WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 4, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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(Information as of 1200 EST, 3 December 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
USSR'S NEW GENERAL STAFF CHIEF 1
The recall of Marshal Zakharov to serve again in this
post has the earmarks of an interim assignment,
OPERATIONS ON THE USSR'S NORTHERN SEA ROUTE IN 1964
Cargo carried during the four-month season reached a
record level of 2.25 million metric tons, 13 percent
more than last year.
YUGOSLAVIA'S EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS
Despite controversy over extending economic and polit-
ical decentralization, the congress is certain to en-
dorse the party leaders' relatively liberal policies.
Implementation, however, may be hampered by regional
and political rivalries.
CHINESE COMMUNISTS BRING NEW PRESSURE ON TOKYO 4
Peiping has stalled negotiations for a large part of
next year"s Sino-Ja anese trade in a move 25X1
t~a press Tokyo for a more "friendly" attitude.
ECONOMIC PRIORITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Recent progress in the modern weapons industry con-
trasts sharply with continued stagnation in the
general economy.
THE MILITIA BUILDUP IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Domestic propaganda indicates that the militia is to
be used primarily to "enforce the people's dictator-
ship" at home.
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued)
VIET CONG INFILTRATION
Recent information from captured documents and prison-
ers of war pictures an extensive and sophisticated in-
filtration network that has moved possibly as many as
34,000 men into South Vietnam since 1959,
Page .
7
BUDDHISTS THREATEN NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME 9
Although Premier Huong appears temporarily to have re-
stored order in Saigon, Buddhist leaders in central
Vietnam as well as in the capital now are insisting
that the government resign or be revised.
NEW ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
Sukarno is tolerating the "Sukarnoists," who are seek-
ing to block the further growth of Communist power in
the country. He may hope to use them in connection
with his own domestic and foreign policy moves.
AREA NOTES
On Laos, Pakistan, Turkey, Cyprus, and Sudan.
CONGCI GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUE TO ADVANCE
I~eopoldville's military campaign was going well this
week, but it lacks troops to garrison captured areas,
a.nd new aid for the rebels may be imminent.
ITALIAN COALITION WEAKENED BY LOCAL ELECTION LOSSES
While election losses by the Christian Democrats and
>ocialists will make it difficult to regroup center-
l.eft majorities in many local administrations, the
effects on the national center-left coalition could be
f'ar more serious.
SE CRE T
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EUROPE (continued)
Page
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOMINICAN STRIKE
The regime appears to be winning its battle to thwart
a general strike
AREA NOTE
On Argentina
BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT ORDERS INTERVENTION IN GOIAS STATE 21
Despite some criticism of his handling of the Goias affair,
Castello Branco has probably not suffered any signifi-
cant loss of political control. The military "hard-
liners," however, may now be encouraged to go after
other political targets.
SECRET
4 ]mac 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Fage iii
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Z'he recent recall of Mar-
shal Nlatvey Zakharov to serve
again as chief of the Soviet
General Staff and presumably as
a first deputy defense minister
has the earmarks of an interim
assignment.
His selection to
rep ace a late Marshal Biryu-
zov suggests a continuing re-
luctance by political leaders
to entrust key military posts
to younger officers who lack
wartime experience at the army
or army group level.
Zakharov was chief of staff
of the 64th Army at Stalingrad
and subsequently was Malinov-
sky's staff chief in central
Europe and the Far East. He
was first named general staff
chief and first deputy defense
minister in 196Q, after he had
served a three-year tour as com-
mander of the Soviet forces in
Germany. He lost these. two pasts
to Biryuzov in March 1963, amid
speculation that he had become
a scapegoat for the Cuban mis-
sile crisis or the Penkovsky
espionage case, or that he had
been involved in a dispute over
military allocations. The real
reasons for his removal have
never become clear, but his age
and health may have been fac-
tors.
Zakharov is said to be
a tough and brilliant soldier,
popular with the army. Although
he allegedly favors traditional
weaponry and methods, his pub-
lic statements have consistently
echoed the party line on troop
cuts, nuclear surprise, rocket
forces, and party control of the
military establishment. 25X1
OPERATIONS ON THE USSR'S NORTHERN SEA ROUTE IN 1964
Despite severe climatic
conditions, 1964 operations on
the USSR's Northern Sea Route
were at a record level. An ex-
timated 2.25 million metric tons
of cargo were carried during
the four-month season. This
was an increase of 13 percent
aver freight volume in 1963 and
was approximately 3 percent above
plan.
This year's ice condi-
tions were about as severe as
in 1962 and 1963. For the first
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1
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~ V
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EASTERN
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USSR: Major Locations on the
Northern Sea Route
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time three large icebreakers,
including the atomic-powered
Lenin, were used simultaneously
in~Fie western Arctic,
The annual naval convoy
from west to east transited the
route, delivering one new guided-
missile destroyer, four sub-
marines, and several auxiliary
ships ~to the Pacific Fleet. A
total of 1(3Q river ships--com-
pared with an average of 50 in
the part--moved from Eastern
Europe and the Western USSR to
the Siberian rivers. These ves-
sels carried cargo for the first
time.
