WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

`"K' 23 April .1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT" INTE16,
RD CENTER
IMMEDI T~LX AFT-TI1
GROUP I Excluded fron autamatic
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 22 April 1965)
VIETNAM
A high-level party-government delegation from North
Vietnam held secret talks last week in Moscow, and now
is in Peiping. The joint communiqud following the
Moscow visit contained a conditional Soviet pledge of
assistance somewhat stronger then Brezhnev's last month,
possibly to set the stage for an announcement of the
dispatch of Russian personnel along with Soviet SAM
equipment which almost certainly is en route to the DRV;
Peiping, meanwhile, has put a National People's Congress
stamp of approval on its own previous conditional pledges
of aid. As US and South Vietnamese air strikes on the
North continued during the past week, Hanoi showed signs
of concern over possible escalation of the air war but
maintained its independent posture with regard to any
form of negotiations.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
COMBAT POTENTIAL OF SA-2 SAM SITES
A single SA-2 surface-to-air missile site can handle
only one target at a time and needs the services of a
technical support battalion to achieve any sustained
level of combat readiness.
ANTIREGIME PLOT SCOTCHED IN BULGARIA
The plotters' probable goal was to loosen Bulgaria's
sycophantic ties to Moscow. Little is known of the
extent of the group's support, but it is unlikely the
regime's stability has been seriously weakened.
NEW TREATY REFLECTS ALTERED SOVIET-]POLISH RELATIONSHIP
The long bargaining which apparently preceded the for-
mal signing and the divergent interpretations of the
treaty by each side reflect a new relationship based
on a mutual accommodation to diverse national inter-
ests.
RUMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS
The new Rumanian leaders, having failed to expand com-
mercial relations with the US significantly and hard
put to ignore pressure for Communist unity on Vietnam,
are finding fewer options available to them in further-
ing their national interests.
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23 Apr 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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sECRE'r
THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued)
Page
INDONESIA CELEBRATES BANDUNG CONFERENCE ANNIVERSARY
Following the Djakarta phase of the celebration--which
produced nothing but the expected anti-Western speeches
--the Japanese delegation traveled to Malaysia, where it
proposed a Malaysian-Indonesian summit meeting in Tokyo.
Malaysia's Rahman has agreed.
THE KURDISH WAR -- ROUND FOUR
Renewed fighting between the Iraqi Army and the Kurds
seems likely to be as indecisive as in past campaigns
and to underline the stalemate which has existed for
four years. Attempts to reach a settlement during the
14-month cease-fire just ended have proved fruitless.
The 5,000 hard-core Kurdish fighters are well trained
and equipped, but Kurdish tribal loyalties are more
divided now than in 1963 against the Baathist regime.
The Kurds can continue to expect limited material aid
from Iran, and propaganda support from the USSR for
Kurdish autonomy demands. The Baghdad government con-
tinues to receive arms from the USSR to use against the
rebels, and words of caution from Egypt. (Published
separately as Special Report OCI No. 0286/65B)
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
Tensions rose for a time last week when the Greek Cyp-
riots banned movement of supplies in or out of Nicosia's
Turkish quarter, but this latest crisis apparently has
not induced Makarios to abandon his "peace offensive."
However, Ankara's current pressure on Athens to negoti-
ate a Cyprus settlement may prove counterproductive.
AFRICAN MODERATES PUSH NEW CONGO PLAN
Five relatively conservative West African states have
launched an effort to provide major military and admin-
istrative assistance to the Leopoldville government,
with a view ultimately to limiting Communist and radi-
cal African influences in the area.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
INTERNAL TENSIONS IN GUINEA
The heavy-handed economic cont:rols imposed by President
Tourd's regime have bred widespread discontent, partic-
ularly among the Fulani tribal people who compose a
third of the country's population.
COMMON MARKET: THE FINANCIAL REGULATIONS PROBLEM
The EEC Commission's proposals for financing the common
agricultural policy go beyond anything anticipated at
this stage of the EEC's development and, by combining
financial inducements with federalist principles, con-
front Paris in particular with a difficult choice.
THE NEW DUTCH CABINET
Its domestic economic program will probably weaken the
anti-inflationary effort pursued by the old government.
Foreign policy, including a long-term effort to improve
relations with Indonesia, is likely to continue along
the same general lines.
COLOMBIAN CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SESSION
Its likely failure to enact meaningful reforms could
cause existing public disillusionment to crystallize
into more direct opposition to the National Front gov-
ernment. This outcome is already the goal of several
political groups.
POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
If Chief of Government Peralta decides that disorder
would accompany an election campaign this year or that
he could not easily control the results, he will be all
the more susceptible to pressure from his advisers and
businessmen who prefer his military regime.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
ECUADOR DELAYS MISSION TO SEEK BLOC TRADE
Political considerations account for the delay, but
the trade mission probably will set out later. It is
also possible that, in support of its economic policy,
the Ecuadorean Government will eventually extend
diplomatic recognition to one or more Communist states.
