WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004200110001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
Referral
Review by
NGA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Do Hal o Roy
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automot25X6
downgrading and declassification
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C O N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200 EST, 14 November 1963)
OLD-LINE COMMUNIST REMOVED FROM HAVANA UNIVERSITY POST
Increasing pressures confronting the regime at home
and abroad may lead Castro to replace other offi-
cials he does not trust, although there is no other
evidence at this time of any impending purge.
CASTRO SNUBS SOVIET ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS
In its efforts to avoid anything smacking of favor-
itism toward either Moscow or Peiping, the Castro
regime reacted to the Soviet national holiday with
a calculated perfunctoriness.
USSR DISPLAYS NEW SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE 4
The large missiles shown publicly for the first t9.me
on 7 November are probably antimissile missiles as
Soviet spokesmen have claimed.
USSR CONTINUES TO CLAIM AUTHORITY OVER BERLIN ACCESS 5
Gromyko's assertion that existing autobahn proce-
dures are based on Soviet-Western agreements in the
early postwar period may be groundwork for seeking
a four-power review of the access question.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
PEIPING'S INITIATIVES TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE
Recently concluded trade contracts and increased po-
litical activity in Western Europe suggest that the
Chinese Communists are trying to end their isolation
and reduce their vulnerability to Soviet pressures.
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Many plans of the new military rulers appear still
in a formative stage, but preliminary steps have
been taken. Viet Cong activity has intensified.
SOUVANNA'S RETURN TO LAOS COINCIDES WITH NEW FIGHTING 11
He is trying to revive the faltering coalition gov-
ernment at a time when fighting is increasing around
the Plaine des Jarres. His talks in Moscow showed
that the USSR remains unwilling to press the Pathet
Lao or their North Vietnamese mentors to adopt a
more cooperative attitude toward the Geneva accords.
SOVIET CULTIVATION OF IRANIAN FRIENDSHIP 13
The forthcoming visit of Soviet President Brezhnev
to Iran is the latest gesture in the USSR's 16-month
campaign to improve relations between the two states.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
NEW UPHEAVALS IN IRAQ
A long-simmering dispute between extremist and mod-
erate factions of the ruling Baath Party broke out
into open conflict this week.
AREA NOTE 15
On Morocco and Algeria.
NATO MEETING TO DISCUSS WESTERN TRADE WITH BLOC
The attraction of new markets in the bloc could
lead some NATO members to overlook the economic
and political ramifications of bloc trade and
could create new frictions within the alliance.
SPAIN STRIVING TO INCREASE TRADE WITH CUBA
It is unlikely, moreover, to discontinue its exten-
sive sea and air communications with Cuba, although
it did offer to "consider sympathetically" a US re-
quest that it halt specific strategic exports.
ITALIAN PREMIER-DESIGNATE BEGINS CABINET TALKS
Christian Democrat Moro now has formally launched
the formidable task of bringing the Socialists in-
to a new center-left government.
AREA_NOTF,S
CONTROVERSY OVER ARGENTINE OIL CONTRACTS
President Illia intends to carry out his campaign
promise to annul contracts--which his party consid-
ers illegal--made with US and other foreign compa-
nies during the Frondizi administration.
AREA NOTES 21
On Latin American Communist Youth; and Surinam
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OLD-LINE COMMUNIST REMOVED FROM HAVANA UNIVERSITY POST
Juan Marinello, rector of
Havana University and a long-
time leader of the prerevolu-
tionary Cuban Communist Party
(PSP), was recently removed
from his post and appointed
ambassador to UNESCO headquarters
in Paris. Juan Mier Febles,
deputy minister for higher edu-
cation, has been named provi-
sional rector. Mier, like his
predecessor, has a long history
of PSP activities.
There is at
present no information that
Marinello's removal presages
a purge of other old-line Com-
munists, although the increas-
ing pressures confronting the
regime at home and abroad may
well cause Castro to replace
other officials whom he does
not fully trust.
Marinello resigned after leaders
of the University Students'
Federation (FEU) "continuously
flouted the authority of the
rector, referring to his ac-
tions as those of an old Com-
munist who 'stood contrary'
at a time when fighting was in
progress for the victory of
the revolution." Marinello is
known to have aroused student
ire for defending the Soviet
strategic missile withdrawal
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15 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
last year when Castro himself
was bitterly resentful over
the Soviet move.
Marinello, who is 65 years
old and in poor health, was
the first Communist in Latin
America to hold a cabinet post--
he was minister without port-
folio in the 1940-44 Batista
regime. Marinello's political
fortunes waned after the PSP
was outlawed in 1953 and he
was forced to spend the greater
part of the late 1950s in
hiding. Like many of his Cuban
Communist colleagues, Marinello
was caught off balance by Fidel
Castro's victory in 1959. Two
years earlier he had written
in a Mexican newspaper that
Castro's guerrilla methods
"were neither appropriate nor
effective in bringing the
Batista tyranny to an end."