In still another first,
Sibex?i;an timber was shipped
The eighth congress of the
Yugols;av party will open on 7
December amid considerable con-
troversy within the regime over
the proper pace and means of
extending economic and politi-
cal decentralization. The con-
gress is certain to endorse the
party leaders' relatively lib-
eral policies, including the
new party statutes, but the re-
gional and political rivalries
which lie behind the controversy
to Japan via the Northern Sea
Route in 1964. This develop-
ment may be related to a Feb-
ruary 1964 statement that it
made economic sense to expand
exports of timber and pulp
rather than gold to earn for-
eign exchange.
On 31 March the Chief
Directorate of the Northern
Sea Route was abolished af-
ter certain of its functions
had been transferred to other
directorates. It was replaced
by the Chief Directorate of
Navigation, indicating that
the USSR now considers use of
the Northern Sea Route a more
routine annual operation.
will hamper, if not hamstring,
their effective implementation.
The top leaders enjoy the
support of most of the manage-
rial class and the younger party
members. Arguing that Yugo-
slavia has developed beyond the
paint where the economy can be
efficiently operated from the
center, they will have the in-
itiative at the congress.
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TYie conservative opposi-
tion is made up primarily of
middle--level party function-
aries vvhose power is likely to
be undE~rmined by further decen-
tralizaition. Their claims that
decentralization has led and
will lead to diffusion of ef-
fort, wasted resources, and eco-
nomic imbalances will probably
be ovex?ruled, but they can later
frustrate the policies adopted
by fai]Ling to implement party
directives.
Tkre confrontation of these
groups is complicated by the in-
creasirrgly open rivalry of Yugo-
slavia"s nationalities, a prob-
lem wii;h which the congress will
also have to deal. The parties
of the more developed republics,
Slovenia and Croatia, favor
greatex? decentralization as a
means of retaining more funds
for local development. The par-
ties oi' the less developed re-
public.> generally wish to en-
sure that further decentraliza-
tion will not lessen the amount
of federal funds committed for
their cevelopment. In an effort
to quiet this rivalry, the au-
thors of the seven-year plan
(1964-~0), which will be adopted
at the congress, have emphasized
raisin; the living standard of
all republics.
Iri keeping with the endorse-
ment oi' decentralization, the,
new party statutes to be pre-
sented at the congress are de-
signed to restrict direct party
interference in everyday gov-
ernment and economic affairs and
to introduce a measure of democ-
racy into the operations of
lower level party organizations.
The statutes call for replace-
ment of one fourth of the cen-
tral committee members at each
congress and periodic changes
in the membership of executive
committees--principles adopted
by the government in 1963.
This year's congress will
probably see the first substan-
tial personnel changes in lead-
ing party bodies since 1952. Im-
plementation of the new sta-
tutes, which are designed to
promote efficiency and broader
based decision making, would
also open the way for the new
generation of party members to
move up in party ranks.
The conservatives will
probably be the main losers,
in that the party's moderate
leadership can manipulate the
changes to get rid of ineffec-
tive officials--particularly
World War II partisans who
have failed to adapt to the
needs of Yugoslavia's now more
complex society. The top lead-
ership--Tito, Rankovic, Kar,d~elL
--undoubtedly will remain./
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SE FRET
Peiping .may be launching a
new campaign of political and eco-
nomic pressure against the Japa-
nese Government, On 27 November,
Chinese officials in Tokyo suddenly
postponed signing contracts cover-
ing a substantial portion of next
year's Sino-Japanese trade. They
said Peiping had ordered them to
delay final formalities on trans-
actions involving purchase of fer-
tilizer worth $80 million and
about X520 million in contracts for
Japanese steel and Chinese iron
are.
Peiping's latest move is prob-
ably intended to add weight to pub-
lic attacks on the Sato government
which began on 21 November with a
formal Foreign Ministry statement
protesting the decison to bar the
high-level Chinese party group,
headed by politburo member Peng
Chen, from Japan. The statement
was followed by vitriolic commen-
tary in People's Daily attacking
the Japanese prime minister by
name and openly hinting at the
possibility of retaliation for his
"unreasonable" actions. Chou En-
la,i also criticized Tokyo's "un-
friendly attitude" at an Albanian
Embassy reception on 28 November.
Peiping probably calculates
that the threat of a break in
trade relations will generate do-
mestic pressure in Japan for
changes in policy. An attempt to
influence the Japanese by cutting
off commercial relations in 1958
was z~ot successful, however, and
the Chinese have thus far been
careful to avoid steps which would
foreclose the possibility of fur- 25X1
ther political bargaining.
The Chinese will probably seek to
probe Tokyo's intentions more
deeply--and to bring new pressure
to bear--when influential Japanese
Diet member Chuji Kuno visits
China on 8 December.
Sato will probably meet the
Chinese moves initially by main-
taining a firm-line on Japan's
declared policy of separating
politics from economics in deal-
ing with the mainland. It seems
likely that he will insist that
all contacts with the Chinese
be handled throu h channels he
can control.
SECRET
4 Dec 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 4
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ECONOMIC PRIORITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Recent developments in
China's modern weapons industry
contrast sharply with continued
stagnation in the general econ-
omy,
Tlhe detonation of a nuclear
device, the testing of missiles
at Shu;~ngchengtzu, the produc-
tion o:f a ballistic missile sub-
marine at Dairen, and renewed
construction of conventional
patrol submarines at Shanghai
have emphasized the high prior-
ity accorded modern weapons.
