WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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-13 .. . I ovember=1964
OFFICE OF CURRENT INT~:LL1GEN E ;m
REItRiN TO ABCHI Es 6 RECORDS CET
RSE
aview completed 3M?' AT .Y AC E-9
GROUP I Excluded from oufornati~
downgrading and ceclassifiaafian
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 12 November 1964)
SINO-SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS
Talks between Chinese and Soviet leaders in Moscow
continue behind a tight security screen, with no
indications that either side intends to modify its
stand on substantive issues.
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH
His first major address contained a new statement on
resource allocation, a reaffirmation that the regime
will work for more increases in the standard of living,
an identification of agriculture as the problem area
of Soviet economy, and a more positive attitude to-
ward the private sector in agriculture.
THE BIG PARADE
The missiles shown for the first time this year in-
cluded an ICBM which is either an SS-7 or SS-8 and an
antimissile missile.
PEIPING STEPS UP CAMPAIGN AGAINST REVISIONISM
Working intellectuals reportedly are being dismissed or
punished for their views, and harsher "socialist
education" drives are being directed against the rest
of the population.
HANOI SEES PROSPECTS BRIGHT IN VIET CONG WAR
The increasingly confident line seems designed to
encourage a sense of frustration and futility among
South Vietnamese troops.
AREA NOTE
On Poland
INTERZONAL TRADE
Trade between East and West Germany under the inter-
zonal trade agreements seems likely to surpass the
$500 million record set in 1960, perhaps by as much
as 10 percent, largely because of East Germany's
desire for trade.
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ASIA-AFRICA
SATO TAKES OVER AS JAPAN'S PRIME MINISTER
The record of this veteran politician suggests that he
will take a more activist approach to both domestic
and foreign policies than did his predecessor.
NEW SOUTH VIETNAM CABINET UNDER FIRE
Premier Huong's civilian government has been widely
criticized by divergent groups, and it may soon be
reshuffled in an attempt to restore stability.
LAOTIAN FORCES JOCKEY FOR POSITION
Control of the dominant hills east of the Plaine des
Jarres is being contested, and there is increasing
activity north of Tha Thom.
CYPRUS DISPUTE STILL ON DEAD CENTER
Diplomatic positions of Athens and Ankara remain as
divergent as ever, and little progress has been
made in reducing tensions on the island itself.
INSTABILITY IN THE SUDAN
Both the new civilian cabinet and the National Front
which promoted it have come under heavy Communist
pressure.
NIGER DISSIDENTS LAUNCH ARMED ATTACKS
Opponents of the shaky conservative regime have been
operating out of adjacent countries, and appear to
be securing popular support.
AREA NOTES 18
On Congo and on Rhodesia
BONN'S EUROPEAN PROPOSALS
West Germany's two-part program for political union
and economic integration within the EEC will be
received by various member countries according to
their positions in the MLF and grain price disputes.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
BOLIVIAN JUNTA STILL IN CONTROL
The junta maintains its shaky hold on the government
by not doing anything to arouse concentrated opposi-
tion. The Communists and pro-Communist supporters
of Juan Lechin, however, are gaining labor and
peasant support.
CAMPAIGN FOR JUAN PERON'S RETURN TO ARGENTINA
Leaders of the Peronist movement insist that Peron
will return from exile before the end of the year,
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With the 7 November celebra-
tions out of the way, the two a.n-
tagonists'in the Sino-Soviet con-
flict continue to maneuver for ad-
vantage behind a tight security
screen in Moscow. According to
persistent press reports from Mos-
cow, however, the Soviets have
agreed to postpone temporarily
the preparatory meeting of 26 Com-
munist parties originally sched-
uled for December.
There is no confirmation of
this and other stories that agree-
ment has been reached on bilateral
negotiations in Peiping early next
year before any larger conference.
takes place. The fact that most
East European Communist leaders
left Moscow soon after the anniver-
sary celebration, however, suggests
that some such solution to the im-
passe--a matter of vital concern
to them--waas worked out fairly
quickly.
There have been no indications,
however, that any progress has
been made in settling basic issues
in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Po-
lemic exchanges between Peiping
and Moscow will probably continue
to be muted, as they have been
since the downfall of Khrushchev,
at least until bilateral talks
begin. During the interim period
each side will seek to appear rea-
sonable but it is clear that nei-
ther is prepared to make any major
concessions.
Events leading up to Chou En-
la.i's departure for the USSR sug-
gest that Peiping's decision to
send a. high-level delegation was
part of an attempt to take advan-
tage of the leadership change in
Moscow and seize the initiative.
The move may have been triggered
by indications that the new Soviet
leaders were planning to go through
with the preparatory meeting--
something Peiping was determined
to forestall. Private statements
by Peiping's diplomats and the un-
compromising tone of Chinese Com-
munist propaganda make it clear
that despite their conciliatory
gestures. following Khrushchev's
downfall the Chinese have been
on the attack.
A People's Daily editorial
on 6 November outTT-n-ed the tough
terms Peiping is seeking to impose.
Although not openly polemical, its
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tone is arrogant and uncompromising.
Asserting that the trouble had
arisen through no fault of the Chi-
nese, the editorial condescendingly
lectures the new Soviet leaders on
ways in which difficulties between
Peiping and Moscow can be "grad-
ua.lly resolved." Chief among these
is a return to the support of mili-
tant revolutionary struggle through-
out the world--the "unshirkable
obligation" of established social-
ist states.
