WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 4, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Copy No -
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
C R ET
GR 1U P I x >vded from aufomai e
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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var
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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 3 September 1964)
PEIPING STRIKES ANOTHER BLOW AT MOSCOW CONFERENCE
It is trying to convince leaders of other parties that
Moscow's proposal for a "unity" conference will lead to
a formal split. The USSR, however, appears determined
to go ahead with the preparatory meeting.
AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Crop prospects are improved over a year ago, largely be-
cause the grain crop in the USSR promises to be the best
since the estimated record harvest in 1958.
RECENT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA
There has been a relocation of a cruise missile storage
base and the transfer of additional sub-chasers to Cuba.
CHINESE MERCHANT FLEET EXPANDING INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
Peiping is stepping up domestic construction and pur-
chases of western ships to bolster its merchant fleet.
CHEMICAL FERTILIZER AVAILABILITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Net imports have apparently dropped enough to offset the
20-percent increase in domestic production this year, with
the result that last year's total of 4.5 million tons is
unlikely tobe bettered.
KHANH RESUMES LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH VIETNAM
He remains under heavy pressure from Buddhists, political
and student groups, however, and his relations with
Generals.Khiem and Minh remain unclear.
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4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
LAOS TALKS MAKE LITTLE PROGRESS 7
In their initial meetings in Paris neither Premier
Souvanna nor Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong have shown
an inclination to compromise.
AREA NOTE
On India
AFGHAN KING PUSHES CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The plans to modernize political institutions face a
major test in an extraordinary congress of tribal chiefs
next week.
CYPRUS TROOP ROTATION CRISIS DEFERRED 10
Ankara's postponement of the scheduled rotation of
its troops put off a threatened showdown
CONGO GOVERNMENT GAINS IN KATANGA 11
Rebels have cleared all major towns there, but are still
virtually unopposed in the north.
25X1
25X1
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EUROPE (continued) Page
AREA NOTE 15
On Italy
DISSENSION IN THE SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY
Pro-Chinese elements have formed their own organization
and the party itself has purged important proponents of
a soft line in domestic affairs.
HAITIAN REBELS STILL SUCCESSFUL
Rebel forces continue to harass government troops, in-
flicting moderate casualties. New weapons might help
the army, but the government would still have to over-
come the poor morale of its forces.
BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT FACES GROWING POLITICAL PRESSURES 17
Castello Branco's government is being pressed by left-
ists, opportunists and hard-line elements of the military,
but the regime plans to continue its socioeconomic
reforms while watching the opposition's strength.
COLOMBIAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS
The army is finding the highly organized Communist guer-
rillas in the Marquetalia region an elusive force which
evades a head-on attack in favor of ambushes.
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PEIPING STRIKES ANOTHER BLOW AT MOSCOW CONFERENCE
Peiping's abusive open
letter to the central committee
of the Soviet Communist Party
on 30 August is its latest ma-
neuver to block the preparatory
meeting of representatives from
26 key parties called by Moscow
to discuss problems of unity by
15 December. Although the Chi-
nese do not declare explicitly
that they will boycott the gath-
ering, their letter is designed
to convince leaders in other
parties that cooperation with
Moscow's proposal will create a
formal split. Apprehensions on
this score have acted as a brake
on Moscow's previous efforts to
force a showdown with Peiping.
The Chinese assert that
Russian efforts to call a meet-
ing are illegal and declare that
they will never take part in such
schismatic activities or share
the "responsibility for splitting
the international Communist move-
ment." To forestall a rebuttal
that Chinese obstructionism is
blocking attempts to solve the
unity problem, Peiping once again
urges the necessity for an inter-
national Communist conference.
They insist, however, that it
must be preceded by "ample prep-
arations"--which should include
thorough consultations among
"all the fraternal parties."
North Korea promptly echoed
the Chinese line in an editorial
in Nodong Sinmun on 31 August
whichhbitter y denounced Moscow's
maneuvers for the preparatory
meeting and an early conference.
Like the Chinese, the Koreans
4 Sept 64
avoid saying specifically and
directly that they are turning
down the Russian invitation.
Making it perfectly clear that
they are talking about Moscow's
proposal, they condemn moves
which would lead to a split and
declare they will never partici-
pate in a conference which would
lead to this result.
