature of Soviet trade with
East European countries has been
reflected in recently concluded
trade pacts covering the period
from 1966 to 1970. Trade during
this time will be less favorable
for Eastern Europe than has been
the case recently. However, both
sides recognize that these coun-
tries will continue to depend
economically on the USSR.
In the past two months Mos-
cow has signed long-term trade
agreements with Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria,
and Hungary. The pacts call for
substantial, although generally
declining, rates of growth in
exchanges. Most of the basic
raw materials and fuels that
these countries need to import
will still be supplied by the
USSR. Certain uneconomic prac-
tices such as the supply of iron
ore by expensive long-haul ground
transport to Hungary and East
Germany, however, are to be cur-
tailed. Because of changing re-
quirements in Eastern Europe, So-
viet deliveries of crude oil--
needed to expand and modernize
petrochemical and energy indus-
tries--and of rolled steel for
machinery and equipment indus-
tries are scheduled to rise rap-
idly.
There was hard bargaining
throughout 1965 over Soviet pro-
vision of foodstuffs and raw ma-
terials, particularly grain. De-
liveries of these products had
fallen sharply since the 1963
Soviet crop failure. In the
case of Czechoslovakia, Prague's
irritation over the Soviets'
failure to commit themselves on
future grain deliveries was so
great that the matter came under
top-level discussion during
Brezhnev's visit to Prague in
mid-October. Subsequently, it
was announced that grain ship-
ments would rise over 1964-65
levels and that the USSR would
supply about two thirds of Czech-
oslovakia's estimated import
requirement of two million tons
next year.
A similar arrangement prob-
ably has been worked out with
East Germany, which also depends
on the USSR for its basic wheat
imports, but no amounts have as
yet been announced. However,
the Soviets reportedly harshly
rejected other East German trade
proposals, presumably because
they did not conform to Moscow's
intention to conduct its trade
with more regard for its own
economic interests. East Ger-
many's preliminary plans for 1966
to 1970 indicated that it ex-
pected more favorable treatment
than was forthcoming. (See also
next article, on the Apel affair.)
Despite Moscow's reluctance
to expand exports of grain and
some important industrial raw ma-
terials and its greater selectiv-
ity in accepting imports of East
European manufactures, exchanges
between the USSR and Eastern Eu-
rope will remain sizable--more
than 50 percent of Soviet foreign
trade.
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111~EILFT XT QTTUMAUV 17 Dec 65
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`"i, SECRET lwmw
THE APEL AFFAIR IN EAST GERMANY
Although the circumstances
surrounding East German planning
chief Erich Apel's suicide on 3
December remain unclear, the un-
confirmed West German accounts
and explanations seem to be plaus-
ible enough to cause confusion
within the East German Communist
(SED) party and among the people.
If these accounts are accurate,
furthermore, the Apel affair
could have repercussions within
the party leadership and in East
German - Soviet relations.
Sensational West German ac-
counts of a violent argument be-
tween Apel and the Ulbricht
leadership over reported Soviet
economic exploitation have been
broadcast widely by radio and
TV. There is no confirmation,
however, that Apel prepared a
document detailing East German
differences with the USSR or
that any such document is in
Western hands. West German ac-
counts have referred to a letter,
one or two documents in the form
of testaments, or a personal
notebook kept by Apel. No West
German or Berlin official has
admitted to US officials seeing
any of these documents.
East German sensitivity to
the whole matter is reflected in
the heavy propaganda labeling
the Western accounts as fiction
and the documents as nonexistent,
and extolling the new Soviet -
East German trade agreement.
If, as some reports indi-
cate, several East German "tech-
nocrats" side with Apel against
the majority of the leadership,
a few demotions may be forth-
coming. No wholesale purging
is expected, however, because
these men are needed to run the
economy, now undergoing a re-
organization. In any event, the
Ulbricht regime may reconsider
the wisdom of promoting apolit-
ical "technocrats" like Apel,
or at least of circumscribing
more carefully their role in
top policy levels of the party.
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COMMUNIST CHINA'S 1965 ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM
During 1965
Peking gave new eco-
nomic assistance to
North Vietnam and
Albania but made
available only about
$45 million in new
credits to free world
countries. Between
1960 and 1964 annual
Chinese Communist aid
to free world recip-
ients averaged al-
most $140 million,
including a record
$340 million in 1964.
tended new military
and economic aid to
Hanoi last summer,
and gave additional
economic credits in
early December during
North Vietnamese
Vice Premier Nghi's
visit to Peking. The
amount of this new
aid is not known, but
much of it will prob-
ably be used for re-
pairs to transporta-
tion and industrial
CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID
TO FREE WORLD COUNTRIES
million credit -for economic de-
velopment projects. Uganda got
most of the remainder. Another
credit--$100 million for Indo-
nesia--was shelved following the
attempted coup in Indonesia on
30 September.
Since 1950 when China's aid
program began, the bulk of the
assistance has gone to Communist
countries--North Korea, North
Vietnam, Mongolia, Albania, and
Cuba--which have received at
projects as well as for building
new facilities. Earlier Chinese
assistance, amounting to over
$450 million, was used largely
for similar purposes. China's
only other aid to a Communist
country this year was a new
long-term credit for Albania's
next five-year plan.
Of this year's aid to free
world countries, Afghanistan re-
ceived the largest share, a $28-
SECURE T
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least $1.2 billion. China's
economic aid extensions in the
free world--totaling about $830
million--have been spread among
21 of the less developed coun-
tries. The countries selected
and the amounts extended have
been calculated primarily for
political impact. Until 1963,
most of Peking's aid gestures to-
ward non-Communist countries were
in Asia. Since then, Peking has
directed its attention toward
Africa and the Middle East, re-
flecting wider diplomatic inter-
ests.
