WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900120001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

IState Dept. review completed
DIA review
completed.
SUMMARY
ARMY Review
Completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, A
ENCY
G
OFFICE OF CURRENT" . INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
downgrading and decIassrfication
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(Information as of noon EDT, 22 July 1965)
VIETNAM
Hanoi's invitation to Ghanaian President Nkrumah, follow-
ing its rejection of the Commonwealth Peace Mission, is
presumably aimed at winning sympathy from Afro-Asian
states it considers neutral. Both Hanoi and Peiping
this week declared new determination to continue the
war until the US is driven out of Vietnam, and a joint
communique issued in Peiping suggests substantial new
Chinese aid commitments. Peiping evidently hopes that
the Viet Cong will keep up the momentum of their offen-
sive in the South in the face of the US military build-up
there, but that offensive has decreased in intensity
for the second week.
CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD BERLIN
Moscow has been extremely cautious in its actions in
the highly sensitive Berlin area at a time when the
Vietnam conflict is increasing frictions in Soviet-US
relations.
USSR BECOMING MORE ACTIVE IN WESTERN MARKETS
With Soviet purchases of Western manufacturing plants
beginning to firm up, the USSR is making new efforts to
increase its exports to earn hard currency for financing
its imports.
SOVIET CROP PROSPECTS DETERIORATE
Insufficient rainfall makes the outlook for the spring
wheat crop especially bleak, and significant new grain
imports may be necessary this year.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN POLAND
While there is probably no substance to rumors that Go-
mulka is ill and about to be replaced, they reflect the
widespread dissatisfaction with the party leader's stub-
bornly conservative policies.
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fir/ +JL' UKn,lj
Asia-Africa
NEW YEMENI GOVERNMENT FIRMLY PRO-EGYPTIAN
The Amri cabinet is under Egyptian control despite the
inclusion of several members of ex-premier Numan's "third
force" group. It will probably lose important tribal
support, dimming the prospects of ending the civii'war..
INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND THE KUTCH AFTERMATH
Both sides learned hard lessons In the crisis over the
Rann of Kutch and, having backed away from their long-
threatened military confrontation, may be less inclined
to allow future problems to reach such dangerous propor-
tions.
REBELS STEP UP ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN 12
The well-armed rebels control most of the southern hin-
terland and are successfully resisting the government's
military offensive. Khartoum has virtually given up
trying for a political solution.
MAURITANIA MOVING TO THE LEFT 14
Mauritania's recent recognition of Communist China and
withdrawal from the moderate African and Malagasy Common
Organization ` reflect its increasing alignment with'the
radical Arab and African states.
POLITICAL SHOWDOWN IN LEOPOLDVILLE CONGO MAY BE NEAR 16
President Kasavubu has clearly indicated during the
past week that he intends to cut Premier Tshombe down
to size, if not force him to resign. Tshomb6's reac-
tion is uncertain, but a showdown may be in the offing.
NEW INSTABILITY IN BRAZZAVILLE CONGO MAY BENEFIT LEFTISTS 17
The leftists stand to gain more influence following last
week's abortive terrorist actions, apparently staged by
followers of conservative ex-President Youlou. The re-
gime has reacted frantically, and a general breakdown of
order could result.
Europe
THE GREEK POLITICAL CRISIS
King Constantine's ouster of Premier Papandreou brought
the long-developing government crisis to a head. No com-
promise is yet in sight, and military intervention cannot
be precluded.
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SL' (.'KL'1 ' "fle
EEC COUNCIL TO MEET DESPITE FRENCH BOYCOTT
The EEC Commission, hoping either to end France's boy-
cott or underscore its isolation, may table a revised
proposal on agricultural financing which, by sidestep-
ping "political" aspects of the original plan, is con-
ciliatory toward the French.
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS STILL UNRESOLVED
Political negotiations continue to dominate the still-
confused Dominican scene. The unwillingness of either
side to compromise on what it considers basic principles
is impeding a settlement.
UNEASY CALM IN ECUADOR 22
The curfew has been lifted in rebellious Guayaquil and
economic life has returned to normal, but martial law con-
tinues in effect and students remain extremely restive.
COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT REQUESTS SPECIAL POWERS
In opening the regular session of Congress, Valencia
sought many economic reforms, including those not en-
acted by the 12-week special session just ended. New
Finance Minister Vallejo may be able to enlist the sup-
port of the generally cynical public.
SECRET
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AJL
World-wide
PROSPECTS FOR EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE MEETING
A treaty to curb proliferation of nuclear weapons is
likely to be the main focus of discussion when the ENDC
reconvenes in Geneva next week, but prospects for agree-
ment are poor.
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SECRET -
There have been several re-
cent indications of an increas-
ing warmth in Sino-Vietnamese
relations. Two North Vietnamese
politburo-level delegations in
Peiping last week expressed ef-
fusive praise for Chinese as-
sistance to the DRV in contrast
with a more perfunctory expres-
sion of gratitude for Soviet aid
a week earlier.
Hoang Van Hoan--on the first
leg of a friendship visit to
China, North Korea, Mongolia,
and the USSR--in a 15 July speech
described Chinese aid to Vietnam
as "the firmest, the most power-
ful, and the most effective,"
and called China "the most en-
thusiastic and resolute comrade-
in-arms of all nations fighting
against the imperialists." Hoan
also credited the Chinese with
"holding high the banner of anti-
revisionism." This is the first
open attack on revisionism by a
Vietnamese politburo member
since last fall, and seems
clearly critical of Moscow.
The language of a joint com-
mumiqud signed by a high-level
DRV economic delegation in Pei-
ping on 17 July was along similar
lines. It noted "enormous sup-
port" and "steadfast" assistance
already received from China and
paid tribute to "beloved and re-
spected" Mao Tse-tung. The com-
muniqud stated that new Chinese
economic and technical aid had
been granted with a view to
"jointly defeating" the US. The
tenor of the communiqud suggests
that Peiping may have extended
substantial new commitments in
an effort to ensure that the
morale and momentum of the Viet-
namese Communist offensive will
riot be affected by the US mili-
tary build-up in Vietnam.
