WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1965
• Content Type: SUMMARY

OROI P 1 Excluded from au+omatic''
dt v ~roding,eQnd declassification
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%wool SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200 EST, 28 January 1965)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
ALLIED TRAVEL POLICY FOR EAST GERMANS CHALLENGED I
East Germany is gaining at least tacit support from
some NATO members in its latest challenge to the system
of regulating East German travel to the West.
NEW SOVIET LEADERS ENCOURAGE LOCAL AND PRIVATE INITIATIVE 2
Funds are being made available for private housing and
for purchase of private livestock, and an experiment
last year allowing textile plant managers to control
production and marketing is to be greatly expanded
during 1965.
HANOI COMPLAINS OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Its modest claims for 1964 have been overshadowed by
expressions of concern that the "heavy tasks" of 1965
will not be accomplished.
MILITARY TAKE OVER AGAIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM
General Khanh's bloodless coup has damped down growing
Buddhist street agitation, but he still faces a host
of problems as he tries to revamp the government.
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29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
COMMUNIST MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN LAOS 7
The Communists have launched what appear to be clearing
operations in northern Laos at a time when the govern-
ment's defense capability is hampered by the accidental
destruction of a number of its combat aircraft. Commu-
nist supply and reinforcement movements continue in south-
central Laos and around the Plaine des Jarres.
ETHIOPIA AGAIN FACES DISSIDENCE IN ERITREA
Long-standing Eritrean opposition to Ethiopian rule may
soon receive a boost in the form of aid from Muslim
countries, including the Sudan and Somalia.
PROSPECTS FADING FOR MARCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SUDAN 9
The non-Communist parties, anxious to dissolve the left-
ist-influenced transitional government, are pushing hard
for elections, but the Communists and other leftists could
delay an electoral law indefinitely.
TSHOMBE TO NEGOTIATE IN BRUSSELS
The Congolese premier's oft-delayed trip to Belgium is
scheduled to take place this week end, at the same time
that another meeting of the Organization of African
Unity's Congo Commission convenes in Nairobi.
OAU PRESSURES AGAINST HOLDEN ROBERTO'S ANGOLAN EXILES
Moves are under way within the Organization of African
Unity to reduce support for the inept Roberto's Congo-
based Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile.
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29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
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EUROPE (continued)
MEETING OF DE GAULLE AND ERHARD
The principal result of the 19 January conference of
the two leaders was a renewal of Franco-German amity
which may have set the stage for early resumption of
negotiations on a European political organization.
ITALIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The badly divided Christian Democrats have convened
their national council in an effort to reach agreement
to enact certain of the coalition's reform measures.
Unless they are able to do so, their coalition partners
will probably feel obligated to leave the government.
Meanwhile, new demands from factions in both the Chris-
tian Democratic and Socialist parties may portend a
fairly extensive cabinet shakeup.
25X1
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
POLITICAL TENSIONS RISING IN HONDURAS 19
The majority Liberal Party, believing Chief of Govern-
ment Lopez intends to rig elections for a constituent
assembly next month in order to remain in office, may
resort to violent protest. 25X1
COLOMBIAN MINISTER OF WAR REPLACED
President Valencia, taking advantage of an upsurge of
public confidence in the government after the collapse
of a threatened general strike, has replaced the polit-
ically ambitious and outspoken General Ruiz Novoa.
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29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
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The Communist World
ALLIED TRAVEL POLICY FOR EAST GERMANS CHALLENGED
East Germany is gaining at
least tacit support from some
NATO members in its latest chal-
lenge to the system of regulat-
ing East German travel to the
West. This system operates
through the Allied Travel Office
(ATO), which was set up as a
four-power group after the de-
feat of Germany and now is ad-
ministered by the three Western
powers with the support of NATO.
ATO adopted a highly re-
strictive policy after the Ber-
lin Wall went up, when it be-
came more apparent that East Ger-
many would permit trips abroad
only if they served its politi-
cal interests. To counter this,
ATO began granting Temporary
Travel. Documents (TTDs) only for
compassionate reasons, emigra-
tion, or trade of interest to
the West.
Some relaxation occurred
in mid-1963: TTDs were granted
to athletic teams and scientific
or cultural delegations if they
joined with similar groups from
the Federal Republic to repre-
sent all of Germany. Regula-
tions were further relaxed on a
trial basis in April 1964 to per-
mit freer travel by individuals
and by teams and delegations
representing a locality, a sports
club, or a regional scientific
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 1
group. At no time, however,
were travel documents granted
to government or party offi-
cials. (See table on reverse
of this page.)