Nevertheless, the revolutionary
government reinstated Marinello
in a teaching post at the uni-
versity. In January 1962 he
was named rector. During the
past few years he has made
frequent trips to bloc coun-
tries as a spokesman for Cuban
cultural and educational insti-
tutions.
On 9 November Havana
Radio, in a somewhat cryptic
announcement, reported that
"bearing in mind the need to
appoint an ambassador... at the
main headquarters of UNESCO
in Paris, and considering the
qualities of Juan Marinello,
he has been appointed to that
high post and thus relieved
of his functions as rector of
the University of Havana."
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A calculated coolness
marked the Cuban performance
on the 46th anniversary of the
October Revolution as the Cas-
tro regime sought to avoid any-
thing smacking of favoritism
toward either Moscow or Pei-
ping.
No ranking member of the
regime was present at the Melia
Theatre in Havana on 6 Novem-
ber to hear Soviet Ambassador
Alekseyev extol his country
and pledge the USSR's assist-
ance in the event of a new
crisis. Significantly, Alek-
seyev felt constrained to cau-
tion his listeners against
heeding those who cast doubt on
the "sincerity of the Soviet
Union toward Cuba." Communica-
tions Minister Faure Chomon's
reply was a standard recital
of the USSR's technological
and economic prowess, ending
with the promise that "Cuba
will support other nations in
turn in the way that the Soviet
Union supported Cuba."
"Che" Guevara, Bias Roca,
Foreign Minister Raul Roa,
Manuel Luzardo, and Emilio
Aragones led the Cubans pres-
ent at the Soviet Embassy re-
ception the following night.
However, Fidel Castro--who
failed to attend the Chinese
Communist anniversary in Octo-
ber--was conspicuous by his
absence, as was his brother
Raul. A regime spokesman an-
nounced in midafternoon that
Fidel had left Havana for a
tour of the provinces. Presi-
dent Dorticos, who three days
later received a Chinese dele-
gation, was said to be "indis-
posed."
Havana egregiously flouted
bloc custom by waiting until
9 November to release a con-
gratulatory telegram from Cas-
tro and Dorticos to the Soviet
leaders--and perhaps to send
the wire to Moscow, as well.
The Cuban message failed to
single out Khrushchev for
special praise and, unlike other
bloc telegrams, omitted any
reference to "peaceful coexist-
ence" and the nuclear test ban
treaty. As of 12 November the
Moscow press had ignored Cas-
tro's telegram.
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NEW SOVIET SURFACE -TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM)
PHOTOGRAPHIC REVIEW OF PROBABLE ANTIMISSILE MISSILES
DISPLAYED IN MOSCOW PARADE ON 7 NOVEMBER 1963.
25X1
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Detail of sustainer/warhead stage and
positioning of fins.
Three were shown in parade, one held in
reserve. They are larger than the 39' long
SA-1; or the 35' long SA-2.
TRACTOR
VERSION
SOVIET MAZ-502
BOOSTER STAGE
(APPROX. 14')
AR D -STAGE (APPROX. 38')
IN
(APPROX. 6 ' LO
Dimensions and Components
Detail of booster stage
Rear view. Some of the new missiles had been
seen under canvas by Western attaches during
parade rehersals on 22 and 26 October.
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USSR DISPLAYS NEW SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE
The large surface-to-air
missiles shown publicly for the
first time in the 7 November Mos-
cow parade probably are antimis-
sile missiles as Soviet spokesmen
have claimed. They appear to be
compatible with the project under
construction at Leningrad which
is believedto be an anti-ballistic-
missile system. Preliminary
analysis suggests that they have
high-altitude, controlled-inter-
cept capabilities suitable for an
antimissile role. They may also
be intended for use against air-
craft.
Photographs taken on 7 No-
vember show a two-stage vehicle
about 52 fee- long which may have
a gross take-off weight of around
20,000 pounds. The first or
booster stage is approximately 14
feet long and and 3 feet in diame-
ter. The booster, probably solid
propelled, is equipped with four
stabilizer fins measuring about
15 feet from tip to tip. A sec-
ond or sustainer stage, probably
liquid propelled, measures about
38 feet from the tip of the probe
in the nose to the end of the
nozzle skirt in the rear. The
diameter of this stage is about
32 inches. Two sets of fins--
one large set of stabilizers with
a span of about 11 feet and a
smaller set of control fins with
a span of about 7 feet--are at-
tached to the second stage.
Analysis to determine the
operational performance of the
new missile is not yet complete.
It would probably be fired from
a vertical or near-vertical posi-
tion and appears to be designed
to engage targets at high altitudes
within the atmosp_iere.
There is no evidence that
h missiles are operationally
SA-](GUILD) SAMs at left; SA-2 (GUIDELINE): SAM in
foreground; new missiles at top and right.
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The Communist World
USSR CONTINUES TO CLAIM AUTHORITY OVER BERLIN ACCESS
The USSR is continuing its
efforts to document the claim
that US military convoys on the
Berlin autobahn have violated
"established procedures." It
contends that these practices
have their basis in certain
agreements reached immediately
after World War II.
