WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005100030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

26' November 1965
WEEKLY SUMMARY
.CENTRAL, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
:State Dept. review completed
~~~ ' ,Sr?j ECUI
AGENCY AFL : IVES SECRET 25X1
f~ { OR OUP I Excluded l afrom outornafic
down radin and declassification-
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SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of noon EST, 24 November 1965)
VIETNAM
Heavy fighting in western Pleiku Province continued
during the past week, and the intensity of Viet Cong
actions increased markedly throughout South Vietnam.
Hanoi, in a recent attempt to bolster Viet Cong morale,
gave red-carpet treatment to a visiting "liberation
army" delegation. Still trying to appear reasonable
on peace talks despite its adamant public statements
on the issue, Hanoi also received another delegation
from a non-Communist country (Italy) which came to
discuss an end to the fighting. Moscow's statements
in support of the Vietnamese Communists continue to
avoid mention of a negotiated settlement.
Page
1
PLANS FOR THE SOVIET OIL INDUSTRY IN 3966
The USSR plans its largest jump ever in crude oil produc-
tion and is likely to meet the goal. It may have future
distribution problems, however, because scarce pipeline
resources are being diverted to natural gas. -
SOVIET-JAPANESE TALKS ON TRADE AND CIVIL AIR ROUTES
The trade talks will cover the most extensive agreement
to date, a five-year pact for the period 1966-70, but
are not expected to bring any sharp increase in trade.
The air negotiations center on Tokyo-Moscow service and
the difficult issue of Japanese rights over Siberia.
tOOF AND MOUTH DISEASE IN THE USSR
Moscow is maintaining official silence on the extent
of the outbreak, but measures are being taken over a
wide area to control this highly contagious disease.
SECRET
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PROGRESS OF THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC REFORM 12
In the four months since its introduction, the reform
has improved price relationships, halted excessive in-
vestment spending, and reduced the strain on the balance
of payments. Temporarily, however, it has slowed the
industrial growth rate and lowered living standards.
BULGARIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS BECOMING MORE FLEXIBLE 13
In recent weeks Sofia has made political and economic
overtures to the West that appear to reflect a basic
reappraisal by the regime--apparently emulating Ruma-
nia and Yugoslavia--of how its national interests can
best be served.
Asia-Africa
SINGAPORE PLANS TO RESUME TRADE WITH INDONESIA
Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman considers the plan a
security threat and says he will use force to stop it.
SUDANESE COMMUNIST PARTY OUTLAWED
A constitutional amendment passed this week will force
the Communists underground, but they will probably re-
tain a sizable influence among labor, students, and
professionals .
GUINEAN "PLOT" CRISIS DEVELOPING
President Toure, reacting to alleged plotting against
his regime, has broken diplomatic ties with France and
has shaken up his government. The crisis, moreover,
does not yet appear to have reached its climax.
TSHOMBE'S CONGOLESE OPPONENTS INCREASE THEIR PRESSURE 17
President Kasavubu and his allies are stepping up their
campaign to destroy the ousted premier as a political
force in the Congo.
RHODESIA'S REBEL REGIME IN FULL CONTROL 17
International pressures are mounting, however, and there
have been disturbances by local Africans and some white
opposition to independence.
SECRET
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SECRET VAW
SPECIAL NATO COMMI'17EE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR SHARING PROBLEMS 20
Defense ministers from ten of the fifteen alliance coun-
tries will consider three main problem areas, especially
that relating to improvement and extension of allied
participation in nuclear planning.
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND FRENCH POLITICS
The near certainty of De Gaulle's victory leaves little
beyond the size of his majority to speculate about.
Only widespread voter abstention will keep him from
the "massive endorsement" he has asked for. A less-
than-wholesale endorsement is unlikely, in any case,
to affect his basic policies, except possibly to make
him more cautious in implementing them. Such an out-
come, however, might breathe new life into the lack-
luster opposition. (Published separately as Special
SWEDISH RULING PARTY MOVING LEFTWARD IN FOREIGN POLICY
Prime Minister Erlander's dominant Social Democratic
Party, under pressure from a strident left-wing minor-
ity, is pursuing a more active foreign policy and ap-
pears to be moving to the left on several controversial
issues.
Western Hemisphere
RIGHTIST DOMINICAN UPRISING FAILS
At midweek there were indications that President Garcia
Godoy was trying to "balance" the failure of the right-
ist conspiracy by finally acting against leftists in
the government.
HAVANA TO HOST TR I -CONTINENT CONFERENCE IN JANUARY
Although the meeting has a standard Communist-influenced
"revolutionary" agenda, and could well become another
Sino-Soviet battleground, Castro sees it as a major ef-
fort to demonstrate that the Cuban regime is not isolated
from the world.
SECRET
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CHILEAN COPPER STRIKE
The month-old strike is basically a contest between the
Communists and Socialists, who want full nationalization
of the copper mines, and President Frei, who considers
his more moderate halfway approach to nationalization
the keystone of his reform and development program.
URUGULYAM LABOR UNREST
Despite a government employees' walkout and the threat
of a Communist-instigated general strike, the govern-
ment is standing firm on its wage stabilization program.
United Nations
COMMUNIST CHINA MAKES GA INS TOWARD ADMISSION TO UN
Peking's supporters did not muster the required two-
thirds majority in this year's vote, but its opponents
failed for the first time to get a plurality. Peking
has hailed the outcome as a vindication of its obdurate
stand, which the Chinese Communists apparently believe
will gain them membership eventually on their own terms.
SEC', E'
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SECRET
Military activity in South
Vietnam during the week ending on
24 November was highlighted by
continued heavy fighting between
allied troops and Communist forces
in western Pleiku Province, and
by a marked increase in the in-
tensity of Viet Cong actions
throughout the country.
Communist losses between 13
and 20 November--totaling 2,262
killed and more than 1,100 weapons
lost--were higher than for any
other week of the war. Allied
casualties of nearly 2,000 killed,
wounded, or missing also reflected
the severity of recent combat.
Heavy fighting several miles
west of the Plei Me Special Forces
camp abated at least temporarily
after a sharp encounter between
Vietnamese airborne units and
Communist forces on 20 November.
However, nearly 7,000 allied
troops are continuing their sweep,
and further clashes with probably
three North Vietnamese regiments
remaining in the operational area
seem likely. By 23 November, en-
emy losses during the ten days of
fighting in this area totaled more
than 1,500 killed.
In Quang Ngai and Binh Doung
provinces regimental-size attacks
were successfully beaten off by
government troops. However, a
series of actions initiated by
another enemy regiment in the
coastal province of Phu Yen was
still in progress as of 24 Novem-
ber. Other Viet Cong forces in-
flicted moderate damage on air-
fields at Soc Trang and Tan Hiep
in the delta region south of
Saigon and attacked govern-
ment outposts in Chau Doc, Gia
Dinh, and Quang Nga.i provinces.
Heavy sabotage activity noted
along Route 13 and its tributary
roads north of Saigon was proba-
bly designed to impede allied
forces operating in Binh Duong
Province.
Moral Support for Viet Cong
Hanoi underscored its sup-
port for the Viet Cong this week
by giving red-carpet treatment
to the visiting South Vietnam
"liberation army" delegation of
military heroes. They were re-
ceived by Ho Chi Minh and feted
by almost the entire DRV leader-
ship at one ceremony after an-
other. The extensive publicity
surrounding the delegation's visit
suggests that Hanoi is using it
to demonstrate its faith in the
military capability of the Viet
Cong, and to strengthen the in-
surgents' determination to con-
tinue the war.