Less then one third of the
Chinese credits offered to the
;Free world from 1956 to 1964
have been drawn upon, primarily
because of delays in developmental
programs in the recipient coun-
tries. By comparison, about two
thirds of such economic aid to It;
Communist countries has been used.
Page 11
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COMMUNISTS MAY STEP UP FIGHTING IN LAOS
The Communists apparently
plan to intensify the fighting
in Laos, although they have made
no significant new attacks in the
past several weeks.
On 8 December the Pathet Lao
radio announced a "mobilization
order" which described the mili-
tary situation as "very critical"
and claimed that "counterthrusts"
would have to be made to preserve
"our territory." These actions
are portrayed as defensive, but
the Communists also refer to pos-
sible thrusts in areas "held by
the enemy." The entire state-
ment is reminiscent of similar
Communist exhortations made prior
to increased military activity
in past years.
In the panhandle area, mili-
tary activity in the past week
has been confined to small-scale
skirmishes. Government forces
are continuing a cautious sweep
south and east of Thakhek in an
effort to regain positions lost
JLn early November. The Commu-
nists apparently have strength-
ened their positions along the
Se Bang Fai River and have in-
creased their probes in that
the Commu-
nists have made plans for an at-
tack just north of Attopeu dur-
ing the current dry season.
There are indications that
the Communists may also be plan-
ning to step up their activity
in northern Laos, where they
have been generally quiet during
the past ten months. They may
strike back in the Plaine des
Jarres area, where a strategic
Communist position has been un-
der concerted attack in the past
several weeks. Roadwatch re-
ports indicating very heavy enemy
truck movements near Samneua
town suggest that the Communists
malt' make another attempt to
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INDONESIAN ARMY KEEPS INITIATIVE AGAINST SUKARNO
The Indonesian Army is main-
taining the initiative in its
political sparring with President
Sukarno.
It registered a clear gain
this week with the removal of
Foreign Minister Subandrio from
his position as deputy commander
of the powerful Supreme Opera-
tions Command (KOTI). A trium-
virate replaces him. In the new
arrangement, Defense Minister
Nasution will be responsible for
military affairs, the Sultan of
Jogjakarta will oversee economic
matters, and Minister for People's
Relations Ruslan Abdulgani will
handle social issues.
Subandrio's ouster may indi-
cate that Sukarno is reassessing
the political cost of continued
support for a man widely thought
to be implicated in September's
abortive coup. The US Embassy
in Djakarta reports a growing
coolness toward Sukarno on the
part of the Indonesian press;
most papers have endorsed the
army's recent actions at Sukarno's
expense.
Sukarno has devoted increas-
ing attention to the country's
growing economic crisis. In an
effort to stem rocketing infla-
tion the President ordered an
exchange of currency at the rate
of 1,000 old to one new rupiah,
combined with a flat confiscation
of 10 percent of the new currency.
This, plus a ceiling on prices
and a tight control of import
quotas, should have a measurable
deflationary impact. The army
hopes to exploit popular dissatis-
faction over the worsening eco-
Inomic situation by placing the
!blame at Sukarno's door.
Suppression of the Communist
Party (PKI) continues, and the
army apparently is more hopeful
than ever of eventually eliminat-
ing it from the Indonesian politi-
cal mosaic.
Sukarno,
however, may still hope
to re-
constitute
the party in
some other
In
form
a speech on 11
December
.
he warned
that "there would no
longer be
an Indonesia"
without
Communist
ideology.
Subandrio, who remains for-
eign minister, has called for
talks with Singapore and Malay-
sia's component territories on
their mutual differences. This
appears to be little more than a
propaganda gesture, since it fails
to recognize the integrity of the
Malaysian Federation. There is
some likelihood, however, that
Subandrio is genuinely seeking
to improve relations with Singa-
pore.
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YEMEN CONFERENCE IN DEADLOCK
After over three weeks of
intermittent conferring at the
village of Harad in northern
Yemen, Yemeni republicans and
royalists remain deadlocked over
the formation of a joint provi-
sional government, as provided
for in the agreement of last
August between Egypt's President
Nasir and Saudi King Faysal. The
two sides are wrangling over the
meaning of the terms of the agree-
ment, which also outlined other
steps for ending the three-year-
old civil war.
The republicans insist that
the provisional government be
republican in name, on the grounds
that the present republican gov-
ernment is internationally recog-
nized. The national plebiscite
scheduled for next November would
then accept or reject it. The
royalists, backed by Faysal, in-
sist that the provisional regime
be neutral, and suggest labeling
it simply "the state of Yemen"
or "the provisional government
of Yemen."
The Saudi and Egyptian leaders
have already kept the conference
going once when it was on the verge
of collapse, and their views re-
main crucial. The Saudis have urged
again that the conference continue
Elt all costs. The Egyptians' posi-
tion has been equivocal, although
INtasir still seems intent on reach-
ing a settlement, however precar-
ious, that would enable him to take
his more than 50,000 troops home.
POLITICS REVIVING AFTER CONGO COUP
Congolese politics are begin-
ning to simmer again as the momen-
tum of General Mobutu's coup runs
down. Most of the politicians are
disappointed at Mobutu's assump-
tion of power for five years, some
important tribal groupings are
restive,
For the next few weeks at
least, Mobutu and Premier Mulamba
should be able to keep ahead of
these disparate opposition ele-
ments. However, Mobutu's
call for austerity and hard work
seems unlikely to jolt the coun-
try out of its traditional ways,
Jockeying for position among
civilian and military factions
thus seems likely to increase
gradually in intensity and to
pose a steadily greater chal-
lenge to Mobutu.
