CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003800070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 2, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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11
URRENT
C
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 73
OCI NO.0441/62
2 November 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE.
ARMY review(s)
completed.
SECRET
State Dept. review completed
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 1 Nov)
THE SITUATION IN CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Cuban forces remain on alert. Castro's domestic
position has apparently changed little thus far despite
Khrushchev's decision to remove the offensive missiles
from Cuba. Cuban propaganda continues to insist that the
Castro conditions are decisive in any disarmament of Cuba.
In talks with U Thant, the Cubans rejected any international
inspection of their territory.
SOVIET TACTICS IN THE CUBAN CRISIS . . . . . . . . , , . . Page 3
The Soviet leaders are seeking to salvage as much as
possible of their position in Cuba and to shore up their
world prestige after the unexpected strength of the US re-
action transformed what had been Khrushchev's boldest for-
eign policy gamble into his greatest defeat. The back-
down by the Soviet premier has been followed by repeated
assurances of Moscow's desire for an early settlement in-
tended to guard against any renewed danger of US military
action. At the same time, the USSR is seeking to contain
the damaging effects of the Cuban fiasco by portraying
Khrushchev's agreement to remove the missiles as a "major
victory for Soviet policy" which forestalled US aggression. 25X1
IMPACT OF THE CUBAN ADVENTURE ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP . . Page 5
The Cuban crisis is likely to produce new strains in
the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev seems to have opened him-
self to charges of adventurism in international affairs.
Some of his associates may feel that they now can move to
redress the balance of power in the party presidium. Any
move to put Khrushchev permanently in check, however,
would not be an easy undertaking.
IMPACT OF CUBA WITHIN THE COMMUNIST BLOC . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Moscow's decision to remove offensive weapons from Cuba
caught satellite leaders, as it did Castro, unprepared and
without guidance from the USSR. Except for Albania, the
European satellites are echoing Moscow's line portraying
Khrushchev's action as statesmanlike, :Forbearing, and re-
sponsible for preserving the peace. Khrushchev's conduct
of the Cuban affair, however, will probably strengthen the
doubts among those East European Communists who have long held
reservations about his policies. Communist China has in-
dicated in its propaganda that it regards Khrushchev's action
as a complete capitulation to the US enemy. Peiping can be
expected to exploit this view in its efforts to induce other
Communists to oppose Soviet primacy in the Communist move-
ment.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND THE CUBAN CRISIS . . . . . . . . Page 3
While the NATO countries joined in congratulating
President Kennedy for his leadership in the Cuban crisis,
the degree of their support varied considerably. The reasons
include special national interest and attitudes, domestic
political pressures, or reservations regarding specific as-
pects of past or present American policies toward Cuba. US
actions have also raised anew long-standing problems such
as other countries' desire for prior consultations and dif-
ferences over the geographic limits of NATO responsibility.
The highlighting of the weakness of individual European
nations relative to the superpowers may give a new spurt
to the drive for European economic and political unity.
ACTIVITIES OF CASTRO FOLLOWERS IN LATIN AMERICA . .
Page 11
There are indications that Castro has ordered some of his
supporters in Latin America to start militant action, but
he probably has not yet issued a general call mobilizing
all his assets for a campaign of sabotage and violence.
The Soviet-controlled sabotage apparatus in Latin America
has been alerted, but apparently will riot be put in action
unless"aggression" against Cuba occurs,.
SINO-INDIAN BORDER FIGHTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
After a series of reverses during the first week of
heavy fighting at both ends of the border, India has
apparently stiffened its resistance to Chinese Commu-
nist military pressure. New Delhi has appealed for arms
from the West in an attempt to overcome, China's advantage in
infantry firepower. Krishna Menon, removed as defense
minister after being blamed for heavy Indian losses, will
remain a close adviser to Nehru. Moscow's support of Chi-
nese proposals for settlement of the dispute has not
satisfied Peiping, which is seeking to have the Soviet
Union dissociate itself further from India.
HARVEST PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Grain production in Communist China in 1962 may be
only slightly better than the poor 1961 harvest and below
normal for the fourth straight year. The food situation
is therefore expected to remain stringent through the
coming winter and spring, and any resumption of a program
of industrial expansion will have to be postponed at least
another year.
THE SITUATION IN YEMEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Royalist tribes in northern and eastern Yemen, with
Saudi and Jordanian support, continue to resist the rAvnlli_
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A reorganization of the revolutionary government,
wnicn nas strengthened those elements most in sympathy
with the UAR, may precipitate religious strife and could
eventually result in more support for the royalist cause.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
Viet Cong forces are continuing their recent pattern
of small-scale, effective guerrilla activity throughout South
Vietnam while avoiding significant combat with regular
government troops. The Viet Cong apparently are still
building up their force strength throw h local recruitment
and infiltration.