DRV propaganda. also played
up the 25th anniversary of an
obscure uprising against the
French to demonstrate the tradi-
ftiona.l revolutionary character
of the South Vietnamese people.
A special editorial in the 23
November party daily claimed that
this event exemplified a determi-
nation on the part of the Viet-
namese that would enable them to
fight until the US was defeated.
Propaganda on Negotiations
Hanoi's propaganda on nego-
tiating a settlement remained
SECRET
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SECRET
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adamant this week. Ho Chi Minh
restated the DRV I.,osition in an
open letter to American Nobel
Peace Prize winner Linus Pauling
on 17 November. Ho called for
US recognition of Hanoi's four
points. In a continuing effort
to appear reasonable, however,
the regime continues to host
non-Communist delegations which
come to Hanoi to discuss an end
to the fighting. The ex-mayor
of Florence, Georgio La lira,
has just returned from talks
with the North Vietnamese leaders.
They probably told him, as they
have others in the past, that
the US must stop the bombings in
the North and declare a unilateral
cease-fire in the South.
Moscow's statements in re-
cent weeks have not gone beyond
standard condemnations of US
actions in Vietnam and continue
to avoid any mention of a nego-
tiated settlement. This suggests
that Moscow is apparently re-
signed to a prolonged struggle
in Vietnam and remains determined
to avoid open divergence from
Hanoi's stand.
Four more surface-to-air
missile sites were discovered
in North Vietnam this past week,
bringing the total. number of sites
to 49. Three of the sites are
located in the Haiphong area,
bringing to ten the number of
sites defending this vital port
city. The other site is about
27 miles northeast of Thanh Hoa.
Moscow vs. Peking on Vietnam
Although the USSR also con-
tinues its policy of restraint
toward answering Chinese attacks
against Soviet policy in Vietnam,
it has apparently decided to re-
ply indirectly to Peking's 11
November indictment of US-Soviet
collusion over Vietnam. A 20
US aircraft attacked two
sites northwest of Hanoi on 22
November. Pilots reported that
a radar van was destroyed and
other SAM-associated equipment
possibly damaged at one. Two
secondary explosions were ob-
served at the other.
SECRET
November article in the East
German newspaper Neues Deutsch-
land, openly critical o Pte; ng's
anti-Soviet tactics with regard
to the Vietnamese conflict, is
aimed at convincing Communist
audiences that Peking's opposi-
tion to coordinated Communist
bloc support for Hanoi is
creating serious difficulties
for the DRV in its prosecution
of the war. TASS promptly
replayed portions of the article
which cited Chinese obstruction
of Soviet military aid to the
DRV as evidence that Peking is
"putting ideological differences
above the struggle against im-
perialism."
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South Vietnamese Politics
At a press conference last
week, Saigon student union lead-
ers called for an end to the Ky
government, criticizing its per-
formance and lack of popular sup-
port. Student representatives
from Dalat also reportedly at-
tacked the government at the con-
ference. Student groups from
the Hue area, which have been
openly hostile to the government
since August, were not represented.
There has been no noticeable pub-
lic reaction to the conference,
and US Embassy officials doubt
whether the conference spokesmen
have muchinfluence within Saigon
student circles.
Members of the ruling mili-
tary Directorate are again con-
sidering the eventual formation
of a senate body representing
the various ethnic and religious
groups in South Vietnam. The
Directorate shelved such a plan
about a month ago, after an ex-
perimental conference of provin-
cial council representatives pro-
duced more bickering than agree-
ment.
CIRET
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PLANS FOR THE SOVIET OIL INDUSTRY IN 1966
The increase planned by the
USSR for the production of crude
oil in 1966 is the largest ever.
The minister of the oil-extrac-
tion industry recently stated
that crude oil production next
year is set at 264 million metric
tons, a rise of 21 million over
the expected 1965 output. Pre-
viously, the largest planned in-
crease had been 19 million metric
tons in 1962.
As in the past, the bulk of
the crude oil produced in 1966
will come from the Urals-Volga
oil fields. The new fields in
West Siberia and on the Mangy-
shlak Peninsula in Kazakhstan
are still in the early stages of
development and will produce only
relatively small quantities. How-
ever, the USSR has historically
been able to meet its crude oil
output targets, and the 1966
goal seems to be within its capa-
bilities. Looking further ahead,
Soviet officials have estimated
that 1970 crude oil production
goals will range between 350 and
SECRET
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1411111001 SECRET NIIIIIIIIII
USSR: Major Crude Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines
PIPELINES
In Use
Under Construction
Planned
Sevastopol'
Ventspilst
1 Leningrad
1
Minsk~Polotsk 11
,
Novorossiysk ,Rostov
ow_
Tikh t k
ore s
.....
Tuapse ? Volgograd
Stavropol'
1 .
1 ?Vologda
\MOSCOW
Bet usovo?
I November 1965
Natural Gas
PRODUCING AREAS
Established
Major New Finds
? Ryazan' I
Gor'kiy
Voronezh
MANGYSHLAK
9 FNINSULA
O Kungrad'Nukus
0
Polunochnoye.
gPerm'
AI met'yevsk
.tr
Kuybyshev
URALS-VOLGA Tyumen!
Tobol'sk
~~Chelyabinsk
,Bukhara
Samarkand
Omsk
.Frunze. Alma-Ata
S'ECRE'T
Novyy Port
Tazovskoye'
WEST SIBERIA
nt Mansiysk
Sur6
Krasnoyarsk
Novosibirsk
To Angarsk
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370 million tons. If the 8.6-per-
cent rate of increase planned for
1966 is maintained, the larger 1970
figure appears altogether possible.
The bulk of the additional
output probably will be used to
meet growing domestic demands and
the needs of the Eastern European
satellites, which are becoming in-
creasingly dependent on the USSR
as their main supplier of crude
oil. As a result, no dramatic up-
surge in Soviet oil sales to non-
Communist countries is likely in
1966. Such sales, however, prob-
ably will increase at about the
same rate--10-11 percent--as is es-
timated for this year over 1964.
The 1966 plan continues the
trend noted previously during the
seven-year plan (1959-65), in which
priority in pipeline resources was
given largely to the natural gas
industry. Gas pipeline construc-
tion averaged about 4,000 kilom-
eters annually during this period
compared to about 2,000 annually
for oil pipelines. In 1966, con-
struction of only 1,400 kilometers
of oil pipeline is planned, the
smallest increment scheduled in
recent years. The construction of
oil pipelines at the end of the
seven-year period will be only
about half the planned goal of
28,600 kilometers.
The lag in oil pipeline con-
struction has not yet caused dif-
ficulties in the distribution of
crude oil or petroleum products.
Problems are likely in the near
future, however, unless construc-
tion is accelerated.
SOVIET-JAPANESE TALKS ON TRADE AND CIVIL AIR ROUTES
The USSR and Japan will open
talks in Tokyo soon on their most
extensive trade agreement to date,
a five-year pact covering the pe-
riod 1966 through 1970. Both are
approaching these negotiations in
a cautious mood. It appears un-
likely that the USSR, for whom Japan
already is an important trade part-
ner, will increase exchanges sharply
in the near future.
