SPECIAL REPORT BELIGIAN TECHNICAL AND MILITARY AID TO THE CONGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005000080002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For
BELGIAN TECHNICAL AND ?MILITARYAIE`-'rO'THE CONGO
ARMY review(s) completed.
1 October 1965
Copy N
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State Dept. review completed
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BELGIAN TECHNICAL AND MILITARY AIL TO THE CONGO
Belgian technical and military assistance, de-
spite its many failings, is nontheless the key ele-
ment in the rehabilitation of the Congo. The various
aid programs involve over 2,500 people and an annual
expenditure of some 80 million--a major undertaking
for a nation with a shortage of skilled workers and
chronic budgetary problems. The programs have en-
abled the Belgians to maintain considerable politi-
cal leverage in the Congo and to ensure in some
measure the security of the $3-billion investment
of Belgian business there. However, there is lit-
tle likelihood that the technical assistance pro-
grams will ever be adequately staffed and financed,
reorganized to exclude the self-interested and in-
effective personnel, and able to train the Congolese
to the extent necessary to permit them to establish
a viable, long-term civil administration. The pic-
ture on the military side is brighter, because the
Belgian logistics effort has been quite successful,
and all reports indicate that Belgian retraining of
the Congolese Army may prove effective.
The Belgian technical as-
sistance effort in the Congo con-
sists of two basic programs--one
comprising some 2,000 "working
level" technicians, the other
consisting of 62 administrators
organized in administrative teams
with considerable authority over
their counterpart Congolese of-
ficials, Congolese in subordinate
positions, and the general popu-
lation. The personnel of both
programs are concentrated in the
areas of large-scale Belgian in-
vestment--some 1,300 in the min-
ing regions of Katanga in the
southeast and the rest in the
rebel-torn plantation areas of
the north and east.
The Belgian program au-
thorizes a T/O of 2,050 person-
nel, about two thirds of them
teachers, under the regular
technical assistance program.
Page 1
This undertaking represents for
the most part a continuation of
the Belgian participation in
civil administration of the co-
lonial period under a technical
assistance program. It retains
many of the personnel and much
of the organization ol~ its pred-
ecessor, but a measure of Congo-
lese management and financing
has been added.
Most of the Belgians had
served in the Congo prior to
1960; many left the country for
some months or years during the
chaos that followed independence,
only to return when a semblance
of order began to be restored.
Others left during the continu-
ing rebellion in the northeast,
causing a net loss of 244 tech-
nical personnel between 1963 and
1964. (See table on Page 2).
Belgium's financial contri-
bution to the program this year
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elgian' Regular Technical Assistance
Personnel in tie Bongo
TECHNICAL SKILL a
AUT4ORIZED
Education
1219
Public Health
260
Economics and Finance
118
Agriculture
103
Justice
94
Communications
79
Public Works
65
Police
63
Other
49
TOTAL
2050
1964
ACTUAL
1219
1199
202
187
116
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108
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Not Available
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is $19 million, most of which
will go to pay and equip the
Belgian technicians. Belgium
gives the Congo no financial aid
on a grant basis; it has not
done so since independence, un-
less the servicing of the Congo-
lese national debt--$44 million
in 1965--is included in this
category. Brussels has offered a
$20-million credit in the form
of a short-term, 7.5-percent
interest loan, but Leopoldville
is showing little enthusiasm
for it.
Administrative Teams
The first administrative
team began its duties in October
1964 at Kamina. These teams
were established in early 1964
to provide high-level Belgian
direction and control of the
civil administration which might
facilitate its rehabilitation.
The teams must parallel a Congo-
lese administration, not supplant
it. They are limited to areas
of pressing need and of immediate
Belgian concern, mainly because
the Belgians do not provide the
resources for a nationwide pro-
gram.
The basic team was to con-
sist of a chief, an agronomist,
a public works expert, an econo-
mist, and a financial affairs
specialist. In practice the
teams have had from 2 to 12 mem-
bers, with skills and specialties
depending on the needs of the
designated areas.
