WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 5, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
Jose 1964
0334 164
V vi~
mak
QE
-NT I N T-
AG
FE OF CURRENT II~TLL~NC %!
State Dept. review completed
25X1 -
A:F
V" 5
'QR9"P I J ' it m,a~t am4t.%e
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
SECRET 1W
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 4 June 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
EAST - WEST'GERMAN TRADE EXPANDING 1
Interzonal trade this year will probably exceed the rec-
ord level of 1960, and long-range contracts suggest that
the East Germans do not anticipate a Berlin crisis.
PEIPING PRESSES DRIVE FOR INFLUENCE IN ASIA AND AFRICA 2
Looking ahead to the second Afro-Asian conference sched-
uled ten months from now, the Chinese Communists are
stepping up their campaign to counter increased Soviet
influence in the area.
COMMUNIST VIEWS OF THE LAOS SITUATION 3
All Communist regimes are seeking some sort of interna-
tional conference in an effort to contrast their "rea-
sonable" approach with alleged US plans to intervene
militarily. Despite differences over procedures, their
tactics all seem aimed at a negotiated settlement to
legitimize military gains already made by the Pathet Lao.
All Communist capitals have raised the specter of a
dangerous East-West confrontation if the military situa-
tion is allowed to escalate.
THE SITUATION INSIDE LAOS 5
Communists may be preparing to launch new attacks on the
neutralists in the Plaine des Jarres area, and Pathet Lao
leader Souphannouvong is pressing to renew talks regarding
the coalition government.
POLITICAL TROUBLES STILL PLAGUE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT 6
The release of four generals associated with the Minh
regime has helped little, and Buddhists and Catholics
are at odds concerning a controversial trial. Insurgent
activity has dropped off.
INDONESIA'S ANTI-MALAYSIAN CAMPAIGN IN POLITICAL PHASE 7
Djakarta is ostensibly toning down its active subversion
in favor of efforts to pursue its aims diplomatically
through a summit conference later this month.
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
N.01 114W
SECRET
ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
Page
SHASTRI TAKES OVER IN INDIA
The new prime minister faces an uphill battle to con-
solidate his powers as Nehru's successor.
TANGANYIKA MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE UNION WITH ZANZIBAR
Steps are being taken to integrate the two regimes in
the diplomatic and military spheres, but pro-Communists
and their bloc advisers continue active on Zanzibar.
CONGO ARMY DISINTEGRATING 10
The army has proved completely ineffective against rebels
in the Kivu area, and other dissidents apparently feel
they can rebel with impunity.
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
The British may pull out their contingent from the UN
force in the face of a sharp increase of anti-British
activity by the Greek Cypriots; arms continue to arrive
for both communities.
FRENCH-TUNISIAN RELATIONS EMBITTERED BY LAND SEIZURE
Since the abrupt nationalization of French-owned farm-
lands in Tunisia, Paris has taken certain economic re-
prisals and is contemplating further sanctions if the
Tunisians persist in their present course.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPANISH COAL STRIKE
The government has made wage concessions to striking
miners and is considering other moves which may have
long-range economic and political implications.
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
SECRET
EUROPE (continued) Page
DEBATE ON ECONOMIC POLICY SHAKES ITALIAN GOVERNMENT 14
Premier Moro's enemies in his own and the opposition
parties are using Italy's current economic difficulties
to attack his government. The government's failure to
move forward with promised reforms is causing Moro's
Socialist coalition partners to threaten to reconsider
their participation in the cabinet.
SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS TO CONSIDER NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUE 1.6
Prime Minister Erlander and his government are being
pressed for decisions on whether Sweden should develop
a nuclear weapons capability, and this issue will be
a. major topic at the ruling party's congress this month.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
RACIAL TENSIONS INCREASING IN BRITISH GUIANA
The bitterness between the Negro and East Indian commu-
nities is creating a cycle of brutal racial attack and
counterattack which will prove hard to stop. Janet
Jagan's resignation as home minister may portend an
effort by the ruling party to decrease the effectiveness
of the police force.
ELECTION AFTERMATH IN PANAMA
President Robles' election was confirmed without
incident but evidence of pre-election deals with pro-
Communists and others suggests his power and freedom of
action may be limited.
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
POSTELECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BOLIVIA
President Paz Estenssoro won his third term as expected,
but random violence in mining areas and moves by his
principal opponents to unite in an effort to overthrow
him suggest that the political situation will remain
uneasy for some time.
ARGENTINE LABOR AGITATION
Tension is rising as the General Confederation of Labor
proceeds with its campaign to extract political and eco-
nomic concessions from the government by briefly occupy-
ing business establishments.
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
Nwe %W
SECRET
The Communist World
EAST - WEST GERMAN TRADE EXPANDING
Interzonal trade (IZT) be-
tween East and West Germany in
1964 probably will exceed the
record level of 1960. Goods
turnover in the first quarter
of 1964 increased by about 18
percent.
Despite the requirement
that IZT accounts be balanced
annually on 30 June, the settle-
ment due this year has been post-
poned until 30 June 1965. The
East Germans therefore can run
a substantial deficit in 1964
if they choose to.
A large number of licenses
have already been issued for de-
liveries to East Germany this
year. Orders for West German
goods placed in the first quar-
ter totaled $120 million, in
comparison with $72.5 million
for the first quarter of 1963.
Licenses for steel deliveries
to East Germany already cover
amounts equal to deliveries for
all of 1963.
