WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300120001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 14, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DHS Review Completed. State Dept. review
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
-CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
completed
// SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
dnwngnadinqona Jeciassification
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Iftw SECRET ""
(Information as of 1200 EST, 13 February 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
SOVIET PLENUM ON AGRICULTURE
The speeches since the plenum began on 10 February give
a clear picture of plans for Soviet agriculture in the
next few years and indicate no major policy changes.
PEIPING INTENSIFIES HATE-THE-US CAMPAIGN
The Panama crisis has excited Communist China's anti-US
propaganda to new shrillness.
EAST GERMANY'S "NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM"
Ulbricht's remarks to the recent party plenum suggest
he is under pressure both from hard-liners opposed to
the new system and from liberals who want changes in
the political sphere as well.
NORTH VIETNAMESE FOOD PROBLEM WORSENS
The persistent agricultural difficulties, however, will
probably have no dampening effect on Hanoi's aggressive
foreign policy.
BOLDER VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Communist attacks seem to be eroding morale, but
General Khanh's government shows promise of firmer
leadership than its predecessor.
COMMUNIST PRESSURE RISES IN LAOS
Vientiane fears a possible assault at Thakhek, on the
Mekong, and is also concerned over Communist attacks
in the Plaine des Jarres.
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14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page i
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
AREA NOTES
On Malaysia and Yemen
THE SITUATION ON CYPRUS
Serious clashes have occurred between local Greek and
Turkish elements and threaten to provoke intervention
by Turkey. The Communist Party is exploiting growing
anti-Western sentiment among Greek Cypriots.
NKRUMAH MOVES TO TIGHTEN GRIP ON GHANA
Fear for his personal security has spurred him to
further steps to reshape Ghana on Communist models.
TENSIONS HIGH BETWEEN RWANDA AND BURUNDI
Attempts by exiles of the Tutsi tribe to invade Rwanda
have triggered retaliation by Rwanda against its Tutsi
minority and may bring clashes between Rwanda and neigh-
boring Tutsi-dominated Burundi.
THE SITUATION IN EAST AFRICA
Lines of power are beginning to clarify in Zanzibar,
but instability is likely to continue there and in
Kenya and Tanganyika. Uganda's prime minister is
consolidating his control.
STATUS OF THE MULTILATERAL FORCE DISCUSSIONS
While an eight-nation working group has made consider-
able progress in initial examination of political and
military issues involved in establishing an MLF, consid-
eration of the next steps to be taken has pointed up the
political obstacles the MLF still faces.
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14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
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Aftor, )Ji (.'Ki 1 ' ..F,
EUROPE (continued) Page
AREA NOTE 13
On Italy
THE CANAL CRISIS AND PANAMANIAN POLITICS
The hero's welcome staged for Miguel Moreno, the rabid
nationalist who presented Panama's charges of US aggres-
sion to the OAS, confirms suspicions that he intended to
use this mission to further his presidential aspirations.
CUBA AND THE US NAVAL BASE
Castro's action against Guantanamo was apparently in-
tended to dramatize the whole series of Cuban complaints
against the US--issues on which he may intend, at a time
of his own choosing, to demand formal UN consideration.
Hemispheric reaction, however, has been moderate and
generally favorable to the United States.
MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Mexican foreign policy under President Lopez' successor
will probably continue to feature a cordial but "inde-
pendent" relationship with the US, a tendency to expand
contacts with the bloc, and refusal to cooperate on
strong hemispheric action against Cuba.
ARGENTINE LABOR PROTEST
The General Confederation of Labor has launched the
first stage of a militant plan to force government ac-
tion on its extensive economic and political demands.
The second and third stages could lead to violence.
AREA NOTES
On Bolivia and British Guiana
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Speeches thus far during
the USSR's central committee
plenum which began on 10 Feb-
ruary give a clear picture of
plans for Soviet agriculture in
the next few years and indicate
no major policy changes.
Effort in traditional farm-
ing areas is to increase, with
little or no expansion of total
acreage. The chief emphasis is
to be on grain, which for the
first time in Soviet practice is
to receive large applications of
chemical fertilizer. An irriga-
tion program is well along in
the planning stage and, if imple-
mented, will make still another
major claim on Soviet economic
resources.
Over the next several years,
land under irrigation is to in-
crease by one third--an addi-
tional 6.9 million acres (size
of Maryland). Two thirds of this
new irrigation will take place in
the semiarid areas of the Russian
Republic and the Ukraine, with
only one third in Central Asia
and the Transcaucasus, where most
irrigation now takes place.
Virtually all of the new
irrigated lands will be devoted
to grain--rice, corn, and wheat
--and in addition some 6.4 mil-
lion acres already under irriga-
tion will be shifted to grain
crops, principally at the ex-
pense of hay.
Cost estimates of the pro-
gram vary. Last September,
Khrushchev, outlining much the
same program as described by the
chairman of the State Committee
for Irrigation at the plenum,
set the cost at 7.3 billion
rubles (1 ruble nominally equals
$1.11). The chairman, however,
implied that it might cost con-
siderably more. Even Khrushchev's
figure is more than the cost of
the New Lands grain program of
the mid-1950s and even somewhat
more than the fertilizer portion
,of the chemical program announced
last December.
While irrigation does not
require the complex machinery
associated with fertilizer pro-
duction and application, it never-
theless will make significant de-
mands on industry for tractors,
scrapers, pumping stations, and
pipe. In addition, maintenance
and operation costs will impose
a continuing and fairly heavy
expense on the economy.