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South Vietnamese military boundaries
Airfield
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The announcement on
17
and
North Vietnamese agreed that
April
that a party-government
"it
would be useful to convene
delegation from North Vietnam
the
relevant international con-
led by party first secretary Le
Duan, Minister of Defense Vo
Nguyen Giap, and newly appointed
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh
had held week-long secret talks
with Soviet civil and military
leaders suggested that Hanoi was
seeking clarification of Moscow's
position on assistance to the
defense of the DRY. These were
the first high-level talks held
since the US has stepped up its
assistance to the South Vietnam-
ese and increased its bombing
of North Vietnamese military tar-
gets.
The joint communiqud re-
leased at the conclusion of the
visit is highlighted by a cau-
tious threat to send volunteers
to the DRV "in case of necessity."
Moscow made its pledge condi-
tional upon an "intensification
of US aggression" and an appeal
by the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment, but this goes beyond Brezh-
nev's ambiguous reference in a
23 March speech to the readiness
of Soviet citizens to "take part
in" the DRV's struggle. The So-
viet pledge may be intended to
set the stage for an announcement
of the dispatch of Russian per-
sonnel along with the Soviet SAM
equipment which almost certainly
now is en route to North Vietnam.
There was no call in the com-
muniqud for a Geneva-type confer-
ence on Vietnam, but the Soviets
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23 Apr 65
Page 1
ferences" to solve the problems
of Laos and Cambodia.
The visit and resulting com-
muniqud suggest that Moscow and
Hanoi have drawn closer, but the
net effects of the trip will not
be clear until the results of
the delegation's current talks
in Peiping are known. It ar-
rived there on 18 April and was
feted by top Chinese leaders,
who are undoubtedly attempting
in their discussions to offset
the Soviet initiative. The Chi-
nese have broadcast the text of
the Soviet-DRV communique, but
they have made no comment on it.
In addition to filling out
the public Soviet position on
"volunteers," the communique
also contained the USSR's most
authoritative public reference
to President Johnson's 7 April
speech. Although it avoided the
vitriolic, personal criticism.
of the President characteristic
of Peiping's reaction, the sta.te-
mEnt reiterated that US "exten-
sion of acts of aggression"
proves that Washington does not
really seek a peaceful solution.
In a 19 April speech, Pre-
mier Kosygin asserted that re-
cent talk in ?Vashington about a
peaceful settlement is valueless
in light of US determination to
continue intervening in Vietnam.
Kosygin endorsed Premier Pham
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Van Dong's 8 April four-point
formulation setting forth the
basis for the "soundest" settle-
ment of the Vietnamese crisis.
He denounced US use of such "in-
human instruments" as napalm,
phosphorous bombs, and gases,
and warned that, since the US
has no monopoly on modern arms,
the use of such weapons might
invite retaliation in kind.
Developments in North Vietnam
Hanoi made it evident this
week that the "urgent and new
tasks" referred to in recent
official statements were mostly
concerned with building up DRV
defenses against continuing US
air strikes. The regime's con-
cern over possible escalation
of the air war was reflected in
its request on 16 April that
foreign officials, including
those of Communist countries,
evacuate their dependents within
ten days.
Construction of the SAM
site near Hanoi is continuing.
Photography indicates
that four of the six launch po-
sitions are completed. The re-
vetted central guidance facility
also appears complete, but the
perimeter roads are still under
construction. There was no evi-
dence of any missile equipment
within the site.
Although there is still no
hard evidence on the arrival of
Soviet military equipment in the
DRV, the 17 April joint communi-
ctud claimed not only that Soviet
military aid is "being imple-
mented in the envisaged extent
and procedure," but also that
an agreement was reached on "fur-
ther steps" to defend the DRY.
Equipment for the SAM site now
almost completed is probably
moving by rail through China ra-
ther than by sea.
While building up its de-
fenses and urging the population
to "heighten its vigilance"
against the US "aggressor," Hanoi
continued last week to maintain
an independent posture with re-
gard to any form of negotia-
tions. On 19 April Hanoi issued
a politely worded reply to the
17 nonaligned nations' appeal
stressing its belief that the
only "basis for the sound politi-
cal settlement" of the Vietnam
question was Premier Pha.m Van
Dong's four-point proposal.
Chinese Communist
Political ea.c ons
Peiping is displaying a,
somewhat tougher stance on nego-
tiations than is Hanoi. The
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16 April People's Daily edi-
torial hammered atthie neces-
sity for withdrawal of all US
armed forces from South Vietnam
as "an indispensable precondi-
tion" for a peaceful solution
and warned that "the issue of
peace and war" hinges on whether
the US will get out of Vietnam.
It omitted the passing refer-
ence to negotiations mentioned
in Pham Van Dong's formula,
while endorsing his proposal as
the only way to restore peace.
