WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 5, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

5 July 1963
cony No. `~
25X1
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed
a~::
PACOM review(s)
completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
downgrading and declassification
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SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 3 July 1963)
PEIPING AND MOSCOW COME TO GRIPS
The long-awaited Sino-Soviet "unity talks" seem
certain to usher in a period of even more ruthless
fighting within the Communist world and might even
lead to an explosion which would divide it in two.
KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECHES IN EAST GERMANY
The restrained tone of his public remarks during the
visit--including a shift of position on a nuclear
test ban treaty--showed a desire to keep lines open
to the West of the eve on the Sino-Soviet talks.
KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
He condemned ideological deviation and warned that
it could lead to expulsion from the party. His re-
marks on the economy offered no new solutions to
old problems.
PEIPING CURTAILS PEASANT FREEDOMS AND INCENTIVES
The regime discovered that the freedoms it allowed
in order to encourage production also increased the
peasants' resistance to political controls.
NORTH KOREA'S DETENTION OF US PILOTS
Pyongyang, in an effort to wring political conces-
sions from the US, apparently intends to continue
holding two American officers forced down just
north of the demilitarized zone on 1? May.
YUGOSLAVIA'S NEW GOVERNMENT
Tito has distributed political responsibility more
widely and prepared for a successor regime; however,
he is still federal President and will retain indef-
initely a position of decisive influence.
5 July 63
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V rirr
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RIVAL LEADERS MOVE TOWARD TALKS IN LAOS
Souvanna and Souphannouvong have agreed to pre-
liminary talks, as minor military skirmishes and
maneuvering continue.
BUDDHISTS STILL AT ODDS WITH SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME
The Buddhist hierarchy is skeptical that the Diem
regime will implement the mid-June compromise agree-
ment, and further demonstrations and propaganda
appeals are planned.
ADOULA GETS A BREATHER IN THE CONGO
With Parliament in recess until September, polit-
ical leaders are concentrating on preparing for
next year's elections.
RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT IN ALGERIA
Recent arrests and a small-scale mutiny in the
army point up dissatisfaction with the Ben Bella
regime.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UN
Other independent African states, having prevented
South Africa's participation in the recent Interna-
tional Labor Organization conference, will continue
their drive against the Verwoerd regime at the UN.
AREA NOTES
Iraq and Syria
PROSPECT FOR CONFIRMATION OF ITALY'S CARETAKER REGIME
The Socialists' decision to abstain makes it vir-
tually certain that Premier Leone will win a vote
of confidence in parliament for his all - Christian
Democratic government.
FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH THE UN
Paris has become more amenable to UN involvement in
the Middle East and has hinted it might eventually
pay its share of the Congo operations. Like the So-
viet bloc, however, it continues to reject UN levies
for peacekeeping operations it does not approve of.
SPANISH RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC 17
By taking a less restric-tive policy toward the bloc,
Madrid probably hopes to strengthen its hand in bases
talks with the US, as well as to increase Spain's
stature in the Western community.
5 July 63
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~vESTERN HEMISPHERE
REACTIONS TO ET,ECTION OF BELAUNDE IN PERU
Most Peruvians are relieved to have a civilian Pres-
ident again; few erect him to ltee his elaborate
reform romises.
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5 July 63
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`"" SECRET v
PEIPING AND MOSCOW COME TO GRIPS
The long-awaited Sino-Soviet
"unity talks" seem certain to
usher in a period of even more
ruthless fighting inside the
Communist world and might even
lead to an explosion which would
forma~.ly cut the bloc in two.
Each side has abandoned all
pretense of "friendly disagree-
ment,-" and their naked power
struggle has led to an open
deterioration of state as well
as party relations. While each
side is girding itself for
continued strife, however, both
are wrestling with the problem
of how to escape the onus for
the ever-widening breach while
pressing home further attacks.
This disposition on both
sides argues against a formal
break during the talks or in
the immediate future. The more
likely outlook is for continued
maneuvering centering about what
is probably the only negotiable
issue left--whether or not to
hold a world conclave of Com-
munists soon.
Because the two antagonists
have long since foreclosed gen-
uine discussion, the present
talks seem destined to deal more
with procedural questions than
with the important substantive
issues which stand between them.
The Chinese, who made important
gains at the-'fast international
conclave of Communist leaders,
will probably press for another
such gathering when it is clear
the Russians will give no ground
in bilateral negotiations. If
Moscow turns down this sugges-
tion, Peiping will probably
make an open appeal to other
Communist parties.
The Chinese Communists
apparently believe the tide
is running with them and regard
the Moscow encounter as an
opportunity to expand their in-
fluence in the world Communist
movement. Probably for this
reason Peiping chose not to
launch a polemical attack
against Moscow's expulsion of
Chinese diplomats who had been
spreading anti-Soviet prop-
aganda, and has reacted with
restraint to the obviously
staged attack on its embassy.
Nevertheless the Chinese point-
edly reserved the right to re-
open the matter in due course
Peiping's optimism concern-
ing its present and future pros-
pects in the world movement was
given impetus by its recent im-
portant tactical victory in Bel-
gium. Provided with money and
support by the Chinese, sympa-
thetic Belgian Communists have just
split their party and formed a
pro-Peiping splinter group--the
first such organization in West-
ern Europe. This development
is another indication that Pei-
ping's appeal transcends geo-
graphic and racial considera-
tions.