The regime currently is
making use of selected travel-
ers to NATO states in an ef-
fort to undercut the ATO reg-
ulations. It has encouraged emi-
nent clergymen, scientists,. and
athletes to apply for TTDs to
attend church meetings, sym-
posia, and sports events which
draw public attention. If these
are not granted, it accuses ATO
of being arbitrary and unreason-
able. More recently East Ger-
man offers of increased trade
have had some success in gain-
ing access to NATO countries
for officials without proper
documentation. In October, for
example, Trade Minister Julius
Balkow visited the Salonika
Trade;Fair and reportedly met
with government officials in
Athens. He went to Belgium in
December after Brussels and Ant-
werp businessmen, fearful of
losing shipbuilding and other
contracts, persuaded Foreign
Minister Spaak to waive the TTD
requirement.
Twice the East Germans have
also caused strain and embarrass-
ment in NATO by sending
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ALLIED TRAVEL OFFICE CATEGORIES FOR EAST GERMAN TRAVEL IN THE WEST
1. Trade
2. Transport
and Communications
3. Professional
4. Cultural
5. Political
6. Press
7. Religion
8. Official East German
Delegations and Teams
9
.
All
-
G
erman
D
e
l
egation
s
and Teams
10. Private Visits
11. Tourism
12. Emigration
13. Wives with Husbands
1.
Trade
2.
Transport
and Communications
3.
Agriculture
Banned
4.
Medical and Scientists
Banned
Banned
5.
Professional
Banned
Banned
6.
Political
Banned
7.
Cultural.
Banned
Banned
8.
Sport
Banned
10. Religion
11. Visits to Relatives
12. Visits to Friends
13. Wives with Husbands.. Banned
14. Tourism Banned
15. Health
16. Emigration
17. Compassionate
18. Private Contractual
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high-ranking party leaders to
Western capitals. An SED dele-
gation, led by candidate polit-
buro member Axen, attended the
funeral of Maurice Thorez in
Paris last July. The French
later explained with some cha-
grin that harried customs offi-
cials at Orly had overlooked the
East Germans' lack of documenta-
tion. In late August, another
SED delegation, led by polit-
buro member Warnke, attended the
funeral of Palmiro Togliatti in
Rome. The Italian Government
claimed that pressure from the
local Communists had caused it to
grant the East Germans 48-hour
transit visas.
Reflecting the greater in-
terest of some NATO members in
trade with East Germany, as well
as general dissatisfaction over
the way current regulations are
enforced, the Netherlands dele-
gation to the North Atlantic
Council meeting on 13 January
proposed liberalizing ATO regula-
tions to permit more travel by
sports teams and other "unobjec-
tionable individuals." It also 25X1
argued that trade officials
should be allowed to travel on
business.
NEW SOVIET LEADERS ENCOURAGE LOCAL AND PRIVATE INITIATIVE
The new rulers of the USSR
are encouraging local and pri-
vate initiative in housing con-
struction, agriculture, and in-
dustry.
The Construction Bank is
once again offering credits to
private individuals to build their
own homes and encouraging them
to do so. These seven-year cred-
its--up to 700 rubles for work-
ers and 1,000 rubles for teachers
and doctors--will cover about 25
percent of the total costs of a
private house.
In the late 1950s private
housing construction, which was
supported by government loans,
accounted for about a third of
all urban housing built. When
Khrushchev withdrew his support
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 2
of this program in 1960, how-
ever, only a limited program
of loans was sanctioned, and
by the end of 1964 only 19 per-
cent of total urban housing
was privately built. The new
government apparently recognizes
that the 1965 goal of building
over 10 million square meters
more living space than in 1964
cannot be reached without a
large increase in private homes.
Another incentive to stim-
ulate private housing construc-
tion is offered to families who
settle in state and collective
farms on irrigated land. The
10-year credits previously
granted have been increased
from 1,700 rubles to a maximum
of 3,500 rubles for building
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The Communist World
dustry. The successful produc-
tion-marketing experiment con-
ducted at two clothing plants
last year is to be expanded in
July 1965 to some 400 factories
which account for one fourth
of total Soviet output of
clothing and shoes. In the
second quarter of 1965 the
same system will be applied
to 76 textile and 20 leather
enterprises which supply these
factories. Plant directors will
have authority to buy the raw
materials and hire the workers
needed to fill orders received,
and to set wages. Any reduc-
tion in profits caused by
changes in consumer demand will
be covered at least temporarily
by reserves of the regional
economic councils.
houses with small sheds for
animals.
