WEEKLY SUMMARY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004200090001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

DIA review
completed.
OCI No, 0304/63
Copy No, 71
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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downgrading and declassification
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AW
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200 EST, 31 October 1963)
EARLY WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING NOW APPEARS UNLIKELY
Moscow's apparent change of attitude may derive
from concern on the part of some foreign Communist
leaders about the disruptive effects--in their own
parties and in the Communist movement as a whole--
of a formal conference to condemn the Chinese.
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE MOON RACE
US press reports have distorted the Import of
Khrushchev's remarks at a 25 October press con-
ference, which differ little from views he has
expressed over the past two years.
SOVIET DRIVE FOR CREDITS IN THE WEST
in negotiating new trade pacts and especially in
contracting for equipment from Western companies,
the USSR is indicating that purchases will be gov-
erned by the availability of credit.
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN AID PROGRAM
Until thi.s year the Chinese made their major aid
offers to their Asian Communist and non-Communist
neighbors; now they are extending more aid to Mid-
dle Eastern and African countries.
TENSIONS PERSIST IN SOUTH VIETNAM
National Day celebrations on 26 October passed
without major incident, but another Buddhist sui-
cide the following day
indicative of continuing unrest.
INDONESIA VERSUS MALAYSIA
Indonesia's covert operations and propaganda con-
tinue unabated, and Malaysia's defenders are ral-
lying political and military support.
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND SYRIA
Moscow apparently 'intends to maintain correct rela-
tions with both Baathist regimes and continue sup-
plying aid, but to augment its anti-Baath propaganda
as a union of the two comes closer to realization.
MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN CEASE-FIRE ARRANGED
The agreement reached at Bamako seems unlikely to
result in more than a temporary truce. Each side
continues to seek more arms--Morocco from the West,
and Algeria from Egypt, Cuba, and the bloc.
SITUATION CALMS IN LEOPOLDVILLE
The three-member "emergency committee" now run-
ning the government appears to have intimidated
the labor unions, at least temporarily.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
DAHOMEY'S GOVERNMENT OVERTHROWN
A four-man provisional regime, headed by the army
chief of staff, has taken over and is trying to
keep the coup d'etat from precipitating a struggle
between the country's northern and southern regions.
LABOR DEMANDS THREATEN FRENCH ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM
Unions say they favor price stabilization but not
at labor's expense. New strikes are threatened
in both the nationalized and private sectors.
THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION
Difficult negotiations on cabinet posts and a leg-
islative program are in prospect as Italy's Social-
ists and Christian Democrats start to implement
their decision to form a center-left coalition.
DANISH GOVERNMENT THREATENED
The generally moderate two-party coalition govern-
ment has defeated a series of no-confidence motions
in recent weeks, but its margin of victory declined
to one vote in the most recent test.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
POLITICAL PLANS OF HONDURAN COUP LEADER LOPEZ
He evidently has presidential ambitions and may de-
lay restoration of civilian government until a new
party being organized by his supporters can ensure
his victory in a legitimate election.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
LABOR. UNREST IN BRAZIL
The potentially critical situation in Sao Paulo
raises the possibility of a showdown between the
Goulart government and its opponents.
VENEZUELA PREPARES FOR ELECTIONS
President Betancourt has reduced leftist terrorism
for the moment, and, with elections set for 1 Decem-
ber, he now may realize his ambition to be the first
freely elected Venezuelan president to hand over the
government to a freely elected successor.
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The Soviet leaders appear
to have decided against calling
a new world Communist confer-
ence in the near future. They
may have beeen persuaded by talks
with foreign Communist leaders
that the disruptive effects of
a formal condemnation of the
Chinese, both in some foreign
parties and in the movement as
a whole, would outweigh any ad-
vantages Moscow could derive
from such a conference.
Pravda on 28 October sig-
naled i s-apparent change of
Soviet intentions by reporting
on an Italian Communist Party
statement.which contained the
first explicit admission of ma-
jor foreign Communist opposi-
tion to a conference. Although
the Italians attacked the Chi-
nese and acknowledged the value
of a conference "under certain
conditions," their statement ex-
pressed "reservations" about
the "appropriateness" of holding
a meeting "in the near future,"
and said that such a gathering
could only further intensify
differences or adopt an "unsat-
isfactory compromise." On 30
October Moscow radio noted a
joint statement by the French
and Dutch parties which also
denounced Peiping and endorsed
a conference "at a suitable
time."
Khrushchev's press conference
remarks on 25 October also im-
plied a decision not to proceed
with a conference at this time.
In contrast to Soviet pronounce-
ments in September and the first
half of October which appeared
intended to lay the basis for
a formal indictment of Peiping,
Khrushchev confined himself to
renewing the appeal for a ces-
sation of polemics. He said,
"Let time determine which point
of view is more correct."I
Although the Soviet leaders
have carefully avoided any pub-
lic commitment to a new con-
ference, the US Embassy in Mos-
cow concluded in mid-October
that they were moving toward
convening a meeting, but with
considerable misgivings. As
late as 23 October, Moscow
broadcast a summary of a major
Kommunist editorial (released to
the press on 18 October) which
warned that if steps were not
taken "in time" to defend the
"general line" of the world
Communist movement from the
"line of Mao Tse-tung," the
consequences for the entire
movement "may be very grave."