Noting that the Soviet "peo-
ple" had always supported this
principle, the editorial declared
that they had been betrayed by Khru-
shchev--the "chief representative
of modern revisionism." The edi-
torial, Peiping's first official
commentary on Khrushchev's down-
fall, warned that anyone follow-
ing his course would inevitably
be overthrown. Pointedly with-
holding approval of the new Soviet
leaders, People's Daily asserted
that revis ons m is "mill the
main danger" and smugly advised
Moscow on the proper way to main-
tain party purity.
A key Chinese demand, unflinch-
ing struggle against the US, was
the central theme in a speech by
central committee member Liu Ning-
yi at a. Peiping rally on 6 Novem-
ber. It was given added emphasis
on 7 November by Peng Chen, a. sen-
ior member of the politburo, when
he declared that the essential
characteristic of a true revolu-
tionary is opposition to "US im-
perialism." Those who attempt to
obscure this vital point, he said,
"either have been or are being
repudiated."
Although Brezhnev's 6 No-
vember anniversary speech strikes
an attitude of reasonableness
and fair play toward the Chinese,
he makes it clear that Moscow
will make no concessions on
basic policy positions. The So-
viet first secretary once again
endorsed "peaceful coexistence,"
singled out the nuclear test
ban treaty as an example of
steps taken by Moscow to restrict
the armaments race, and declared
that the USSR is prepared to de-
velop US-Soviet relations in the
interests of peace.
In a. similar vein, a Pravda.
editorial on 10 November s ressed
that "at the basis of Soviet for-
eign policy is the Leninist prin-
ciple of peaceful coexistence,"
and reasserted the Soviet posi-
tion that "in modern conditions
world war is not inevitable."
In the past the USSR has accused
Peiping of rejecting attempts to
promote Communist aims through
peaceful means, and charged that
the Chinese consider world war
unavoidable. The Pravda edito-
rial concluded by repeating Mos-
cow's call for a. world Communist
meeting, declaring that "at the
present time the necessity for
a, new international conference
has obviously ripened," but made
no mention of the preparatory
meeting previously proposed for
this December.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The role of the Eastern
European delegations in Moscow
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13 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3
seems mainly to have been to
provide a backdrop of support
for the Russians in their talks
with the Chinese, while trying
to ensure consideration of
their desire for a temporizing
solution. All of these dele-
gations which were lead by first
secretaries were received by
Brezhnev and Kosygin. The lower
level Czechoslovak, Rumanian
and Yugoslav delegations, how-
ever, apparentl were no accorded
such honors.
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The Communist World
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH
Brezhnev's first major ad-
dress is noteworthy in three re-
spects as far as the domestic
economy is concerned. It con-
tains (1) a new statement on the
question of resource allocation;
(2) a reaffirmation by the new
regime that it will work for
further increases in the stand-
ard of living; and (3) an iden-
ification of agriculture as the
problem area of the Soviet econ-
omy and the adoption of a more
positive attitude toward the
private sector in agriculture.
Brezhnev said that the "de-
velopment of heavy industry
must be subordinate to (or "be
so designed as to meet"--dolzhno
podchinyat'sya) the demands o
e cons a fechnical require-
ment of the whole national econ-
omy, the needs of defense as
well as the interests of the
rapid rise of agriculture and
the light and food industries."
Although a certain ambigu-
ity is undoubtedly intended in
this characterization, it indi-
cates at a minimum that greater
attention is to be focused on
the end uses of the economic
product rather than on economic
growth alone. The statement
also suggests that the regime
will attempt to spur the pro-
gram for technological improve-
ment that was introduced in
1959-60 but has been faltering
since 1961. The increased capi-
tal costs of such a program
would mean still another defer-
ment of improvements long
promised for the consumer.
Regarding defense, the
sentence that "as long as no
agreement is reached on dis-
armament we shall maintain our
defense potential on the high-
est possible level" is the
strongest that has yet been
made by the new leadership on
this subject. This statement,
falling in the section of the
speech on disarmament, reas-
sures the military that it will
not be neglected. The phrase-
ology carried forward the line
that has been taken since the
coup, that the party and the
government "have taken and are
taking"--in some cases "will
take"--"measures to strengthen
the defense potential of our
homeland."
Brezhnev's statements also
call for increased production
of high-quality consumer goods,
improved services, and better
housing. He treats these con-
sumer-oriented goals explicitly,
but adds that the populace must
cooperate if the regime's
promises are to be fulfilled.
Increases in labor productivity
and efficiency--both clearly
imperative--are held to be pos-
sible through better organiza-
tion and management as well as
through tightened labor disci-
pline and concern with quality.
Underlying this is the basic
question of incentives, which
the new regime has already in-
dicated it intends partially to
resolve without concern for
ideological factors.
The performance of Soviet
agriculture is stressed several
times in Brezhnev's speech as
not meeting the regime's ex-
pectations. To rectify this
situation, Brezhnev called for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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VAAP~ NW
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increased investment in agricul-
ture and in industries support-
ing agriculture. He also em-
phasized that more autonomy
"should be granted, not in words
but in deeds, to collective and
state farms in the organization
and planning of their communal
production." Finally, he ac-
knowledged the need for a "fuller
use of the principle of the ma-
terial interest of the collective
farms and the collective farmers."
The most striking evidence
of concern for the agricultural
situation was Brezhnev's abroga-
tion of "unfounded restrictions
imposed in the past few years" on
private plots and small-scale
animal husbandry allowed the
peasants and part of the urban
population. This decision has
already abolished all such re-
strictions imposed after 1955 in
the Ukraine and will probably be
extended to the rest of the coun-
try.