Moreover, East Germany last
year began again to place long-
term orders, suggesting that
IZT will continue at a high level
for some time. For the first
time in several years, three-
to four-year contracts have been
placed for factory installations,
including a $5 million gas sep-
aration installation and a $3.4
million rolling mill. East Ger-
many has also contracted for
greatly increased imports of
nitrogen fertilizers over a four-
year period, although all de-
tails of the transaction have
not yet been settled by the IZT
negotiators. These long-term 25X1
contracts suggest that the
East Germans do not anticipate
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 1
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
SECRET *90
PEIPING PRESSES DRIVE FOR INFLUENCE IN ASIA AND AFRICA
The Chinese Communists ap-
pear to be running scared in
their competition with the So-
viet Union for influence in the
Afro-Asian world. Looking ahead
to the second Afro-Asian confer-
ence--Bandung II--scheduled to
meet in Africa ten months from
now, Peiping is accelerating
the tempo of its campaign in
an effort to counter increased
Russian activity in the area.
Unable to match Soviet offers
of economic and technical as-
sistance, the Chinese are forced
to rely mainly on diplomacy and
propaganda.
Clearly sensitive to grow-
ing distaste for violent Sino-
Soviet wrangling in various
Afro-Asian meetings, the Chi-
nese are adopting a more moder-
ate public stance. Peiping
waited more than a month before
replying to Moscow's renewed
attack on Chinese "racism" on
25 April. Both the Chinese
note and the accompanying edi-
torial in People's Daily on 31
May arguing aga n tinclusion
of the Soviet Union in the Afro-
Asian conference next March,
although sharply worded, lacked
the pitch of abusiveness which
had become common place in Sino-
Soviet exchanges.
Peiping has also played
host recently to a growing num-
ber of Afro-Asian leaders in
an attempt to press its case
for solidarity. Among these
have been President Abboud of
the Sudan, the minister of home
affairs and the minister of
state from Kenya, Prime Minis-
ter Abdirascid of the Somali
Republic, Zanzibari ex-foreign
minister Babu, and a parliamen-
tary delegation from Burundi.
Yemeni President Sallal is in
China now, and visits by the
presidents of Mali, Algeria,
and the Somali Republic are
scheduled later this year. Pend-
ing Chinese bids are out to
King Hassan of Morocco, and the
presidents of Tunisia and Tan-
ganyika.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY - Page 2
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
W
SECRET
COMMUNIST VIEWS ON THE LAOS SITUATION
Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi
are all pushing for some sort
of international conference on
Laos in a major effort to dis-
credit and isolate the US Gov-
ernment by contrasting the Com-
munists' desire to work out a
"reasonable settlement" with
alleged US plans to intervene
militarily in Laos. Communist
tactics over the past few weeks
appear to be aimed at increas-
ing pressure on the US to ac-
cept a negotiated settlement
which in effect would legitimize
the military gains already made
by the Pathet Lao forces., All
Communist countries continue
to raise the specter of a dan-
gerous East-West confrontation
if the military situation is
allowed to escalate.
There appears to be some
difference between Moscow and
Peiping on procedures leading
to such a conference, reflect-
ing the different roles the
major powers could play in the
various types of conferences
proposed and perhaps reflecting
different views of the risks of
escalation. Although Peiping
has called for an immediate con-
ference, it is apparently in
no hurry for negotiations ex-
cept on its own terms. These
include a conference organized
along the lines of the Geneva
meeting in 1962, without pre-
conditions that would limit the
discussion to Laos alone.
Peiping may be willing to
bargain on some of the other
points it has put forth, such
as having the conference in
Asia because it deals with Asian
affairs, but will probably not
give way on the issues it con-
siders central to its own in-
terests--the size of the meet-
ing and the broad agenda. The
Chinese, pleased by the gains
already achieved in Laos and
the current trend of events in
Southeast Asia, are probably
content to wait in the belief
that the US will eventually be
forced to come to terms. In
the meantime, Peiping is prob-
ably counting on Communist pro-
testations of willingness to ne-
gotiate to generate world-wide
pressure against increased US
intervention.
Within the past two weeks,
all Communist capitals have
formally endorsed holding a 14-
nation Geneva-type conference
on the Laotian situation. An
alternative proposal was pre-
sented by the Polish Government
on 27 May, however, which would
restrict the talks to the for-
eign ministers of the UK and
the USSR (the Geneva co-chair-
men) and of Canada, India, and
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 3
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
SECRET
Poland (the members of the In-
ternational Control Commission)
and to representatives of the
three Laotian factions. The
proposal, which was probably
made after consultations with
Moscow, maintained that such a
meeting would facilitate the
subsequent convening of the 14-
nation conference.
The Polish proposal ap-
pears intended to counter Brit-
ish charges that the Poles had
been uncooperative in discharg-
ing their ICC responsibilities
and to offer an alternative to
the ambassadorial talks in Vien-
tiane jointly sponsored by the
US and the UK. Both Hanoi and
Peiping have bitterly assailed
the ambassadorial talks, and
the Communists have refused to
join in any such discussions.
