WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 20, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved
State Dept. review completed
OBI No. 058/64,:
Copy No : "~
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CROUP I .Excluded frtim aVEOmotic
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C O N T ENT S
(Information as of 1200 EST, 19 November 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page.
MOSCOW STILL FIRM ON UNITED NATIONS DEBT ISSUE
Soviet envoys are pressing Afro-Asian governments to
support Moscow's position and probably to urge the US
to back away from a showdown in the General Assembly,
MOSCOW AND PEIPING SILENT ON CHOU VISIT TO USSR
There are some tentative indications that the new Soviet
leadership may have agreed to put off next month's pre-
paratory conference to discuss a world Communist meet-
ing. As a concession, F~eiping may have agreed to a
truce in polemics, although both sides continue indi-
rect attacks.
FURTHER CHANGES IN SOVIET TOP LEADEP~SHIP
The latest shifts seem to destroy the fiction of a dual
Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership, leaving Nikolay Podgorny
now in the best position to act as a brake on Brezhnev's
growing power.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA ADOPTS A NEW COURSE
Party support for Novotny's independent course in re-
lations with the USSR is confirmed by his re-election
to the presidency.
ASIA-AFRICA
UNIFICATION ISSUE AGAIN STIRRING SOUTH KOREANS
Reticent events, both on the world scene and locally,
have put greater pressure on the Pak government to show
some initiative to develop contacts with the North.
POSITION OF HUONG GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Open opposition seems to have subsided for the moment,
but armed forces leaders remain lukewarm toward Premier
H~nnno^
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
COMMUKIST AID TO PAKISTAN
Communist countries are promoting economic relations,
but their aid and trade remain dwarfed by that of the
West.
AREA NOTE
On Sudan
AREA NOTE
On Israel-Syria
LEOPOLDVILLE FORCES MOVING AGAINST STANLEYVILLE
A 400-mile movement against the rebel capital is
underway.
TANZANIA IN TUR1140IL OVER WESTERN "PLOT"
Radical elements in Dar es Salaam are using spuri-
ous documents to undermine the US position in East
Africa and probably to press President Nyerere into
giving more active support to dissident movements in
the Congo and Malawi, as well as Mozambique.
THE MLF AND THE ALLIANCE
The search for a way to avoid a crisis in the A1-
:Liance over the multilateral nuclear force continues,
but the resulting delay may itself be lessening the
project's chances for success.
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EUROPE (continued)
THE EEC AND THE KENNEDY ROUND
By an eleventh-hour compromise among themselves, the EEC
countries met the 16 November deadline for presenting the
exceptions they desire from a general tariff cut, but
Kennedy Round negotiators still face hard bargaining in
January over this and other important issues.
NATIONWIDE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN ITALY
Continuation of center-left government at the national
level may well depend on the outcome of the local elec-
i:ions. Significant losses by the Christian Democrats
or Socialists, or important gains by the Communists,
would precipitate a cabinet crisis, followed by extreme
political instability.
BOLIVIAN JUNTA MOVES TO WIN PUBLIC SUPPORT
17
President Barrientos is stumping the provinces, and
the junta has abolished the "oppressive" measures and
organizations of the ousted Paz regime.
POTENTIAL FEDERAL-STATE CLASH IN BRAZIL
18
Attempts by army leaders to oust the leftist governor
of Goias have already strained relations between the
Castello Branco administration and the important Social
Democratic Party, and have brought renewed charges by
politicians of undue military influence in civilian affairs.
RECI'NT DEVELOPMENTS STRENGTHEN DOMINICAN REGIME
triumvirate president Reid has appointed three
new cabinet ministers who will be more responsive to him.
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The Communist SVorld
MOSCOW STILL FIRM ON UNITED NATIONS DEBT ISSUE
As
the 1 December date
for
convening the 19th
General
As-
aembly
approaches,
Moscow
con-
tinues
its adamant
refusal
to
pa.y its peacekeeping a.rrea.rs
to the UN. Soviet ambassadors
in several Afro-Asian countries'
are warning local officials
that even a.n abstention on a.
showdown vote to deprive Moscow
of its General Assembly vote
will be considered an "unfriendly
act." A particularly strong
Soviet pitch in New Delhi ha.s
stressed that the USSR "will
not back down" and "will Leave
the UN completely" if it loses
the vote. Three Soviet deputy
foreign ministers are touring
various ca.pita.ls in Asia. and
Africa,, probably to press this
line. They will probably sug-
gest that the Afro-Asians urge
the US to back away from an im-
mediate confrontation on Article
19 when the assembly convenes.