The return from the new ir-
rigation will almost certainly be
less than the regime apparently
expects. Khrushchev's estimate
of an extra 15 million tons of
grain a year would mean an average
yield per acre far above what is
obtained through irrigation in the
US and, in the case of wheat,
nearly four times that presently
obtained from irrigation in the
USSR--although admittedly wheat
now being irrigated is not grown
under optimum conditions.
It is clear from the emphasis
given the use of irrigation and
fertilizer in the traditional
farming areas of European Russia
that these are intended to sup-
plant the New Lands as the chief
source of large increases in grain.
The New Lands program, in its
prime, provided nearly one quarter
of all grain production, but year-
in-year-out cropping on these
marginal lands has resulted in
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TYPICAL ANTI-US CARTOONS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PRESS
Kennedy bites the dust. "Give me a little something to wet my whistle."
(Peiping )6orker's Daily, 24 Nov 63) (People's Daily, 14 January 1964)
Trying his skill for the first time
(People's Daily, 13 January 1964)
Yankee Peace Banner
(People's Daily, 23 January 1964)
LINE OF SUCCESSION (People's Daily, 20 January 1964)
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rapid deterioration. The re-
sulting erosion problem is se-
rious and is not likely to be
solved without taking huge
amout.ts of land out of cultiva-
tion and introducing soil con-
servation practices on a wide
scale.
It is not clear whether
the regime intends to take these
steps, but it evidently is not
planning for large increases in
grain output from the area.
For example, Kazakhstan--which
contains a major part of the
New Lands--is expected in the
future to do no more than equal
its 1962 crop, while grain out-
put in the Ukraine is intended
to double.
Summaries of speeches given
at the plenum indicate that the
regime will take steps to in-
crease farm production through
greater material incentives--
larger money wages and bonuses
for collective farmers--but there
has been nothing to suggest plans
for any basic alteration in the
present system of collectivized
agriculture.
PEIPING INTENSIFIES HATE-THE-US CAMPAIGN
One of the fundamental as-
pects of Chinese Communist pol-
icy has been a sustained cam-
paign of hostility toward the
United States both at home and
abroad. The outbreak in Jan-
uary 1964 of the Panama Canal
crisis excited Peiping propagan-
da to new shrillness in pursuit
of this policy. Nationwide mass
rallies in support of.Panama re-
portedly involving more than 16
million people highlighted a
major campaign of vilification
carried on in the press and in
both domestic and international
radiobroadcasts.
The campaign, the most vitu-
perative since the 1958 Peiping
lambasting of American landings
in Lebanon, frankly seeks to use
events in Panama to demonstrate
that the United States is "the
most vicious enemy of the people
of all countries." This con-
stantly reiterated theme appears
most strikingly in Chinese Com-
munist press cartoons. Long
noted for the vulgarity, rude-
ness, and viciousness of their
anti-Americanism, they have dem-
onstrated fresh vehemence dur-
ing this most recent campaign.
Although Chinese party officials
privately conceded the poor taste
of a cartoon following President
Kennedy's assassination entitled
"Kennedy Bites the Dust," car-
toons published since then show
no greater refinement.
In line with Peiping's con-
viction that all American lead-
ers are equally malevolent rep-
resentatives of a single aggres-
sor clique, Chinese cartoonists
have merely substituted President
Johnson for President Kennedy as
the world's number-one bogey-
man.
Although the Chinese cannot
expect to capitalize for long on
events in Panama, they will
doubtless find other issues on
which they can malign the United
States in pursuit of their policy
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Walter Ulbricht's remarks
to the East German party's 3-7
February enlarged central com-
mittee plenum called largely to
discuss the economic situation
show that, despite the opposi-
tion of certain extremists, he
will continue to implement gen-
erally realistic economic poli-
cies, including such Soviet-ap-
proved devices as allowing greater
initiative in industrial man-
agement. The tenor of his speech
suggests that he is under pres-
sure both from hard-liners who
oppose the "new economic system"
and from more liberal party ele-
ments who want changes in the
political sphere as well.
Ulbricht made an extraor-
dinary effort to appear more
liberal. He attacked entrenched
bureaucrats and advocated some
degree of economic experimenta-
tion, defending his position in
terms of Lenin's method of making
a realistic appraisal of a sit-
uation and taking appropriate
steps.
Parts of his speech suggest
that he may even have been at-
tacked personally as a Stalinist
survival, probably by younger
party elements, for the regime's
economic difficulties. He ad-
mitted the use of harsh methods
but tried to excuse them on
grounds of postwar equipment
shortages and lack of economic
expertise--precisely the bases
for charges leveled at him by,
competent economic administra-
tors. In an evident attempt ,to
silence critics who assert that
the USSR forced East Germany to
institute de-Stalinization meas-
ures, Ulbricht alleged that the
East German party leadership,
"on the basis of its own analysis
of the situation," had corrected
the evil effects of Stalinism in
a relatively short time.
Although he displayed sen-
sitivity to charges that the new
economic approaches are capital-
istic in character, he called
attention to Western literature
on industrial management which
"contains many interesting and
useful points." His call for
honest appraisal of economic
problems was echoed by the younger,
technically trained economists
who appear to have dominated the
meeting.
Central committee secretary
Guenther Mittag, for example,
declared: "Available information
and documents are of no avail if
we do not, in the interests of
our cause, honestly assess our
own work and results achieved in
other countries, and if we hide
or belittle our own faults and
arrears." At the same time Werner
Jarowinsky, newly installed secre-
tary for trade and supply matters,
indicated that the regime would
make a greater effort to provide
consumer goods in the current
seven-year plan period.
where in the bloc.