The Polish proposal would neatly
side-step these objections and
yet leave the USSR and Poland
to uphold the Communist side--
a development the Russians might
prefer to having to share this
role with the Chinese. Hanoi,
while it has not publicly ob-
jected to the Polish proposal,
broadcast an official statement
on 30 May asserting that the
most realistic way to settle
the problem is through a 14-
nation conference.
in addition to the pres-
sure implicit in these various
SECRET
5 Jane 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
proposals for a conference, re-
cent Communist maneuvering in
Laos--including the withdrawal
of the Soviet and North Viet-
namese ambassadors and the
Pathet Lao representatives from
Vientiane--is probably directed
at convincing the US that it
must soon reach some negotiated
solution which reflects the
wishes of the Pathet Lao or
face the consequences of a sep-
aratist Communist government
and de facto partition.
Hanoi, Peiping, and War-
saw have reported Pathet Lao
leader Souphannouvong's recent
charges that Souvanna is a pris-
oner of the rightists. Pei-
ping has repeated the claim
that he can "no longer be con-
sidered premier of the coali-
tion government," and Moscow
has strongly implied that Sou-
vanna is no longer a free agent.
Soviet leaders have no interest
in upsetting the status quo as
established by the 1962 Geneva
settlement but probably feel
they have no choice but to con-
tinue to harmonize their actions
with those of the North Viet-
namese to the greatest possible
degree. The Soviet Union can
be expected to lend full sup-
port to Pathet Lao demands
that the precoup government
arrangement be restored.
Page 4
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
*AW SECRET
While diplomatic consulta-
tions over Laos continue, there
are indications that the Com-
munists may be preparing to
launch new attacks against neu-
tralist forces following a
week-long lull in military ac-
tivity in the Plaine des Jarres
area. The neutralists used the
lull to bolster their defenses
near Muong Soui.
In other areas Pathet Lao
and rightist forces have engaged
in limited activity. Right-wing
forces recently launched a clear-
ing operation against Pathet
Lao units along the Nam Lik
River west of Vang Vieng, North
of Pak Sane rightist forces are
moving slowly toward Tha Thom,
and as of 1 June were reported
within ten miles of the village.
Pathet Lao forces are pressing
clearing operations against
right-wing elements north of
Muong Moc near the North Viet-
namese border.
The small Laotian Air
Force has provided air support
to right-wing units near Vang
Vieng and has attacked Pathet
Lao targets in the Plaine des
Jarres and along Route 7 toward
the North Vietnamese border.
"extremely dangerous," Souphan-
nouvong called for immediate
talks to "create conditions
necessary for the government to
resume its functions." In a
conversation with the French
ambassador on 31 May, Souphan-
nouvong said he would be willing
to go to a "neutralized" Luang
Prabang and was "particularly
anxious" to meet with Souvanna.
Souvanna has indicated his will-
ingness to meet with Souphannouvong
but doubts that anything could
be accomplished now.
Tensions remain high in
Vientiane)
On the other hand ,Sou-
vanna's recent reassignment of
the two Pathet Lao ministerial
portfolios and the planned with-
drawal of Pathet Lao representa-
tives from Vientiane could lead
to the formation of a separatist
government by Pathet Lao and left-
On 31 May, Pathet Lao
leader Souphannouvong urged
Premier Souvanna and General
Phoumi to renew the tripartite
talks,broken off just before
the 19 April coup. Asserting
that the situation was becoming
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
Page 5
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
~%W e SECRET
POLITICAL TROUBLES STILL PLAGUE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
Political difficulties in
South Vietnam'continue to hinder
General Khanh's efforts to es-
tablish an effective counter-
insurgency movement. The Khanh
government, in an apparent move
to bolster a sagging military
and political mechanism, has
released the four arrested gen-
erals of the short-lived Minh
junta. The generals, and Minh
himself, are probably still dis-
satisfied with their status,
Civilian ministers continue to
complain that the military re-
tains too much authority and
that corruption is still prev-
alent.
Additional troubles arise
from the current trial of Major
Dang Sy, charged with responsi-
bility for the killing of sev-
eral Buddhists in the May 1963
demonstrations in the city of
Hue. Catholics reportedly re-
sent the fact that there will
be no trial of Sy's Buddhist
superiors under whose orders he
allegedly was acting. Although
Khania has indicated that Sy
will not be executed, failure
to impose stiff punishment could
arouse Buddhist opposition to
the government, whereas a harsh
penalty would confirm Catholics
in their suspicions of a vendetta
against them.
Both Communist and govern-
ment military activity continues
to decline. Viet Cong incidents
for 23-30 May were the lowest
since the first week in April,
as were government large-scale
operations; government small-
scale activities reached new
highs, but fewer contacts were
made with the Viet Cong. Govern-
ment casualties and weapons
losses, although decreased dur-
ing the last two weeks of May,
still compared unfavorably with
Viet Cong losses, which were at
their lowest since January 1963.
Results of pacification
efforts throughout the country
indicate that local initiative
is still lacking in many areas.
Marginal progress is reported
from the north, but in other
areas the program appears stag-
nant. Although funds are now
available in most areas and
training programs for civilian
and military cadres are begin-
ning to pick up, local govern-
ments are still far from mak-
ing effective use of available
resources.
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 6
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
SECRET %MO
INDONESIA'S ANTI-MALAYSIA CAMPAIGN IN POLITICAL PHASE
Indonesia is again shift-
ing temporarily from active
subversion to diplomacy in its
campaign to bring about the
collapse of Malaysia.