The hiatus in production
of military aircraft and sub-
mariner over the past few years
resultE~d from technical problems
related to the withdrawal of So-
viet specialists in 1960 as well
as the general chaos caused by
the aborted "leap forward." Re-
sumption of production reflects
not only the substantial earlier
Soviet aid in plants and designs
but al:;o a decision to concen-
trate China's limited technical
resources on a few military proj-
ects oi' highest priority,
These developments have
taken place within the context
of a depressed economy in which
agriculture continues to stag-
nate and the population to rise,
forcing Peiping to import food
this year at a record level,
Plans for the Iagg'ing agricul-
tural sector are partially re-
vealed in a recent People's
Daily editorial on warmer con-
servation which stated flatly
that rural areas should not
count on state funds. The edi-
torial pointed out that if the
peasants rely on revolutionary
enthusiasm the state will be
able to use funds in a mare con-
centrated way in areas of "most
urgent need," probably an indi-
rect reference to crash efforts
in the special weapons field.
While the regime has been
concentrating on developing pres-
tige weapons, the general econ-
omy has limped along with sur-
prisingly little long-range guid-
ance. Although China will soon
enter the third year of its
Third Five-Year Plan (1963-67),
there is still no evidence that
Peiping has been able to draft
a workable plan. Furthermore,
the declining per capita output
of grain leaves the regime with
little margin for financin in-
vestment in future growth.~~
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A major buildup of Commu-
nist Cliina.'s civilian People "s
Militi;~,, virtually dormant for
four ycaa.rs, has been under wa.y
for five months. In its exter-
nal propa.ga.nda, Peiping ha.s en-
couraged the impression that the
chief purpose of the buildup is
to defend Chin a, from "imperia.l-
ist inva.ders." Domestic propa-
ga.nda., however, makes clear that
a. more important aim is to create
a. tool for curbing dissidence.
For example, overseas broad-
casts of parts of a key edito-
rial :from People's Daily of 17
November p aTyec~up ie militia's
potent:ia.l a.s a. defense reserve
which ca.n release regular troops
for du7ty elsewhere. The full
text, however, emphasizes the
militia's role in helping the
public security forces a.nd the
army "enforce the people's dic-
tatorship" a.t home. The edi-
torial demands that the militia.
pa.rtic:ipa.te in the socialist
educa.t:Lon movement, which it in-
dica.te;~ will soon be a.s repres-
sive a:~ the bloody land reform
movement of 1950.
The present buildup takes
place against a. history of ten
years :in which the militia grew
rapidly, then almost tata.lly
colla.p:~ed. In the heady atmos-
phere of the "Leap forwa.rd,"
militia ranks swelled suddenly
to a. claimed 230 million, with
predictably chaotic results.
The authorities soon lost all
firm knowledge of the actual
number of men or units, their
political reliability, what
weapons they possessed, even
what they were capable of doing.
a Military Affairs
omm ee conference in October
1960 all but disbanded the mili-
tia.. A year or so later, the
regime began cautiously to re -
orga.nize it, using demobilized
army men a.nd some active army
personnel a.s the hard core.
Nevertheless
remained imi
early 1964.
25X1
militia. activity
ed even through
The buildup began in earn-
est about June 1964, a.t a. time
when regime policies, both for-
eign a.nd domestic, appeared to
be generally hardening.
news stories r ve ea
increased recruiting a.nd train-
ing, with the emphasis at first
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on urban students, workers, and
junior party officials. There
are tenuous indications that the
militia. by now ma.y have regained
a. strength of about 20-30 mil-
lion. The extent of current
official interest in the sub-
ject i~o shown by the many mili-
tia. deuionstra,tions a.nd confer-
ences since June, which have
been a.t:tended by Mao Tse-tung
and ot1--er top military and po-
litical officials.
Despite the regime's seem-
ing surge of confidence in the
loyalty of the new militiamen,
its worries over their political
reliability are far from over-
come. Its propaganda calls for
further purification of militia.
ranks and for distribution of
weapons to only the most reliable
pea.sa.nts a.nd workers. There
are a.lrea.dy indications that sup-
plies of ammunition for local
militia forces a.re being tightly
controlled. In the continuing
absence of broad popular sup-
port for regime policies, it is
questionable whether a trust-
worthy militia, force can be
organized on a. large scale.
Recently ava.ila.ble infor-
mat ion 1
has provided a. cleaxer picture
of the magnitude of the Commu-
nist a.ppa.ra.tus used to infil-
trate men a.nd materiel into
South Vietnam. This informa-
tion a.:Lso inGlicates that the
number of men infiltrated may
be much higher than previously
believed.
Since 1959 when the f first
unit o:f 400 men was assigned by
Hanoi ~to set up an infiltration
route, North Vietnam ha.s created
a. soph:istica.ted a.nd highly se-
cure system which handles the
flow o:f men and materiel from
the north, through Laos, a.nd in-
to the Viet Cong organization.
The 70th Tra.nsporta.tion Group,
directly subordinate to Hanoi,
controls that portion of the
system from North Vietnam to 25X1
the South Vietnam - Laos border
near the junction of Thua. Thien
a.nd Qua.ng Nam provinces. Some
2,000 men, many of them porters,
a.re used in this part of the
operation. Viet Cong authori-
ties take control of the infil-
trating groups a.nd materiel once
they reach the South Vietnamese
border.
