WEEKLY SUMMARY
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12 June 1964
771
OCI Noe 0335/64
Copy NO.:
State Dept. review completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 11 June 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
MOSCOW INTENSIFIES EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT PEIPING'S POLICIES 1
Soviet leaders seem to believe that by building a con-
vincing public record of Chinese intransigence and ob-
structionism they can eventually overcome opposition in
many foreign parties to a world Communist conference.
NEW EVIDENCE OF SOVIET-YUGOSLAV MILITARY COLLABORATION 2
Yugoslavia reportedly will soon buy "liberal quantities"
of Soviet military equipment. Yugoslav officials deny
that these purchases signify agreement on matters other
than procurement.
THE CULT OF MAO TSE-TUNG INTENSIFIES
While reverence for Mao's works is not new in China,
this year's campaign goes to unprecedented lengths and
brings the cult of his personality close to the syco-
phancy around Stalin during his last years.
THE LAOS SITUATION
Neutralist military forces suffered setbacks this week,
and elements of all three Laotian factions are criti-
cizing Souvanna's performance as premier. Meanwhile,
diplomatic maneuvering over Laos centers on the question
of a proper forum for international negotiations.
SECRET
12 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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,SL+ GME 1 '
ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
NEW POLITICAL TURMOIL IN SOUTH KOREA 6
President Pak Chong-hui has promised to clean up the
government and is easing martial law restrictions, but
he faces a potentially dangerous behind-the-scenes
power struggle.
INDIA'S NEW CABINET UNDER SHASTRI
The key portfolios of defense, home, and finance
remain with the incumbents. A select inner cabinet will
probably make most major decisions.
PROSPECT OF NEW SOVIET AID TO IRAQ
Current talks probably will lead to a major new arms
deal, and Moscow may also offer to participate in new
economic aid projects. No appreciable improvement in
political relations is likely, however.
ELECTION NOTE
On Turkey
TURKISH INTERVENTION ON CYPRUS DEFERRED
Turkish troops, however, are still ready to invade--a
posture the Greek Cypriots have been citing as cause
for an urgent UN Security Council meeting. On Cyprus,
both sides are maneuvering for strategic advantage.
GENERAL STRIKE AGITATES NIGERIA
The strike has put new strains on the federal government
coalition, whose members are already at odds over last
year's controversial census.
TENSE SECURITY SITUATION AND POLITICAL TURBULENCE IN CONGO 11
Politicians in Leopoldville
are maneuvering for control of a "transitional"
government which is to take over pending parliamentary
elections.
SECRET
12 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
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SLCIRIi I'
EEC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING
German intransigence forced the Council at last week's
meeting to postpone until December further consideration
of unifying Community grain prices. The ministers did
decide to open talks with Spain and Nigeria looking to-
ward some form of association with the EEC.
Page
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AVOIDS CRISIS
While chances appear fairly good that the center-left
coalition will hold together over the next few months,
it will be under severe pressures from many quarters,
BRITISH LABOR PARTY GAINS
Party leader Wilson enhanced his own image as Britain's
next prime minister by his consultations with Khrushchev
in Moscow last week., and the latest by-election and opin-
ion polls show that Labor continues to please the voters,
ELECTION NOTE
On Luxembourg
CUBAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Five Soviet passenger ships carrying 1,500 persons
have left Cuba since the first of May. All four
surface-to-air missile installations evacuated in
late May have been relocated.
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12 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
BRITISH GUIANA'S PROSPECTS FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT REMOTE 15
The smallest of the three political parties refuses to
participate at all
TENSION IN ARGENTINA AS LABOR AGITATION CONTINUES
Despite government concessions, the Peronist-dominated
labor confederation has announced the continuation of
its "battle plan" to back up its wide-ranging political.
and economic demands.
BRAZIL'S EX-PRESIDENT KUBITSCHEK LOSES POLITICAL RIGHTS 16
While the government's relations with Kubitschek's large
political party have been put under some strain, Presi-
dent Castello Branco has strengthened his position
among military leaders, who feared Kubitschek's re-elec-
tion might restore corruption and Communist influence.
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT MOVES AGAINST COMMUNIST ENCLAVE 17
The army action has met only light resistance in the
Marquetalia enclave thus far, but the Communists are
protesting the cleanup campaign by terror bombings in
major cities.
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12 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
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MOSCOW INTENSIFIES EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT PEIPING'S POLICIES
Over the past few weeks,
the USSR has increased its ef-
forts to create the impression
that the majority of Communist
parties endorse its denuncia-
tion of Communist China's
"splitting" activities within
the world Communist movement.
It seems to believe that by
building a convincing public
record of Chinese intransigence
and obstructionism it can even-
tually overcome the opposition
of many of the parties to an in-
ternational Communist conference.