Neither the Peiping nor the
Moscow communique spelled out
the form or amount of assistance
but both indicated that the new
aid pacts were in part aimed at
improving North Vietnamese mili-
tary defense capabilities.
The agreement signed by the
same DRY delegation the previous
week in Moscow made no reference
to gratuitous assistance and de-
scribed the talks only as "cordial
conversations" in a "spirit of
complete understanding."
While seeking military sup-
port from other members of the Com-
munist bloc, the, North Vietnamese
are also attempting to win sym-
pathy from Afro-Asian states they
probably consider at least neutral.
They have invited Ghanaian Presi-
dent Nkrumah to visit the DRV in
a personal capacity and not as
part of the Commonwealth Peace
Mission. In rejecting the mission
itself, the North Vietnamese, had
few qualms about the sensitivities
of the British but they want to
avoid offending its other members.
A delegation headed by Ghana's
high commissioner ambassador in
the UK, Kwasi Armah, left London
for Hanoi on 20 July apparently
to pave the way for Nkrumah, who
is reportedly scheduled to go there
within a week.
While making this gesture
toward reasonableness, the North
Vietnamese have also made it clear
that negotiations to settle the
SECRET
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T*W Mw
Pei-f'un
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NORTH :.,-tying-ming
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'Rung Sat Special Zone (VNN)
Division
The Indochina - South China Area
__ South Vietnamese military
boundaries
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*awl SL G'RL'i *r
war are not what they have in
mind. On 19 July, Ho Chi Minh,
speaking at a celebration com-
memorating the 1954 Geneva Ac-
cords, said that the Vietnamese
Communists intended to fight on
to victory if it takes five, ten,
or twenty years.
This line was echoed by the.
Chinese in a 20 July People's
Daily editorial which asserted
that the withdrawal of US troops
was "the basic point and the most
important prerequisite" for a
Vietnam settlement and that there
was "no point" in talking about
other aspects so long as US
forces remain. Emphasizing
Peiping's determination to see
that fighting continues until
the US is driven out, the edi-
torial warned that, if necessary,
the war will be carried on by
generations to come.
The Fighting in the South
Viet Cong activity has de-
creased for the second consecu-
tive week, with a concomitant
reduction of casualties on both
sides. The one battalion-size
Viet Cong attack, on 14-15 July,
resulted in 130 casualties in
two government companies defend-
ing a regimental headquarters in
northern Binh Duong Province,
north of Saigon. On 19-20 July,
after inflicting nearly 90 cas-
ualties in a night-long attack
on a government Special Forces
camp at Bu Dop in adjacent Phuoc
Long Province, the Viet Cong
withdrew under pressure of air
attacks but have continued to
harass the camp intermittently.
Scattered attacks against dis-
trict towns in the I, II, and
III Corps zones have continued,
as have acts of sabotage against
lines of communication.
On the government side, 12
battalions with supporting engi-
neer, artillery, and air units
on 16 July launched a major clear-
ing operation along Route 19
linking the port of Qui Nhon with
the highland provincial capital
of Pleiku. For several months,
effective Viet Cong control of
this highway had prevented land
resupply shipments. A strike ex-
ecuted by B-52 SAC bombers from
Guam on 17 July assisted Viet-
namese marines in clearing a
chokepoint at Mang Yang Pass,
and several supply convoys have
since moved over the road en-
countering no Viet Cong resist-
ance. To the south, two rein-
forced government battalions were
also unopposed in conducting a
three-day road-clearing operation
last week along Route 15, connect-
ing Bien Hoa with the port city
of Vung Tau. In an earlier road-
clearing operation on Route 1 near
the Quang Nam - Quang Tin Province
border area, however, government
troops attacked a Viet Cong am-
bush position on 15 July and in-
curred 122 casualties while kill-
ing 174 Viet Cong and taking 145
suspects.
On the basis of interrogation
reports and captured documents,
the US Military Assistance Command
in Saigon reports an increase of
4,450 in Viet Cong combat strength
for a new estimated total of 53,000
combat regulars. The increase re-
sults in part from the filling out
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of existing units, but includes
the confirmation of four addi-
tional Viet Cong battalions.
Meanwhile, the arrival of com-
bat elements of the US First
Division and additional logistic
personnel has increased Ameri-
can strength in. South Vietnam
to almost 73,000.
South Vietnamese Politics
The political situation in
South Vietnam remains generally
quiet. Chief of State General
Thieu, speaking on 20 July at a
major rally in Saigon marking
the anniversary of the 1954 Ge-
neva Accords as a "day of shame,"
declared the agreements and the
line dividing North and South
Vietnam "no longer valid." Gen-
uine peace, he said, would come
only when the Communists had
been driven out of all of Viet-
nam. Thieu's speech and simi-
lar recent remarks by Premier
Ky are part of an intensified
effort to whip up stronger popu-
lar support for the war effort.
Some rumblings of dis-
content with the new military
regime continue to be heard,
although the death of Colonel
Pham Ngoc Thao removes one per-
sistent coup plotter from the
scene. Thao, a militant Catho-
lic involved in several plots
to overthrow various administra-
tions in Saigon over the past few
years, reportedly died of wounds
suffered when he was ambushed by
security forces on 16 July. His
death, and a subsequent govern-
ment suspension of a militant
Catholic newspaper in Saigon,
could stir new resentments in
Catholic circles.
SECRET
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SECRET
The Communist World
CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD BERLIN
Moscow has been extremely
cautious in its actions in the
highly sensitive Berlin area at a
time when the Vietnam conflict is
increasing frictions in Soviet-US
relations. Soviet party and gov-
ernment leaders, along with the
Soviet press, have in recent months
avoided any provocative statements
on Berlin and have been careful
not to link events there with So-
viet strategic interests.