Although only portions of
the total infiltration system
have been reliably indentified,
established routes extend as far
south as Ta.y Ninh Province.
There a.re over 100 stations em-
ploying up to 6,000 men in this
SECRET
4 Dec 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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100 105 110
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part o:f the system. If, as seems
likely?the system extends to
the tip of South Vietnam, as
many as 10,000 may be involved.
The extent of this operation
and the number of men involved
help explain Viet Cong ability
to acquire large quantities of
bloc-ma.nufa.ctured weapons a.nd
ammunition ovex the last two
years.
Most of the people employed
in the infiltration system a.re
coolies assigned to the tra.ns-
porta,t:ion of goods. The tra.ns-
porta,tion stations a.re generally
only a half -da.y's march apart,
while the way stations for per-
sonnel a.re a. whole day apart.
There ~a.re 400-600 men for every
ten tr~a.nsportation stations, and
each relay station ha.s three to
seven guides. To maximize se-
curity the guides are kept ignor-
ant of the exact location of the
a.djace;nt wa.y stations, meeting in-
coming groups about halfway be-
tween ~sta.tions.
many wa.y
sta.tio:ns are protected by up to
a platoon of guards a.nd
armed units of
company size have been assigned
by the 70th Group to protect
the infiltration corridor from
attack either from Laos or South
Vietnam. There can be little
doubt that the present infiltra.-
tion system is ca.pa.ble of ma.in-
ta.ining, and even increasing,
the flow of men and arms to the
Viet Cong.
a minimum of 19,000 Viet
Cong infiltrators entered South
Vietnam between January 1959
and August 1964.
the
total number is probably closer
to 34,000.
A unique aspect of the 1964
infiltration is that the over-
whelming majority of those re-
ported coming into South Viet-
nam.have been native northerners,
drafted specifically for service
in the south. The typical infil-
trator of earlier years had been
drawn from a. pool of southerners
regrouped in North Vietnam fol-
lowing the 1954 Geneva. Agree-
ments. The present extensive
use of native northern draftees
suggests that few of the remain-
ing members of the pool are
physically fit for the rigors
of guerrilla. wa.r. It also dem-
onstrates Hanoi's increased
willingness to risk exposure
of its active involvement in
the war in order to improve
Viet Cong ca.pa,bilities.
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Asia-Africa
BUDDHIST.i THREATEN NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME
Soui;h Vietnamese Premier Huong
has remained firm in the face of
pressure;, from student and Buddhist
groups to resign or to reshuffle
his government. Although he appears
for the present to have restored
order in Saigon under martial law,
the deci.;ion of central Vietnam
Buddhist leader Tri Quang to oppose
Huong openly poses the threat of a
concerted Buddhist campaign to top-
ple the new regime,
Quang, who was in the fore-
front of Buddhist efforts against
the Diem regime, ha,d hitherto stayed
aloof fram the effort exerted by
the hierarchy in Saigon to have the
High National Council replace
Huong~s government. Quang now ha.s
told US officials, however, that
he will arder agitation a.ga.inst
Huong if the entire government does
not resign in the near future.
Quang accused the government of
being anti-Buddhist and repressive
in using security forces against
student demonstrators.
Huong so far is still re-
ceiving firm support from most
of the key military and police
afficials, although the position
of Commander in Chief General
Khanh is somewhat ambiguous.
Khanh absented himself from Saigon
during last week's demonstrations
and ha.s avoided a,ny clear state-
ment of support for Huong. Dis-
satisfaction among younger gen-
erals over Khanh 's reinstatement
in the army high command of most
of the leaders of the former
Minh junta. appears to be sharpen-
ing a.s a, result of suspicions
that Khanh may be maneuvering to
undermine Premier Huong.
The military situation dur-
ing the past week wa.s highlighted
by several tactical successes
scored by government troops in
scattered security operations,
Viet Cong activity, following the
pattern of over a month remained
relatively low, I
NEW ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA
A new non-Communist Indone-
sian political movement calling it-
self "Suka.rnoism" surfaced while
President Sukarno was abroad this
fall and is continuing its activi-
ty. Various political figures, in
either the knowledge or the belief
that Sukarno wants to see how the
new group develops a,nd behaves,
for the time being consider it
safe or expedient to ally them-
selves with it.
The group, whose immediate
objective is to block the further
rise of the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI), is led by Minister
of Trade Adam Malik, Chaerul
Sa.leh, third deputy prime min-
ister a.nd minister of develop=
went, also appears to be deeply
involved. Malik, a former a.m-
ba.ssador to the Soviet Union,
and Saleh are ideologically at-
tuned to the "right wing" of the
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Murba (Proletarian) Party, usually
described as the "national Commu-
nist" party of Indonesia. With
Indonesia moving to the left under
Sukarno, Malik and Saleh have come
to represent a "moderate" position,
and their activities, which seem
oblique to Westerners, are arousing
the hopeful interest of individuals
who stand further to the right.
The "Sukarnoists" base their
attack on the PKI largely on
"Pantjasila"--Sukarno's "Five Prin-
ciples" to~ which all officially
recognized. Indonesian political
parties are obliged to subscribe.