Recruitment in Belgium has
been slow--many of the personnel
are "Congo hands," some have been
drawn from the regular techni-
cal assistance program. The
Belgian Government provides
only $100,000 annually to sup-
port the teams.
Of the 64 administrators
who are to make up the teams,
51 are in place and 11 others
are expected to arrive by 1
November. In addition to the
12 locations for which teams
are authorized, the Belgians
are considering extension to
four others, and the US is urg-
ing the inclusion of an addi-
tional 10. (See map on page 2)
Evaluation
Belgian technicians appar-
ently account for virtually
everything that is being done
in their areas of competence,
but the programs are poorly
planned and managed, inadequately
financed, and achieving far less
than their potential. There is
little coordination and coopera-
tion between the Belgians and
the Congolese, but both parties
seem to prefer it that way.
The Belgians like having a free
hand, and the Congolese are
content to have the Belgians
do the work.
Officials in Brussels, how-
ever, feel little sense of ur-
gency in filling personnel and
material commitments to the
Congo, since Belgian public
opinion is at best apathetic on
the matter. Consequently, the
government's effort varies with
the intensity of the pressures
from the Belgian Embassy in Leo-
poldville, Belgian business in-
terests in the Congo, and the
United States Government.
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Both Jean Cordy, the coor-
dinator of the regular technical
assistance program, and Jacques
Brassine, chief of the adminis-
trative teams, have shown an
interest in extending their
present mandates and programs
to include the training of the
local administrators required
to meet the needs of the Congo.
Cordy has been particularly frank
in noting that the colonial ad-
vide technical education and
training is the underlying cause
of the present rebellion.
Students in Belgium
Figures for the last aca-
demic year indicate that Congo-
lese were studying in Belgium
under scholarships totaling
$1.58 million. Of this number,
407 were at high-school level,
494 at college level, and 28
at graduate level. In 1960
there were only 76 Congolese
students at the university level
and considerably fewer at the
high-school level.
The students are generally
free to attend the school of
their choice. All scholarship
applicants are tested in the
Congo on their knowledge of
French and mathematics.
About 44 percent of those
at the college level were study-
ing liberal arts, 30 percent
economics and business, and 26
percent sciences, engineering,
and medicine. This is a good
balance, in contrast to the
usual overwhelming preference
for liberal arts among students
from the less developed countries
Military Assistance
The Belgian military aid
program focuses on retraining
the Congolese National Army (ANC)
and providing operational sup-
port for the mercenary and ANC
units that are engaging the reb-
els. Belgium also participates
with the United States and the
Congo in a logistics group which
reviews the Congolese Govern-
ment's expenditure of military
credits.
As of mid-April 1965, ap-
proximately 240 Belgian Army
personnel of all ranks were serv-
ing two-year tours in the Congo.
This number is expected to reach
300 by the end of 1965 and 350
by the end of 1966. The majority
(179) are technical assistants,
about half of whom are assigned
to the ANC training center at
Kitona. The remainder are
advisers to top Congolese offi-
cers or selected ANC units.
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There are also some 50-70
logistic advisers who provide
operational support for the mer-
cenaries and the ANC. They in-
clude infantry troops as well
as supply corps personnel. Their
tour is three months, and their
number varies depending on the
availability of volunteers for
this duty.
The Belgians undertook the
retraining of the ANC by de-
fault. When it was recognized
during the course of the UN op-
eration that this revamping was
vital to the rehabilitation of
the Congo, it was hoped that
the UN or a combination of West-
ern states would accept the
task. The indecision of the
former and the fears of the lat-
ter that massive WVestern partici-
pation would raise the specter
of neocolonialism caused the
Belgians to step in.
This program now is con-
sidered a vital part of the Bel-
gians' effort to establish their
influence over the chief secu-
rityorgansof the central gov-
ernment. It was many months af-
ter the initial agreement was
made with Premier Adoula in
1963 and reaffirmed by Tshomb6
in mid-1964 that the Belgians
commenced their effort in Novem-
ber of 1964.
The Kitona Project
The Belgians have staked
the success of their retraining
program on a single effort, the
Kitona project. This calls for
the training of three battalions
totaling 1,800 men annually,
although the number presently
in training is probably closer
to 1,200 and only two battalions
will be ready this year.