Kommunist charged that the Chi-
nese are out to split the move-
ment and "create some new move-
ment under their aegis." It
claimed that 65 parties already
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The Communist World
had pledged support to the Soviet
party and had condemned Peiping.
In contrast to Peiping's
lobbying earlier in the year
for an international meeting
which it probably believed
would provide a forum to ex-
press its views, the Chinese
apparently now recognize that
the effective Soviet exploita-
tion of their rejection of the
test ban treaty has weakened
their position. On 27 October,
the Chinese press reprinted
a statement of the New Zealand
Communist party terming such
a meeting premature at this
time. Several members of this
solidly pro-Chinese party re-
cently completed a tour of China,
and the statement probably was
worked out with Peiping.
Recent Chinese pronounce-
ments, like the Soviet ones,
are somewhat more ambiguous in
tone and less aggressive than
earlier statements. In an
interview with the chief of
Reuters in Peiping on 13 October,
Chou En-lai struck a moderate
note concerning the dispute.
The fourth installment--pub-
lished on 21 October--of the
Chinese serial reply to the
Soviet open letter of 14 July
is not so abusive an attack
as the previous three articles,
although it leaves no doubt
concerning Chinese views of the
Soviet position on the "national
liberation struggle." Peiping's
rebroadcast on 30 October of
a month-old Albanian diatribe
against Khrushchev, however,
makes it clear that the Chinese
have not forsworn abuse.
If the Soviet leaders have,
in fact, decided to forego or
at least postpone a conference,
this would not preclude some
demonstration of solidarity
by pro-Soviet parties during
the forthcoming Bolshevik Revo-
lution anniversary. An Italian
Communist journalist in Moscow
has indicated that a meeting
of pro-Soviet parties from 7 to
15 November will draw up a draft
program for submission to the
Chinese as a precondition for
a conference and will consider
rejection of this draft by the
Chinese as tantamount to self-
exclusion.from the Communist
movement.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page
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A0001 **W
It would be very interesting to take a trip to the moon. But I cannot
at present say when this will be done. We are not at present planning
flights by cosmonauts to the moon. Soviet scientists are working on this
problem. It is being studied as a scientific problem, and the necessary
research is being done.
I have a report to the effect that the Americans want to land a man
on the moon by 1970. Well, let's wish them success. We shall see how
they will fly there, how they will land on the moon, and, more important,
how they will start off and return home. We shall take their experience
into account, We do not want to compete with the sending of people to
the moon without careful preparation.
It is clear that no benefits would be derived from such a competition.
On the contrary, it would be harmful as it might result in the destruction
of people. We have a frequently quoted joke: He who cannot bear the
earth any longer may fly to the moon. But we are al I right on earth. To
speak seriously, much work will have to be done and good preparations
made for a successful flight to the moon by man.
April 1962 - Interview With Publisher Gardner Cowles
Cowles: Mr. Chairman, what date can you predict- for a Soviet manned
flight to-the moon and back?
Khrushchev: I-cannot give any date, as it has not been decided yet.
Your President, the head of a nation where, as you put it,
everything is decided by private enterprise, has already
announced his plan for sending a man to the moon. But we,
though we have a planned socialist economy, have not
decided this yet.
A manned flight to the moon, you see, raises many
different problems. It will cost a lot to fly to the moon and
back.
Cowles: Would you like this to be a joint project by the Soviet Union
and the United States of America?
Khrushchev: We would welcome this. The Soviet Union has no aims of
conquest in general and with regard to the moon in particular.
In principle, we could pool our efforts--material, technical,
and scientific--and jointly develop a ship-for a flight to the
moon. Our scientists are, of course, working in this field. I
have heard them; they have good ideas, calculations.
In answering a question as to when the USSR would send a man to the
moon, Khrushchev stated that there was no fixed schedule yet for landing
a Soviet citizen on the moon and explained:
It is not a question of getting him on the moon, but of getting
him off again. Our national emblem is already on the moon,
but we don't want to place a coffin beside it. We are now
studying the possibilities of such a flight, but I can't yet say -
when it would. be scheduled. We can fly a man to the moon,
but the difficulty is getting him away from there. We can
now take off from the earth and land again. If we compare
our development to yours, we believe it is a more important
development. We remember Darwin's theories on the
evolution of the species--from those which crawled, like
reptiles, to those which- jumped and those which flew. Well,
you are still in the jumping stage, while we have already
learned to fly and land again. But that is still insufficient.
We still have to learn how to land on other planets, and then
to take off from them and return to earth.
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KHRUSHCHEV AND THE MOON RACE
US press reports have dis- have wanted to make it clear
torted the import of Khrushchev's that the USSR is not allowing
remarks at a press conference the US to set the rules for
on 25 October about the moon the space competition.
race, which differ little from
views he has expressed over the
past two years (see opposite
page). Soviet scientific offi-
cials, moreover, deliberately
voiced similar views to Western
scientists earlier this year,
alleging that Soviet scientists
regard manned lunar missions as
unfeasible, at least for the
time being.
