CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003900020002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 4, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/07/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900020002-8
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 January 1963
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 3 Jan)
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
OK
The UN is continuing to apply military pressure to
induce Tshombd to implement the UN reintegration plan.
After quickly winning control of Elisabethville, Kipushi,
and Kaminaville against only limited Katangan resistance,
UN forces moved on toward the key mining towns of Jadot-
ville and Koiwezi. The Katangan leader has posed the
threat of all-out war and a "scorched earth" policy, but
he has so far sought to avoid a major confrontation with
UN forces. In Leopoldville, Adoula has finally recessed
Parliament, and is pressing for the establishment of a
central government presence in southern Katanga.
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3 25X1
The Castro regime's fourth anniversary celebrations on OK
2 January featured an impressive display of Soviet-made mil-
itary equipment and a speech by Fidel Castro in which he
stressed Cuba's own defiant stand against the threats of
"imperialist aggression" and its continuing adherence to
the Sino-Soviet bloc. In his first public reference to
the Sino-Soviet dispute, Castro in effect appealed for an
end to "public discrepancies." Castro also stressed his
regime's continuing determination to be the spearhead for
the spread of Communism in Latin America. The military parade
preceding the speech was chiefly notable for the display of
surface-to-air and coastal defense cruise missiles. He
stated that Cubans are being trained in their operation.
There have been no signs of a reduction in the Soviet mil-
itary presence in Cuba.
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5 25X1
OK
'
s relatively restrained pronouncements on
Khrushchev
the New Year suggest that the Soviet leaders are still re-
assessing their policies in the aftermath of the Cuban
venture. Moscow's stress on the importance of improving
US-Soviet relations is being accompanied by increased
efforts by Soviet diplomats abroad to expand contacts with
US officials. Moscow's anti-US propaganda campaign over
the past two months, which clearly contradicts its inter-
national posture, is aimed primarily at tightening internal
controls. Although Khrushchev's greetings to President
Kennedy voiced hope that the new year would see a great
improvement in relations, Moscow has attacked the "warlike
statements" in the President's 29 December speech to the
Cuban refugees in Miami.
YUGOSLAV POLICIES AFTER TITO'S SOVIET VISIT . . . . . . . Page 7
In policy statements on 29 and 31 December, his first Ot:
since returning from the USSR, Tito indicated that Yugoslavia's
SECRET
i
BRIEFS
Approved For Release 2008/07/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900020002-8
 Approved For Release 2008/07/02 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900020002-8
SLCRET
4 January 1963
domestic and foreign policies are to remain generally un-
changed. Although a greater effort will be made to avoid
offending the Soviet bloc, nonalignment will continue
as the cornerstone of Belgrade's foreign policies. Tito's
main intent in his speeches was apparently to redirect
public and regime attention to his broad plans for re-
vitalizing the party and government.
COMMUNIST CHINA CONTINUES LARGE-SCALE PURCHASES OF GRAIN . Page 8
Peiping's purchase of 1.36 million tons of wheat--
announced on 28 December--brings its total grain purchases
from Australia since 1960 to over 5 million tons. Since
beginning large-scale grain purchases from the West in late
1960, China has contracted to buy about 14 million tons of
grain valued at about $900 million. Thus far it has met
its payments obligations, offsetting the strain on its thin
reserves of foreign exchange by drastic trade adjustments.
SOVIET-INDONESIAN FINANCIAL NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . Page 9
After stalling for three months, the Kremlin appar-
ently has agreed to revise the schedule for repayment ol.
Indonesia's de s to the Soviet Union. In a ~"f=
ter to Sukarno, khTushchev stated that was ready
to do "everything possible" to h~ndonesia pay off its
debts, including stretchi` `the repayment period over
20 to 25 years as requ'd b akarta. Khrushchev said
a Soviet economic ti would arri in Indonesia in Janu-
ary to work o4t Retails of repayment. oscow probably sees
little t ...ga n in continuing to avoid a s ement of the
debisue on Indonesia's terms and may view essions
as the only way to maintain its Indonesian aid pr
intact.
INDONESA,I,ING STRONGER EFFORT AGAINST MALAYSIA
Indonesia's invo e%wWt and objecties' he northern
Borneo territories have blecom rYtsince the short-
lived Brunei revolt. Alah an sified diplomatic
effort on behalf o4