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AFRICANS GIVE BRITAIN MORE TIME ON RHODESIA ISSUE
Only Ghana, Guinea, Mali
and Tanzania broke relationsawith
Britain on 15 December pursuant
to the resolution of the Organi-
zation of African Unity'sspe-
min-
cial conference of foreign
isters on 3 December. ghecklher
OAU governments, which developed doubts about the wis-
dom of the resolution, have ap-
parently decided to use the al-
ternatives for pressuring Brit-
ain into strong action against
Rhodesia which were offered this
week by Nigeria, Ethiopia, and
Kenya. Nigeria's Premier Balewa
called for a meeting of Common-
wealth heads of state in
in January;
l
y
ear
Emperor proposed another OAU con-
ference, this time with heads of
state attending; and Kenya's
President Kenyatta plans to re-
quest a UN Security Council de-
cision for mandatory sanctions
against Rhodesia under chapter
VII of the UN Charter.
President Kaunda continues
in-
to place Zambia's economic
and
terests above his personal political reasons for wanting
to join the sanctions-against-
Rhodesia club. His government
decided for the time being to
meet Prime Minister Smith's
requirement that all Rhodesian
exports to Zambia be paid for
in nonsterling currency.
Kaunda continues to insist
that Britain must station troops
on the Rhodesian side of the Ka-
riba dam. Kaunda?is unlikely to
accept the World Bank's reported
offer to establish a small se-
curity force at the dam. In an
apparent attempt to exert more
pressure on London to station
British troops there, Kaunda has
decided-to dispatch delegations
to Washington and Moscow to dis-
cuss protection of the dam.
In Rhodesia, -economic sanc-
tions are being felt sooner than
anticipated, but there are no
apparent breaks in the ranks of
the white militants. Rather,
Smith's support--even among itiose
not originally committed toini-
dependence--is reportedly growing
as the sanctions increase.
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25X6
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SECRET
Security conditions in peri-
pheral Ethiopian areas are dete-
riorating and causing increasing
concern to US officials in Addis
Ababa.
During the past two to three
years government forces have en-
countered growing trouble in sev-
eral outlying provinces which Ad-
dis Ababa has never tightly con-
ETHIOPIA'S TROUBLED BORDER PROVINCES!
trolled, notably western Eritrea,
:5idamo, Bale, and Ilubabor. So-
mali tribal dissidence poses a con-
1:inuing problem in Flarar Province,
although it has abated since Ethio-
pian and Somali Republic army units
clashed along the border two years
ago.
The US Embassy in Addis Ababa
reports that the growing numbers of
36 4
18
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A
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SEcRJ,T
Americans traveling and working in
the remote areas risk American
casualties, although no deaths
have yet resulted. The embassy is
concerned also that security prob-
lems will impede US developmental
projects.
Various motivations stir the
dissidents: religious enmity,
tribal rivalries, political dif-
ferences, and simple brigandage
as practiced through the centuries.
The ruling Christian Amhara peoples
have traditionally displayed a
superior attitude toward the Mus-
lim and animist tribesmen, the cen-
tral government has failed to re-
dress many of their long-standing
grievances, and the pace of devel-
opment in remote areas has lagged.
In recent years a heavy in-
flux of arms has reached the dissi-
dent tribes, and occasionally given
them an advantage over government
security forces. Some weapons
have been acquired through capture
from government-supplied tribes,
from police and army units, and
from travelers. Others are ac-
quired by smuggling from neighbor-
ing countries, and still others
come initially from Ethiopian of-
ficials, including the Emperor, who
seek thus to secure the loyalty of
doubtful tribes. In addition, the
wide distribution of transistor ra-
dios has increased the impact of
propaganda broadcast from Cairo,
Khartoum, Damascus, and Mogadiscio.
In the view of the embassy the
most crucial factor is the weakness
of the Ethiopian security forces,
which continue to deal with tribal
dissidence in the traditional man-
ner by burning villages, destroying
or removing crops and cattle, and
beating or killing the people. In
addition, the Emperor, even while
seeking further aid from the US, has
obstructed modernization of the
forces lest he increase their poten-
tial for staging a coup.
Europe
FINNISH PROPOSAL TO NEUTRALIZE NORTHERN SCANDINAVIA
There has been noofficial
Norwegian reply to Finnish Presi-
dent Kekkonen's proposal for a
treaty between Norway and Finland
neutralizing their northernmost
provinces. The proposal was made
in a public address on 29 November.
The Norwegian press and various
Oslo officials have reacted in an
almost uniformly negative fashion,
but the Borten government has
hesitated to reject the suggestion
out of hand and is taking the po-
sition that no immediate answer
is required.
The proposal was couched in im-
precise terms, but Kekkonen con-
tended that the treaty would allev-
iate tension along the Finnish-Nor-
wegian border during periods of in-
ternational crisis and would elimi-
nate the threat to this area posed
by the fact that NATO and Soviet
forces face one another along Nor-
way's 122-mile frontier with the
USSR in the far north. Kekkonen ap-
parently has it in mind that both
Norway and Finland would defend
this territory against a move by
either Warsaw Pact or NATO countries
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_ftw 14W
SECRET
to use the area as a
path of attack.In short,
Norway--a NATO member--
would be asked to remove
all or a portion of the
northernmost part of its
territory from the pro-
tection of the alliance.
Norway has never per-
mitted foreign troops or
nuclear weapons to be
stationed on its soil in
peacetime, but NATO
would be handicapped in
other ways if the north-
ern province of Finnmark
were to assume a special
status. The Oslo gov-
ernment, for example,
has permitted NATO to
hold military exercises
in the area.
