WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 23, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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23 Octcber 1964
ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
'FACE OF CURRENT INTEL
LIGN
State Dept. review
:completed
SECRET
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`W SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 22 October 1964)
THE COUP AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV
The :Long accumulation of grievances and dissatisfac-
tion with Khrushchev's leadership may have been
brought to a head by his behavior at a late September
meeting of top party and government officials and
their reading of the consequences of the economic
changes he apparently recommended then.
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR TEST
Although the successful Chinese test registers prog-
ress in nuclear technology and points the way to
future growth in military strength, the immediate
gain has been political. Peiping's gains are largely
in Africa and Asia.
DEATH OF SOVIET MILITARY AND SECURITY LEADERS
The appointment of successors to Marshal Biryuzov
and Major General Mironov, killed on 19 October in
a plane crash in Yugoslavia, may provide clues to
the new regime's military and political policies.
CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY SHIPMENTS
Recent Soviet military shipments have included major
deliveries to Algeria and probably Somalia, mainte-
nance deliveries to Egypt, a token cargo to Cambodia,
and one lone IL-14 (Crate) piston-engine transport--
probably specially configured for military use--for
Cuba.
DETENTE IN THE BALKANS
For the first time since World War II, the Communist
and non-Communist governments of the area are dis-
cussing long-standing problems in realistic terms,
and exploring expansion of communications, trade, and
travel.
CLASH BETWEEN POLISH REGIME AND WRITERS
The regime appears to have suffered a significant set-
back in its long struggle to establish control over
Polish writers.
SECRET
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NEW CHARTER PROMULGATED IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The charter's provisions reflect an effort to recon-
cile differing civilian and military groups, but it
remains to be seen whether the military will be sat-
isfied with the role assigned them.
ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN PAKISTAN
A revivified opposition is beginning to worry Presi-
dent Ayub's regime as it prepares for,a series of
nationwide elections beginning next week.
EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN LEADERS MEET
The conclave in Dar es Salaam reflects the growing
seriousness with which African nationalists view
the struggle against white domination of southern
Africa.
CONGO DEVELOPMENTS
Government forces have made limited military gains,
and the European business community seems to be re-
gaining confidence.
SECRET
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EFFECT OF COMMON MARKET CRISIS ON THE KENNEDY ROUND
The French determination to obtain a unified grain
price agreement will probably delay and possibly
disrupt the Kennedy Round.
AREA NOTE
On De Gaulle's Tour
EURATOM BUDGET AND POLICY DEBATES
The current discussions are likely to have important
implications for EURATOM's future. The basic issue
is a French move to have EURATOM programs more Euro-
pean oriented and less dependent on the US, and coin-
cidentally, more in line with French interests.
THE COMING CUBAN DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE US
The initial Cuban effort to maneuver the US toward
acceptance of the Castro regime will probably be
made during the coming UN General Assembly session.
Algeria, Russia,and many nonaligned nations promise
diplomatic support.
NEW PRESSURES IN PANAMANIAN-US RELATIONS
Critics of President Robles are denouncing the cur-
rent Canal Treaty discussions as unproductive
AREA NOTES
On Colombia and on Bolivia
SECRET
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Khrushchev fell victim to a
carefully planned and skillfully
executed palace coup. Although
his downfall was the product of
a, long accumulation of grievances
and dissatisfaction with his lead-
ership in both domestic and for-
eign affairs, one immediate cause
which brought these disparate forces
and issues to a, head probably was
Khrushchev's behavior at the late
September meeting of top party and
government officials on a new long-
term economic plan.
There are indications that
Khrushchev made a fundamental at-
tack on the entrenched economic
policies and vested interests
which he believed had frustrated
his program of economic reform.
The crucial issue probably was his
bid to break the stalemate on the
long-contested issue of economic
priorities. The abridged account
of his speech claimed that since
the USSR has developed its heavy
industry and brought its defenses
"to an appropriate level," the
"main task" in the future should
be to accelerate the output of
consumer goods and to raise the
standard of living. Khrushchev
seemed to imply that defense pri-
orities would be downgraded. He
may have served notice that he in-
tended to force through a major
reorientation in priorities at the
November plenum.
In addition, Khrushchev may
have hinted at important personnel
changes in the party and adminis-
tration. Fear of being ousted
from places of authority and priv-
ilege may well have been one of the
factors that forged the anti-Khru-
shchev alliance in the party presi-
dium. Pravda's 17 October listing
of Khrusic ev's errors--drifting in
Communist construction, hare-brained
schemes, immature conclusions,a.nd
hasty decisions divorced from real-
ity--seemed to relate primarily to
economic-administrative problems.
Another immediate cause may
have been dissatisfaction with Khru-
shchev's handling of the split in
the Communist World.
The plotters in the party pre-
sidium seem to have made their first
basic decisions shortly after Khru-
shchev left for his Black Sea re-
treat at Sochi on the morning of 30
September. Most of the other top
leaders remained in Moscow for a.
few days. By 5 October, when Brezh-
nev departed for East Berlin, the
decision to move against Khrushchev
later in the month probably had
been made.
Khrushchev almost certainly
was aware that he faced a, major
challenge when he and Mikoya.n re-
turned to Moscow on 13 October.
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to reports from Communist cor-
respondents in Moscow, Khrushchev
defended himself vigorously on
his return and then demanded
a full central committee meet-
ing when he found the presidium in
virtually solid array against
him. The anti-Khrushchev coali-
tion, apparently assured of a.
heavy majority, had already con-
voked the central committee on
14 October and the vote to de-
pose Khrushchev was taken on
that date.
The first public acts of
Khrushchev's successors follow-
ing the 16 October announcement
of his ouster were to reassure
the Soviet people and the world
that they have no intention of
repudiating doctrines and poli-
cies developed since the 20th
Party Congress in 1956. In ad-
dition to consolidating and
legitimizing their rule, the
initial pronouncements of the
new leaders appear intended to
serve notice that they will not
abandon or compromise "princi-
pled" positions long at issue
with the Chinese Communists.
Subsequent public and private
statements reflected concern
to prevent the removal of Khru-
shchev from damaging Soviet re-
lations with non-Communist gov-
ernments by stressing continuity
in foreign policy and claims
that the overriding factor in
the coup was Khrushchev's errors
in domestic policy and adminis-
tration. A Soviet diplomat in
Ottawa., for example, told a US
official on 20 October that the
action against Khrushchev was
prompted by his impulsive, er-
ratic domestic policies and that
foreign policy issues, includ-
ing Cuba., the struggle with China,
and the disarray in the Commu-
nist movement, did not figure
in the indictment.
Although Khrushchev's suc-
cessors may not have yet taken
any firm decisions, they have
little freedom of maneuver in
dealing with Peiping. It would
not be easy for them to dissoci-
ate themselves from Khrushchev's
China policy. They have reaf-
firmed their intention to "ac-
tively work" for a conferen