The private plots, an
anomaly in the Soviet structure,
have been tolerated for obviously
practical reasons. They occupy
only about three percent of total
sown area but have consistently
contributed a disproportionately
large share in the over-all out-
put of potatoes and vegetables.
In addition, privately owned
livestock provide substantial
proportions of the total produc-
tion of dairy and meat products.
Brezhnev's announcement is
the first unequivocal reversal
by the new regime of policies in-
stituted under Khrushchev's lead-
ership. His agricultural policy
since 1956 had involved a series
of restrictions on private produc-
The Communist World
tion which cut the share of the
private plots in the total sown
area from 4.0 percent in 1955 to
3.1 percent in 1962, and de-
creased privately owned cattle
from 46 percent to 28 percent
of all cattle during the same
period.
The motives behind these
restrictions were both economic
and ideological. The private
plots compete with the social-
ized sector for the labor time
of the farmers. In addition,
the great disparity between the
yields on the private plots and
on the collective or state farms
has been a source of embarrass-
ment to a state committed to the
doctrinal superiority of social-
ized agriculture. Lastly, the
private plots supply the farmers,
particularly collective farmers,
with a considerable share of
their money income through sales
on the kolkhoz market.
Like the new leadership's
decision to grant a considerable
degree of managerial autonomy to
thousands of factories in the
clothing and footwear indus-
tries, the recent concessions
to private agriculture may indi-
cate that the new regime is
searching for more realistic
solutions to economic problems.
Relaxation of the restrictions
on private plots and livestock,
however, may be a temporary
measure designed to elicit pop-
ular support for the new lead-
ers. A similar, lenient atti-
tude toward the private sector
in agriculture that was adopted
in the 1953-55 period following
Stalin's death was reversed af-
ter Khrushchev had consolidated
his power.
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13 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Soviet Parade Missiles
SA-3 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE
ANTIMISSILE MISSILE
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w Nome
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The Communist World
The USSR displayed six mis-
siles for the first time during
the annual October Revolution
parade, held on 7 November in
Moscow. Among them was an ICBM
and a weapon described by Soviet
commentators as an antimissile
missile.
The ICBM, the first ever
publicly shown by the Soviets,
is either the SS-7 or the SS-8.
Preliminary analysis indicates
that it is about 75 feet long
and has a maximum diameter of
about 12 feet. A two-stage ve-
hicle, it uses liquid propel-
lants. If this ICBM is the SS-7
it is considerably shorter than
previous evidence had suggested.
Both the SS-7 and the SS-8 have
a range of 6,000 miles. They
can be fired only from prepared
sites.
Also shown for the first
time was an antimissile missile
enclosed in a. metal canister
about 64 feet long. One end of
the canister was covered by a
fabric or plastic hemisphere.
Four rocket nozzle covers were
visibile in the other end. Small
wings appeared to be folded in-
side the canister near the noz-
zles.
The missile probably is a.
multistage vehicle boosted by
a cluster of solid-propellant
motors. Its size and Soviet
commentary indicate a. high-alti-
tude, long-range intercept mis-
sion against ballistic missiles.
It might have an antisatellite
capability as well.
Another missile paraded
for the first time was the SS-5
IRBM, one of the weapons the
Soviets planned to put in Cuba
in 1962. The SS-5 is a single-
stage vehicle about 78 feet
long and 7.5 feet in diameter.
It uses storable propellants and
has a range of about 2,200 nau-
tical miles. Like the ICBMs,
it must be fired from prepared
positions.
A new 35-foot naval missile
shown in the parade is 13 feet
shorter than the Sark, which has
been displayed on previous oc-
casions. It might equate to the
underwa.ter-launched SS-N-5 mis-
sile now carried by a small
number of Soviet submarines.
The SS-N-5 has a range of about
700 nautical miles.
The SA-3 surface-to-air
missile (Goa), which is designed
primarily to intercept low-fly-
ing aircraft, was also shown
for the first time. This two-
stage,solid-propellant missile,
transported in pairs on a truck,
is about 19 feet long and has
an estimated range of 10-15 miles.
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The Communist World
A new tactical weapon--a
truck-mounted rack containing
40 rocket tubes--wa.s also dis-
played. These nonnuclear rock-
ets appear to be tailored for
close infantry support and have
an estimated range of 8,000-
10,000 yards. Formerly, the
greatest number of rockets that
could be sa.lvoed from this type
of launcher was 16.
The Ganef ra.m-jet missile,
which in a previous parade had
been shown at the end of the air
defense section, was among the
tactical rockets this time.
This placement emphasizes its
tactical role, but also suggests
that the Ganef may be used as
a. surface-to-surface weapon as
well as for air defense of the
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The Communist World
PEIPING STEPS UP CAMPAIGN AGAINST REVISIONISM
The Chinese Communists ap-
parently are beginning to put
teeth into their political cam-
paigns. For the first time
there are reports that working
intellectuals, including teach-
ers and propaganda officials,
are being dismissed or punished
on charges of holding pro-Soviet
or revisionist views.
The sharpening campaign
against revisionism--aimed
chiefly at intellectuals--is
being accompanied by a step-
up in the "socialist education"
drives directed against the
rest of the population.
A harsher line is called
for in the September issue of
the Peiping magazine Front Line,
which advised rural o iciaTS
not to be afraid of turning the
socialist education campaign
into a "violent mass movement."
It is not enough, stated the
article, to expose and punish
counterrevolutionary elements.
"The entire reactionary class
must be supervised so that the
reactionaries can be transformed
into new men through labor."