In recent years there have
been continued Soviet and Japanese
expressions of interest in expand-
ing trade, including occasional
talk of Japanese participation in
developing the resources of Siberia,
but trade growth, while steady, has
not been spectacular. During the
last five years, Soviet-Japanese
commerce has increased from $150
million to $410 million. Any
dramatic expansion of trade will
continue to be inhibited by a num-
ber of factors. These include
Tokyo's fears of overdependence
and its commitments to its other
suppliers. Other factors are stra-
tegic trade controls, competition
of other free world countries, and
the USSR's own desire for balanced
trade.
So far in 1965, trade is at
about the same level as last year.
As in past years, the goods ex-
changed consist mainly of Soviet
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crude oil, petroleum products,
pig iron, and lumber, and Japa-
nese industrialgoods such as mer-
chant ships, machinery, and com-
plete industrial plants.
Soviet-Japanese talks on
civil air routes, which have been
held on and off for several years,
have already reopened in Tokyo.
These talks have centered on To-
kyo-Moscow air service and Japa-
nese rights over Siberia,a point
over which negotiations broke down
last year. The Japanese have re-
portedly accepted a temporary ar-
rangement using Soviet aircraft
and crews over Siberia as long as
a future agreement allows for
full Japanese flight rights.
Negotiations on these matters are
still under way.
HOOF AND MOUTH DISEASE IN THE USSR
An outbreak of hoof and
mouth disease, perhaps of epidemic
proportions, has occurred in the
USSR.
Moscow has maintained offi-
cial silence as to the extent of
the outbreak, but measures are
being taken over a wide area to
control and prevent the spread
of this highly contagious disease.
in 1966. In addition, measures
to control the spread of the
disease may disrupt normal market-
ing of animal products in the
coming months.
Principal area of
livestock production
? Location of reported
control activity
control stations, some
manned by military personnel, in
the RSFSR and Ukraine as far west
as Minsk, almost as far north as
Leningrad, and south to the Cau-
casus. It is not known how far
east the disease has spread.
On many main roads, passen-
gers in cars and buses must get
out to disinfect their shoes,
vehicle tires are washed, and
trunks are inspected.
Although mortality rates
of animals infected with hoof
and mouth disease are normally
low, reduced productivity could
lower meat and milk production
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y.u
S
FINLAND -
lenlegrad?
Chudava
POLAND 7
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RUMANIA ~iikoloy?v
4
SPA
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Four months after its intro-
duction, the Yugoslav economic
reform appears to be progressing
satisfactorily, although not
without widespread complaints
and a dampening effect on eco-
nomic development. The reform
and preceding stabilization meas-
ures have improved price rela-
tionships, halted excessive in-
vestment spending, and reduced
the strain on the balance of pay-
ments. Temporarily, however,
they have slowed the rate of in-
dustrial growth and depressed
living standards.
To bring Yugoslav prices
more into line with the world
market, the regime has permitted
substantial increases for agri-
culture, mining, transportation,
and other services while allow-
ing only moderate rises for manu-
facturing industries. The new
price relationships are having
the intended effect of putting
great pressure on manufacturing
plants to produce more efficiently.
The regime shows little inclina-
tion so far to provide subsidies
or easy credit for enterprises
in financial difficulty.
Real wages of workers in
manufacturing have been hard hit
by the efforts to improve the
economic position of agriculture,
basic industries, and services.
Large increases in agricultural
producers' prices have led-to
much higher retail prices for
food, which most manufacturing
enterprises have been unable to
compensate for fully through
wage increases. Most urban fam-
ilies also must now pay much
higher prices for utilities,
transportation, and other serv-
ices.. Domestic sales of in-
dustrial consumer goods have
been hampered both by the lag in
consumer incomes and by the di-
version of supplies to the ex-
port market. Although the re-
form had the initial effect of
boosting the cost of living at
least one fourth, there apparently
has been little further increase
since August.
Devaluation of the dinar
from 750 to 1,250 to the dollar
and continued state control over
some imports have improved Yugo-
slavia's balance of payments.
Exports so far this year are 20
percent higher than during the
same period in 1964, while im-
ports are down 5 percent. Pres-
sure on the balance of payments
also has been eased by the agree-
ment of some Western countries
to postpone due dates for Yugo-
slav repayments on earlier credit-s
and by a standby credit of $80
million from the International
Monetary Fund. Foreign exchange
reserves, according to a recent
Tito speech, are at the highest
level since the war. However,
they are still inadequate to per-
mit much relaxation of state con-
trol over foreign trade and a
renewed rapid growth of imports.
The long-term success of the
reform is by no means assured as
yet. Much will depend on re-
straint in setting economic goals,
in making credit available for
investment, and in rescuing inef-
ficient enterprises from the con-
sequences of the reform.
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Nor,
SECRET
In a new and--for Bulgaria--
surprising display of political
flexibility, Sofia in recent
weeks has made a series of po-
litical and economic overtures to
the West which appear to reflect
a basic reappraisal by the regime
of how its national interests can
best be served.
Sofia recently made its first
request to the UN for technical
aid, with an expressed preference
for US technicians. This ini-
tiative closely follows Sofia's
proposal to send a construction
delegation to the US, its request
for a US delegation of electric-
power specialists, and the conclu-
sion of a consular agreement with
Washington. Bulgaria also has
stepped up its campaign for better
economic and cultural ties with
Western Europe and its non-Commu-
nist Balkan neighbors since early
last summer. In addition, party
chief Zhivkov is currently making
official visits to the Middle East
and Africa.
These developments follow
official visits to Sofia last Sep-
tember by Yugoslav President Tito
and Rumanian party chief Ceausescu
as well as Zhivkov's visit to Mos-
cow last month. It seems likely
that he received encouragement
at these meetings to go ahead
with his new foreign policy in-
itiatives.
Zhivkov evidently has con-
cluded from observing his Yugo-
slav and Rumanian neighbors that
he can safely and profitably ex-
pand contacts with the West as
well as with other non-Communist
areas without basically altering
his dependent relationship with
Moscow. Never a dynamic or
imaginative leader, Zhivkov pre-
sumably hopes to satisfy both po-
litical wings in his party by in-
dicating to nationalist party mem-
bers a new maneuverability in
foreign relations, and to con-
servative elements that this is
possible without breaking the
traditional and comfortable de-
pendency on Moscow.
As a consequence of last
April's abortive conspiracy against
his regime, Zhivkov and Moscow
must have concluded that Bulgaria's
image as an appendage of the So-
viet Union had become unaccept-
able to significant numbers of
party members. His new overtures
to the non-Communist world will
serve to mollify this element,
but will probably elicit renewed
opposition from the p art Stalin-
ists. 25X1
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Singapore's planned resump-
tion of barter trade with Indo-
nesia on 1 December may seriously
exacerbate relations with Malay-
sia.
Malaysia broke off barter
trade with Indonesia in August
1964 as a security measure
against increasing Indonesian
infiltration efforts against
Singapore. Since Singapore's
separation from Malaysia last
August, however, Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew has been under strong
pressure from business and labor
groups to resume the once lucra-
tive trade.