The new group's ultimate argument--
which is usually implied rather
than directly stated--is that the
PKI does not sincerely accept Pant-
jasila but; is pursuing its own ob-
jectives and insidiously challeng-
ing Sukarr.~o himself and his asso-
ciates.
The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the
only large legal Muslim party in
Indonesia, earlier had withdrawn
from the Sukarnoist movement but
apparently now considers it safe
to join again. According to Malik,
an NU official received Sukarno's
personal consent to "endorse non-
communist ideas" during a speaking
tour of East and Central Java.
Leaders of: the right wing of the
National Party have also aligned
themselve:~ with Sukarnoism. Malik
claims that he has the support of
the lower levels of these political
parties and of the government bu,-
reaucracy. The movement also has
the backing of a majority of the
newspapers in Djakarta as well as
of -some papers in Narth Sumatra
and East ,Java.
The army until recently had
carefully avoided supporting the
movement publicly.. At a recent
labor conference, however, Army
Commander General Jani and the
West Java territorial commander
made strong statements in behalf
of Pantjasila, and thereby ap-
peared to align themselves with
the Sukarnoists. Navy Chief of
Staff Admiral Martadinata and
Minister of Defense General Na-
sution have openly encouraged
Sukarnoism.
The future of the movement
nevertheless rests with Sukarno
himself. Although the president
is opposed to divisive political
tendencies, he is at the same
time even willing to find effec-
tive pro.-Sukarno elements that
can be used in his political bal-
ancing game. If he now is con-
cerned that the PKI is pushing
too hard, he might be willing to
overlook for a time the fact that
there are elements within Sukarno-
ist ranks whom he distrusts and
whom he has even considered cast-
ing into political limbo.
Another factor in Sukarno's
mind could be a hope that he can
use the Sukarnoists in diplomatic
maneuvering on the Malaysia issue.
He may even believe they would be
useful in getting economic assist-
ance from the West. Sukarnoist
spokesmen are urging the US Em-
bassy in Djakarta to encourage
UK-Indonesian or Indonesian_Ma-
laysian talks. They state that
unless the Malaysia issue is
settled peacefully, their movement
will be smothered in the continu-
ing anti-Malaysia clamor and that
efforts to remedy Indonesia's de-
teriorating economy will fail. Al-
though the Sukarnoists are not
necessarily being directed by Su-
karno to approach the Americans,
their needs and strategy for the
moment seem to coincide with his.
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Gulf of Tonkin
t ;,
- en '~ Tchepone ang Tri
Ban Ban av nnakhet~`-- ~,
`?., ~ Ban Non Phine Hue~"'+~
e ..`'Sala Nong Pet
Khang _ Phou Nonge
Pakse 5e
~'~ Atta~u .-r
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"~~ Xieng Khouang
Phou Khee
-t
Ban Phan ~ V ? 1~
Road'"_ a' f xieng Kliohg
tMuong Kheung
~' ~-~Lat Bouak
VI TNAM
ti _\ ~_ '_
Hanoi
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Laos: Communist forces pressed to within four miles of
have stepped up the tempo of I Tha Thom, southeast of the Plaine,
their operations in widely I while to the northwest vigorous
scattered areas of central and ~ clearing operations have been
northern Laos. mounted against Mea units guard-
Government forces have
abandoned several positions
clang Route 13 northwest of
`fhakhek in the face of in-
creased Communist activity
earlier this week. Rightist
military leaders have ordered
reinforcements for friendly
units defending the northern
approaches to Thakhek.
Farther north Pathet a
troops
have been increasingly aggres-
sive in their moves in the hills
surrounding the Plaine des
Jarres. Communist patrols have
Pakistan: The presiden-
tial erection has been advanced
from March to 2 January, and
campaign activity is intensify-
ing. President Ayub's forces,
as well as the combined opposi-
tion backing his opponent, Miss
Jinnah, now are giving their
undivided attention to winning
support among the 80,000 local
government council members,
elected in November, who also
ing mountain ositions near Mu-
ong Soui. ~
Neutralist forces, mean-
while, have launched an effort
to recapture Phou Kout, a stra-
tegic hill commanding the east-
ern approaches to Muong Soui.
The neutralist drive is being
coordinated with Meo diversion-
ary moves in the flanking hills,
and supported by T-2S strikes
flown by the Laotian Air Force.
serve as Pakistan's electoral
college. The government has
put off planned negotiations
with India and with Afghanis-
tan because key leaders are pre-
occupied with the campaign.
Neither side yet seems able
to make a firm judgment of its
strength among the electors.
'the government apparently has
the support of something mover
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65 percent of the 40,000 elec-
tors in West Pakistan, but of
less than half of the 40,000 in
East Pakistan. It can be ex-
pected to exert all possible
pressures to give Ayub a safe
Turkey: The recent attempt
by Tur~Tis~military leaders to
intimidate the Justice Party
(JP), the major opposition party,
appears to have had some success.
The military's campaign, which
started with a letter from Gen-
eral Staff chief Sunay warning.
against further JP criticism of
the army, has probably not ended,
but may have passed its most
critical stage.
The army's major immediate
object i?ve may have been to ensure
the election by the JP of a party
leader whom the military could
accept. In its national conven-
tion from 27 to 29 November, the
party did just that, choosing as
its president-general Suleyman
Demirel the most moderate of the
candidates and the only one
Cyprus: The Cyprus dispute
is agaiin moving toward the United
Nations. The present mandate
for the UN force stationed on
the island expires on 26 December,
and the Security Council is ex-
pected ?to extend it for another
three-month period. However,
another Cyprus debate is to oc-
curin this session of the General
Assembly. The precise timing is
uncertain, but it is not likely
to take place before February.