Soviet officials in
East Germany (GDR) have played
down the significance of recent
East German moves related to Ber-
lin and have stressed that the So-
viets retain control over such
moves.
Such statements seem primarily
designed to convince the US that
recent GDR actions are merely part
of a campaign to advance East Ger-
man claims of sovereignty and are
not intended to provoke a crisis
over basic Allied rights.
General Petr Koshevoy, com-
mander of Soviet forces in Germany,
told British officers that all pi-
lots, Soviet or East German, "obey
me without question," that he per-
sonally controls all aircraft in
the GDR, and that recent helicopter
violations of the East - West Ger-
man border were "small mistakes"
caused by a lack of radar control
for low-flying aircraft,
He also played down the East
German helicopter flights over
Berlin. No identifiable East Ger-
man helicopter flights near the
West Berlin borders have occurred
since 21 June. Earlier, the Allies
had noted seven helicopter viola-
tions of West Berlin air space,
but the Soviets have not acknowl-
edged any of them.
Koshevoy's line reinforces one
taken earlier by the Soviet coun-
selor in East Berlin. He told the
French minister that there was no
foundation to rumors of a crisis
over Berlin, and that nobody in-
tended to modify the present situa-
tion in Germany.
Since their harassment campaign
to protest the Bundestag session in
West Berlin last April, the Soviets
have insisted that they oppose any
alteration in what they regard as
the status quo (the existence of
"two German states," with West Ber-
lin as a "separate entity" under
temporary Allied occupation).
Koshevoy's remarks indicate
that there will probably be no heli-
copter flights over West Berlin
in the near future. They are, how-
ever, likely'to occur again elsewhere
in the Berlin Control Zone. The
Communists may hope to use the
threat of future flights to press
the Federal Republic for conces
sions on other matters.
the GDR was not planning any
more flights over West Berlin.
In return, it.wanted Bonn to re-
lease funds requested for the sur-
render to West Germany of prisoners
held on a variety of charges.
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.EW BSI C'RE 1 ' Vame
Soviet purchases of manufac-
turing plants in Western markets
are firming up. Negotiations
which have been in process for
some time are now being concluded
or are moving closer to resolu-
tion. New possibilities are be-
ing discussed at high levels--
talks which probably will assure
some results. Moscow's main in-
terest continues to center on the
chemicals production field and on
consumer goods. Most recently,
the Soviets have been seeking of-
fers of an automobile production
facility.
Moscow has not neglected the
export side of its trade with the
West, which must increase to fi-
nance plant imports. The ever-
present threat of crop failures at
home (see next article) and a con-
tinuing requirement to buy grain
abroad--probably at least $175 mil-
lion worth this year--add to the
USSR's chronic need to earn hard
currency. In addition to using
traditional sales promotion meas-
ures to broaden their export markets,
Soviet traders are insisting that
Western suppliers accept from 10 to
100 percent of navment in Soviet
Prospects for the 1965 So-
viet harvest, especially wheat,
have worsened in recent weeks be-
cause of below-average rainfall
over extensive areas. The outlook
for winter wheat is close to nor-
mal, but the spring wheat crop,
which normally accounts for al-
most two thirds of total wheat pro-
duced, has been affected by the
drought. The drought is especially
bad in the New Lands, the major
producing area of spring wheat, and
unless it ends soon, a wheat crop
much below average is likely.
Wheat usually accounts for about
half of Soviet grain production.
At present the situation
does not appear as bad as in
1963, when the USSR bought 12 mil--
lion tons of foreign wheat, The
Soviet minister ox agriculture
has stated, however, that the
USSR plans to import more wheat
during the 1965-66 crop year than
the 3.2 million tons it purchased
during the preceding one. The
USSR has just purchased from
France 300,000 tons of wheat,
perhaps in anticipation of
another poor crop this year.
Prospects for crops other
than grains appear to be about av-
erage at this time. Consequently,
production of these crops in 1965
is not expected to reach the record
or near-record levels produced in
1964. Cotton, because of a reported
shortage of irrigation water and a
slightly reduced acreage, should be
well below the record crops har-
vested in 1963 and 1964.
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USSR: Soil Moisture in the New Lands Area
1963* 1964k 1965*
tPE/ CENT OF" AVERAGE!
Soot
wn, Orals
$4
134
99
Nor?h
eatldrats
43
117
58
Wtste
tis Kutssk4 eta' Men,(
131
229
140
KaaSta
oai -
68
190
86
t n!`
oasss.1
40
142
55
43
162
78
,Awn le
dor,
40
87
49
Weste
rn Sher a,
57
111
?0
A1tay.
Kta
62
124
78
Western Kazakhstan Keay
IF-W
Kostanai
Northern
Kazakhstan
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SECRET
POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN POLAND
According to rumors in War-
saw, party first secretary
Gomulka is seriously ill and
the next party center committee
plenum on 27 July will consider
the question of a successor.
While these rumors are apparent-
ly without substance, they re-
flect the dissatisfaction at
all levels of society with the
stagnation of Polish life which
has resulted from Gomulka's
stubbornly conservative policies.
Ever since his return to
power in October 1956, and es-
pecially after the vicious fac-
tional battles which wracked the
party between 1956 and 1958,
Gomulka has been convinced that
the "Polish October" was too re-
visionistic, too anti-Soviet,
and too anti-Communist. As a
result, he reversed the trend
toward "liberal" economic de-
centralization, reinstalled
hard-line party stalwarts in the
apparatus and in the government,
and strengthened the secret po-
lice in support of the hard-
liners who were trying to create
"order. "
In the economic sphere the
tightening of control was said
to be necessary to achieve rapid
growth in heavy industry--a
necessity for long-run increases
in living standards. In spite
of fairly rapid economic growth
since the late 1950s, however,
consumption and wage levels have
increased only slightly, causing
widespread disillusionment over
regime promises.