MOSCO~Y AND PEIPING SILENT ON CHOU VISIT TO USSR
Moscow and Peiping a,re
still :noncommitta.l on the dis-
cussions last week between Chou
En-la.i and the new Soviet lead-
ers. A terse communique issued
when Chou left Moscow on 13 No-
vember merely listed the partic-
ipants from both sides. TASS
added only a. brief comment that
"the talks were held in a. frank,
comra.d,ely atmosphere."
High-level bilateral con-
tacts, however, have been re-
establ.ished a.nd some limited
agreement on procedural matters
ma.y have been achieved. The an-
niversary celebrations in Moscow
gave the Chinese a.n opportunity
to confer with leaders of other
parties a.nd to press for a. post-
ponement of the December prepar-
atory conference to discuss a.
world Communist meeting.
The official Yugoslav press
service reported on 17 November
that the British Communist Party
--one of 26 parties invited to
Moscow in December--had declared
that "if a brief postponement
of the committee's work would
facilitate China.'s participation,
we think it desirable."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The new Soviet leaders
have stressed their intention
to continue preparing for a
world conference, but they prob-
ably feel that agreeing to de-
La.y preparations will demon-
stra.te that they sincerely de-
sire to promote unity and soli-
darity within the Communist
movement.
Peiping ma.y have agreed to
call a. truce in direct polemics
and to attend a later prepa.ra.-
tory meeting in order to make
it easier for Mosco~~~ to retreat
gracefully on the question of
a. December conference. Post-
ponement of that meeting wa.s
clearly one of Peiping's prin-
cipal objectives in sending
Chou to resume bilateral con-
versations--broken off in mid-
1963. It would enable Peiping
to carry on the struggle against
the new Soviet leaders while
still inside the world Commu-
nist movement a.nd from a. more
a.dva.nta.geous position.
The prospect now seems
better for a period of bilateral
conversations, designed to work
out details for a. new prepara-
tory meeting. The problems
presented by agenda. a.nd composi-
tion of the conference a.re so
formidable, however, that con-
siderable~dela.y seems likely.
Major concessions by both
sides would be necessary before
there would be any prospect for
a. genuine settlement of differ-
ences. These a.ppea.r unlikely.
Both sides have continued
indirect attacks by reiterating
their opposing positions on fun-
da.mental issues. A Pravda edi-
torial printed the day ZT ou En-
lai left Moscow underscored So-
viet views on "pea.ceful coexist-
ence" which have been repeatedly
denounced by Peiping. The edi-
torial declared that Moscow "a.t-
tached great importance to the
development of normal relations
with the main capitalist coun-
tries, including the U5 where
the recent elections strengthened
the positions of more moderate
circles." People's Daily on the
same day asser a ha.~~resident
Johnson, "far from being a. so-
called moderate, is a. repulsive
and vicious chieftain of US im-
pera.lism with his fangs bared."
Each side ha.s returned to
the tactic of publicizing third-
pa.rty criticism of the other.
The November issue of Problems
of Peace and Socia.lism_, pu is ed
in rg argue-Tut con ro ed by the
Soviets, contained an article by
the head of the World Peace Coun-
cil a.tta.cking the Chinese for
poisoning the atmosphere with
their nuclear test explosion.
Peiping ha.s been rebroa.dca.sting
remarks by Asian Communists criti-
cal of the new Soviet leaders.
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SECRET The Communist World
FURTHER CHANGES IN SOVIET TOP LEADERSHIP
The personnel changes ap-
proved by the Soviet party cen-
tral committee on 16 November
seem to have destroyed the fic-
tion of a dual leadership shared
by Premier Kosygin and party
First Secretary Brezhnev. Unlike
Brezhnev, Kosygin does not ap-
pear to have benefited. The per-
son now in the best position to
act as a brake on Brezhnev's
growing power is fellow secre-
tary Podgorny, who also profited
by the changes,
'T'wo of Brezhnev's close
collaborators on the party sec-
retariat, Aleksandr Shelepin
and Petr Demichev, were promoted
to full and candidate membership
respectively on the ruling party
presidium. An erstwhile rival
of Brezhnev, Frol Kozlov, was
expelled from the presidium and
the secretariat "because of ill-
ness." Kozlov had been incapa-
citated since April 1963 but had
retained his high party posts,
presumably at Khrushchev's be-
hest.