On 7 November, in discussing
the autobahn incidents, Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko told
Ambassador Kohler and UK Am-
bassador Trevelyan that an
agreement had been concluded
between Soviet and Western
military representatives in
1945 which specified that military
authorities should establish
access procedures. He asserted
that this agreement and a com-
munication sent in 1958 by the
Soviet military commander in
East Germany to his US counter-
part were "the basis of estab-
lished practices respecting
autobahn traffic."
Moscow's immediate purpose
in setting forth these claims
probably is to establish its
right to a voice in determining
access procedures prior to making
a bid for new negotiations on
this issue.
In his remarks to the two
Western ambassadors, Gromyko
implied that a formal statement
from the Soviet Government on
the question of access would be
forthcoming. The USSR may have
decided to avoid further harass-
ment of Allied convoys at least
until. it has presented the West-
ern governments with such a
statement. On 12 November, a
US convoy which fell within the
Soviet--but not the Western--
criteria for dismounting trans-
ited the autobahn without a
formal challenge.
In alluding to the 1945
agreement on the access question,
Gromyko apparently was referring
to a conference of US, UK,
and Soviet military representa-
tives held in Berlin on 29 June
1945. At this meeting, a number
of decisions were made regarding'
the practical implementation
of the four-power occupation
of Berlin. General arrangements
were agreed upon for the use by
the Western powers of specific
roads, air corridors, and rail
lines in exercising their right
of access to Berlin, but the
agreement was never formally
adopted by the four powers.
According to a US memorandum of
the conversation, General Clay
asked Marshal Zhukov "only for
the right to move without re-
striction under whatever Russian
regulations are set down."
Zhukov later replied that it
would be "necessary for vehicles
to be governed by Russian road
signs, military police, document
checking, but no inspection of
cargo...."
Gromyko's second reference
appears to be a letter sent by
General Zakharov on 17 July 1958'
to the US commanding general in
Europe in response to a Western
statement on procedures in con-
veying movement orders of Allied
convoys. Zakharov accepted the
proposals but reserved the right
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to inspect individual covered
vehicles. On 29 July 1958,
Zakharov contended that the
USSR, retained this right in
accordance with the 1945 agree-
ment "which confers responsibil-
ity for control of traffic ex-
clusively to the Soviet side."
In asserting a right to
control Allied military traffic,
Moscow may be laying the ground-
work for calling for a major
four-power review of the whole
access question. Soviet leaders
may, for example, revive the
proposal they made last year
for an international access
authority. Soviet diplomats
have recently hinted privately
that the USSR may be prepared
to negotiate a new access
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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After nearly three years
of cautious exploration, Pei-
ping has started to place firm
orders with industrial suppli-
ers in Western Europe. This
trade initiative has been ac-
companied by an increase in
political activity which sug-
gests that the Chinese are mov-
ing tentatively toward a new
policy designed to end China's
isolation and make it less vul-
nerable to economic and polit-
ical pressure from Moscow.
The number of Western trade
representatives visiting China
has increased sharply during
the past few months. These
groups have received a cordial
reception and have closed deals--
including contracts for a com-
plete fertilizer plant from the
Netherlands and a synthetic am-
monia plant from the UK--total-
ing about $20 million.
These contracts mark a rad-
ical departure from established
Chinese practice in that they
call both for British and Dutch
technicians to assist with the
construction of the fertilizer
complex and for Chinese trainees
to go outside the bloc for study.
The Chinese have long regarded
foreigners as potential spies
and feared that trainees sent
abroad would defect. By arrang-
ing for technical assistance
from a number of foreign sources,
Peiping probably hopes to avoid
a repetition of the blow it
received in 1960 when Moscow
suddenly pulled out all Soviet
advisers.
China has limped along
with virtually no plant and
machinery imports for the past
two years, a circumstance which,
taken together with Peiping's
relatively tight foreign ex-
change position, adds signifi-
cance to the small transaction
completed so far in Western
Europe. Peiping may view these
contracts as test cases, to be
followed by major orders for
other industrial equipment if
all goes well.
Continued Western eager-
ness to tap the China market
and Chinese receptivity to such
efforts are indicated by the
level of commercial activity
during the past two months.
Several UK firms recently held
an industrial exhibit in Pei-
ping, while representatives of
the "48-group"--British firms
long involved in the China
trade--and other UK trade rep-
resentatives visited China
during September and October.
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Chinese Communist Representation in Europe
* Embassy
O Consulate
^ New China News Agency
Trade office, 1 or more
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The French have shown a
high degree of interest, and
several missions from Paris
are visiting Peiping this fall.
A private economic delegation
of businessmen led by Georges-
Picot had tacit governmental
approval and came away from
China in early October impressed
by Chinese friendliness and ef-
ficiency, and hopeful concerning
the possibilities for increased
trade. Swedish and Dutch trade
groups have also traveled to
China recently.
Peiping's political efforts
in Europe have thus far been
concentrated on developing pro-
Chinese elements and factions
inside local Communist parties.