In a 3 June Izvestia edi-
torial, Moscow leveled a blis-
tering attack against the Chinese
and warned them of the dangers
of not consulting with the So-
viet Union on major political
and economic policies. The
editorial maintained that Pei-
ping now is openly voicing its
contempt for treaties concluded
with "fraternal countries." It
implied that the Chinese no
longer abide by the provision in
the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty of
alliance that they will give the
Soviet Union information on ques-
tions of foreign policy. Izvestia
contrasted this alleged growing trend toward isolation with the
"regular consultations" under-
taken by members of the Warsaw
Pact on all important interna-
tional problems.
The editorial also condemned
Peiping's failure to coordinate
economic policies with other
Communist countries. This ac-
cusation, which by implication
was also directed at the Ru-
manians, was buttressed in a
4 June Izvestia article which
labeled as a solutely imper-
missible the uncoordinated
steps of some members" of the
""socialist camp" in foreign
trade.
Pravda, too, has dramatized
Peiping s subversive activities.
It lashed out at the Chinese
withdrawal from the bloc's theo-
retical journal, Problems of
Peace and Socialism, and criti-
cized Peiping'~'s new journal,
Revolution. Other articles have
made a serious effort to prove
that the Chinese are "fractionists"
and are providing political di-
rection to anti-Soviet Communist
party factions throughout the
world. Pravda went on to claim
that a "majority of all parties
from all areas of the world now
want a world Communist confer-
ence as soon as possible."
The extensive bilateral
consultations Soviet leaders
have held over the past two
weeks with high-level repre-
sentatives from East Germany,
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugo-
slavia suggest that Moscow is
concerned over the lack of uni-
fied Eastern European support of
its tactics against the Chinese.
A senior Finnish Foreign Ministry
official told the US Embassy that
on the basis of Tito's remarks
during his state visit to Fin-
land, the "sole purpose" of his
Leningrad meeting with Khru-
shchev was to discuss tactics
to be pursued in the dispute
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25X1
NEW EVIDENCE OF SOVIET-YUGOSLAV MILITARY COLLABORATION
Reports that Yugoslavia
will soon buy "liberal quanti-
ties" of Soviet military equip-
ment on long-term credit add to
the growing evidence of closer
Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation in
military affairs. Yugoslav De-
fense Secretary Gosnjak and
others deny, however, that these
purchases signify agreement on
matters other than procurement,
and state that Yugoslavia has
turned to the Soviets because
equipment is not available from
the West.
The types of arms to be
purchased have not been publicly
specified
Yugoslavia al-
ready has at least 21 MIG-21s,
as well as SU-100 self-propelled
guns and T-54 tanks, and at
least 14 surface-to-air missiles,
18 self-propelled twin anti-
aircraft guns, and 12 clusters
of Snapper antitank missiles.
Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation
is also evidenced by the schedul-
ing of an official Soviet naval
visit to Yugoslav ports from 18
to 25 June. This is the first
such visit since October 1957.
In addition, Soviet Defense
Minister Malinovsky recently
spent a week in Yugoslavia. Al-
though the specific topics dis-
cussed are unknown, his delega-
tion included the chief of naval
intelligence, the leading mili- 25X1
tary aid official on the General
Staff, and a leading surface-to-
air missile expert.
Yugoslavia will prob
ably stop short of jeopardizing 25X1
25X1
its relations with the West by
any such obvious move as a full
re-equipment program using So-
viet arms. However, the USSR
will probably seek to translate
its position as Yugoslavia's
major military supplier into
some form of military or politi-
cal gain.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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Revered and belayed Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao,
everyday I wish, and-very mont, I hope, to see you. I look at
your picture several times a day and see your kindly face even
Diary of soldier hero Lei Feng, published April 1963
gardeners; Mao Tse tung's thinking nurtures my growth with dew
and sunshine,
plants with no rainwater wifFwither
the thought of Chairman Mao, even
Without the stud, y of
with your eyes open you
,People 's Daily,26 March 1964.
On cannot be l Ignt dbout the fact that Mao Tse tongs
petsanaflt u t is having a more and more negative inrl"uence
aFo 11
11 sntheactivity ofthe C iinese ommunist Party. Formanyyears
now, Chinese propaganda hasieen assuring everyone that Mao
Tse tun's ideas"are the"hijiest embodiment'of Marxism-
nd tat opt epoc is the epoch of Mao Tse-tung.
Leninism a h
It is quite clear now that the CCP leadership is trying to
Sad the cult of Mao Tse-tang's personality to the entire
world Communist moveme sothatthe (PleaderLl"ke Stalin
In his time, can be raise to the level J'; god above all
Marxist-Leninist parties andcan determine according to his
oWn Will ail the questions of their policy and activities.
r ..
Suslov speech to the February Soviet central committee plenum,
published 3 April 1964
IN 1HE CHINESE COMMUNIST PRESS
"The thinking of Mao Tse-tung is welcomed by revolutionary
people everywhere, for they derive a revolutionary weaponfrom
the experience of the Chinese revolution and from the Marxist-
Leninist works of Comrade Moo Tse-tango This is a very good
thing, and only the imperialists and reactionaries are unhappy
nb0u# ix,, InsJheu vain} }f rljp vil f,'y Comrade Moo Tse-tung
ond_bi .ides the Leaders of the Soviet party are like ants
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The people of Communist
China, from housewives to gov-
ernment officials, are now un-
der strong pressure to spend
several hours every week study-
ing Mao Tse-tung's writings for
spiritual guidance. While rev-
erence for Mao's works is noth-
ing new in China, this year's
unprecedented campaign and Mao's
increasingly imperious public
behavior have brought the cult
of his personality to a level
which approaches the sycophancy
around Stalin during his last
years.