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An even more authoritative
article by An Tzu-wen, the di-
rector of the organization de-
partment of the party's central
committee, recently called for
increasing vigilance against
class enemies who "disguise them-
selves and work their way into
party and state organs to strug-
gle against us." According to
An, whose infrequent writings
usually have been associated
with purification drives, the
solution is to have the party
apparatus "regularly and in-
tensively investigate cadres...
and become thoroughly familiar
with their life histories and
current activities."
North Vietnamese propaganda
recently has taken a more opti-
mistic view of Communist pros-
pects in the war in the south
and occasionally has predicted
a rapid disintegration of anti-
Communist resistance. The ref-
erences to a "long and arduous"
struggle which tempered last
spring's cautious optimism have
all but disappeared.
The increasingly confident
line seems to date from the abor-
tive 13 September coup in Saigon.
The resulting disarray in anti-
Communist ranks led Hanoi to
claim that the US and its "hench-
men" were facing the "biggest,
most powerful, and dangerous
storm" in the course of the war.
This coup apparently encouraged
the Communists to believe that
one or more South Vietnamese Army
commanders might defect, set up
an independent enclave, and even
join with the Communist National
Front for the Liberation of South
Vietnam (NFLSV).
Following the 13 September
coup, both Hanoi and the NFLSV
attempted to encourage further
defections by giving extensive
play to civil and military up-
risings such as the Montagnard
rebellions in Central Vietnam
in September and October. Re-
cently, the NFLSV announced the
formation of a "liberation
force" military unit made up
exclusively of two former ARVN
platoons which deserted in June
and August. In a 25 October
radio commentary, Hanoi predicted
that within "a few weeks" de-
sertions will drastically reduce
ARVN strength.
The bulk of this propa-
ganda has been broadcast di-
rectly to South Vietnam, much
of it in programs pitched spe-
cifically to the ARVN. By it
the North Vietnamese hope to
encourage a sense of frustra-
tion and futility on the part
of the South Vietnamese troops.
The bold 31 October attack on
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,*me Nftlov
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Bien Hoa Airfield has given
added impetus to the Communist
propaganda campaign. The de-
struction of US bombers has been
portrayed as an illustration of
the vulnerability of the dreaded
US Air Force to attack and de-
struction by the "peoples" forces,
Despite occasional refer-
ences to an imminent end to the
conflict, it is unlikely that
the North Vietnamese actually
believe victory to be so close.
Hanoi is still obviously con-
cerned that the Viet Cong con-
serve their carefully built mili-
tary strength and avoid rash and
precipitate action. The Viet
Cong have undoubtedly made re-
markable progress in the past
Poland: With the sentenc-
ing OTolish-born US citizen
Melchior Wankowicz to three
years in prison for "slandering
People's Poland abroad," the
Polish regime has worsened the
dilemma arising from Gomulka's
determination to;establish party
controls over the intellectuals.
Caught in their own web once
Wankowicz was brought to trial,
the authorities have attempted
to improve their position by im-
mediately reducing the popular
writer's sentence to 18 months,
and freeing him on bail for three
weeks pending his decision
whether or not to appeal.
Various reports indicate
that he will choose imprison-
year in building their military
strength. Recent US intelli-
gence estimates indicate that
perhaps as many as 5,000 hard-
core Viet Cong were infiltrated
into South Vietnam from the north
during the first six months of
this year. On 6 November, Hanoi
quoted a French paper to the ef-
fect that the Viet Cong control
four of the six northern prov-
inces and that "South Vietnam
will soon be cut in two." De-
spite rapid growth, however, the
Viet Cong hard-core military
force is still considered in-
ferior to ARVN in conventional
war capability and will neces-
sarily be confined for the time
being largely to guerrilla-
type warfare.
ment rather than appeal, in or-
der to dramatize the struggle.
If he goes to jail, he will be-
come a hero to most Poles, who
believe him innocent. If he is
freed in Poland, the secret po-
lice will be humiliated. If he
is expelled, he is likely to
continue his attacks on what he
considers the regime's "destruc-
tion of Polish culture," from a
sanctuary in the West.
After this inept perform-
ance by the regime, Polish in-
tellectuals probably will soon
openly resume their fight for
less censorship and a more re-
laxed policy toward cultural
affairs.by the regime.
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Trade in 1964 between East
and West Germany under the in-
terzonal trade agreement seems
likely to surpass the record of
$500 million set in 1960, per-
haps by as much as 10 percent.
Encouraged by the improvement
in relations this year, and by
the conclusion of a number of
recent agreements in which East
Germany's desire for increased
trade played a vital role, West
Germany is considering several
measures to ensure the continua-
tion of IZT at a high level in
1965.
Just before Kurt Leopold
retired on 31 October as chief
of West Germany's Interzonal
Trade Office, he agreed to in-
crease West German deliveries
of phosphate fertilizers to a
total value this year of $10
million, or twice the 1963 level.
This amount is in addition to
$25 million worth of nitrogenous
fertilizers, included in IZT for
the first time this year. Leo-
pold also agreed to a $5-million
increase in the value limits for
East German machinery imports
and exports and an increase of
an undisclosed size in East Ger-
man grain deliveries.
To keep trade expanding,
West Germany may agree to grant
additional medium- and long-
term credits and to postpone
for another year the 30 June
deadline for cash settlement of
imbalances in IZT accounts. West
Germany probably will also con-
tinue to compensate East Germany
another year for losses it suf-
fers as a result of the 1963
West German oil tax law. East
Germany would like to increase
the amount of imbalance permitted
in IZT accounts, which gives it
in effect interest-free credit
from the time of purchase until
the annual cash settlement.
West Germany is likely to in-
sist on some political conces-
sions in return, however.