The questions Khrushchev
answered were submitted in ad-
vance, and it must be assumed
that he had some specific pur-
pose in mind--perhaps several--
in commenting on the Soviet lu-
nar program at this time. He
may have felt it necessary to
reassure Russian consumers that
the regime is not spending large
sums on nonproductive projects.
He may also have intended to
further his objective of retard-
ing the pace of the arms and
technological race in order to
relieve the pressures on Soviet
resources. His downgrading of
the urgency of a manned lunar
landing was probably aimed at
influencing US Congressional
and public opinion concerning
the cost and pace of the US
lunar program. And, he may
The USSR has been energeti-
cally pursuing a space program
which includes lunar exploration.
Indications are lacking, however,
of a high-priority lunar land-
ing program. Military and space
expenditures have imposed a
heavy financial burden and have
grown at a considerably faster
pace than the economy as a
whole. Pursuit of a high-
priority manned lunar landing
program would aggravate and
prolong the present period
of serious economic strain.
If the USSR is not now
trying to land a man on the moon
in advance of the US Apollo
schedule, then Khrushchev is
trying to discount any American
achievement in advance, as well
as to delay it. Even then, he
would probably try to sustain
Soviet prestige with attempts
to carry out earlier, less ex-
nensive, but impressive proj-
ects,, such as orbiting a manned
space station or a manned cir-
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SOVIET DRIVE FOR CREDITS IN THE WEST
The USSR is pressing its
Western suppliers of equipment
for credits, and the European
satellites are following its
lead. In negotiating new trade
pacts and especially in con-
tracting for equipment from
Western companies (which seek
government guarantees for the
extension of credit), the USSR
is indicating that purchases
will be governed by the avail-
ability of credit.
The Soviets are not only
seeking more credits but are
also asking for longer terms.
To finance their large pur-
chases of technologically ad-
vanced equipment in 1960-61,
the Soviets--with only minimal
debts to the free world at that
time--were able to make satis-
factory arrangements. Since
then, credits with terms up to
five years--and in some cases
slightly longer--have been ex-
tended for purchases of about
$1 billion worth of plants and
machinery.
The USSR has failed to
develop adequate exports to
balance its import requirements,
however. In fact, its inability
to export grain to Western Eu-
rope next year will cut further
into its foreign exchange earn-
ings. Exports of raw materials
for fertilizer production may
also fall off; Denmark already
has been told potash would not
be available in 1964. The ne-
cessity to repay earlier credits
is tending to nullify the effect
of newly acquired medium-term
credits and requires Moscow to
seek to defer payments for cur-
rent purchases for ten or twelve
years. This year the Soviets
have received about $300 mil-
lion worth of credits; their
repayment obligations during
the year total about two thirds
of this amount.
There appears to be no
slackening in the Soviet de-
mand for Western industrial
goods, and thus the require-
ment for credits is growing.
Soviet economic negotiations
abroad and the activities of
Soviet trade representatives
in Western Europe suggest that
the USSR may increase its em-
phasis on the purchase of chem-
ical and petrochemical plants
and equipment. The Khrushchev
program to support agriculture
by stepped-up imports of equip-
ment continues to be stressed.
such purchases may be at the
expense of other imports.
NATO countries are dis-
cussing a new common policy on
credits to the bloc, covering
primarily the question of du-
ration. The consensus appears
to be to continue limiting cred-
its to five-year terms. How-
ever, the UK and Canada are
balking at precisely defined
curbs. There is some concern
about the magnitude of credits
extended, but limitation has
not been proposed. The policy
under discussion permits ex-
ceptions to meet competition
from countries not adhering to
the agreed policy. This loop-
hole could be important to the
USSR should any of the major
industrial countries not sub-
scribe to the agreement.
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Communist China, whose
assistance in past years has
been extended primarily in
Asia, now is offering increased
economic aid elsewhere. So
far this year, all its offers
of such assistance, totaling
$90 million, have been extended
to Middle Eastern and African
countries--Algeria, Syria, and
the Somali Republic.
About two thirds of China's
estimated $1.75 billion in aid
offers since 1953 have been
made to the Far Eastern satel-
lites--North Vietnam, North
Korea, and Mongolia. Offers to
non-Communist Asian countries
began in 1956 with cash gifts
and credits to Nepal, Indone-
sia, and Cambodia and reached
a peak in 1961 with an $84-
million long-term credit to
Burma for economic development.
The most recent offers to non-
Communist Asian countries were
in 1962--a total of $15 million
in credits to Ceylon and Laos.
Peiping's aid to African
countries--Guinea, Ghana, Mali,
Somali Republic and Algeria- -
has totaled about $140 million
since 1960. Offers to these
countries, as well as to Yemen
and Syria, appear to have been
motivated by a desire to main-
tain a Chinese "presence" in
the face of Soviet aid or to
exploit what the Chinese be-
lieved were favorable local
conditions.
China's substantial assist-
ance to Albania in 1961-62 as
well as the very recent dis-
aster relief donated to Cuba
probably stemmed from political
considerations in Peiping's
ideological dispute with Mos-
cow. The Chinese have extended
about $325 million in aid to
these countries, including a
long-term credit to Cuba in
1960.