The cult of Mao, although
practiced mainly for domestic
reasons, serves external pur-
poses also. Peiping bases much
of its claim for ideological
leadership of the world Commu-
nist movement on its assertion
that Mao is the world's greatest
living Marxist theoretician. To
Afro-Asians, Mao is presented as
a symbol of anti-imperialism,
and his increasingly frequent
receptions for their representa-
tives are conducted with much
pomp and ceremony.
The drive to imbue people
with "the thought of Mao" is ap-
parently being undertaken in the
belief that it will bolster the
party's sagging prestige and in-
crease the people's willingness
to work hard for little material
return. However, there are prob-
ably many pragmatic Chinese, in-
cluding most scientists and tech-
nicians, who find it hard to
swallow the demand that Mao's
writings be studied as if they
were divine scripture.
The basic material used in
the study campaign is The Se-
lected Works of Mao Tseiung,
a four-volume coTT c on a
sermonizing essays with titles
like "On Protracted War," "On
Contradictions," and "On Prac-
tice." Written 15 to 30 years
ago in a repetitious style and
dogmatic manner, they abound in
Maoist homilies: for example,
"knowledge comes from experience"
and--the most famous Maoism of
all--"power grows from the barrel
of a gun."
The "study Mao" campaign
is highly organized. In 1963,
activists were given three-month
courses in directing "study Mao"
sessions in factories. By March
1964, according to Peiping, the
drive to learn from Mao was
"sweeping the nation." In April
the campaign was receiving in-
tensive treatment in newspapers,
radio, plays, study classes, and
public speeches. Although the
People's Daily on 26 March in-
structed party officials to be
sure that participation was
strictly "voluntary," such an
injunction has little meaning
in China, where social pressure
for conformity is nearly over-
powering.
The campaign emphasizes the
application of Mao's precepts to
daily personal and work problems.
Persons who merely memorize Mao's
writings are sternly criticized.
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Chinese newspapers are full of
homely examples of people, such
as a vegetable vendor and a tele-
phone operator, who studied Mao
and now work more efficiently.
A soldier wavering in his de-
cision to re-enlist was stirred
by Mao's words, "the world can
only be improved through the
barrel of a gun," and promptly
signed up for another tour. Work-
men at a Shanghai shipyard who
were having trouble fitting a
steam engine into the hull of a
fishing boat were said to have
solved the problem after studying
Mao's principle of "concentrating
on the main contradictions."
Another story tells how a
soldier absorbed in one of Mao's
works did not even look up when
his troop train passed through
his native village, which he had
not seen in many years. Every-
one is urged to be like this
soldier, and carry one of Mao's
works with him at all times to
read in leisure moments. And,
according to Peiping, every house
should have several conveniently
placed sets of The Selected
Works. Although some
letup in
intensity may
occur,
the drive
to study Mao
appears
well en-
trenched and
probably
will be
sustained so
long as
Mao is on
the scene.
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Neutralist military forces
in Laos suffered setbacks this
week. Elements under Kong Le
have withdrawn from positions
at Muong Kheung, some ten miles
north of the Plaine des Jarres,
while Pathet Lao forces have ap-
parently regained control of
Phou Kout, a strategic hill
guarding the approaches to the
neutralist stronghold of Muong
Soui, west of the Plaine.
In Vientiane, rightist
elements appear more dissatis-
fied than ever with Souvanna
Phouma's performance as premier.
They have long distrusted the
idea of a new Geneva conference,
which he supports, and are crit-
ical of his recent statements
opposing US overflights. Gen-
eral Phoumi has hinted that
there is growing opposition to
Souvanna within the government
which could develop into another
move against him. On 10 June
Kong Le himself expressed frus-
tration over Souvanna's failure
to call for foreign aid in the
face of the Communist advances.
The neutralist commander told
the press he wanted increased
US support, specifically "more
jet bombers and fighters to de-
stroy all enemy positions." The
Pathet Lao are also sharpening
their criticism of Souvanna.
They now call him a "traitor to
Laos" who is beginning to "ex-
terminate" the Laotian people.
Diplomatic maneuvering over
Laos centers on the question of
a proper forum for internationl
negotiations. In a 6 June let-
ter to the Chinese Communist
foreign minister, Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko again indicated
Moscow's agreement to a full
14-nation "Geneva" conference on
Laos. He said that a 14-nation
conference could be held in Cam-
bodia, but added that all 14
signatories of the 1962 Geneva
accords must agree to such a
decision. The USSR has also en-
dorsed the Polish proposal for
six-power consultations, claim-
ing that these would facilitate
convening a larger conference
later. However, Chinese and
Pathet Lao insistence that only
a 14-nation conference is compe-
tent to settle the Laos problem
may increase Soviet caution in
discussions with the UK on the
Polish plan.