CONGO DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
UN Under Secretary Bunche returned to New York from
Leopoldville on 29 October reporting no progress on the UN
reconciliation plan. The UN appears to be preparing to
strengthen its military posture in South Katanga to
mount new pressures on Tshombe. UN forces may try to move
outside Elisabethville to the mining towns of Kolwezi,
Jadotville, and Kipushi--a move which could trigger new
fighting. The Adoula government, fearful'of being over-
thrown, has not yet decided whether to allow parliament
to reconvene as scheduled on 5 November.
RESULTS OF THE FRENCH REFERENDUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
De Gaulle's failure to win the massive support he sought
in the 28 October referendum for popular election of future
French presidents may foreshadow a period of renewed parlia-
mentary instability after the National Assembly elections
late this month. Encouraged by their slowing in the refer-
endum, De Gaulle's opponents will probably continue to
press for a united effort against him, particularly in
the runoff vote on 25 November.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN . . . . . . . Page 1
General Franco, evidently convinced of the need for
associating Spain with the European Common Market, is
pushing forward with measures to liberalize the economy
and make Spain better able to compete in foreign markets.
His political changes to date, however, appear to be no more
than gestures designed to quiet fears at home and abroad re-
garding continuity of stable government and to create the im-
pression that political liberalization may be on the way. Never-
theless, the economic liberalization moves--notably in the
field of labor--and Spain's growing contacts with other Western
countries are likely to generate political ferment.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Military Situation
25X1
25X1
showed that no
definite steps had been taken
toward dismantling the weapons
and removing them from the
country. Launch stands, ca-
bling, and other launch compo-
nents which would probably be
the first items to be torn down
were still intact. Many of
the missile erectors at the
MRBM sites had been moved from
their hardstands
and were no longer visible.
There is evidence that at
least one of these erectors at
one site, plus other missile-
associated equipment, had been
concealed in nearby woods. As
long as the erectors remain
near the launching sites, they
remain fully operational.
An American U-2 photograph-
ic reconnaissance aircraft was
downed about noon Cuban time on
27 October. Cuban comment on
the event has been kept to a
minimum, and very few references
to the incident appeared in the
Cuban press and radio statements.
Castro had implied in a public
announcement earlier on 27
October that foreign aircraft
flying over Cuban territory
would be attacked, and Havana
radio claimed in mid-morning
that antiaircraft batteries
"drove off unidentified war
planes over wide areas of
eastern Cuba."
Cuban military forces are
continuing to improve their
state of readiness
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There is
no clear evidence of any whole-
sale disaffection or poor mo-
rale among Cuban military forces,
A 27 October mil-
itary ra io roadcast in Las
Villas Province ordered that
"severe measures" be taken
against those militiamen "who
may demonstrate a lack of loy-
alty toward the present regime."
Internal Conditions
Regime leaders
have made few speeches, and
there has been no effort to
organize the usual street dem-
onstrations and. protest meetings.
Civil defense activities were
continuing even after the 28
October announcement of the
Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange;
regime spokesmen, reflecting
the Castro line that further US
assurances must be given before
Cuba can accept any guarantee
that it will not be invaded,
stiJLl insist that the danger
of "US aggression" is as great
as ever.
Other evidences of the pro-
found impact of the crisis on
internal conditions include the
formation of numerous committees,
including one to draft Cuban
workers to serve wherever they
are needed, the most. Radiobroad-
casts indicate that strict
measures to control the sale
and distribution of gasoline and
motor oil have been decreed in
some areas, and Cuban commenta-
tors and local governmental
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
organs have issued strong warn-
ings against "scare buying" of
foodstuffs and other goods known
to be in short supply.
Havana radio announced on
31 October that a vessel loaded
with "gifts" of foodstuffs and
other goods from Czechoslavakia
would arrive in Havana on 1 No-
vember and that a Czech commer-
cial delegation would arrive
there in mid-November in order
to negotiate the Cuban-Czech
commercial agreement for 1963.
Soviet First Deputy Premier Mi-
koyan is to arrive in Havana on
2 November amid speculation
that his trip has been under-
taken to pressure Castro into
going along with the Soviet de-
cision on removal of the missile
bases or to extend some new So-
viet aid to Cuba as a sign of
the USSR's continuing underwrit-
ing of the Castro regime.
Castro's domestic position
has apparently changed little
thus far despite the announced
decision of Khrushchev to re-
move offensive missiles from
Cuba. Regime leaders have
reiterated Castro's 29 October
demands for a cessation of ex-
ile activities and the US evac-
uation of its Guantanamo base,
and Cuban propaganda media at
home and abroad continue to in-
sist that the Castro conditions
are decisive in any disarmament
of Cuba.