On 30 May Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, and the Philippines an-
nounced they would hold a "sum-
mit" conference in Tokyo dur-
ing June. In this connection
Indonesia has agreed to the
"principle of withdrawal" of
its guerrillas in Malaysian
Borneo, to begin simultaneously
with the opening of a foreign
ministers' meeting which is to
precede the summit conference.
Thailand has agreed to verify
this withdrawal.
This issue, which hampered
previous efforts to arrange a
conference, may yet delay the
one now planned. On 31 May
Djakarta stated that movement
beyond this initial withdrawal
would depend on progress at the
summit conference. Malaysia
has asked for clarification of
this statement, and,unless it
receives satisfaction, may not
attend the proposed meetings.
Simultaneous with this
political jockeying, Indonesia
is continuing its subversive
efforts, although there have
been few incidents in the past
few weeks. At least 200 Indo-
nesian guerrillas, including`
regulars, are estimated to be
inside Malaysia.
Indonesian operations
throughout Malaysia include
the use of local Chinese Com-
munists despite claims that
Djakarta fears Malaysia will
one day fall under indigenous
Chinese--and eventually Pei-
ping's--control.
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
Page
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
Iftwo, *M0
SECRET
Lal Bahadur Shastri, who
will be sworn in as India's
prime minister next week, faces
an uphill battle to consolidate
his powers as Nehru's successor.
Compounding his task is the
mounting disarray which has
plagued his Congress Party in
recent years, as well as a host
or urgent domestic and foreign
policy problems.
The Shastri government
will face the continuing threat
of renewed Hindu-Muslim communal
violence, serious lags in In-
dia's economic development pro-
grams, and local factional
strife which has all but immo-
bilized several state govern-
ments and threatens to produce
a Communist victory at the polls
in Kerala State early next year.
On the Kashmir question,
Pakistan has indicated a will-
ingness temporarily to ease its
pressure for a solution. Never-
theless, it is eager to main-
tain the recent perceptible
momentum toward settlement which
accompanied Sheikh Abdullah's
release from prison in early
April. Shastri's freedom of
action is severely limited by
the largely hostile popular at-
titudes in India toward any
concession on Kashmir.
Shastri's election to party
leadership preserved the spirit
of outward unanimity which has
long characterized the Congress
Party in its formal delibera-
tions. His selection was
strongly contested, however, by
Morarji Desai, the conservative
former finance minister, and
by the party's leftists.
Shastri's main support came from
key powerful state and regional
party bosses with whom he de-
veloped a smooth working rela-
tionship during his years as
Nehru's chief political lieuten-
ant. These regional leaders,
including Congress Party Presi-
dent Kamaraj, feel they can
work well with the conciliatory
Shastri from whom they expect
a somewhat larger grant of au-
thority than Nehru permitted them.
state level.
Shastri brings to the prime
ministership many valuable as-
sets. He is skilled in the art
of compromise and has a well-
developed facility for deft po-
litical maneuver. The magnitude
and duration of real power he
will wield depend on his ability
to satisfy his supporters while
placating at least the most in-
fluential disgruntled elements
and on his success in imposing 25X1
his own imprint of compromise
on unruly party elements at the
TANGANYIKA MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE UNION WITH ZANZIBAR
Tanganyikan Foreign Minis-
ter Kambona has begun to con-
solidate Tanganyika and Zanzi-
bar diplomatically and militar-
ily, but without yet confronting
the problem of pro-Communist
control of Zanzibar. President
Nyerere prefers to avoid a di-
rect challenge to Vice President
Karume--who doubles as Zanzibar's
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 8
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
SECRET
president--and to rely instead
on the hope that disapproval by
other African nations will even-
tually divert Karume from his
Communist alignment.
Kambona has appointed the
United Republic's first ambas-
sadors to the UN, Washington,
and Bonn. Governments with dip-
lomatic missions in both Dar-
es-Salaam and Zanzibar were
told they might convert the is-
land mission to a consulate.
However, this ruling does not
apply to East Germany, whose
status on Zanzibar remains un-
resolved.
Soviet
statements suggest that Moscow
continues to regard good rela-
tions with other East African
countries as more important
than the rather nebulous possi-
bilities offered by close coop-
eration with Zanzibari leaders.
Some 300 Zanzibari recruits
arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on 29
May to begin training with 600
Tanganyikans as the first bat-
talion of an integrated army.
These recruits were not part
of the Zanzibari army--now 500
strong--which the pro-Communists
control and which the Soviets
are training. A transfer of
arms to this force has left the
moderate-led Zanzibar police
with only enough rifles for
every fourth man.
The first contingent of
Tanganyikan police trained and
equipped with new UK and US au-
tomatic weapons reached Zanzi-
bar last week. More are expected
as other Tanganyikan units on
the island rotate to the main-
land for training. It is not
clear, however, where the ef-
fective balance of forces on
Zanzibar now lies.
Other new arrivals on the
island include five East Ger-
man teachers, the first of seven
East German doctors, 14 Soviet
merchant marine officers, and
a North Vietnamese charge-des-
ignate who expects to present
his credentials to Karume.
Some 5,000 tons of materials
for the East German housing
project are due next month.'
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 9
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
* Province capital
0 100 200 Miles
0 100 200 Kilometers
C/
BRAZZAVILLE
O-CENTRAL
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Coquilhotvife i
KWANGOJ
KIBALI-ITU/RI
Buaia*r/
SANKURU
*Lodla
xut abourg Blk
st CvQeo
~s a o URA, I S u
-_\ KAS
N
KA?