Peiping's latest official
statement on Laos, broadcast on
9 June, reiterated its opposi-
tion to any negotiations short
of a full Geneva-type conference,
which would give the Chinese a
voice in the proceedings. Pei-
ping's displeasure with the Pol-
ish proposal, implied in its 26
May statement on Laos, was made
more explicit. While Peiping
stresses the seriousness of the
situation in Southeast Asia,
probably in an attempt to gener-
ate pressure against US inter-
vention, it is apparently in no
hurry to negotiate and foresees
lengthy preliminary maneuvers
before formal talks can start.
Chinese Communists.
Although Souva.nna has ac-
cepted the Polish proposal, he
evidently favors a. full-scale
conference. He told the US am-
bassador on 6 June that he saw
"potential failure" in the Polish
plan because it leaves out the
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Public disorders in South
Korea have abated, but President
Pak Chong-hui now probably faces
a behind-the-scenes power strug-
gle that could undermine his
government.
To placate his critics,
Pak has promised to eliminate
government corruption and punish
officials guilty of irregulari-
ties. He has gradually eased
restrictions on public activi-
ties in Seoul, where martial law
was declared on 3 June to halt
student demonstrations. Some
political observers fear, how-
ever, that Pak will prolong mar-
tial law to eliminate opponents
of his regime.
The resignation of Pak's
strong man, Kim Chong-pil, as
chairman of the ruling Democrat-
ic-Republican Party (DRP) has
eased the immediate pressure on
Pak from Kim's enemies both in
and out of the government. Kim
has been the principal target of
the student demonstrators, who
are dissatisfied with their eco-
nomic prospects and oppose a
settlement normalizing relations
INDIA'S NEW CABINET UNDER SHASTRI
Indian Prime Minister Lal
Bahadur Shastri's new 16-member
cabinet (see reverse of page)
appointed this week, retains sub-
stantially the same moderate
character and composition as its
predecessor. The key portfolios
of defense, home, and finance
remain with their incumbents.
with Japan. The one student
death caused by the demonstra-
tions has not yet been picked
up as a new cause.
Kim is still not completely
eliminated from the political
scene, however, and probably will
attempt to retain behind-the-
scenes control of the DRP appara-
tus. As a further complication,
his apparent decline will touch
off political infighting among
other politicians hoping to replace
him.
The role of senior general
officers in forcing Kim's ouster
has increased the influence of
military figures in politics,
where they have not been prom-
inent since Pak re-established
civilian government last December.
If the situation worsens, senior
commanders may rally to Pak's
support as they did last year to
prevent the collapse of the
former military government. Some
officers, however, might unite
with politicians to weaken Pak's
control or even force him out.
Shastri will supervise foreign
affairs and atomic energy, as
Nehru did.
The right and left extremes
of the Congress Party, represented
respectively by former finance
minister Morarji Desai and by
Krishna Menon and K.D. Malaviya,
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_1 HE INDIAN CABINET
(9 June 1964)
Age
Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs,
Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission
59
Minister of Home Affairs
Gulzarilal Nanda*
Minister of Finance
T. T. Krishnamachari
Minister of Information and Broadcasting
Indira Gandhi *
Minister of Industry, Engineering, and
Sardar Swaran Singh
Technical Development
Minister of Railways
S. K. Pati I
Minister of Law and Communications
A. K. Sen
Minister of Defense
Y. B. Chavan *
Minister of Steel and Mines
Sanjiva Reddy
Minister of Food and Agriculture
C. Subramaniam
Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals
Humayun Kabir
Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and
Satyanarain Sinha
Civil Aviation
Minister of Irrigation and Power
H. C. Dasappa
Minister of Education
M. C. Chagla
Minister of Labor and Employment
D. Sanjivayya
Minister of Rehabilitation
Mahavir Tyagi
Names in green identify ministers who were members of previous government.
Names followed by an asterisk ;dentify ministers who are also on the
all-powerful, 19-member Conqress Party Working Committee.
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were rebuffed in their efforts
to re-establish their influence
in the cabinet. The two most
notable additions to the govern-
ment--Nehru's daughter, Indira
Gandhi, supported by the left,
and the conservative former food
and agriculture minister, S.K.
Patil--are popularly identified
with the extreme factions. How-
ever, both appear willing to ac-
cede to the moderate socialist
economic measures and the some-
what more conciliatory foreign
policies, particularly concern-
ing Pakistan, that the new gov-
ernment is likely to pursue ini-
tially.
Even with second-ranking
portfolios, both are likely to
be part of a small inner cabinet
which, with the prime minister,
As a result of Khrushchev's
talks with Iraqi Premier Arif in
Cairo last month, an Iraqi mili-
tary delegation has gone to Mos-
cow, and an economic delegation
will follow soon.