Although he has had no ex-
perience in IZT matters, Leo-
pold's successor, Alfred Polack
has long been associated with
the Economics Ministry in Bonn.
He has said that the status of
the IZT office will remain un-
changed under his direction.
The East Germans, however, may
initially dispute his creden-
tials and his authority to ne-
gotiate for West Berlin. 25X1
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SECRET
SATO TAKES OVER AS JAPAN'S PRIME MINISTER
The selection of Eisaku
Sato to replace the ailing Ha-
yato Ikeda as Japan's prime min-
ister brings to power a skilled,
experienced politician who has
cultivated a more activist image
than his predecessor.
Sato had narrowly missed
ousting Ikeda from the presidency
of the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) last July, but this time
won the top prize when Ikeda
broke a deadlock by endorsing
his candidacy. By emphasizing
continuity in cabinet personnel
and policy, Sato will retain
the solid backing of the LDP
which manages to overcome fierce
internal factional battles when
it faces the socialist opposi-
tion in the Diet. A cabinet re-
shuffle can be expected before
long in keeping with the new
balance of factions behind him.
Sato's record in recent
years points to further changes
ahead. In the past, he strongly
criticized both Ikeda's generally
conciliatory approach to poli-
tics and certain key policies.
Sato's advocacy of a "high-pos-
ture" approach to political op-
ponents inside and outside the
LDP implies a less compromising
program in both domestic and
foreign fields. His recollection
of the turbulent 1960 events
under his brother, Prime Minis-
ter Kishi, is nevertheless likely
to restrain him somewhat.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In foreign affairs, Sato's
proclivities point toward a dem-
onstration of greater independ-
ence within the framework of a
generally pro-Western orienta-
tion. The new prime minister
has indicated his desire to
work closely with the US on de-
fense matters and on Southeast
Asian affairs, and to improve
relations with Taiwan and South
Korea. A tough bargainer, he
may be expected to demand in
return US concessions on such
sensitive economic issues as
impediments to Japanese trade
and investment in the US, fish-
ing rights in the North Pacific,
and civil air routes.
Sato has stated that he
will carry on Ikeda's highly
popular policy of developing
economic and cultural ties with
Communist China. He probably
shares a widely held view in
Tokyo government circles that
Peiping's admission to the UN
is inevitable and might come
next year. Japanese policy-
makers have indicated they ex-
pect to offer diplomatic recog-
nition to Peiping when this
occurs. They apparently hope
to persuade both Peiping and
Taipei eventually to accept a
formula of "one China- one Tai-
wan" despite the adamant hos-
tility of both to such a con-
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SECRET
The new civilian govern-
ment in Saigon has failed to
generate any enthusiasm among
either the civilian populace or
the military. Almost as soon
as the cabinet was announced,
the acting president of the High
National Council resigned in
protest over its inadequate po-
litical composition. His crit-
icisms have been echoed in the
press and political circles, as
well as among Buddhists, Catho-
lics, and students who further
resent Premier Huong's statement
that politics must be divorced
from religion and from the
schools.
Huong has so far averted
any public demonstrations against
his government by warnings of
strong countermeasures and by
retaining the public backing of
General Khanh. Privately, how-
ever, five army generals repre-
senting various military fac-
tions are predicting that Huong's
government, in its present form,
will not last beyond November.
Buddhist leaders claim that they
plan no overt protests, but stu-
dents in Saigon have reportedly
threatened demonstrations this
weekend if the cabinet is not
revamped. A reshuffle may be
discussed when Huong meets with
the High National Council on 13
November.
Huong has publicly appealed
for unity and admitted that his
cabinet is not perfect, but em-
phasized that it is intended to
serve in a transitional period.
He apparently plans to take some
short-range measures to try to
stabilize the civilian and mili-
tary apparatus for the govern-
ment's pacification effort. In
addition to private expressions
of shock at the Viet Cong mortar
attack last week on US aircraft
at Bien Hoa airfield, much of
the Saigon press, and General
Khanh himself, are reviving the
subject of expanding the war to
the North. Huong also has im-
plied that he believes retalia-
tion against North Vietnam may
be needed to bolster morale and
rally support.
With the exception of the
Bien Hoa attack, Viet Cong mili-
tary activity, both in terms of
scale and intensity, has remained
at the relatively reduced level
of recent weeks. Of 547 total
incidents reported last week,
sixteen were armed attacks, one
possibly of battalion size; the
remainder consisted primarily
of terrorism and sabotage against
government lines of communication.
The generally constant rate of
Communist activity over the past
month suggests that the Viet Cong
may be deliberately holding back
in order to be able to exploit
any political developments in
Saigon. In the general coastal
provinces, where refugees from
Viet Cong harassment in the
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LAOS
(I "gMuongSat 11 k
ll. J
Ban Houei Sat glMuangHoun;
Muong
Kassy
n Nongo
ua Lao
Road
------Track or trail
+-- '_I Railroad
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Awme None
SECRET
countryside are already flock-
ing to some major cities, the
hard-pressed government position
may be further strained by ex-
tensive flood and typhoon dam-
age. One government junk force
unit was extensively destroyed,
and aircraft have been diverted
to assist the civilian popula-
LAOTIAN FORCES JOCKEY FOR POSITION
The military situation is
becoming more active as Commu-
nist and government forces try
to improve their positions.
In the hills east of the
Plaine des Jarres, opposing
forces are vying for control of
dominant terrain features. The
Pathet Lao, supported by troops
from North Vietnam, have'mounted
several operations over the past
two weeks to clear Meo guerrillas
from outposts near the strategic
Route 7 supply artery. Reports
indicate that the flow of troops
and materiel over this route
from North Vietnam to the Plaine
des Jarres area is continuing,
and perhaps increasing.