The USSR is also helping
individuals acquire livestock.
The state will extend five-year
credits of 300 rubles for pur-
chase of a milk cow, and 150
rubles to buy a calf. Grain
now can be bought from state
supplies for privately owned
livestock, and fodder now is
being sold to collective and
state farms and other govern-
ment enterprises at wholesale
prices and without the turnover
tax.
A recent article in Pravda
has suggested increased reliance
on local initiative to raise
agricultural production. Stat-
ing that profit may be the best
indicator for evaluating the op-
eration of agricultural enter-
prises, the article implied that
the government should pay more
for agricultural products be-
cause some current procurement
prices keep production rates be-
low plan. The newspaper also
suggested that the farms help
draft the plan so that the state
can determine which products
they want to produce and can
then adjust procurement prices
to meet the needs of the whole
country.
This encouragement of pri-
vate and local initiative in
agriculture follows the announce-
ment of plans to expand a rela-
tively liberal production sys-
tem now being tried in light in-
In line with Premier Kosy-
gin's statement in his 1965
plan speech that this system
will eventually spread to other
branches of industry, an ex-
periment is under way in five
enterprises in the Lvov area
including a lift-truck plant
and a coal mine. The results
of this trial will be watched
closely because some of the
strongest supporters of the
textile experiment believe it
cannot be successfully applied
to heavy industry. Proponents
of its expansion, however,
argue that central control over
the "commanding heights" of
the economy can be maintained
through less direct means.25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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HANOI COMPLAINS OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Hanoi's year-end statements
have been unusually brief, with
modest claims for 1964 over-
shadowed by concern for 1965.
The official announcements
on 1964 are thus far limited to
claims of a five-percent increase
in the value of agricultural
output over 1963's very poor
crop and a ten-percent increase
in industrial production. The
early rice crop was excellent,
but autumn typhoons left con-
siderable damage from waterlog-
ging. The fact that Hanoi has
made no mention of total rice
output suggests poor results
in this vital area of the econ-
omy.
In spelling out the prob-
lems, a recent.editorial in
Nhan Dan reiterated the usual
compli~int that "various short-
comings in leadership and eco-
nomic management" have limited
progress and have created con-
cern about accomplishing the
"very heavy" tasks of 1965. Al-
though this is the last year of
North Vietnam's first five-year
plan (1961-65), Hanoi's per-
functory references to the plan
indicate that even the reduced
goals are not expected to be
met. Goals for 1965 are stated
in extremely broad terms with
the only persistent stress be-
ing on the need to fulfill food
targets. A recent communiqud
called for better distribution
of food and noted that require-
ments were growing faster than
production.
Hanoi found it necessary
to import food in 1964 and may
have to again in 1965. While
food shortages have not been
serious, the need to import
food and the inability to ex-
port significant amounts of
agricultural products are re-
stricting economic growth and
making Hanoi's goal of self-
sufficiency all the more unat-
tainable. With limited exports
to earn foreign exchange, Hanoi
will remain dependent on aid
from the Communist world for
most of the manufactured goods
it needs.
Although North Vietnam's
economy is clearly capable of
supporting its present level of
aid to dissident forces in Laos
and South Vietnam, Hanoi re-
mains dependent on the rest of
the Communist world for all but
the simplest military equipment.
In his 1 January statement, Vice
Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh said
that the 1965 state plan would
have to link the economy closely
with national defense in order
to increase the economic poten-
tial for supporting the mili-
tary and "to heighten combat
readiness." Considering the
negligible military potential
in the predominantly agricul-
tural economy, Nguyen's state-
ment appears designed to stimu-
late the people to greater eco-
nomic efforts by citing external
threats to the security of North
Vietnam.
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1"01 -now"
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MILITARY TAKE OVER AGAIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The military's bloodless coup
on 27 January against the Huong
regime in South Vietnam has damped
down what was becoming increas-
ingly violent Buddhist-inspired
agitation, but General Khanh is
likely to encounter a host of
problems in his attempt to revamp
the government.
Khanh and the military say
that Buddhist leaders promised to
give the military time to stabil-
ize the situation and agreed to
exile some of the more militant
monks. The Buddhists, however,
having once again demonstrated
their political power, are already
showing signs of reneging. They
are insisting, as they have in the
past, that all persons arrested in
their recent demonstrations, in-
cluding identified Viet Cong, be
freed.
The projected council, which
will include religious elements,
may become the new focus for the
exertion of Buddhist pressure, as
well as for the interplay of those
other contending political forces
which have thus far prevented es-
tablishment of a viable regime.