Moscow already has agreed
in principle to substitute air-
craft and land armaments for the
surface-to-air missile (SAM) pro-
gram canceled by Iraq. Current
negotiations probably will lead
to a major new arms deal
The new
Iraqi shopping list includes ad-
ditional MIG-21 jet fighters,TU-16
jet bombers, T-54 tanks, armored
may also include, ministers
Nanda, Krishnamachari, Chavan,
and possibly Subramaniam. Gov-
ernment decisions will also be
influenced by Atulya Ghosh, the
foremost political power in east-
ern India, and by the Congress
Party president, Kamaraj, a south
Indian. These nine leaders will
probably participate directly in
all major decisions. Of this
group, only Subramaniam and Krish-
namachari are not regular mem-
bers of the party's all-powerful
Working Committee.
Shastri--although growing
more assertive--is likely to main-
tain, at least at first, a con-
ciliatory and deferential pos- 25X1
ture of first among equals with-
in this group as well as within
the cabinet as a whole.
personnel carriers, and ammuni-
tion and spare parts for the
more than $300 million worth of
equipment furnished by the USSR
under three earlier agreememts.
Although military shipments
were suspended by Moscow for a
three-month period at the height
of the Soviet-Iraqi dispute last
summer, the curtailment in eco-
nomic aid activities was at Iraqi
initiative. The government held
a lengthy review of Soviet proj-
ects included under the $137-
million economic credit extended
in 1959 which resulted in a re-
vision of the aid program. A
steel plant, a chemical fertilizer
plant, and a sulfur extraction
plant originally covered by the
aid agreement have been canceled
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and opened for Western bids.
Other Soviet projects, notably
an electric light bulb factory
and a woolen textile plant, are
still under review.
Work has continued on some
15 projects, but after a five-
year period only four--a radio
station, a garment factory, a
cannery, and an automatic tele-
phone exchange for Baghdad--
have been put into operation.
The Baghdad-Basra railroad built
with Soviet aid under a separate
credit of about $46 million was
opened last March.
The coming economic talks
will probably concentrate first
on the $50 million worth of
Soviet projects which Iraq has
canceled or which have been dor-
mant. Moscow may also offer to
participate in some new projects
for which Iraq has recently
requested bids. The So-
Turkey: The strength gained
by the Justice Party (JP) at the
expense of minor parties in Tur-
key's 7 June senatorial elec-
tions increases its already good
chances of a substantial victory
in the 1965 general election.
As the minor parties--the New
Turkey Party and the Republican
Peasant Nation Party--will prob-
ably continue to disintegrate,
that election will in effect be-
come a contest between the JP
and the present ruling party,
the Republican People's Party.
viets are said to have recently
discussed the supply of equipment
on credit for a $6-million rail-
way workshops project. The USSR,
which has done extensive river
surveys in Iraq, may also offer
to participate in major water
conservation projects long under
consideration by the Iraqi Gov-
ernment.
The discussions of military
and economic aid are unlikely to
cause any appreciable change in
political relations.
Moscow may ex-
pect, however, that by expanding
its contacts with Baghdad it can
induce the government to be more
tolerant of local Communists and
to associate itself more closely
with Soviet policy objectives.
The day before the senator-
ial election, the JP's figure-
head president-general, Ragip
Gumuspala, died. The party may
choose another weak, compromise
leader like Gumuspala in order
to avoid a fight over his replace-
ment. If it meets the issue
squarely, however, the victor
might well be from that wing of
the party which most strongly
opposes military influence in
politics. Such a development
would increase the distrust of
the JP among Turkey's military
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TURKISH INTERVENTION ON CYPRUS DEFERRED
The threatened Turkish in-
tervention in Cyprus has been
deferred. The invasion forces,
concentrated in the Iskenderun
area of southern Turkey, have been
placed in a more relaxed state
of readiness. They have par-
ticipated in several amphibious
exercises in recent weeks, how-
ever, and presumably could
rapidly carry out any new order
to intervene.
Many senior Turkish mili-
tary and political leaders are
bitterly disappointed at Prime
Minister Inonu's acceptance of
US advice against intervention
and may exert pressure to re-
verse his decision. The Turk-
ish press has criticized recent
US actions and anti-US slogans
--possibly the work of left-
wing students--have appeared
on the windows of US installa-
tions in Ankara. The press
and the Turkish public appear
convinced that the US is com-
mitted to participate actively
in obtaining a. "solution" of
the Cyprus issue.
Citing the latest Turkish
threat, the Greek Cypriots early
this week began to call publicly
for an urgent meeting of the
UN Security Council but on 11
June announced that no formal
request for a special meeting
would be made at this time.
Their motive seems to be to use
the recent Turkish actions and
militant speeches to build up
a. case for eventually demanding
that UN forces on Cyprus be given
a broader mission than peace-
keeping. The Greek Cypriots
want the UN troops to assist in
quelling the Turkish Cypriot
"rebellion" and to defend Cyprus
against Turkish invasion. The
present UN mandate comes up for
extension by the Security Council
in mid-June.