The Chinese and Korean at-
tacks on the proposal for a pre-
paratory meeting will probably
encourage the growth of opposi-
tion to the Russian scheme inside
the Communist world. The other
Far Eastern parties invited to
the meeting--North Vietnam, Japan,
and Indonesia--can be expected
to back the Chinese view. Mos-
cow's idea has not been received
with enthusiasm even by all the
normally pro-Soviet parties and
thus far only nine of those in-
vited have come out in favor of
the December meeting. The Rus-
sians can expect at least another
eight parties to accept their in-
vitation eventually, but it is
not yet clear whether Moscow will
be able to secure the participa-
tion of the important Rumanian
and Italian parties.
The Rumanians apparently
still hope to get Moscow to alter,
if not abandon, its plans for a
meeting in December. The Chinese
sent a high-ranking delegation
to Rumania's independence day
celebration and are doing every-
thing they can to encourage these
efforts. Soviet trouble-shooter
Podgorny reportedly failed to get
assurances of cooperation during
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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his visit to Bucharest on 27-28 munist unity is intense activity
July and in a series of recent on the part of Communist pa_'ties."
press conferences Rumanian of-
ficials carefully evaded ques-
tions concerning the conference.
Bucharest still has not published
the text of the Russian proposal.
Moscow is trying to appear
determined to go ahead with the
preparatory meeting. In a 27
August speech in Prague Khru-
shchev declared "we cannot sit
with arms folded and wait until
all is resolved through the laws
of history." The Soviet premier
warned that "an essential condi-
tion for the restoration of Com-
If the Russians carry through
with their plans it appears likely
that Peiping will counter b-r or-
ganizing a meeting of its own
supporters. It hinted at tiis
intention on 19 August by pAb-
lishing a New Zealand party reso-
lution--issued during July--which
opposed any meeting without ade-
quate preparations and suggested
a conference of parties which
shared this view for "coord:i.na-
tion of policy" if Moscow at-
tempted to force its plans on
the rest of the Cnmmnni=t world.
AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
As of August 1964, crop
prospects in the Communist world
looked better than a year ago,
largely because the grain crop
in the USSR promises to be the
best since the estimated record
harvest of 1958. Crops in the
European satellites probably will
be no more than average, while
the harvest outlook in China is
for some improvement over 1963.
By late August, over half
the USSR's grain harvest was in.
Harvesting was nearing comple-
tion in the Ukraine, Moldavia,
and North Caucasus and was well
under way in the crucial new
lands area. Bad weather there
in the next few weeks could cause
large losses because of the per-
ennial difficulties with machin-
ery and transport, a compressed
harvesting schedule caused by a
two-week delay in the ripening
of crops, and a lack of adequate
storage facilities. Khrushchev's
recent trip highlighted the im-
portance attached to completing
the harvest satisfactorily.
The production of vegetables
and potatoes in the central and
western regions of the USSR suf-
fered somewhat from a hot, dry
June. Good rainfall in July,
however, has improved the coadi-
tion of spring crops in most of
the European USSR, and fair]-,
satisfactory crops of corn, sugar
beets, and sunflowers are expected.
In the European satellit=es,
the forecast is for another medi-
ocre agricultural year. Onlrv
Hungary is expected to increase
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4 Sept 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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grain production significantly
over the below-average 1963 crop,
and only in Hungary and Rumania
is the outlook for fall-harvested
crops favorable. Yugoslavia's
wheat harvest was down an estimated
15 percent from last year, and re-
portedly is 1.2 million tons short
of domestic needs. There may be
a bumper crop of corn, however,
unless the weather turns bad. The
livestock feed situation looks bet-
ter than at the same time last year.
Inadequate precipitation, un-
usually hot weather, and low soil
moisture have contributed to the
generally poor outlook. Except
for Rumania, which apparently will
be a net exporter of grain again
in 1964, all these countries will
depend on Western sources for a
large share of their grain imports
in 1964-65, in spite of the good
Soviet harvest.
SECRET
grain and tubers in 1964 may pos-
sibly exceed the 175-180 million
tons produced last year.