Both sides, meanwhile, are seek-
ing int~arnational support. At
that time, the Greek Cypriots
majority, A narrow margin would
give the opposition a moral vic-
tory and encourage it to greater
activity during Ayub's next ad-
ministration than it has shown
during the past few years.
likely be to be approved by the
military high command. Demirel
came from behind to win by al-
most a two to one margin. If
the JP should win next year's
elections, as now appears likely,
its president-general would be-
come Turkey's prime minister.
Although the army apparently
has gained its immediate goal
with regard to the JP, it still
distrusts the party, which is
generally regarded as the suc-
cessor to the defunct Democratic
Party whose regime the military
overthrew in 1960. The high com-
mand may be reconciled to the
JP's coming to power eventually,
but will probably continue its
efforts to influence party pol-
icy.
presumably will ask for unfettered
independence and self-determina-
tion; the Turkish Government will
insist that previous treaties
limiting Cypriot independence re-
main in effect. UN mediator Galo
Plaza's latest soundings indicate
little or no change in positions.
His report apparently will not
now be issued until sometime af-
ter the General Assembly debate.
Turkish officials remain bit-
ter at both the US and NATO. More-
over, they have become increas-
ingly intransigent since Foreign
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~ SECRET ~r
Minister Erkin returned from
Moscow with what he regarded
as Soviet support for the Turk-
ish view: i.e., an independent,
but federated Cyprus. Greek
Cypriot officials, on the other
hand, insist that they have
been reassured that the USSR
will continue to support them.
In Athens, Premier Papandreou
has reiterated his view that
negotiations with Turkey would
not now be productive. Greek
officials maintain that no sud-
Scidan: The Sudanese lead-
ership '-polarizing into in-
creasixigly antagonistic blocs,
one reX>resented by the Commu-
nist-led Professional Front and
the other by the more moderate
National Political Party Front.
The latter group, led by the
conservative Ansar politico-.
religious brotherhood, has held
demonstrations aimed at counter-
ing Communist calls for aboli-
tion of the political parties.
The parties are also opposing
Commun:Lst influence in cabinet
delibemations.
Recent major cabinet deci-
sions have increasingly favored
leftist interests. Committees
have been established to super-
vise widespread purges in the
government ministries, with the
generally pro-Western civil
service a prime target. Two
Communist newspapers have been
reinstated, and a Communist-
backed provision setting aside
15 legislative seats for "grad-
uates"--presumably university--
has been included in plans for
den proclamation of enosis--
union~:;bf Cyprus with Greece--
is contemplated, but they note
that moves toward "de facto
enosis" are already under way
and are expected to continue
until union is achieved.
There has been no 'sig-
hificant outbreak of violence
on the island, but there have
been only minor breakthroughs
in UN efforts to re-establish
a more normal life.
The Communists' abil-
ity to organize street mobs
quickly has also strengthened
their bargaining position.
However, the Communists'
acceptance on 3 December of a
moderate-backed plan for a five-
man Supreme Sovereignty Council
represents an apparent victory
for the moderates. The Commu-
nists may have given in on this
issue in order to avoid a show-
down at this time. A cabinet
decision favoring the Communist-
backed plan for a three-man
council of "independents" might
have incited strong pressures
from the traditional parties
for a reshuffle of the cabinet
and thereby threatened the Com-
munists' present disproportion-
ately strong position on that
body.
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4 Dec Ei4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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MULELE
Rebellion
CAMEROON ~ jp
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
-~~- Interna!ional boundary
Province boundary
National cap~~tal
Province t;ao~~tal
Approximate area of
uprising
u ~r~,-: o~n~dE,;
I i
G 1G0 2'i0 hfinmeterc
~.~?' MOT \1R[(]~~L
,?. r~~o.).)
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~' SECRET '~
CONGO GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTINUE TO ADVANCE
Leopoldville 's military
campaigns a.re for the moment
going well, but its lack of
troops to garrison captured
a.rea.s .and the imminence of arms
shipments to the rebels from
other .African nations will make
for further difficulties.
T:he security situation in
Sta.nleyville improved during
the week, according to Tshombd's
top Belgian military adviser,
Colonel Van der ~Va.lle. Although
desultory sniping continues in
the African quarters of the
town, organized resistance for
the most part ha.s subsided.
In the northeastern Congo,
a combined mercenary - Congo
Army unit ha.s been pushing from
Bumba since 23 November, a.nd
ha.s almost reached Paulis.
Another government column about
300 miles north of Buka.vu cap-
tured Bunia on 1 December.
Elsewhere, Tshombd's lack
of reliable troops with which
to garrison captured towns is
beginning to tell. Rebels have
reta.ke~n Punia, astride the land
supply route between Sta,nley-
ville and Kindu, a,nd a.re said
to threaten Kindu itself.
Arms shipments to the reb-
els a.ppea.r to be imminent if
they have not occurred already.
As yet no "volunteers" for the
rebel forces have a.ppea.red in
the Congo, but Algeria has said
publicly that it may send some.