Greek Cypriot charges
against Ankara will also be
used to counter expected com-
plaints from Turkey and the Turk-
ish Cypriots regarding the Greek
Cypriots' recent passage of their
conscription bill and their an-
nounced intention to import
heavy arms.
The Greek Cypriots have
begun to draft men for military
service under the new regulations.
Rumors still circulate in Nicosia
that Vice President Kuchuk is
about to declare certain areas
of Cyprus either independent or
Turkish territory and to request
immediate military assistance
from Turkey. Greek Cypriot
forces have strengthened their
positions, apparently in prepara-
tion for a possible Turkish in-
vasion and probably also for a
quick attack on Turkish Cypriot
positions if Kuchuk makes the
anticipated announcement
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GENERAL STRIKE AGITATES NIGERIA
A general strike over wage
issues, starting on 1 June,
crippled Nigeria's essential
public services and took on dis-
tinct political overtones before
showing signs of crumbling un-
der government pressure this
week. The strike occurred as
Nigeria's parties were undergo-
ing a major realignment in prep-
aration for the national elec-
tions due this year.
After a protracted period
of delay and, apparently, inde-
cision, federal authorities moved
abruptly to break the strike.
On 8 June Prime Minister Balewa
told the workers bluntly that
the government would not nego-
tiate while the strike continued.
A 48-hour back-to-work ultimatum
was issued, and troops took over
key installations in Lagos, the
federal capital, and other cities.
By 10 June, some strikers were
beginning to return to their
jobs, although the major union
leaders had not yet capitulated.
The strike has subjected
the federal coalition govern-
ment--dominated by the conserva-
tive Northern People's Congress
(NPC)--to heavy new strains.
Michael Okpara, premier of south-
ern Nigeria's Eastern Region and
leader of the coalition's junior
partner, the National Convention
of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), has
begun cautiously to take up the
workers' cause. Last week he
announced that the NCNC has made
an electoral alliance with the
opposition party, the Action
Group (AG), which has announced
"unqualified" support for the
strikers.
Okpara is himself embroiled
with the central government over
last year's controversial census
which favored the North. Both
the NCNC and the AG are southern-
based parties, and their alliance
can only intensify the already
existing tensions between north-
ern and southern Nigeria.
Extremist elements have
benefited greatly by the strike.
Such elements in the trade unions
and in the pro-Communist Social-
ist Workers and Farmers Party
have long planned to capitalize
on growing social discontent to
develop a national front and
replace the present regime. Al-
though their political position
is still weak, the strike has
given them an excellent oppor-
tunity to contrast the ostenta-
tious manner of living of most
high government officials with
that of the average Nigerian and
may have strengthened their num-
bers.
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TENSE SECURITY SITUATION
AND POLITICAL TURBULENCE IN CONGO
The security situation in
the eastern Congo remains tense
and uncertain.)
Two Congo Army (ANC) com-
panies with some local police
hold defensive positions south
of the city and have rallied to
their side a large group of trib-
al enemies of the rebels. ANC
commander General Mobutu visited
Bukavu and organized the various
units into a new brigade
/It seems unlikely
that new equipment and reinforce-
ments will improve the ANC's
performance.
Premier Adoula has as yet
been unable to obtain African
troops from outside the Congo
to help the ANC after the UN
troops leave. If the situation
deteriorates rapidly, he may be
forced to appeal to Belgium for
military assistance.
The debacle in Kivu has
warmed up political activity
in Leopoldville. A new politi-
cal combination, the African
Democratic Committee (CDA), was
formed last week. It includes
Minister of Defense Anany, four
other cabinet ministers, and a
leader of President Kasavubu's
key Kongo Central Province ABAKO
party. The CDA hopes that Kasa-
vubu will name one of its leaders
to head the "transitional" gov-
ernment which Kasavubu, following
the recommendation of a consti-
tutional commission, is supposed
to appoint this month to adminis-
ter the country until new parlia-
mentary elections.
Both the CDA group and the
slow-starting pro-Adoula Rally
of Congolese Democrats are court-
ing Katangan support. The CDA
in particular hopes to win over
exiled Katangan leader Moise
Tshombd. Anany, who has been
close to the Belgians, said re-
cently that he would like to see
Tshombd as head of the new gov-
ernment. Tshombd on 10 June
indicated again he was "ready
to serve"and hinted he would
ally himself with the CDA. Bel-
gian officials in Brussels con-
tinue to promote the idea of a
government of national reconcilia-
tion, including both Katangans
and members of the anti-Adoula
exile group, the Committee of
National Liberation. 25X1
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EEC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING
Last week's meeting of the
EEC Council of Ministers took
some far-reaching decisions on
the Common Market's grain prices
and relations with Spain and
Nigeria.
German instransigence
forced the Council to set mid-
December as the new deadline
for further consideration of
whether or not to unify support
prices for grains within the
Community. The postponement
was opposed by the EEC Commis-
sion, which asserts that re-
fusal to agree on unified prices
not only imperils the Community,
but jeopardizes the Kennedy
Round trade negotiations. The
Commission has sent a letter to
the Community's six chiefs of
state deploring the Council de-
cision and requesting reconsid-
eration of the matter before 1
August.