There continues to
be considerable specu-
lation in Finland and
elsewhere in Scandinavia regard-
ing Kekkonen's motives in advanc-
ing the proposal. The US Embassy
in Helsinki believes he was moti-
vated by foreign policy as well
as domestic political considera-
tions. Kekkonen may have ex-
pected to gain some credit with
the Soviet Union by the initia-
tive, which he advanced along
with his frequently proposed
scheme for declaring Northern Eu-
rope a nuclear-free zone. Soviet
propaganda, however, has thus far
not commented on the proposal,
perhaps in order to avoid strength-
ening speculation that it was in-
spired by Moscow.
Kekkonen was probably also
seeking to enhance the prospects
of his Center Party in next year's
national elections by reminding
the voters of the importance of
electing a government which has
the confidence and support of the
Soviet Union. Faced with the con-
tinuing decline of the rural popu-
lation, the agrarian-based Center
Party has sought to broaden its
support by turning to the all-im-
portant area of foreign relations,
where it claims for itself a spe-
cial competence and understanding 25X1
of the USSR by virtue of Kekkonen's
good relations with the Soviet
leadership.
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The outcome of the Costa
Rican national elections of 6
February 1966 will be extremely
close in the view of the US Em-
bassy in San Jose. At the pres-
ent time, Daniel Oduber, standard
bearer of the ruling National
Liberation Party (PLN) is accorded
a slight edge for the presidency
over opposition coalition candi-
date,Jose Joaquin Trejos.
Oduber, a shrewd, pragmatic
politician, is a leader of the
PLN's sizable liberal wing. The
PLN ticket, which appears to be
moderate and broadly based, was
fashioned to please conservative,
wealthy members of the PLN and
to nullify opposition attempts
to link Oduber to Castro and the
Communists. Even if Oduber wins,
the PLN may have only a thin
majority in the 57-man unicameral
Legislative Assembly.
Political neophyte Trejos
of the opposition National Uni-
fication Party (UN), a coalition
of the Republican and National
Union parties, is a moderate and
highly respected university pro-
fessor. His candidacy has also
been endorsed by a third faction,
the United Republican Action
Party of ex-President Mario
Echandi. The UN ticket covers
the political spectrum. Dr.
Jorge Vega, its candidate for
the first vice-presidency, is
wealthy and ultraconservative,
while Calvo Sanchez, candidate
for the second vice-presidency,
is a member of the Republican
:reformist wing. Among the prob-
lems Trejos has had to face are
the strong organizational ad-
-vantage of the PLN, and the
fear of many of his supporters
that the Republican Party would
have "excessive" influence in
a UN government. Also it is
unclear whether the Trejos ticket
will retain the active support
of Echandi and his backers now
that they have failed to get
the UN to run pro-Echandi legis-
lative candidates.
A Trejos victory would
bring to power a coalition of
disparate groups. Their lack of
a unified approach would impede
government operations and might
herald increased nationalism
In Costa Rican dealings with
the United States.
The embassy believes Oduber,
if elected, would spare no ef-
fort to make his administration
a successful one under the
general framework of the Alliance
for Progress. The embassy also
believes that an Oduber adminis-
tration, although it might well
take a somewhat more liberal
and independent line on some
:issues, would not depart sub-
stantially from the pro-US cast
of the incumbent Orlich govern-
ment, and that the prospects for
smooth transition and effective
government would be better than
in the case of a Trejos victory.
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Mounting labor unrest could
provoke a new crisis in the Do-
minican Republic. President
Garcia Godoy's decision to pay
only part of the traditional
Christman bonus to public employ-
ees and his intention to enforce
a November decree which forbids
strikes by government employees
are being put to the test by a
wave of strikes in public offices.
Civil servants demanding the pay-
ment of back wages have joined a
strike which started with a call
by two of the country's three la-
bor federations for walkouts at
most of the government-owned
sugar mills.
The government's firmness
in dealing with disorders by un-
employed workers at a US-owned
banana plantation near Azua has
become a political campaign is-
sue. In an effort to increase
waning Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD) strength in the la-
bor movement, Juan Bosch has pub-
licly taken the administration
to task for using troops and ar-
rests to prevent violence at the
plantation. Labor problems at
the US-owned La Romana sugar
central could also easily flare
up as management faces an extrem-
ist-controlled union in contract
talks.
Little remains of the
vaguely defined political truce
called for by the OAS peace
terms. Campaigning for the June
1966 elections by the two major
parties, the FRD and Joaquin
Balaguer's Reformist Party (FR),
has earnestly begun. Bosch took
to the airwaves on 11 December
to answer charges by Balaguer
and others of government par-
tiality toward the PRD. Employ-
ing the style he so effectively
used in the 1962 campaign, Bosch
charged that everything that has
adversely affected the PRD or
the "people's" interests is part
of a plot by reactionary sectors
to rekindle the civil war. Bosch
took the opportunity to lump
such elements as the military
terrorists, US news media, and
the US-owned banana company into
the reactionary category.
The working relationship be-
tween Garcia Godoy and military
leaders has been maintained and
the President continues to is-
sue optimistic statements con-
cerning the integration of rebel
military personnel into the armed
forces. Over 300 former rebels
reportedly have been paid off
and have left the 27th of Febru-
ary camp, according to Garcia
Godoy. He told US officials
that he expects the remaining
rebels who are eligible will be
incorporated into the military
this week--perhaps a too-optimis-
tic estimate. To reduce tem-
porarily the number of trouble-
makers in the armed services,
the government has accepted an
Israeli offer to provide three
months' training to Dominican of-
ficers.
cards.
In an effort to promote hon-
est elections next June, the gov-
ernment has announced that new
identification cards, used in the
voting process, will be issued.
Numerous reports have indicated
that leftist forces had illegally
acquired large stocks of the old
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S 001i low
An explosion on 6 December
which killed a congressman's
pretty, young wife--she was Miss
Venezuela in 1963--appears to
have dispelled the government's
hope that the Venezuelan Commu-
nist Party (PCV) and its ally,
the Movement of the Revolution-
ary Left (MIR), might soon
abandon violence in favor of
legitimate political action.