Although Chinese aid proj-
ects in Communist countries
appear generally to have been
implemented according to sched-
ule, drawings on Chinese credits
outside the Communist bloc have
been spotty. To date, projects
under long-term Chinese credit
arrangements in a large number
of non-Communist countries have
progressed slowly, partly be-
cause of delays in recipient
countries. Of a total of $180
million in long-term credits
extended in Africa and the
Middle East, so far only about
$25 million are known to have
been drawn, about half accounted
for by Yemen. Drawings by
North Vietnam, North Korea, and
Mongolia against China's esti-
mated $1 billion in economic
aid probably have reached about
70 percent, but of the $275
million offered to non-Communist
Asia, only about 25 percent
has been drawn.
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South Vietnam's National
Day was celebrated on 26 Octo-
ber without major incident, but
the political situation in Sai-
gon remains uneasy.
Three minor bombings oc-
curred in Saigon on the 26th.
Tight security precautions ap-
parently kept crowds small.
The US Embassy also saw indica-
tions of some deliberate public
and official boycott of the
celebration.
steel products by 10-50 percent.
Prices of domestic perishable
foodstuffs remained generally
stable, but the cost of many
nonperishable domestic products
has risen. Hoarding has become
widespread, and the value of
the South Vietnamese piaster
continues to decline on the
black market.
On 27 October, another
Buddhist protest suicide took
place in Saigon, the seventh
in the country since mid-June.
The UN mission to observe
the Buddhist situation, after
two days of briefings by gov-
ernment officials and visits
to selected pagodas, announced
it was abandoning the govern-
ment's planned itinerary and
would conduct its own investi-
gation. The group has since
broadened its interviews to in-
clude Buddhists and students in
President Diem's National
Day speech contained no announce-
ment of political or economic'
changes. He stressed the need
"for self-sufficiency and self-
relian2e," presumably in antic-
ipation of substantial reduc-
tions in US aid. Further in-
creases were reported last week
in the prices of some imported
goods. Flour went up 2 percent,
condensed milk and chemicals as
much as 5 percent, and iron and
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US military attaches in the
past week have reported tenuous
signs of lower morale in the
Vietnamese armed forces. A
redefinition of corps boundaries
becomes effective on 1 November,
and the government may take
this occasion to reshuffle com-
mands and try to appease and
neutralize dissatisfied military
elements.
The latest available sta-
tistics show some increase in
Viet Cong activity. Both Com-
munist and government casualties
--as well as government weapons
losses--rose sharply as a re-
sult of the 19 October battle
at Loc Ninh in the delta. In
the same general area, an ambush
on 29 October made casualties
of half the members of one gov-
ernment company. In their prop-
aganda, the Viet Cong, presum-
ably to capitalize on current
tensions in Saigon and to boost
morale among their followers,
have recently been claiming
that the " eneral uprising" is 25X1
imminen
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INDONESIA VERSUS MALAYSIA
While Indonesia's covert
and propaganda operations
against Malaysia have continued
unabated, the new nation's
defenders are rallying politi-
cal and military support.
In Sarawak and Sabah mili-
tary clashes on a larger scale
than heretofore may soon occur,
inasmuch as both Indonesian and
UK-Malaysian forces in the
border areas are being built
up. A platoon of 42 Indonesian
raiders made contact with Brit-
ish-led forces on 24 October.
Indonesian hostility is ap-
parently having a unifying effect
within Malaysia. Daily patriotic
rallies and effigy-burnings of
Indonesian President Sukarno and
Indonesian Communist leader
Aidit are being held throughout
the new federation. On 27 Octo-
ber, the largest demonstration
of its kind was held in Kuala
Lumpur by the Chinese Chambers
of Commerce backed by 60 Chinese
organizations. This was the
first anti-Indonesian rally
organized and attended almost
exclusively by Chinese; pre-
viousdemonstrations were
dominated by Malays.
State Prime Minister Lee
appears confident that Singa-
pore can weather the unemploy-
ment problem and attendant
political repercussions result-
ing from the economic break
with Indonesia, even though the
island was the hardest hit of
any part of. Malaysia by the Indo-
nesian action..A r.ecent*meeting of
about 400 businessmen in Singa-
pore, however, voiced concern
over the effects of a continued
Indonesian trade embargo. The
conferees, ; mostly Chinese,
supported Malaysia in principle
but asserted that this support
did not extend to the economic
ruin of Singapore.
Although Lee has tried to
impress Djakarta that there is
no chance of playing off Singa-
pore against Kuala Lumpur and
has reiterated his support for
Malaysia's stand against Indo-
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SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND SYRIA
The USSR has moved slowly in
recent weeks to improve its rela-
tions with Iraq. In response to
Iraqi initiatives, Moscow re-
sumed military shipments and now
has had withdrawn from the UN
agenda Mongolian charges of gen-
ocide based on Iraq's campaign
against its rebellious Kurds.
However, Moscow turned down a
proposed visit by Iraq's foreign
minister and has kept up a vigor-
ous propaganda campaign against
the "antirational" Baathist regime
Moscow had continued cautiously
to maintain good relations with
Syria's Baathist rulers until
their military union with Iraq
was announced early this month.