The Chinese have been active in
France, Italy, Switzerland, and
the Netherlands,
The greatest Chinese polit-
ical success thus far has been
in Belgium, where Jacques Grippa's
radical Brussels Federation of
the Belgian Party split with
the pro-Moscow leadership in
Peiping has also mounted
a broader campaign aimed at the
Belgian public and government.
The Chinese established an of-
fice of their New China News
Agency in Brussels in March
and are supporting a Belgium-
China Friendship Association.
During 1963 four Chinese dele-
gations have visited Brussels,
a marked contrast with last
year, when no Chinese groups
came to Belgium.
These activities in Belgium
have been accompanied by gestures
of friendship toward France and
Sweden. Former French Premier
Edgar Faure received an unusu-
ally warm welcome from top-level
officials in Peiping last month.
In September the Chinese sent a
military delegation to Sweden
headed by the second-ranking
officer of the Chinese Army--
the highest level military dele-
gation ever sent outside the
bloc--to return an earlier cour-
25X1
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tesy visit b a Swedish military
group.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
South Vietnam's new mili-
tary rulers are turning their
attention to their avowed pro-
gram of reforms, although many
of their plans appear still in
the formative stage and some
groping is evident.
The new regime apparently
intends to revamp the strategic
hamlet program, but it has not
made clear how this is to be
done. While declaring that the
theory of the program is good,
various military leaders have
criticized its implementation,
particularly the use of forced
labor and the indoctrination of
hamlet inhabitants in the Diem
regime's obscure "personalist"
philosophy.
Premier Tho has indicated
that he and coup leader General
"Big" Minh hope to enlist the
support of the once-powerful
politico-religious sects, whose
independent armed strength was
largely crushed by Diem in 1955,
in a "revitalization" of strate-
gic hamlets in the delta prov-
inces.
The regime meanwhile
is proceeding with new military
appointments, including the re-
placement of a large number of
province chiefs appointed under
Diem. It is also making some
efforts to channel student po-
litical energies into a national
organization which would engage
in social welfare work with
peasant and labor-class youths.
The regime has endorsed the
idea of a student "peace corps"
to operate in strategic hamlets.
Various nongovernmental
civilian leaders, including
Bonze Tri Quang, the leading
Buddhist critic of the former
regime, are reserving judgment
on the new government and with-
holding any strong endorsement.
Labor leader Tran Quoc Buu, who
was temporarily detained last
week, has expressed some mis-
givings and regards Tho as a
weakling and an opportunist.
Former opposition politi-
cians, including those return-
ing from prison or exile abroad,
are apparently moving cautiously
toward political organization,
seeking to determine what limits
the regime has set for political
activity. Some groups which
lent support to the coup, re-
portedly including junior offi-
cers, apparently feel that the
generals have usurped the fruits
of victory. These groups are
also concerned over the emer-
gence of factions among the
generals, who are said to be
separating into pro-French and
pro-US cliques.
.Virtually all military
units brought into Saigon for
the coup have returned to normal
duty stations. Government forces
are reacting aggressively to
Viet Cong activity, which has
intensified since the coup. Com-
munist attacks in the first week
of November numbered 165--a high
for 1963. So far this month
there have been two battalion-
and six company-size Viet Cong
attacks, as compared with eight
in company strength in October.
Except for the surrender of some
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villagers in central Vietnam who
believed Viet Cong propaganda
that the Communists had taken
over in Saigon, this military
activity and Viet Cong exhorta-
tions have had little signifi-
cant success.
ation Front" organization.
the Viet Cong or offer the
southerners an attractive alter-
native to the Communist "Liber-
Communist propaganda in
Vietnam has repeatedly forecast
that the new government will soon
fall into jealous bickering and
power struggles. This line is
probably intended to counter
any notion that the new regime
may prove an effective foe of
Premier Souvanna Phouma,
back in Laos after two months
abroad, is trying to revive his
faltering government coalition
of rightists, neutralists, and
the pro-Communist Pathet Lao.
His effort is threatened, how-
ever, by a renewal of fighting
between the three factions' mili-
tary forces, and his talks in
Moscow this month reflected no
major change over the past half-
year in the Soviet leaders' at-
titude toward Laos. They con-
tinue to give verbal support to
the 1962 Geneva accords and to
the coalition government, but
remain unwilling to exert any
effective pressure on the Pathet
Lao or their North Vietnamese
mentors to cooperate in imple-
menting the accords.
Soviet policy in Laos-ap-
pears to be motivated by two
main factors--a desire to avert
a renewal of large-scale mili-
tary action which might embroil
the USSR in another confrontation
with the US, and a wish to avoid
having to take positions on Lao-
tian developments which might
further alienate Hanoi at this
juncture in the Sino-Soviet con-
flict. Soviet freedom of maneuver
has been diminished by the ap-
parent increase in the influence
of pro-Chinese militants in the
North Vietnamese party and by
Hanoi's public support in recent
months of Peiping's major posi-
tions.