In Communist China, the early
harvest--principally winter wheat
and early rice--has been completed
and is tentatively estimated to be
10-15 percent above last year's
poor harvest. The acreage of late
harvest grain appears to be some-
what larger than last year's. Grow-
ing conditions for the fall crops,
although less favorable than a
month ago, remain fair to good in
most of the major agricultural
areas. Barring unfavorable weather
from now until these grains are
harvested (September-November),
the fall grain harvest may equal
or possibly exceed last autumn's
estimated 117 million tons (ex-
cluding tubers). Assuming tuber
production equal to last year's
estimated 27 million tons (grain
equivalent), the total harvest of
Red China's contracts with
the West for the delivery of grain
in 1964 so far amount to 5.3 mil-
lion metric tons, worth about
$350 million. A deal with France
is also under way for as ,much as
430,000 metric tons.
The North Vietnam situation
continues to be favorable. The
spring rice crop may have equal-
led the record harvest of 1959,
and growing conditions for the
important fall rice crop were
favorable through early August.
Prospects are poor in North
Korea, where drought and a ty-
phoon have damaged rice and corn.
Several aspects of Cuban
foreign trade for the first half
of 1964 reflect intensified ef-
forts to boost the domestic food
supply. The first seven months
of 1964 saw record imports of
fertilizer and a continued in-
crease in imports of foodstuffs.
Cuba's sugar harvest is es-
timated to have been about 3.8
million metric tons, the same
as in 1963. Sugar exports for
the first six months of 1964
were 2 million tons, also about
equal to exports for the first
half of last year.
The coffee harvest has begun,
and because of the damage caused
by hurricane Flora last year, will
probably be below average.
This year's hurricane, Cleo,
apparently did no significant
damage to crop areas.
4 Sept 64
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Havana. San Jose is more centrally Two Soviet SO-I - c Gss sub-
located and is less vulnerable to chasers towed by Soviet 2val tugs
maritime raids. In addition, con- I also arrived in Cuba dur rg August.
A cruise missile storage and
support area established at Guerra
in late 1962 has been moved to San
Jose de las Lajas, southeast of
struction activity at La Sierra,
near Cienfuegos, suggests that this
site--abandoned in November 1962
--may be reoccupied.
tary supplies and some equipment
Three other SO-Is delive.'Ed last
Komar guided-missile Boa
winter, on which Cubans lave been
training, were recently -ransferred
to the Cuban Navy. utii r --ov1ec-
supplied naval. craft, usE?c pri-
marily for coastal patro and anti-
raider activity, includes six
Khronshtadt-class subcha$=ers, 24
P-4 and P-6 torpedo boats , and 12
CHINESE MERCHANT FLEET EXPANDING INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
Peiping is expanding its in-
ternational shipping operations and
is stepping up domestic construc-
tion and purchases of Western ships
to bolster its merchant fleet.
Chinese vessels have recently
begun operating a new cargo line
between Shanghai and Nampo, North
Korea. A Netherlands trade dele-
gation, just back from China, in-
dicated that Chinese ships will
start calling at Dutch ports before
the end of the year. The Chinese
are also interested in opening a
shipping service to Japan and to
African ports.
Until recently most of Pei-
ping's international shipping ac-
tivity had been limited to South-
east Asia with only very limited
service to Africa and Europe. In
the last few months, however, Chi-
nese cargo ships have made five
trips to Mediterranean ports and
have called at Japan, North
Korea, Zanzibar, and Tanianyika
for the first time.
Now that Chinese trr-ie with
the free world is increaL iag, more
of Peiping's trade will be sea-
borne and an increased anount will
probably be carried in its own
ships. This year, Peiping has
built several dry-cargo Srnips for
its merchant fleet. It has also
purchased several more it the West,
its first significant purcnasesof
Western vessels since 1901. In
addition, British, Frenct, Dutch,
and Japanese shipbuilding delega-
tions, which visited PeiF iag this
year, have apparently concluded
some deals for vessels pcs-ibl.y in
the 10,000-ton to 1 5, 000- c >n class.
Peiping's internaticn3l ship-
ping operations are still limited,
however, and the bulk of its sea-
borne trade will continue co be
carried in foreign bottoms. .
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CHEMICAL FERTILIZER AVAILABILITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The total of domestic and
imported chemical fertilizer
available in 1964 will probably
remain at the 1963 level of
about 4.5 million tons, far short
of China's needs. The regime's
plans for future production are
still modest even though Chinese
literature has recognized chemi-
cal fertilizers as offering the
most promising path to higher
agricultural yields.