Peiping's hard line on ne-
gotiations has been reinforced
by the intensification of Chi-
nese propaganda efforts designed
to mobilize support, both for-
eign and domestic, for the re-
gime's Vietnam policy. On 20
April Peiping announced that the
Standing Committee of the Na-
tional People's Congress--China's
rubber-stamp parliament--had
adopted a resolution calling for
the Chinese people to join "with
the world's people" in launching
a "powerful mass movement" to
force the United States out of
Vietnam.
The Chinese people were
instructed to make "full prep-
arations" to send men to fight
alongside the Vietnamese in the
event that the United States
"continues to expand the war"
and the "Vietnamese people need
them." This conditional resolu-
tion, although putting the Na-
tional People's Congress stamp
of approval on previous Peiping
declarations, does not represent
any extension of Peiping's com-
mitments. It appears designed
to increase the credibility of
;previous pronouncements.
President Johnson's 17 April
declaration that the US will
never be forced from Vietnam un-
til South Vietnamese independ-
ence is guaranteed has been
singled out by Peiping for bit-
ter criticism. Emphasizing Pei-
ping's professed unwillingness
to settle for anything short of
complete Communist victory in
Vietnam, a People's Daily edi-
torial on 21 April asser s that
the President in fact seeks the
"permanent occupation" of South
Vietnam and the "perpetual divi-
sion of Vietnam." The editorial
stresses that "the very purpose"
for which the South Vietnamese
"'people" are fighting is to
destroy completely this "so-
called independent country" and
to realize the "reunification
and complete liberation" of
Vietnam. In 'language resem-
bling the 20 April National
People's Congress resolution
on Vietnam, the editorial
pledges that the Chinese people
and the "people of the world"
will support the Vietnamese
"people" as long as the latter
have to fight.
US and South Vietnamese
aircraft kept up the steady
pace of bombing attacks and
armed reconnaissance against
lines of communication in North
Vietnam during the past week.
Strikes were conducted on all
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seven days. Considerable suc-
cess was achieved in bombing runs
against eight bridges; seven
were either destroyed or rendered
unusable and the other was
damaged.
The armed reconnaissance
missions flown both day and
night on a daily basis along
the major rail lines and high-
ways south of the 20th parallel
were less successful. Targets
were generally hard to find,
probably as a result of North
Vietnamese resort to night
travel, camouflage, and use of
secondary roads. Several mil-
itary camps, ferry landings, and
a chokepoint on the communica-
tions line were also attacked.
Military Developments
In South Vietnam
In South Vietnam, the heav-
iest fighting of the week was
reported in Quang Tin Province,
where government air and ground
elements attacked a strongly
fortified entrenchment of three
Viet Cong battalions 28 miles
south of Da Nang air base, near
the frequently harassed govern-
ment outpost of Viet An. US
military authorities confirmed
150 Viet Cong killed as the
result of initial air strikes,
while the latest unofficial
estimates place enemy losses as
high as 300 dead. Friendly
forces reportedly sustained ca.s-
ua.lties of 100 killed, wounded,
and missing.
On 15 April, 230 US and
Vietnamese aircraft, including
50 B-57s and 79 F-100s, flew
443 attack sorties against the
main headquarters of the Viet
Cong in their War Zone C in
western Tay Ninh Province--
northwest of Saigon. An esti-
mated 862 tons of bombs were
dropped on an area. three kilo-
meters by six kilometers. Re-
sults of the air action are
still inconclusive. Govern-
ment ground forces in a, follow-
up search-and-destroy operation
between 16 and 18 April failed
to establish contact with the
Viet Cong, but recovered small
amounts of foodstuffs, weapons,
documents, and materiel.
Communist guerrillas for
the first time last week pene-
trated the US Marine security
perimeter at Da Nang air base,
slightly wounding two marines
with a barrage of hand grenades
and directing small arms fire
at a. battery emplacement. Enemy
mortar and small arms fire was
also placed on US Marines defend-
ing the important Phu Ba.i air-
strip in Thua Thien Province.
A document captured in
late March in Binh Duong Prov-
ince north of Saigon indicates
that the Viet Cong have been
making preparations for a major
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campaign in the area.
Targets of the
L carps gn were r ported to be
provincial and district capitals
along the highway running due
north of Saigon toward Cambodia.
The report also notes that the
Viet Cong have been recruiting,
stockpiling, and concentrating
units in the same general area.
Political Developments
In South Vietnam
Dissension within South
Vietnam's military leadership
remains apparent following the
recent naval mutiny, which now
is reported to have had some
adverse effect on the conduct
of naval operations. Armed
forces chief General Minh wants
to take disciplinary measures
against the rebel naval officers,
whereas Premier Qua-t, backed by
certain generals in sympathy
with the revolt, is urging a
delay in further action until
the charges of the naval sub-
ordinates against their commander
have been fully investigated.