Preparations have now been
made to route the renewed Singa-
pore trade through an island
some 13 miles from Singapore
harbor. British officials in
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Singapore and Malaysia feel that
such a controlled resumption of
trade would pose little threat
to security. Malaysian Prime
Minister Rahman, who is deeply
antagonistic toward Lee, and
other leaders in Kuala Lumpur
nevertheless consider the plan
a security threat. They also ap-
pear convinced that Lee is mak-
ing a calculated effort to pro-
voke the Malaysian Government.
The Constituent Assembly in
Khartoum has passed a constitu-
tional amendment declaring Com-
munist associations unlawful and
authorizing the assembly to en-
act the necessary legislation to
effect the amendment.
The assembly's action came
after more than a week of pro-
and anti-Communist agitation in
Khartoum, which included wide-
spread rioting. The strongly
conservative Muslim Brotherhood
became aroused last week when a
Communist student declared pub-
licly that God was a fallacy and
went on to make derogatory re-
marks about the prophet Muhammad
and his wife. Thousands of anti-
Communists stormed Communist cen-
ters, and the Communists were
forced to request police protec-
tion. Over the weekend, however,
the Communists marshaled their
SECRET
own 'followers and provoked vio-
lent street demonstrations.
The amendment was passed
on 22 November by an overwhelm-
ing majority.
25X1
25X1
be forced to go underground, but
will probably be able to retain
their extensive influence in
trade unions and student and pro-
fessional groups and will con-
tinue to agitate against the
conservative regime. The Com-
munists will probably also con-
tinue to manipulate the leftist
and pro-Egyptian people's Demo-
cratic Party and the leftist
"Democratic Socialist Alliance."
25X1
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Guinean President Tourd,
reacting to alleged plotting
against his regime, has broken
diplomatic ties with France and
has shaken up his government.
The crisis, moreover, does not
yet appear to have reached its
climax.
The government announced on
10 November that it had crushed
a coup attempt and planned to
take severe measures against
those behind it. On 15 November,
two French cabinet ministers and
several moderate African leaders
--most notably Ivory Coast Pres-
ident Houphouet-Boigny--were named
as instigators of the plot.
Paris maintains that the
charges are absurd, and the ac-
cused African leaders have is-
sued statements to the effect
that Tourd's troubles are really
due to his own mismanagement of
Guinea's affairs. Both Guinea
and Ivory Coast have called for
adjudication by the Organization
of African Unity.
Discontent has been wide-
spread in Guinea for over a year
because of economic decline and
the regime's harsh measures to
control speculation. Tourd may
be using the plot charges to un-
dercut substantial high-level op-
position within Guinea's single
political party and the cabinet.
Tourd may also be trying to
revive Guinea's standing in West
Africa by encouraging opposition
elements elsewhere who resent
continuing French influence.
It is this aspect of the matter
which places him in direct con-
frontation with moderate Houphouet-
Boigny. Rivalry between the two
presidents has been particularly
acute since the Ivory Coast leader
early this year organized the
African and Malagasy Common Or-
ganization, which Tourd views as
a threat to real African unity.
On 20 November, Conakry an-
nounced extensive shifts in high-
level government personnel. The
most important of these was the
transfer of Minister of Defense
and Security Fodeba Keita to
the Ministry of Rural Economy.
At the same time, the gendarmerie
was separated from the Ministry
of Defense and placed under
direct presidential control.
Tourd apparently was displeased
with Keita's lack of enthusiasm
in ferreting out plotters.
Most of the Guineans impli-
cated so far are relatively unim-
portant or already discredited.
However, Tourd has said that two
other groups, presumably more in-
fluential, are under investiga-
tion. Conakry radio has been
giving heavy play to the "confes-
sion" of a high Ivory Coast of-
ficial--now in custody in Guinea
--and demands for execution of
the traitors are increasing.
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NWV SECRET`
'iSHOMBE'S CONGOLESE OPPONENTS INCREASE THEIR PRESSURE
President Kasavubu and his
allies are stepping ui. their cam-
paign to destroy ousted premier
Tshombd as a political force in
the Congo.
In the week and a half since
Tshombd engineered the parlia-
mentary defeat of Evariste Kimba's
proposed government, the anti-
Tshombd forces have turned to
extraparliamentary methods to un-
dercut the former premier in Leo-
poldville. Newspapers
support-
ing
Tshombd"have been
harassed,
and
strong man Victor
Nendaka's
goon
squads have been
intimidat-
ing
pro-Tshombd parliamentarians.
Nendaka and some of the
other top leaders apparently
would like to arrest Tshombd,
ar, however, they
have eeo stymied by the reluct-
ance of army chief Mobutu.
Tshombd lacks resources in
Leopoldville to counter this
kind of activity, and he appears
nervous and on the defensive. The
mercenaries are on the other side
of the country, and Nendaka was
able to thwart an effort by
Tshombd's Belgian advisers to
bring a few of them to Leopold-
ville as a bodyguard. At the
same time, Tshombd's assets--his
popular appeal and his wealth--
are essentially unimpaired. On
the other hand the popularity of
Kasavubu and Nendaka has nose-
dived as their preoccupation with
the Tshombd vendetta has led them
to neglect all normal government
activity.
In this confrontation Mobutu's
position is crucial. He distrusts
Tshombd profoundly, but his nat-
ural inclination toward the other
camp is tempered by disgust at
Kasavubu's inactivity and concern
over Nendaka's ambition. He is
meeting late this week with his
principal subordinates in the
.army. Although he is reluctant
to intervene openly in politics, 25X1
some kind of move on his part is
a possibility after the meeting.
The rebel regime in Rhodesia
remains in full control, despite
disturbances by-some local Af-
ricans, some white opposition to
unilateral independence, and
mounting international pressure.
As of noon EST on 24 Novem-
ber, Rhodesian African response
to the declaration of independ-
ence has been relatively limited,
particularly in the rural areas.
Attempts by the Africans to or-
ganize general strikes in Salis-
bury and the industrial city of
Bulawayo have failed, although
In some instances workers report-
edly require police escorts to
protect them from intimidation
by nationalist firebrands. In-
cidents are increasing in Bulawayo,
however, and one African was
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 I
NIGERIA
SANTA CAMEROON
ISABEL *YAOUNDE
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SECRET
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W
SECRET
killed there this week when po-
lice fired into a demonstrating
crowd.
There is opposition to Prime
Minister Smith among high church
officials, university professors
and students, moderate African
parliamentarians,and, reportedly,
senior civil servants and mili-
tary officers. Nevertheless,
most foreign officials remaining
in Salisbury believe that Smith
retains the support of the major-
ity of white Rhodesians, but that
his position could become shaky
as economic sanctions take effect.
The UN Security Council has
adopted a compromise resolution
calling for economic measures
against Rhodesia, including an
oil boycott. The boycott would
probably be unenforceable, how-
ever, because oil from certain
small international companies, or
from producers in Angola, might
be smuggled to ports in Portuguese
Mozambique. In any case, oil is a
distant third to coal and water-
generated electricity as a source
of power in Rhodesia.
South African and Portuguese
officials apparently are attempt-
ing to determine the extent of
economic support they might of-
fer Rhodesia, but no clear picture
has emerged
rime Minister Verwoerd
will not risk assistance which
could bring UN sanctions against
South Africa too. The US Embassy
believes that this view may be
too sanguine, in view of wide-
spread popular support in South
Africa for the white Rhodesians.