Reaction Outside Cuba
Latin American govern-
ments so far are responding
cautiously to the announcement
that the missile bases are to
be dismantled. Some are
apprehensive lest the US commit
itself beyond promising not to
invade Cuba, fearing that any
further commitments on the part
of the US could weaken its
ability to support them in their
struggle against Cuban sub-
version and Communist encroach-
ments.
Cuban exile groups are
generally despondent over the
latest turn of events, many
expressing the fear that any
US guarantee not to invade Cuba
would signify the end of their
hopes for liberating the island.
Several of the more militant
anti.-Castro groups, such as Alpha-
66 and the Revolutionary Student
Directorate, have reversed their
earlier decision not to continue
armed action against Castro.
United Nations
UN Acting Secretary General
Thant's talks with Castro in
Havana went badly. The Cubans
continue to refuse to accept
any form of international in-
spection or presence in their
territory. Thant may call for a
meeting of the Security Council
to report his lack of success
and request guidance regarding
the next steps to be taken by
the 'UN .
Meanwhile Secretariat of-
ficials have begun recruiting
officers and men to staff the
UN observation corps in Cuba.
They have run into considerable
difficulty with the neutrals,
who are reluctant to partici-
pate unless there is complete
agreement between the US and the
USSR. Thant had hoped to appoint
officers from Ethiopia, Nigeria,
Ghana, Sweden, Yugoslavia, the
UAR, Brazil, Mexico, and Switzer-
land. The US delegation com-
ments that appointing only
Brazil and Mexico to represent
Latin America is "politically
unwise." With the exception of
Switzerland, the other countries,
while considered to be neutral,
have not been particularly
sympathetic to the US position on
the Cuban crisis.
Secretariat officials have
also been negotiating with offi-
cials of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, which has
agreed to inspect shipping reach-
ing Cuba "if the US, the USSR, and
Cuba consent." The ICRC is think-
ing in terms of about 30 persons
who would come to New York for
briefings before proceeding to
the sites where the inspection
of vessels will take place.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET TACTICS IN THE CUBANN CRISIS
The Soviet leaders are
In this situation, he dis-
seeking to salvage as much as patched his long, rambling
possible of their position in
Cuba and to shore up their world
prestige after the unexpected
strength of the US reaction
transformed what had been
Khrushchev's boldest foreign
policy gamble into his greatest
defeat. The Soviet premier's
backdown on 28 October was mo-
tivated by his belief that US
military action was imminent.
His acceptance of President
Kennedy's terms for dismantling
and removal of offensive weapons
was a last-minute move to fore-
stall a US attack which would
have confronted the USSR with a
choice between accepting the
destruction of the missiles,
loss of Soviet lives, and possi-
bly the collapse of the Castro
regime, or making a response
which would have carried unac-
ceptable risks of escalation to
general war.
private letter of 26 October to
President Kennedy, indicating
in guarded language willingness
to accept the President's terms
for a settlement. In less than
24 hours, Khrushchev sent another
letter, which was published im-
mediately, in an effort to cover
his retreat and to stimulate
pressure on the US to begin
negotiations at once. This
letter, which contained Khru-
shcLLev's first public proposals
for a settlement, called for
reciprocal Soviet-US withdrawals
of offensive weapons from Cuba
and Turkey under international
supervision and for mutual non-
aggression guarantees covering
these two countries. Khrushchev
expressed the belief that it
was possible to "end the conflict
quickly" and that his scheme for
a Turkey-Cuba swap provided the
"basis for a settlement."
Khrushchev had become con-
vinced by 25-26 October that
the situation was critically
dangerous and that his maneuvers
in the days immediately follow-
ing President Kennedy's 22 Oc-
tober speech to gain time and
involve the US in protracted
negotiations were failing. He
decided that immediate action
was required to avert US mili-
tary action which would spell
complete disaster for his Cuban
venture, inflict enormous damage
on the USSR's world position,
and make the risks of any mean-
ingful Soviet response prohibi-
tive.
President Kennedy's 27
October letter stating that
Khrushchev's private proposals
of 26 October "'seem generally
acceptable" opened the way for
the Soviet premier's public
backdown on 28 October, when he
informed the President that a
'"new order" had been issued to
dismantle the missiles and to
"crate and return them to.,the
Soviet Union." Khrushchev used
this letter to begin developing
the justification for his re-
treat. He represented the
President's 27 October offer
to give assurances against an
invasion of Cuba as a formal
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
commitment and declared that,
in view of this alleged pledge,
"the motives which induced us
to render assistance of such a
kind (offensive weapons) to
Cuba disappear."