Since the outbreak of fight-
ing in the Plaine des Jarres
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uang Prabang
Let Houang
Nang Het
Vang Vieng
Pak Sane
d ,.' Road
VIENTIANE Track ortral
tNang Khai
{ Muong Khao
4
Ban Ban
PLATE./U DU
N NINH Nong pet
Phou Keng ? Kite g Khay
Muong Phanh. P we hong Savan
DES ARRES
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last spring and the abortive Sino-
Soviet talks in July, the USSR has
displayed increasing reluctance
to undertake any positive diplo-
matic,action with respect to Laos.
Soviet spokesmen have asserted
that they are both unwilling and
unable to influence Laotian events
and that, in any case, it is up
to the three Laotian factions to
resolve their own problems. Most
cow has rebuffed all Western re-
quests for Soviet efforts to in-
duce Hanoi to withdraw its cadres
and technicians from Laos and to
persuade the Pathet Lao and the
Polish members of the Interna-
tional Control Commission (ICC)
to cease obstructing ICC activi-
ties.
Souvanna has indicated that
he does not expect to receive
significant Soviet military assist-
ance. In response to his request
for spare parts for unserviceable
Soviet transport aircraft provided
by the Russians in December:1962,
Khrushchev contended that such
parts are no longer available.
The Russians were also evasive re-
garding Souvanna's request for
new aircraft.
Although the Russians will be
careful to avoid any moves that
might antagonize Hanoi or provide
additional propaganda ammunition
for the Chinese, they probably will
continue to make gestures from
time to time to symbolize their
formal support for the coalition
government. Souvanna, for example,
claims that Khrushchev agreed to
halt the flow of Soviet arms
through Hanoi to the Pathet Lao,
although it would be virtually im-
possible to verify- the fulfill-
ment of this "promise." The Rus-
sians,moreover, reportedly agreed
to support Souvanna's plan to de-
militarize the royal capital of
Luang Prabang with a view to :fa-
&iiitating.renewiparticipation
by Pathet Lao ministers in the
coalition government.
Since his return, Souvanna
has asked Pathet Lao cabinet minis-
ter Phoumi Vongvichit to come to
Vientiane for talks. Souvanna
has also authorized a meeting--
now tentatively scheduled for
16 November on the Plaine des
Jarres--between neutralist command-
er.- Kong Le and the Pathet Lao
military leader, Singkapo, to
discuss a possible cease-fire..
These political moves coin-
cide with new fighting around the
Plaine des Jarres. Neutralist
and right-wing troops on 7 No-
vember began a., limited:"6ffensiv-boto
clear Communist forces from ke
positions near the plain.
The right-wing and neutralist 25X1
initiative followed Pathet Lao at-
tacks against Meo positions along
Route 7, the key artery for the Com-
munist supply build-up in the Plaine
des Jarres region. Several key Meo
posts have fallen to the enemy dur-
ing the past three weeks, and others
are under heavy pressure.
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SOVIET CULTIVATION OF IRANIAN FRIENDSHIP
The forthcoming visit of
Soviet President Brezhnev to
Iran is the latest gesture in
the USSR's 16-month campaign
to improve relations between
the two countries. The visit,
due to begin on 17 November,
will follow an increase in
cultural exchanges, favorable
Soviet propaganda treatment of
the Shah's land reform program,
and the recent extension of a
Soviet credit to Iran. These
earlier efforts have been effec-
tive and Moscow will probably
continue cautious probes of
Iranian susceptibility to fur-
ther blandishments.
Soviet representatives have
recently revived the possibility
of assistance for an Iranian
steel mill, playing on the Shah's
strong desire for such a proj-
ect and Western reluctance to
finance it. There is also a
report that Soviet officials
in Meshed, near the Soviet bor-
der, have offered to provide
electrification to that city
free of charge.
Iran and the USSR, will provide
irrigation water and hydroelec-
tric power to be divided equally
between the two countries. To
finance Iranian construction
costs, Moscow extended a $38.8-
million credit at 3.6-percent
interest to be repaid by Ira-
nian exports of agricultural
products, principally dried
fruits.
The pattern of Soviet ac-
tivity in Iran indicates, how-
ever, that Moscow still regards
Iran as firmly tied to the US,
and thus it is unlikely that the
Brezhnev visit will result in
any major offers of aid. While
the USSR might propose to make
feasibility studies for a steel
mill, Moscow probably would
not undertake this or any other
large-scale project without a
reorientation of Iran's politi-
cal structure which would make
that country more amenable to
rendering a political quid pro
quo for economic aid.
In the meantime, the USSR
will seek further gradual improve-
An economic and technical
cooperation agreement signed on
27 July provides for the con-
struction of a dam on the Aras
River, construction of eleven
grain silos, and the development
of Caspian Sea fish hatcheries.