The South African National
Bank already has given permission
for the resumption of preinde-
pendence financial and trade
transactions with Rhodesia.F_
25X1
25X1
African states, frustrated
by Britain's unwillingness to
use force against Rhodesia, are
looking toward the Organization
of African Unity to bring re-
sults. There is speculation that
the OAU foreign ministers will
soon meet to consider how to im-
plement last month's heads-of-
state resolution calling on OAU
members to use all means, includ-
ing force, against the unilateral
declaration of independence if
it is not thwarted by Britain.
The ministers probably will try
to put additional pressure on the
UK and will plan action of their
own in case this fails.
Zambia's moderate President
Kaunda is under increasing pres-
sure from cabinet militants who
believe that by provoking Rhode-
sian reprisals against the highly
vulnerable Zambian economy they
can force Britain to intervene.
When the cabinet was consider-
ing a total trade boycott against
Rhodesia, Kaunda made a public 25X1
appeal for British troops to
secure the Kariba power station
on the Rhodesian side of the
border. A promise of contingent
military support from Tanzania,
Kenya, and Uganda was also ap-
parently intended to induce Lon-
don to send troops.
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SECRET
for the Smith regime.
own political party may force
him to take action if the Smith
regime shows great staying power.
Zambian animosities could also
be aroused if racial incidents
occur in the Zambian copper belt,
where a majority of the skilled
workers are white Rhodesians,
many of whom are showing sympathy
SPECIAL NATO COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR SHARING PROBLEMS
The NATO special committee
of defense ministers which meets
in Paris on 27 November will
bring together, under secretary
General Brosio's chairmanship,
ten of the 15 members of the al-
liance. An eleventh member--
Norway--has said it may join
the committee later. France,
Portugal, Luxembourg, and Ice-
land have indicated that they
have no intention of participat-
ing.
Defense Secretary McNamara
is expected to initiate discus-
sion of three main areas of the
nuclear-sharing problem facing
NATO: improvement of communica-
tions and exchange of intelli-
gence among alliance members,
provision for adequate and prompt
consultation on decisions to use
nuclear weapons, and improvement
and extension of allied partici-
pation in nuclear planning. Pro-
visions have been made for
follow-up work to be done by
three working groups, expected
to report to the next special
committee meeting tentatively
scheduled for February or March.
An interim procedural report
of the November meeting will be
made to the regular NATO minis-
terial meeting in December.
Indications are that in-
terest will focus on the third,
or nuclear planning, working
group, which the US is deter-
mined to hold to at most five
members (US, UK, Italy, West
Germany, and perhaps a small-
country representative). The
recommendations of such a group
could include creation of a
small standing group for NATO
nuclear affairs.
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25X1
25X1
25X1
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The Social Democratic Party,
which has dominated the Swedish
political scene for more than 30
years, faces pressures which could
divide the party and which already
show signs of forcing changes in
foreign policies. The problem
is essentially a conflict between
the moderate and pragmatic--but
aging--leadership headed by Prime
Minister Erlander, and the party's
generally more youthful left wing.
Although still only a strident
minority, the left wing appears
to have gained influence during
recent months.
On domestic problems there
appears to be no basic conflict,
perhaps because the Social Demo-
crats have provided one of the
most comprehensive programs of
social welfare yet devised, and
have led labor and capital into
a cooperation that has given
Sweden both stability and the
highest living standard in Europe.
The left wing therefore has turned
increasingly to foreign policy
issues to engage its interest and
idealism. Basic to its approach
is its insistence that Sweden
abandon the essentially passive
foreign policy of past decades
and become more actively involved
internationally.
The US involvement in Viet-
nam has provided a ready-made is-
sue for the left wing, which is
basically unsympathetic toward
the US in any case. Last summer,
acting Foreign Minister Palme,
widely regarded as Erlander's
probable successor and perhaps
the leading spokesman for the
left, suggested in a speech that
the US was supporting reactionary
forces that were suppressing de-
mands for social justice. Under
pressure to clarify the govern-
ment's position, both Erlander
and Foreign Minister Nilsson in-
dicated that they supported
Palme's statement.
This stand on Vietnam, as
well as recent feelers put out
by Stockholm relating to a
Nordic defense alliance, indi-
cates that the party leadership
has decided to appease the radi-
cals by moving left on foreign
policy issues.
Such a shift may preserve
the loyalty of many who are at-
tracted by the refurbished Swed-
ish Communist Party under its
new leader, Carl Hermansson. The
Social Democrats probably see
this as the major threat at the
moment, particularly in view of
the Communists' success in pro-
jecting their image as a "na-
tional" party independent of Moscow.
In assessing the prospects
for his party, Erlander must find
particularly troubling the fate
suffered by his Norwegian col-
league, Einar Gerhardsen, whose
long-established Labor government
was defeated in elections this
fall. Gerhardsen, too, faced
pressures from the left and right
in his party. He temporized and,
as a result, Labor lost votes to
the "national" Communists as well
as to the nonsocialist parties.
r 30 E CRET
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Now SECRET W
Western Hemisphere
A right-wing effort to es-
tablish a rival government to
the Garcia Godoy regime quickly
failed on 22 November as the
Dominican armed forces remained
loyal and firm US backing of'the
government discouraged many po-
tential participants. The plan
called for seizure of vital in-
stallations throughout the coun-
try, but the uprising was local-
ized in Santiago. Conspirators
established roadblocks around
that interior city and announced
they had formed a "Revolutionary
Democratic Government" headed
by a relatively minor conserva-
tive politician, Tomas Alcibiades
Espinosa. Police and troops
quickly dispersed peasants man-
ning the barricades and arrested
Espinosa and other leaders of
the revolt.
The dispatch
of 60 US troops to Santiago on
21 November at the request of
Garcia Godoy strengthened the
resolve of local military com-
manders to oppose the rebels and
convinced many civilian plotters
that the scheme was bound to fail.
The rapid collapse of the
uprising will weaken the right
but probably not end plotting com-
pletely.
many other conservatives
will probably not be satisfied
as long as any liberal govern-
ment is in power. The collapse
of this attempt, however, will
probably halt rightist terrorism
at least temporarily.
25X1
25X1
The military emerged relative-
ly undamaged because officers
involved in the plotting backed
out at the last moment. Defense
Minister Rivera's strong sup-
port for the President, despite
his concern over some of the
regime's policies, will probably
further increase Garcia Godoy's
developing confidence in him.
Nevertheless, the President has
voiced considerable suspicion
over the loyalty of other officers,
particularly army chief Martinez,
and still wants to make some 25X1
changes in the military leadership.
At midweek there were indica-
tions Garcia Godoy was trying to
"balance" the failure of the right-
ist conspiracy by finally acting
against leftists in his government.
He removed Attorney General Morel 25X1
Cerda and replaced him with a moder-
ate, Gustavo Gomez Ceara. 25X1
25X1
Such moves would go far _25X1
toward reassuring moderates and con-
servatives, such as Joaquin Balaguer
that the provisional government, 25X1
policies.
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SECRET
Fidel Castro personally at- I The conference will become
taches great importance to a con- another Sino-Soviet battleground
Terence sponsored by the Commu-
nist-influenced Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)
which is scheduled to meet in
Havana from 3 to 10 January. The
conference is a major effort to
demonstrate particularly to Wash-
ington that the Cuban regime is
not isolated from the world.
This will be the first time
that Latin American representa-
tives have joined AAPSO delibera-
tions as accredited delegates.