Amid the African outcry
over the US-Belgian parachute
drops to rescue hostages,
Tshomb~'s government has become
increasingly unpopular among
African governments. On 28 No-
vember, the Orga,niza.tion of Afri-
can Unity's a.d hoc commission
on the Congo, sitting in Nairobi,
adopted a. series of recommenda-
tions which protested the pa.ra,-
drops and asked for a. cease-fire,
a. general amnesty for the rebels,
a.nd a halt to foreign military
intervention in the Congo. Rep-
resentatives of Nigeria., Ethiopia,
Upper Volta., a.nd Tunisia--a.ll
hitherto considered moderate --
joined in the recommendations.
The Nigerian Government has since
in effect repudiated the signa-
ture of its representatives.
To drum up support,.Tshombe
sa.w De Gaulle in Paris on 2 De-
cember. He wa.s unable to get
a.ny commitment of help beyond
a. vague promise of "technica.l
a.ssista.nce" in the undefined
future.
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RESULTS OF ITALIAN ELECTIONS
(As published by Italy's Interior Ministry)
Provincial
Elections 1964
Provincial
Elections 1960
Parliamentary
Elections 1963
Votes %
Votes
%
Votes
Christian Democrats
9,476,812
37.36
10,021,718
40,3
10,163,176
38.2
Republicans
297,800
1.17
319,978
1.3
352,241
1.3
N ATION AL
CENTER-LEFT
Social Democrats
1,674,871
6.68
1,426,363
5.7
1,671,144
6.3
COALITION
Socialists (PSI)
2,866,346
11.30
3,580,338
14.4
3,772,314
14.2
,,,`;:3,p_SP'
737.1179
?.,91
__
_-
--
--
Communists
6,600,887
26.02
6,085,848
24.2
6,778,709
25.6
1_iberals
2,418,7$0
7.96
998,504
4.0
1,846,402
7.0
N ea-Fasoists
1,265,914
4.94
1,473,835
5.9
1,325,112
5.0
Monarchists
236,952
0.93
715,499
2.9
448,658
1.7
Others
189,962
0.76
240,531
1.0
194,229
0.7
TOTALS
25,365,408
24,862,614
26,551,985
MUNICIPAL ELECTION
S (Figures c
over only cities of mo
Municipal
re than 10,000 i
nhabit
ants) **
Municipal
Parliamentary
Elections 1964
Elections 1960
Elections 1963
Votes
Seats
%
Votes
Seats
%
Votes
Christian Democrats
5,163,087
9,205
35.8
5,158,795
9,533
37.8
4,959,648
33.3
Republicans
166,859
223
1.2
166,341
178
1.2
214,613
1.4
Social Democrats
911,894
1,014
6.3
739,064
745
5.4
958,114
6.4
Socialists (PSI)
1,638,312
2,412
11,4
2,072,316
3,355
15.2
2,147,840
14.4
".i?;s'''^
9i.Ck'i0
447
2.7
__
__
'-
--
-?
Communists
3,838,157
5,951
26.5
3,371,324
5,472
24.7
4,096,058
27.5
Liberals
1,217,464
455
8.4
468,523
38S
3.4
1,268,999
8.5
Neo-Faseists
655,294
713
4.5
687,971
748
5.1
826,970
5,6
honarchists
122,283
64
0..6
402,611
222
2 9
305,405
2.1
Others
347,588
1,016
2.4
595,094
1,514
4.3
111,637
0.8
TOTALS
14,451,998
22,000
13,662,004
22,202
1
4,889,284
* The Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity, created in January 1964
when the largely pro-Communist left wing split with the PSI.
**Approximately 14.5 million votes were cast in
cities and towns with a population below 10,000.
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Europe
T'he heavy loss of seats in
Italy's local governing councils
by the Christian Democrats (CD)
and the Socialists (PSI) in last
week's provincial and municipal
elections has created an immedi-
ate ;problem in a number of key
cities, where center-left ma-
jorities cannot be mustered to
regroup local administrations.
The political effects on CD-
PSI cooperation on the national
scale, however, could far ex-
ceed the local significance.
The Communist gain of many
council seats carries with it
considerable benefit in terms
of local patronage and propa-
ganda opportunities, and the
party's chances for upsetting
the coalition government have
been somewhat improved.
In such major cities as
Milan, Florence, Naples, and
Genoa the only solution will
probably be to set up care-
taker governments under a com-
missioner pending new elections.
In other cities the CD will ex-
ert ;pressure on the PSI not to
ally with the Communists. Else-
where, all three of the CD's
coalition partners will try
either to prevent it from
forming all-CD administrations,
or to block CD efforts to align
with the conservative Liberal
Party.
A principal effect on the
national coalition will be that
both the CD and t;he PSI will
adopt more rigid bargaining po-
sitions on a number of important
issues which must soon be faced.
PSI chief Nenni will be intent
on controlling dissatisfaction
within his party over heavy
losses mainly to the Socialist
splinter party (PSIUP). He
will want the coalition to show
some progress on its reform pro-
grams in time for him to counter
an increase in left-wing strength
in the elections for the PSI
congress, planned for February
or March.