Congress, in a special
joint session on 7 December,
unanimously condemned both the
PCV and MIR. President Leoni
also spoke out against the PCV.
A subsequent Communist effort
to shift the blame to uniden-
tified rightists served only
to infuriate the military.
Sharp denials and countercharges
were issued by spokesmen for
those officers who feel the gov-
ernment has not been sufficiently
vigorous in pursuing terrorists
and guerrillas of the PCV/MIR
paramilitary group, the Armed
Forces of National Liberation
(FALN). A secondary public re-
action thereafter was a ripple
of rumors that a military coup
was imminent, but such rumors
seem to have died down.
Even before the bombing,
efforts by PCV moderates to
create a peace-loving image
were being thwarted by MIR and
FALN murders of policemen, na-
tional guardsmen, and agrarian
leaders. A recent editorial
in La Republica, a daily that
often acts as the government's
unofficial mouthpiece, cited
these and other incidents in
Irefuting a PCV claim that the
,government had rejected Commu-
l nist overtures for rapproche-
ment. Among other things, the
paper pointed out that the PCV
had been offered "concrete op-
portunities" for pacification
since before the elections of
December 1963.
The paper repeated a state-
ment from President Leoni's
first message to Congress, in
January 1964, that if the Com-
munists would abandon violence
and give proof of their new
stand they would open the path
to rehabilitation of their party.
La Republica denied Communist
h-arges of ideological persecu-
tion, pointing out that the PCV
is still legal and that captured
terrorists and guerrillas were
jailed for civil crimes rather
than for political activities.
FALN.
Recently, dissension has
appeared among the leaders of
the PCV and the MIR. Some are
trying to persuade their vio-
lence-minded colleagues to re-
turn to orthodox political ac-
tion--the so-called "via paci-
fica." The dispute between ad-
vocates of violence and pro-
ponents of the "via Pacifica"
is inducing polarization in
both parties. Members of both
groups have threatened to split
away to follow the policies
they advocate. Such a formal
schism would reduce the present
slim possibility that the ad-
vocates of political action
would be able to stop the vio-
lence committed by the die-hard
terrorists of the MIR and the
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At least temporary peace
appears to be returning to the
Uruguayan labor scene in the
wake of a reported agreement
between the government and both
state and autonomous agency em-
ployees.
The government was forced
to reimpose emergency security
measures during the week of 6
December in order to deal with
the protracted labor
unrest.
Although wages were
no longer
at issue, workers had refused
to accept penalties the govern-
ment
imposed on
those who took
part
in strikes
in October.
Most
government
employees en-
gaged
in strikes and slowdowns,
which
on 9 December virtually
paralyzed all but emergency
services. Scattered incidents
of violence and sabotage occurred,
and police arrested several hun-
dred striking bank and press em-
ployees.
The majority faction of
the government let it be known
that it was considering break-
ing relations with the USSR be-
cause of alleged Soviet inter-
ference in the labor crisis.
The threat to sever relations
appears to have been intended
primarily to frighten the Uru-
guayan Communists and to make
them halt the labor agitation,
for which they were in large
part responsible. Government
leaders seemingly had little
serious intention of breaking
relations with the Soviets--
with whom they have just con-
eluded a substantial wool sale
--and were surprised at the in-
ternational reaction to their
threat. The government may now,
however, consider limiting the
activities of bloc diplomats
and reducing the size of the
large Soviet Embassy staff in
Montevideo.
The maneuver appears to
have served its purpose, as
labor leaders reportedly have
agreed to accept some pay sanc-
tions. The government reduced
to suspension the penalty of
dismissal which had been assessed
against some workers and agreed
to release jailed trade union-
ists. The Communist-influenced
National Workers' Convention sus-
pended its planned 14 December
general strike.
Uruguay's labor difficulties
are far from solved, however.
The cost of living has risen
nearly 60 percent in the first
eleven months of 1965 and unem-
ployment is increasing. Many
workers in the private sector
will probably press for wage
agreements more favorable than
the 26- to 30-percent adjustment
made for the government employees.
The governmentworkers themselves
will probably become increasingly
dissatisfied with their salaries,
which are frozen until after
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UN FINANCING AND PEACEKEEPING PROBLEMS STILL AT IMPASSE
No progress has been made
in resolving the problems of in-
itiating and financing UN peace-
keeping operations in the four
months since the US reluctantly
agreed to drop further efforts
to enforce Article 19 against
delinquent members. Following
the failure of the current 20th
session.of the General Assembly
to find solutions, the whole
problem has been dumped once
again on the Committee of 33,
whose mandate has recently been
extended.
The UN is increasingly hard
put to find ways of financing
the peacekeeping operations it
has already authorized. Secre-
tary General Thant has indicated
it may be necessary to resort
to assessments to save the Cy-
prus operation, especially since
the Scandinavian countries which
have provided troops have been
pressing for reimbursement of
their expenses. Contingency
funds for the two UN missions
in Kashmir are exhausted and
Thant is seeking to have them
financed under the regular budget.
To overcome the expected Soviet
and French objections, he may
resort to the French formula
whereby the Security Council
would "invite" the General Assem-
bly to inscribe the expenses in
the regular budget. However,
the method of financing these op-
erations may in the end be mod-
eled after whatever compromise
is reached for financing the Mid-
dle East Emergency Force (UNEF),
one of the oldest UN operations
which now is under close review.
The current assembly's only
specific move so far toward re-
solving the precarious financial
situation is approval of a French
resolution for a year's study on
UN expenditures. Response to
the UK's lead earlier this year
in making voluntary contributions
to alleviate the critical situa-
tion has been poor. Moscow and
Paris, the principal delinquents,
have still not made contributions,
although France may do so in the
first quarter of 1966.