The results of the party
plenum published to date suggest
that the regime at long last is
making a genuine effort to rid
itself of the Stalinist stigma--
but not of Ulbricht--and to deal
somewhat more honestly with the
population. The new trend cer-
tainly reflects developments in
the USSR. It may also indicate
that younger party elements be-
lieve that only in this manner
can East Germany become more
closely attuned to the liberal-
izing tendencies evident else-
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14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Pane 3
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The 1963 food output in
North Vietnam was far below
even the mediocre harvests of
1962, resulting in the fourth
straight year of severe agri-
cultural shortfalls. The scanty
harvests will require a further
tightening-of the already mar-
ginal North Vietnamese food ra-
tions--at least through the
spring harvest of 1964. Famine
conditions probably will not de-
velop, however, except possibly
in some isolated mountainous
areas of the country.
A combination of severe
drought and flooding caused sub-
stantial damage to spring and
fall crops in 1963. The impact
of adverse weather was height-
ened by the widespread agricul-
tural mismanagement which has
been a chronic problem under the
Communists. The 1964 outlook is
not yet clear, although weather
conditions late this winter ap-
pear to have been somewhat bet-
ter than last year.
The 1963 agricultural dif-
ficulties have already led to
ration cuts in at least some
have thus tar seen no evidence
that the food situation is des-
the past, small
Aerate. In
amounts part from routine purchases
abroad--havein crucial areas, and this has
reduced the impact of poor har-
There are as yet no in-
vests. cations that last year's agri-
di
difficulties resulted
cultural
in an extraordinary program of
food procurement abroad.
depressed by the repeated food
shortages. Continuation of mar-
ginal conditions into 1964 will
doubtless sap morale still fur-
ther. There does not appear to
be any prospect of serious pub-
lic unrest, however, nor does
the stability of the regime seem
threatened. More important from
Hanoi's standpoint is the likeli-
hood of a deepening of public
apathy and resentment toward gov-
ernment efforts to improve agri-
cultural production by sociali-
zation.
The regime is clearly con-
cerned over its persistent agri-
cultural setbacks. It has ini-
tiated a drive to increase 1964
agricultural output, with spe-
cial emphasis on better manage-
rial and control techniques. Re-
gime propaganda has indicated
that the "regular and extraordi-
nary" activities of the army--
presumably support of insurgency
in Laos and South Vietnam--now
require larger amounts of food.
The armed forces have been mildly
admonished to make more economi-
cal use of their food, and to
participate more wholeheartedly
in food production.
Current agricultural diffi-
culties probably will not have
a dampening effect on the aggres-
sive North Vietnamese foreign pol-
icy. Support of Communist forces
in Laos and South Vietnam at
present levels does not appear
to be a particularly heavy drain
on North Vietnam's economy. Hanoi
has in the past, moreover, demon-
strated its willingness and abil-
ity to commit very large slices
public and party morale in of its resources to prime political
North Vietnam has been sharply objectives SECRET
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SECRET `'p
Until a seven-day Communist
cease-fire began early this week,
an intensive level of Communist
activity had been sustained in
South Vietnam following the 30
January coup. This included a
marked step-up in terrorist bomb-
ings with American personnel as
prime targets.
The scale and boldness of
these recent Viet Conk; attacks,
coupled with an intensified rate
of harassing actions, sabotage,
and terrorist propaganda, seems
to have had an erosive effect
on popular and troop morale.
There have been numerous re-
ports of paramilitary posts and
strategic hamlets being overrun
or destroyed with little or no
resistance from defending forces,
and sometimes with their col-
laboration. There are signs
that much of the rural popula-
tion, uncertain of the reason
for the latest change in Saigon,
is apathetic and willing to
resist the Communists only if
government military protection
is immediately available.
A drop in Viet Cong armed
attacks is occurring with the
onset of South Vietnam's Tet,
or lunar new year period, for
which the Communists proclaimed
a "cease-fire" from 11 to 17
February. While they probably
feel they must honor an earlier
promise of a holiday respite
for their troops, the Viet Cong
may also hope to demonstrate
a capability to hasten or slow
the pace of the fighting at
their own whim.
Reports from several critical
provinces near Saigon suggest rel-
atively little progress by the
government--and, in some cases, set-
backs since the 1 November coup.
As a result of the second coup,
some province chiefs now appear
uncertain of their status and feel
that pacification programs must
await new directives. Some senior
officers appear to regard Maj. Gen.
Nguyen Khanh's takeover as merely
the substitution of one generals'
clique for another.
The government established
by Khanh on 8 February nonetheless
offers some prospect of firmer
leadership than its predecessor.
Khanh has assumed the post of
premier, and his cabinet is more
broadly representative of the
country's geographical regions,
religions, and leading political
parties. Khanh apparently hopes
this will result in the crystaliza-
tion of a two-party system, with
the government party emerging from
a unification of the rival Dai
Viet party factions now repre-
sented in the cabinet.
Khanh has persuaded the
popular chairman of the deposed
junta, Maj. Gen. Duong Van "Big"
Minh, to serve as nominal chief
of state. Minh told American
officials he agreed to cooperate.
in order to keep the armed forces
from fragmenting, but he has ap-
peared personally depressed and
could become a focal point for
potentially discontented elements
in the military.
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`"e SECRET `?'f
COMMUNIST PRESSURE RISES IN LAOS
Communist military pres-
sure is on the rise in widely
separated areas of Laos. While
Vientiane's immediate concern
remains the threat to Thakhek
in the central part of the coun-
try, Communist attacks in the
Plaine des Jarres area and a
troop build-up in Sam Neua Prov-
ince, farther north, point to
developing campaigns against
anti-Communist positions in
these regions also.