The CD can take some com-
fort from its increase this time
in percent of the municipal vote
as compared with the total vote
in last year's parliamentary
elections (see table on facing
page). The party reaffirmed
the validity of the center-left
concept at the CD congress in
September and during the elec-
toral campaign. However, fac-
tional differences over the
nature and scope of the coali-
tion's course have not been re-
solved. Elements in the party
who oppose the center-left and
its program will probably be
emboldened by the loss of seats
in the local councils to press
for a reorientation when a
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prospective meeting to "reorgan-
ize" the party's directorate is
held. All of these positions
are now held only by the largest
of the party's five factions.
Another serious immediate
problem is the necessity of
electing a successor to ailing
Presidlent Segni--a divisive
issue both within the CD and
between the CD and its coalition
artne~rs.
~ The parliamentary
electoral college must be con-
vened with 15 days after either
resignation or a declaration of
permanent disability. Preoc-
cupation with the presidential
election, followed by the custorn-
a.ry year-end recess, will stall
legislative activity until par-
liament reconvenes in earl
February. J
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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOMINICAN STRIKE
Th.e Dominican Government
appears to be winning its bat-
tle to thwart a general strike
that was to have begun in Santo
Domingo on 2 December, despite
support for the walkout from op-
portunistic politicians of both
the right and left .
BY
~nc~~day, how-
ever, only a few taxi-drivers
had joined sugar workers in wa lk-
ing off' their jobs.
TYie strike, which has been
relatively free from violence,
brought: a quick response from
the ru7Ling triumvirate. Troops
and naf;ional police were alerted
in Sani;o Domingo, and strike
leader; and agitators were ar-
rested., Triumvirate President
Donald Reid Cabral undercut some
of the support for the strike by
announcing that, despite the gov-
ernrnenit's financial difficulties,
part of the traditional Christmas
bonus would be paid to public
employees.
Wl1at started out as a pro-
test by irresponsible leftist
unions against the government's
refusal to pay sugar workers a
harvest bonus was quickly seized
by political interests which
hope to topple the Reid Cabral
regime. An unlikely coalition
of ex-President Bosch's Domini-
can Revolutionary Party, ex-
President Balaguer's Reformist
Party, the right.-wing Liberal
Evolutionist Party, and the left-
ist Revolutionary Social Chris-
tian Party appeared to be collab-
orating in support of the strike.
Communist elements, which
have been relatively inactive
for several months, also eagerly
joined the strike efforts. On
27 November two bombs were ex-
ploded in Santo Domingo
A day later the home of
et minister was machine-
gunned.
For the moment, Reid's po-
sition appears reasonably secure
despite the dissident army fac-
tion, since he has the support
of key elements of the military.
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Western Hemisphere
Argentina: The threat of
passi y vio ent demonstrations
in Argentina in support of Juan
Peron's return was averted on
2 December when Brazil forced
the e~x-dictator to go back to
Madrid on the same day he ar-
rivecl in Rio. The Argentine
mi.lit:ary, standing firmly be-
hind the Illia administration,
adamantly oppose Peron's return
and were ready to aid the po-
lice to quell any internal dis-
turbances..
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay
--in addition to Brazil--had all
finally indicated willingness to
assist the Argentine Government
in preventing Peron's return. Such
evidence of international support
may tend to strengthen the inter-
nal position of the Tllia adminis-
tration. Brazil's action will not
only enhance its standing in Ar-
gentine eyes but may also improve
its position in Uruguay, where it 25X1
has been trying to persuade the
government to curb the activities
of Brazilian exiles.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 20
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Western Hemisphere
Etrazilian President Cas-
tello Branco's order imposing
federal intervention in Goias
State and Congress' approval of
the decree have reduced tensions
raised) by the prolonged efforts
of military "hard-liners" to
oust Governor Mauro Borges.
Under the presidential decree,
which became effective on 26
Novemk-er, Borges has been re-
moved from office and replaced
by a i'ederal "interventor," who
will administer the state gov-
ernmerit for a maximum of 60
days.
7'he President justified
his action against Borges by
public;ly charging him with sub-
version and involvement in a
Communist-inspired plot to over-
throw the federal government
by fox?ce. While it is not clear
that i;he latter charge can be
proved, there seems to be con-
sidera ble evidence that Borges
tolerated Communist infiltra-
tion i.n his own administration,
collaborated with "agents" of
a Communist bloc embassy, and
permii:ted armed groups of ex-
tremists to operate in Goias.
Borger' fate is in doubt, but
presumably he will remain free
as long as his party's majority
in thca state legislature pre-
vents his formal impeachment--
wh:ich would allow his case to
be tried in a military court.
In connection with Borges'
ouster, the army arrested more
than 200 persons in Goias and
elsewhere for allegedly prepar-
ing to launch a "counterrevolu-
tion." ~
Despite some unfavorable
criticism of his handling of the
Goias affair, Castello Branco
probably has not incurred any
significant damage to his polit-
ical control. The 52-vote margin
in the Federal Chamber of Dep-
uties supporting the interven-
tion is a substantial show of
confidence, considering that ad-
ministration supporters hold
less than one third of the 409
chamber seats. In the senate,
the government's action received
overwhelming approval.
Castello Branco, anxious
to prevent further political
interruptions of his efforts in
the fields of economic develop-
ment and social reform, will
probably now seek to persuade
the military "hard-liners" to mod-
erate their tactics in any future
cases. These elements, however,
may be encouraged by their vic-
tory in Goias to go after other
political targets.
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