Belgians serve as instructor-
advisers; much of the equipment
is provided by the United States.
All recruits must have a minimum
of four years of primary school-
ing. They are screened and rec-
ommended for the program by the
Belgians, but the ANC has the
final say on their participation.
The course includes six months
of basic infantry training and
four months of specialized train-
ing in weapons, communications,
and the like.
The key elements and most
controversial aspect of the pro-
gram is the use of Belgian. offi-
cers as instructors during the
training phase and as advisers
when the battalions move to the
field. A Belgian will be at the
elbow of each battalion and
company commander, but the ad-
viser's de facto command authority
will depend on his personal rela-
tionship with his Congolese coun-
terpart.
All reports from Kitona indi-
cate that this aspect of the pro-
gram is working well during the
training phase in spite of occa-
sional Congolese hostility toward
the Belgians. Whether this will
carry over to a field situation
where Belgians will necessarily
be advising Congolese to take ac-
tion against Congolese is ques-
tionable. The Belgians hope to
minimize friction by segregating
the Kitona trainees as much as
possible from the rest of the
ANC.
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The first Kitona-trained bat-
talion moved to Stanleyville in
late August and is preparing to
take on security responsibilities
in that area. If this unit and
those that follow prove effective,
they will gradually take over the
functions now performed by mercen-
aries.
It is hoped that all ANC of-
ficers and NCOs will eventually
pass through the Kitona training
center. At present about 100 are
trained annually in Belgium.
The Belgian Air Force Role
The Belgian Air Force (BAF)
program is separate from the
regular Belgian-Congolese mili-
tary assistance agreement, but is
likely to be brought under it
during the current renegotiation
of the pact. The 165 officers
and airmen involved are rotated
every three months.
Morale, once a problem, now
is high, and requests for reas-
,Gi;nment to this duty have been
numerous since the Belgians be-
came active in the black market.
It was concern with this activity
which brought the BAF chief of
staff to the Congo in May 1965.
However, he was more impressed
by the sharp improvement in mor-
ale than by the potential antago-
nisms that might develop between
the Belgians and Congolese be-
cause of such activities.
against the rebels in the east
and northeast. Combat air opera-
tions are conducted for the
most part by mercenaries.
The training of Congolese
pilots and airmen is being car-
ried out by the Italian Air
Force mission. Difficulties
have developed between the Bel-
gian and Italian missions, the
Belgians being torn between
their fear of any potential
challenge to their position and
their desire to have other nations
bear some of the manpower and
financial burdens. At present
the latter consideration, aug-
mented by pressure from the
United States, predominates and
the Belgians are supporting a
continuation of the Italian ef-
fort.
All BAF personnel were
scheduled to leave the Congo by
the end of September 1965 under
an agreement reached at Belgian
urging during Ambassador-at-
large Harriman's visit to Brus-
sels in March 1965, but it was
later agreed that they would
remain as long as deemed neces-
sary. The US had maintained con-
tinuous pressure on the Belgians
to remain until an adequate al-
ternative could be found. The
lessening of BAF agitation for
withdrawal after the chief of
staff's May trip also contributed
to the government's decision to
continue the operation.
During their three-month
tour Belgian pilots fly between
100 and 125 hours each in six
C-47s and a single C-54 to pro-
vide supplies for the mercenary
and ANC units which are active
Any increase or even a con-
tinuation at the present level
would probably require NATO
acceptance of a further weaken-
ing of Belgium's capacity to ful-
fill its commitment to the de-
fense of Europe.
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The Logistics Group
A logistics group was es-
tablished in early 1965, and is
supported by credits of $4 mil-
lion from the Congo, $2 million
from Belgium, and $2 million
worth of equipment from the
United States. It was conceived
by the Belgians to ensure a
measure of control over the ANC
and to secure a formal material
commitment from the United States.
The chiefs of the Belgian and
US military missions and the com-
mander in chief of the ANC com-
prise the group, and must unani-
mously pass on the ANC's expendi-
ture of the available fund.