A dissident Communist group
in Brazil which favors the mili-
tant Chinese line has already
set up a separate party. Pei-
ping has supporters--as yet
lacking formal organization--
in most of the other Latin Ameri-
can Communist parties. Moscow
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'~ SECRET `~
was sufficiently concerned over
Chinese inroads in Uruguay to
counsel the head of the party
there to purge such elements be-
fore they staged a coup.
Peiping now enjoys support
from the major Communist parties
in New Zealand, Indonesia, and
Japan. In Australia, a revolt
against pro-Russian party
leaders may be in progress. Among
the Asian Communist nations,
the North Koreans are solidly
behind Peiping. The North Viet-
namese are still seeking to main-
tain a middle position, despite
heavy pressure from the Chinese.
Hoping to enter talks in
the best possible light, Moscow
is still refraining from open
polemics and will probably at=
tempt to maintain a public pas-
ture of dignified authority.
The discrepancy between the
length of Khrushchev's address
to the plenum--more than four
hours--and its printed version
suggests the latter was heavily
cut to suppress extensive and
reportedly scurrilous attacks
on the Chinese.
Khrushchev probably put
forward similar views at the
meeting of satellite leaders
who gathered in Berlin, osten-
sibly to celebrate Ulbricht's
birthday. The sudden announce-
ment of the gathering and the
disarray suggested by the stag-
gered arrival of various leaders
indicate it was a rapidly im-
provised affair, probably
designed to lay down the line on
coming tactics and provide a
display of unified support for
Moscow.
As a demonstration of
satellite solidarity, however,
the Berlin meeting was marred
by the absence of Rumanian Com-
munist leader Gheorghiu-Dej.
Khrushchev made a hurried trip
to Bucharest on 24 June in what
was probably a last-minute
effort to persuade the Rumanians
that they must abandon their
opposition to Moscow on questions
of bloc economic integration.
The stirrings of independ-
ence within the bloc, as demon-
strated by the troubles with
Rumania, can be expected to
strengthen Russian resistance
to Peiping's demands for a world-
wide Communist meeting. Any
proposal an this score agreed to
by Moscow will almost certainly
contain numerous devices to en-
sure delay. In such an impasse,
each side can be expected to
respond with unbridled assaults
on the other.
ship.
The Soviets are likely to
break their own restraint on
polemics and publish the "secret"
speeches of Khrushchev and his
subordinates. The Chinese have
as much as promised to renew
their attacks. If, after a
period of such open warfare,
it appears to the Chinese that
Moscow intends to stall indefi-
nitely on the question of an
international meeting, Peiping
might call for an all-part y
gathering under Chinese sponsor-
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KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECHES IN EAST GERMANY
The Soviet premier's re-
cent visit to East Germany, os-
tensibly to take part in cele-
brations of Walter Ulbricht's
70th birthday, further reflected
Moscow's desire to keep lines
open to the West against the
prospect of an even sharper de-
terioration of intrabloc rela-
tions following the Sino-Soviet
talks.
Khrushchev's speeches dur-
ing the visit were restrained
in tone. He reiterated the
need for a German peace treaty
but again without spelling out
any deadline. He introduced
no new proposals on Berlin and
Germany. In his mayor address
on 2 July he was obliged, given
his audience of East German party
faithful, to rebuke President
Kennedy for his speeches in
West Germany and West Berlin.
However, Khrushchev again re-
ferred favorably to the Presi-
dent's 10 June speech and its
"sober appraisal" of the world
situation.
The 2 July speech contained
a new proposal designed to give
the forthcoming three-power test-
ban talks in Moscow an appearance
of increased scope and promise.
In a marked shift of position,
Khrushchev dropped his long-
standing insistence that an in-
definite moratorium on under-
ground testing accompany an
agreement to ban nuclear test-
ing in the atmosphere, outer
space, and under water. This
shift, taken together with his
renewed favorable comment on
the President's 10 June speech,
was intended as a constructive
approach to East-West relations.
The new proposal, however,
calls for a NATO - Warsaw Pact
nonaggression treaty to be
signed "simultaneously" with
the partial test-ban agreement.
This dual proposal is obviously
aimed at achieving a bargaining
advantage at the outset of the
talks--beginning on 15 July,
Khrushchev may eventually indi-
cate a willingness to modify or
drop this link should he feel
the need to achieve some success
for his "peaceful coexistence"
strategy.
Refusal to drop the link,
however, probably would mean
that Khrushchev's main purpose
is to build a record of alleged
Western unwillingness to come
to any agreements on European
security. It would also indi-
cate that the Soviet leader con-
tinues to be more preoccupied
with forestalling the emergence
of a NATO nuclear force than
with a serious effort to reach
agreement with the West.
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Khrushchev's 21 June speech
to the Soviet central committee
plenum--published by Moscow a
week afterward--revealed his
deep concern over the erosion of
discipline in party ranks and
warned that deviation from the
lU^emlin line could result in
expulsion from the party.
In tones which were at once
defensive and threatening, Khru-
shchev condemned the attempts
of "Western imperialists" to
separate the Soviet party from
the people through a campaign
of ideological subversion, and
lashed out at those within the
party who have been "duped" by
bourgeois ideology. Calling
for a hatred of the "class
enemy" which knows neither
national boundaries nor family
ties, he branded support of the
"peaceful coexistence" of West-
ern and Communist philosophies
as a betrayal of Marxism. He
suggested that the party rid
itself of all those guilty of
such deviation--"the quicker
the better."