Although there are no firm
indications that the Pathet Lao
are contemplating any major push,
it is possible that limited moves
may be made to counter recent
government advances. Communist
forces have sharply countered a
pre-emptive rightist operation
designed to clear the northern
approaches to Tha Thom, and now
threaten to take the town.
Farther south, government
forces with air support are at-
tempting to dislodge Pathet Lao
from positions east of Savanna-
khet in the Ban Nong Boua Lao
area. This move has met with
some limited success.
Meanwhile, desultory nego-
tiations have continued in Paris
among representatives of the
three factions. The neutralists
remain insistent that reconven-
ing the 14-power Geneva Confer-
ence be preceded by a Pathet Lao
withdrawal to 16 May positions
on the Plaine des Jarres, a
cease-fire, and Pathet Lao ac-
ceptance of Souvanna as head of
a joint delegation in his role
as premier. Souvanna now seems 25X1
inclined to suggest that the
talks be broken off in Paris and
reconvened in Laos.
25X1
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13 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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wool
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CYPRUS DISPUTE STILL ON DEAD CENTER
There has been little prog-
ress in returning Cyprus to nor-
mal. Diplomatic positions ap-
pear as divergent as ever. NATO
Secretary General Brosio found
both Greek and Turkish govern-
ments still adamant behind their
established policies during his
recent visit to the two capitals.
Tension rose sharply in the
Kokkina area of northwest Cyprus
last week when both Turkish and
Greek Cypriot forces pushed
their lines forward. At one
point only 20 to 30 yards sepa-
rated the opposing forces. Swed-
ish troops of the UN command ap-
parently have succeeded in es-
tablishing a new ceasefire line.
President Makarios has ig-
nored Vice President Kuchuk's
proposal for a full meeting of
the cabinet, including the Turk-
ish Cypriot members, to discuss
the rehabilitation of some 25,000
homeless Turkish Cypriots. The
Greek Cypriot press, quoting a
government official, said the
proposals were couched in "in-
sulting terms" and declared that
Kuchuk no longer was vice presi-
dent because he had led a re-
bellion against the government.
Some Turkish Cypriots are
beginning to return to their
homes even though they must live
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
under Greek Cypriot rule. About
50 of them returned to a village
near Paphos in the southwest
last week despite threats
against them by militant Turkish
Cypriots in the area.
Factionalism within the
Greek Cypriot community contin-
ues. The largest Nicosia daily
has accused Minister of Interior
Georkatzis of working closely
with a Western intelligence
organization. The publisher of
this newspaper is Nicos Sampson,
an occasional confidant of Ma-
karios and leader of an important
irregular fighting force last
winter.
Both Cypriot communities
have tried to exploit the com-
munique issued after Turkish
Foreign Minister Erkin's visit
to Moscow. The Turks have con-
centrated on the passage about
the need to respect existing
agreements and the recognition
given to the two "national com-
munities" on the island. The
Greeks note the lack of any men-
tion of the London-Zurich Agree-
ments, which entrenched Turkey's
interests in the new republic,
and emphasize that Turkey agreed
on the necessity of finding a
"peaceful solution" to the dis-
pute.
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Both the cabinet and the
National Front which led the
drive for civilian government in
the Sudan have come under heavy
Communist influence, and the gen-
eral situation is still unstable.
The new civilian government
has drastically reduced the
army's ability to make any suc-
cessful countermove. All lead-
ers of the former junta--except
figurehead President Abboud--
and several key security offi-
cials were arrested on 9 Novem-
ber. These arrests were prompted
by the army's removal of several
junior officers on charges of
pro-Egyptian political activity.
The Communists quickly organized
widespread demonstrations pro-
testing this step, demanding im-
mediate action against the mili-
tary. The junta members are now
imprisoned, and Abboud has been
relieved as army commander.
Reports that the army was
retaliating by moving armored
units against the new government
brought out large crowds in pro-
test. A Communist started the
rumors by an unauthorized radio-
broadcast, probably as part of
a campaign for further army
purges. The Egyptian Embassy
was sacked during the disorders.
The attack may have been aimed
at arousing anti-UAR sentiment
and undercutting Egyptian influ-
ence among non-Communist groups.
Non-Communist cabinet mem-
bers still control the key minis-
tries. The Communists, however,
reportedly dominate all cabinet
sessions, and are promoting es-
tablishment of a paramilitary
national guard under their con-
trol. Another Communist has
been elected to the cabinet as
a representative of the unions.
Communists continue to show that
they can call successful strikes
and demonstrations at will in
order to press their demands.
Other political elements
in the coalition government have
not yet been able to develop
comparable singleness of purpose.
However, they are now alert to
the rapid expansion of Communist
influence. Representatives of
non-Communist parties have con-
demned the Communists' role in
inciting the disturbances. The
influential and usually anti-
Communist Ansar brotherhood
staged a march in protest against
the demonstrations. Pledges to
liberalize the government's
southern policies immediately
are probably aimed at winning
the voting support of southern
cabinet ministers. The Negroid
southerners have reportedly been
voting consistently with the
Communists in exchange for the
Communists' support of their
separatist ambitions.
The pro-Egyptian National
Union Party and the two reli-
gious brotherhoods--the Ansar
and the Khatmia--still have con-
siderable support in the army
which may yet aid them in future
maneuvering a ainst the Commu-
nists.