Within the past year, the
authority of the party central
committee departments has been
increased to the detriment of
governmental efficiency. Retire-
ments or transfers to innocuous
government jobs of liberals, Jews,
and other suspect persons have
been more numerous. Often such
people are replaced by nominees
of the hard-liners.
The secret police are again
feared, although the mass terror
of the early 1950s has not re-
turned. In addition, the regime
has cautiously attempted, with
varying success, to impose con-
trols or restraints on the ac-
tivities of certain groups.
The cumulative effect of these
measures has been to engender wide-
spread apathy among the Polish
people who see themselves worse off
than ever while the lives of their
East European neighbors are improv-
ing. Moreover, Gomulka's efforts
to improve relations with the USSR
reportedly are being criticized
even by high party members.
It is not clear what course
Gomulka will pursue to cope with
this instability. Because of re-
ported serious party clashes over
how to deal with the economic situa-
tion, he probably will accept lim-
ited economic reforms. However,
given Moscow's continued support,
the influence of the secret police,
and the inertia of the central party
apparatus, he will probably resist
significant changes elsewhere.
Under these circumstances
the prospects are for continued
stagnation in virtually all
fields of activity in Poland.
The resulting frustration may
well lead to a coalition of the
opposing factions in the regime
which could pose the most serious
challenge to Gomulka since his re-
turn to power.
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`"' SECRET
Asia-Africa
NEW YEMENI GOVERNMENT
The new Yemeni cabinet
formed by Major General Amri is
under Nasir's thumb, despite
the inclusion of several members
of former premier Numan's "third
force" group.
Formation of the Amri cab-
inet followed three weeks of
political crisis, inaugurated
by the 1 July resignation of
Premier Numan and complicated by
President Sallal's attempt to
take complete charge. Sallal
apparently appointed himself
premier and announced a 15-man
cabinet which included 13 mili-
tary officers, but his immediate
summons to Cairo suggested Na-
sir's disapproval.
Nasir's discussions with
representatives of opposing
Yemeni factions resulted in
the announcement that Amri, a
former premier and Sallal's
chief lieutenant, was to form
a government, which now in-
cludes six army officers and 13
civilians. Nasir's selection
of a Sallal supporter indicates
his determination to keep Yemeni
affairs firmly in pro-Egyptian
hands.
FIRMLY PRO-EGYPTIAN
rorist operations against the
British-protected Federation of
South Arabia, which had lessened
under Numan.
The government's obvious sub-
servience to Egyptian policy will
probably cost it heavily in terms
of vital tribal support. Abdullah
al-Ahmar, paramount sheikh of the
most powerful tribal confedera-
tion, has not been included in the
cabinet, although he held the
vital post of interior minister
in Amri's previous government as
well as in that of Numan.
Several. anti-Egyptian sheikhs now
in the republican camp are already
making overtures to the royalists,
who still retain the military ini-
tiative. The most important of
these is the sheikh of the 10,000
man tribe from which Prime Minis-
ter Amri originates and from which
the republican government has
usually drawn strong support.
Prospects for an agreement
between Nasir and Saudi King
Faysal are dim, and there are no
indications at present that Nasir
intends to reduce the number of
Egyptian troops committed to
the Yemen civil war--now ester
The revival of the Ministry
for the Affairs of the Occupied
South, dropped by the Numan gov-
ernment, suggests that the Egyp-
tians intend to step up the ter-
mated at 53,000 to 58,000.
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Iftor SECRET VWO
INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND THE KUTCH AFTERMATH
Indian and Pakistani tem-
pers have cooled since the Rann
of Kutch crisis, but mutual sus-
picion and vigilance remain high.
A formal cease-fire has
been in effect in the Rann since
1 July. The troops which were
deployed there have withdrawn
in accordance with the agreement
worked out in London by the Brit-
ish between Indian Prime Minis-
ter Shastri and Pakistani Pres-
ident Ayub.
In the Punjab, withdrawals
have been very slow, with each
side keeping its guard up in
the event of a need for swift
redeployment of forces to the
borders. It seems likely that
both sides of that border will
remain more like armed camps
than they were before.
In Kashmir, the explosive
situation around Kargil has been
defused somewhat, but India's
reinforcement of its three-di-
vision force along the 16-year-
old cease-fire line and the con-
tinued presence of Pakistani
tribal irregulars brought in dur-
ing the Kutch crisis are keeping
tensions up.
In the east, withdrawal
understandings have been hon-
ored more swiftly, but the size
of the forces involved was never
very large. Nevertheless, the
situation remains touchy in the
Dahagram area where fighting--
unrelated to the Kutch affair--
broke out earlier this year.
Indian eviction of Muslims in
the Tripura area continues una-
bated, despite Pakistani pro-
tests.
Politically, neither side
seems to be taking very seriously
ministerial-level meetings sched-
uled for next month. Neither
expects the Rann of Kutch ques-
tion to be resolved in bilateral
negotiations. Each is probably
planning to use the meetings
only to put its position on rec-
ord before the dispute goes to
the arbitration proceedings to
which both agreed in London.
Other and more pressing
foreign policy concerns may soon
overshadow the hard lessons both
sides learned from the confron-
tation in the Rann of Kutch,
but its effect on the power re-
lationships in the subcontinent
will be long felt. Pakistan
has proved it has better sol-
diers, but India has many more
of them. For years each side
has threatened major military
action without facing this fact
squarely. Now the military con-
frontation has passed, and
cooler heads on both sides must
realize that it may only have
been London's intercession that
avoided larger hostilities.
While these lessons do not move
the adversaries any closer to
resolving their long-standing
problems, there is a good chance
both sides will be less inclined
to allow future controversy to
reach such dangerous proportions.