Efforts to expand the in-
dustry during the recent years
of agricultural crisis will
raise output in 1964 by about
40 percent over 1960. Domestic
production this year will prob-
ably increase about 20 percent
over 1963 to reach 3.5 million
tons. This increase, however,
will probably be offset by a
cut in :imports. Imports from
Japan this year have about dou-
bled over 1963, but there have
been drastic cuts in purchases
from NITREX, the European com-
bine which supplied most of
China's previous imports.
The industry appears to
have achieved full capacity pro-
duction after several years of
serious technical difficulties
in operating and maintaining the
complex equipment in the larger
and newer plants. Improved use
of existing facilities and sup-
plies of raw materials made pos-
sible the high percentage in-
creases in 1963 and 1964 but
has just about reached tie end
of the line where further in-
creases are concerned.
At least five more new
plants are scheduled for the
industry. Three of the seven
large nitrogenous fertilizer
plants started in 1958 have yet
to be completed and one or two
plants from Italy and a i3ritish-
Dutch urea plant have ye- to be
delivered. The completi)n of
these plants and further Expan-
sion of existing plants .nay raise
domestic output by 1967 LO sub-
stantially more than 4 mi-:.lion
tons. Imports to supple-nent
this production will be 9-..mited
by world availability to a maxi-
mum of about three millic)n tons.
The press once mentioned
an unofficial domestic produc-
tion goal of eight million tons
by 1972. To meet this goal,
however, sustained heavy invest-
ment will be needed in support-
ing fields such as machine build-
ing and mining as well as in the
chemical fertilizer industry it-
self. Technical difficulties,
although apparently diminishing as
experience is gained in the equip-
ment characteristic of he indus-
try, are likely to persist and re-
tard expansion for some years to
come. Even if the eight -million-
ton goal is achieved, tie avail-
able fertilizer will st-11. meet
only a small part of China's
needs.
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SE CRET
General Khanh resumed ac-
tive leadership of the caretaker
government after having briefly
absented himself in Dalat. A
government spokesman claims that
Khanh has received new affirma-
tions of support from Vietnam's
military leadership. The status
of the ruling military triumvi-
rate of Khanh and Generals Khiem
and Minh established last week
is unclear.
The situation remains vola- Student leaders in Sai.r-n
tile. The Buddhists promised a appear to be abiding by the wo-
two months moratorium of their month moratorium which they =Tong
protests to permit the organiza- with the Buddhists, granted he
tion of a more democratic, civil- I government. In the importas-
ian-oriented government. They I northern cities of Hue and .)si
are now threatening a two-day Nang, however, student agit ! ion
fast to protest alleged police is continuing. In Hue, a n.=W
brutality toward arrested Bud- "People's Revolutionary Cou-i il"
dhist rioters. The Buddhists has been formed under the 1 ;d-
had already induced the govern- ership of extremist profess,)?s.
ment to release all but 16 of The Council's initial commui.:ques
509 demonstrators arrested in call for sweeping democrati-- re-
the wake of last week's religious forms, but deny that it cong:_ders
rioting in Saigon. itself to be an autonomous 4()v-
ernment for Central Vietnam. In
The long-simmering dispute
between Khanh and southern Dai
Viet leader Nguyen Ton Hoan
erupted this week into an acri-
monious public exchange result-
ing in Hoan's resignation as
deputy premier for pacification.
The Dai Viets enjoy considerable
army support, particularly by
certain commanders of troops in
and around Saigon. If Khanh
continues to try to reduce Dai
Viet influence, he might provoke
a coup attempt.
Da Nang, student vigilante zr?oups
have been ferreting out fornor
Diemists.
The Viet Cong appear t; be
pursuing at least a short-term
policy of watchful waiting -;i
connection with the crisis. In
the week ending on 29 August the
rate of enemy military acti-,1?ty
dropped substantially from tat
of the previous week.
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4 Sept 64
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LAOS TALKS MAKE LITTLE PROGRESS
Laotian leaders meeting in
Paris have failed to achieve any
substantial progress in their ef-
forts to ease the current politi-
cal and military impasse.