There is no assurance that
West Germany, facing an election
next year, will be any more
agreeable in December to lower-
ing its grain prices to the lev-
els proposed by the Community.
The Commission, however, intends
to apply further pressure in
Bonn while the elections are
still far enough off to allow
Chancellor Erhard some room for
maneuver.
Although the French have
the most to gain from agreement
on unified prices, they finally
agreed to the postponement.
France may wish to let the Ger-
mans set a precedent which would
support the French thesis that
important national interests
should not be overridden by Com-
munity decisions, a point of
Europe
view which endangers the Common
Market treaty's majority-voting
provision due to come into ef-
fect on 1 January 1966.. In ad-
dition, Paris is probably not
unhappy that--to the extent the
grain price issue delays the
Kennedy Round--the blame will
not be laid to France.
On a more positive note,
the Council finally decided to
open talks with Spain and Ni-
geria. The Spanish question
has been particularly thorny
because of strong anti-Franco
feeling in Italy and Benelux
and resentment over Spanish
threats of economic reprisal if
the EEC rejects Spain's bid
for negotiations. The wording
of the Council mandate to the
Commission--calling for an ex-
amination of "economic problems
(for Spain) resulting from the
development of the EEC"--appears
to fall short of the Spanish
request for EEC association.
Madrid, nevertheless, is report-
edly pleased with the decision.
The actual negotiations with
Spain, however, are likely to
be prolonged.
France ended its opposition
to Nigeria's requests for talks
looking to some form of associa-
tion with the EEC, but Paris
will still have ample opportu-
nity to throw up roadblocks to
any final agreement. The Com-
mission's mandate to open talks
about 15 July is partially qual-
ified by the French reservation
that any eventual arrangement
not impair advantages currently
enjoyed by the 18 African states
now associated with the EEC.
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Europe
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AVOIDS CRISIS
Italian Premier Aldo Moro's
coalition has weathered the
near government crisis brought
on by the Socialists' sharp re-
action to Treasury Minister
Colombo's recent call for a
moratorium on socioeconomic
reforms already agreed upon.
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While chances now appear fairly
good that the center-left coali-
tion will hold together for at
least a few more months, it will
continue under severe pressures
and may face new crises.
Christian Democratic right-
wingers remain opposed to most of
the reforms, and intraparty fac-
tionalism is building up as the
party prepares for its congress
late this month. In addition,
some Socialists--including Riccardo
Lombardi, the influential editor
of Avanti!--feel that the Christian
Democratic Party's reaffirmation
Labor Party chief Harold Wil-
son appears to have enhanced his
standing as Britain's prospective
prime minister during his visit
to Moscow last week. Press and
public reaction in the UK has been
favorable, and Wilson's visit is
viewed as giving a further advan-
tage to the Labor Party in the cur-
rent pre-election period. In Mos-
cow Wilson sought to convey the im-
pression that he was a responsible
and imaginative world statesman
fully abreast of events and better
able than the present prime minis-
ter to deal with the Soviet leaders.
British political observers
generally agree that Wilson
"scooped" Douglas-Home in arrang-
ing talks with Khrushchev so soon
after the latter's return from
Cairo and in sounding out Soviet
attitudes on the tense Southeast
Asia situation. Latest British
public opinion polls and a parlia-
mentary by-election in Faversham25X1
last week show Labor continuing
its lead over the Conservatives.
Luxembourg: Prospects for
the early formation of a durable
coalition government seem to be
poor. The present regime, composed
of the moderately conservative
Christian Socialists (PCS) and Demo-
crats, came out of the 7 June elec-
tions with only half of the 56 seats
in parliament. The Democrats,
usually identified with business,
were the big losers and conse-
quently may be replaced in the
coalition by the Socialists, who
won 21 seats, only one less than
the PCS. In any event, any coali-
tion excluding the Socialists
would probably be fragile. The 25X1
Communist Party increased its
parliamentary representation
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Europe
last week of its intention to
abide by the coalition's reform
commitments is "equivocal." These
Socialists will press for quick
action on such specific reforms
as urban renewal, regional legis-
lation, and economic planning.
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Western Hemisphere
CUBAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Since the first of May, five
Soviet passenger ships have left
Cuba for the Soviet Union with
more than 1,500 passengers on
board. Most of the passengers
appear to be Soviet military per-
sonnel.
some may be dependents and Cubans.
Two Soviet passenger ships ar-
rived in Cuban ports on 7 June--
one in Havana and one in Santiago
de Cuba.
All four SAM installations
evacuated in late May have been
relocated. Three of the sites
are within 13 nautical miles of
Santa Clara in central Cuba, sub-
stantially improving the defense
of that important military area, 25X1
but leaving the Central Naval Dis-
trict Headquarters at Cienfuegos
unprotected by SAM defenses. The
fourth was moved less than a mile
from its original emplacement at 25X1
Mariel, west of Havana, probably
because of local terrain conditions.
