PETROLEUM IN NORTH VIETNAM AT THE OUTSET OF 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070030-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: February 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Petroleum in North Vietnam at the Outset of 1967
(A Review of Developments During 1966)
JCS review completed.
DIA review(s)
completed.
Secret
N?- 138
RR IM 67-9
February 1967
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
OROUP t
Eccludad from automatic
dawagrading and
dcuificafian
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This memorandum makes estimates of the supply of petroleum in
North Vietnam at the beginning and end of 1966 and on 28 June 1966, the
day before intensified bombings began. It also estimates storage capacity
on these dates. No hard intelligence is available on inventories of petro-
leum, total petroleum storage capacity, or losses through bombings, but
a methodology has been developed to provide the necessary estimates.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Introduction . . . . . . . ,
2. Petroleum Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Principal Storage Terminals . . , , , ,
Dispersed Storage Sites -- Tanks . . . . . . .
Dispersed Storage Sites -- Drums . . .
Other Storage Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Capacity at the End of the Year . . . . . . . .
4. Petroleum Supply and Demand in 1966 . .
5. Effects of the Bombings of Petroleum Targets . . . .
Appendixe s
Appendix A. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
10
1. North Vietnam: Location and Estimated Capacities of
Principal Petroleum Storage Terminals, 1 January
and 31 December 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. North Vietnam: Location, Capacities, and Routes of
Communication for Dispersed Petroleum Storage
3. North Vietnam: Estimated Imports of Petroleum, by
Carrier, 1964-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
SFCR FT
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Page
North Vietnam: Estimated Monthly Imports of Petro- 16
leum, by Carrier, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5, North Vietnam: Estimated Average Monthly Consump- 17
tion of Petroleum, July-December 1966 . .
Figure 1. Principal Petroleum Storage Terminal at Hanoi,
Before and After Bombing (photograph)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 2. North Vietnam: Principal Petroleum Storage 4
Terminals (map) following page . . . . . . .
Figure 3. Cu Van Dispersed Storage Tank Site, Before
and After Bombing (photograph) following 4
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 4. Thuong Thon Dispersed Storage Tank Site,
Before and After Bombing (photograph)
9:
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
Figure 5. North Vietnam: Dispersed Petroleum Storage
Sites - Tanks (map) following page . . ? . ? .
Figure 6. Hanoi (Duc Noi) Dispersed Storage Tank Site
(photograph) following page . . . .
Figure 7. Soviet Tanker in Haiphong Waters with Barges
and Tugs Alongside (photograph) following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 8. Phuc Loi Dispersed Storage Tank Site, Before
and After Bombing (photograph) following
page . . . . . . . . .
cr.f T]~T
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PETROLEUM IN NORTH VIETNAM
AT THE OUTSET OF 1967
(A Review of Developments During 1966)*
Summary
The bombing of petroleum targets during 1966 destroyed an estimated
82, 000 tons of storage capacity and between 41, 000 and 62, 000 tons of
petroleum; the combined replacement value is between US $4. 9 million
and $5. 6 million. In addition, the bombing increased the cost and diffi-
culty of importing and distributing petroleum, both for the USSR and North
Vietnam. There is no evidence, however, that the bombing of petroleum
targets seriously weakened the economy of North. Vietnam, produced
shortages of petroleum, or diminished North Vietnam's capability to
support military activities or the infiltration of men and supplies into
the South.
At the beginning of 1967, between 52, 000 and 56, 000 tons of petroleum
are estimated to have been on hand -- the equivalent of between 90 and
100 days' supply. The program for constructing dispersed storage tanks,
which is still under way, provided North Vietnam with between 30, 000
and 40, 000 tons of usable capacity by 1 January 1967. This, together with
the residual capacity estimated to be available at the principal storage
terminals and a sizable inventory of drums, gives North Vietnam between
87, 000 and 97, 000 tons of capacitywith which to operate its oil economy.
Although present storage capacity is less than that which existed at
the beginning of 1966, the North Vietnamese can move petroleum in bulk,
principally by water, closer to points of consumption; store it in facilities
which arc relatively invulnerable to air attack; and disperse it throughout
the countryside to a degree not previously possible.
North Vietnam has improved its tanker unloading procedures in the
lasthalf of 1966 to the pointwh.ereit candischarge the cargoes of 10, 000-
ton tankers, using barges, on a routine basis.
* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by
the Office of Research and Reports; the estimates and conclusions repre-
sent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of February
1967.