NORDI
1'W1
KIVU(t XO(y/R1
Gam r":, C
-. ~ RWANDA1
indu I KIVU *t, J
KIVII Rebellion ~)1
$URUNDI~
EMA Uvlra'".
~\NTR BUJUMBURA
45t a / maps andl mielligehpe reports. and are not
dr/inittvre 6 ' 2a
UVETTE-CE11`,~TRALE
SUDAN
A Vs
T
LOMANI
Iga*Kabind
1 tP~~rr.)
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
SECRET
CONGO ARMY DISENTEGRATING
The Congo National Army
(ANC), severely beaten by the
rebels in the Kivu region of
eastern Congo, is rapidly dis-
integrating.
On 30 May rebels in Kivu
Central Province ambushed and
put to flight an ANC detachment,
throwing government troops
throughout the province into
panic. The rebel victory was
the latest in a series of en-
gagements in which the insur-
gents, suffering relatively
little themselves, have defeated
and demoralized ANC reinforcing
units. The provincial capital
of Bukavu presently is threat-
ened by rebel forces advancing
from the south over a narrow
and winding road defended by a
small but well-entrenched ANC
detachment. Even if the rebel
troops were stopped here, Bukavu
could fall if its principal
tribal leader decides to throw
in with the insurgents, or if
the rebels managed to enter
Bukavu through Rwanda. Rwandan
security forces have repelled
one such attempt.
Although Kivu is in a
remote part of the Congo, the
consequences of events there
are far-reaching. The ANC's
poor showing appears to be con-
vincing other dissidents that
they can rebel with impunity.
Several antigovernment outbreaks
have been reported in various
localities throughout the Congo,
and other disturbances can be
expected.
It is extremely unlikely
that the ANC, its morale low
and its effective reserves nearly
exhausted, can handle any new
disturbances. The last effective
unit in Katanga, where the ANC's
strategic reserve has been based,
is being committed to Kivu, leav-
ing Katanga vulnerable to dis-
order. UN officials still appear
to be hesitant to commit UN troops
which are scheduled to complete
their departure by 30 June. A
Nigerian battalion is to remain
at least until the end of the
month, but the only other UN
forces in the country, two
Ethiopian battalions, are appar-
ently in the process of leaving.
Fears are growing in Belgium
that even if Leopoldville succeeds
in putting down the current
unrest, the whole Congolese
Government could be swept away
in a second series of revolts.
Belgian authorities--convinced
that the Adoula government is
totally inept--seem to be
casting about for means to
broaden its political base.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 10
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
V0,01 %~
ALBANIA
BULGARIA
\POhS
U A R
EGYPT CAIR6*
Kormaki Temb os
Lofk
Famagusta
4firna
Paphos
CYPRUS
0 '0 20
STATUTE MILES
U R K E Y
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
SECRET
Anti-British activity among
the Greek Cypriots has sharply
increased following the arrest
last week of a British airman
on charges of transporting arms
and messages for the Turkish
Cypriot irregulars. While the
airman was not a member of the
British contingent of the UN
Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the
Cypriot minister of interior
publicly questioned the propri-
ety of continued British par-
ticipation in that force.
Anti-British demonstra-
tions were organized in the ma-
jor towns, Greek Cypriots sub-
jected British nationals and
their vehicles to intensive
searches, and several generally
ineffective attempts were made
to sabotage the water supply for
the British bases. Vasos Lys-
sarides,left-wing associate of
President Makarios, informed
the press he intends to denounce
the continued presence of Brit-
ish military bases on Cyprus at
the forthcoming Balkan Peace
Conference in Belgrade. 25X1
Galo Plaza, UN political
adviser on Cyprus, has privately
stated that the British may
pull out of UNFICYP by 27 June,
when the present UN mandate
ends. Should this happen, he
expressed hope the Dutch would
replace them. The `UN Security
Council will discuss extension
of the.. mandate about 10 June.
The Greek Cypriots have
passed a conscription bill which
allows for the call-up of men
between 18 and 50. The final
version of the bill bars the
existence of private "armies"
and thus should be a step to-
ward instituting centralized
control over the bands of Greek
Cypriot irregulars.
Arms continue to arrive for
both communities--the Turkish arms
reportedly by small boat from Tur-
key, the Greek Cypriot weapons by
ship at the major ports. There is
reliable evidence that light
planes (two or three) and helicop-25X1
ters (probably two) have come into
the hands of the Greek Cypriots
during the past week.
three British light
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 11
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
1%W %0
r TRIPOLI
-WHLELUS `_.
400 N.3) 1 250
IDRIS 1000 Tobruk
BENGASI 1000,
EL ADEM
(U. K.)
ALGERIA."
BRITISH FORCES
LIBYA
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
140W %W
SECRET
Europe
FRENCH-TUNISIAN RELATIONS EMBITTERED BY LAND SEIZURE
French Foreign Ministry
officials fear that the abrupt
nationalization of French-owned
farmlands in Tunisia last month
may have more serious effects
on Franco-Tunisian relations in
the long run than Tunisia's at-
tempt in 1961 to force France
to evacuate the Bizerte naval
base. President Bourguiba's
action violates the March 1963
bilateral agreement which rec-
ognized Tunisia's right to
nationalize the remaining French-
held farmlands, but provided
for a five-year period of grace
for individual proprietors.
