WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000100001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 15, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Release 2008/05/27 :CIA-RDP79-00927A005000100001-7
State Dept. review completed
ARMY review(s) completed.
REfitIA~l fi~ AR~1tl~S. & tlECORDS GE~IfiEi
l~~ED1AtElY AFfiER tlSE
148~~~~BOX_._.~',~....
,~~ Y _~~ ~) ~+ ,~/, ' GR?UP ! Excluded from gutomStic
Y _ /' ~
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SECRET
(Information as of noon EDT, 14 October 1965)
Page
VIETNAM
Although there was a relative decline in large-scale
military engagements in South Vietnam last week, the
number of Viet Cong incidents reached the highest level
in over a year amid indications that the Communists may
be planning to step up their terrorist activity. The
Communists are also nearing completion of considerable
construction and improvement work on roads in southern
Laos which will extend their infiltration routes into
South Vietnam. The number of confirmed surface-to-air
missile sites in North Vietnam reached 29 last week, but
it is estimated that the DRV has only enough equipment
for six to ten of these. Hanoi has intensified its
propaganda alleging US air strikes against civil targets.
The Communist World
UNANNOUNCED HIGH-LEVEL PARTY MEETING IN COMMUNIST CHINA 4
Recent regime pronouncements suggest that the leaders
are frustrated by a wide range of foreign and domestic
problems, and an important unannounced conference has
apparently been under way since at least 2? September
to discuss and act on them.
WARSAW PACT EXERCISE IMMINENT IN EAST GERMANY g
Preparations for the announced Warsaw Pact exercise
are virtually complete. Military activity in south-
western East Germany is expected to accelerate in the
next few days as Soviet, East German, Polish, and
Czech forces deploy for the event.
ANOTHER SOVIET LUNAR PROBE FAILS 7
The increasing frequency of Soviet lunar probes sug-
gests that the USSR is anxious to show some results
from a program which has suffered badly in comparison
with US lunar explorations.
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KOS-YGIN'S PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZING SOVIET ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
The Soviet premier's 27 September speech to the central
committee was short on the details and vague as to the
timing of the extensive changes he proposed in indus-
trial management. The probable impact of the new pro-
gram on Soviet economic performance is therefore diffi-
cult to judge. The proposals appear to go far enough
to bring some slight improvements in management, but
not far enough to give the economy the sharp boost it
needs. (Published separately as Special Report OCI No.
0311/65A)
Asia-Africa
INDONESIA
The army, proceeding with its investigation of the 30
September coup, remains determined to build a case
against the individuals responsible. It is keeping
Sukarno and the Communist Party on the defensive, but
still appears reluctant to defy the President by a
major crackdown on the party.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
b n little change in the basic situation.
e
h
as e
There
Cease-fire violations remain at a relatively low level,
but neither side has pulled its troops back from for-
ward positions. Pakistan continues its attempts to
stir the US and UK into more immediate action on the
Kashmir question, and India still claims Kashmir is
not a subject for discussions at all.
PRO-WESTERN JUSTICE PARTY WINS TURKISH ELECTIONS 12
The party's, solid majority clears the way for a strong
government, after four years of weak coalitions. The
government will. maintain Turkey`s pro-Western orienta-
tion. The military can be expected to lend its support.
BRITISH-RHODESIAN TALKS FAIL 13
.Prime Minister Wilson made clear to Rhodesia's Ian
Smith that a unilateral declaration of independence
would mean strict sanctions by the UK. Nevertheless
Smith and his cabinet are likely to decide soon to
take this step, although the announcement-may be de-
layed for several months.
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PAGE i i WEEKLY SUMMARY 15 OC t 65
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~ AJ'~ ~,~ J..J r~ ' 7j
ACCRA TO HOST AFRICAN SUMMIT MEETING
Most of the 36 countries belonging to the Organization
of African Unity will send high-level representatives,
although some heads of state will not attend. African
problems will be of primary concern, but some touchy
East-West issues may also come up.
TSHOMBE OUSTED IN THE CONGO ,
President Kasavubu's dismissal of Premier Tshombe al-
most certainly presages a period of political turmoil
and possibly violence. Moreover, Leopoldville still
faces a long campaign to re-establish its authority
in large rebel-infested areas, although .mercenary forces
captured the last major rebel stronghold last week.
Europe
SCANDINAVIA AND NATO
Swedish Prime Minister Erlander's recent cautious al-
lusion to the possibility of a Scandinavian defense
pact raises the question of whether Norway and Denmark
will continue their NATO membership after 1969 when
they may opt to withdraw. Opinion in those two coun-
tries will be affected as always by Soviet moves but
also by how French NATO policy develops and by their
latent fear of Germany as Bonn seeks a greater nuclear
role in NATO.
Western Hemisphere
THE CANADIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Few issues are well defined at this point, but the
campaign for the $ November parliamentary election is
beginning to heat up. Opposition leader Diefenbaker
seems to have lost considerable ground since the last
election, and Prime Minister Pe arson's Liberal Party,
which is favored by the polls, is confident of victory.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
As preparations for expected elections get under way,
even moderate forces seem to be seeking popularity by
espousing anti-Americanism. Juan Bosch has put out
vague feelers to the US Embassy about cooperating on
"anti-Communist" strategy. Some progress has been made
in reintegrating the rebel zone, but it remains to be
seen whether President Garcia Godoy will now take a
stronger stand against leftist inroads in the government.
ECUADOR'S MILITARY JUNTA REMAINS UNCHALLENGED
The political parties are determined to press-the re-
gime to accelerate or otherwise alter its plan for a
return to constitutional rule by September 1966, but
they have failed in their attempts to arouse popular
support--most recently during a patriotic holiday cel-
ebration in Guayaquil on 9 October.
REPERCUSSIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS 21
Political conditions remain unsettled as President
Caste lla Branco plans measures to ease the tensions
caused by the military's strong reaction to the elec-
tion results.