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COMBAT POTENTIAL OF SA-2 SAM SITES
Discovery of an SA-2 sur-
fa.ce-to-a.ir missile site under
construction near Hanoi
raise questions regar ing
e combat potential of newly
deployed sites. Estimates of
range and altitude capabilities
of the equipment
the answers, but other factors
First, an SA-2 launch site
is not designed to operate inde-
pendently for any length of time.
It requires the services of a
technical support battalion,
which is usually located at
regimental level, to achieve
any sustained level of combat
readiness. Since a launch site
can handle only one target at a
time, several sites with over-
lapping coverage are needed
around a defended area. SA-2
regiments normally have four
sites, although the number can
vary from three to six.
The model of the radar used
for target tracking and missile
guidance also affects system
capabilities. ~
The Soviets typically as-
sign about 150 men to a. launch
site. A four-site regiment with
headquarters and technical sup-
port elements totals close to
a thousand men. Many of the
equipment operators need only
a few months' training, but
maintenance and missile assembly
require a. large number of skilled
technicians with much more ex-
tensive training.
An SA-2 site is not neces-
sarily static. A well-trained
crew can disassemble an emplaced
launch site in about four hours,
move it by road to a prepared
location, and put it back in
operation in as little as six
holars.
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Between 6 and 9 April Bul-
garian security organs report-
edly frustrated a coup against
the regime of party boss Todor
Zhivkov. Little is known of
the extent of the group's sup-
port, but it is unlikely that
the regime's stability has been
seriously weakened.
Although the plotters are
being labeled "pro-Chinese,"
particularly by Soviet bloc
sources, they appear basically
nationalist--and therefore
"anti-Soviet"--in outlook.
Their probable goal was to
loosen or break Bulgaria's
sycophantic ties with the So-
viet Union.
The principal plotters ap-
pear to have been Bulgarian mil-
itary officers or civilians
who had served in the same par-
tisan unit during World War II.
Ivan Todorov Gorunya, a central
committee member and ex-partisan
from the Vratsa area, has com-
mitted suicide. Major General
Tsvetko Anev, commandant of the
Sofia garrison, and Tsolo Krus-
tov, former commandant of Vratsa
partisans, have been arrested.
Elements of the Bulgarian Navy
may also be involved.
The regime did not take pub-
lic note of the coup reports un-
til 22 April, when it denied any
threat to the "public order" or
the "regime's stability" had been
involved. Western diplomatic
sources indicate, however, that
party ideologist Mitke Grigorov
spoke of the plotters' activities
to a party central committee ple-
num on 14 April, and to a small
select group of party leaders on
15 April. In addition, six other
leading party figures, including
Zh:ivkov, have addressed local
party meetings--principally around
Sofia--since the plot was uncov-
ered. The regime's willingness
to issue a statement strongly sug-
gests it has arrested all major
participants in the suppressed
coup.
The Bulgarian party has a
long history of acute factional-
ism. In early 1961, a narrowly
based faction having a "nation-
alist" orientation apparently
wanted Zhivkov to alter his pol-
icies along lines adopted by
Yugoslavia.
23 Apr 65
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NEW TREATY REFLECTS ALTERED SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONSHIP
The new 20-year treaty of
alliance signed early this month
in Warsaw by Brezhnev and Kosy-
gin formalized a new stage in
Soviet-Polish relations. The
USSR took the unusual step of
ratifying the treaty within a
week after signature.
The "completely unanimous"
agreement claimed by both sides
had been achieved only after a
year of hard negotiating. In
addition, interpretations of the
treaty in speeches by the Polish
and Soviet leaders reflect di-
vergencies in emphasis stemming
from diverse national interests.
This type of "harmony" may be
reflected in future negotiations
between the Soviet Union and
other East European countries.
its hands on this issue in any
talks concerning Germany. At
the same time, the consultations
clause grants the Poles a hedge
against future Soviet moves in
Central Europe, and this prob-
ably was instrumental in per-
suading them to accept Moscow's
wording on the Oder-Neisse line.
Even this weak statement,
together with the apparent suc-
cess of recent Polish-Soviet
economic talks and the signing
of a convention which may again
permit the repatriation of eth-
nic Poles from the USSR, will
enable Gomulka to point to tan-
gible achievements in counter-
ing domestic critics of his
policy of closer relations with
the USSR.
The treaty obliges the USSR
to consult with Poland on all
major Soviet foreign policy
moves affecting it. Together
with Brezhnev's assertion that
there is room for differences
in foreign as well as domestic
policies of socialist states,
this provision extends the limits
of Polish autonomy. Gomulka
took immediate advantage of this
to make a more favorable refer-
ence to US "bridge-building"
proposals.