Paris has accused Bourguiba
of flagrant disregard of an
international commitment in
order to bolster his anti-
colonialist image in the Maghreb.
While he admits to violating
international protocol, Bour-
guiba has maintained that the
five-year clause was "forced"
on Tunisia by France as a quid
pro quo for the evacuation of
Bizerte.
Bourguiba insists his ac-
tion is "a question of life or
death" for Tunisia, arguing
that it will bolster lagging
agricultural output and provide
work for the large numbers of
rural unemployed. He charges
that "immense" tracts of land
are being underexploited by
absentee French landlords, while
soil is abused and farm imple-
ments are sold by Europeans who
know they must leave by 1968.
The French Government re-
fuses to accept the fait accompli,
and the Foreign Ministry ap-
parently prompted by De Gaulle,
will not even discuss modes of
execution with the Tunisians.
Paris, meanwhile, has suspended
its modest financial contribu-
tion to Tunisia for 1964--a
$9 million public investment
loan. It has further announced
its intention to recall some
20 French agricultural tech-
nicians who hold the most im-
portant positions in Tunisia's
Agricultural Ministry.
There are indications that
Paris is contemplating further
sanctions if the Tunisians
persist in their present course.
President de Gaulle, still
smarting over Bizerte and de-
termined to demonstrate French
sensitivity to the honoring
of international commitments,
appears willing to cancel the
rest of the French aid program
in Tunisia. This includes
$22 million in credits and $11
million for project aid. Paris
can also curtail French im-
ports of Tunisian wine, wheat,
and olive oil, the sale of
which are vital to Tunisia's
economy.
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 13
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
SECRET
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPANISH COAL STRIKE
The eight-week-old strike
of coal miners in Spain's north-
ern province of Asturias is
forcing the Franco government
to make concessions which may
have long-range economic and
political implications.
The original walkout in-
volved only 3,000 miners, but
the number later swelled to a
peak of over 40,000, including
several thousand metalworkers
striking in sympathy with the
miners. At present, about 5,000
are still off the job.
The workers' demands center
on higher wages and improved
working conditions, but the
strike nonetheless has some po-
litical overtones. The workers
are also seeking the right to
choose their own representatives
in the government-controlled
labor syndicates. In addition,
the strike emphasizes the loss
of worker confidence in the syn-
dicates, whose chief, Jose Solis
Ruiz, has persistently opposed
reforms. Throughout the strike
the workers have preferred to
deal with the mines' management
through the Labor Ministry.ra-
ther than with syndicate of-
ficials.
In mid-May the Ministry
of Labor ordered substantial
wage increases for all bitu-
minous mines except those in
Asturias. The regime apparently
hopes that the strikers there
will return to work anticipat-
ing that the wage boost will be
extended to them as well. The
regime has indicated that this
would be the case.
Financing these wage in-
creases promises to be a sticky
problem for two reasons. First,
further pay raises will compound
the government's problem of curb-
ing inflation. Second, more
money for the miners would ap-
pear to call in turn for raising
the price of coal, a step the
government is unwilling to take.
The government, in the
meantime, is considering other
ways of attacking the mining
problem. These include loans
to modernize many of the unprof-
itable mines, indemnification
for the operators whose mines
would be closed, and special tech-
nical training to prepare sur-
plus miners for jobs elsewhere.
These are clearly long-range ap-
proaches. Apparently not much
thought has been given to pro-
viding alternate employment to
those who will lose their jobs
when these changes are imple-
mented.
DEBATE ON ECONOMIC POLICY SHAKES ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
Italian Premier Moro this
week was obliged to call in the
coalition leaders to consider
ways of staving off a govern-
ment crisis; a vote of confi-
dence may soon be called. Al-
though the center-left coalition
is expected to survive such a
test, its stability is being
severely undermined by the
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 14
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
low *4000
SECRET
government's failure to project
an image as a reformist administra-
tion and by exploitation of current
economic difficulties by opponents
of its program.
While the Communists and the
conservative Liberals continue to
attack the coalition, its stability
is also threatened increasingly by
the fierce factional infighting
within the dominant Christian Demo-
cratic Party, which has arisen in
connection with its national con-
gress to be held late this month.
This factionalism has sparked a
new attack on the government's at-
tempt to reconcile its long-range
reform program with the "austerity"
measures it has adopted to counter
present economic difficulties.
The economy improved slightly
in the first five months of this
year, and there has been some "mod-
erate optimism" generated by a
leveling off of the rate of price
increases, an improvement in the
foreign exchange market, and some
return of flight capital. Large
tourist receipts and good agricul-
tural prospects have also been en-
couraging. No decisive upturn in
the economy is expected this year,
however, and recent favorable de-
velopments may not offset the need
for further stabilization measures.
Treasury Minister Colombo has
complicated the political situation
by producing what appear to be some-
what unduly pessimistic economic
forecast for the remainder of the
year. In a mid-May letter to the
premier, which Colombo "leaked" to
a conservative Rome newspaper last
week, he said the government must
continue fiscal austerity and main-
tain stringent wage restraints.
Should labor not cooperate, he said,
the government would have. to turn
to the alternative of enacting se-
vere credit restrictions and in-
creasing taxes "without regard to
the dangers of deflation and unem-
ployment."