Discussion on future peace-
keeping operations in the as-
sembly's Special Political Com-
mittee has focused on the Irish
proposal to revise the Uniting
for Peace resolution which allows
the assembly to take peacekeep-
ing action when the Security
Council is paralyzed by a veto.
Irish Foreign Minister Aiken,
author of the resolution, main-
tains that it is necessary to
reimpose mandatory assessments
for peacekeeping if the UN is
to operate at all. The Soviet
delegate, however, has maintained
the traditional Soviet position
that the proposal is at variance
with UN Charter provisions giving
the Security Council jurisdiction
in peacekeeping.
This Soviet opposition and
reservations on the part of
other countries caused the Irish
proposal to be referred to the
Committee of 33. Past experi-
ence has shown, however, that
if the committee is to become
more than a debating forum it
will need firm guidelines on how
to proceed and what should be
accomplished before the 21st
assembly.
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 SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS
Soviet military doctrine has always emphasized
surprise as a vital factor for battlefield success.
To achieve this surprise, the Soviets stress that
night operations must be conducted with the same
efficiency and in the same magnitude and tempo as
daylight operations. Soviet military training re-
flects this by great attention to night exercises,
and Soviet science equals the US capability to de-
velop night vision aids.
Doctrinal Change Since the War
During World War II, the
Soviets used darkness and fog
primarily for troop movements,
for preparation of large-scale
daylight attacks, for construc-
tion of field fortifications,
and for supply operations. Night
operations usually consisted of
attacks in up to regimental
strength, reconnaissance in force,
and raids. Tanks were regarded
as dawn-to-dusk weapons.
Current Soviet doctrine em-
phasizes that operations at night
are to be considered a normal
phase of combat which provides
maximum opportunity for achiev-
ing surprise and reducing losses
from enemy fire. Full offensives,
including tank units, may be
initiated at night, and an of-
fensive begun during daylight
is expected to maintain momentum
beyond nightfall.
The Field Service Regula-
tions of the rme orces
--the e e or v Sion
and regimental commanders--has
a section providing detailed
guidance for the conduct of night
offensive operations. This sec-
tion states in part: "Extensive
use should be made of night con-
ditions to conduct offensive op-
erations with decisive aims. A
night offensive facilitates the
delivery of surprise strikes and
the continuity of combat opera-
tions. It also makes counter-
measures more difficult for the
enemy.... The success of combat
operations at night depends on
thorough planning and on the
training of troops, and also on
the skillful handling of night
vision devices and illumination
equipment."
Training for Night Operations
The Soviets recognize that
the skills necessary for the ef-
fective conduct of night opera-
tions can only be attained by
constant training. Soviet units
are known to conduct realistic
night training exercises at all
levels.
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COMPANY
ATTACKS
AT NIGHT
ISO * ~4ht OP
F ~ir,ro. u ao do
e?ng eleet~~~,~
igh voltage ineut
4a
ection. In d-
ti n. the device
eo inbuilt
Soviet interest in night operations
is illustrated by this montage of items
from Soviet military publications-
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Soviet military publications
frequently publish articles dis-
cussing night training and opera-
tional techniques or praising
units which have demonstrated
proficiency. For example, Mili-
tary Herald, the major unclassi-
ie journal. for combined-arms
commanders, had an article in its
November 1965 issue titled "Train-
ing in Night Firing." This arti-
cle praised and described in de-
tail the training in night firing
techniques conducted by a motor-
ized infantry company.
Night Vision Aids
Soviet night combat doctrine
emphasizes the employment of
illumination and night vision de-
vices by friendly forces and re-
stricting enemy use of such equip-
ment. The Soviet ground forces
now are equipped to overcome the
lack of visibility at night and
to detect and counter enemy use
of infrared equipment. (See photos
on reverse of page) .
Although Soviet forces in
the field are widely supplied
with night vision equipment, most
of it is not much more sophisti-
cated than that which was avail-
able to US and German forces at
the end of World War II. Never-
theless, infrared vision, driv-
ing, and aiming aids are mounted
as standard equipment on Soviet
tanks and some other vehicles.
Passive infrared detection equip-
ment has been issued to Soviet
field forces down to squad leve
The Soviets also plan ex-
tensive use of searchlights, il-
luminating artillery shells, and
signal and identification devices.
According to the field regulations,
"Aircraft... are brought in to
create lighted reference points
in enemy positions and to illumi-
nate the most important targets."
To aid in the concealment of
Soviet forces, the regulations
state: "In addition to its usual
tasks, artillery destroys enemy
radiotechnical means and night
vision equipment."
The Soviets have demonstrated
a determination to develop more
sophisticated night vision equip-
ment for their field forces. Be-
ginning with the German equipment
and scientists captured during
World Wax II, the Soviets launched
an intensive developmental pro-
;ram that continues to the present.
While this work is highly classi-
fied, available information in-
dicates a capability to develop
advanced infrared equipment and
low-level light amplification
devices for tactical forces which
is at least equal to that of the
US. Current emphasis appears to
be on the development of less
vulnerable passive systems which
do not expose the user to detec-
tion. So far as is known, none
of these highly sophisticated
systems has yet been issued to
troops.
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 17 December 1965
OCI No. 0320/65B
Copy No. 53
SPECIAL REPORT
POPULAR ATTITUDES AND MORALE IN COMMUNIST CHINA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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POPULAR ATTITUDES AND MORALE IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Until 1958, the Peking regime had the general
approval of the majority of the Chinese people. Since
the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" and the eco-
nomic disasters of the years 1959 through 1961, the
gap between the revolutionary goals of the leader-
ship and the individual, materialistic goals of the
people has widened. The regime can command compli-
ance and obedience but it Is unable to arouse the
population from its political apathy. The leadership
would like to recover some measure of the former revo-
lutionary elan, and has been conducting persistent
and intense political indoctrination programs for
this purpose. At present, these programs appear
largely ineffective.