Agreement on a new government com-
bination may thus be difficult
to achieve.
An alliance between Khanh and 25X1
the Buddhists appears to have been
a prime factor behind Huong's
overthrow.
Continued
divisions within the military can
be expected to limit the degree to
which Khanh can enhance his per-
sonal power position.
The military have entrusted
to Khanh responsibility for estab-
lishing a joint civilian-military
council., which will in turn name a
new chief of state. The new chief
of state is to name a new premier.
The council will act as the legis-
lative body pending election of a
national assembly, still scheduled
for mid-March.
Phan Khac Suu will remain as
acting chief of state. Third Dep-
uty Premier Nguyen Xuan Oanh has
been appointed acting premier
pending designation of a successor
to Huong. Khanh professes an in-
tent to leave the rest of the
cabinet largely unchanged for the
present, but Buddhist pressures
are likely to force the removal of
some civilian ministers who had pre-
viously excited Buddhist attacks.
Viet Cong military activity
was relatively light last week,
possibly reflecting a tapering off
as the Tet (lunar new year) holi-
days approach. As in previous
years, the Communists have uni-
laterally declared a cease-fire
from 31 January to 6 February in
observance of this major Vietnam-
ese holiday. A sharp upsurge of
activity can be expected thereafter.
On the government side, six
large-scale operations last week
resulted in substantial Viet Cong
losses. The most notable govern-
ment success was against the 261st
Viet Cong Battalion, famous for 25X1
its defeat of government forces in
the battle of Ap Bac in 1963.
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29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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LAOS
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SOUTH
V1ET\M
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NW SECRET 1we
Communist forces last week
launched a strong clearing opera-
tion against government military
pockets in Sam Neua. Province in
northern Laos. Similar opera-
tions conducted sporadically
over the past few years have re-
sulted in only temporary gains
aga.inst the strongly entrenched
government troops, mostly Meo
tribesmen.
In the present instance,
the Pathet La.o, probably rein-
forced with additional North
Vietnamese elements and new anti-
aircraft artillery, are believed
to outnumber the government
forces by about six battalions
to three. Some minor government
positions west and southwest of
Sam Neua town have been taken
by the Communists, whose main
objective appears to be a. base
area. about 30 miles southwest
of the provincial capital. Gov-
ernment defensive actions have
been hampered by the loss of
air support resulting from the
destruction of nine Lao Air
Force T-28s in a series of ac-
cidental explosions at Vientiane
Airfield on 23 Ja.nua.ry.
The military situation is
relatively quiet in other areas
of La.os, although there are re-
ports that the Communists may be
preparing for another push in
the Tha Thom area, southeast of
the Plaine des Jarres. Farther
south, the recent capture of a.
North Vietnamese soldier along
Route 9 in the panhandle lends
support to previous reports
that North Vietnamese forces
have reinforced Pa.thet La.o
troops in this area. The Com-
munists may be preparing to
launch a. counterattack to re-
gain territory lost during the
recent government offensive ea.st
of Sa.vannakhet.
Meanwhile the Communists
continue to supply advanced
positions in the pa.nha.ndle area
along routes 12 and 23. In the
11-26 January period a total
of approximately 70 trucks moved
west on Route 12 toward the
Nhomma.ra.th-Mahaxa.y area, an
average of about 5 per day. In
the same period, a.bout 100
trucks moved south on Route 23.
This latter movement wa.s high-
lighted by a. 60-truck convoy on
25 Ja.nua.ry, the largest south-
bound convoy on Route 23 since
mid-December. Most of the trucks
carried unidentified cargo, al-
though in some instances small
numbers of Communist troops
apparently were transported.
A recently received road-
watch report, the first since
late December, indicates that
Communist traffic continues to
move into the Plaine des Ja.rres
via Route 7. photography 25X1
tends to confirm earlier reports
that a. ford just north of the
destroyed Ban Ken bridge is in
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NW SECRET *ft/
ETHIOPIA AGAIN FACES DISSIDENCE IN ERITREA
Ethiopian officials are in-
creasingly concerned about
chronic armed dissidence in
Eritrea Province. The latest
incident was a successful at-
tack on a police unit at Mas-
saua in mid-January. Addis
Ababa is particularly worried
over the support the new Suda-
nese Government is giving the
Eritrean liberation movement,
whose leaders have been in
exile, first in Egypt and now in
Iraq, since Eritrea was feder-
ated with Ethiopia in 1952 un-
der a UN resolution. It became
an integrated province of
Ethiopia in-1962.