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13 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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13 NOVEMBER 1964
Town names in red indicate areas of diswdent ociisrty
Town names in block indicate areas where dissidents
have been seen en route to Niger
Madaoua
?Maradi ?Zinder
Madarounfa ?f~ Magaria
} N I G E R I A
CAMERO
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
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SECRET
NIGER DISSIDENTS LAUNCH ARMED ATTACKS
Dissidents, evidently op-
erating out of Ghana, are at-
tempting to overthrow conserva-
tive President Diori's shaky re-
gime in Niger. The dissidents'
efforts thus far have been clumsy
and poorly organized, but they
have shaken Diori and appear to
be securing some popular support.
Since early last month,
small armed bands have assaulted
and sabotaged government instal-
lations in southern and western
Niger. The Nigerien gendarmerie
have reportedly thwarted the 1.11-
equipped invaders and four cap-
tives have been publicly executed.
The bands are evidently infiltra-
ting into the sparsely populated
country from adjacent upper Volta,
Mali, Dahomey, and Nigeria.
All available evidence in-
dicates that these dissidents
are adherents of the outlawed
Sawaba party led by exiled former
Niger premier Djibo Bakary, who
has for some time been based in
Accra. Ever since the French
ousted him from the premiership
in 1958, Bakary has maintained
close contacts with foreign Com-
munists and kept his radical
party alive clandestinely.
In a raid in southwestern
Niger last week, the dissidents
were assisted for the first time
by members of Diori's own Djerma
tribe. Although Bakary is also
a Djerma, his main support has
come from the 1.5 million Hausa
in southeastern Niger who are
currently excluded from the gov-
ernment. This incident probably
reflects the considerable antip-
athy which the Diori regime has
aroused throughout the country
for its failure to achieve eco-
nomic progress and for the brutal
repressive measures some of its
members have employed. Local
support during this raid has
heightened French apprehension about
the future course of events in
Niger from which most French
troops now are being withdrawn.
Upper Volta, Nigeria and
apparently even radical Mali
have joined in the effort to
round up the dissidents, but
Diori believes the Dahomean Gov-
ernment and Ben Bella's Algeria
are collaborating with the Gha-
naian-backed Sawaba party. There
is no firm evidence to support
his suspicions, even though Da-
homeans are still smarting over
Diori's expulsion of Dahomean
nationals last year. Paris'
efforts to reconcile the govern-
ments of these two former French
territories have thus far failed.
Diori also claims that the
Chinese Communists are ultimately
directing the attacks. Peiping
would presumably prefer a Bakary
government and there is some
evidence that at least a few of
the infiltrators received guer-
rilla training in China in the
past. The Chinese probably are
not as deeply involved in these
incidents as Diori has charged,
however, for they are not likely
to risk jeopardizing the headway
they are making among the mod-
erate former French dependencies
in their drive for diplomatic
recognition by committing them-
selves to a cause with such un-
certain prospects.
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13 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Congo: The rebel regime is
probab y on the verge of collapse.
The fall of the rebel redoubt in
Stanleyville, however, ma.y be a.ccom-
panied by a bloodbath of European
and American hostages.
Government forces are rapidly
converging on Stanleyville from
three directions. The main thrust
is in the eastern Congo. On 5 No-
vember, Kindu capital of'Ma.niema
Province, fell easily to a 300-man
Congo Army - mercenary force in
Kindu. In the northwest, army units
were also pressing on from Bumba
down the Congo River and from the
south from Ikela. All indications
are that the government columns
will meet little resistance.
As the insurgents apparently
are aware of their predicament,
Rhodesia: The immediate threat
of a. reac etween the British La-
bor government and Salisbury over
the Rhodesian independence program
has receded. Prime Minister Smith's
recent maneuvers indicate he hopes
to avoid a final confrontation un-
til he can somehow rally all Rho-
desian whites who want independence.
Many of them shrink from incurring
the sanctions which on 27 October
the British warned would follow a
unilateral declaration of independ-
ence.
The predominantly white elec-
torate on 5 November approved by a.
9-1 margin a referendum for inde-
pendence on the basis of the pres-
the situation of the European and
American hostages held by the reb-
els has become increasingly pre-
carious. Six more Europeans have
been executed recently in addition
to the three slain at Boende last
month. The Europeans freed in
Kindu claimed they were within a
few minutes of death when the Congo
Army column arrived. Several hours
before the government. troops enter-
ed the town, rebel authorities de-
parted, leaving the Europeans ex-
posed to the caprice of what the
hostages described as "uncontrolled
hordes of savage teenagers." Should
Stanleyville officials also decide
to flee--as seems likely-_a simi-
lar situation could occur in the
rebel capital.
ent constitution, which entrenches
the white minority's position.
Smith has interpreted this as en-
dorsing his government's increas-
ingly hazy policy on independence.
However, the British remain deter-
mined to oppose independence until
majority rule is attained through
constitutional reforms, and with
Smith's opposition to such reforms
freshly backed by the electorate,
prospects for resolving the im-
passe remain bleak. Since London's
repudiation of Smith's independence
program, neither Smith nor the op-
position Rhodesia Party is yet
ready to confront the electorate
with a clear-cut choice on the ac-
tual alternatives the county faces.
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13 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Europe
BONN'S EUROPEAN PROPOSALS
West Germany last week sub-
mitted to its Common Market part-
ners a two-part program outlin-
ing steps toward political union
and further economic integration
within the existing community
framework. It also leaves the
door open to eventual participa-
tion by other countries.