Premier Souvanna, in initial
talks with. Pathet Lao chief Sou-
phannouvong, has shown little in-
clination to compromise. On 28
August he proposed that the rival
forces jointly occupy the Plaine
des Jarres, which has been under
Communist control since the out-
break of fighting last spring.
The Communists have in effect re-
jected this, terming it a "cover"
for rightist penetration of "lib-
erated areas."
Pathet Lao chief Souphannou-
vong, for his part, has put for-
ward what appear to be maximum
positions on several key issues.
He has called for an end of US
support to Souvanna, undertaken
without tripartite approval, cit-
ing particularly the operations
of Air. America in supplying re-
lief provisions to refugee. groups
throughout the country. The Com-
munists have also reiterated their
demands that T-28 attacks against
India: Nationwide demonstra-
tionsTed-by each of the two fac-
tions of the divided Communist
Party have failed to establish
either wing as the leader of the
urban discontent over food prices
and shortages. Government firm-
ness, lack of support from the
non-Communist opposition parties,
and accelerated efforts to reduce
prices and improve distribution
Pathet Lao positions cease and that
the cabinet existing prier to the
rightist coup of last ApriL be re-
stored.
In spite of these divergences,
the Lao leaders have continued to
express optimism over ch2nces for
some sort of agreement. Souvanna's
room for maneuver, however, ap-
pears to be narrowly circumscribed
by the opposition of strong right-
ist elements to any accommodation
with the Pathet Lao. I Souvanna,
under pressure from the Wrench as
well as the Pathet Lao, were to
make major concessions, rightist
elements might unite to )%erthrow
his coalition government
The military situat.on re-
mains generally quiet. Rightist
forces, however, are continuing their
clearing operations against scat-
tered Pathet Lao units west of
Vang Vieng and Muong Kassy, while
Meo guerrillas have begun efforts
to retake territory southeast of
the Plaine des Jarres whi4.h was
lost to the Pathet Lao ea:-?lier
this year.
have greatly lessened tle effec-
tiveness of the proteste.
Nevertheless, the strain on
India's public security is likely
to continue until the October har-
vests. September may bE the most
trying period, especial"y if the
opposition parties carry through
with plans to call a 24-hour nation-
wide strike.
.S'E CRET
4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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AFGHAN KING PUSHES CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The future of the reform-
minded, pro-Western Afgha.n Gov-
ernment under King Zahir Shan
and Prime Minister Yusuf faces
a. major test next week. An ex-
traordinary congress of tribal
chiefs has been called to pass
on proposals for a. more liberal
constitution. The "Pushtoon-
istan" issue--Kabul's long-stand-
ing demands for self-determina-
tion for Pushtoon tribes living
across the border in Pakistan?
probably will also be discussed.
The government's plans in-
clude establishing a. more modern
and independent judiciary, grant-
ing increased power to the Leg-
islature, and limiting the
monarchy by formally separating
it from the executive branch
of the government. Despite
this last feature, the King is
keenly aware that the orderly
development of more demo-
cratic institutions will require
his own firm support for the
foreseeable future. Indeed,
Zahir's support and guidance
has been essential in bringing
the cabinet and constitution
drafters to the present stage
of the long-term reform plans.
The King's cousin, former
prime minister Prince Daud,
leads the opposition. He riled
the country with an iron hard
for ten years until his resigna-
tion in March 1963. Daud specifi-
cally objects to provisions ex-
cluding members of the royal
family from the cabinet. TYe
King designed this exclusion to
a1 lay some fears that Da.ud it ight
one day return to power.
The tribal elders seem
likely to support the King, des-
pite qualms about liberal rt-form,
disappointment over the King's
moderate Pushtoonistan poli,.?y,
and a possible attempt by Daud
to address the congress. Z d it
remains the most powerful a'd
most popular national leade .
After over a year of cautiois
maneuvering against Da.ud an 1 his
followers, Zahir has been i;i-
creasin 1 firm dealin wit
them.