Khrushchev then moved
quickly to get negotiations
under way, to impress the US
with his good faith in carrying
out his commitments, and to
minimize Soviet responsibility
for any complications which
might arise.
Mikoyan's Mission to Cuba
Mikoyan's urgent trip to
Havana via New York reflects
the Soviet leaders' great con-
cern that Castro's attempts to
block an agreement could jeop-
ardize the negotiations, revive
the danger of US military action,
and thwart the USSR's efforts
to salvage its position in Cuba
and its international prestige.
His immediate assignment prob-
ably is to reassure US of-
ficials of Moscow's intention
to carry out its commitments
and to bring heavy pressure on
Castro to clear the way for an
early agreement.
In addition to trying to
bring Castro into line, Mikoyan
probably is under instructions
to work out coordinated negotiat-
ing tactics. Despite Moscow's
propaganda support for Castro's
"just; demands," it is unlikely
that Mikoyan will endorse Castro's
insistence on the return of the
Guantanamo naval base and termi-
nation of US economic sanctions.
He may, however, agree to sup-
port Cuban attempts to obtain
US guarantees extending beyond
President Kennedy's offer of
assurances against an invasion.
This line suggests that the
USSR and Cuba may call for
reciprocal pledges by the US,
Cuba, and various Latin American
countries to respect each other's
sovereignty and to refrain from
interference in each other's
internal affairs.
In his attempts to obtain
Castro's cooperation, Mikoyan
may be authorized to make new
offers of assistance. Several
members of his delegation are
economic and trade specialists.
Khrushchev's 28 October letter
make it clear that the Soviet
leaders will not "absolve our-
selves of responsibility for
rendering assistance to the
Cuban people."
Soviet Propaganda
for Soviet policy."
Moscow Radio is claiming
that President Kennedy's guar-
antee against an invasion of
Cuba is "precisely what the
Soviet Union and the Cuban
Government have tried to achieve
all the time." Moscow also
contends that its sole aim was
to bring about a "detente" over
Cuba and that the US-Soviet
agreement on terms for a settle-
ment constitute a "major victory
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
IMPACT OF THE CUBAN ADVENTURE ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
The Cuban crisis is likely
to produce new strains in the
Soviet leadership. Khrushchev
seems to be vulnerable to
charges of adventurism in inter-
national affairs and of exces-
sive domination of Soviet
foreign policy. Some of his
associates may feel that they
now can move to redress the
balance of power in the party
presidium.
The military buildup in
Cuba was clearly Khrushchev's
policy. With the aid of his
military advisers, he probably
sold it on the grounds that it
was a relatively fast and in-
expensive way to improve the
USSR's strategic military pos-
ture at a time when the Soviet
Government was pressed to al-
locate its strained resources
elsewhere. Unlike some other
Khrushchev policies--the in-
dustrial reorganization, for
instance--there has been little
or nothing to suggest that
Cuba had become a heated issue
within the leadership. While
the policy seems to have re-
ceived collective endorsement,
its reversal will probably
strengthen the hand of Khru-
shchev's detractors and may
weaken his authority at home.
Any move to put Khrushchev
permanently in check, however,
would not be an easy undertaking,
since it is unlikely that he
would acquiesce easily in the de-
mands of his colleagues. Over
the past five years he has been
able to build such an intricate
network of control over the
party, armed forces, and secret
police that no one apparently
has dared to challenge his
primacy. At the same time, he
now may feel that he is on the
defensive and that a challenge
can no longer be ruled out. If
this is the case, he would prob-
ably marshal his forces quickly
and attempt to make a dramatic
display of authority. For their
part, any members of the leader
ship who might be disposed to
throw down the gauntlet to
Khrushchev would probably seek
to champion the cause of the
military in its efforts to
garner a larger share of
economic resources.
Should Khrushchev need
scapegoats, there are several
likely possibilities at home.
Military advisers and intelligence
officials could readily come
under fire. Foreign Minister
Gromyko, who was in the United
States as late as 20 October but
evidently unable to report ac-
curately on US intentions, is
a particularly good target.
At this time, the leader-
ship is trying to give the
impression of business as usual.
On 28 October, Khrushchev and
most of his chief lieutenants
attended a theater performance
in Moscow, probably in an attempt
to demonstrate that the Cuban
crisis had not divided their
ranks. At the same time the
Soviet propaganda machine
started proclaiming Khrushchev
as the great defender of peace.
On 1 November, Mikoyan was
dispatched to Havana as a
special emissary. The choice
of Mikoyan, who is closely
associated both with Khrushchev
and with Cuba, was probably
intended to show that the
political balance of power in
Moscow is unchanged.