While most of his remarks
were addressed to the Soviet
intelligentsia, it seemed clear
that he was in fact speaking to
the party as a whole. His under-
lying theme seemed to be an ad-
mission that widespread disbelief
in Communist ideals and growing
acceptance of Western concepts
--detailed in party secretary
Ilichev's address which opened
the plenum--had infected the
party itself. He declared that
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5 July 63
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only "simpletons" believe in
Western freedom and denounced
those who accept ideological
coexistence as "bourgeois agents
in our midst," Sorne cohesion
of views among those guilty of
such doctrinal deviation was
suggested by his remark that
they "form a bind of party
of nonparty people." Khrushchev
stressed again and again the
unity of the party and its close
ties with the people. He re-
affirmed the leading role of
the party in all areas of life,
and made it clear in the strong-
est terms that Kremlin decisions
are unconditionally binding an
all Conununists.
Khrushchev revealed his
personal sensitivity to charges
of complicity in Stalin's crimes
--an implicit theme in the
polemic between the regime and
the liberally oriented intel-
lectuals--and implied that he
had carried the day against
certain top leaders who opposed
his revelation of Stalin's mis-
deeds because they themselves
had aided and abetted reign by
terror. In addition, he defended
himself against recent charges
of a return to "Stalinist methods"
by stating that those who join
the class struggle on the side
of the "lculak" should not be
"offended" if they receive hard
blows.
Despite his harsh words,
Khrushchev's specific attitude
toward the intelligentsia was
reminiscent of the aftermath
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The Communist World
of the Pasternak affair in
19.59 when--the extremes of open
nonconformity having been
curbed--he attempted to estab-
lish a mare normal relation-
ship with Soviet writers and
artists, but without encourag-
ing new outbreaks from the
iiberals. He demanded obedience
to the party,but his remarks
generally lacked the high pitch
of anger in his March speech
to the intelligentsia.
Of the recalcitrant intel-
lectuals recently under critical
fire, only the writer Viktor
Nekrasov was treated as beyond
redemption. Nekrasov had pub-
licly cited his honor "as a
communist" as his reason for
refusing to recant, and insisted
that he would continue to write
"the genuine truth" for which
he had fougcit in the trenches of
Stalingrad. Khrushchev demanded
that the party expel members
who failed to obey even after
a party decision had been made.
In the final portion of
the published speech, Khru-
shchev expressed his frustra-
tion with economic planners
who follow traditional pat-
terns and resist changes in
technology. He proposed that
the party "take planning into
its own hands." His comment
that Gosplan "cannot cope
with this work on its own"
suggests that the party's
relationship to the planning
organs will be formalized in
some manner.
His general tone was one
of discouragement over the
failure of past programs, but
he offered no new solutions
to old problems. He again pro-
posed a moratorium on new con-
struction starts, perhaps for
the year 1964. The almost
verbatim repetition of previous
solutions suggests his bewilder-
ment at the persistence of
overcommitment in the invest-
ment program.
Despite his veiled threats,
Khrushchev apparently made only
one concrete proposal in cultural
policy, urging a reorganization
of the press and of publishing
houses so that tighter control
could be exercised by party
ideological workers. There
may have been other proposals,
however, and his entire speech
may well have been much more
harsh in tone than would. appear
from the published version.
According to the embassy in
l~loscow, the speech was heavily
edited--perhaps by as much as
half--and in the original
version was "replete with un-
printable phrases."
He again urged priority
for the chemical industry,
stressing its consumer goods
orientation, and hit especially
the need far increased. mineral
fertilizers. There are other
signs that the seven-year goal
for this commodity may have
been raised sharply.
He indicated that a "regu-
lar central committee plenum"
will discuss development of
the chemical industry, but
gave no hint of when this
plenum will take place. 25X1
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PEIPING CURTAILS PEASANT FREEDOMS AND INCENTIVES
Peasant freedoms in Com-
munist China have been curtailed
in recent months in a new ef-
fort to curb "spontaneous cap-
italist tendencies" and to
strengthen collectivization.
Peiping has denounced the view
widely held both inside and
outside China that the slight
increase in agricultural pro-
duction in 1962 was due chiefly
to private plots and not col-
lectivization. In contrast,
earlier actions by the regime
had indicated an appreciation
that incentives cause peasants
to increase production; its
present actions reflect a con-
cern that increased incentives
bring in their train reduced
ideological commitment and
stronger resistance to political
controls.
After the retreat from the
commune system in 1960, peasants
were given considerable freedom
to raise pigs, chickens, vege-
tables, and other produce on
their own. Since the end of
1962, however, such opportunities
have been greatly restricted.
col-
lective farms have been to ng
back land reclaimed by individ-
ual peasants in 1962 at the
urging of the regime, although
the private plots assigned in
1961 have not yet been touched.
The regime has also been requisi-
tioning night soil accumulated
for private plots and needed to
maintain their fertility. ~~
According to the Chinese
Communist press, collective farms
are limiting the number of side-
line activities and tightening
supervision over those still pert
mitted. For example, they have
begun to assign production quotas
for pork, chickens, and eggs,
thereby transforming a freedom
into an obligation.
One crude device for en-
forcing the new rural restric-
tions is the "class struggle,"
which is being used to restrict
the influence of any peasant
who has ever accumulated a
little wealth for himself. The
technique is to classify peas-
ants as "poor," "lower middle,"
and "upper middle" and to declare
the last group ineligible for. the
management committee of the col-
lective farm. The Chinese Com-
munists have warned that "new"
upper middle peasants--including
those who took advantage of re-
gime-encouraged activities last
year to make money--can be especi-
ally stubborn believers in capital-
ism .