This month Ethiopia's act-
ing foreign minister, angered
by an anti-Ethiopian demonstr~-
tion in Khartoum as well as Suda-
nese press and radio propaganda
favoring the Eritrean cause,
publicly deplored the new Suda-
nese sympathy for Eritreans in
exile. Ethiopian officials also
believe that in recent months
the USSR has been giving more
encouragement to the Eritreans
in exile.
Banditry, tribal warfare,
and Christian-versus-Muslim an-
tagonisms as well as political
dissidence have been endemic in
Eritrea, but poor organization
and factional rivalries have
kept unrest at a level control-
lable by police and army units
responsible for internal security.
During the past ten years, the
exile leaders have obtained mili-
tary training for displaced Eri-
treans, recruited from Sudan and
elsewhere, while a few personnel
and small quantities of arms have
been smuggled in and out of Eri-
trea with minor help from
Egypt, Somalia, and other Mus-
lim countries. The impact of
this activity has been minimal.
The collaboration that evidently
has been developing between the
new Sudanese Government and So-
malia, however, lends some sub-
stance to Ethiopia's historic
fears of Muslim encirclement.
The Somali Government,
which has its own long-standing
feud with Ethiopia over the
Ogaden region, is surprised and
delighted by the Sudanese sup=
port for the Eritreans.
A marked step-up in dissi-
dence in Eritrea would severely
tax the Ethiopian Army, whose best
units are already tied down watch-
ing the Somalis in the Ogaden. Any
sign of weakness in dealing with
the Eritreans, moreover, could en-
courage elements in: Ethiopia hos-
tile to the Emperor's regime. Con-
tinued Sudanese toleration of the
Eritreans thus could eventually
provoke the Emperor to retaliate,
possibly by supporting the south-
ern Sudanese rebels.
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29 Jan 65 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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PROSPECTS FADING FOR MARCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SUDAN
Prospects for March parlia-
mentary elections in the Sudan
are fading. While the non-Com-
munist parties are anxious to
dissolve the leftist-influenced
transitional government as soon
as possible and are pushing hard
for cabinet assurances that
elections will be held as prom-
ised, the Communists still pre-
fer a postponement. The Commu-
nists and other leftists can
probably secure ample cabinet
votes to put off final approval
of an electoral law indefinitely.
The growing conflict be-
tween the non-Communist Front
of Political Parties--led by
the Ansar religious brotherhood
--and the Communist-backed Pro-
fessional Front has thus far
been limited to an exchange of
public accusations and demands.
Both groups, however, may soon
turn to demonstrations and vio-
lence. The Professional Front
has already called on the govern-
ment to lift the present ban
on demonstrations.
The inflexibility of the
strongly anti-Communist leaders
of SANU, the southern dissident
organization, is playing into
the hands of the leftists. The
Communists and most other north-
ern Sudanese insist that any
elections held must be nation-
wide, and SANU refuses to par-
ticipate in elections until the
government meets its presently
unrealistic demands for self-
rule in the southern provinces.
SANU leaders in exile are
said to have agreed to return
to the Sudan for constitutional
negotiations. Southern dissi-
dent activity, however, is con-
tinuing. While both northerners
and southerners still claim to be
anxious to settle the southern
problem, both sides are taking
an increasingly hard line, and
there is no indication that any
compromise is possible at this
time.
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 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700120001-9
ft
SECRET
TSHOMBE TO NEGOTIATE IN BRUSSELS
Moise Tshombd plans to make
his oft-postponed trip to Brus-
sels this week end, while the
OAU's Congo Committee is sched-
uled to meet in Nairobi.
The Congolese premier's
object is to try to resolve out-
standing critical problems with
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak.
Tshombd is interested primarily
in obtaining possession of the
important portfolio of shares
in Belgian companies operating
in the Congo which was to have
been handed over at independence,
four and a half years ago. Spaak,
worried by radical African sup-
port of the rebels, is pressing
Tshombd hard to seek wide Afri-
can support by broadening his
government, holding general
elections, proclaiming a, sweep-
ing amnesty, and replacing South
African mercenaries with Euro-
peans.
As a pressure tactic the
Belgian Government has recently
stalled on further military and
technical assistance to the
Congo. Some of the most effec-
tive Belgian military advisers
recently returned to Belgium
at the expiration of their tours,
SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700120001-9
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
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Province ec.indary
N strove cap tal
* Prince capital
Approximate area of
uprising
GABON_. Inongo
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
L
l/ B A N G I i`?
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?,` Banzyville
r-f
*.- -?Bumba
Lisala -~
Basoko
Buma*' r