The dam, on the border between
ment of relations and expansion
of contacts by attempting to ne-
gotiate such matters as mutual
air and landing rights for sched-
uled commercial aircraft and the
specifics of the transit agree-
ment signed in 1957 but not rati-
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Iraq entered a new period
of turmoil this week when a
long-simmering dispute between
factions within the ruling
Baath Party broke into open con-
flict in Baghdad. Neither fac-
tion has yet been able to gain
a clear-cut victory, and, regard-
less of any temporary rapproche-
ment, rumblings within the
party are likely to continue
for some time. The result is
to weaken the Baath's prestige,
unity, and grip on the levers of
power in Iraq.
For some time, the extrem-
ist` policies of Iraqi Baath
leader Saadi, who organized the
party while it was being per-
secuted by former premier Qasim,
have been opposed by a moderate
faction led by Foreign Minister
Shabib and Minister of State
Jawad. These leaders felt that
Saadi's emphasis on rapid social-
ization, on exclusive exercise
of power by the Baath, and on
early union with Syria, was
depriving the regime of the
widespread support it badly
needed. The issue was fought
out early this fall at a regional
party conference, where Saadi
gained a narrow victory with
the aid of Defense Minister
Ammash, a lone wolf with strong
ties in the military wing of
the party.
Continued maneuvering for
position resulted on 11 November
in the election by a "rump con-
gress" of a new slate of Iraqi
Baath leaders in which Saadi
and his supporters were re-
placed by moderates. Saadi and
four close associates were
arrested and exiled to Spain.
However, members of the
national guard--the party's
paramilitary wing and a reservoir
of strong support for Saadi--
refused to accede to the move
against Saadi. They insisted
that the new leadership group
had been elected illegally.
Fighting broke out at a few
strategic points in Baghdad on
13 November, but the moderates,
with the support of Premier.Bakr
and Ammash, were initially able
to contain the situation. How-
ever, the national guard and
the lower echelons of the party,
where pro-Saadi sentiment is also
strong, evidently continued opposi-
tion to the new leadership group.
In an effort to resolve the
impasse, Bakr and Ammash called
for a meeting of the international
command of the party in Baghdad
late on 13 November. This
group, which includes Syrian
Premier Hafiz and Baath Party
founder Aflaq, evidently placed
the question of party discipline
above all other considerations.
Shabib and Jawad, together with
several of their supporters,
have in turn been exiled to
Beirut, and have apparently been
read out of the party entirely.
No new list of Iraqi party
regional leaders has been
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Asia-Africa
announced, and Saadi's present
position is unclear. He is
still in Spain, but he retains
widespread support throughout
the middle and lower echelons
of the party. Ammash, with his
strong military ties and "swing-
man" position,appears to be the
immediate winner in a still con-
fused situation, but the dust
has not finally settled.
The Baath Party in Iraq thus
faces a considerable period of
confusion and unrest. The
party's prestige has clearly
suffered a body blow, and its
control of the machinery of
state and over internal security
has almost certainly been weak-
ened. The party's position in
Syria will be affected by the
events in Iraq, and new tremors
can probably be expected there
as well. Anti-Baath elements
in both countries--particularly
among the military--will also
maneuver in the present confusion,
seeking to overturn the two
regimes entirely.
Morocco and Algeria con-
tinue to improve their mili-
tary positions along the bor-
der, but no incidents have
disrupted the cease-fire which
became effective on 4 November.
The four-power commission--
Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and
Ethiopia--set up under the
cease-fire agreement to estab-
lish a demilitarized zone in
the disputed area has not yet
met. Agreement on such a buffer
zone seems unlikely.
Meanwhile, both governments
also are seeking support in
preparation for the forthcoming
meeting of the foreign ministers
of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa.
The recent reorganization of
the Moroccan Government, in
which King Hassan relinquished
his role as premier, is prob-
ably a gesture toward the OAU,
some members of which seem to
have been impressed by the re-
peated Algerian charge that
Morocco's regime is "feudal."
Algeria, for its part, continues
to resist the idea of border
adjustments and is relying for
support on leading members of
the OAU who want to maintain
their own present boundaries
in the face of revisionist
pressures.
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NATO MEETING TO DISCUSS WESTERN TRADE WITH BLOC
A special meeting of the
North Atlantic Council (NAC)
has been scheduled for 18 No-
vember at US request to dis-
cuss East-West economic rela-
tions and related problems of
economic defense. The request
stems from US concern over pres-
sures among NATO members for
expanding trade with the bloc
--pressures which the detente
in general and the Canadian
wheat deals in particular have
increased. The attraction of
possible new markets may lead
some US allies to overlook the
economic and political ramifica-
tions of such trade and may even
create new frictions within the
alliance.
The discussions will focus
in particular on a common credit
policy in trade with the bloc--
a perennial question in NATO,
but one which appears to have
become even more pressing. Be-
cause of its large expenditures
for agricultural imports, Mos-
cow is pushing still harder for
long-term credits from the West
in order to maintain its program
of importing capital goods. Sev-
eral West European countries--
notably Britain--seem suffi-
ciently eager for such sales to
compete with each other in of-
fering favorable credit terms.
Prospects for curbing such
competitive bidding remain poor.