This maneuver by Colombo, a
Christian Democrat, seems aimed
mainly at enhancing his own chances
to succeed Moro. His emphasis on
economic stability, implying that
even limited progress toward socio-
economic reforms should not be con-
sidered, has placed the coalition's
Socialist (PSI) members in a diffi-
cult position and brought from them
a sharp rejoinder. The PSI has de-
manded that Moro reaffirm his gov-
ernment's reform objectives by is-
suing "a clear refutation of posi-
tions contradictory to the program
and goals of the center-left." The
party had earlier insisted that
some progress toward specific re-
form measures be shown by early
July, at which time the PSI would
"take stock of its situation" and
decide whether to continue its par-
ticipation in the government.
politics.
A few worrisome pockets of
unemployment and shortened work-
weeks have already appeared. Should
unemployment rise markedly, or
should a recession arise, labor
disturbances seem almost inevitable.
This could eventually lead to the
formation of a rightist government,
drive the democratic left toward
the Communists, and thus open the
way for a polarization in Italian
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 15
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
SECRET
SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS TO CONSIDER NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUE
The quadrennial congress
of Sweden's governing Social
Democratic Party scheduled for
mid-June convenes at a time when
Prime Minister Erlander is being
pressed by the party's left wing
and by the opposition parties,
whose sights are on the national
elections in September.
Probably the most contro-
versial question facing the
congress is whether Sweden should
develop a nuclear weapons capa-
bility. This issue has troubled
the party and deeply divided
public opinion for the past dec-
ade.
Despite Erlander's efforts
to avoid a debate on the nuclear
issue, elements in his party
apparently intend to try to end
the leadership's temporizing
on the matter by getting the
congress to reject acquisition
of nuclear weapons. The pro-
posals supported by opponents
of such weapons would go fur-
ther by having Sweden unilater-
ally renounce any intention of
either acquiring or developing
such weapons.
Faced with pressures which
threaten to split the party,
but not wanting to compromise
Sweden's future freedom of ac-
tion, party leaders are expected
to push through a resolution
acceptable to both sides. It
will probably resemble the mo-
tion adopted last month by the
party's central committee which
in effect would again postpone
a formal decision on the matter,
as was done at the last congress.
The opposition Liberal and
Conservative parties will try
to capitalize on the nuclear
issue and the related question
of national defense in the Sep-
tember parliamentary elections.
Erlander and his party are al-
ready under fire as a result of
the Wennerstrom espionage affair
and the unfavorable light in
which several cabinet ministers
have been placed by its revela-
tions. While the government ap-
parently has convinced a large
segment of public opinion that
no irreparable damage was done
to Sweden's defenses, the affair
and its implications for national
defense and security are certain
to figure prominently in the
campaign.
In the campaigning, the
Social Democrats probably will
contend that by deferring a de-
cision on the nuclear issue,
Sweden is in step with world
opinion and the general atmosphere
of detente between East and West.
In an effort to reassure the
electorate that Sweden's interests
will continue to be protected,
Erlander and his party will point
to the reservations with which
Stockholm adhered to the limited
test ban treaty last summer. At
that time, the government declared
that in signing the treaty, Sweden
did not forego the acquisition 25X1
of nuclear weapons at some future
date if conditions should require
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 16
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
Vftaplf SECRET
Western Hemisphere
RACIAL TENSIONS INCREASING IN BRITISH GUIANA
Tensions remain high be-
tween the East Indians and
Negroes in British Guiana, and
both sides are increasingly in-
clined to seek security in num-
bers by moving into communities
in which their race predominates.
The most recent disturbances
were apparently an East Indian
reaction to Negro attacks on the
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 17
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
VOW, %W
SECRET
East Indian community of Wismar,
which now has been evacuated.
The emerging pattern of brutal
racial attack and counterattack
will prove hard to stop.
Ominous also is the attitude
of several leaders of Premier
Jagan's People's Progressive
Party (PPP) in advocating vio-
lence as the only way to block
the forthcoming elections, which
the PPP is fearful of losing.
The PPP is also struggling
by other means to retain power.
Conspiracy charges, for example,
have been filed against five of-
ficials of a new anti-Jagan East
Western Hemisphere
Indian organization which has
been more active recently. Premier
Jagan also saw the unsuccessful
efforts by Trinidad Prime Minis-
ter Williams to arrange a coali-
tion government in British Guiana
as a way of delaying the elec-
tions.
Meanwhile, Jagan's wife has
resigned as minister of home af-
fairs and the governor has assumed
responsibility for the ministry.
Her resignation seems to have been
prompted by pressure from the gov-
ernor and the police commissioner
to expand the emergency regulations.
In an effort to diminish the ef-
fectiveness of the police, Mrs. 25X1
Jagan in her resignation statement
severely criticized the force as
re ud iced toward Ne roes .
SECRET
5 June 64
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 18
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
*W10 1WW
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
The formal confirmation on
29 May of Marco Robles' elec-
tion as President of Panama came
off smoothly, and no disturbances
materialized. There is increas-
ing evidence, however, that
Robles ensured his victory by
numerous deals--some with pro-
Communists--which may seriously
limit his power and freedom of
action when he takes office on
1 October.
Meanwhile, there are signs
of increasing disagreement with-
in the Panamanian Communist
Party (PdP) over how best to ex-
ploit the new opportunities that
have been opened to it in re-
cent months. Besides any bene-
fits accruing to the party as
a result of Robles' election,
unofficial election results show
that several of the candidates
for the National Assembly sup-
ported by the PdP were also
elected. Younger members of the
party, however, are impatient
with its emphasis on a long-
term program of political action.
