WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 11, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

State Dept. review
completed.
11 September 1964
OCI No. 0348/64
Copy No. 6 $
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
GROUP I Ex ctu.. ec "rom automoti c
downgrac'.ing or-- eciassification
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CON T ENT S
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 10 Septembek 1964)
NEW STATEMENTS ON SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
A two-part article in Red Star sees a future general
nuclear war as a short nut-c-e-cisively destructive ex-
change of rocket-nuclear weapons with little or no need
for conventional forces.
KHRUSHCHEV PRESSES FOR COMMUNIST PREPARATORY MEETING
Khrushchev's recent remarks reflect Soviet determination
to convene a preparatory meeting this Decembe . Moscow
is trying to demonstrate that Peiping has exc'uded it-
self from the Communist movement.
SOVIETS EDGE FORWARD IN CREDIT FIELD
Other governments are likely to follow suit now that
London has broken the five-year credit line. Private
financiers may be less eager, however, to tie up funds
in long-term loans to the USSR.
Page
I
UNREST AMONG HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA
A re-emergence of traditional national problems as a
significant factor in Eastern European politics may be
presaged by Hungarian minority unrest in the Transylvania
area of Rumania.
KHANH MANEUVERS TO STABILIZE SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME
The appointment of General Minh as chief of state is
evidently another of Khanh's attempts to gain Buddhist
support while he reduces the influence of the Dai Viet
Party. There has still been no significant Viet Cony;
military reaction to Saigon's political difficulties.
NEW INDONESIAN MOVES AGAINST MALAYSIA
Airdrops of Indonesian troops into Malaya have evoked
threats of retaliation from the British.
AREA NOTE 7
On India
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
A Cypriot Government delegation is to leave shortly for
Moscow to discuss possible Soviet aid, while the UN
mandate for peacekeeping on the island is likely to
be renewed.
TSHOMBE SUCCESS AT ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE
The Congolese premier has gained considerable legal
stature among the African states as a result of the
special Organization of African Unity meeting this
week, while his government has generally held its own
against the Congo rebel forces.
NEW CHINESE COMMUNIST GAINS IN AFRICA
Peiping's currently traveling delegates have been cor-
dially received in moderate capitals, while Senegal
has severed relations with Taiwan.
MALAWI'S FIRST CABINET CRISIS
After only two months of independence, Prime Minister
Banda has had to rally his popular following against
fellow ministers who seek to cast off his virtual one-
man rule.
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EUROPE (continued) Page
SWEDISH NATIONAL ELECTIONS
The ruling Social Democratic Party is expected to retain
control of the government even without an absolute
majority, since the Big Three of the opposition are
likely to loose popular votes to a newly organized party,
the Christian Democratic Assembly.
THE CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 16
President-elect Eduardo Frei received the largest election
plurality in more than 50 years but his impressive victory
has probably shaken the Communists' belief in a peaceful
road to power and may have strengthened the splinter
groups sympathetic to Peiping's doctrines.
AREA NOTES
On Venezuela, Bolivia,and Haiti
UNITED NATIONS FINANCING
The smaller nations are trying to come up with a com-
promise which will satisfy US insistence that the UN
charter be upheld regarding dues payments and also give
Russia a way to have part of its dues written off.
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11 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PAGE iii
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The so-called "modernist
or "Khrushchevian" view that a
future general nuclear war will
be a short, decisively destruc-
tive exchange of rocket-nuclear
weapons with little or no need
for conventional forces is ap-
parently gaining round in a con-
tinuing Soviet debate on military
doctrine. Marshal Sokolovskiy
and Major General Cherednichenko
discuss the idea in a two-part
article, "Military Art at a New
Stage," in Red Star of 25 and 28
August.
Sokolovskiy and Cheredni-
chenko had previously expressed a
"moderate" viewpoint, as author
and contributor, respectively,
in the 1962 and 1963 editions of
the book Military Strategy.
They saw a genera nuc ear war
being waged primarily by massive
nuclear strikes, but with a sec-
ondary and essentially strategic
role for large ground forces.
The latter would be needed to
achieve the final victory by
smashing the surviving enemy
armed forces, liquidating their
bases, and occupying strategi-
cally important enemy territory.
The recent article, however,
leaves little, if any, role for
conventional forces in a general
nuclear war:
"The initial period of the
war, in the course of which both
sides will use their main stocks
of nuclear weapons stockpiled in
peacetime, will have decisive
importance in the course and out-
come of the entire war. It is
completely possible that the war
will even be ended in that period,
since after the exchange of nu-
clear strikes it is unlikely that
further military operations will
be needed.
"The Strategic Rocket Force
can independently accomplish the
missions in a nuclear war. It
can deliver such a powerful strike
against any area that the com-
mitment of troops to that area
will turn out to be unnecessary
and even impossible.
"In a new world war, if the
imperialists unleash it, time
will have a decisive importance
in the victory. Those missions
which were accomplished in months
and years in the past will be
accomplished in the course of min-
utes, hours, or several days in
a rocket-nuclear war. In our
view, an indisputable conclusion
follows from this: a thermonu-
clear war cannot be long. There-
fore, in our opinion, it is nec-
essary to prepare in the first
place for a short war."
The article is also important
in that while it relieves the
conventional forces of a v impor-
tant mission in a general nuclear
war, it appears to give these
forces a new primary mission--
fighting a relatively protracted
non-nuclear local war against a
formidable enemy.
"...one cannot exclude the
possibility of the occurrence of
a relatively protracted war, in
which nuclear weapons wit) not be
used (for example, a local war,
which is capable of escalating
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY P:ge 1
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into a world conflict). Therefore,
one cannot neglect preparing also
fora relatively protracted war."