The Common Market countries
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15 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
agreed last summer on a general
credit policy which would limit,
government-guaranteed export
credits to five years, require
a substantial down payment, and
permit exceptions only for the
less-developed countries and
for meeting competition. Britain
has consistently opposed NATO
endorsement of this policy, how-
ever. At the 31 October meeting
of the NATO economic advisers,
the British delegate reiterated
London's general position that
there is not now a credit race
favoring the bloc, that NATO
is not the appropriate forum
for discussing credit policy,
and that established British
credit policy is opposed to
discrimination against any par-
ticular area. Norway and Canada
supported these remarks.
The NAC meeting may also
provide a clearer indication
of the West German position
on trade with the bloc. Bonn
has supported the EEC resolu-
tion restricting credits to
the bloc, and has recently
proposed that NATO undertake
studies of commodities on
which the bloc is dependent
for imports or exports. On
the other hand, important
West German figures have in-
dicated interest in greatly
increasing exports to the USSR.
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SPAIN STRIVING TO INCREASE TRADE WITH CUBA
Spain, despite its dislike of
Castro, has been trying with some
success to reverse the recent sharp
decline in its exports to Cuba.
It hopes to quadruple the 1962
figure to a total of $5-$6 million
in 1963 and eventually raise exports
to their pre-Castro level.
Last February Madrid welcomed
a Cuban commercial delegation which
negotiated an extension through
1963 of an existing three-year-old
trade agreement. The Cuban delega-
tion contracted, among others, man-
ufacturers of trucks, spare parts,
and earth-moving equipment. Span-
ish and Cuban ships have carried
from Spain to Cuba such merchandise
as lead plate, copper wire, chemi-
cal products, trash trucks, and
food items. Under the extended
agreement Spain's imports from Cuba
will include $3 million worth of
sugar and $2.5 million of tobacco,
and total trade will amount to $15
million.
During October there was a
steady increase in air flights be-
tween Madrid and Havana. In addi-
tion to the regular weekly round
trip by Spain's Iberia line which
has been in effect since last June
Cubana Airlines stepped up the
number of nonscheduled flights.
Some Cubana flights carried refu-
gees to Spain and then proceeded
empty to Prague, others returned
to Cuba--one or two via Algiers--
and one took on cargo in Madrid
for Cuba.
In July 1963 Ambassador
Garrigues in Washington defended
Iberia's flights as necessary
for the welfare of the hundreds
of thousands of persons of Span-
ish nationality or extraction in
Cuba. He also argued that the Cu-
ban trade was "a matter of life or
death" to the Spanish shipping
firm Transatlantica.
Although the Spanish Embassy
has said that Madrid "would con-
sider sympathetically" a US re-
quest that it halt the export of'
specific strategic items, Madrid
is unlikely to consider discontinu
ing either sea or air communica-
tions with Cuba. The embassy,
however, has suggested that the
number of Iberia's flights might
be reduced and perhaps put under
some form of control.
SPAIN'S TRADE WITH CUBA
(thousands of dollars)
1958 1959
Spain's Exports 12,200 7,800
Spain's Imports 18,500 7,400
1960 1961 1962
9,900 4,401 1,372
10,300 9,240 8,519
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ITALIAN PREMIER-DESIGNATE BEGINS CABINET TALKS
Aldo Moro, Italy's premier-
designate, began formal negoti-
ations for the center-left gov-
ernment on 12 November. His
worst problem at the outset is
the continued intransigence of
the right wing of his own Chris-
tian Democratic Party.
Some right-wingers--probably
including President Segni, For-
eign Office Secretary-General
Attilio Cattani, and NATO Ambas-
sador Adolfo Alessandrini--seem
to be trying to block a rappoche-
ment with the Socialists by press-
ing for certain commitments now,
particularly on the MLF, which
they know are unacceptable to the
Socialist Party at this time.
Christian Democratic die-hards
headed by ex Premier Scelba and
former Educat.:on Minister Guido
Gonella succeeded in rallying
only about 16 out of the 150 mem-
bers present at a meeting of the
party's national council to vote
against negotiations with the
other three prospective coalition
parties. This poor showing, how-
ever, will not deter them from
other opposition tactics. They
might try, for example, with
Segni's encouragement, to include
in the cabinet such extreme right-
wingers as Giulio Andreotti, the
present defense minister, and
Giuseppe Pella, a former premier
and a laissez-faire economist.
These men in key cabinet posts
might be able to water down the
proposed center-left program of
the projected government.
Moro fears, moreover, that
Amintore Fanfani, who favors a
center-left government and him-
self headed the first one, may
try to torpedo negotiations or
bring down a new government if
he is left out of it.
Both Moro and Giuseppe Sa-
ragat, leader of the Democratic
Socialists, are apprehensive about
the success of the negotiations.
However, they and Oronzo Reale--
leader of the Republican Party,
the fourth prospective coalition
partner--have expressed the view
that the Socialist Party's October
congress was "positive" about 25X1
collaboration.
The order in which the major
problems are to be discussed in
the coalition talks oresents another
difficult .