The Soviet leaders now may
give increased attention to
domestic affairs to divert
popular attention from Cuba and
to focus on the "full-scale
building of Communism" at home.
Plans for a major industrial
administrative reform--to be
considered at a central commit-
tee plenum sometime this month--
are believed to be still under
development.
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IMPACT OF CUBA WITHIN THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow's decision on 28
October to remove offensive
weapons from Cuba caught satel-
lite leaders, as it did Castro,
unconsulted, unprepared and
without guidance from the USSR.
All the European satellites,
with the usual exception of
Albania, are dutifully echoing
the Russian line portraying
Khrushchev as statesmanlike,
forbearing, and responsible for
saving the peace. This unani-
mous and almost automatic
propaganda response, however,
cloaks a probably highly diver
sified private reaction within
the bloc.
Khrushchev's whole con-
duct of the Cuban affair--
major risks followed by a major
backdown--will probably help
strengthen the doubts among
those Communists in Eastern
Europe who have long harbored
reservations about his policies.
The East German leadership in
particular will fear that it
must wait yet another turn for
progress on the Berlin problem.
The immediate reaction of middle-
level party and government of-
ficials in East Berlin on 28
October was reported to be
that Khrushchev's yielding on
Cuba would imply an indefinite
postponement of any action on
Berlin and on a separate peace
treaty.
East German officials be-
lieve that the signature of a
peace treaty and the creation or
a free city of West Berlin are
of vital importance to them as
the symbol of the stabilization
of their regime and the elimi-
nation of an immediate threat.
Disappointed in their expecta-
tions for the past four years,
they have tended toward bitter
--although necessarily covert--
criticism of Khrushchev for
sacrificing their basic in-
terests to the desire to con-
ciliate the United States.
Moscow's actions in the Cuban
crisis will be interpreted as
new evidence of Khrushchev's
weakness, indecision, and vacil-
lation, and will deepen their
discontent.
Poland and Hungary, whose
liberal regimes are dependent
on Khrushchev's support, were
dismayed at the deep risks
taken by the Soviet leader.
Until Ambassador Stevenson sup-
plied graphic proof, they simply
did not believe President Kennedy's
charges. Despite this, US of-
ficials have been treated by
both countries in a business-
as--usual manner; in Poland
numerous special efforts have
been made to show friendship.
Officials of both countries
have openly congratulated
American representatives on a
substantial victory. The at-
titudes of both countries can
be summed up in the words of
a Polish journalist, who said
if there must be war over Cuba,
the US should: (1) forbear
from use of nuclear weapons,
and (2) win it.
The more conservative
regimes in Czechoslovakia and
Rumania and the strong opposi-
tion in Bulgaria, which have
demonstrated a private preference
for Stalinist internal and ex-
ternal policies, will also find
much to criticize in Moscow's
policy. Although the implica-
tions that this policy can have
for Berlin will not be as im-
mediate to them as to the East
Germans, there are many other
aspects of Khrushchev's handling
of the affair with which they
can disagree.
These regimes share a
critical attitude toward what
they consider excessive aid by
Moscow to underdeveloped coun-
tries outside the bloc and to
bourgeois governments. They
probably feel, as Stalin did,
that it is best not to become
deeply committed in areas far
from home. They too will look
upon the climax of the crisis
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
as a display of weakness. Never-
theless, their criticism will
remain unspoken.
The Chinese Communists,
however, are not constrained
by the same political need for
conformity in expression. During
the height of the Cuban crisis,
Peiping struck the bloc's most
militant note. Khrushchev's
28 October letter was received
in Peiping with "surprise and
disapproval," according to a
creditable Western news account
from the Chinese capital. Top
political circles there were
said to be talking of a "Soviet
Munich."
On 31 October, People's
Daily indicated the depth
elm pping's dismay. The West,
said the Chinese, now could
boast that President Kennedy
has scored a "major triumph."
Whatever assurance Khrushchev
had received from the President
was "nothing but a hoax"; no
trust could be given to the
"empty promises of the US
aggressor." Hopeful but not
optimistic that they can in-
fluence Khrushchev into re-
jecting what they consider a
complete capitulation, the Chi-
nese indicate he now should
press for US acceptance of all
five of Castro's demands.
A major point of apprehen-
sion in Peiping appears to be
that a resolution of the Cuban
crisis might lead to further
understandings between the US
and the Soviet Union. A Chinese
Communist broadcast on 29
October noted that President
Kennedy's reply to the Soviet
leader had "in particular"
mentioned the issue of prolifer-
ation of nuclear weapons. Peiping
has publicly proclaimed that it
will not allow itself to be
cheated out of nuclear weapons.