The strong force of sev-
eral Pathet Lao and North Viet-
namese battalions east of
Thakhek still shows no signs
of preparing for a direct
assault on the strategic Mekong
River town. However, small
units are reported to be moving
deeper into the lowlands to
the north and approaching within
a few miles of main Route 13. In the
Plaine des Jarres area rein-
forced Communist forces are
moving out from Xieng Khouang
town to assault ridge positions
from which government forces
have operated to virtually iso-
late that Communist-held pro-
vincial capital for many months.
The Pathet Lao contend
that they have been forced to
take countermeasures against
Lao Army provocations in "lib-
erated territory." Uncertainty
over Communist military inten-
tions is causing concern and
confusion in Vientiane. Premier
Souvanna is anxious to arrange
a suitable atmosphere for the
tripartite talks that had been
contemplated, and has called
on foreign representatives in
Laos to use whatever influence
they may have to restrain the
Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao,
while professing a strong desire
for talks, show no inclination
of withdrawing to previous posi-
tions as a precondition.
As an immediate step to
ease the military threat, Souvanna
is pushing for an International
Control Commission (ICC) investi-
gation of the recent fighting
in the Na Kay area northeast of
Thakhek. If the Pathet Lao con-
tinue to block such an investi-
gation, Souvanna wants at least
to establish an ICC presence
in that territory outside Thakhek
which is still in the hands of
neutralist and rightist forces.
The Lao Army reverses have
damaged General Phoumi's prestige.
To defend himself against crit-
icism within his own camp and
to bolster his arguments against
talks with the Pathet Lao, Phoumi
is exaggerating the seriousness
of the military situation, par-
ticularly the extent of North
Vietnamese involvement. He also
speaks of the need for "drastic
action," and has hinted of possible
"spontaneous" popular demon-
strations against the North
Vietnamese Embassy and Pathet
Lao mission in Vientiane. There
also is talk again of a right-
wing coup in Vientiane,-and
Souvanna seems increasingly con-
cerned for his personal safety.
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Malaysia: The conference
in Bang ook of Indonesian, Phil-
ippine, and Malaysian foreign
ministers ended on 10 February
without agreement on the with-
drawal of Indonesian guerrillas
from Malyasian territory. The
conferees endorsed the principle
of the cease-fire, but Malaysia
formally noted that the truce
could not be fully effective
until Indonesian forces with-
draw. President Sukarno told
the US ambassador in Djakarta
on 9 February that the guerril-
las would remain "in pockets in
the jungles" until some progress
is achieved in the political
arena.
The ministers agreed to
meet again in Bangkok, probably
within a month, before the pro-
posed summit meeting of heads
Yemen: Saudi Arabia and
Egypt may a moving gradually
toward an accommodation. despite
their differences, especially
over Yemen. Saudi Arabia has
offered to restore diplomatic
relations with Egypt if out-
standing problems are resolved.
Cairo has responded favorably
of government. The Borneo bor-
der area has become relatively
quiet, with neither side reporting
serious clashes or violations
of the cease-fire--to be super-
vised by Thai officials.
Following the ministerial
meeting, Malaysian Prime Minister
Rahman and Philippine President
Macapagal met in Cambodia to
settle their differences arising
from the formation of Malaysia.
Rahman reportedly did not press
for recognition at this time and
agreed to discuss the Philippine
claim to part of Sabah (North
Borneo)--the main issue blocking
normal diplomatic relations be-
tween these two countries. As a
first step, each country is also
prepared to establish a consulate
in the other's ca ital.
and indicated willingness to
send a delegation to Saudi Ara-
bia for talks.
Inside Yemen, royalist ac-
tivity south of Sana, the capital,
has picked up and is interfering
with traffic on the roads to the
town.
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The most serious clashes
since the establishment of a
cease-fire in late December
erupted throughout Cyprus this
past week and threaten to pro-
voke early Turkish intervention.
A running battle in the south
coast port city of Limassol has
produced 150 or more casualties.
In Nicosia, a dangerous
situation has developed over
the continued detention of four
Greek Cypriot intelligence serv-
ice personnel by Turkish Cyp-
riots who refuse to release them
until told of the whereabouts of
up to 180 Turks missing since
late December. Vice President
Kuchuk has publicly expressed
the view that the missing people
have been murdered.
Both men and women in the
Greek community are receiving
weapons training.
President Makarios in ne-
gotiations this week has re-
mained firmly opposed to the
revised British-American plan
for an international police
force. He continues to insist
on a UN role to provide protec-
tion against aggression from
Turkey. Proposals to expand
the British peace-keeping force
by bringing in troops from other
NATO countries continue to be
denounced in the Greek Cypriot
press and at public rallies.
A right-wing opponent of Makarios
has violently denounced the US
in a speech before some 600
Cypriots.
The well-organized Commu-
nist Party on Cyprus is exploit-
ing the present anti-Western
sentiment.
In Turkey, the government
is under increasing pressure to
exercise its right under the
1960 Treaty of Guarantee to in-
tervene unilaterally on Cyprus,
and will almost certainly do so
if the Turkish Cypriots send a
direct appeal.
In Greece, public concern
over Cyprus has increased, and
there have been further anti-
NATO demonstrations in Athens
and Thessaloniki. In the cam-
paign for the 16 February na-
tional elections, the small Com-
munist-front party has tried to
capitalize on the Cyprus issue.