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I _._
ANDHRA
PRADESH
Dat agram
ASSAM
Nor
Frontier
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lJ.L'J .4L%LJ l N%NW
REBELS STEP UP ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN
The rebels in the Sudan's
Negroid southern provinces have
begun a more aggressive campaign,
last week attacking a security
post in the provincial capital
of Juba.
The capabilities of the
rebels have vastly increased ir,
the past six months. They have
taken over large quantities of
modern weapons destined for the
Congolese insurgents and now
control most of the south except
for major garrison towns. The
rainy season, just beginning,
will further hamper army actions
against the rebels.
The government nevertheless
has apparently discarded all ef-
forts to negotiate with the
separatist-minded southerners.
Fearing, moreover, that separa-
tist sentiment may spread to
other provinces, the government
plans to strengthen the security
forces in those bordering the
south.
The army also is still
saddled with handling the Congo-
lese rebel refugees in the border
Berea--reportedly several thousand
strong. Their presence in the
Sudan has encouraged Congolese
Premier Tshombd to cooperate with
the Sudanese insurgents, who in
turn are said to be assisting
Congolese Army reconnaissance and
patrol missions along the border.
In Khartoum, southern leaders
quickly protested the brutal re-
prisals taken against southern
civilians after the clash in Juba
last week, when perhaps as many
as 1,000 southerners were slaugh-
tered. The reaction of the gov-
ernment--which has consistently
minimized casualty figures from
the south--was to close Khartoum's
southern-sponsored newspaper
Vigilant, and to institute spe-
cial security measures to protect
government installations in the
Khartoum area against sabotage.
The regime is still trying
to recruit candidates for two
empty cabinet posts reserved for
the south, but almost all southern
leaders of any stature refuse to
join the government. Meanwhile,
a split within the Sudan African
National Union--the main southern
group--has led to the formation
of still another southern po-
litical faction which calls for
the establishment of the inde-
pendent state of "Azania." Even
if the Khartoum government should
make some serious effort to find
a political solution to the south-
ern problem, it is now nearly im-
possible to discover which group
really speaks for the majority of
southerners.
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"%W Nwo
SUDI1fl
Predominantly Arab Ad Dami
Wad l
ladani
i Malakal
Pred4inantly Negroid
RE!)
SEA
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N.r SECRET
MAURITANIA MOVING TO THE LEFT
Mauritania's recent recog-
nition of Communist China and
withdrawal from the moderate Afri-
can and Malagasy Common Organiza-
tion (OCAM) reflect its increas-
ing alignment with the radical
Arab and African states.
Although Nationalist China
had maintained a chargd in Mauri-
tania since late 1960, its first
ambassador was appointed only
after Peiping showed an interest
in the country. He was en route
to his post when the decision to
recognize the Communist regime
was announced. A Chinese Com-
munist mission, headed by the
ambassador to Tunisia, visited
Nouakchott, Mauritania's capi-
tal, from 16 to 20 July, depart-
ing several hours after the ar-
rival of Taipei's ambassador-
designate. Mauritania has in
the past appeared to favor a
"two Chinas" solution, but now
appears to be trying to force
the Nationalists to bow out.
Earlier this month, Presi-
dent Moktar announced Maur.i-' tania's withdrawal from OCAM, of
which he was titular head. Mok-
tar was apparently dissatisfied
with Ivory Coast President Hou-
phouet-Boigny's manipulation of
OCAM to give an aura of respecta-
bility in African circles to the
detested Moise Tshombd's regime
in the Leopoldville Congo and
to issue anti-Peiping and other
antiradical pronouncements. Mauri-
tania is currently cultivating
Cameroon, the OCAM country whose
African policies are closest to
its own.
The new leftward orientation
has accompanied Mauritania's grow-
ing maturity as a nation. Since
independence, in.1960, Mauritania
has developed its own national
identity and overcome the handi-
cap of Moroccan claims to its en-
tire territory. Moreover, it has
become one of the few new African
states able to function without
extensive foreign aid.
By 1964, Moktar was able to
begin giving a more distinctive
character to his regime. The in-
ternal political structure was
made over on the model of the radi-
cal African states, notably Guinea,
and steps were taken to erase an
international reputation as a
rather unimportant French protegd.
In this connection, several Com-
munist countries, including the So-
viet Union, have been permitted
to open embassies in Nouakchott
since late 1964. Concurrently,
progressive pro-Arab elements in-
creased their influence within the
regime at the expense of the tra-
ditional tribal leaders and the
conservative Negro minority.
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Iftuse Nampo
C ONGC '
GABON REPUBLIC
v R W AN
3c.+; 1,(w~l le O F THE
copoldville
C O N G O
Con mon Organization (OCAM
MALAGASY
RFP0SLIC`
Meonbers of African and Malagasy
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POLITICAL SHOWDOWN IN LEOPOLDVILLE CONGO MAY BE NEAR
Actions and statements this
past week by the Leopoldville
Congo's President Kasavubu
clearly indicate that he is out
to cut Premier Tshombd down to
size, if not to force him to re-
sign. Moreover, Kasavubu appar-
ently has no present intention
of trying to work out a private
agreement with the premier on
sharing the presidential powers.
Kasavubu's seemingly unrelenting
offensive against Tshombd sug-
gests a showdown may be in the
offing, although for the moment
Tshombd is quietly absorbing
these political reverses.
Following his abrupt dis-
missal earlier this month of
Tshombd's henchman, minister of
interior Munongo, Kasavubu gave
Tshombd another slap by appoint-
ing an anti-Tshombist replace-
ment, Victor Nendaka, without
first consulting the premier as
required by the constitution.
Earlier this week Kasavubu
publicly attacked Tshombd's
political party, CONACO, as a
"Katangan" party. He adamantly
insisted that he would not agree
to any changes in the constitu-
tion to meet the desires of the
prime minister. The President
also demanded that a new gov-
ernment of "national unity,"
not dominated by CONACO, be
formed prior to the as yet un-
scheduled opening of parliament.