FRANCE TRIES TO CURB UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S POWERS
France, anxious to assure great-power predominance in
the UN through the Security Council, has seized upon
the Kashmir crisis to introduce a resolution which would
have the effect of curbing the role and inf luence of the
secretary general and his. staff, particularly in peace-
keeping operations.
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The Communists may be plan-
ning to step up their terrorist
activity in South Vietnam. Re-
cent broadcasts by the Viet Cong ~
clandestine Liberation Radio
have placed unusual emphasis on
appeals for a "month of hatred"
of the US, scheduled to begin
on 15 October. All Vietnamese
are being urged to observe an
hour of silence that morning and
to participate in a general
strike in cities throughout the
country. Appeals have also gone
out to the people to assist in
a stepped-up campaign of terror-
ism and sabotage.
Meanwhile, the number of
Viet Cong incidents during the
past week increased to the high-
est level in over a year.
Major Vietnamese-A llied op-
erations last week against sus-
pected enemy troop concentrations
in Binh Duong Province, north of
Saigon, and in the northern
coastal province of Binh Dinh
failed to establish major con-
tact with the Viet Cong, but did
serve to open areas previously
denied to the government. Re-
flecting the recent decline in
large-scale fighting, Viet Cong
casualties during the week end-
ing on 9 October totaled 66$, a
sharp drop from the average of
1,760 sustained during each of
the previous two weeks.
The recent command reorgani-
zation in Saigon has caused some
discontent among government and
military circles. Defense Minis-
ter General Co, who was elevated
to deputy premier for war and re-
construction while losing his
position as chief of the Joint
General Staff, was particularly
dissatisfied with the prospect
of increased political responsi-
bilities and fewer military
duties. After reaching an agree-
ment with Ky and others which
served to allay his fears concern-
ing his position in the military
chain of command, Co publicly re-
affirmed the unit of the mili-
tart' leadershi
~ 25X1
the DRV's 325th Infantr P,ivi-
sion in South Vietnam
had infiltrated
in four phases from late 1964 25X1
through mid-1965. In addition
to the three organic infantry
regiments now acce b MACV as
~e~ Y
being in the South
transpar a ion battalion,
a guard company, a medical com- 25X1
pant', an engineer company, a sig-
nals company, and possibly a chem-
ical company had also infiltrated..
The Communists have worked
through the current rainy season
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to complete roads in southern
Laos started in mid-1964. ~9hen
the dry season arrives in a few
weeks they will have more than
150 miles of roads flanking the
South Vietnamese border to a
paint 90 miles south of the de-
militarized zone (DMZ)--some 55
miles farther than a year ago.
The general plan appears to
be to extend Laotian route 92--
which parallels the South Viet-
namese border at an average dis-
tance of about 25 miles--to the
vicinity of Ban Phone and to open
branches from route 92 toward the
border both with new construction
and by upgrading existing trails.
As of the end of September, the
branches which can be confirmed
by photography consist of one from
Ban Phone completed to the bor-
der, a second from Muong Nong com-
SOUTHERN LAOS: Roads Built or Improved Since Mid-1964
pleted to within five miles of
the border. A third road start-
ing from Ban Bac, in an early
stage of construction, may also
lead to the South Vietnamese bor-
der.
Development of route 92 and
its branches is almost certain to
be stepped up when the dry season
arrives. This will probably in-
clude the provision of more off-
road support facilities and bridg-
ing and the further extension of
route 92 from the latitude of
Saravane to Ban Phone, a gap
crossed in 1964 by using large
canoes on the Se Kong River..
More SAM Sites in the DRV
The total number of confirmed
surface-to-air missile sites in
North Vietnam reached 29 this
week with the confirmation of
seven new sites, Despite this in-
crease it is estimated that at
present there is only enough SAM
equipment in the DRV to equip six
to ten sites. The largest number
of operational sites--those
equipped with missiles and ready
to fire--noted at any-one time was
five on 8 October. Many of the
newly confirmed sites are in
groups of two or three within a
few miles of one another, prob-
ably to make the most effective
use of the available .equipment,
e e - 25X1
namese have to en over SAM opera-
tions after only three months'
training instead of the nine to
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to twelve months normally re-
quired.
Alleged Bombing of Civil Targets
Hanoi's propaganda charges
denouncing alleged US bombing
and strafing of civil targets in
the DRV have recently been in-
tensified, Part of the DRV cam-
paign involved a guided tour of
the damaged areas for a group
of journalists from Japan, In-
donesia, and the UAR. Initial
reports from the newsmen de-
scribe urban centers in the south-
ern DRV as "virtually flattened,"
and claim "indescribable damage
to civilian establishment" in-
cluding over 40,000 dead from
the raids. After a spate of new
charges over damage to hospitals
and other medical facilities,
Hanoi on 12 October released a
detailed list of 124 "educa-
tional institutions" it claims
were hit by US planes.
Beyond the general inten-
tion of arousing additional free
world sentiment against the air
raids it is not clear exactly
what has sparked the heightened
DRV propaganda charges. Hanoi
may hope to provide some spe-
cific detail and background
music for leftist and Communist
spokesmen at a series of upcom-
ing free world student protest
demonstrations over US policy in
Vietnam. In its declaration on
the alleged bombing of schools,
Hanoi called on "educational 'cir-
cles in all countries" to launch
a "powerful movement of protests."
DRV Assembly Postponed
Indicative of the problems
caused in the DRV by the bombing
is Hanoi's decision to "postpone"
the upcoming fall session of its
national assembly, The postpone-
ment will allow state organs and
cadres to concentrate on resist-
ing US "aggression," according to
Hanoi. The move probably also
reflects anticipation of diffi-
culties in transporting delegates
to Hanoi and a reluctance to con-
centrate many key cadres in one
large assembly.