Prior to the conclusion of
a formal political union treaty,
Bonn envisages a series of con-
sultations on foreign, military,
and cultural policies on the
basis of an "executive agreement"
among the Six. Although the
stress on intergovernmental co-
operation is designed to appeal
to the French, the program car-
ries enough of a supranationalism
tone to disturb Paris. This is
a proposal that a "consultative
committee" facilitate coopera-
tion and draft a definitive
treaty.
The economic proposals call
for coordination of national
taxes, and business-cycle, mone-
tary, and budgetary policies.
They also provide for EEC control
over its own revenues. In sev-
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
eral respects Bonn's plan goes
beyond the EEC Commission's own
proposals and represents a con-
siderable commitment on Bonn's
part to effective economic union.
Initial reaction to these
proposals has been colored by
the positions the various mem-
ber countries have taken in the
dispute over grain prices and
the MLF. Paris has given notice
that any discussions of a com-
mon defense policy must include
a review of the MLF project.
French officials have also crit-
icized the German proposals for
not specifically calling for
grain price unification. The
Dutch meanwhile are apparently
planning to present their own
ideas on European political union
in order not to appear isolated
by adopting a negative attitude
toward Bonn's ideas. The Dutch
presumably would push for a
clearly supranational Europe
with a greatly strengthened Euro-
pean parliament and would also
insist on British participation
from the beginning.
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WWII, *me
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BOLIVIAN JUNTA STILL IN CONTROL
The new military junta,
headed by General Rene Barrientos,
is managing to maintain a precar-
ious hold on the reins of govern-
ment by avoiding any actions which
might drive certain political par-
ties and powerful interest groups
into open opposition. The junta's
tack of qualified administrators
is causing considerable confusion
in the government's affairs.
Communist and pro-Communist
supporters of former vice presi-
dent Juan Lechin are making gains
among urban labor and peasant or-
ganizations that were formerly
controlled by Paz Estenssoro and
the Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR). In La Paz, con-
struction workers, street vendors,
factory workers, municipal em-
ployees,and flour mill unions
have fallen under the domination
of the Communists and Lechinists.
The loyalties of the large rail-
road workers'federation and the
teachers 'federation are presently
divided. In addition, a new peas-
ant federation has been formed by
Lechinist elements to absorb those
peasants who used to be controlled
by MNR.
Student organizations, heavily
infiltrated by Communists and
Lechinists, seized control of ra-
dio stations in La Paz and Cocha-
bamba last week, apparently with
the sanction of military authori-
ties.
The junta's strategy, mean-
while, has been outlined by Minis-
ter of Economy Julio Sanjines
Goitia. He says the regime rec-
ognizes its weakness, but that it
is doing all it can to buy time un-
til it is militarily strong enough
to prevail in any armed conflict
which might develop. A large in-
crease in the size of the military
is the cornerstone of this policy.
For tactical reasons, politi-
cal parties, the students, miners,
and labor groups continue to claim
they support the junta. They too,
however, are buying time in order
to organize, strengthen their mem-
bership, and develop their strategy.
The primary objective of the
Communist Party (PCB) is to infil-
trate and work for a common front
with Lechin's National Leftist Rev-
olutionary Party (PRIN). By it-
self, the PCB poses no immediate
threat to the junta. An alliance
between the PCB and PRIN, however,
would represent a concentration of
manpower and weaponry which could
seriously challenge the military
for control of the government.
The junta so far has not been
recognized as the government of
Bolivia by any country. Venezuela
and Costa Rica broke diplomatic
relations with Bolivia last week,
while most Latin American govern-
ments are maintaining a wait-and-
see attitude. The Latins are
primarily concerned about the
stability of the junta, the ma-
neuverings of extreme leftist
elements,and the junta's plans
for returning the country to
civilian rule. Junta members
talk of holding elections in
six months to a year.
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13 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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CAMPAIGN FOR JUAN PERON'S RETURN TO
Many leaders of the badly
split Peronist movement continue
to insist that Juan Peron will
keep his promise to return to
Argentina from his exile in Spain
before the end of the year, de-
spite legal obstacles and mili-
tary opposition. Five of these
leaders, known as the "Committee
for the Return of Peron," are
now in Madrid and may have had
some success in extracting a com-
mitment from the ex-dictator.
In Argentina, the outlawed
"official" wing of the Peronist
movement is pushing for Peron's
return in order to press the
government into legalizing its
political status. More impor
tantly,they feel it is essential
to restore the movement's for-
tunes which have sagged percep-
tibly ever since the "official"
group failed to do well in the
July 1963 elections. In fact,
a subsequent effort to reorganize
the movement not only fell through,
but the "neo-Peronist"--those
who favor Peronism without Peron
--have tended to cooperate more
and more with other political
groups.
The Peronist grip on organ-
ized labor also has been loosened
by the withdrawal of the "inde-
pendent" unions from executive
positions in the Peronist-domi-
nated General Confederation of
Labor (CGT). This has undercut
their so-called "battle plan"
which is aimed at extracting po-
litical and economic concessions
from the government through il-
legal plant seizures and the
threat of violence. Riots pro-
voked during last month's visit
by President de Gaulle and on
the Peronists' anniversary day
also diminished their prestige.
Despite persistent Peron-
ist provocation, the Illia gov-
ernment has maintained a toler-
ant attitude toward Peronist
activities. It hopes to encour-
age the reincorporation of the
Peronists into the political
life of the nation without Peron,
and to gain some Peronist support
for Illia's party. The campaign
for Peron's return, however, may
yet turn into a desperate effort
to create instability and pre-
cipitate a political crisis.
The Argentine armed forces, sup-
ported by a majority of Argen-
tines, can be expected to employ
strong measures to suppress any
violent outbreaks by the Peron-
ists.
SECRET
13 Nov 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
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