The group also advises the
Congolese Government on the spend-
ing of its own defense budget,
but formal checks are difficult,
because of third-country purchases
and the like. It was in this
forum, however, that the US and
Belgium were able to convince Gen-
eral Mobutu, the Congolese Army
chief, to scale down his dreams
of a 100,000-man army to a more
easily financed, trained, and
disciplined one of 25,000.
Belgians comprise a large
part of one of the principal
mercenary battalions, the 6th
Commando. At the beginning of
the year the unit numbered some
330, spread around in various
locations which it garrisons
throughout the Congo. The qual-
ity of the soldiers of the 6th
is generally low and most of the
real fighting is done by the
South African 5th Commando, led
by Colonel Hoare. The 6th per-
forms a valuable function, how-
ever, by freeing the more ef-
fective South Africans for ac-
tive duty. The 6th is not part
of the Belgian assistance pro-
gram, but is paid and equipped
by the Congolese Government.
Also present in the Congo
are a considerable number of
Belgians hired as "industrial
guards" by plantations and fac-
tories in locations exposed to
rebel harassment. There are, for
example, Belgians guarding a
textile mill north of Albert-
ville, a tin mine in Kivu, and
a palm oil plantation near Bumba
which has frequently been subject
to rebel attack.
Many of the problems be-
setting the technical assistance
program also hamper the military
aid effort. The Belgian public
is apathetic; planning seldom
goes beyond the project of im-
mediate concern; funds are lack-
ing; and the personnel, all
volunteers, are generally not
first rate, as service in the
Congo is not helpful to a career
in the European-oriented Belgian
armed forces.
There are few in the De-
fense Ministry who believe in
the Congo involvement and few
who have any sympathy for the
renuests for men and materiel
coming from the Congo. More-
over, the more sympathetic For-
eign Ministry has little influ-
ence on the Defense Ministry un-
der the Belgian constitutional
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system, which emphasizes the in-
dependence of individual minis-
tries.
The Belgian chiefs of staff
are scheduled to visit the Congo
this fall to familiarize them.-
selves with the locations and
situations mentioned in the con-
tinuing requests for support.
The trip comes at a time when
the Defense Ministry is under
pressure to trim its budgetary
estimates, and the chiefs prob-
ably regard the Congo allocations
as the most expendable. On a
more positive note, however, it
has been suggested that these
officers have finally come to
accept the fact of a long-term
commitment to the Congo.
Most of the Belgian public
and many officials in the Belgian
Government are unenthusiastic
about or openly hostile to the
Belgian involvement in the Congo.
A few powerful financial interests
and government officials, however,
are able to exert enough influ-
ence to ensure a continuation
of Belgian assistance, as long
as they believe that in some
measure these programs are safe-
guarding Belgian commercial in-
terests in the Congo. At the
same time, the efforts of these
interested officials vary with
the intensity of the pressure
from the US--a pressure to which
Foreign Minister Spaak, in par-
ticular, has responded.
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The Belgian Government may
at times threaten to discontinue
its aid to exert leverage on the
Congolese political scene, but
it seems unlikely to carry out
such threats barring a complete
breakdown of Belgian-Congolese
relations. The Belgians are
easily riled by Congolese criti-
cisms, such as the recent attacks
on the technical assistance pro-
gram by Interior Minister Nendaka,
but at the same time they are
willing to learn to live with
just about any Congolese poli-
tician.
The Belgian Government
which took office in July 1965
has shown every indication of
implementing its pledge to put
forth a balanced budget for the
next fiscal year. To the Belgian
voter, cuts in defense and foreign
aid expenditures are much more
palatable.than a decrease in his
social benefits or an increase
in his tax burden. Moreover,
if a reduction in defense spend-
ing must come, the defense es-
tablishment would first seek a
substantial cutback in the Congo
operation.
Spaak and other interested
officials can probably keep the
aid effort going at its present
level, but any chance of increas-
ing it is slight. A markedly
demonstrable success of either the
technical or military assistance
programs would greatly strengthen
their position. The Kitona
training program seems to be the
best hope of rovidin such a suc-
cess.
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