Hungarian Mission to DRV
A high-level Hungarian dele-
gation led by politburo member
Jeno Fock arrived in Hanoi on 7
October. The delegation, which
included both economic and mili-
tary specialists, met with party
First Secretary Le Duan and DRV
economic and military officials
on 10 October. Hanoi described
the talks only as an "exchange of
views on problems of common in-
terests."
The full purpose of the
visit is not clear. North Viet-
nam relies on Hungary for some
telecommunications and electronic
equipment and may be seeking ad-
ditional assistance of this-type,
probably for military purposes.
It is likely, however, that the
subject of a settlement of the
war will also be discussed, with
the Hungarians probably urging a
policy of moderation,
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F ~.-
,S`E~'RET
On 6 October, Hungarian For-
eign Minister Peter hinted in a
speech before the UN General As-
sembly that North Vietnam might
be more amenable to a. negotiated
settlement of the Vietnamese war
if the US stopped its bombings.
In subsequent conversations with
US officials, however, he was un-
able to offer any earnest of
North Vietnam's intentions to
agree to talks. Peter's remarks
parallel other claims
that a
lack of influence over Vietnamese
developments and consequently
their limited room for maneuver.
These considerations together
with their current preoccupation
with their problems a.t home would
seem at present to preclude any
strong Russian initiative on Viet-
nam unless events take some dras-
tic turn. In his recent talks
with Secretary Rusk, Soviet For-
eign Minister Gromyko apparently
went out of his way to avoid dis-
cussing the Vietnam issue in any
provocative wa.y. The general
tenor of his remarks on East-West
relations provided a further indi-
cation that underneath the public
display of anti-US sentiment, So-
viet leaders a.re intent on pre -
venting relations from fa.llin
into complete disrepair.
a t to the bombings is ma.nda.tory
before there can be a.ny movement
toward talks.
The Sovie-t posture on Viet-
nam remains unchanged. The Rus-
sian leaders fully realize their
The Communist World
UNANNOUNCED HIGH-LEVEL PARTY MEETING IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Recent regime pronouncements
suggest that Chinese Communist
leaders a.re frustrated by a.
wide range of foreign and domes-
tic problems. An important un-
announced conference of leaders
ha.s apparently been under way
since at least 27 September to
cape with these problems.
Several regional and provin-
cial party leaders, who seldom
show up in Peking except for "en-
larged palitburo meetings," have
been noted in the capital since
27 September, and all five known
regional leaders were there on
2 and 10 October, It is particu-
larly unusual for them to be
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25X1
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absent from their own areas in
early October, when they normally
preside over local National Day
celebrations. This strongly sug-
gests that the activity in Peking
was unscheduled and possibly ur-
gent.
Any meeting at this time
may have been triggered by for-
eign policy problems, such as re-
cent developments in Vietnam,
China's role in the Kashmir
crisis, and difficulties in ex-
tending Chinese influence in Af-
rica and Latin America, Foreign
Minister Chen Yi's truculent and
wide-ranging press conference on
29 September suggests that a de-
cision had already been reached
by then to take a generally harder
line in foreign policy,
The enlarged group meets
so seldom that, once together,
it would undoubtedly also con-
sider domestic affairs, includ-
ing personnel appointments. No
change in domestic policies is
evident yet, but the stress on
domestic problems evident in Na-
tional Day editorials and
speeches suggests that new ap~
proaches are being considered.
Although these contained the
usual claims that the situation
at home and abroad was "excel-
lent," the regime in fact ap-
pears to be disappointed by its
mediocre achievements and
frustrated over the intractabil-
ity of its long-term problems.
In the keynote National Day
address, politburo member Peng
Chen claimed that agricultural
production had incre>sed over
1964, but he warned that "quite
a few areas had suffered seri-
ous natural disasters," an ad-
mission probably designed to
condition the populace to ex-
pect some belt tightening next
spring, Other information on
gra~:.n crop conditions indicates
no increase over the mediocre
1964 level.
The absence of a strong
popular commitment to regime
policies also continues to worry
Peking. Chen Yi admitted there
were "revisionists" in China but
claimed they represent no threat.
The National Day editorial in
the party journal Red Flag--re-
flecting a long-stan ing dear
of top leaders that China, like
the USSR, might some day back-
slide--was devoted entirely to
the problem of inculcating peo-
ple with Maoist beliefs through
"socialist education" campaigns.
Bath Chen Yi in his press
conference and Premier Chou En-
lai in a National Day speech
alluded to the third five-year
plan, which is to start in 1966,
but neither gave details and
both stressed that it would
take decades--30 to 50 years ac-
cording to Chen--to build a
strong China.
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Preparations for the an-
nounced Warsaw Pact exercise
are now virtually complete.
Military activity in southwest-
ern East Germany is expected to
accelerate during the next few.
days as Soviet, East German,,.
Polish, and Czech forces deploy
for the event.
Duxing the past week in-
tensive preparations for the
large maneuvers focused partic-
ularly oa arrangements for the
air movement of Soviet and Po-
lish airborne farces from their
home bases to East Germany. The
airborne phase of the exercise
is expected to be the largest
operation of its type ever con-
ducted by bloc forces in Eastern
Europe.. Observation of the major
military activity--which may in-:
volve the actual participation
of elements of as many as ten
divisions--will b.e denied to
Allied liaison personnel. A
large area in southern East Ger-
many has been closed to them from
9 through 27 October.
The theme of the exercise..
will probably be the' blunting
of a NATO attack into East Ger-
many followed by a counter.offen-
sive through the Fulda Gap to
West Germany, Simulated tacti-
cal and strategic- nuclear blows
WARSAW PACT EXERCISE AREA IN EAST GERMANY
'4.,~~i}nnover
FEDERAL
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Note; Marahat Grechko states that Soviec farces in Easc
f rcmanW,tiss the - Warsaw Pact "striking
providea~heavy troop parNeipaeioti.