The morale of China's 600
million peasants is closely tied
to their current living situation,
and their attitudes to the poli-
cies of the regime that directly
affect them. The average Chi-
nese peasant lives a spartan and
localized life. He is a member of
a commune where he works on col-
lective farmlands and tills his
own minuscule private plot. The
average rural resident eats about
2,000 calories a day--much more
than in 1960-61, but still slightly
less than in a "normal" year such
as 1957. About 20 percent of this
is supplementary food which he has
grown himself or bought on the
open market. He earns very lit-
tle cash, but there is little
need for money except to buy food
to supplement his rations. His
greatest material need is prob-
ably for cloth, and he has been
limited to a cotton cloth ration
of less than five feet a year
for the past several years. His
well being depends to a large
degree on the state of the har-
vest, which has been barely aver-
age since 1962.
The failures of the "Great
Leap Forward" and subsequent re-
gime concessions to time-honored
methods and individual enterprise
have destroyed whatever belief
the peasant might have had that
the regime was infallible. In
fact, he probably resents its ef-
forts to spur him on to greater
political and economic achieve-
ments from which there is little
personal gain. These feelings
are essentially passive, however,
and he would probably not do any-
thing to express his dissatisfac-
tion as long as he could somehow
manage to exist. If he lived
close enough to Hong Kong or Macao
and an opportunity to escape arose,
he would probably take advantage
of it. He probably thinks or
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knows little about foreign af-
fairs, except when he is called
upon to make greater efforts,
for example, for the war in Viet-
nam. He is probably somewhat
skeptical of the regime's propa-
ganda in general, and this skep-
ticism probably extends to propa-
ganda about US weaknesses and
hostile intentions.
The regime would like to
overcome peasant apathy and has
devoted considerable propaganda
and organizational effort to this
purpose. The spring and summer
of 1965 saw the renewal of Poor
and Lower Middle Peasant Associa-
tions, with hints that these or-
ganizations would have some voice
in local agricultural programing.
Composed of the most "progres-
sive" peasants and separate from
the commune structure itself,
these organs could serve as checks
on the local party cadres as well
as rallying points for the peas-
ants. They appear to be under
the control of a new central com-
mittee department called the Po-
litical Work Department for Ag-
riculture and Forestry, estab-
lished in August 1965.
By Mao Tse-tung 's own a m s--
sion. China's 130 million youth
(aged 15-24) are a source of worry
to the Peking leaders, mostly be-
Page 2
cause the coming generation lacks
the revolutionary zeal that brought
the present leadership to power.
Even worse, a large part of the
young people apparently do not
support the regime. They were
prominent in the May 1962 exodus
of refugees from Kwangtung to
Hong Kong, and 10,000 of the 11,000
high school and college students
who vacationed in Hong Kong in
the summer of 1962 opted not to
return to China. Since then, the
Communists have held the number
of exit permits for students to a
few hundred per summer.
China's youth are probably
most dissatisfied because there
seems to be no future for them
on the mainland. Opportunities
for schooling are extremely lim-
ited. In one high school in Pe-
king, for example, only 20 per-
cent of the junior high school
students who wanted to could con-
tinue their schooling in 1965
and only about 30 percent of the
senior high school students who
so desired could go on to col-
lege. These proportions prob-
ably are much lower in other cit-
ies. Peking itself announced
in April 1963 that 100,000 of the
170,000 college and university
graduates of 1962 were required
to return to rural areas for em-
ployment.
For the young person whose
schooling has been terminated,
there are few job opportunities.
The regime has tried to accommo-
date them by moving many to re-
mote areas such as Sinkiang or
enrolling them in "half-work,
half-study" schools, from which
a career as a farmer or factory
worker is the most they can ex-
pect. The current stagnation in
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*40
SECRET
industrial activity precludes
any extensive recruitment of
youths by factories.
Such dim prospects engender
loss of faith in the regime's
wisdom and purpose, as well as
personal disappointment. Low-
ered standards of instruction
and the forced migration to rural
areas with their more primitive
educational facilities are crit-
icized
Im -
patience with political indoc-
trination is widespread. The re-
gime's attempted remedies, in-
cluding a revamping and expansion
of party-affiliated youth organi-
zations and increased indoctrina-
tion, appear to be ineffective.
There is no evidence either
of any recent general overt ex-
pression of dissatisfaction on
the part of young people, or that
they could express their dissatis-
faction without expecting sharp
reprisals from the government.
It is unlikely, however, that the
regime can spur them on to be
true "revolutionary successors."
The four million or more
professional people who make up
China's academic, artistic, and
managerial intelligentsia have
been a prime target of indoctrina-
tion since 1949, and they prob-
ably reciprocate the regime's
distrust of them. Their stand-
ing in China has varied from the
extreme low after the "100 flow-
ers" movement in 1957 to the rel-
ative high of the early 1960s
when the regime openly acknowl-
edged its need for them and told
them that their expertise, even
without "redness," would suffice.
This policy again began shifting
in 1964, and recent indications 25X1
are that political indoctrination
may again be intensified. In
June 1965, China's foremost rocket
expert, US-trained Chien Hsueh-
sen publicly apologized for hav-
ing belittled politics in the past
and recommended that scientists
study Mao's works more conscien-
tiously.
These people must find the
regime's erratic industrial and
economic policies frustrating.
They must also resent the time
"wasted" on political indoctrina-
tion and labor stints in the coun-
tryside. The close party super-
vision of their work, as well as
the constant suspicion with which
they are treated, have also been
sources of private complaints.