Unofficial delegations will at-
tend from 100 countries, includ-
ing the Soviet Union and perhaps
Communist China. The agenda,
agreed on at a preparatory meet-
ing in Cairo in September, indi-
cates that the session will be
devoted to attacks on "imperialism,
colonialism, and neocolonialism,"
demands for greater economic
rights for underdeveloped coun-
tries, and calls for intensifi-
cation of "all forms" of the rev-
olutionary struggles of the
peoples of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America.
unless Peking decides to boycott
the meeting. As yet, the Chinese
have given no indication they are
prepared to do this. China, how-
ever, is probably unenthusiastic,
and whether it attends or not may
ultimately depend on how many
Chinese-oriented delegations ob-
tain invitations. Official in-
vitations will be issued by the
Cubans--and most will probably
go to Moscow-oriented organiza-
tions in cases of conflicting
claims between pro-Moscow and
pro-Peking groups. A column in
Pravcda T 14 November clearly in-
ca ed that Moscow looks to the
Havana conference to consolidate
gains made at Peking's expense at
the abortive Bandung II meeting
in Algiers.
The conference probably will
he used by Havana to discuss hem-
isphere strategy and tactics with
representatives of Latin American
and other leftist-extremist groups.
The Cubans probably will also take
the opportunity afforded by the
conference to pledge additional
material assistance to selected
African insurgent groups.
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SECRET
CHILEAN COPPER STRIKE
A month-old copper strike in
Chile is continuing in spite of a
lack of sympathy in labor circles
for the illegal and politically
motivated walkout. The government
has arrested Communist and Social-
ist leaders of the copper confed-
eration and asked the confedera-
tion's Christian Democratic mem-
bers to return to their jobs, but
has made no move to take over the
mines temporarily as suggested by
some administration officials.
The strike is basically a
test of strength between Communist
and Socialist advocates of complete
copper nationalization and support-
ers of a copper bill which would
allow the government to purchase
a half interest in copper companies
owned by US and other private com-
panies. President Frei considers
this legislation the keystone of
his reform and economic develop-
ment program and is determined to
see it enacted.
25X1
25X1
ing out actively against the gov-
ernment, the Socialists apparently
hope both to discredit the Commu-
nists' declaration of limited co-
operation with the ruling Christian
Democrats and to force the Frei ad-
ministration into an unpopular use
of troops in the mining area.
Thus far neither side has
shown any desire to compromise.
The Chilean economy has been losing
an estimated $1 million per day in
foreign exchange, and the finan-
cially hard-pressed government can
probably not take much more of a
strain. Unless the workers return
to work in the near future, the 25X1
government will have to take over
the mines.
The Uruguayan Government re-
mains at an impasse with labor over
wage demands. Government employees'
unions have been on strike demand-
ing wage hikes much larger than the
government is prepared to grant.
On 27 November, government wages--
affecting 25 percent of the.labor
force--are to be frozen for the
year preceding general elections.
A number-of other unions have also
walked out for short periods.
The Uruguayan Communist Party
has been working toward a 24-hour
general strike on 25 November to
force wage increases commensurate
with the estimated 60-percent cost-
of-living increase, and to make the
government lift wage penalties im-
posed on workers who took part in
strikes last month. The government
recently vetoed a bill designed to
lift the penalties and is standing
firm on its wage stabilization pro-
gram designed to hold raises to 25
percent. It reportedly intends to
penalize the strikers with new sanc-
tions and may reimpose recently
lifted emergency security measures.
Labor has made a breakthrough
at one point. Montevideo municipal
employees have forced the city coi,n-
cil--controlled by the opposition25X1
Colorado Party--to give in to their
wage demands,
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SECRET
United Nations
Although the Chinese Commu-
nists did not receive the two-
thirds majority last week needed
for admission to the United Na-
tions, their opponents failed for
the first time to muster a plural-
ity against them. China's gain
relative to the last vote on the
question in 1963 was due in large
part to the switching of votes by
African members. In the vote on
the resolution to admit China this
year (47 for admission, 47 against
and 20 abstentions), Peking gained
eight new African supporters and
lost two while Taiwan won two and
lost nine. Although France
worked closely with Red China's
sponsors,. there is no evidence
that it tried to persuade its for-
mer African colonies to switch to
Peking.
For the first time the Latin
American bloc was not unanimous
against Peking. The Chilean dele-
gate abstained
and Jamaica
and Trinidad-Tobago also abstained.
UN diplomats now-fear that many
Latin American votes may shift to
outright support of Peking next
year.
The Chinese Communists have
hailed the outcome as a vindica-
tion of their obdurate stand and
apparently believe that their re-
fusal to compromise will make it
possible to gain membership even-
tually on their own terms. A
People's Daily editorial on 19 No-
vember, Peek 's first major re-
sponse to the vote, asserted that
support for the US position had
weakened and called the vote a
"humiliating setback" to US ef-
forts. The editorial cited US
inability to "rig up" a majority
as evidence of increased US "isola-
tion." The Chinese confidently reit-
erated their conditions for accept-
ing a UN seat, including expulsion
of the Chinese Nationalists, UN con-
demnation of "US imperialism," can-
cellation of the resolution charg-
ing China and North Korea with ag-
gression, and complete UN "reform."
Their statements strongly sug-
gest that the Chinese did not ex-
pect to gain admission this year
and that they believe "manipulation"
will continue to be used against
them in the future. They appear to
believe that China will prosper out-
side the world body, and that time
will show the difficulties the UN
will have as it tries to function
in the absence of a nuclear power
representing nearly a quarter of
the world's population.
Because of the narrowness--
only seven votes--of the margin
upholding the "important question"
ruling which requires a two-thirds
majority to admit China, few dele-
gations believe Peking's opponents
can use this tactic next year.
Backers of Taiwan now may be more
interested in the Italian idea of
a study committee or even some
kind of "two-Chinas" solution.
Many delegations strongly favor a
"two-Chinas" approach despite the
probability that Peking would not
join an organization which in-
'ECtET
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTE ON. CHINESE REPRESENTATION
1965
t in o communist China 4"
anston
Albania
,Algeria
Britain
Bulgaria
Burma
$~elarussia
Cambodia`
eyIon aw
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
han a .
Guinea
,Hungary
India
Iraq
Kenya
Malt
:Mauritania
ty ongol is
t torocco
e;`Nepal
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Poland
Rumania
`Sierra Leona
ngapore
area io
Susan
Sweden
Syria
,*Tonzania
Uganda
l kraine,
oviet- Union
United Arab Republic
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Against: 47
Argentina
Austral i a
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Nationalist China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Gabon
*Gambia
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Jordan
Liberia
Luxembourg
Malagasy Republic
*Malawi
Malaysia
*Malta
Mexico
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
South Africa
Spain
Thailand
Togo
Turkey
United States
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Venezuela
Abstentions: 20
Austria Lebanon
Burundi Libya
Cameroon (No) *Maldive Islands
Chad (No) Netherlands
Chile (No) Portugal
Cyprus (No) Rwanda
Iceland Saudi Arabia
Iran (No) Senegal (No)
Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago
Kuwait Tunisia (Yes)
Not Participating: 3
Congo (Leopoldville) (No)
Dahomey (No)
Laos (Yes)
*New Members
O Vote in 1963, where different, is shown in Parentheses
1963 TOTALS
Against: 57
Abstentions: 12
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 bcI No. 0316/65A
Copy No. 5 4
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND FRENCH POLITICS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
GROUP I Excfudedfrorn automatic
downgrading and declassification
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THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND FRENCH POLITICS
De Gaulle appears assured of an easy, first-bal-
lot victory in France's presidential election on 5
December, and only widespread voter abstention will
keep him from the "massive endorsement" he has
asked for. Public opinion polls suggest that he will
win between 60 and 70 percent of the vote. The size
of his majority is unlikely in any case to affect
his basic policies, although he may be more cautious
in implementing them if he falls short of 60 percent.