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t iJL (.ilt~' l
are expected to play a major
role.
Propaganda to date, plus
~Yarsaw Pact commander Marshal
Grechko's statement that the
exercise will be the "largest
ever," suggests that the Soviets
intend to use the exercise as a 25X1
demonstration of bloc preparedness
to counter "the West German threat
to peace."
ANOTiiER SOVIET LUNAR PROBE FAILS
The increasing frequency of
Soviet lunar probes suggests that
the USSR is feeling a sense of
urgency to shave some results
from this program. Luna 7,
launched on 4 October, was the
most recent probe and was in-
tended to make a soft landing.
Its retrorocket system apparently
malfunctioned, however, and the
vehicle crashed on the meson on
7 October.
A T~4SS announcement released
some 13 hours after the impact
stated that the probe`s operation
was generally successful. While
Luna 7 must be charged off as
the latest failure in a notably
unsuccessful program, it un-
doubtedly chid produce some data
which will be useful in further
efforts to perfect a soft-land-
ing system.
So far this year the Soviets
have announced three lunar probe
launchings, none of which has
been wholly successful. They
now appear to be stepping up
their program to develop a soft-
landing technique, possibly in
an attempt to obtain lunar sur-
face data for an eventual manned
lunar landing. In addition,
Moscow certainly feels the need
to show some results from a pro- 25X1
gram which has suffered badly
in comparison with US lunar ex-
ploration.
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The army Conti ues to keep
Sukarno and the Ind nesian Com-
munist Party (PKI) n the deflen-
sive, but still app ars reluctant
to defy the Freside t by a major
crackdown on the parnty.
The army is pro
its investigation of
tember coup and will
ceeding with
the 30 Sep-
try to build
a case against the individuals
responsible. The investigations
permit the arrest an
tion of relatively 1
of leftist suspects
the terms of Sukarno
instead of taking di
against the PKI and
the army is relying
nist civilian organi
interroga-
rge numbers
nd are within
ect action
its affiliates,
anti-Commu-
ations. These
ve chiefly
gs used by
nt groups.
in destroying buildi
the party and its fr
There seems to have
tively little person
een rela-
1 violence.
Sukarno returned to Djakarta
from his palace at B
October. Although h
relatively little ac
then, his presence i
strengthens his posi
counting reports tha
or in protective cus
gor on 10
has taken
ion since
the capital
ion by ds-
he is i11
ody.
In accordance with army]
wishes,. Sukarno has appointed
Maj. Gen. Suharto commander iof
the army. Suharto led the a',rmy's
counteraction against the 30 Sep-
tember coup. He replaces Ma '.
Gen. Yani, who was murdered n 1
October. ',
The PKI's central committee
had made no pronouncements since
its statement on 5 October c aim-
ing that it was not implicated
in the coup attempt. Chairm n
Aidit's whereabouts remains n-
known, although the army sti~.l
believes he is in central Jaffa.
Indications are mountin
that Sukarno and the party a e
willing to make Aidit the maj r
scapegoat of the affair and hat
they will try to form a "new';'
Communist party. Several Dj~-
karta newspapers have printed
stories to the effect that there
are two kinds of Communists:',
"extreme Communists," who ark
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E 8 WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1.
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un-Indonesian and who serve for-
eign interests, and "decent Com-
munists," who could take a right-
ful place in Sukarno's national-
ist-religious-Communist concept
of government.
Moscow has treated events
in Indonesia with caution. The
Soviet press has reported and de-
plored the moves against the PKI
but has stopped short of attempt-
ing to assess the situation,
routinely indicting alleged "im-
(however, Soviet
officials have implicated pro-
Chinese elements in the PKI. Mos-
cow probably views the situation
in Indonesia as an advantageous
one which reinforces the Soviet
argument that Peking's advocacy
of violent revolutionary tactics
can lead to disaster for many
Communist parties in Asia and
There has been little change
in the basic military-deplomatic
confrontation between India and
Pakistan. Cease-fire violations
remain at a relatively low level.
UN Secretary General Thant told
members of the Security Council
last week end that the situation
an the cease-fire line had im-
proved, but he sa.w considerable
room for further improvement.
Neither side has made any move
to pull its troops back from for-
ward positions.
General MacDonald, commander
of the UN observer group in the
Punjab, believes senior military
commanders on both sides are sin-
cere in their assurances to him
that they will honor the cease-
f-ire. He feels his most pressing
problem is to bring about the dis-
engagement of forward elements,
but he is hampered in effecting
this, as well as in verifying re-
ported cease-fire violations, by
limited communications and logis-
tics. MacDonald hopes to take up
the withdrawal issue with the
chiefs of staffs of the opposing
armies.
General Musa, the Pakistani
Army commander, has already indi-
cated, however, that Pakistan has
no intention of withdrawing its
troops from Kashmir until real
progress has been made in moving
the Kashmir issue toward a perma-
nent solution.
Unrest has plagued Srinagar,
the chief city of Indian-held
Kashmir, in the past week. A
number of people were killed in
riots last week end, and several
more were killed or wounded in a
subsequent incident on 11 Octo-
ber. The Indian press reported
on 12 October that Srinagar
schools had been closed for three
days. The rioting has resulted
in a nighttime curfew and the ar-
rest of several opposition polit-
ical leaders. Indian authorities
can be expected to react quickly
and harshly to further disorders.
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a~ A, i
In~IA-PAKISTAn ORDER OF BATTLE
c.
Tith. ~J
Tdngt~ a
r~nago
P~'onch
M~ras~l~ar
~~ Ic~pt
',l n~f"', fU7? ~~, =-it7~/'ye'r' it ~,(~iO(1
.-_- t,~ ,
R~, I. a 17 0~
%`~;gCB~rki
~~6.-
Infantry div!~tion
Infantry brigade
Armored division
Armored brigade
~pproximaie territory
occupied on 113ept
`~a:zd 25Q,OOQ in north est 1~zdirt, _
,,ti ~ _ _ _:
O 25 50
i
MILES
To New Delhi
(Approx. 60 Miles)
l
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~~azilkcj
PAKISTAN
JAM1V1 U ANA KAS MIR
`~,.