The important question of how
or where the Soviets would become
involved in such a war is not an-
swered in the discussion.
The article indicates that the
debate on Soviet military doctrine
initiated by Khrushchev in 1960 is
continuing and that even this for-
mulation may not be final. In the
introduction, the authors state
that their observations on the con-
tent of military art and the es-
sence of the revolutionary change
in the methods of armed combat "may
or may not coincide with the opin-
ions and views expressed by other
comrades." They also state that
they assume that the military reader
will treat their observations
critically. In conclusion, the
article notes that "it is essential
to further elaborate the new mili-
tary art, the art of waging a
KHRUSHCHEV PRESSES FOR COMMUNIST PREPARATORY MEETING
Khrushchev's 7 September speech
contained the clearest indications
to date that he is trying to maneu-
ver Peiping into a position which
will enable the USSR to claim that
the Chinese have excluded themselves
from the Communist movement. In
deference to foreign Communist opin-
ion, Moscow has denied repeatedly
that its motive in calling for "col-
lective discussions" is to excommuni-
cate the Chinese. It is concentra-
ting instead on proving that Peiping's
rejection of "principled party dis-
cussion" places sole responsibility
on the Chinese for "giving the split
a formal status."
This tactic was evident in
Khrushchev's statement that those
parties "which have agreed to take
part" should proceed with the pre-
paratory meeting in mid-December
even though Peiping and pro-Chinese
parties refuse to attend. He ap-
plied the same formula to the pro-
posed conference of all parties next
year, saying the "only correct so-
lution" is for those parties which
are "defending the unity" of the
Communist movement to discuss ques-
tions ripe for solution.
Khrushchev's confidence in
this course of action probably was
strengthened by the agreement of
the important Italian part,,., to at-
tend the December meeting.
The Soviets probably hope the
Italian agreement to attend the
December gathering will. make it
more difficult for the Rumanians
to abstain.
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Substantial numbers of nego-
tiations to supply the USSR with
industrial equipment on terms ex-
ceeding the usual five-year medium
term credits are expected to fol-
low London's approval of the first
15-year government-guaranteed
credit to the USSR. The magnitude
of new deals may, however, be
limited; the number of eager sel-
lers in the West probably exceeds
the number of eager financiers.
Furthermore, while other Western
governments feel under pressure
to follow the British lead, they
are clearly unenthusiastic.
The Japanese Government may
be the first to follow the British
pattern. Last week, when it pro-
vided the usual five-year guaran-
tee on the sale of a. $9-million
fertilizer plant, Japan permitted
private financing for an addition-
al three-year period and said it
would extend its guarantee should
the five-year credit line be
broken.
Belgium probably will
adopt the French position, and the
West German Government's Hermes
Credit Insurance Company may ex-
tend its medium-term credit-
guarantee system to cover sales
to the USSR.
flood gates of credit for tae $3
billion worth of Western chemical
equipment and other ma.chiner, and
plants the USSR is estimated to
need by 1970. It is likeli that
other governments will a.lsc Limit
the availability of financing as
Britain did when it restricted its
long-term credit guarantees to the
USSR to $280 million. The 3~)vi.ets
? must compete with long-tern: credit
demands from other bloc countries
and non-Communist underdeveloped
countries. Furthermore, some gov-
ernments, already faced with in-
flation problems, may be reluctant
to exacerbate them by apprt,v ing
large quantities of new lorg-term
credit.
Even those Western governments
which are pushing exports will
probably not wish to see to large
sums committed to long-tern loans
which, over a period of tine, will
finance fewer exports than loans
made for shorter periods. Traders
have observed the USSR's urwill-
ingness or inability to stfp up
more than moderately its exports
to Western industrial countries
and may doubt its ability rc ac-
quire enough hard currency to buy
what it needs and to repay long-
term credits.
For its part, Moscow must
weigh its need and desire -cr
Western equipment against :.he cost
of long-term credit. Inte'est
charges will add more than a third
to the price of the equipmf?rt it
has Lust bought from the U};.
The credit "break" represents
a. success in the Soviet program, }
but does not necessarily open the
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11 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The Commu
UNREST AMONG HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA
In the present atmosphere of
increasing independence, if not
friction, between Moscow and the
Eastern European states and among
the satellites themselves, tradi-
tional national problems may again
become a significant factor in
Eastern European politics. The
million and a half ethnic Hungar-
ian minority residing in Rumanian
Transylvania provides an interest-
ing example. US diplomats have
confirmed that Hungarians in sev-
eral western Transylvanian towns
staged riots and demonstrations
during the past three months. There
is some evidence that Budapest,
which tacitly covets Transylvania.
has helped to stir the unrest.
Rumanian-Hungarian relations
have long been marred by rivalry
for the control of Transylvania.
Hungarian rule began with the Mag-
yar conquest of the great Tran-
sylvanian plain in the 11th Century.
The Magyars were--and still are--
an individualistic and independent
people who look down on others in
the region, especially the Ruma-
nians, who make up the bulk of the
peasantry.
Following World War I the
Treaty of Trianon (1920) awarded
Transylvania to Rumania, thereby
increasing the natural hostility of
the Hungarian minority for Rumanians.
The desire for reunion with Hungary
was stimulated and encouraged by
Hitler's contempt for the World War
I peace treaties. Although Hitler
returned northern Transylvania to
Hungary at the beginning of the war,
the allies subsequently again made
northern Transylvania a part of
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Rumania in the general b