Poland failed to get an
explicit guarantee of its west-
ern boundary written into the
treaty, which merely describes
the integrity of the Oder-Neisse
line as "one of the main factors"
of European security. Moscow
apparently wants to avoid tying
Poland's part of the bar-
gain apparently included meas-
ures to tighten the military
alliance. Shifts last February
in its military hierarchy, which
give key posts to "pro-Soviet"
generals, followed reports of
Soviet concern about national-
ism in the Polish military
leadership.
Gomulka's reiterated pledge
that the Polish party would
warmly support all initiatives
aimed at overcoming Communist
disunity appears to be a re-
sponse to Brezhnev's implicit
suggestion that such a common
approach is one condition of
the new type of relations among
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RUMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS
Developments in the last
month have
reduced the options
available
to the Rumanian
lead-
ership in
furthering its
national
interests.
It has failed
to ex-
pand commercial relations
with
the US significantly, and
seems
to be hard put to ignore
the
pressure for Communist unity
created by the Vietnamese situa-
tion. As a result, some accom-
modations will probably be made,
but without any real modifica-
tion of the regime's independent
posture.
Bucharest's latest diffi-
culty in dealing with the US
was the collapse last week of
lengthy negotiations with the
Firestone Company for a synthetic
rubber complex which the Ruma-
nians had regarded as the key
item in the shopping list they
presented to the US last May.
Rumanian officials have
attempted to endow the Fire-
stone negotiations with implica-
tions for all Eastern Europe.
A Foreign Ministry official
said in March that "many peo-
ple. . .not just here but else-
where" are awaiting with inter-
est the outcome of the talks.
If they were to fail, "people
elsewhere" would gleefully say
"you cannot count on America
for economic support."
Delays in arranging commer-
cial deals in the US had al-
ready caused Rumania to cancel
one purchase. In addition, the
regime has complained about
problems in finding US markets
for its products. Commercial
relations with Western Europe
are likely to be expanded as
a result.
These developments may,
in part, account for Bucharest's
apparent stalling in talks for
a consular convention with Wash-
ington.
Rumanian displeasure may
also be reflected in the re-
giime's being less reluctant
to condemn "US imperialism" in
Vietnam. With Moscow and Pei-
ping both attacking the US posi-
tion, Rumanian leaders probably
believe they have little choice.
Rumania has in the past gained
maneuvering room for dealing
1 with the West, among other
things, by playing off Moscow's
differences with Peiping.
However, no basic reorien-
tation of regime policies is
likely. Decisions announced
after a 14-15 April central com-
mittee plenum emphasized the
independence of Rumania's for-
eign policy. They also indi-
cated that the country's col-
lective leadership has been
working effectively since the
death of party first secretary
Gheorghiu-Dej. The top four
party leaders will deliver the
major addresses at the fourth
party congress, which opens on
19 July. The fact that the
regime can make this announce-
ment three months in advance
augurs well for a period of
stability at the to . 25X1
F_ I
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INDONESIA CELEBRATES BANDUNG CONFERENCE ANNIVERSARY
The Bandung anniversary con-
ference, which began on 17 April,
appears to have been no more
than it was billed to be--an an-
niversary celebration. The
speeches, as expected, were ran-
corously anti-Western and unsub-
stantive. Some of the delega-
tions left when the Djakarta
phase of the.. celebration ended
on 20 April.,.. but others, includ-
ing the Chinese and the North
Vietnamese,. are staying for a
few more days. Festivities in
other parts of Indonesia will
continue through 26 April.
Once the celebration is
over, Indonesia is expected to
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
Tension between Turkish
and Greek Cypriots increased
rapidly on 15 April when the
government banned the movement
of people or. supplies in or out
of the Turkish quarter of Nico-
sia. The ban followed a shoot-
ing incident and the discovery
that Turkish Cypriot fighters
had infiltrated abandoned Greek
Cypriot shops along the dividing
line.
SECRET
23 Apr 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
return to matters which were
held in abeyance during the
most of April: repressive ac-
tion against remaining anti-
Communist elements, further
Communist pressure against Amer-
ican presence in Indonesia, and
increased paramilitary activity
against Malaysia.
The Japanese delegation
to the anniversary conference
went on to Malaysia from In-
donesia, and proposed a meet-
ing in Tokyo between Sukarno
and Malaysian Prime Minister
Rahman. Rahman agreed to at-
tend such a meeting; Sukarno
has not made his position clear
The restriction on supplies
has since been lifted, and ten-
sion has eased somewhat. How-
ever, the prohibition on move-
ment of persons is to remain in
force, according to government
spokesmen, -until. the Turkish
Cypriots remove their fighters
from the shops and permit in-
spection of the disputed sec-
tion by UN troops.
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President Makarios' plans
to accelerate his "peace offen-
sive" may have been delayed but
apparently were not abandoned
as a result of the latest crisis.
On 21 April, the government
lifted restrictions on freedom
of movement in the southern two
thirds of the island. Turkish
Cypriots living in this area
generally have adapted to living
under Greek Cypriot administra-
tion.