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SECRET ~"~
There has been little prog-
ress. toward a substantive discus-
sion of the Kashmir issue in the
UN, despite Pakistani prodding.
Foreign Minister Bhutto now is
in New-York for a further explora-
tion of this question. The idea
of a four-power commission to
assist U Thant on this issue
appears to be fading, largely
as a result of Soviet and French
objections. Thant still favors
this approach to the problem,
however.
Pakistani Foreign Secretary
Ahmed has told Ambassador Mc-
Conaughy that his country antic-
ipated little effective action
within the UN on this issue, add-
ing that Pakistan was again con-
sidering the Soviet offer of its
'-'good offices" in an effort to
resolve the problem. Pakistani
officials, probably hoping to
stir the US and UK into more im-
mediate action, have recently
raised this possibility with a
number of diplomats.
Ahmed also suggested that
Pakistan was coming to the con-
elusion that the UN was unable
to preserve the cease-fire, and
that accordingly Pakistan may
have to fall back on its own re-
sources, taking a number of ac-
tions "which together may lead
to escalation." Ambassador Mc-
Conaughy has noticed a number of
signs that the Pakistanis may make
important decisions around 15-16
October. He believes it prudent
to anticipate a stiffer Pakistani
response to cease-fire violations,
It is likely, however, that again
the Pakistani warning is primarily
intended to stimulate Western ac-
tion on the Kashmir problem.
India continues to claim
that Kashmir is not a subject far
discussion at all. In a recent
magazine interview Prime Minister
Shastri asserted that Pakistani
"aggression" was encouraged by
the fact that "some of the big
powers" not only condoned crime
but wanted to make aggression
pay, He reportedly was "particu-
larly distressed" at the British.
There are continuing indi-
cations that India's efforts to
cope with its critical food sup-
ply problem have been unsuccess-
ful, Residents of Calcutta are
finding that food-grain rations
set during the hostilities are
inadequate, and recourse to the
black market is increasingly com-
mon, Nevertheless, the state
government plans temporarily to
cut rations even more until addi-
tional food-grain can be obtained
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SECRET
The solid popul
won by the conservat
Party (JP) in the 10
liamentaxy elections
wa.y for restoration
government in Turkey
years of weak coalit'
ficial returns give
estimated 60 percent
lar vote and about 2
450 seats in the Nati
bly. Its leader, Sul
rel, will almost cert
new prime minister.
JUSTICI~ .PARTY. WINS TURKZ$~;,Ej.,NCTiON~.s
r majority
.ve Justi_ce
October par-
clears th',e
~f strong; '
after four
ons . Unof -
he JP an
of the papu-
~0 of the '
onal Assem -
eyman Dem'i-
ainly be the
The Republican P oples'
Party (RPP), led by t e venerable
Ismet Inonu, suffered a serious
defeat. It received less than'..
30 percent of the vot but will
remain the major oppo ition with
130-140 assembly seat The re-
maining 60-?0 seats w 11 be split
among the four minor a.rties, ',
with the leftist Turk sh Labor''
Party (TLP) winning a. out LO '
seats, assuring it a arliamen-
tary sounding board f r its '
strong anti-American tta.cks.
The extreme rightist epublican
Peasant Nation Party iRPNP),
headed by retired Col
former member of the
Committee of National
a poor showing at the
party leaders hope to
support from "friends
>nel Turks,
revolutionary
Union, made
polls but
attract
' in the
assembly.
The JP victory s
US interests in Turke
tain Turkeys Western
tion. The party lead
ould favor
and ma.in-
orienta-',
rship is
basically pro-American and real-
izes the importance of sound,;
moderate, effective governmen .
The JP favors flexible , rather
than rigid economic planning,
is oriented toward private en-~
terprise rather than state own
ship, a.nd while trying to main
tain good relations with the
er-
USSR, will probably try to slo~
down the current Soviet economic
offensive in Turkey.
The new government will r~ -
main firm in its strong suppor
and direction of the Turkish
community on Cyprus. At the
same time it will be in a bett r
position to accept compromise f
indeed compromise becomes poss -
ble. .Like its predecessors, i
will look to the United States.
a.nd the UK, rather than the Un~ted
Nations, for the ultimate reso
lution of this sticky problem.)
The new government will f~ce
many knotty problems, not the
least of which will be the lim~,ted
number of JP leaders with top I~
government experience. There '~
will be continuing pressure fr m
both the left--the TLP--and th~
right--the RPNP--as well as pex?-
sistent badgering from the RPP.,
The new government probab y
will also encounter intermittent
criticism from elements within
the military who either fear p
litical revenge for the revolutoivn
of 1960 or who want a. stronger',
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SE~'RET
military voice in the affairs of
government. Unless the new govern-
ment reverts to the dictatorial
tendencies of the prerevolutionary
regime, however, or threatens to
undermine the position of the
military, or neglects the country'
social and economic development, 25X1
the military can be expected to
support the Demirel regime.
BRITISH-RHODESIAN TALKS FAIL
Last week's talks in London
between Prime Ministers Wilson
and Smith on the question of
Rhodesian independence ended in
failure. Smith and his cabinet
remain uncompromising and are
likely to decide soon to make a
unilateral declaration of independ-
ence (UDI), although the announce-
ment may be delayed for several
months.
Wilson made clear to Smith
that UDI would be met by strict
political and economic sanctions
from the UK and might lead to open
racial conflict in central Africa.
In an effort to put the onus for
such action on Rhodesia, Wilson
requested in a nationwide tele-
vision address that Rhodesia ac-
cept a mission of senior Common-
wealth prime ministers to assist
in reaching a negotiated settle-
me nt .