]podgorny's protege, Ukrai-
nian party boss Petr Shelest,
was raised from candidate to full
member of the presidium.
The only other casualties
were Vasily Polyakov, who had
been deeply involved in Khru-
shchev's recent agricultural
schemes, and Khrushchev's son-
in-law Aleksey Adzhubey. Polya-
kov was dropped from the secre-
tariat without explanation and
Adzhubey was expelled from the
central committee for "mistakes
in his work." The central com-
mittee also elevated eight of
its candidates to full member-
ship, thereby regaining its full
complement of 175 members; the
candidates now number 141.
Shelepin bossed the Soviet
youth organization during the
1950s. He was named head of the
secret police (KGB) in 1958, at
a time when Brezhnev was appar-
ently party secretary for police
affairs. Shelepin's success in
streamlining the KGB and refur-
bishing its public image was a
key factor in his elevation to
the party secretariat in 1961.
Since 1962 he has also been a
deputy premier and chairman of
the party-state control committee,
which ferrets out and punishes
mismanagement in the economy.
Demichev also became a mem-
ber of the secretariat in 1961.
A chemical engineer who rose to
head the Moscow party organiza-
tion, he was chosen to head the
central committee bureau for
chemical and light industries
established in November 1962.
Shelest, a specialist in
industrial management, made his
,_._~eer in the Ukrainian party
apparatus. He became a secre-
tary in 1962 and succeeded Pod-
gorny as party boss a year later.
In addition to the person-
nel changes, the plenum reversed
Khrushchev's 1962 reorganization
of the party into virtually sep-
arate organizations for agricul-
ture and industry. Khrushchev
had argued at the time that bi-
furcation would ensure that
nei t~her industry nor agriculture
would be slighted at the expense
of the other. However, it not
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only failed to improve economic
performance, but created cumber-
some overlapping party units
which in turn multiplied the
number of vested interests in
CZECHOSLOVAKIA ADOPTS NEW COURSE
Antonin Novotny is develop-
ing an independent course for
Czechoslovakia's relations with
the USSR and--like Rumania last
year--is seekin some si n of US
support.
For two years, party leader
Novotny has been gradually ac-
ceding to domestic pressures for
de-Stal.inization. As a result
he has reconsolidated his posi-
tion,-and both party and country
have experienced change. On the
eve of Khrushchev's fall, Czech-
oslovakia was on the verge of
basic economic changes, which
were subsequently announced.
Khrushchev's removal gave
Novotny an opportunity to ex-
press :his increased independence.
Along with Rumania's Gheorghiu-
Dej, Novotny refused to attend
the 7 November Moscow celebra-
ti ns. This followed almost
th~~e weeks of Czechoslovak com-
mentary favorable to Khrushchev,
leavened with professions of
continued friendship for the
USSR.
T.n 1963 when Rumania be-
gan it:s own move toward independ-
ence, the immediate object was
The Communist World
the party. For this reason,
its dissolution seems likely
to cause severe dislocations
and uncertainties for some time.
to gain recognition for its na-
tional economic interests within
the Soviet bloc. At this time
the Czechoslovak regime does not
appear to be in disagreement
with the Soviet bloc over such
a specific issue. However,
Novotny may be motivated in
part by a desire to secure a
favorable bargaining position
with Moscow. Prague has been
trying to improve relations and
to increase trade with the West.
Prague now has suggested an in-
vitation to the US for a high
Czechoslovak official, even for
an outwardly insignificrant event
or purpose.
In a move which will prob-
ably be interpreted by Eastern
Europeans as a gesture of sup-
port for Czechoslovakia, Yugo-
slavia has sent Deputy Foreign
Minister Nikezic to Prague for
an unpublicized visit of two
or three days' duration.
Novotny's loyalty to Khru-
shchev has enhanced his public
and political position at home
and reportedly he now has almost
the total support of his party.
This strength was confirmed in
his re-election to the resi-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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UNIFICATION ISSUE AGAIN STIRRING SOUTH KOREANS
South Korean President Pak
Chong-huff's unsteady government
is facing increasing public
pressure to show some new ini-
tia.tivE> on the problem of uni-
fication with North Korea..