Tshombd has been insist-
ing that constitutionally his
government should remain in power
until presidential elections, six
months after parliament first
meets. The establishment of a
new government, as opposed to a
reshuffled one, reopens the issue
of Tshombd's parliamentary im-
munity, since a minister in the
new government cannot retain his
parliamentary seat. Tshombd is
clearly worried that his enemies
might arrest him if he loses his
immunity.
Tshombd's possible responses
to Kasavubu's actions are limited.
He can decide to try to oust
Kasavubu by force. This, how-
ever, would be a dangerous move
and seems unlikely. Only two le-
gal courses appear open to him:
to hang on and bide his time, or
resign. If he stays, he will
probably have to swallow the in-
clusion of some of Kasavubu's sup-
porters in the new government.
This, however, would appear pref-
erable to resigning, which would
cost him the prestige and patron-
age of the government in any sub-
sequent contest for the presi-
dency.
The central issue between
the two men could be resolved
if Tshombd should agree to sup-
port Kasavubu's re-election.
He is unlikely to make this de-
cision, however, without firm
guarantees from Kasavubu on
his powers and tenure as pre-
mier.
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v JEGKI;1' NNW
Last week's sabotage and ter-
rorist activity in Brazzaville--
apparently staged by supporters of
conservative ex-President Youlou--
may help leftist extremists in-
crease their already strong influ-
ence in the government. The regime
appears in no danger of being over-
thrown, but its frantic efforts to
combat real and imagined opposition
activity could result in a. general
breakdown of order.
Emergency defense measures
were imposed on 15 July following
unsuccessful attempts to blow up a,
power line and to assassinate two
government ministers, reportedly
made by some 35 to 45 of Youlou's
Leopoldville-based tribal follow-
ers. Elements of Brazzaville's
tiny and undisciplined army, equipped
with Soviet weapons, have be-
gun patrolling the tense capital
city and the Congo River waters
which separate it from Leopold-
ville. In addition, members of
the heavily armed and unpredict-
able youth wing of Brazzaville's
single political party have set up
barricades throughout Brazzaville
and are said to have orders to fire
on anyone refusing to stop. They
reportedly have already stormed a
prison and killed an army sergeant
suspected of "counterrevolutionary"
activity.
Foreign Minister Ganao on 16
July told the US ambassador his
country faced a "full-blown coun-
terrevolution" mounted by Youlou's
Lari tribe. Ganao claimed his
government had captured seven of
the saboteurs who he said had been
furnished with plastic explosives,
US grenades, and Belgian pistols,
presumably by elements of the Leo-
poldville regime. Besides worsen-
ing Brazzaville's already bad re-
lations with Leopoldville, these
incidents could revive charges of
US subversion against Brazzaville.
The party newspaper on 19 July
charged that the grenades used by
the terrorists were "made in USA."
Brazzaville's interior min-
ister has reportedly said that
the "counterrevolutionaries" in-
clude some Lari tribesmen in the
army and other security forces.
Extremists, anxious to bring the
military under the single party's
domination, had earlier demanded
a. purge of the army. A "people's
court" last month allegedly un-
covered antiregime plotting by
some senior officers, and several
military personnel were arrested.
The regime postponed action against
the military, however, and has at-
tempted to maintain an air of
stability during the 18-25 July
All-African Games, for which ath-
letes and dignitaries from some
27 African countries are assembled
in Brazzaville.
The period from now until the
mid-August second anniversary cele-
brations of Youlou's ouster will
be a particularly tense one, dur-
ing which a purge of the army and
possibly some of the remaining
moderates in the cabinet may be
attempted. Although key military
leaders still seem committed to
the regime, overzealous action by
the extremists could bring on
clashes between the youth organi-
zation and the regular securit 25X1
forces.
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THE GREEK POLITICAL--CRISIS
The ouster of Premier Papan-
dreou by King Constantine late
last week brought the long-de-
veloping government crisis in
Greece to a head.
In an attempt to resolve
the dispute over control of the
Ministry of Defense, the King
offered to give Papandreou the
portfolio temporarily and later
appoint a new minister. Papan-
dreou refused, and the intended
announcement of his resignation
was preceded by the King's de-
cision to replace him with George
Athanasiadis-Novas, the former
president of parliament.
Athanasiadis-Novas has
formed a 20-man cabinet from
among members of the Center Un-
ion (EK) party, but the support
of the majority of EK parliamen-
tary deputies was uncertain at
last report. Some members of
the cabinet reportedly joined
the new government reluctantly.
However, Coordination Minister
Mitsotakis, also a key member of
Papandreou's administration, has
stated that new tactics have been
instituted which could enlist
majority EK support. A vote of
confidence must be held when par-
liament meets around the end of
July.
Papandreou has attacked the
King's action as unconstitutional.
His confidence in his personal
mandate has been strengthened by
the intensity of the popular dem-
onstrations in his behalf during
the past week. He reportedly has
refused to approve any compromise
government, such as one proposed
.under former deputy premier
jStephanopoulos, and in which Papan-
dreou would theoretically retain
the leadership of the EK.
There is convincing evi-
dence that Papandreou's son An-
dreas has sought the active sup-
port of the Communist-front
United Democratic, Left (EDA) for
his father's cause, and EDA has
been prominent in the demonstra-
tions. Additional demonstrations
by left-wing groups have been
scheduled, but the government is
determined to use any means neces-
sary to maintain order.
In the event of a showdown
with the Papandreou forces, the
army and the security forces are
likely to remain loyal to a gov-
ernment which has the King's
blessing. If the crisis should
lead to eventual elections in
which the King's interference in
politics is a prime issue, inter-
vention by the military cannot
be precluded.