>: Unless otherwise indicated, tonnages are given in metric tons.
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1. Introduction
North Vietnam has no known resources of petroleum and is com-
pletely dependent on imports for its supplies. Moreover, it has no
refineries and must import all of its petroleum in the form of products.
Historically, most petroleum imports have been delivered to North
Vietnam by sea -- mostly in bulk on tankers, but also in packages on
dry cargo vessels. Intelligence on sea shipments is good, and imports
by sea can be estimated with a high degree of accuracy. In recent
years, petroleum has also been imported by rail through Communist
China. Intelligence on rail shipments is poor, and estimates of imports
by rail are, therefore, subject to considerable margins of error. For-
tunately, such shipments have almost certainly been small, except for
the probable transshipment of the cargoes of four tankers diverted to
Communist China in 1966.
2. Petroleum Storage
a. Principal Storage Terminals
The principal storage terminals are large-capacity installa-
tions with conventional above-ground tanks. Figure 1 shows the terminal
at Hanoi before and after bomb ing. On 28 June, the day before the in-
tensified bombings began, nine principal storage terminals, with. a total
estimated capacity of almost 101, 000 tons, were operational in North
Vietnam. At the end of the year, about 24, 000 tons of residual capacity-,*
remained at seven installations, although the capacity at two of these
installations may not in fact have been usable. Table 1 shows the loca-
tion and capacity of the principal storage terminals on 1 January and
31 December 1966. The locations of the nine principal storage terminals
are shown on Figure 2.
b. Dispersed Storage Sites -- Tanks
The dispersed storage tank system was first observed in 1965
and was still being expanded at the end of 1966. The sites consist essen-
tially of small cylindrical tanks placed horizontally in shallow excavations
and covered with. earth. At some sites the tanks are placed side-by-side
in rows, and at others they are placed at random. Individual tanks come
>ti Residual capacity at JCS fixed targets totals about 26, 000 tons, includ-
ing about 24 000 tons at principal storage terminals and 2, 500 tons at
Can Thon , a dispersed storage site.
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in three sizes -- 6, 10, and 21 tons -- and individual sites have varying
:numbers and mixes of the tanks. Figures 3 and 4 show examples of
dispersed storage tank sites.
There is no intelligence on which to make an estimate of the
capacity of these sites on 1 January 1966. On the basis of photographic
intelligence that became available during 1966, it is estimated that
their capacity on 28 June was 17, 000 tons. By the end of 1966, 89 dis-
persed tank sites with a total estimated capacity of about 32, 000 tons
had been identified and analyzed from photography. Pilot and other
reports from the field suggest that the number of sites may exceed 100,
with an original total capacity of perhaps 35, 000 to 45, 000 tons. The
average (median) capacity of the 89 sites is 226 tons; almost two-thirds
have capacities of less than 300 tons, and only about 10 percent have
capacities greater than 1, 000 tons. Figure 5 shows the general loca-
tion and dispersal of the 89 sites.
Dispersed tank sites have been bombed in recent months, but
damage has been difficult to assess. According to one analysis, almost
5, 000 tons of capacity have been destroyed, 1/* and this estimate is
considered reasonable. Although the estimate probably does not allow
fully for the inflation inherent in pilot and other reports from the field,
it. also excludes damage to sites for which no assessments are avail-
able. Thus, at the end of 1966, these sites, after bombing, may repre-
sent between 30, 000 and 40, 000 tons of capacity.
The tank sites are dispersed throughout the country, and,
although many are in urban areas, they are generally remote from
densely populated areas. Figure 6 shows a dispersed site in an iso-
lated area near Hanoi. Sixteen sites, having a total capacity of 3, 900
tons, have been identified within a 10-mile radius of Hanoi, and 33
sites, with. a capacity of about 12, 000 tons, within a 30-mile radius.
There are 11 sites, with a total capacity of almost 5, 000 tons, within
a 10-mile radius of Haiphong. This capacity, together with the residual
capacity at the remaining principal storage sites in the Hanoi/Haiphong
area, enables North Vietnam to discharge (using barges) fully loaded
ocean tankers on a routine basis. Figure 7 shows a Soviet tanker with
barges alongside in the Haiphong waters.
The North Vietnamese generally have located dispersed tanks
at sites accessible to more than one mode of transport and have taken
advantage of security inherent in cover, concealment, and dispersal.
~For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B,.