Frustration and fear that
time is working against Turkish
interests on Cyprus have led
Ankara to step up pressure on
Athens to negotiate a Cyprus
settlement. The remaining few
thiousand Greek citizens in Tur-
key are to be deported, and the
Orthodox Patriarchate in Istan-
bul will be investigated and
possibly expelled. Reaction in
Athens indicates that meaningful
Greek-Turkish negotiations are
probably less, rather than more,
likely as a result of these
moves.
Five moderate West African
states led by Ivory Coast Pres-
ident Houphouet-Boigny have
launched a major effort to pro-
vide military and administrative
assistance to the Leopoldville
government. This Congo initia-
tive,planned in outline last
February, is regarded by the
sponsoring governments as part
of a broader scheme to organize
the continent's moderates against
radical African--notably Ghana-
ian--pressures and Communist--
particularly Chinese--inroads.
At a meeting in Abidjan
earlier this month, Ivory Coast,
Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, and
Senegal agreed to press for Con-
go's immediate admission to their
embryonic African and Malagasy
Common Organization (OCAM), pres-
ently composed of 13 ex-French
territories and the former Bel-
gian trust territory of Rwanda.
The Abidjan group and any other
OCAM members willing to help
Tshombd 'are then to make avail-
able military and lower level
administrative personnel. The
troops are to be drawn mainly
from the pool of 10,500 African
servicemen recently demobilized
from the French Army. They would
be employed to secure "pacified"
areas and thereby free Congolese
Army forces for antirebel
operations in place of the white
mercenaries.
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w w
.ADRI AN & MALAGASY COMMON
ORGANIZATION
(OCAM)
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Asia-Africa
To win support-for this
plan, which is sure to be re-
sisted by the leftist regime in
Brazzaville and probably by some
other OCAM states, the Abidjan
group is sending special emis-
saries to many African and a
few European capitals. The
sponsors have indicated that in
time they, would require finan-
cial and material help from the
US and other Western countries.
France, previously cool to
its protege states' Congo plan,
has recently appeared more
favorably inclined.
reintroduction of other African
troops under any guise.
Circumstances within the
Congo continue to favor the
government, as they have for
several weeks. The rebellion
in the northeast has deteriorated
although some of the' .har=
har=dier rebel bands continue re-
sistance. The mercenaries have
completed the "sealing" of the
Sudanese border. High Sudanese
officials state that they are
disarming fleeing rebels, and
that arms deliveries through
the Sudan have stopped.
Even the regions adjacent
to Lake Tanganyika remain fairly
quiet despite frequent alarms
of impending rebel activity
Premier Tshombe in fact applied
for admission to OCAM last month
only to have his overture spurned
by the organization's current
head, the President of Mauri-
tania. Neither Tshombe, Presi-
dent Kasavubu, nor army chief
Mobutu is prepared to dismiss
the Congo's mercenaries, and
Mobutu strongly opposes the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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INTERNAL TENSIONS IN GUINEA
Continuing signs of tension
in Guinea indicate that Presi-
dent Toure's basically leftist
one-party regime may be under
severe strain. Conakry's eco-
nomic controls, under which the
country's prosperity has de-
clined drastically, are the ma-
jor focus of discontent. Tribal
antagonisms also appear to
be increasing.
Last November, President
Toure launched a crackdown on
economic irregularities. The
government has investigated the
private finances of government
and party officials, arrested
smugglers and jobless migrants,
put stringent limitations on
traders, and decreed the clos-
ing of frontiers.' There have
been many rumors of brutal treat
ment of individuals caught in
the police net.
However, despite the gov-
ernment decree, large numbers
of Guineans are still leaving
the country in search of better
conditions, and are continuing
their customary practice of tak-
ing their products to neighbor-
ing states to trade for consumer
goods unobtainable at home.
There have been a few instances
of disorders when sizable groups
of transient Guineans, sometimes
entire villages, congregated on
one side or the other of a pa-
trolled area of the frontier.
Many of the disciplinary
actions and most of the rumors
of further trouble involve the
Fulani people, who make up over
a third of the population. They
were a favored group under French
rule and have tended to remain
somewhat aloof from the Tour6
regime. Some of TourA's recent
foreign policy moves reflect con-
cern over Fulani attitudes. His
round of contacts with other Af-
rican presidents in March, for
example, apparently involved a
search for reassurances of sup-
port for his government. Resolu-
tion early this month oftGuinea's
long-standing financial disputes
with Paris is probably related to
Fulani criticism of the exclusion
of France from Guinea's economic
development since 1958. Conakry
has also been worried by Portu-
gal's arming of several thousand
Fulani who are natives of Por-
tuguese Guinea.
While the government party's
national council meeting, sched-
uled for 8-10 May, might resolve
some of the more immediate prob-
lems, such as foot-dragging and
factionalism within the regime
leadership, tension is unlikely
to relax significantly until the
economy picks up. Guinean hopes
are focused on rapid development
of a massive bauxite deposit,
but negotiations to exploit it
now appear to be on dead center.