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v SECRET `"e
President Nkrumah is mov-
ing rapidly to strengthen his
grip on Ghana and reshape it on
models found in Communist coun-
tries. While some such action
was implicit in the recent ma-
nipulated vote endorsing a one-
party state, he has also been
spurred on by continuing fear
for his personal security in
the wake of the abortive attempt
on his life last month. His
anxiety has been heightened by
recent rumors--apparently un-
founded--of an impending army
takeover. -
In a seeming effort to
distract public attention from
these rumors and to provide a
scapegoat, Nkrumah last week
turned on another intensive
anti-American propaganda cam-
paign through his Communist-
influenced Convention People's
Party (CPP). Concurrently he
deported four US faculty mem-
bers at the University of Ghana
for "subversive activities" and
reportedly ordered Ghanaian
officials to shun Americans.
The US Embassy in Accra noted
late last week that its contacts
with Ghanaians--both official
and nonofficial--had already
become more limited.
Behind all these moves lies
Nkrumah's deep conviction that
US "imperialists" are bent on
liquidating him. The increased
number of Soviet personnel re-
ported to be functioning now
within his heavily guarded resi-
dence suggests that he is relying
more and more on Moscow to
provide him even with physical
protection.
Nkrumah has cracked down
sharply on university students,
the bulk of whom have long been
critical of the regime's left-
ward drift. On 3 February the
leader of the independent-minded
Ghanaian student organization
was arrested. Two days later
it was announced that all gov-
ernment scholarships--on which
most university students depend
--will henceforth be reviewed
annually. A major requirement
for renewals is "good conduct,"
interpreted in the controlled
press as "close identification
with the spirit and objects of
the party."
Students reportedly were
seriously considering an early
gesture of defiance, but appear
to have been intimidated, for
the present at least, by a mas-
sive demonstration at the uni-
versity on 8 February in which
CPP toughs were assigned a prom-
inent role. There are some in-
dications that Western-oriented
civil servants may be Nkrumah's
next target.
follow.
Ghana's Parliament meets
next week to enact the constitu-
tional amendments approved in
the late January referendum. The
CPP will then legally assume its
"leading core" role and the Presi-
dent will have discretion to fire
at will top-echelon members of
the formerly independent judiciary.
Replacement of several British-
trained judges will probably soon
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yr vr.r
,Lake ;.i
Edward
LrxkeJ
Victoria
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
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i%w 1"0
SECRET
Incursions into Rwanda over
the last three months by Tutsi
tribal exiles living in Uganda,
Tanganyika, the Congo, and
Burundi have resulted in massive
bloody retaliation by Rwandan
authorities against Tutsis re-
maining in the country, and may
bring clashes between Rwanda
and Burundi. Conservative es-
timates put the Tutsi dead at
10,000.
The disturbances find their
genesis in the overthrow in
1959-60 of the centuries-old
Tutsi feudal kingdom in Rwanda,
then a Belgian trust territory.
The majority (85 percent) Hutu
tribe established anall-Hutu
republican regime under Presi-
dent Gregoire Kayibanda. The
deposed king, Mwami Kigeri V,
and 150,000 refugees fled into
neighboring countries. There
the Mwami and his followers,
under the banner of the Rwandan
National Union (UNAR), plot a
Tutsi return to power. Burundi
remains a Tutsi-dominated king-
dom although the Hutu majority
there have increasingly been
brought into the government.
Peiping is exploiting the
Tutsi cause.
Peiping and Burundi established
diplomatic relations in Decem-
ber and a Chinese embassy is
being set up in Usumbura.
Ever since Rwanda and
Burundi gained independence in
July 1962, Tutsis have conducted
sporadic forays into Rwanda.
Since late November UNAR agita-
tors have persuaded large num-
bers of refugees to join in a
massive "invasion." While as
many as 3,500 have formed up
for this purpose, only a few
small groups have actually
crossed the border. On two oc-
casions, authorities in Burundi
and the Congo thwarted Tutsi
attempts to invade Rwanda.
In late December, however,
one incursion advanced from
Burundi to within 13 miles of
the Rvandan capital, creating
considerable panic. The Rwandan
massacre of Tutsis followed.
Rwanda and Burundi have
charged each other with aggres-
sion and appealed to the United
Nations, and Rvanda has appealed
to fellow Afro-Malagasy Union
states and to the Organization
of African Unity. President
Kayibanda, convinced that
Burundi authorities are encour-
aging the Tutsis, threatens to
exterminate the 250,000 or so
who remain in Rwanda if the at-
tacks continue. Burundi's
charges that Kayibanda has al-
ready massacred 16,000-18,000
Tutsis do not seem greatly ex-
aggerated. Each side has
moved some of its small military
forces (some 1,500 each, count-
ing police) to the common bor-
der. Although each force is
under the general control of
Belgian training officers,
clashes may nevertheless result.
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SECRET
The political picture in
East Africa has clarified some-
what but, with the possible ex-
ception of Uganda, instability
is likely to remain the keynote
in each of the four countries
recently disturbed by mutiny
or revolt.
In Zanzibar, a month after
the coup, lines of power are
becoming discernible, although
the government's external orien-
tation is still hazy. The only
US official on the islands re-
ports that President Karume and
Foreign Minister Babu dominate
the regime. Pro-Communists
other than Babu reportedly
occupy secondary positions. The
entire civilian structure oper-
ates in the shadow of "Field
Marshal" Okello and his gun-
toting cohorts, who hold ultimate
power but have been generally
apolitical since the days im-
mediately after the coup.
The economy is said to be
at a complete standstill, and
this fact--coupled perhaps with
pressure from neutralists with-
in the regime--apparently is
tempering any inclination to
rely solely on Communist support.
Instead, the government seems
to be trying to establish the
broadest possible connections
abroad. Financial considera-
tions seem likely to remain an
important factor in Zanzibar's
foreign policy.