The Chinese will undoubted-
ly exploit Khrushchev's actions
in the Cuban crisis as evidence
of Soviet weakness in the con-
test with "the imperialist
enemy" in further efforts
to induce other Communists to
oppose Soviet primacy. Despite
Moscow's moves, as in the shift
of position on the Sino-Indian
border dispute to increase
solidarity in the crisis situa-
tion, the USSR seems likely to
be faced with further open
deterioration in its relations
with China.
Albania, China's East
European ally, has not yet joined
Peiping in direct attacks on
Khrushchev's backdown. Tirana
fears political and possibly
military intervention from both
Yugoslavia and Greece, and prob-
ably expects that the USSR would
abandon it in a crisis situation
as it "abandoned" Cuba. On
30 October, however, the party
press: published a major review
and condemnation of US policies,
which. by implication supports
China's criticism of the Soviet
Union's "trust" in the promises
of President Kennedy.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND THE CUBAN CRISIS
The decision of the United
States to challenge the Soviet
military buildup in Cuba has
tested the cohesion and vital-
ity of NATO as no event has
since the Suez crisis in 1956.
All the allies joined on 29
October in congratulating the
President on his leadership,
but 'the degree and nature of
their support varied consider-
ably, reflecting differing na-
tional interests and attitudes
and, in some instances, domestic
political considerations.
The strongest support of
the US actions came from some
of the Continental allies--
particularly West Germany,
France, and Turkey, long-stand-
ing advocates of a "hard line"
toward the USSR. Bonn's Na-
tional Defense Council promised
on 24 October to go to any
lengths in its support of the
Ua, and the French foreign min-
ister almost simultaneously ex-
pressed the view that a destruc-
tion of missile sites in Cuba
would have been justified and,
in some ways, preferable. Tur-
key pledged its "full support"
on 23 October.
By contrast, officials of
some of the smaller NATO,coun-
tries greeted the quarantine
announcement with deep concern
which was moderated only
partially by the fuller proof
of the presence of Soviet of-
fensive weapons in Cuba. The
concern among the Danes and
Norwegians was linked both to
their traditional feeling of
special vulnerability to Soviet
countermeasures and to their
dislike as maritime nations of
the US quarantine. Only on 25
October did the Canadian Govern-
ment; enunciate formal support
of the US position, and then
partly as a result of prodding
by the opposition Liberals and
the press.
The positions of London,
Rome, Brussels, and Athens fell
somewhere between these hard
and soft extremes. The US Em-
bassy in London has noted that
MacMillan's early declaration
of support contained no explicit
suggestion of Britain's willing-
ness to take part in sanctions
against Moscow, and among British
officials there was lingering
skepticism about US intelligence
estimates and persisting doubts
that Washington was perhaps mov-
ing a bit too fast. The Dutch
Government was somewhat slow in
registering support, and while
Greece officially supported
quarantine action, it was fear-
ful of repercussions should
more drastic action be taken.
In Italy, Premier Fanfani's
first official statement concen-
trated approval primarily on the
US decision to take the Cuban
issue to the UN. Italian
officials later explained pri-
vatEely that the government's
support of the US was actually
much firmer than it appeared but
that; Fanfani was wary of alienat-
ing the left-of-center parties
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
on which he depends in Parlia-
ment.
NATO Problems
The crisis also pointed
up once more the longstanding
NATO problem of prior con-
sultation with the member coun-
tries regarding decisions af-
fecting their vital interests.
None of the NATO govern-
ments has seemed disposed to
make an issue of this, and
some of the smaller countries
which have raised the question
--l.ike Bei.giim and the Nether-
lands--have expressed "under-
standing" that situations will
inevitably arise in which it
will be impossible to consult
all members of the alliance
in advance. However, De Gaulle,
in ordering public support of
the US position, indicated that
France could not be committed
to support any military act on
which it had not been previously
consulted. It has been a major
theme in NAC discussions that
there must be fuller discussion
in NATO of future Soviet ac-
tions with the clear implica-
tion that the response to them
should be a matter for joint
review.
The crisis has also raised
the problem of delineating the
NATO area. Belgium's Spaak
was quick to point out that the
Caribbean was outside that area
and that treaty provisions
calling for mutual support
against aggression would not
necessarily appl.y. By contrast,
Netherlands Foreign Minister
Luns commented publicly that
NATO would be "right" in con-
erning itsel.f with the crisis
even though the treaty area
itself is not directly involved.
While Luns' position may be a
reflection of the existence of
special Dutch interests in the
Caribbean, it is also in keep-
ing with frequent assertions
that he considered Allied sup-
port for the. Netherlands in the
West New Guinea dispute a "test"
of NATO.