BRITISH GUIANA'S PROSPECTS FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT REMOTE
The chances that British
Guiana's three political parties
can form a coalition government
are as dim as ever. A proposal
made last week by Forbes Burnham,
leader of the Peoples National
Congress (PNC), is so far unac-
ceptable to the other two parties
--Premier Jagan's Peoples Pro-
gressive Party (PPP) and the United
Force (UF) led by Peter D'Aguiar.
Burnham insists that Jagan call
in all the arms in the country
and establish a "national govern-
ment." The ministries would be
divided in the ratio of five for
the PPP, five for the PNC, and
two for the UF. He also stresses
that this government would last
only until elections are held.
D'Aguiar, who strongly dis-
likes Jagan, has flatly refused-
to participate. Burnham has
said he will not proceed with-
out D'Aguiar and is not likely
to get him to change his mind.
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Western Hemisphere
TENSION IN ARGENTINA AS LABOR AGITATION
Political tension contin-
ues to rise in Argentina as the
tempers of both employers and
the general public are begin-
ning to wear thin over the con-
tinuing agitation by the Peron-
ist-dominated General Confeder-
ation of Labor (CGT). Despite
recent government concessions,
the CGT has announced continu-.
ation of its "battle plan"
which heretofore has been high-
lighted by a series of brief
sit-down strikes, or "occupa-
tions," at business establish-
ments.
The CGT central committee
voted on 5 June to continue its
plan until the government grants
all of its wide-ranging polit-
ical and economic demands.
BRAZIL'S EX-PRESIDENT KUBITSCHEK
Brazilian President Cas-
tello Branco, continuing his
government's two-month-old
"clean-up" campaign, signed
decrees this week canceling the
political rights of more than
50 additional prominent politi-
cians and labor leaders. Among
them was ex-President Juscelino
Kubitschek, now a senator, who
had been a major contender in
the presidential election sched-
uled for October 1965. Others
were the governor of Para State,
Indicative of this polit-
ical motivation is the fact that
the CGT decision was made just
as Congress was winding up action
on two major CGT demands--a
minimum wage law and a price
ceiling on certain common com-
modities. The CGT has criti-
cized both measures as inadequate
and will try to exert pressure
on the President, who will set
the precise wage and price levels
under the new law.
LOSES POLITICAL RIGHTS
several state deputies, and the
mayor of Belem.
Although reaction thus far
to the move against Kubitschek
has been mixed, public criticism
has been relatively mild. The
government's relations with his
large Social Democratic Party
(PSD), however, have been put
under some strain. PSD congres-
sional leaders have issued a
statement of "solidarity" with
Kubitschek and emphasized the
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party's independence of the gov-
ernment bloc.
Without support from the PSD,
which holds 116 Of 409 seats in
the Chamber of Deputies, the ad-
ministration could have trouble
putting through some of its major
reform bills, despite the simpli-
fied procedures available to the
President under the "Institutional
Act." However, the absence of
solid support for Kubitschek in
the PSD and the lack of party dis-
cipline would tend to offset ef-
forts by the small hard core of
Kubitschek followers to achieve
unified opposition to the govern-
ment.
On the other hand, Castello
Branco has strengthened his posi-
tion among top military leaders,
a number of whom had apparently
been pressing him to nullify
Kubitschek's political rights.
They feared that Kubitschek's re-
election to the presidency would
Western Hemisphere
restore what their military rev-
olution is seeking to eliminate
--corruption and Communist influ-
ence in government.
The government has not stated
its reasons for the action against
Kubitschek, but Castello Branco's
chief civilian adviser told US
Embassy officials that well-docu-
mented justification exists and
that no final decision had been
2 -._ s , 25X1
reached on whe+h
er to pub
Indications are that addi-
tional lists of persons deprived
of political rights will be is-
sued before the emergency powers
expire on 15 June. Castello 25X1
Branco has confirmed that he does
not plan to extend these powers
beyond that date.
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT MOVES AGAINST COMMUNIST ENCLAVE
A campaign by the Colombian
Government to eliminate the Commu-
nist enclave called Marquetalia is
going into its second month. The
first armed resistance was not en-
countered until 5 June, but the
tempo of the fighting is expected
to increase in the days ahead.
The Marquetalia Valley, be-
tween the departments of Tolima and
Huila, was "proclaimed" by the Com-
munists in 1960 to be "The Independ-
ent Republic of Marquetalia." It
is one of the more recent of five
regions in central Colombia to come
under Communist control. Arms and
ammunition, as well as drugs, cloth-
ing, and some food are smuggled in-
to Marquetalia from other parts of
Colombia.
The Colombian Communist Party
(PCC) has protested the army's "in-
terference" in Marquetalia from the
beginning. The protests erupted
into violence on 7 June when a wave
of bombings in major Colombian cit-
ies left at least one person dead
and several wounded. Anonymous
phone calls to newspapers asserted
that the bombings were reprisals 25X1
against the Marquetalia campaign
and indicated that more violence
would follow.
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