Unrest in Zanzibar, with
its communal bitterness and
evidence of outside involvement,
has aroused anxiety in Kenya.
In Prime Minister Kenyatta's
cabinet, long-standing personal
and political differences are
increasingly taking the form of
rivalry between Kikuyu and Luo
tribesmen. Luo leader Oginga
Odinga, a radical opportunist
with many financial ties to the
Communists, is trying to under-
mine Kenyatta, a Kikuyu. Ken-
yatta, who reportedly deprecates
the tribalism issue, neverthe-
less has come to rely on an
inner circle of advisers who
are nearly all Kikuyu. He is
reluctant to force a showdown
with Oginga, however, because
to do so would probably lead
to a period of extensive tribal
conflict.
In Tanganyika, President
Nyerere and Foreign Minister
Kambona apparently have shelved
their differences for the time
being. They will try to impose
penalties on the leaders of
January's mutiny that are stiff
enough to discourage further
attempts, but not so severe as
to cause serious political re-
percussions.
The brief mutiny of Ugandan
troops in late January and the
government's subsequent request
for British troops do not seem
to have affected Prime Minister
Obote's drive to set up a one-
party state and to concentrate
power in his own hands. Last
week he felt strong enough to
deliver a verbal attack on the
important Baganda tribal group
which is nominally allied with
his party in the legislature.
Obote has alienated many Ugan-
dans during this drive, but the
opposition, while vocal, seems
divided and lacking in positive
plans.
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STATUS OF THE MULTILATERAL FORCE DISCUSSIONS
An eight-nation working ful political reactions" in
group has made considerable prog- Italy. The embassy reports
ress in its initial examination that recent contacts with Ital-
how
of the political and military is-
sues involved in the establish-
ment of a NATO multilateral nu-
clear force (MLF). Several im-
portant questions remain unan-
swered, however, and political
problems within some participat-
ing countries make it uncertain
how the talks will now proceed.
The Italian cabinet would prob-
ably collapse if called on to
commit itself formally to the
project at this time, and the
British Government apparently
hopes to spin out the study phase
until after this year's general
elections.
The working group and its
military and legal subgroups
have examined the questions of
membership, juridical status,
organization, and financing of
the proposed force and its rela-
tionship to NATO. The delegates
have also broached the control
problem, which will probably be
one of the hardest to solve. The
working group did agree to set
up a mixed-manning demonstration,
but the participation of Greece
and Turkey may be affected by
the Cyprus dispute.
'rihile the MLF has thus main-
tained some momentum, considera-
tion of the next steps to be
taken has pointed up the formid-
able political obstacles. The
US Embassy in Rome has cautioned
that any strong inference that
the MLF has passed from the study
to the treaty-drafting stage
would likely result in `'unhelp-
n
ian Socialist leaders have s
stiffening opposition to an MLF
--centered on grounds that it
would lead to the nuclear arma-
ment of West Germany. Moreover,
the embassy feels that Socialist
objections would be reinforced
if West Germany were to become
the only major European power
in an MLF--contrary to the claim
of the West German ambassador
to NATO that Italy would not be
able to stay out if Bonn joins.
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Vftw JL+ Ut[r_Jl w
AREA NOTE
Italy: Recurrent nationwide measures. In all of the dis-
strikes in Italy involving about putes the two major non-Com-
1,250,000 unionists pose a direct munist labor confederations
threat to government efforts to have coordinated action with
fight inflation with austerity the Communist-dominated one.
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Western Hemisphere
A 24-hour general strike of
over a million government employees
on 5 February completely disrupted
a number of public utilities and
other services. The government
has offered to implement long-prom-
ised civil service reforms but
wants to spread the cost over a
three-year period to reduce the ef-
fects on its austerity program.
The union leaders rejected this
plan but did call off another
strike scheduled for 13-14 Febru-
ary and express some optimism
about a solution.
Other major strikes involv-
ing some 650,000 workers in the
chemical and textile industries
are under way or planned. Each
group is seeking a 20-percent in-
crease in wages.
THE CANAL CRISIS AND PANAMANIAN POLITICS
The hero's welcome staged for
OAS Ambassador Miguel Moreno when
he returned to Panama on 10 Febru-
ary enhanced his prospects as a
candidate in the forthcoming presi-
dential elections and overshadowed
the arrival of the OAS investigat-
ing committee the next day.
Moreno's intemperate presenta-
tion to the OAS of Panama's charges
of US aggression confirmed suspi-
cions that he would use this mis-
sion to further his presidential
ambitions.
These two groupings have been
divided thus far in support of two
lackluster candidates. If they
combine behind Moreno, the tradi-
tiona]. ruling group would have a
single candidate with sufficient
popular appeal, financial resources,
and governmental backing to defeat
Arnulfo Arias, whose chances for
election have been mounting. Some
Panamanians reportedly fear, how-
ever, that Moreno's rabid national-
ism might lead him to an accommoda-
tion with pro-Communist elements.
A scheduled 15 February rally
of the Communist-guided Committee
for the Rescue of National Sover-
eignty, which is being widely pub-
licized by news media, may be timed
to impress the OAS committee as
well as to maintain "popular" pres-
sure on the Chiari government to
stand fast on the canal dispute.
The minister of government recently
echoed extremist criticism of the
slowness of OAS procedures and
threats to resort to the UN when
he received student marchers at the
presidential palace. An editorial
in the newspaper owned by the Chiari
family subsequently asserted that
the time had come for "Panama to
abrogate the canal treaties unilat-
erally."