NATO members, while im-
pressed by Khrushchev's appar-
ent :retreat when faced with a
showdown, have agreed at recent
NAC meetings that increased
vigilance is required against
Soviet actions elsewhere. There
was, however, also a strong
current of feeling that a sat-
isfactory solution in Cuba might
create an atmosphere favorable
to broader East-West negotia-
tions, particularly on disarma-
ment? Ambassador Finletter
anticipates considerable inter-
est among the NATO countries in
the Brazilian resolution cal.l.ing
for denuclearization of the
African and Latin American con-
tinents. He also notes, however,
the problems this would raise
for the French nuclear testing
program in Africa and the risk
that the concept of nuclear free
zones might be extended to
Europe with a revival. of the
Rapacki or similar plans.
In view of the possibility
that future disarmament
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
discussions may highlight the
question of foreign bases in
general, there will probably
be increased interest in con-
sidering multilateral MRBM
forces. Previously, some of
the NATO countries have been
reluctant even to schedule
serious discussions of US pro-
posals for a NATO seaborne
MRBM force. Interest in such
proposals now seems bound to
increase, but the problems of
organizing such a force are
generally believed to be fear-
ful, and the European countries
seem likely to be appalled at
the costs involved. Similar
problems of a European deter-
rent are also likely to be can-
vassed, but must probably await
satisfactory conclusion not
only of the EEC-UK accession
talks, but also further prog-
ress toward a workable European
political organization.
Europe and the US
In any case, Cuba, like
Suez, has again made Western
Europe painfully aware of its
dependence on American strength
and of the fact that no single
European nation counts for very
much in a struggle between the
world's giants. This seems
likely to raise once more the
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twin specters--that Europe
might be able to exercise no
real. influence in deciding a
question of war and peace be-
tween the US and the USSR, or
that: Europe might be unable
to prevent a sacrifice of its
basic interests in a Soviet-
American detente.
Whether this realization
will, make the logic of European
union seem more compelling than
ever remains to be seen. There
is little question that the
French-British misadventure in
Suez contributed to the feeling
that the small nation-states of
Europe are anachronistic and
gave new impetus to the drive
for closer union which produced
the Common Market and Euratom.
The lesson has probably
not been lost now on either
Paris or London that, despite
Britain's nuclear capabilities,
Britain was accorded no special
privilege in the formulation
of US policy in the Cuban
crisis. In the light of this,
De Gaulle may be forced to
reconsider his view that a
small nation possessing nu-
clear weapons can play a sig-
nificant role in international
affairs.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ACTIVITIES OF CASTRO FOLLOWERS IN LATIN AMERICA
There are indications that
Castro has ordered some of his
supporters in Latin America to
start militant action, but he
probably has not yet issued a
general call mobilizing all his
assets for a campaign of sabo-
tage and violence. The Soviet-
controlled sabotage apparatus
in Latin America has been
alerted, but apparently will
not be put in action unless
"aggression" against Cuba occurs.
US citizens and property. How-
ever, these assume an invasion
of Cuba or a counterrevolution
there. They are not now con-
sidering such extreme measures.
Most of these parties and groups
were totally unprepared for the
announcement that the USSR had
emplaced offensive weapons in
Cuba, and apparently have been
thrown off balance by the gen-
erally widespread sympathy in
Latin America for the actions
taken by the US.
The Venezuelan press has
reported a message from Cuba
to Latin American recipients
ordering them to start destruc-
tion of property. However,
the scattered demonstrations
in various Latin American coun-
tries since 25 October--which
are continuing--appear to have
been the, work of hotheaded pro-
Castro groups acting on their
own. Except for the Venezuelan
oil field bombing, which occurred
the day after the Cuban call for
destruction of property, pro-
Castro demonstrations and ter-
rorist activities appear badly
planned and largely ineffective.
The Communist parties and
pro-Castro groups in Latin Amer-
ica were apparently caught un-
prepared to deal with the situa-
tion presented by the measures
taken by President Kennedy.
They are believed'to have con-
tingency plans for large-scale
strikes, sabotage, and demonstra-
tions, including actions against
The Communist parties in
Latin America, which have been
cool to Castro's exporting his
revolution, may feel that pre-
cipitous action in the present
situation is likely to provide
drastic governmental reprisals
which could cripple their po-
tential for large-scale strikes
and sabotage in future "emergencies.