On Cyprus, Greek Cypriot
leaders fear that Papandreou's
ouster will strengthen the Turk-
ish Cypriot position and bring
Greek pressure for a compromise
solution favoring Turkey. While
the island is calm, pro-Papandreou
demonstrations are possible.
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EEC COUNCIL TO MEET DESPITE FRENCH BOYCOTT
The EEC Council of Minis-
ters, under Italian chairman-
ship_, is.expected, to meet on 26
July despite general recognition
that little can be accomplished
without French participation.
The EEC.Commission may use the
occasion to table its revised
proposal on.agricultural financ-
ing which, by postpoining deci-
sions on the "political" aspects
of its original proposal, is con-
ciliatory toward the French.
The Commission evidently hopes
the new draft will persuade
Paris to reconsider its boycott
policy or failing that, further
its isolation.
There is still no evidence
of French willingness to receive
proposals emanating from the Com-
mission, nor, for the moment at
least, is there any great dispo-
sition among the other five to
remove the discussions to a bi-
lateral setting.
Foreign Min-
ister Fanfani believes the five
should be ready to seek a com-
promise on the financial regu-
lation, but must meet with "firm-
ness" De Gaulle's attempt to
downgrade the importance of the
Council and the Commission. Dur-
ing EEC President Hallstein's
visit to West Germany last week,
Erhard apparently reaffirmed
Bonn's intention to work for a
solution through community ma-
chinery.
It is doubtful how long the
EEC will be able to continue to
participate effectively in the Ken-
nedy Round tariff negotiations un-
der the present circumstances. EEC
Commissioner Rey has told the US
ambassador to the community that
the tariff negotiations should not
be affected "seriously" until the
end of the year. He noted that
the 16 September date for tabling
offers on agricultural products
could be met for some products
without new Council decisions and
that no Council action would be
required this year on the indus-
trial side.
Contrary to Rey's optimistic
assessment, however, the Bonn of-
ficial in charge of economic af-
fairs at the Foreign Ministry has
stated it is "absolutely clear"
the 16 September date cannot be
met. He added that Bonn was very
concerned lest a prolonged EEC
crisis make it impossible to com-
plete the Kennedy Round negotia-
tions before the expiration in
1967 of the US negotiating mandate
under the Trade Expansion Act.
Western Hemisphere
DOMINICAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS STILL UNRESOLVED
Political negotiations con-
tinue to dominate the still-
confused Dominican scene. The
unwillingness of either side to
compromise on what it considers
basic principles is impeding a
settlement.
The OAS committee has
achieved grudging acceptance by
both factions of Hector Garcia
Godoy--a career diplomat and
short-time foreign minister under
Juan Bosch--as provisional presi-
dent. Jurist-diplomat Eduardo
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Read Barreras now appears will-
ing to serve as interim vice
president and seems acceptable
to both the rebel "constitu-
tionalist" government of Colonel
Francisco Caamano and the loy-
alist Government of National
Reconstruction (GNR) of General
Antonio Imbert.
However, numerous problems
remain to be solved before the
provisional government is in-
stalled. One of these is the
future control of subversives.
The Imbert regime supports large-
scale deportations, while the
rebels swing to the other ex-
treme and propose adopting rel-
evant portions of the 1963 con-
stitution which would make con-
trol of subversives extremely
difficult. Garcia Godoy is op-
posed to deportations, and ex-
President Joaquin Balaguer has
publicly announced that he be-
lieves all elements of the pop-
ulation--including Communists--
should be permitted free par-
ticipation in political life,
including elections. Balaguer's
stand is obviously a political
ploy,.predicated on his belief
that he will win the next pres-
idential election and that the
votes he receives from leftists
will enhance his stature as a
president elected by a wide
range of opinion.
The future of the military
establishment and its relation-
ship to the civilian government
is one of the thorniest issues.
The rebels insist that their of-
ficers be reincorporated into
the military, while Imbert's
followers are equally adamant
that none of what they like to
call the "Communist hordes" may
re-enter the armed forces. The
GNR has offered a compromise by
which high rebel officers would
maintain their ranks but be re-
quired to serve outside the coun-
try for five years, while lesser
officers and enlisted men could
be readmitted and allowed to
serve within the country.
The role of the Inter-Ameri-
can Peace Force (IAPF) is also at
issue, Both Dominican factions
demand that it leave one month
after establishment of the pro-
visional government, but the OAS
committee has suggested that the
IAPF stay at the pleasure of the
provisional government, implying
that this stay would continue at
least until the inauguration of
the elected government.
Both the rebels and the loy-
alists are taking advantage of"the
political stalemate to further
their own position. The loyalists
continue to denounce the rebels,
with swipes at the US and the OAS
and to exhort people to leave the
rebel zone "while there is still
time." They back up their veiled
threats with sporadic firing into
the rebel zone, such as the brief
mortar attack on the rebel sec-
tor of Santo Domingo on 20 July.
The rebels take the propa-
ganda offensive by giving wide
publicity to the Inter-America-n
Human Rights Commission's report
of atrocities committed in the
area controlled by the Imbert
government. Extremists in the
rebel camp evidently still plan
to continue the rebellion after
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what they expect will be a sell-
out by the Caamano government.
The interior of the coun-
try is calm although the con-
tinuing strike at the large
sugar mill at La Romana is keep-
ing 18,000 persons out of work.
The continuation of the strike
will cause serious economic hard-
ships in the eastern section of
the country.
UNEASY CALM IN ECUADOR
Ecuador's military junta
has restored order following tur-
bulence which began on 8 July.
The curfew has been lifted in
rebellious Guayaquil and eco-
nomic life has returned to nor-
mal, but martial law continues
in effect and the students re-
main extremely restive. Al-
though both factions of the Com-
munist Party belatedly decided
to encourage new street out-
breaks on 19 July none mate-
rialized.