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Western Hemisphere
CUBA AND THE US NAVAL BASE
Castro's 6 February action
against the US Guantanamo Naval
Base water supply was apparently
intended to dramatize the whole
series of Cuban complaints
against the US. The 5 February
Cuban note to the UN Secretary
General pointed out that the
seizure of the four Cuban fish-
ing boats in US waters was just
one more incident in a US "pol-
icy of aggression." It bla-
tantly warned that this latest
episode, unless "urgently neu-
tralized in a proper manner,"
could lead to a situation simi-
lar to the 1962 missile crisis.
Statements by Cuban leaders
since 6 February have repeatedly
stressed that the naval base is-
sue is only one facet of the US
"policy of aggression" which
"should be discussed." Castro
himself specifically referred
to violations of Cuban air space
and territorial waters, alleged
US subversive activities in
Cuba, "pirate" raids against
Cuban targets, and US efforts
to isolate Cuba diplomatically
and economically from the non-
Communist world. This in ef-
fect reiterates the "Five Points"
Castro put forward in October
1962 as the requisites for peace
in the Caribbean area.
The Cubans are apparently
staking out their positions on
issues on which they may intend,
at a time of their own choosing,
to formally demand UN considera-
tion. Castro declared on 6 Feb-
ruary that "we are not proposing
a fight over the base," and Presi-
dent Dorticos repeated the next
day Cuba's long-standing posi-
tion that its claim to the base
territory will be formalized
"at such time as we consider
convenient... through interna-
tional channels and organs."
Although the evidence re-
mains circumstantial, there are
indications Havana may have de-
liberately touched off the lat-
est series of incidents to pro-
voke a US response. The fish-
ing boats acted provocatively
when they knew they were under
US Coast Guard surveillance on
2 February. Some of the crew-
men told US authorities they
had been ordered into US waters,
that they were advised before
leaving Havana of their "his-
toric" mission, and that, if
their boats were not molested
by US authorities, other ships
would be sent.
some military equip-
ment, including tanks and artil-
lery, have been. moved from Cuban
military encampments in eastern
Cuba.
While Soviet statements
suggest readiness to give Cas-
tro strong propaganda and diplo-
matic support for his present
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actions, Moscow probably will
seek to prevent his anti-US
agitation from inflicting seri-
ous damage on US-Soviet rela-
tions.
Reaction in Latin America
has been. moderate and generally
favorable toward the US. The
strongest support came from the
Central American governments
and the Dominican Republic.
However, official and public
opinion in some countries is op-
posed to an intensified US eco-
nomic offensive against Cuba.
The embassy in Mexico City
reported that even the leftist
press there did not react
strongly on the Guantanamo is-
sue and that Cuban-US develop-
ments were generally overshad-
owed by other events. A sub-
secretary of the Mexican For-
eign Ministry expressed the be-
lief that the fishing boat in-
cident was a deliberate effort
on Cuba's part to provoke a US
response which would provide a
pretext for cutting off the
Guantanamo water supply.
A Chilean Foreign Ministry
official. stated a similar view,
adding that the provocation was
designed to bring pressure for
revision of the Guantanamo treaty
while the atmosphere was clouded
by the events in Panama. On the
other hand, he was "noncommittal"
on the need. for increased eco-
nomic pressure on Cuba. Noting
the continued trade between
Cuba and various European coun-
tries, he stated that the US
economic offensive against the
Castro regime is not proving
successful. Colombian and Costa
Rican officials had similar
opinions on the effectiveness
of the US economic campaign.
The Argentine press
stressed US efforts to become
self-sufficient in water at
the naval base. The press in
Brazil emphasized other aspects
of the problem, such as the de-
fection of US citizen Dennis
Kirby, but no adverse editorial
reaction was evident in Brazil-
ian radio or newspaper accounts.
Foreign Ministry spokes-
men in Nicaragua, Honduras,. El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti
expressed solid support for the
US. Most of them asserted that
Castro will continue his "ag-
gressive course of action" in
the hemisphere and that the US
policy toward Cuba "must remain
firm." Some criticized those
US allies whose pursuit of trade
is "overcoming their interest
in an anti-Castro alignment."
The Dominican regime,
possibly attempting in part
to ingratiate itself with Wash-
ington, gave the most categor-
ical support to the US of all
the governments in the hemis-
phere. The president of the
ruling junta said the Domini-
can Republic was willing to
provide all assistance "with-
in its capabilities" for any
action Washington wished to
take against Castro. He spe-
cifically offered to supply
water, equipment, manpower,
transportation, and "bases."
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Western Hemisphere
Mexican President Adolfo
Lopez Mateos will meet with
President Johnson in California
on 21 and 22 February in the
first of a series of talks Lopez
has planned with other heads
of state before his term ends
this December. Gustavo Diaz
Ordaz, who as presidential can-
didate of the ruling, semioffi-
cial party is Lopez' certain
successor, is likely to retain
the main lines of his foreign
policies. These include a cor-
dial but "independent" relation-
ship with the US, a tendency
to expand contacts with the
bloc, and refusal to cooperate
on any strong hemispheric action
against Cuba.
The settlement late last
year of the long-pending Chami-
zal territorial dispute leaves
US-Mexican relations relatively
free of serious difficulties at
present. However, one poten-
tially grave problem is that
raised by US water conservation
policies in southwestern Arizona
which have caused adverse effects
in the Mexicali valley, an impor-
tant agricultural area in north-
western Mexico. The Lopez gov-
ernment has long been pressing
the US to take measures to re-
duce the excessive salinity of
Colorado River water of US ori-
gin which is used in irrigating
the Mexicali valley. Mexico al-
so charges that the projected
drilling of 200 deep wells near
the Mexican border will dry up
the Mexicali underground water
supply. Mexican authorities
in the area regard the latter
issue as potentially the more
harmful to US-Mexican relations.