The UN General Assembly
passed a resolution this week
calling an the UK to take all
steps necessary to halt UDI.
However, international pressures
are unlikely to do more than tem-
porarily delay Rhodesian independ-
ence.
Most of Rhodesia's white
electorate is reported anxious
for an early decision, but some
are having second thoughts about
the wisdom of UDI. Business and
industrial leaders, who last year
declared that UDI would have dis-
astrous economic consequences for
Rhodesia, have reaffirmed their
opposition to rash action and
apparently are considering ways
of putting pressure on Smith.
Leading newspapers are encouraging
Smith to consider carefully and
to consult public opinion before
reaching his decision.
Nevertheless, Smith announced
on his return from London that
further negotiations were out of
the question, and that Rhodesia
would probably have itsindepend-
ence by Christmas. He is now so
firmly committed to immediate
action that he will probably have 25X1
to declare UDI before too many
months or resign his off ice.
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s'E~RET
ACCRA TO FlOST AFRICAN SUMMIT MEETING
African heads of~ state and gov-
ernment will convene in the capital
of Ghana from 21 to 2;7 October for
the second time since they estab-
lished the Organization of African
Unity at Addis Ababa in 1963, Most
of the 36 member countries are ex-
pected to be represented at the
meeting, although not~by the top
leader in some cases.
The dispute between radical
Ghana and the conserv tive French-
speaking states, whic~i has threat-
ened to split the OAU;, appears to
have been deferred fo~ the sake of
preserving African un ty. The argu-
ment revolved around ~hanaian Presi-
dent Nkrumah's active support of
subversive elements f om inde;pendent
African countries. T is was dis-
cussed at an emergenc OAU foreign
ministers' conference in June,. which
confirmed the Accra s~te for the
summit in exchange fo Ghana's guar-
antee to expel undesi able political
refugees. Nkrumah ha made taken
compliance, but no on believes he
has given up subversi n, and. some
of the conservatives ay still re-
fuse to attend. ~
Although the OAUconference
will be concerned primarily with
African problems, som touchy East-
West issues may also ~ome up, Mod-
erates, who put Vietnam on they sum-
mit agenda, successfully blocked
preliminary efforts bye radical. mem-
bers to present a one-sided version
of the conflict, and the moderates'
bid to ensure a mild African posi-
tion on Vietnam may well succeed.
The question of Chinese Communist
admission to the UN, on the other
hand, would, if it ari es, be sup-
ported by some moderat s as well
as by the radicals.
Of the specifically African
issues on the agenda, the mot ur-
gent will be the working out~of
responses to a possible unil teral
declaration of independence ~Iby Rho-
desia as well as an OAU Stan on
recent Congo developments, ~re-
vious strong resolutions on he
Portuguese African territori s, on
South Africa's racial polici s and
on its mandate over South Wes Af-
rica,are likely to be reiterated.
There are numerous indi
tions that a disguised form
Nkrumah's old dream of a con
tal union government will be
considerable attention at th
mit,
Diallo Telli, the OAU's
bitious secretary general, m
push to make the OAU the
a-
f
inen-
given
sum-
am-
Y
voice for all aspects of Afr~can
affairs.. In close collabora ion
with Nkrumah and the radical ,
Diallo has apparently writte a
subtle resolution to this of ect
for Ghana to present to the ummit.
A somewhat different pu h to-
ward centralization will com from
Ethiopia, which wants to hou a the
OAU's many commissions in Ad is
Ababa, Ethiopia may also pr pose
holding all future summit meetings
there to avoid repetition of~the
recent disagreement over the Accra
site.
Previous efforts to establish
union government have met with no
success. Many African leader.
have been troubled by recent ~dis-
plays of disunity, however, and
may be more receptive than fo~merl
to such su estions. UNCODED
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.S'L' (.,'KL"1 ' ?.
TSHOMBE OUSTED IN THE CONGO
Congolese President Kasa-
vubu's dismissal of Premier
Tshombd on 13 October almost
certainly presages a period of
political turmoil in Leopoldville.
In essence the conflict be-
tween the two men is a struggle
for the presidency, the locus of
ultimate political pawer in the
Congo. Presidential elections
are due in six months, and the
intervening period is likely to
be marked by vigorous and some-
times violent politicking through-
out the.country.
Kasavubu apparently is
working with Intexior Minister
Nendaka to cut away Tshombd's
power. Evariste Kimba,. whom
Kasavubu named to form a new
government, is a fairly able
politician but lacks a national
political base of his own. He
will be heavily dependent on
Kasavubu's support, an Nendaka's
anti-Tshombd,parliamentary alli-
ance, and probably on the goon
squad.Nendaka is assembling in
Leopoldville..
Tshomb$:seems lil~ely to re-
main in Leopoldva.ll.e for the;
present and to use his consider-
able parliamentary strength to
block attempts by Kimba and
others to form a government.
Under such circumstances Kimba.
faces an uphill struggle in his
efforts to get parliamentary ap-
proval. Given the volatile na-
ture of Congolese polities, how-
ever, his outlook is far from
hopeless.
On the rebel front, the
capture of Fizi cuts off the
last insurgent area with chan-
nels for large-scale supply of
outside aid. Rebel resistance
to Colonel Hoare's.mercenaries
suddenly faded away, but there
apparently are still many insur-
gents in the mountains west of
Fizi,
The. Leopoldville .government
still faces a long campaign to
re-establish its authority in
large sections which remain
rebel infested. In many cases
these are areas where rebel ac-
tivity,. local rivalries, and
banditry are intermixed, where
the populations are frequently
antipathetic to the government,
and where the terrain'provide
a base for antigovernment activ-
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SECRET
Europe
Sweden apparently has not
completely dismissed the pos-
sibility of reviving.its 1948
proposal for a Scandinavian de-
fense pact. In a orecent public
discussion, Prime Minister Er-
lander noted that "pressure from
both East and West"' had prevented
such an alliance i~h 1948 and sub-
sequently led Norway and Denmark
to join NATO. He suggested that
this question mighit again become
topical in 1969 whin the NATO
members may exerci a their op-
tion to withdraw f~om the alli-
ance.