At least three Soviet arms
shipments have been delivered to
Ira since August.
Syria has received several
shipments of Soviet arms since
last M
Moscow has continued to provide
economic assistance to both Iraq and
Syria. In Iraq, work is proceeding
on a number of Soviet projects which
at the time of the February coup
were in an advanced stage of con-
struction. Several industrial
plants originally scheduled to be
built with Soviet aid have been can-
celed, however, and the Iraqi Gov-
ernment apparently is still consid-
ering other proposed Soviet projects.
In Syria also, Soviet technicians 25X1
have continued work on projects
under way.
Moscow probably calculates that
its propaganda campaign and tempo- 225X1
rary suspension of military aid have
been at least partially effective
in preventing Iraq from pursuing a
strongly anti-Soviet policy, and
that continuation of a degree of
pressure will help maintain Baghdad
in a neutralist position. At the
same time, the USSR's concern at
the prospect of full union of Iraq
and Syria has been increased by
their establishment of a military
unity. Moscow's heretofore circum-
spect treatment of Syria, where the
Baath severely moderated its anti-
Communism, now has given way to in-
creasingly open attacks on the Syrian
Baathists as the "hangmen's accom-
plices."
Moscow will probably continue 25X1
its dual game of maintaining correct 25X1
relations with Iraq through the pro-
vision of aid, while at the same time
augmenting its anti-Baath propaganda
campaign as Iraqi-Syrian unity comes
closer to realization.
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SECRET
The cease-fire between
Moroccan and Algerian forces
arranged at Bamako on 30 Oc-
tober seems unlikely to pro-
vide more than a temporary
truce. The Algerian arms build-
up is likely to continue, and
the Moroccans can also be ex-
pected to press Western sources
for additional modern armament.
Efforts of Zthiopian Em-
peror Haile Selassie to mediate
the dispute seemed on the verge
of failure when both Moroccan
King Hassan and Algerian Presi-
dent Ben Bella quickly accepted
Malian President Keita's invi-
tation for talks in Bamako.
After a single brief encounter
internal affairs of others, and
to settle their differences by
negotiation.
The participants had hardly
left Bamako, however, when they
voiced conflicting interpreta-
tions of the agreement. The
Moroccans denied that they were
committed to withdraw their forces
from Hassi Beida and Tinjoub
--the two posts around which
most of the fighting has oc-
curred--while the Algerians in-
sisted that the Moroccans were
committed to pull back and de-
nied that adjustments of the
border would be negotiated.
The Moroccans also may resist
pulling their troops back from
in the preszince of Haile Selassie Tindouf, where they were skir-
and Keita, Hassan and Ben Bella mishing with Algerian forces
agreed to a cease-fire effective as late as 30 October.
at midnight 1 November.
Their agreement further
provides for the establishment
of a commissior composed of
Moroccan, Algerian, Ethiopian,
and Malian officers to deter-
mine a demilitarized zone which
is to be supervised by Ethiopian
and Malian observers, and for
the convocation at Addis Ababa
of a meeting of the foreign min-
isters of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) as a special
commission of arbitration. The
OAU commission will determine
responsibility for the outbreak
of hostilities, and submit pro-
posals for settling conflicting
boundary claims. Both parties
agree meanwhile to stop their
press campaigns against the
other, not to interfere in the
The border fighting has
led to further flowering of
Algeria's relations with Cuba.
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Atlantic Ocean
MADEIRA
ISLANDS S
(Port)
(U.K.)
RABAT,
PORTUGAL
0 STATUTE MILES 500
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SECRET
The three-member "emergency
committee" in Leopoldville,
headed by Defense Minister Anany,
appears to have brought labor
agitation in the Congolese cap-
ital under control, at least
temporarily. Although there
is still some talk of attempting
a general strike, the arrest of
top labor leaders appears to
have intimidated their followers.
The potentially dangerous strike
of civil servants never really
got under way, and the long-
standing teachers' strike seems
to have petered out.
With the government press
citing events in Dahomey (see
next :page) as an example of the
dangers of knuckling to the
labor leaders, Anany has indi-
cated he will bring them to
trial. At the same time, how-
ever, the government has inti-
mated that it may at long last
move to meet some of labor's
grievances.
The committee's move to
strike at what is claimed to be
the real source of leftist agi-
tation--the Soviet bloc embas-
sies in the capital--has stalled.
Even though the government claims
it has "proof" that an unnamed
diplomatic mission participated
in a plot to subvert the army
and overthrow the government,
opinion among government lead-
ers reportedly is divided on
whether to break relations
with the USSR, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Bulgaria And exnel
their embassy staffs.