Among De Gaulle's five opponents, only Francois
Mitterrand, who has the support of the Socialist and
Communist parties, seems likely to get more than 20
percent of the vote. With little expectation of
winning, the opposition parties are focusing their
hopes of reducing De Gaulle's majority sufficiently
to ensure them a continued political role following
the election. However, the prospect of failing
even this test has been insufficient to induce the
parties to give up old loyalties and ideologies and
form a united opposition. Only the shock of a very
poor showing in the election is likely to renew in-
terest in pulling together a broad democratic alter-
native to Gaullism,
De Gaulle's Strength
With the near certainty of
a first-ballot victory for De
Gaulle the only major point of
speculation as far as the elec-
tion itself is concerned is the
size of his majority. In the
latest'poll, De Gaulle was
favored by 43 percent of those
responding. Mitterrand was sup-
ported by 15 percent, center
candidate Jean Lecanuet and ex-
treme rightist Jean-Louis Tixier-
Vignancour each got 3 percent,
and 36 percent of the respondents
were undecided. These figures
have remained virtually unchanged
over several polls taken both be-
fore and after De Gaulle's an-
nouncement on 4 November that
he would be a candidate.
Page 1
De Gaulle apparently is the
preferred candidate of a plural-
ity of women voters. In a re-
cent poll, 46 percent of the
women favored the general while
his nearest rival, Mitterrand,
was supported by only 8 percent.
The poll showed that De Gaulle's
support by women voters cuts
across age and social class and
seems to substantiate a recent
statement by a top Communist
leader that, in any election in
which De Gaulle is a candidate,
60 percent of the women who
ordinarily vote Communist would
support him.
Since this is the first
direct election of a French presi-
dent since 1848, there is no
valid precedent on which to judge
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THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL OPPONENTS
FOR THE ELECTION ON 5 DECEMBER
Francois Mitterrand
--the leftist candidate
who stands to make
the best showing
against De Gaulle
Jean Lecanuet
--upholding the political
center with an eye on the
period after De Gaulle.
Fierre Marcilhacy
--whose lackluster
campaigning reflects
hi:; belief a De Gaulle
victory is a foregone
conclusion.
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Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour
--vigorous campaigner
and champion of the
French -Algeria diehards
and other far rightists
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voter behavior. The October
1962 referendum, which proposed
a constitutional revision to pro-
vide for the direct election of
the president, is probably the
best guide. In this referendum,
De Gaulle personally appealed to
the French voter for support,
threw his full prestige behind
the issue, and threatened to re-
sign if his proposal did not re-
ceive clear support. All of the
parties except the Gaullist Union
for the New Republic (UNR) were
opposed to the revision. None-
theless, the revision was favored
by a 62-percent majority of those
voting or 46 percent of the 27.5
million registered voters. Al-
most 23 percent of the electorate
abstained, a fact which report-
edly greatly depressed De Gaulle.
In the 5 December election,
too, it is possible that the gen-
erally accepted certainty that
De Gaulle will win and the lack-
luster nature of the opposition
will keep voters from the polls.
The urge to remain at home may
be offset, however, by the
novelty of voting directly for
a chief executive and by the
large registration of first-time
voters.
The Gaullist Campaign
In announcing his candidacy,
De Gaulle told the French voter
that he must choose between con-
tinuation of a strong, independ-
ent France and reversion to the
weakness and chaos of the Fourth
Republic. To reinforce this
image as a "national candidate,"
the general plans no personal
campaign appearances. Accord-
ing to Minister of Information
Peyrefitte, De Gaulle will not
use all of the four hours of
free radio-TV time allotted each
candidate but will make only one
or two brief TV addresses toward
the end of the campaign. More-
over, Peyrefitte indicated that
government ministers would speak
only sparingly in support of De
Gaulle's candidacy.
The campaign role of the
UNR has also been minimized to
strengthen De Gaulle's "above-
party" appeal and to ease the
way for non-Gaullist support.
The general's campaign report-
edly is being directed by Pre-
mier Georges Pompidou, Olivier
Guichard and Jacques Foccart of
the presidential palace staff,
and Pierre Lefranc, who heads
the National Association for the
Support of De Gaulle. This or-
ganization, formed in 1958, has
been used in past elections to
play down De Gaulle's connection
with the UNR and is again the
vehicle for the "brain trust" be-
hind De Gaulle's campaign.
The Opposition
The five opposition candi-
dates have concentrated their at-
tacks on De Gaulle's "personal
,rule" and his destruction of the
constitutional balance in French
politics, With varying degrees
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of enthusiasm they have also op-
posed De Gaulle's policies of
alienating the US, reducing
French participation in NATO,
and weakening the EEC.
Francois Mitterrand is the
strongest opposition candidate
because he is the "sole candi-
date of the left." Mitterrand is
national president of a group
called the Democratic and Social-
ist Union of the Resistance, a
splinter of the Radical Social-
ist Party. In addition he has
the official support of the Radi-
cal Socialist organization it-
self as well as of the Socialist
Party (SFIO) and the Communist
Party (PCF). Because he cannot
hope to formulate a specific
program acceptable to both his
Communist and non-Communist sup-
porters and because even informal
negotiations with the PCF would
cost him non-Communist votes, he
has kept to vague statements of
intent.
Jean Lecanuet, former presi-
dent of the Catholic-oriented
Popular Republic Movement (MRP),
has the support of his own party
and the right-wing Independent
Party (CNIP). He agreed to run
only after former premier Antoine
Pinay and several other prominent
non-Gaullists refused and by his
own admission is primarily inter-
ested in offering a rallying
point for the center. His candi-
dacy received a slight boost from
the last-minute withdrawal of
Paul Antier, who called on his
farm-based supporters to back
Lecanuet. Of all the candidates,
Lecanuet has been most concerned
by De Gaulle's negative policies
toward the EEC and NATO, and in
his campaign he has stressed the
need for loyalty to the two in-
stitutions.
Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour,
an extreme rightist lawyer, de-
rives most of his strength from
supporters of a French Algeria,
a rapidly diminishing group now
that Algeria's independence is
an irreversible reality. He is
best known for his defense of
the French military leaders who
revolted-against De Gaulle's Al-
gerian policy.
The other two candidates
are Independent Senator Pierre
Marcilhacy, who has no official
party backing, and Marcel Barbu,
a last-minute entry who appears
primarily interested in using
the radio-TV time to sound his
personal views.
All of the major opposition
parties are committed to one or
another of the candidates. Im-
portant divisions within these
parties over the merits of the
respective candidates, however,
reduce the significance of the
official endorsements. The So-
cialist Party., following the
lead of its long-time secretary
general, Guy Mollet, "enthusi-
astically" announced its support
for Mitterrand. Continuing dif-
ferences between Mollet and
Marseilles Mayor Gaston Defferre,
who withdrew his candidacy af-
ter his effort to form a broad
center-left coalition failed,
may result in less than full
support from Defferre's support-
ers.