Although the
"class strug-
gle"
discriminates
against
the
gent
the
more energetic
peasants and
efficiency of
and
thus
the
intelli-
reduces
collective,
25X1'
collective system.
Peiping evidently feels that it
is necessary to strengthen the
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NORTH KOREA'S DETENTION OF US PILOTS
Pyongyang, in an effort to
wring political concessions
from the US, apparently intends
to continue holding two US army
officers forced down just north
of the demilitarized zone in
Korea on 17 May. They have
already been detained far
longer than Pyangyang held its
last US prisoner--11 days in
1958.
The incident was immedi-
ately labeled an act of "ag-
gression" by the North Koreans,
and seized upon as a pretext
to step up their complaints
about other alleged US intru-
sions into North Korean ter-
ritory and violations of the
Korean armistice agreements.
All requests at Korean Military
Armistice Commission (MAC)
meetings that the officers be
freed have been countered by
these charges. Until the most
recent MAC meeting on 29 June
the North Koreans refused even
to comment on the physical con-
dition of the prisoners. At
that session they claimed that
the captives are in "normal
condition," but would not
elaborate.
Beyond interrogation of
the captives for intelligence
purposes, Pyongyang's immediate
objective is apparently to use
them to wrest from the US a
public apology for the incident
and possibly a pledge to prevent
further violations of North
Korean territory. At the 29
June MAC meeting, Pyongyang
said that it would not accept
comfort packages for the men
until the US apologized "be-
fore the Korean people." Pyong-
yang has ignored an apology on
behalf of the UN command in
Korea tendered privately at an
earlier MAC session.
It.is not yet clear whether
even a formal US apology would
secure the release of the of-
ficers. There have been some
hints that the North Koreans
may plan to hold the men as
long-term political hostages.
The captives have repeatedly
been referred to by Pyongyang
as "criminals" in an echo of
Chinese Communist practice
with regard to the US prisoners
Peiping continues to hold.
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Y UG( ~~,AV GOVERNMENT FADERS
KOLISHEVSKI
NEW GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
Socialist Alliance of the Working
People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY),
headed by Kolishevski,
stage-manages elections.
CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT
(headed by Jovanovi c)
PARLIAMENT
approves nominates
(ects (presided over by Kardelj) elects
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (FEC),
chaired by Stambolic, includes heads of
STATE
SECRETARIATS
FEC
SECRETARIATS
FEC
COMMITTEES
PRESIDENTIAL
COUNCIL
JOVANOVIC
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC (Tito)
VICE-PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC
(Rankovi c)
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During the 29-30 June session
of Yugoslavia's new parliament,
Tito divested himself of all
his governmental posts except
the federal presidency. He
now has distributed political
responsibilit~.es more widely
and applied for the first time
his policy of rotating leading
personnel. Having long wished
to play a less active role,
Tito has prepared. the way far
a successor regime but retains
indefinitely the power to in-
fluence the course of events
decisively.
By naming his chief party
deputy, Aleksander Rankovic, to
the federal vice -presidency,
Tito has designated his heir.
Although Rankovic is not in an
uncontestable position to suc-
ceed eventually to Tito's total
power, he now is clearly the
leading contender. Tito's choice
may have been governed in large
part by the fact that Rankovic,
despite his secret police con-
nections, is considered more
personable and a better admin-
istrator than his chief rival,
theoretician and policy-maker
Edvard Kardelj, some of whose
previous functions Rankovic
will now assume.
As the new president of
Parliament, Kardelj will re-
main a leading political figure,
especially since Parliament is
expected now to assume for the
first time an active role in
policy formulation. However,
in Communist systems it is the
administrators who are in the
best positions to build per-
sonal followings, and Kardelj,
therefore, has probably been
seriously handicapped in pre-
paring for the coming succes-
sion struggle.
In addition to relinquish-
ing the premiership--now to be
downgraded to a mere adminis-
trative post--to Petar Stam-
bolic, Tito ceded the presi-
dency of the mass political
organization (SAWPY) to Lazar
Kolishevski, formerly Macedonia's
leading political figure.
SAWPY has been one of the
sources of power of Rankovic,
until now its secretary general.
It now will become a separate
factor in the Yugoslav politi-
cal equation, having influence
primarily as the regime's
mechanism for dispensing polit-
ical patronage.
The head of the country's
new Constitutional Court is to
be Blazo Jovanovic, the former
boss of bZontenegro, wha has
been kicked u stairs.
his
selection suggests that the
new court will fail to realize
its potential as a distinct
political force.
Concurrent with the shifts
at the federal level, extensive
personnel changes have been
made in the six republics.
For the most part, the new
leaders are newcomers to
prominence, consistent with
Tito's intent to regenerate
the regime and make room for
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BURMA
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I_at HOIIanR ~ - _~
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Jarres
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VIETNAM.
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 Approved For Release 2008/06/25: CIA-RDP79-00927A004100040001-4
~ SECRET ~
Premier Souvanna and Pathet
Lao leader Souphannouvong have
i;aken a step toward their first
meeting since early May. They
have agreed on the Plaine des
James airfield as the site
for preliminary talks of lower
off icials. These talks, for
which no date has been set, are
to prepare the way for a "summit
conference" between the two
leaders.
Although the Communists
have not revealed their present
conditions fair negotiations,
they are not expected to depart
significantly from previous
positions. These included. a
demand for the de facto division
of Laos into two zones, one
occupied by the Pathet Lao and
neutralists and the other by the
conservative, forces of General
Phoumi.