Moro ope 25x1
to put off the controversial issue
of a multilateral nuclear force
until agreement is reached on the
government's domestic program and
on cabinet portfolios. Socialist
Riccardo Lombardi, on the other
hand, has been anxious to discuss
the MLF before the other questions.
Socialist leaders insist that they
do not oppose MLF in principle but
add that they could not bring
their party to vote for such addi-
tional military commitments during
the first few months of a center-
left government.
Meanwhile, a half-day strike
in the Rome area on 12 November
was staged without incident by
the Communist-controlled labor
federation to protest the high
cost of living. The Communists
may use this tactic again, par-
ticularly if the issue of Social-
25X1
net negotiations.
ist-Communist relations becomes
a main stumbling block in the cabi-
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Greece: George Papandreou,
leader of Greece's Center Union
(EK) party, is attempting,
against formidable obstacles,
to win acceptable parliamentary
support for his minority gov-
ernment. He faces his first
vote of confidence on 11
December.
Former Premier Karamanlis'
re-establishment of party dis-
cipline in his still-powerful
National Radical Union (ERE)
reduces Papandreou's chances
of obtaining from this source the
votes he needs. He may there-
fore have to rely on the pro-
Communist United Democratic
Left (EDA), whose 30 deputies
would provide strength enough
for a working majority. This,
however, would be an unwelcome
choice for Papandreou, since
it could estrange the right
wing of his own party if the
collaboration should extend
beyond the vote of confidence.
Moreover, any EK-EDA arrange-
ment which deferred to EDA's
wishes in legislative matters
would alarm the country's mili-
tary leaders.
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CONTROVERSY OVER ARGENTINE OIL CONTRACTS
President Illia intends to
initiate action soon to annul
Argentina's petroleum contracts
with US and other foreign com-
panies, as his party has promised
for five years. Renegotiating
the contracts will be more diffi-
cult now because of strong na-
tionalist attacks and the ad-
verse reaction to a US Senate
proposal to cut off US aid if
Argentina acts against the oil
companies without "speedy" com-
pensation.
The contracts are part of
ex-President Frondizi's petroleum
development program launched
in July 1958. They vary as to
degree of investment risk and in
size, duration, and type, pro-
viding for services, drilling,
exploration, or production. US,
British, Italian, and even pri-
vate Argentine firms are in-
volved. US contracts are valued
at approximately $250 million.
Widespread Argentine con-
tention that the contracts are
illegal is based mainly on
Frondizi's failure to have them
ratified by congress or approved
by the State Oil Company board.
The lack of open bidding and
deepening distrust of Frondizi's
honesty before he was ousted
in March 1962 reinforce this
contention. While nationalism
is an important factor, effec-
tive opposition to the contracts
is directed more at the "wrong-
doing" of the Frondizi regime
than at the companies. This ac-
counts for the one-sided ration-
alization that annulling the con-
tracts is an internal matter not
subject to outside threats.
Moderates have tried to
warn that action against the
contracts, which the companies
signed in good faith, will dis-
courage much-needed foreign in-
vestment and hamper petroleum
Since most Argentines be-
lieve that Illia could not re-
main in office without making
some gesture toward nullification
--his party's main campaign
promise--the main debate centers
on the timing and type of action.
Prior to his inauguration on
12 October, Illia suggested that
the government and the oil com-
panies negotiate new working
arrangements prior to any annul-
ment. Since then, however,
nationalists led by Vice Presi-
dent Perette have exerted in-
creasing quick ac-
tion.
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Western Hemisphere
Latin American Communist
Youth-loo of Latin America's
communist youth organizations
will be represented at a meeting
in Montevideo in late November
to discuss the position they
should take on the Sino-Soviet
dispute,
Their purpose
is to ac ieve a united stand
prior to the prospective March
1964 Latin American Youth Con-
gress (LAYC), although their
ultimate hope is that the sub-
ject of the Sino-Soviet dispute
will not be raised there.
Minister_President Pengel,
who heads the dominant Surinam
National Party, failed to push
through the legislature a con-
tract granting mining rights to
a US company for joint explora-
tion with the Surinam Government.
LAYC, a Cuban-sponsored ef-
fort originally scheduled for
last August in Santiago, Chile
was put off because of problems
in organizing it. Since the
Chilean Government reportedly
now objects to having the con-
gress in Santiago, it seems
likely that, if LAYC meets at
all, it will be in Brazil, where
the Cubans believe "more favor-
able elements" are in power.
Surinam: The political
situation in this semiautonomous
Dutch dependency has been un-
stable since 4 November when
the four-party government re-
signed after a disagreement
over bauxite mining concessions
(bauxite accounts for 80 per-
cent of Surinam's total exports).
tion similar to the previous
The major opponent of the measure
was Surinam's second largest
party, the United Hindustani
Party, which wants the conces-
sion to go to another company
and has long sought an issue
to challenge Pengel's power.
Pengel also lost the support
of a faction of his own party.
When a new government is formed,
it is likely that it will be a
relatively conservative coali-
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