Erlander's~ca',utious allu-
sion to this quest~'on comes at
a time when the mo erate group
he represents is b ing challenged
by the ,younger mor radical wing
of his Social Democratic Party.
Pressure from this faction, which
believes that Swedish nonalign-
ment must give way'to a more pos-
itive foreign policy, has al-
ready led the government to
speak out on such controversial
questions as the U~ role in
Vietnam and disengagement in
Central Europe. I~ the future
Stockholm may feel ompelled to
involve itself mor actively
with sensitive iss,es closer to
home--i.e., Northe~n Europe: and
its position between the Western
and Communist worlds.
The success which this'radi-
cal-group can hope; for in pursu-
ing its objectives will not be
determined in Swedeen alone, but
will depend to a large degree on
Norwegian and Danish opinion as
it is affected by developme is
outside Scandinavia--partic -
larly in Moscow. In recent
years a major objective of o-
viet policy in Northern Eur pe
has been to weaken the NATO com-
mitments of Norway and Denm rk
from NATO. Moscow's sabre- at-
tling actions, however, onl
served to convince most Nor e-
gians and Danes that they could
enjoy no measure of securit~
outside an alliance with th US
and Britain.
This attitude might ch'nge
rapidly if there were a pro onged
detente between the USSR an the
West, if De Gaulle were to ~vith-
draw France from meaningf ul par-
ticipation in the alliance, and
if Bonn's pursuit of a grea er
role in its nuclear activit'es
revives latent fears of Wes
Germany. Under such condit'ons,
public opinion might look b yond
NATO for other solutions to the
problem of national securit
Both Oslo and Copenhagen al eady
are under domestic pressure to
hold referendums before com it-
tingtheir governments to co
tinued membership in NATO.
If Norway and Denmark were
to contemplate withdrawing rom
NATO, all three Scandinavia
countries would have to rec n-
sider the basic question of
whether their combined popu ation
and resources would be adeq ate
to organize and maintain a ~e-
fense credible enou h to deter
aggression.
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Western Hemisphere
THE CANADIAN ELECTION CA MPAIGN
The campaign for Canada's 8
November parliamentary election
is beginning to heat up although
few issues are well defined at
this point. Tory chief John
Diefenbaker and leaders of the
minority New Democratic and So-
cial Credit parties have charged
Prime Minister Pearson's Liberal
government with incompetence and
corruption, and have criticized
its auto trade agreement with
the US.
Diefenbaker appears to have
lost considerable ground since
the last election. There is a
general feeling in-Tory circles
that the charismatic quality
which propelled him into office
twice before is lacking this time.
Nevertheless, Diefenbaker hopes
to benefit from dissatisfaction
of farmers with the government's
agricultural policies, and the
Tories are reported showing more
strength in the wheat belt than
in 1963.
New Democratic chief Douglas
and Social Credit leader Thompson
are stumping the country in ef-
forts labeled by some commentators
as decisive for their respective
parties. They are given little
chance of substantially increas-
ing their parties' small repre-
sentations in Commons, and Thomp-
son may himself not be returned
to Parliament. The New Democrats
are making a special effort to
capitalize on discontent among
@uebec farmers, and are given a
good chance to win several seats
from that province.
Pearson has yet to take an
active role in the campaign. The
US Embassy in Ottawa views this
as being in harmony with Liberal
Party strategy which dictates
that he remain aloof from politi-
cal activity as a conscientious
prime minister concerned with af-
fairs of state. The decision to
protect Pearson from the rough-
and-tumble of political campaign-
ing also reflects his aversion
to politicking and the fear that
unfavorable comparisons could be
drawn with Diefenbaker's popular
style.
~ I The latest
Gallup poll shows over 4$ percent
of decided voters favoring the
Liberals compared with 28 percent
for the Conservatives. The Lib-
erals have gained in every region
since the last survey of polit-
ical standings in July. At the
same time, however, the undecided
segment among the voting popula-
tion has reached a new high. Na-
tionally the level of undecided
is 36 percent--up 6 percent since
July. Even in Quebec, a Liberal
stronghold, the undecided voters
now number 42 percent.
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As preparations for the
Dominican Republic's expected
elections get under way, anti-
Americanism is likely to grow,
both as an excuse for the coun-
try's problems and as an easy
way to popularity.
The autonomous Confedera-
tion of Christian Trade Unions,
for instance, reportedly plans
to join the campaign against the
presence of foreign troops--not
because it doubts the Inter-Amer-
ican Peace Force is necessary to
stability in the republic, but
because it feels it must do so
to keep its membership. The pro-
visional-government is urging the
IAPF to hold on to its unpopular
public-order duties rather than
turn them over to the Dominican
police, while at the same time
the government-controlled radio
station is attacking the IAPF
for doing so.
Important progress was made
on extending government control
over the rebel zone in Santo
Domingo when, on 13 October, rebel
military troops started moving
to an IAPF camp outside the
zone, This makes easier the work
of government police, who began
occupying the zone earlier in
the week, It also raises the
question as to whether President
Garcia Godoy will not be ab:Le to
deal effectively with extreme
leftist attempts to infiltrate
government departments and take
over various institutions. He
has insisted that he could not
do so until the rebel zone was
disbanded.
The leaders of the two main
political parties--Juan Bosch
of the Liberal Dominican Revo-
lutionary Party (PRD) and Joaquin
Balaguer of the conservative :~e-
formist Party--both are repre-
senting themselves to the U8
Embassy as moderates. Balaguer
apparently is using his influence
with the military leadership to
urge patience with Garcia Godoy
in his problems with the left.