Since the Pathet Lao probably
have no intention of making con-
cessions, they may well decide
to abort the talks by accusing
the neutralists of bad faith.
Souphannouvong has already pub-
licly stated that if the rightists
and Kong Le "reactionaries" con-
tin*ae their attacks in the Plaine
des Jarres, their actions will
"obstruct the talks." He has
also sharply criticized the re-
cent takeover of the French
air base at Seno by Phoumi's
air force and could use this
as an excuse to call off the
negotiations.
Meanwhile, the Communists
continue their military pressures
in various sectors. In sauth-
central Laos, the neutralists
have established tenuous posi-
tions north of Nhommarath on
Route 8 and southwestward toward
Thakhek.
In the Attopeu area. the
situation remains quiet, but
there are indications that the
Pathet Lao may be building up
for an attack later this month.
The scale of fighting
in the Plaine des Jarres and
near Vang Vieng, north of
Vientiane, remains limited
to smal]._scale skirmishing and
inconclusive artillery duels,
with no significant advances b
either side.
SECRET
5 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
BUDDIIISTS STILL AT ODDS WITH SOUTH VIETNAM REGI1lIE
Relations between the South
Vietnamese Government and the
Buddhists remain tense despite
the compromise agreement of 16
June on five s~ccific Buddhist
demands to end religious dis-
crimination.
The Buddhist hierarchy has
expressed skepticism of the
government's intention to im-
plement the agreement, citing
in particular continued surveil-
lance of pagodas and the regime's
failure to provide full data on
'the whereabouts of persons
arrested during recent Buddhist
demonstrations. Buddhist
leaders plan to resume demon-
strations and propaganda appeals
abroad, and to stage further self-
immolations if the regime pro-
crastinates any longer. Such
activities could in turn lead
to new disorders.
Although the government
is beginning to publicize its
steps to carry out the agree-
ment, there are signs that it
may merely be buying time.
Official attempts to portray
the Buddhists as tools of the
regime's foreign and domestic
enemies. including the Communist
guerrillas, suggest that Presi-
dent Diem's long-range strategy
may contemplate a crackdown on
some Buddhist leaders and co-oper-
ating student groups. Diem's
awn suspicions of Buddhist mo-
tives probably are reinforced by
pressure from his brother and
political adviser Ngo Dinh Nhu,
who has opposed all concessions.
Although the moderate Bud-
dhist leadership has so far tried
tc keep the dispute focused on
the religious issues, some
Asia-Africa
Buddhist priests apparently
are thinning increasingly in
terms of political action
aimed at ousting the Diem regime.
While they continue to assert
that they will not let themselves
be exploited politically,
some of the younger, more militant
clergy have recently indicated
increased receptivity to approaches
by Diem's non-Communist political
opponents. These Buddhists
allege that time is running
out on the Diem government and
on its chances of achieving a
real victory over the Viet Cong.
Diem's handling of the
Buddhist affair has aroused
considerable official as well
as o ular restiveness ~
The Buddhist crisis has
so far had little appreciable
effect on military operations
against the Viet Cong, and the
government has recently inflicted
heavy losses on them. However,
the number of Viet Cong attacks
also rose sharply in the last
week of June,:des ite the rain
season.
SECRET
July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE {MEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 10
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"~
ITURI
gu?i?*,
KONGO CENTRAL rtenge "RiKwn 2 ..A?t~ ~ LOMANI ~" '
.._..~_ .: .. _1 ....~......,.
KWANGO "~~~rk?p? `~''~sai i
f',.:
TF
KasAie""e :i~?' NORD KATANGA
EAST
KATANGA
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Proposed New Provincial
Boundaries
p National cap'.tal
* Provincial capital
Areas in dispute
(R indicates subject to refererdum)
(Arrows indicate disputants)
~_~}p 200 Mies
~-
100 200 Kiiome[ers
'?~*Coquilh?tville
GUVETTE CENTRAL
Round?+les boe?~ peers tnrevpolatvd from existing rrsaps
.end irz: olligenrP reporac, sand are not de/i~sitii~P_
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~ SECRET ~
ADOULA GETS A BREATHER IN THE CONGO
The Congolese Parliament.,
in session since March, recessed
on 26 June until 2 September,
giving Premier Adoula a two-
month breather. Despite Adoula's
lack of control, opposition
deputies made only halfhearted.
forays against him, and rival
forces seemed content to con-
centrate on reorganizing their
political groupings with an
eye to next year's elections.
The anti-Adoula "nationalist"
camp has suffered a new reverse
in the ouster of violently
anti-Western Georges Grenfell
as president of the Haut Congo
Province at Stanleyville. Two
weeks ago Grenfell had intimi-
dated the provincial assembly
into electing him, but Leopold-
ville made it clear new assembly
elections would be held if
Grenfell were not removed.
On 29 June, Adoula extended
de jure recognition to Holden
Roberto's Angolan government
in exile. Minister of Justice
Bomboko said the move was
necessary to avoid being "out-
paced by the extremists," and
designed to bolster the Roberto
group against its rival, the
Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola (MPLA) favored by
the more radical African states.
Adoula feared the growing
interest of other African states
in Angola--highlighted by Al-
gerian Premier Ben $ella's offer
of 10, 000 Arab volunteer fighters
--would diminish hi's own role
in the Angolan independence move-
ment and inevitably pose a
threat to his domestic position.
He also wanted to get the jump
on the nine-country African
SECRET
anxious to succeed him.
July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUR4MARY
Liberation Committee meeting
in Dar-es-Salaam which he
feared might endorse the-MPLA.