Communists, who perhaps are more
numerous and politically influen-
tial in the valley than in most
other regions of Mexico, are ex-
ploiting both problems.
Mexico's dealings with Com-
munist China are at present an-
other important aspect of Lopez'
foreign policy. Mexico recently
has taken several steps--includ-
ing greater sales of agricultural
products--which will increase
commercial and cultural contacts.
The government reportedly will
permit Chinese Communist press
representatives--in Mexico since
last July--to remain at least
six months longer and authorize
Peiping to establish a permanent
five-man trade delegation. More-
over, increasing speculation F_
that Mexico will grant
ip oma is recognition to Commu-
nist China will probably be even
more pronounced during and fol-
lowing the scheduled 16-19 March
visit to Mexico of French Presi-
dent de Gaulle. Recognition of
Peiping would not be out of line
with Mexico's eagerness to demon-
strate its "freedom" from US in-
fluence and might possibly be
inspired in part by a need to
placate the ruling party's ex-
treme leftist wing.
Mexico's relations with
other Latin American countries
continue to be dominated by rigid
adherence to the tradition of
"nonintervention." The Lopez
government, which maintains dip-
lomatic relations with Cuba, will
probably oppose any move in the
OAS to censure Cuba for its clan-
destine delivery of arms to Vene-
zuelan rebels last year. However,
Mexico continues quietly to imple-
ment measures to reduce travel to
and from Cuba by way of Mexico.
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SECRET
Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE LABOR PROTEST
The Argentine General Con-
federation of Labor (CGT) has
launched the first stage of a
militant plan to force govern-
ment action on its extensive
economic and political demands.
These tactics could lead to vio-
lence and compound President
Illia's economic problems.
The CGT gave the Illia
administration, which took of-
fice last October, three months'
grace before beginning its sharp
criticism of government inaction
on labor's problems. Heading
its complaints are unemployment
and the decline in real wages
accompanying the economic
recession of the past two years.
Living costs rose 27.6 percent
during 1963, accelerating during
the last quarter and into 1964.
Unemployment amounts to some
10 percent of the labor force,
but both unemployment and under-
employment are proportionately
more severe in the industrial
sector, the stronghold of the
CGT.
In addition to economic
demands, such as a minimum wage
law, price control, and steps
to reduce unemployment, the
CGT is pressing several politi-
cal issues. These include re-
peal of "repressive legisla-
tion"--that is, current bans
on Communist and Peronist ac-
tivity--and a "generous and
effective amnesty." Several
Peronist labor leaders are still
under detention for crimes not
included in the political amnesty
last year.
The first stage of the
three-stage plan calls for ex-
tensive publicity and organiza-
tional activity to prepare for
the more aggressive strike ac-
tion to follow. The second
stage, scheduled for the period
1-25 March, provides for the
"partial occupation" of fac-
tories and business establish-
ments throughout the country.
The third stage is to be "com-
plete occupation" of these facil-
ities for a period of 24 hours
sometime between 25 and 31 March,
and is to be carried out if the
government does not act on the
CGT demands.
The government's failure
to make a formal reply to the
CGT's petition presented in
early December has increased
pressure on the confederation's
leadership to assume a more
aggressive stand. The relatively
moderate leaders now in control
of the CGT fear that their posi-
tion will be undermined by the
agitation of extremist elements.
They hope that the government
will respond to some of their
demands in order to preclude
carrying out the second- and
third-stage plans and thereby
giving the extremists a pre-
text for provoking violence.
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Western Hemisphere
Bolivia: Vice President Juan
Lechin's decision of 6 February to
challenge President Paz in Bolivia's
June elections seems likely to mark
the beginning of a prolonged period
of mounting tension and sporadic
violence. This move is the most
serious break in the unity of the
ruling Nationalist Revolutionary
Movement (MNR) since it came to
power in 1952. Both the Lechin
and Paz factions have substantial
paramilitary forces which are rel-
atively undisciplined.
Lechin's pro-Communist sup-
porters in the left sector of the
MNR will hold a convention begin-
ing on 2 March. They will decide
at that time whether to seek the
backing of other opposition polit-
ical parties of Communist and non-
Communist orientation in an elec-
British Guiana: The 1-9 Feb-
ruary freedom march organized by
British Guiana's ruling People's
Progressive Party (PPP) took place
without serious incidents despite
advance reports that the PPP was
spoiling for trouble. The turnout
of only 7,000-8,000 PPP supporters
at the final rally in the capital
was characterized by the US consul
general as "unimpressive."
In his address to the rally,
Premier Cheddi Jagan called for
a merger of the PPP and the oppo-
sition People's National Congress
(PNC`, attacked British and US
"imi. :ialism," and declared "open
season" on the conservative United
Force party. The consul general
interpreted the speech as a tacit
instruction to the party faithful
to refrain from provocations pend-
toral front. The Bolivian Commu-
nist Party has already announced
its support of the Lechinists.
The MNR may be faced with ad-
ditional defections which could
cloud the electoral outlook.\,
ing discussions Jagan hopes to ar-
range with the PNC and the media-
tion efforts of a Ghanaian mission
.which arrived this week.
Aside from Jagan's apparent
desire not to foreclose these pos-
sibilities for some solution of the
colony's crucial racial and polit-
ical tensions--which continue to
block elections leading toward in-
dependence--the largely peaceful
character of the march may also be
attributable to the precautionary
measures taken by the police and by
the British troops. Moreover, the
opposition parties advised their
members to keep off the streets and
avoid trouble.
SECRET
14 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3
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SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300120001-3