Given the domestic situation,
the regime may suddenly look for
scapegoats, and an abrupt change
in its present favorable atti-
tude toward American aid and in-
vestment is one possibility.F_
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Europe
COMMON MARKET: THE FINANCIAL REGULATIONS PROBLEM
The EEC Commission's pro-
posals for financing the common
agricultural policy (CAP) and
ultimately giving the EEC its
own source of revenue have set
the stage for a crucial com-
munity debate. They go beyond
anything anticipated at this
stage of the EEC's development,
and by combining financial in-
ducements with federalist prin-
ciples, confront Paris in par-
ticular with a difficult choice.
The proposals recommend a
new CAP financing system to re-
place the temporary arrangements
which expire on 30 June. For an
interim period from June 1965 to
June 1967 there would be a new
and more equitable scale of mem-
ber-state contributions from
national appropriations. Be-
ginning in mid-1967, however--
when the Commission proposes the
customs union become fully ef-
fective-.-the community's income
would include all receipts from
the variable levies on EEC im-
ports of agricultural items plus
progressively increasing por-
tions of the duties collected on
all other imports. By 1973, all
revenues from both sources would
belong to the community.
According to Commission es-
timates, annual community levy
and customs receipts will total
at least $2.2 billion by 1967.
These receipts are at present an
important source of national
revenue, and they far exceed con-
templated community expenditures.
By instituting a "veritable fed-
eral budget," the plan would give
a large measure of budgetary
independence to the EEC, and
end the present situation in
which the Council invariably
cuts even the modest expendi-
tures proposed by the Commis-
sion.
It is unclear how much of
its plan the Commission expects
to achieve in the next few months.
Even some of its friends have
said it has "gone too far."
Similar criticisms were heard,
however, when the Commission
"prematurely" proposed grain
price unification in October
1963, but by maneuvering among
conflicting national interests
achieved the historic compromise
of last December. It may be
hoping to effect another such
compromise or, failing that, at
least to stake a claim to counter
De Gaulle's attempts to bring
the other EEC countries into a
political union without effective
central institutions.
In any case, the Commission
plan will point up once more the
ambiguity if not the dilemma of
De Gaulle's European policies.
The financial regulations, like
the agricultural integration
he has pressed so hard for, are
much to French advantage and are
in logical sequence to the degree
of integration already achieved.
Yet, agreement on them would
carry the EEC still further to-
ward the supranational community
De Gaulle has consistently op-
7
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SE CRE'W'
The new Dutch cabinet
headed by Joseph Cals, which was
sworn in on 14 April, includes
the Labor Party in place of the
business-oriented Liberals. Its
economic program therefore will
probably be less restrictive on
wage policy than that of the
outgoing government, and thus
result in a weakening of the
anti-inflation effort. Dutch
foreign policy, including a
long-term effort to improve re-
lations with Indonesia, is
likely to continue along the
same general lines.
Cals is, like his predeces-
sor, a member of the Catholic
Party, the country's largest
parliamentary grouping, and he
has a notably cordial relation-
ship with the second largest,
the Labor Party. The third
member of the coalition is the
Protestant Anti-Revolutionary
Party. Cals has tried to mini-
mize differences among coalition
members on financial, economic,
and social policies by emphasiz-
ing the shortness of the new
government's tenure in view of
the 1967 elections and the con-
sequent impracticality of long-
term programs.
Cals is expected to provide
more vigorous leadership than
his predecessor and he hopes to
obtain unprecedented authority
to arbitrate cabinet disagree-
ments. This will not, however,
fundamentally compromise the
peculiar Dutch doctrine of the
individual responsibility of
each minister. Foreign Minister
Europe
Luns, for example--a holdover
from the last cabinet--will
alone be authoritative and
responsible in foreign affairs
and must speak for the Nether-
lands even when heads of state
are involved.
Cals can be expected to
give general support to Luns,
whose policy positions he
shares, despite some personal
lack of sympathy and a back-
ground of differences over the
New Guinea issue in 1962 when
Luns took an especially hard
line. In particular, the Dutch
Government, with its usual high
regard for the country's busi-
ness interests, is expected to
continue pushing the restora-
tion of Dutch-Indonesian com-
mercial ties. This policy re-
ceived considerable impetus
from Luns' visit to Djakarta
last July and the subsequent
agreement on a $25-million Dutch
credit .
Friendly feeling in Indo-
nesia toward the people and
customs of the former colonial
power seemed to increase for a
time after the Luns visit. A
contract was signed for Dutch
help in the extension of ship-
yard facilities, and discussions
of highway, mining, and techni-
cal assistance projects were
initiated. However, recent Com-
munist gains in Indonesia and
an upsurge of feeling against
Western economic enterprise are
now causing delay in implement-
ing projects.