Nevertheless, Adoula does
not plan to break diplomatic
relations with the Portuguese,
who have the ability to disrupt
Congolese trade. He believes
that the presence in the Congo
of a large Portuguese colony
and Portuguese investments
will prevent any strong response
from Lisbon, and in fact
Portugal's initial reaction
has been mild.
Moise Tshombd remains in
a medical clinic in Paris where
he has been since 16 June. In
his absence the Congo Parlia-
ment further undercut him by
abolishing South Katanga,
of which he was president. In
May it had split off-the
western part of his province
to form the new Lulalaba Province
An "East Katanga" now has
been set up largely out of what
remained of South Katanga.
Leopoldville has indicated
there will be new provincial
elections. Tshombd could
probably win the presidency in
Lulalaba, his tribal strong-
hold, and perhaps still in
East Katanga, but his absence
has left the field to others
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Premier Ben Fella continues ( ervations regarding Ben Bella,
to face widespread opposition 1 but have not joined forces with
as shown by recent arrests and a
small-scale mutiny among troops
in eastern Algeria.
There is yet no sign that
his position is seriously chal-
lenged, however, for his elim-
ination of most of the old po-
litical leaders has magnified
disorganization among the op-
position. Ousted labor and
political leaders, discontented
veterans, disappointed office
seekers, and dissatisfied in-
tellectuals have yet to find
a leader. In late June the
government arrested Mohamed
Boudiaf , one figure who might
have united them. Boudiaf
had broken with Ben Bella last
year.
Ferhat Abbas, president
of the constituent assembly
and first head of the pre-
independence provisional Algerian
government, recently counseled
Ben Bella to slow down his
socialization measures. While
the traditionally influential
and wealthy Algerian families
look upon Abbas with some favor,
there is little evidence that
they give him either direct or
substantial backing, and Abbas
himself probably would not ac-
cept an open alliance with them.
The Berbers in the Kabylie,
east of .Algiers, still have res-
Abbas. They distrust- him be-
cause he helped Ben Bella gain
power a year ago. Belkacem Krim,
potential leader of forces in
the Kabylie if armed :dissidence
develops in that area, and
Mohammed Khider, the radical
ousted head of the country's
only legal political party, are
both in Cairo now and may be
seeking Nasir's support.
The only visible effect of
the political currents is to
make Ben Bella talk and act
tougher. The one serious rival
to his position is army com-
mander Col. Boumedienne, who
has no national following out-
side the army. Ben Bella
knows that as long as Boumed-
ienne and the army are be-
hind him he controls the single
most effective element required
to preserve power.
Ben Bella's financial
position has been temporarily
eased by the promise of some
$160 million in cash and cred-
its from the French Govern-
ment. He can thus pay some
salary arrears and government
debts, but the respite is not
likely to endure for more than
two to three months. In the
meantime, he faces a deadline
for promulgating a constitu-
tion and holding parliamentary
elections by the end of Sep-
SECRET
5 July 63
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SECRET
CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA IN THE UN
Other independent African
states--flushed with their suc-
cess in preventing South Africa's
participation in the recent
General Conference of the Inter-
national Labor Organization (ILO)
--will push their drive to
isolate that white-supremacist
regime still further when the
UN General Assembly convenes
on 17 September. Their vehe-
mence at the ILO indicates that
the Africans will denounce
South Africa's membership in
all international organizations
when the UN Security Council
meets later this month to con-
sider sanctions against the
Verwoerd government because of
its apartheid policies.
The major aim of the Af -
ricans is to rid the continent
of all vestiges of colonialism,
including Verwoerd. Thirty-one
African states--aided and ad-
vised by the Arab states, es-
pecially the UAR, and the Soviet
bloc--wallced out of the Jude
ILO conference when the chair
recognized the South African
Government delegate's right to
address the assembly. Because
the ILO constitution does not
provide for any legal method to
oust a member, the Africans
hoped that their boycott would
force South Africa to withdraw.
However, it did not, and the
conference continued under a
hastily elected Danish presi-
dent after the Nigerian presi-
dent departed.
The African protest never-
theless resulted in a decision
on 29 June by the ILO governing
body to bar South Africa from
all its elected bodies and meetings
and to consider at next year's
conference constitutional
amendments which would permit
outright expulsion from the 44-
year-old organization
While the African states
will continue in various inter-
national organizations to press
for action designed to force
South Africa to end apartheid,
they may not go to the extreme
of boycotting the UN itself or
the World Health Organization.
SECRET
5 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
Iraq; The advance of Iraqi
Army un is into Kurdish-held ter-
ritory appears to have slowed and
is confined mostly to easily pass-
able roads. Extensive bombing and
strafing of Kurdish villages contin-
ues, but ground engagements have
been on a small scale. Kurdish hit-
and-run attacks against the Iraqi
Petroleum Company's pipeline have
caused brief interru tions of the
oil flow.
Syria; A temporary compro-
mise apparently has been reached
between the Baathists who domi-
nate the Syrian Government anti
Army Chief of Staff Hariri fol-
lowing attempts by them to oust
a number of his army supporters.
A Baathist effort
to orce Har~.ri's resignation
seems to have foundered on his
strong support in the army, as
well as among certain civilian
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SECRET
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SECRET
Europe
PROSPECT FOR CONFIRMATION OF ITALY'S CARETAKER REGIME
The Socialist Party's de-
cision to abstain makes it vir-
tually certain that Italian
Premier Leone's all - Christian
Democratic government will win
a vote of confidence in Parlia-
ment. Establishment of this
administrative government will
provide a breathing spell for
the seriously divided Socialists
to prepare for their national
congress in October, which will
decide an the orientation of
the party. In the meantime,
both rightists and Communists
will continue to seek ways to
topple Leone.