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4 Sept 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Khartourn
Harad
0 Washha
.Abs Rayda
Hallah,~~--. U_ ran
11dda
. Mecca
Taif
Riyadh *
Wadi al J:,. ETHIOPIA
W~ *
Addis Ababa
K(UKRA~ Marib
~'' Sirwah
Jihannah
SAUDI A
Qatabah
BEIHAN
STATE:
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CYPRUS TROOP ROTATION CRISIS DEFERRED
The Turkish Government is
facing mounting domestic criti-
cism in the wake of its agree-
ment to postpone "for a short
time" the rotation of part of
its army contingent on Cyprus.
President Makarios adamantly
refused to grant permission for
the rotation which had been
scheduled for 31 August. The
Turkish decision put off for
the moment what threatened to
be a showdown with Nicosia and
Athens.
Inonu called the Grand National
Assembly into special session
on 3 September to discuss Cy-
prus---primarily in the light of
the collapse of negotiations at
Geneva--and is expected to ask
for a vote of confidence. As
the opposition parties appear
poorly prepared and disinclined
to take over while the Cyprus
dispute continues, the govern-
ment appears likely to survive.
Bitterly critical reports
in the Turkish press, alleging
that the US is supporting a
"Greek solution" for Cyprus, had
led to anti-US demonstrations
in major Turkish cities. The
government, which may have given
tacit approval to some of the
earlier demonstrations, now ap-
pears to have taken the neces-
sary precautions to keep the
situation under control.
In a communique following
Makarios' recent visit to Nasir,
Egypt pledged to support Cyprus
in defending its territory against
intervention and joined in con-
demning foreign military bases
in the area. Greek Cypriot
press reports that Nasir promised
large amounts of military aid
have not been confirmed.)
Makarios recently ren_?wed
his call for enosis--union with
Greece--but insisted that 'yprus
be demilitarized. This word
rule out not only future miii-
tary bases, but the existing
two British bases as well.
Makarios probably hopes by this
means to pose as leader of the
long-time drive for enosis while
retaining the diplomatic stp-
port of the'Soviet bloc and the
nonaligned nations for the UN
General Assembly session b+?gin-
ning in November.
On Cyprus, there is glow-
ing belief among UN and US of-
ficials that new violence -,_s
likely if the economic blockade
of the Turkish Cypriots continues.
The Greek Cypriots eased the
restrictions somewhat this week,
SECRET
4 Sept 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 10
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A004600030001-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0
-ow SECRET logo;
but supplies of food, fuel,
clothing and medicines remain
dangerously low.
There has been little
change in the military situa-
CONGO GOVERNMENT GAINS IN KATANGA
The over-all Congo military
situation has brightened some-
what with government gains in
the south. The rebels in the
north, however, continue to
move unopposed down the Congo
River from Stanleyville, be-
cause the government has no de-
pendable reinforcements.
The northern rebels now
control Lisala on the Congo
River, and face little opposi-
tion from there through Coquil-
hatville to Leopoldville. The
insurgents' rapid advance may
stimulate disorders in the capi-
tal.
There appears to be no
opposition to the rebel occupa-
tion of both Kibali-Ituri and
Uele provinces. The insurgents
have expanded their control to
the Sudan border at Aba in Ki-
bali?-Ituri, and are reportedly
at Bondo on the western border
of Uele Province. The fall of
Bunia in eastern Kibali-Ituri
may be imminent.
4 Sept 64
tion, although the Greek ='yp-
riots have improved their tacti-
cal positions in the nortnwest
to increase the effectiv=?aess
of their siege of Turkis7 Cyp-
riot areas
Government forces r ~1 ain
the initiative in the so.ith.
The capture of Albertvile, the
rebel capital, on 31 Augist by
some 1,000 army troops mt,ving
from Kabalo was the most drama-
tic victory. Manono, tht. last
rebel stronghold in Katarga,
has also been recaptured Bukavu,
the capital of Kivu Centiale
Province, remains in government
control and the morale ar..d phys-
ical condition of the army gar-
rison there improves daily.
Mercenaries continue to
arrive, mainly from Soutb Af-
rica. This polyglot grotp of
South Africans, Southern ttno-
desians, British, French, Ital-
ians, and Portuguese, now 100
strong, figures prominently in
Belgian military plans for the
Congo.
In Leopoldville, Antoine
Gizenga, silent since his re-
cent release from prison, now
openly opposes Tshombd: lie
leftist former Stanleyvilao?
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Pag= 11
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04600030001-0
REPUBLIC
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