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Castro probably still ex-
pects support from the subver-
sive groups in Latin America
which he has fostered. In ad-
dition to supplying arms and
money, Cuba has trained person-
nel from these countries in es-
pionage, subversion, sabotage,
propaganda, and guerrilla war-
fare at a special school in
Castro still maintains
five embassies in Latin America
--in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia,
Mexico, and Uruguay--which he
has used to pass instructions
to area Communists. He also
has the large Radio Havana fa-
cility which beams intensive
propaganda at Latin America,
and the Prensa Latina press net-
work abroad. Castro himself
has spoken publicly over Radio
Havana only once since the
start of the Cuban crisis and
did not on that occasion call
for any anti-U3 violence in
other Latin American countries.
The Cuban-backed groups
are probably not strong enough
to bring off any successful rev-
olutions but they do control
guerrilla units in some coun-
tries and riot and sabotage
cadres in others. These have
long been getting practical ex-
perience through harassing opera-
tions and contributing to what-
ever disorder they find. The
attraction that "Fidelism" has
had for youth and other "im-
patient" groups in Latin
America has been of marked
assistance to the Cubans'
activities.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
After a series of reverses
during the first week of heavy
fighting at both ends of the
border, India has stiffened its
resistance to Chinese Communist
military pressure. Battle lines
have begun to stabilize, re-
flecting greater Indian strength
at key points of contact as well
as an apparent pause in the
Chinese drive, perhaps in part
as a result of winter weather.
Two weeks of border warfare
have, nonetheless, put the
Chinese in a strong position.
In Ladakh, they control a
little more than the extent of
their claims and still threaten
the key Indian base at Chushul.
In the North East Frontier
Agency (NEFA), they occupy
several hundred square miles of
their 34,000-square-mile claim
and are poised just north of
the strategic pass at Se La.
New Delhi has moved to a
virtual war footing and has
sought, through appeals to the
West for arms, to redress the
imbalance in Chinese and Indian
infantry firepower.
Troop Deployments
Heavy troop movements have
brought Indian strength along
the northeastern frontier to
more than three full divisions
under IV corps commander Kaul
at Tezpur. One of these
divisions guards Se La; other
passes are defended by forces
up to brigade strength.*
Since 20 October, the
Chinese are believed to have
committed at least four regi-
ments to the NEFA area. Two
and possibly three regiments
(a total of 10,000 men supported
by artillery) now hold the
Towang area. A fourth regiment
is deployed near Walong.
Indian forces under the XV
Corps in Kashmir are divided
between the Chinese front in
Ladakh and the Indo-Pakistani
cease-fire line in the west.
Although the extent of any
Indian shift of strength to
Ladakh is not known, Indian
infantry forces facing the
Chinese probably number about
6,000; they are subordinate to
a newly created division head-
quarters at Leh.
The Indians estimate
Chinese forces in Ladakh at
about 10,000 men.
Ouster of Menon
The major Indian casualty
to date has been Defense Minister
Krishna Menon,whom Nehru
shunted aside in response to
widespread clamor for his head.
Menon was blamed for the un-
preparedness which resulted in
heavy Indian losses during the
early days of fighting. He
continues in the cabinet as
minister of defense production--
a portion of his former respon-
sibilities--and will remain a
*The basic- Indian infantry
unit is the battalion of 926
men. Three or more battalions
make up a brigade. Divisions
are normally composed of three
or four brigades, usually in-
eluding one artillery brigade.
The basic Chinese Commu-
nist unit is the independent in-
fantry regiment of about 3,500
men. Subordinate to it are
three infantry battalions and
one heavy-weapons battalion
for artillery support.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEKLY SUMMARY
S4NNK!ANG,'
Kargi,l GALWAN VALLEY
S s
IC H
Leh
K A S H M I 'V, CHANG ENMO VALLEY
(Status.In ct~s'pute r.
Hajr
Langar
N K758
Boundary shown on most US and Western maps
-..- Demarcated
x - Delimited only
- Indefinite
Boundary shown on, recent Chinese and Indian maps
!where differing from US and Western maps)
Chinese
Indian
.-. I cli ni Railroad
ND,
I
Simla ~a e Road
Major caravan route
or trail
50
Airfield
Pass
Spot height
(in feet)
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f3nnndr ynes and narnet`c are not necessaniy
thnce n roeruzed by the U. S. 6nvomnie1, 1,
EASTERN CHINA - INDIA
FRONTIER AREA
MEM
f, ound4ci ss aiki names are not necessanl
Lr.y ovemrne>t
STATUTE MILES 208 those rr2t'o i zed 2,y the
IAN(
AR A
LUHIT V ALONG
Tsetang IRI ~~ AninC,`f EA
YALLEV t 1,6
Longlu SLANG ~?I -Walol
} ~~ ihu Peking O`1
1 +[lzdng ~R v~~
A ~ P KAMENG ,~~ ~ ?/--
2 wane Q l Le Bo diia ? L mpur Nov 62 WR.