The vote in the Socialist
central committee meeting on 2
July on the abstention issue
was reportedly 45 in favor and
34 against--presumably from the
left wing. The principal reason
behind the decision to abstain
is probably fear that, if Leone
fails, President Segni might
call for new elections--in which
the Socialists are convinced
they would do poorly. Although
there is press speculation that
the party's left-wing members of
Parliament might revolt and vote
against Leone anyway, the Social-
ists have generally observed
party discipline in parliamentary
voting in the past and, as the
confirmation vote is an open one,
a revolt is probably unlikely.
The other center-left par-
ties--the Social Democrats and
the Republicans--will follow the
Socialist lead and abstain. The
Communists on the left and the
Liberals, Monarchists, and neo-
Fascists on the-right are ex-
pected to vote against Leone.
Although Leone has indicated
his intention to step down
after the 1964 national budget
is passed in October and after
the Socialist national congress
that month, his government may
not last even that long. Right-
wing Christian Democrats and the
rightist parties will seek op-
portunities to bring him down
by attempting to exacerbate dif-
ferences among the parties sup-
porting him. Right-wing Chris-
tian Democrats probably favor
holding new elections in the be-
lief that their party could re-
gain some of the votes it lost
to the Liberals in April, there-
by conceivably opening opportu-
nities to abandon the center-
left formula.
The Communists would cer-
tainly favor new elections in
the expectation of making sub-
stantial gains. The party is
increasingly aggressive as a
result of its electoral gains
in April and can be expected to
press hard to bring down the
Leone government. The Commu-
nists may initiate strikes--
perhaps using rising living
costs as a pretext--to embar-
rass and discredit the Social-
ists, who are still joined with
them in Italy"s largest labor
union.
The time available far ac-
complishing Leone's downfall
by parliamentary vote will be
limited, however, inasmuch as
Parliament is normally recessed
from mid-Jul to earl October
SECRET
5 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUP.Zll21'iRY
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v SECRET ~
Europe
FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH THE UN
France's attitude toward
the UN has recently altered in
certain respects. Paris is
more amenable to UN involvement
in the Middle East, and has
hinted it might eventually pay
its arrears from the Congo oper-
ation. There has been no change,
however, in the French position
that the UN doss not have the
power to levy on sovereign mem-
bers for operations they da not
approve of. France last month
joined with the Soviet bloc
countries in opposing a plan
adopted by the General Assembly
for financing UN peacekeeping
operations.
The plan was contained in
five general resolutions involy-
ing financing-and a sixth which
reduced peacekeeping assessments
for 85 "economically less-devel-
oped countries" and placed the
cost burden on some 26 econom-
ically advanced countries. Both
France and the USSR maintain
that the General Assembly's in-
trusion into the field of peace-
keeping operations is illegal..
~"~hils France abstained
on a resolution for financing
the UN Emergency Force in the
Middle East, it announced that
it would continue voluntary con-
tributions to this peacekeeping
operation and indicated it would
also pay its share of incidental
costs borne mainly by the US
and the UK in the past. Ear-
lier Francs had increased its
contribution to the UN Relief
and Works Administration for
Palestine refugees. Such moves
nevertheless do not reflect any
basic change of attitude, because
France has generally approved
UN truce and peacekeeping opera-
bons in the Middle East and,
since the end of the Algerian
War, has shown an increasing
interest in playing a more ac-
tive role in the area.
France's debt to the UN
arises from its refusal to pay
the special assessments levied
for the Congo operation. It re-
jected an International Court of
Justice advisory opinion, which
in effect classified special
expenses as regular UN outlays
which must be paid for by all
UN members. The French have
bean hinting since spring, how-
ever, that ones the UN troops
are withdrawn fram the Congo,
some face-saving device would
be sought to permit payment of
arrears without compromising the
French view that such assess-
menu are not legally binding.
Unless France and the
Soviet bloc countries pay their
share of psaceksssping costs
authorized by the June resolu-
tions, they stand to loss their
votes at the First General As-
sembly meeting in 1964--a pen-
alty provided by Article 19 of
the UN Charter in cases of ar-
rearage. Francs denies that a
member country automatically
loses its vote for this reason,
arguing that the General As-
sembly must first establish the
fact of arrearage and subse-
quently make a decision either
to apply or waive the article.
While this position aligns
France with the Soviet bloc,
it is viewed sympathetically
by numerous one-crop-economy
nations which might in the event
of a crop failure be obliged
themselves to default on UN as-
sessments.
SECRET
5 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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?"' SECRET `~
Europe
SPAr1ISII r~ELA'I'IONS WITH TIME SOVIET BLOC
~l~'he Franco regime is mov-
ing toward a less restrictive
policy on contacts with the
Soviet bloc. It pr~abably hopes
thereby to strengthen its hand
in the forthcoming negotiations
for extension of the US bases
agreement anti also to increase
Spain's stature in the Western
community, Establishment of
diplomatic relations is unlikely,
however, although favored by a
number of government officials.
The absence of formal
diplomatic ties between Spain
and bloc members is ascribed.
by Madrid. in part to Soviet
refusal to return the half-
billion dollars worth of Spanish
gold sent to the Soviet Union
during the civil tivar for safe-.
keeping? The lack of diplomatic
tins, however, has not prevented.
certain official contacts
with r;7oscaw, and. semiofficial
trade agreements with all of
the satellites except Albania.