Bomboko ,rand Anany have
denied that the "emergency com-
mittee" intends to supplant or
dispense with Adoula. However,
the committee apparently does
not go out of its way to con-
sult with the premier, whose
office is deserted while a whirl
of activity engulfs the offices
of the committee. If the threat
of disturbances continues to
recede, the committeemen may
press for a cabinet reshuffle
to drop Adoula. In this event,
a new struggle for the remier-
shi would be likel
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1 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 12
25X1
25X1
25X1
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'hr/
w
MALI
UNITED
ARAB
REPUBLIC
`.y I"AB t SUDAN
0 MERIA
ETHIOPIA
SAL AERICA
sr _ l1ItiC
RWAN
OF THE
AFROCA
Afro-Malagasy Union
(UAM)
CONGO
jLeopoldville)
REPUBLIC
OF U
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SECRET
DAHOMEY'S GOVERNMENT OVERTHROWN
After a week marked by
rioting, demonstrations, and
a four-day general strike,
President Maga has resigned and
a four-man provisional govern-
ment headed by Army Chief of
Staff Soglo has taken over in
Dahomey. The immediate polit-
ical crisis has passed, but
the emergence of both the labor
unions, which spearheaded the
demonstrations, and the mili-
tary as important political
factors seems to portend fur-
ther instability.
Besides Soglo, the new
government includes a civilian
triumvirate of Maga, ex.- Vice
President Apithy, and erstwhile
Assembly President Ahomadegbe.
This group is not likely to
alter Dahomey's strongly pro-
Western orientation to any
significant extent. Soglo has
announced that the initial task
of the provisional government
will be to prepare for early
elections. Ahomadegbe, who
reportedly has influence with
Dahomey's military leaders,
may be emerging as the rr,st
important leader.
Maga was included as a
minister after a previous
provisional government under
his leadership was rejected
by unionists who insisted he
step down as head of state.
Since he is spokesman for
Dahomey's northern tribesmen,
military leaders were reluc-
tant to oust him altogether
for fear that this would ag-
gravate the country's basic
north-south split. For the
same reason Apithy and Ahomak-
degbe, rival leaders of the two
southern factions in Dahomey's
long-standing three-cornered
political struggle, reportedly
helped persuade union leaders
to keep Maga on.
The US Embassy feels that
the French probably encouraged
Malta's resignation from the
presidency after it became ap-
parent that the unionists would
be satisfied with nothing else.
The French maintain 800 troops
in Dahomey, but have not used
them during the crisis.
Leaders of Dahomey's basi-
callyweak trade union movement,
some of whom in the past have
been associated with Communist
fronts, capitalized on wide-
spread discontent over economic
conditions, especially a wage
freeze imposed by Maga, and
emerged from the crisis with
considerable political power.
There seems to have been no
Communist role in the crisis,
however, and the influence of
the more radical younger union-
ists may be counterbalanced by
moderate unionists and by the
predominantly conservative mili-
tary leaders.
The Dahomey upheaval is
likely to hasten the demise of
the 14-nation,Paris-oriented,
Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM). The
UAM states were already having
difficulty adjusting to the
revolution in Brazzaville just
two months ago. The Dahomey
incident may stimulate labor and
military leaders in other UAM
states to seek a more influential
political role.
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SECRET
Europe
LABOR DEMANDS THREATEN FRENCH ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM
The nationwide 24-hour
rail strike in France on 23
October was a major move in
the trade unions' stepped-up
campaign to press the govern-
ment to liberalize its wage
policy. The government has
raised this year's cost-of-
living increment from three to
four percent, but labor is res-
tive and the much-heralded stabi-
lization plan is in jeopardy.
The plan, announced in
September, was designed to
arrest spiraling living costs
and wages. Its major aim was
to prevent French prices--which
have already risen an average
six percent annually since
1961--from outdistancing those
of the other EEC members.
Specific measures include price
ceilings, tax increases, a credit
squeeze, and appeals to employers
not to bow to demands for con-
stant wage boosts.
The general public has re-
acted with a "wait and see"
attitude, but the plan has come
under increasingly severe
attack from farmers, small shop-
keepers, and big business. The
most serious threat to the gov-
ernment's resolve to bring
inflation under control, how-
ever, is posed by labor's re-
newed wage claims. Government
ministers have been meeting
with trade union leaders in an
effort to win support for the
austerity program; so far the
discussions have served only
to harden the existing stale-
mate, with the unions insisting
they favor stabilization but
not at labor's expense.
The unions argue that rising
prices are not the result of
pay increases, but rather of
military expenditures, business
and land speculation, excess
profits, and an uneconomic dis-
tribution system. Moreover,
they accuse the government of
bad faith in its efforts to
limit wage increases to four
percent for the coming year
and to defer until spring a
conference on the broad prob-
lem of wage structure promised
for autumn,
The current unrest is great-
est in the nationalized enter-
prises--i.e., among railway and
mine workers and civil servants.
It stems basically from prob-
lems of internal wage structures,
disparities between government
wages and those of private in-
dustry, and long-range job
security issues which were not
definitively dealt with in the
April 1963 labor-government
settlements. The unions claim,
for instance, that the govern-
ment.'s present wage offer still
fails, particularly because of
the price increases since the
spring settlement, to over-
come the lag between real wages
and the cost of living.