SE 'RE
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The Radical. Socialist Party
also endorsed Mitterrand, but
several top party officials forced
inclusion in the official en-
dorsement statement of a favorable
mention of Lecanuet's candidacy.
Lecanuet's own MRP endorsed him,
but a leading MRP figure, Maurice
Shumann, publicly criticized the
candidacy and endorsed De Gaulle's.
He indicated that the center might
be playing a "suicidal role" by
standing against the general.
Even the tightly disciplined
PCF may be unable to deliver a
full share of Communist votes to
Mitterrand. A left-wing faction
which reportedly urged the party
leadership to put up a PCF candi-
date has now spoken out against
Mitterrand. Two leading Social-
ists have also estimated that at
least 25 percent of the 4 million
voters who supported PCF candi-
dates in the 1.962 National As-
sembly elections would vote for
De Gaulle.
De Gaulle After Re-election
It is unlikely that a "nar-
row victory"--defined as anything
less than 60 percent of those
voting on the first ballot--will
alter either De Gaulle's basic
policies or his determination to
achieve them. There is evidence,
however, particularly in his
handling of the Algerian war set-
tlement, that the speed and bold-
ness with which De Gaulle moves
to implement his policies is af-
fected by his confidence in pub-
lic support.
In the past seven years he
has pursued, undaunted, policies
which at one time or another have
brought into opposition political
parties, intellectuals, a major
part of the military establish-
rnent, various economic pressure
groups, and even his own cabinet.
I)e Gaulle has always felt that
his exalted person, above partisan
politics and symbolic of the
spirit of France, has given him
a direct relationship with the
French people. He has relied on
this basic groundswell of support
to counter the opposition of se-
lected groups.
Proof from the voters that
this special relationship was
deteriorating would be likely to
make De Gaulle move more cau-
tiously in controversial areas.
]tn the unlikely event that he
fails to win a majority on the
first ballot and is forced into
a runoff, there is even the re-
mote possibility that he would
withdraw entirely from the race.
If he is re-elected by an
overwhelming proportion of the
vote, De Gaulle might well be
tempted to stake out new claims
in the international and domestic
spheres or enlarge old ones. He
seems certain to continue his ef-
forts to seek fundamental changes
i.n the EEC and to undermine the
US and NATO presence in Europe.
He is likely to push for closer
relations with the USSR and a
variety of nations from Africa
to the Far East. The increasing
cost of the French nuclear force
over the next few years will not
be allowed to stand in the way of
its achievement.
Regardless of the size of
his majority, De Gaulle is likely
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to institute some changes on the
domestic scene. One of the prob-
lems he will probably move to re-
solve is that of his successor.
The constitution provides that
the president of the senate tem-
porarily succeeds the president
in the event of his death or
incapacitation, a provision which
would bring to the presidency
Gaston Monnerville, a man who
has consistently and publicly op-
posed him. To alter this situa-
tion, De Gaulle is said to favor
making the premier, who is chosen
by the president, the interim suc-
cessor until an election can be
held.
In addition, there will al-
most certainly be changes in the
present cabinet, now composed
primarily of Gaullist party mem-
bers or those not affiliated with
any party. To further strengthen
his image as a president of all
the people, he might include more
non-Gaullists, probably drawn from
parties such as the MRP and In-
dependents, who have been flexible
in their opposition to his poli-
cies.
Opposition in Postelection Period
All of De Gaulle's opponents,
certain of defeat, have projected
their campaigns in large part to
the postelection period, hoping
that, a less-than-wholesale en-
dorsement of De Gaulle will in-
fuse new life into the opposition
parties. Moreover, it could set
the stage for a determined come-
back by them in the 1967 legisla-
tive elections, in which local is-
sues will be more important and
De Gaulle himself will not be di-
Page 6
rectly involved. This considera-
tion is particularly important
for the CNIP and the MR P, both of
which have lost much of their tradi-
tional support to the UNR.
On the other hand a massive
turnout for De Gaulle could prove
to be a blessing in disguise for
the non-Communist opposition over
the longer term. While none of
the defeats which De Gaulle has
inflicted on these parties since
1958 has yet been sufficient to
jolt them into joining forces, a
humiliating defeat in this elec-
tion might shake the old-line
party leaders sufficiently to lead
them to reconsider the merits
of close cooperation.
Seen only in terms of this
one election, a single opposition
candidate representing a broad
federation of the major democratic
parties, such as that envisaged
by Gaston Defferre, probably could
not have beaten De Gaulle. In
fact, the present proliferation
of candidates may cut more deeply
into the Gaullist total than a
single coalition candidate could
have. Nevertheless the failure
of the federation effort robbed
the parties of the opportunity
to demonstrate that they have
turned away from the paralyzing
political infighting which char-
acterized the Fourth Republic and
to lay the groundwork for coopera-
tive efforts to be pursued in a
post - De Gaulle era.
Socialist-Communist
Collaboration
The French Communist Party's
decision to support the Mitterrand
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candidacy affords it distinct ad-
vantages, but some of these ad-
vantages could be nullified in
the postelection period. The
party supported Mitterrand despite
his failure to negotiate a com-
mon program with the PCF, a.con-
dition it had repeatedly stressed
was the sine qua non for its en-
dorsement. Endorsement of a can-
didate espousing a mildly pro-
NATO and pro-EEC platform has
been regarded by some Communist
militants as a capitulation to
the parties of the democratic
left.
By endorsing Mitterrand, how-
ever, the party was spared the
need to run a Communist candidate
who might get a substantially
smaller proportion of the total
vote than the 21-25 percent the
party has won in previous par-
liamentary elections. Moreover,
in the longer run, it could be
a step toward the "unity of ac-
tion" on the political front long
sought by the PCF.
Contributing to the party's
decision, too, was the knowledge
that, in view of the developing
dialogue between De Gaulle and
the Soviet leadership, Moscow
might not greet a PCF candidate
with open arms. This seems borne
out by a TASS comment that the
general would win support not only
from committed Gaullists but also
from those who "approve some posi-
tive, realistic foreign political
actions of the government."
The PCF has rationalized its
current tactics by claiming that
its support of Mitterrand opens
the door to future, more lasting
cooperation with the Socialists.
Should the Socialists return to
collaboration with the center
parties after the election and
abandon all pretense of coopera-
ting with the Communists, the PCF
would be more effectively iso-
lated and might face severe prob-
lems of internal discipline.
The utility of "popular front"
candidates and cooperation with
the non-Communist parties would
then be increasingly questioned.
Up to this point, the So-
cialists have succeeded in play-
ing down the question of Social-
ist-Communist cooperation and
the prospect of having to work
out a common program if Mitter-
rand were elected. Whether the
postelectoral period will be
:marked by any extensive coopera-
tive efforts will depend on how
Mitterrand fares at the polls.
If he obtains a respectable pro-
portion of the vote, the So-
cialists probably will be strongly
tempted to explore and expand
the possibilities for common po-
litical action. Conversely, if
Mitterrand fails to run up a
sizable total, the Socialists
will probably turn again to the
center and center left. The
outcome of the Mollet-Defferre
battle for control of the So-
cialist Party, which will be
carried on at a special party
congress after the first of the
year, may also depend in large
part on Mitterrand's showing.
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