Recently, the Spanish Gov-
ernment has taken to rnaking of-
ficial replies to Russian moves.
Last April, Whell Khrushchev sent
through Soviet and Spanish em-
bassies in Paris a request for
clemency for the condemned
Spanish Communist Grima.u, Franco
sent an answer using the same
channels. Khrushchev's plea--
which r^ranco refused, primarily
to demonstrate to the world,
and particularly the West,
Spain's unswerving anti-Commu-
nist posture--was a routine one
which he occasionally makes to
non-Con~rnunist government leaders
vrhen local Conmiunists are given
death sentences ar long prison
terms. Early last month Spain
also replied to the Soviet note
on denuclearization of the Medi-
terranean by defending the
presence of nuclear submarines
in that area and criticizing
Soviet aggressive intentions.
The secretary general of
the Spanish syndicate organi-
zation of workers and. employers
recently informed. the US Embassy
in Madrid. that two Soviet
delegations had requested
visas to visit Spain. One of
these delegations wants to
observe workers in the textile,
agricultural, and mining sectors,
and. the other wishes to observe
the syndicate elections which
are to be in process during the
remainder of this year. Syn-
dicate officials have defended.
these contacts with the USSR
on the grounds that previous
efforts to establish relations
with US and Western European
trade unions had been rebuffed.
Cultural and. economic
exchanges with the Soviet Union
and its satellites include
Soviet participation in the
San Sebastian film festival,
visits by the Bulgarian
state orchestra and. ballet to
Barcelona, and bloc partici-
pation in the recent Barcelona
trade fair. The Spaniards
have stepped, up imparts of
Rumanian cement and Russian
fuel oil and heavy machinery,
and are displaying a wide
variety of bloc constureer items
in Madrid sho s...
SECRET
duly G' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY' SUMMARY
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PERUVIAN ELECTION STATISTICS - 9 JUNE 1963
PARTY
PRESIDENTIAL
VOTES
SENATORS
DEPUTIES
CANDIDATE
ELECTED
ELECTED
AP-P DC
Be launde
7U~, 662
20
50
APRA
Haya
623,501
18
58
UN O
Odri a
463, 085
7
27
UPP
Samame
19, 320
0
0
Independents
None
--
0
5
FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS IN PERU'S CENTRAL RESERVE BANK
1963
MILLION DOLLARS
100
31 May
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~"` SECRET
Western HernisplYere
The Peruvian National
Electoral Board on 28 June
officially proclaimed Fernando
Belaunde Terry President-
elect. Fie will begin his six-
year term on 28 July. The
board canfirmed that he had
garnered 39.05 percent of the
1,814,568 votes cast on 9 June.
Of the 70 congressmen
elected on the coalition ticket
of Belaunde's Accion Popular and
the Christian Democrats (AP-
PDC), 18 are known to be Com-
munists or pro-Communists.
The inclusion of these individ-
uals on the AP-PDC lists
probably explains the Communist
Party's avert support of Belaunde
throughout his campaign.
The leftist, anti-Communist
APRA elected '76 congressmen,
and the followers of ex-dictator
Manuel Odria 34. No known
Communists were elected on
either of these tickets.
In addition, the new con-
gress includes five independents:
one Communist, 'two suspected
Communists, one Socialist,
and one of unknown political
orientation.
Mast Peruvians appear to be
reacting to the election out-
come with moderate relief that
after a year of military rule a
civilian president has finally.
been chosen. Very few expect
Belaunde's admin3.stration to
bring any great change into
their daily "lives. Most of
them suspect that the far-
reaching reform programs he
advocated in his three campaigns
(1956, 1962, 1963) will be
watered down, and they believe
that Belaunde's military over-
seers will prevent any sizable
infiltration of the government
by Communists and pro-Communists.
Thus far, no significant
adverse comment has appeared
in Peruvian public media. APRA
charged that fraud had been
committed in two northern
provinces, but, when the
official tally showed that
APRA had won in bath provinces
by a greater margin than in
1962, the charges were quietly
forgotten.
Businessmen in Peru are
encouraged by Belaunde's
restraint since the election.
They point out that he has
not repeated his more national-
istic compaign statements
since election day, and they
cite his avowed in?ention to
work close7_y with the Alliance
for Px?ogress. An off icial of
the US Embassy in Lima commented
that "it is significant that
Peru's foreign exchange reserves
...remained relatively stable"
during the period from 31 May
to 18 June.
,SECRET
5 July 63
Page 19
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~ SECRET ~
Western Hemisphere
Ct?MMUNIST-BACKED STUDENT CQNGRESS IN BRA~II
The Goulart regime in Bra-
zil appears to be giving support
to the Communist-bacl;ed "Inter-
national Congress of Students
o:f Underdeveloped . Countx?ies"
scheduled for 7-14 July in Sal-
vador de Bahia.
The meeting is being
sponsored by the leftist Bra-
SECRET
5 July G3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE Z~EEKLY SUA4MARY Page 20
zilian National Union of Stu-
dents (UNE) in collaboration
with the Communist-dominated
International Union of Students,
which is providing funds.
Delegates from more than 90
nations and several inter-
national organizations are
expected to attend.
The Chinese Communists
are reportedly sending 14
delegates, who intend to pro-
mote the Chinese line and at-
tack Soviet views. The domi-
nant ideology of the UNE
leadership is said to be nearer
that of the Chinese than Mos-
cow's.
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SECRET
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