In the meantime, labor
unrest in the nationalized
sector, which has been fester-
ing since early September, is
rapidly reaching a more se-
rious stage. At present the
unions are acting cautiously;
but there is an increased
likelihood of strikes involving
mine, gas, and electricity
workers and civil servants. In
the private sector, moreover,
strikes are threatened in metals,
textiles, clothing, and retail
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SECRET
THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION
Difficult negotiations on
cabinet posts and on a legisla-
tive program are in prospect
as Italy's Socialists and
Christian Democrats begin the
effort to form a center-left
coalition. Opponents of such
an alliance have a wide range
of tactics available to try
to block it.
Socialist Party (PSI)
Leader Pietro Nenni's freedom
to negotiate the alliance will
be limited by the fact that
Riccardo Lombardi, who blocked
coalition efforts in June. con-
troLs L6 of the Nenni faction's
59 seats on the patty's newly
elected ?entral committee.
Moreover, the resolutions
adopted at this week's PSI con-
gress include foreign policy
reservations which may lead
Christian Democratic opponents
of the center-left to balk.
Negotiations with the
Christian Democrats on the dis-
tribution of portfolios in a
new government had already be-
More formidable roadblocks
to an agreement could be thrown
up at any time. President
Segni, for example, may try to
complicate matters by appoint-
ing someone less pro-center-
left than Moro to head the gov-
ernment.
Another obstacle might be
a Socialist request that Lombardi,
who fathered the controversial
bill which nationalized Italy's
electric energy last year, be
appointed to the ministry of
state holdings. The PSI negotia-
tors could make matters still
worse if they demand--as pre-
dicted in some quarters--that
former premier Fanfani be made
foreign minister, since a large
segment of his own party opposes
such an appointment. The Social-
ists also are reluctant to in-
clude such right-wing Christian
Democrats as former premier
Pella in the cabinet.
With the further problem
of a government legislative
program still to be tackled,
there is mounting evidence that
Christian Democratic right-wingers
who strongly oppose a center-
left government are prepared
to go to great lengths to pre-
vent one. A sizable minority
of the parliamentary group
openly rebelled against Moro's
statement before the Socialist
congress that center-left govern-
ment "must be attempted despite
the risks involved in an ex-
periment of such historic magni-
tude."
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-ftw
SECRET
Europe
Danish Prime Minister
Krag's coalition government--
a generally moderate political
grouping of his own Social
Democratic Party and the Radical
Liberal Party--may be forced
to call early elections. It
has defeated a series of no-
confidence motions in recent
weeks, but its margin of vic-
tory declined to one vote in
the most recent test on 23
October. The opposition is
made up primarily of more con-
servative parties, but also
includes the extreme leftist
Socialist People's Party.
The conservatives contend
that -the government cannot
work out a general program sup-
portable by a large parliamen-
tary majority. It is tradi-
tional in Denmark to seek
broadly based compromise solu-
tions which will to a consider-
able extent satisfy the opposi-
tion. The government worked
out such a compromise in con-
nection with an important
fiscal bill last June, but
several months previously major
economic legislation was passed
only by a bare majority.
The political maneuvering
is taking place against a back-
ground of considerable pros-
perity. Although prospects
for an early resumption of ne-
gotiations on Danish EEC mem-
bership are'dim, the Danes are
hopeful of securing favorable
treatment for their agricultural
products through some other
arrangement with the EEC. Like
Norway's, Denmark's membership
had been conditioned on the
United Kingdom's admission.
The Krag government's policy
over the past year has never-
theless been successful in re-
placing inflation and a balance
of payments deficit with stable
prices and a foreign exchange
surplus.
Several key political
leaders are assessing prospects
for a new postelection govern-
ment coalition. Aksel Larsen,
who led the bulk of Danish
Communists and sympathizers
away from orthodox Communism
to his "national communist"
Socialist People's Party (SFP),
is working for eventual coopera-
tion with the Social Democrats.
Krag, however, has sharply re-
buffed him and appears to be
considering cooperation with
the more moderate of the con-
servative parties.
percent.
New general elections must
in any case be held before the
end of 1964. A recent Gallup
poll suggests some movement
away from the government. At
the last election in 1960 the
two coalition parties had 47.9
percent of the vote, but, accord-
ing to the survey, would win
only 43.7 percent now. The
two major conservative parties
had 39 percent of the 1960
vote, but drew 41.6 percent in
the recent survey. The SFP
showed an increase from 6 to 8
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,Nft~ *40
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
POLITICAL PLANS OF HONDURAN COUP LEADER LOPEZ
Although the military regime military influence appears to be
in Honduras will probably soon growing in the Ministry of Health
announce a plan to return to con- and its network of rural health
stitutional government, it appears centers.
determined to control the govern-
ment until elections can be held.
The head of state, Colonel Oswaldo
Lopez Arellano, evidently has
presidential ambitions, and may
delay elections until he can build
up enough popular support to en-
sure his victory.
Lopez told a US embassy of-
ficial on 25 October that his
regime, while not anxious to pro-
long its tenure,, intends never-
theless to conduct a new electoral
census, call a constituent assem-
bly to revise the constitution
or draft a new one, and then hold
elections. He refused to indi-
cate how long this might take.
Lopez went on to say that
the armed forces had definitely
decided not to install a civilian
government during the interim
period, since a provisional presi-
dent would be just a figurehead
of the military, and most Latin
American governments
would so regard him.