Spokesmen for these mal-
contents include Victor Avila
and Floyd Britton, who played
major roles in the January riots
and have subsequently increased
their influence in the Chiari
government as well as in the
university. They are criticiz-
ing the party's long-entrenched
leadership and are demanding im-
mediate revolution, possibly
with the encouragement of Ar-
nulfo Arias' nephew, Roberto
"Tito" Arias. Castro may be
encouraging these "young Turks"
to try to assert control over
the Soviet-supported PdP and
consolidate it with the Cuban-
supported Vanguard of Revolu-
tionary Action (VAN).
The old-line PdP leaders
are giving lip service to a
more activist campaign, claim-
ing that armed insurrection in
Panama is both inevitable and
imminent. They seem reluctant,
however, to touch off a revolu-
tionary movement for fear of
government retaliation.
On another front, it is in-
creasingly evident that the ultra-
nationalists who will speak for
Panama in the upcoming discus-
sions of US-Panamanian problems
will demand some sweeping eco-
nomic concessions, such as the
elimination of US tariffs for
Panamanian products. In this,
the negotiators will be encour- 25X1
aged both by extreme leftists and
influential local business in-
terests.
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 19
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE LABOR AGITATION
Tension has been rising
steadily in Argentina as the
General Confederation of Labor
(CGT) proceeds with its campaign
to extract political and eco-
nomic concessions from the gov-
ernment by "occupying" business
establishments.
On four occasions in the
last two weeks, the CGT ordered
the occupation--seizing control
--of a large number of factories
for periods lasting two to six
hours. On 21 May, it moved in
on some 500 plants in the Buenos
Aires area. On 27 and 29 May
and 2 June it extended its or-
der to several hundred plants
in the provinces.
The CGT says that these
brief occupations will continue
until 15 June, and will include
public services. It plans a
24-hour occupation of all cen-
ters of production between 15
and 18 June.
The Peronist bloc within
the CGT, which is responsible
for the occupations, is trying
to force the government to ac-
cede to such demands ranging
from a minimum wage law to le-
gality for that segment of the
Peronist movement still directed
by the exiled former dictator.
The independent bloc within the
CGT feels obliged to endorse
the occupation program because
of rank-and-file pressure for
relief from economic hardship
but opposes its implementation
while Congress is debating a
minimum wage bill. They reluc-
tantly admit that the program
is an attack on the government,
with which the independents
have more friendly relations
than have the Peronists.
The independents also ob-
ject to the Peronists' injection
of political demands into the
campaign as well as to such
strong-arm tactics as the taking
of hostages. The independents
have intimated, however, that
if Congress does not pass a
minimum wage law by 8 June, they
too may participate in the oc-
cupations.
Thus far there has been no
violence. The workers have
quietly left the plants at the
orders of court judges, who have
rushed from plant to plant. Em-
ployers have made no effort to
defend their property, but their
attitude seems to be hardening.
The government, caught be-
tween CGT provocation and mount-
ing public criticism, shows
signs that its patience is wear-
ing thin. It seeks to avoid
repressive measures, but is
giving sharpening warnings that
private property will be pro-
tected. The Interior Ministry
has specifically warned that 25X1
any interference with public
services will be suppressed with
whatever force is needed.
SECRET
5 June 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 21
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
Bolivian President Victor
Paz Estenssoro was elected to
a third term last Sunday as ex-
pected. There was no opposi-
tion presidential candidate,
and the Paz slate received about
65 percent of the vote. The
remaining ballots were either
cast blank, voided for irregu-
larities, or went to the two
small opposition groups run-
ning candidates for Congress.
Abstentions and electoral ir-
regularities were most preva-
lent in the tin mining regions
--the stronghold of Paz' bitter
political rival, incumbent Vice
President Juan Lechin.
Although the elections
were held with a minimum of dis-
order, tension remains high.
This is particularly true in
the mining areas, where miners
continue random acts of vio-
lence, although Lechin called
off the four-day-old strike on
2 June.
Former president Hernan
Siles Zuazo announced on 1 June
that he no longer recognizes
Paz as the head of the ruling
Nationalist Revolutionary Move-
ment (MNR), and is organizing
a new opposition front with the
presumed objective of unseating
Paz by armed insurrection.
Lechin's Nationalist Revolution-
ary Party of the Left (PRIN)
and the centrist Authentic Rev-
olutionary Party (PRA)--led by
another important former MNR
leader, Walter Guevara Arze--
will form the nucleus of the
new anti-Paz front. The lead-
ers of smaller opposition groups
will also attend the front's
organizational meeting to be
held soon in the mining center
of Oruro. Siles was expelled
from the MNR on 3 June.
Up to now, opposition lead-
ers have been united only in
their hatred of Paz. Their in-
ability to put aside personal
political ambitions was largely
responsible for their ineffec-
tive opposition to him during
the pre-electoral period. The
odds therefore seem to be against
any prolonged cohesion in the
Siles-Lechin-Arze combination.
If the idea is to over-
throw Paz by force of arms, the
group would have to move soon
and, in its present unorganized
state, would have little chance
to succeed. Paz is supported
by the military and has already
begun to round up political
agitators--including Arze's
chief lieutenant--who have been
involved in recent antigovern-
ment incidents. It would not
take much of a provocation to
cause him to go after the new
front.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 20
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A004500020001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04500020001-2