Bosch claims to be shacked by
the extend of Communist penetra-
tion of his party. The PRD lead-
ership plans to enlist the aid
of a labor expert from Venezuela
to regain control from the Com-
munists of its own labor organi-
zation, and $oscn has put out
vague feelers to the US Embassy
about cooperation with US offi-
cials and Balaguer on "anti-
communist" strategy in the com-
ing months. Bosch is, however,
so embittered about the US inter-
vention that more and more of his
supporters say his judgment on
all issues is clouded.
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SECRET -
The country remains bitterly
divided, with its basic problems
far from solution, The longer
it takes Garcia Godoy to put the
rebels under firm government
control the more difficult his
job will be, a.nd the more frus-
tra.ted and desperate right-wing
"vigilante" groups are likely to
ECUADOR'S MILITARY JUNTA REMAINS UNCHALLENGED
Ecuador's military junta
went unchallenged during the 9
Jctober celebration of the 145th
anniversary of Gua.ya.quilts inde -
pendence from Spain, an occasion
when the boisterous regionalism
of that coastal city has often
found expression in antigovern-
ment demonstrations. Although
opportunists were prepared to
exploit disturbances, the national
police were ready and politicians
proved unable to concert action,
Despite this failure, the
political parties remain deter-
mined to press the regime to
accelerate or otherwise alter its
plan for return to constitutiana.l
rule by September 1966, Basically
distrusted by the people, poli-
ticians have shown no ability
to arouse support since their
maximum effort of July, The
junta. has played upon traditional
religious attitudes by announc-
ing that it will consider sub-
sidizing parochial schools, a
ploy designed to divide the anti-
clerical Liberals and Socialists
from the Conservatives a.nd hinder
formation of an effective a.nti-
junta. ad hoc coalition.
Only repercussions of a
sharply declining economy or
exacerbation of the perennial
boundary problem with Peru now
appear able to threaten the gov-
ernment s resolve to maintain
the pace of its present transi-
tion plan.
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REPERCUSSIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
President Castello Branca
is attempting to ease the ten-
sions caused by heated reactions
of political and military leaders
to results of Brazil's 3 October
gubernatorial elections. The
government's present difficulties
stem from the strong showing made
by several candidates of the So-
cial Democratic Party (PSD) who
are linked to opposi~lon forces.
Many senior army officers have
blamed Castello Branco for the
outcome, charging that subver-
sive and corrupt politicians will
now have access to influential
positions, particularly in the
politically important states of
Guanabara and Minas Gerais,
Partly as a result of pres-
sure from the military, the ad-
ministration is planning to pre-
sent several proposals to Con-
gress designed to increase the
federal government?s authority,
especially over security matters,
at both the national and state
levels. ~
Governor Carlos Lacerda, a
presidential contender and pres-
ent governor of Guanabara, has
added to the administration's
troubles by increasing his severe
attacks on Castello Branco. In
several public statements during
the past week, Lacerda accused
the President of betraying the
March 1964 revolution and fai~1-
ing to provide effective leader-
ship. Lacerda's renewed outbursts
reflect his anger at the loss to
his personal prestige caused by
his personal candidate's defeat
in the Guanabara gubernatorial
race. Lacerda has announced that
he may withdraw as a candidate
for the presidency until his
party, the National Democratic
Union (UDN), has considered
whether or not it wants to con-
tinue with his nomination..
Castello Branco,-with the
cooperation of War Minister Costa
e Silva, seems to have succeeded,
at least for the moment, in re-
assuring the armed forces that
the regime intends to remain firm
against subversion and corruption.
At the same time he has pledged
to uphold the election results.
Political conditions will
remain unsettled, however, as
the various power elements vie
for advantage. The government
will have to reappraise its re-
lations both with the UDN, which
now generally supports Castello
Branco, and with the restrengthened
Social Democrats,
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SECRET ~'
United Nations
FRANCE TRIES TO CURB UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S POWERS
France has seized upon the
Kashmir crisis to revive issues
regarding the future development
of the United. Nations. The main
objective as in the past is to
assure the maintenance of great-
power predominance through the
Security Council.. The result will
be to curb the role and influ-
ence of the secretary general and
his staff, particularly in peace-
keeping operations.
The French delegation has
been vigorously maintaining that
the Security Council should have
complete authority over all de-
tails of Secretary General Thant's
actions with regard to financing
and staffing the UN observer
groups in Kashmir. The resolu-
tion the French have proposed. for
Security Council approval would
set budgetary. limits, approve
measures. taken so far, anal au-
thorize the secretary general to
recruit more personnel to a cer-
tain limit.
The French have always main-
tained that the Security Council
must approve financing as well as
the initiation of peacekeeping op-
erations. They have said they in-
tend to produce a definitive.
change in the practice previously
followed by the Security Council
and seem unconcerned by Western
warnings that such a change would
enable the USSR to impose spe-
cific requirements for these
operations, such as troika com-
position of forces.
The French atfiitude also
reflects Le Gaulle's distaste
for any multilateral encroach-
ment on national sovereignty.
According to members of the
French delegation, it was
France's experience with the
"usurpation of power" by the
EEC Commission that has influ-
enced its present determination
to check similar usurpation by
the UN Secretariat.
The. controversy recalls -
the split over the Congo opera-
tion which led to'the financial
crisis of the past year. Both
the Soviet Union and France then
maintained that the secretary
general had gone beyond his au-
thority in the Congo. They now
are arguing the same for Kashmir.
The Soviets are probably
happy to have France taking the
lead in trying to limit the --
power of the secretary general.
Soviet delegate Morozov has pro-
fessed "dismay" that Thant has
gone beyond his mandate and com-
plained that the- council in its
resolutions of 20 and 27.Septem-
ber did-not give him "carte
blanche."
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