Moreover, he added, a
civilian junta would
only lead to squabbling,
with the army ultimately
stepping in as arbiter.
The overwhelming
influence of the mili-
tary in the national
government thus far
seems to reflect Lope'
well-known contempt
for
all "politicians."
Mili-
tary officers have
also
assumed
of the
control of
country's 18
most
governorships. Moreover,
LOPEZ
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1%001.
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Western Hemisphere
New labor troubles in
Brazil have ended the rela-
tively relaxed period that
followed President Goulart's
short-lived drive to establish
a state of siege in October.
The potentially critical situa-
tion in Sao Paulo raises the
possibility of a showdown be-
tween the government and anti-
Goulart forces.
The newly formed Joint
Action Pact (PAC), a Communist-
oriented alliance of some 700,-
000 workers in Sao Paulo, has
begun an industrial strike,
ostensibly for wage increases
but undoubtedly with overriding
political motives. Latest re-
ports estimated that more than
30 percent of Sao Paulo's in-
dustrial workers were on strike
and indicated that sympathy
strikes were breaking out else-
where. Brazil's largest labor
confederation, the Communist-
controlled National Confedera-
tion of Industrial Workers, has
threatened a nationwide strike
if the PAC demands are not met.
Meanwhile, the taxi drivers!
strike which, began on 25 October
continues to tie up most of the
city's cabs.
A more serious danger is
the threat of federal interven-
tion should the strikes get
out of hand. No violence was
reported in the early stages
of the strike, and Governor
Adhemar de Barros with the help
of the army seemed to be in
control of the situation. Gen-
eral Peri Bevilacqua, Second
Army commander stationed in Sao
Paulo, said he would back up De
Barros with troops and would
ensure the peace "at any price."
However, while Bevilacqua
is considered a staunch anti-Com-
munist, his maneuverability may
have been curtailed somewhat by
recent events. War Minister Jair
Ribeiro continues to transfer
large numbers of officers out of
the Second Army in an apparent
attempt to undermine Bevilacqua.
Moreover, the War Ministry re-
cently issued regulations cau-
tioning army commanders against
complying with requests from any
state governor for assistance
without authorization by the
President--a direct warning to
Bevilacqua not to collaborate
with De Barros,aleading opponent
of Goulart.
President Goulart will be
under heavy and conflicting
pressure to reach a reasonable
solution in Sao Paulo. Federal
intervention against Governor de
Barros could spark a widespread,
violent reaction by moderates
and rightists. To agree to ex-
cessive labor demands would ag-
gravate the already rampant in-
flation--which has raised living
costs over 50 percent this year--
and would add to growing public
dissatisfaction. On the other
hand, any action which hinders
labor's efforts would tend to
alienate Goulart's leftist sup-
porters.
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Western Hemisphere
Venezuela's Romulo Betancourt
has temporarily thwarted leftist
terrorist efforts to defeat his
ambition to be his country's first
freely elected president to com-
plete a five-year term and hand
over the government to a freely
elected successor.
By adding military units to
his beleaguered police force, Betan-
court has managed to reduce the
terrorism which reached a peak dur-
ing the second week of October.
His action has also placated most
of the military leaders who had
accused him of ineffectual han-
dling of the terrorist problem.
However, there probably will be an
upsurge of both terrorism and mili-
tary unrest before the 1 December
elections and another during the
period between the elections and
the inauguration next March.
The political views of all
seven presidential candidates are
left of center. Betancourt's
Democratic Action (AD) party is
represented by Raul Leoni, who
owes his status of "candidate most
likely to win" almost wholly to
the fine organization the AD has
built up during its five-year incum-
bency.
AD's coalition partner, the
Social Christian Party(COPEI), is
running Rafael Caldera. Defeated
by Betancourt in 1958, Caldera's
chances are considered slim.
Jovito Villalba is the candi-
date of the largest opposition
party, the Republican Democratic
Union (URD). He could win only in
the unlikely event the opposition
parties united behind him.
Arturo Uslar Pietri, an in-
dependent, is making a surprisingly
good showing with a campaign he
claims is based on Theodore H.
White's analysis of the 1960 elec-
tion in the United States, The
Making of a President.
Wolfgang Larrazabal, who as
URD candidate was defeated by
Betancourt in 1958, is also running
as an independent. His campaign
has been far less successful than
expected, and he has been under
considerable pressure from URD to
withdraw in favor of Villalba.
Two minor candidates--Raul
Ramos Gimenez, of the "ARS" splin-
ter of AD and German Borregales,
of the National Action Movement--
have no chance of winning or of
significantly influencing the out-
come.
In any event, whichever party
wins the presidency will probably
face a hostile congress with a mi-
norityof seats, as no single party
is expected to win a majority in the
congressional race.
Voting is compulsory in Vene-
zuela. About 25 percent of the
voters became eligible during the
past six years and are expected to
register the usual discontent of
youth with the established authority.
They will probably support Villalba.
There is also a great number of
voters who have migrated from rural
regions to urban slum districts.
Their discontent with living condi-
tions represents a disadvantage to
Betancourt'S party
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IQJ
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