On the political front, the
cabinet resigned to give the
junta full freedom of action to
fashion a new administration,
possibly with a broader politi-
cal base. The politicians, who
originally provoked the disturb-
ances to speed the shift to
constitutional rule, have be-
gun to confer with the govern-
ment on possible modification
of its plan for the transition.
To their original conditions--
an interim civilian president
and a constituent assembly--
they now have added release of
political prisoners and reopen-
ing of closed newspapers. The
junta is determined to deny op-
portunistic politicians the
chance to negate its reforms in
tax structure and collection
methods, university administra-
tion, and the key agrarian re-
form program which has benefited
thousands of Indians, but it is
seeking a political understand-
ing.
Former president Galo Plaza,
informal adviser to the govern-
ment for some time, told the junta
that if it clings to power by
sheer force--as it has done for
the past two weeks--it will lose
so much popularity that a suc-
cessor regime will be impelled
to repudiate all of the reforms.
Plaza, who had been suggested as
interim president, told the junta
that no "competent leader" would
assume the post, and urged ac-
commodation with the three tradi-
tional parties--Radical Liberal,
Conservative, and Socialist.
Gradual efforts by the junta
to remove the causes of recent
tension appear likely to gain
time for it to achieve a grace-
ful, if accelerated, departure
from power.
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COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT REQUESTS SPECIAL POWERS
On the evening of 20 July,
President Valencia formally con-
voked the regular session of the
Colombian Congress with a plea
for many economic reforms, in-
cluding those which had not been
enacted by the 12-week special
session that ended on 16 July.
In his address, he asked for
special powers to reorganize
the administrative structure of
the government by eliminating
some present institutions, trans-
ferring their functions to other
departments, and readjusting
the budget to take account of
the changes.
Valencia's purpose is to
reduce the annual cost of gov-
ernment business. He proposed
a method of reducing the service
costs on Colombia's foreign debt
and a new way of financing the
domestic public debt. He also
asked for powers to levy new in-
come taxes and to regulate cur-
rency exchange, foreign invest-
ments, and interest payments.
He requested power to create a
National Economic Council to
plan further domestic and for-
eign trade regulations. In ad-
dition, he advanced a plan to
encourage construction of low-
cost housing and another to
solve the near-critical problem
of unemployment.
Although the advisers from
several international financial
institutions have urged for
more than two years that the
Colombian peso be devaluated,
Valencia remains adamantly op-
posed to such action. He is
convinced that devaluation would
result in "political chaos."
Valencia prefers to imple-
ment his program through the
use of special powers rather
than undergo the arduous process
of shepherding it through a re-
calcitrant congress. Congress
is unlikely to grant such spe-
cial powers, however, and the
President may resort to issuing
decrees, which he is empowered
to do under the present state
of siege. Such decrees would
have to be ratified by congress
after the state of siege is
terminated, and thus Valencia
may find that he has only post-
poned his day of battle.
Since his appointment on
14 July, Minister of Finance
Joaquin Vallejo has made a
series of public addresses in
support of Valencia's conserva-
tive approach. He has consist-
ently stressed the need for
popular support and the restora-
tion of public confidence, and
he has blamed the Congress en-
tirely for the lack of progress
thus far. He has already gained
the reputation of a "man of ac-
tion," and may rouse the gen-
erally cynical public to some
active support at last. Rous-
ing the public to expect action
may be dangerous, however, if
in the longer term no action is
forthcoming.
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PROSPECTS FOR EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE MEETING
A treaty to curb prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons is likely
to be the main focus of discussion
when the Eighteen-Nation Disarma-
ment Committee (ENDC) reconvenes in
Geneva next week. Prospects for
agreement are poor, however, de-
spite the high priority many ENDC
members attach to this question.
The USSR has consistently taken
the line that an agreement is pos-
sible only if the West abandons
the planned NATO multilateral force
(MLF), and there are sharp differ-
ences even in the Western camp.
The British are eager to in-
troduce a draft treaty on nonpro-
liferation. Their proposal, based
on the Irish resolution submitted
to the General Assembly in 1961,
calls on nuclear states not to
transfer control of nuclear weapons
to any nonnuclear state or to any
association of states. Nonnuclear
powers would agree not to iuanufac-
ture, acquire control of, or par-
ticipate in any association having
control of such weapons. This pro-
posal has important implications
for development of a NATO nuclear
force--which Moscow contends would
amount to further dissemination.
As the British interpret their plan,
it would still allow a force in
which one or more of the nuclear
members retained a veto, as envis-
aged in the British-backed proposal
for an Allied Nuclear Force (ANF).
However, the eventual transfer of
control to a European union--as the
so-called "European clause" in the
MLF proposal envisages--might be
difficult to justify under a non-
proliferation accord.
It is uncertain whether any
new proposals on nonacquisition can
be reconciled with Bonn.'s views. For-
eign Minister Schroeder, in a re-
cent press statement, seems to imply
that Germany's nuclear needs must be
met by participation in a multilat-
eral force before it would agree
with its allies not to acquire its
own nuclear weapons. He added that
German accession to a world-wide non-
dissemination agreement would be pos-
sible only if the USSR would take
steps toward German reunification.
Other matters the Geneva forum
is likely to inherit from the United
Nations Disarmament Commission
(UNDC) discussions earlier this year
are: extension of the limited test
ban treaty to include underground
tests; reduction of military budgets,
with savings to be used for economic
development; and the Soviet and US
resolutions which were not brought
to a vote in the UNDC.
The Soviet press has not yet
informed its readers that the ENDC
talks are to resume. The US Embassy
in Moscow was informed on 21 July
that Tsarapkin, chief Soviet rep-
resentative at the last session,
would head the Soviet delegation
again. A few days earlier, a TASS
correspondent in Geneva commented
to a US official that if the So-
viets "simply wished to condemn
the US for its actions in Vietnam,"
Tsarapkin was "capable of that."
He added that if the Soviets were
interested in disarmament progress,
First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuz-
netsov would probably head the
delegation.
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