Se~vera.l unrelated events
outside: Korea. have recently led
Koreans to talk a.nd think more
explicitly a.nd at greater length
than usual about their major
political ambition--the ulti-
mate reunification of their
country. They see the ouster
of Khrushchev, the Chinese Com-
munist nuclear explosion, a.nd
the victory of the British Labor
Party as signs of change in the
world, a.nd there ha.s been con-
siderable criticism, in the
press and elsewhere, of the Pak
regime's "sta.gna.nt" foreign pol-
icy. In particular, the lack
of progress in negotiations for
a. settlement of South Korea's
problems with Japan is encourag-
ing some Koreans to believe that
more could be gained from uni-
fication with North Korea. than
from close a.ssocia.tion with the
Japanese, Korea's former rulers.
Publication of the details
of a poignant meeting at the
Tokyo Olympics between a. North
Korean girl athlete and her
father, a Seoul resident, drama-
tized the tragedy of the divided
nation for the ma.n in the street
In the flood of emotion that
followed, 46 South Korean legis-
lators sponsored a proposal to
establish a family center at
Panmunjom where divided families
could meet. While government
leaders recognize the risk of
North Korean propaganda exploita-
tion of such a.n a.rra.ngement,
they axe unable to oppose the
measure openly in the present
climate of opinion.
Implicit in the new dis-
cussion of unification is a. grow-
ing conviction that the UN--
which in Korea. means the US--
ca.nnot or will not deal with the
problem. The authorities re-
Gently removed the editor of a
government-subsidized ma.ga.zine
who published articles calling
for the withdrawal of US troops
from Korea. and criticizing the
UN formula for unification. The
author is suspected to be a. Com-
munist, but he is also a. friend
of President Pa.k. The Presi-
dent recently ha.s twice felt
compelled to reaffirm publicly
the "una.lterable faith" of the
Korean people in the UN for "the
ultimate solution of the Korean
problem."
Nevertheless, the cabinet
decided late last month to es-
tablish a permanent committee
to study unification. This
move is unlikely to satisfy the
growing pressures, and proposals
for contact of one sort or an-
other with the North a.nd demands
for new initiatives probabl
will increase.
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20 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Asia-Africa
POSITION OF HUONG GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Premier Huong's vigorous
defense of his cabinet against
its critics, and his firm stand
against student demonstrations
in Saigon, have strengthened his
image and for the moment quieted
overt opposition to South Viet-
nam's new government. Preoc-
cupation with the task of or-
ganizing assistance for victims
of the floods and typhoons in
central Vietnam is serving
further to divert public atten-
tion fx?om political infighting.
Although the government's
immediate prospects thus appear
slightly brighter, it has yet
to face a serious challenge.
The High National Council is re-
viewing the cabinet's "forma-
tion," but so far remains re-
luctant either to endorse it or
to formally express disapproval.
Armed forces leaders have
voiced lukewarm support for
Huong, but it is by no means
clear that they would support
him in a crisis.
COMMUNIST AID TO PAKISTAN
Communist countries have
been actively promoting economic
relations with Pakistan this
year. Before last June, Pakis-
tan's only Communist credit was
$30 million for oil exploration
given by the USSR in 1961. Since
then, it has received credits
of $11 million for Soviet trac-
tors, $60 million from Peiping
for economic development and
commodity imports, and $14 mil-
lion from Czechoslovakia.
20 Nov ~4
Viet Cong military activity
has declined for the fourth con-
secutive week, and is currently
at the lowest levels since early
July. The decline has been par-
ticularly evident in the northern
coastal provinces. A signifi-
cant increase in incidents in
the south central provinces of
Binh Tuy and Khanh Hoa, however,
may presage new enemy encroach-
ments into an area once con-
sidered comparatively secure. _
Further credits seem to be
in the offing. A Soviet credit
to finance equipment for a trac-
tor plant may be discussed later
this year, when a Soviet trade
team is scheduled to visit Pakis-
tan. In addition, the Pakis-
tanis claim that Peiping will
make economic aid available for
their third five-year plan, which
begins in mid-1965.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Implementation of the $60 -
million Chinese credit is being
discus:>ed now in Peiping, and
the first Chinese exports under
the pa