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GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, APRIL 1965
~ommttrttt,dm~nated
Viota
.
Fusagasuga
COMMUNIST LEADER VARELA
Photo taken before 1953
wmev~o nr~o
umopaz
l_- _ 'ACTA
EI Pato'
ECUADOR
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1WW
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
A special session of con-
gress has been called by Colom-
bian President Valencia for 26
April to consider tax reform
and other recommendations of a
commission set up last January
in response to labor union de-
mands. The special session may
run into difficulty arriving
at the two-thirds majority re-
quired to pass important legis-
lation. Failure to enact mean,
ingful reforms could cause ex-
isting public cynicism and dis-
illusionment to crystallize
into a more direct and overt
opposition to the governing Na-
tional Front coalition.
Such an outcome is already
the goal of several political
groups, including the followers
of General Rojas Pinilla, the
ex-dictator (1953-57), and of
General Ruiz Novoa, former min-
ister of war. Many of these
people and several parties out-
side the front have formed a
loose alliance called the Na-
tional Assembly.
Communists, too, seem to
be taking advantage of the Na-
tional Front's weakness. Po-
litical overtones to banditry
are becoming more noticeable,
particularly in southern Tolima
and nearby departments. Commu-
nist guerrilla activity and
kidnapings of important people
are already a cause for deep
concern.
The Colombian Communist
Party (PCC) held its 31st plenum
in Viota from 28 March through
2 April.
As part of the PCC plenum's
decision to support all insur-
gency, aid presumably will now
go to Juan de la Cruz Varela,
Communist boss of Sumapaz~__
In addition to the
victims of his banditry, Varela
is accused of murdering at least
50 people, including his four
brothers, just to maintain his
supremacy in Sumapaz. He may
provide a link in the Communist
chain of armed insurrection
that then would extend across
the northern border of Huila,
joining the upper reaches of
Colombia's two major river val-
ley systems--the Magdelena and
the Cauca.
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Western Hemisphere
POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA
Guatemalan Chief of Govern-
ment Enrique Peralta speaks of re-
turning the military to their nor-
mal occupations and of restoring
the nation to constitutional gov-
ernment. However, the public con-
tinues to accept Colonel Peralta
in his present role, and many
businessmen prefer his military
regime. These attitudes, to-
gether with the inability of the
military "High Command" to agree
on an official presidential candi-
date, may convince Peralta that
the "best thing for the country"
would be for him to remain in of-
fice.
The state of siege imposed
on 24 February has not been lifted,
so that overt political activity
is at a standstill. The constitu-
ent assembly is expected to com-
plete the new constitution in
June, in which case elections for
the president and congress ought
to be scheduled for the end of
this year. Should elections be
held, there are four political
parties with the legal status
necessary to participate.
The government-backed Demo-
cratic Institutional Party (PID)
is expected to be the vehicle for
an official candidate. The Na-
tional Liberation Movement (MLN)
--not being disposed to antagonize
Peralta by pressing for its fa-
vored candidate, armed forces
Chief of Staff Ponciano--is ex-
pected to cooperate with the PID
in backing a government candidate.
The Revolutionary Party (PR), a
moderate leftist group, will offer
its director, Mario Mendez Monte-
negro, who will provide the "demo-
cratic opposition" in accordance
with a deal between the PR and the
PID concerning cabinet positions.
The only other legal party is the
Guatemalan Social Party (PSG), re-
cently formed to back Finance Min-
ister Caballeros, a controversial
figure who has the backing of
significant elements in the gov-
ernment.
A well-controlled contest
among these four parties would re-
sult in a successor government en-
tirely acceptable to the present
military administration, which
would then "retire to the barracks"
as promised. Such a development,
however, would leave a signifi-
cant part of Guatemala's politi-
cally conscious citizenry without
representation and might lead the
extreme right to join with the
left in concerted illegal o
If Peralta. decides that dis-
order would accompany an election
campaign or that the results
could not be easily controlled, he
will be all the more susceptible
to pressures from his close ad-
visers and businessmen who wish
to see the military government
continued.
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Western Hemisphere
Last January the Ecuadorean
Government authorized barter
trade with the Communist bloc
as a measure to increase lagging
markets for the country's major
product, bananas. It began
forming a commercial mission to
visit various Far Eastern and
European Communist countries
and Japan. Rumors indicated
that, although Ecuador severed
diplomatic relations with Commu-
nist countries. in April 1962 and
has had no significant trade
with them since mid-1963, rec-
ognition might be extended in
support of economic policy.
In late March departure of
the trade mission was postponed,
partly because Ecuador had
turned its attention to its bor-
ders with Peru. Nevertheless,
given the sharp drop in first-
quarter exports, the trade mis-
sion probably will set out later,
and the possibility of eventual
recognition of one or more Com-
munist countries remains. 25X1
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