Since all top Chinese in-
tellectuals were either trained
in the West or had teachers
trained there, they, more than
any other segment of Chinese so-
ciety, appreciate the wealth and
power of the West and are able
to contrast this with China's
tremendously backward state. They
remain, however, very much China-
centered and furthermore tend to
credit the regime at least with
re-establishing China as a world
power.
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Some cadres have become Increasingly corrupt
and have trekked on a deviate path.... Some
cadres have lost their great revolutionary, tradi-
tional spirit.... This has become a very shame-
ful and serious problem. (Secret directive on **socialist
education" for cadres, issued by the party central
committee. November 1964)
Medium and lower level party
cadres are the officials who must
carry out the regime's policies
and as such are most often the di-
rect recipients of blame or praise
for failure or success from both
the people and the government.
Since late 1962, they have been
receiving particular attention in
political indoctrination from the
Chinese leadership.
Most conspicuous of the re-
gime's efforts has been the "four
clearance" phase of the socialist
education movement, which centers
on discovering cadres' errors and
misdeeds and which is to continue
until as late as 1972. Substan-
tial numbers of infractions by
local cadres have been found
(4,000 in one county in Kwang-
tung), involving embezzlement of
funds, misuse of official posi-
tion, promiscuity, and the like.
There have been several reported
instances of suicide by miscreant
cadres, indicating that at least
some have reached the breaking
point.
The confidence of working-
level party cadres in the rewards
of absolute party fidelity has
been gravely impaired by con-
tradictory domestic policies of
the regime as well as by their
own observation of peasant hard-
ships. During periods of eco-
nomic difficulties such as the
serious food shortages of the
winter of 1960-1961, reports were
received of cadres purposely
overlooking cases of theft of
food from the fields. The cadres
have increasingly tended to dis-
card the ascetic self-sacrifice
of earlier days in favor of naked
opportunism, which the current
socialist education movement is
meant to correct. Indications
are, however, that the movement
is counterproductive, and in fact
has impaired the morale and ef-
fectiveness of low-level offi-
cials.
The purification campaigns
so far have been aimed chiefly
at officials in factories and
collective farms. Since mid-
October, county-level officials
for the first time have been
made the target of a "socialist
education movement." People's
Daily has published several-e_7i'i-
or als criticizing county-level
leadership for being "out of bal-
ance" and demanding that it be
"revolutionized."
Cadres are probably more
cynical toward official propa-
ganda on all subjects than the
population generally. They are
for the most part, however, so
committed to the regime that
they would not seriously enter-
tain any ideas, or take any ac-
tions, significantly at variance
with the art lin
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Party influence permeates
all levels of the 2.5-million-
man armed forces. The senior
political and military leaders
are united by ties of comrade-
ship in a long revolutionary war.
Political commissars are assigned
to every command down to company
level. Although the troops are
conscripts, they are selected
for political reliability and re-
ceive constant political indoc-
trination.
1961 in reaction to ration cuts
and adverse news from home re-
gions, but the regime moved ef-
fectively to counter this reac-
tion by giving soldiers preferen-
tial treatment while simultan-
eously tightening discipline and
party control. Combat victories
during the Sino-Indian border
conflict in 1962 and China's nu-
clear testing in 1964 and 1965
also provided a psychological
lift. Military defectors are
rare.
Out look
Among the officer corps,
however, there appear to be per-
sistent frictions with the party.
The
abolition of military ranks on
1 June 1965 for the announced
purpose of strengthening "revo-
lutionary purity" of the People's
Liberation Army was followed by
an increase in indoctrination
aimed at officers above regimental
level. These measures could ad-
versely affect morale. Many mili-
tary officers probably believe
that party interference is exces-
sive and that the party is paying
too much attention to Mao's guer-
rilla war doctrines and not enough
to problems of modernization.
The over-all morale and dis-
cipline within the armed forces
is probably good, however. Morale
sagged in the lean years of 1959-
gime is relying on to counter
the negative attitudes and poor
morale in Chinese society are
The heavy political indoc-
trination campaigns that the re-
unlikely to have the desired ef-
fect. So long as the regime in-
sists on "politics over economics,"
emphasizes political and police
controls over material incentives,
and refuses to allow scope for
the development of personal in-
dividual goals for fear that this
will replace state-oriented goals,
'there will be popular disaffection.
And the present leaders of the
Chinese Communist regime show
no indication that they can es-
cape long enough from their ideo-
logical strait jacket to effect
significant changes in their ap-
proach.
Under these circumstances,
demands from the people for an
amelioration of their harsh
lives and for a relaxation of
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the insistent pressures for po-
litical conformity will increase.
These demands are unlikely in
the near future to lead to much
active resistance, for the mili-
tary and police controls are too
strong for this. But apathy,
work slowdowns, and passive re-
sistance to the regime's desires
will result.
Given the present leaders'
ossified views, an ascending
spiral of counterpressures may
result. As popular morale sinks
and negative attitudes grow, the
regime is likely to attempt even
greater political oppression.
This will bring in its wake more
disaffection. Such a cycle will
not follow a neat mathematical
progression: the current regime
has shown itself capable of tem-
porary periods of relaxation when
the weight of its programs has
proven too much for the people
to bear. The net result over the
years, however, has been for a
gradual increase in the -oppres-
sion.
While the present regime
seems unlikely to change even in
the face of increased public pas-
sive resistance, a new generation
of leaders may well adopt a more
pragmatic view. This, in fact,
is what happened in the Soviet
Union after Stalin's death. Al-
though a similar development will
not necessarily occur in Commu-
nist China, Mao Tse-tung himself
has made it clear on many occa-
sions that it is this adoption of
Soviet "revisionism" that he most
fears in those who are likely to
reilace the men now in power.
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