QVI'D t'm
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PRINCIPAL PETROLEUM STORAGE TERMINAL AT HANOI, BEFORE AND AFTER BOMBING
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 Phong
Saly
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' Ko chiu
Vang
Vieng
'Ban Chieng
.r'
r Linn Cam
,' ~ Ha Giang
LAOS Samneua
\?.; VIENTIANE
TLHAILAND
Udon Thani
0 Existing site
C Destroyed site
---t Railroad
~,,.? Dong\
Van
Nakhon Phanom`. Khammouane
Sakon
Nakhon
I
SavannakhetL
?1
N
Dong Hoi
-
f DEMARCATION LINE
Dong Ha
'?w' ~ Hue
Muong Nong. ` VIETNAM
Saravane oN??~
Figure 2
NORTH VIETNAM
PRINCIPAL PETROLEUM
STORAGE TERMINALS
1. Viet Tri
2, IIa Gia
3. Ilanoi (Thanh Amt
4. Nguyen Khc
5. Bac Giang
6. Ilai Phong
7. Duong Nharn
8. Do Son
9. Vinh
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05,
NOTE RANDOM PATTERN OF EXCAVATIONS FOR FUTURE TANKS AND TANKS COVERED
AND CONCEALED IN PLACE
NOTE THAT EXPANSION HAS BEEN HALTED AND THAT TANKS, PREVIOUSLY COVERED
AND CONCEALED, HAVE BEEN REMOVED
FIGURE 4. THUONG THON DISPERSED STORAGE TANK SITE, BEFORE AND AFTER BOMBING
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Phong
Saly
-Dien Bien
Phu
Ban Chieng
. Xieng
Khouang ~..~
Vang
Vieng
VIENTIANE
I.IlNong Khai
H A I L A N D
0 25 50 75 Mlles
0 25 50 75 Klorneteu
36
Vinh Linh
~?. ~~x}/ DEMARCATION LINE
Deng Ha
? 53
N?
Cang o J
Ba
Tuyen
Quang
8 4 ?4s
/e 29
Bac Man R8 57__ Z2 45g53 ?47
-
,76 -'"a 0 J4
'Hon Gal
ng 86,87 D Haig 84Q ng Hon uon Y Yeen
Hun
Phu Yeng 410 1 di
0~phong
Ly 61 42 1 75
? -Thai 44
6 ?8Binh 80
1
am
Dinh
51 Ninh
Binh
r Linh Cam 4i55,58,71,
Nathan Phanomy.Khammouane
Sakon
Nakhon
r.,.? Don
Van
Savannakhet
CCCCCC .~
Ban Laee \..s? ..y .~- CHINA
-
\ 46 %Dong Hoi
\ VIETNAM
LAOS
Saravane ry
Figure 5
NORTH VIETNAM
DISPERSED PETROLEUM STORAGE SITES-TANKS
1. La Danh
2. Van Lung
3. Van Lung (West)
4. Iluaug Mai
5. Hanoi, '1'hi Cain
6. Bai Thuong, Southeast
7. Son La
S. Thuong Thou
9. Ngoc Son
10. Thai Lai
11. Yen Ilan
12. Thanh Lang
13. IIanoi, Thanh Lict (Area 1)
14. Hanoi, Thanh Lict (Area 2)
15. Bang So
16. Son Chan
17. Can Thon
18. IIanoi, Due Not (Area 1)
19. IIanoi, Due Not (Area 2)
20. Hanoi, Due Not (Area 3)
21. IIanoi, Due Not (Area 4)
22. Cu Van
23. Cu Van, East
24. Duo Quan, East
25. Dao Quan, West
26. Nam Dinh
27. Thai Nguyen, South
28. Phu(, Yen Airfield, Area 1
29. Phuc Ycn Airfield, Area 2
:30. Xom Duong Quan, East
:31. Xom Duong Quart
32. Nui Tap Tiuh
33. Sac Le
34. Plut Doug
:35. '1 huan Lc
36. Phu Loc
37. Thank Hoa
38. Ba Don
39. Phue Loi, Navy
40. Thu 'Prang
41. Ninh Ciang
42. Viet Yen
43. Kcp IIa
44. Tien Iloi
45. Doug Mai
46. Xom Lang
47. Van IIoa
48. Phn Lo
49. Jaunc Island
50. Co Nhue Iloang
51. Quang Suoi
52. Trung Phu
53. Cia IIoa
54. Bai Chay
55, Vinh Petroleum, Yen 'I Ninh
56. Ba Don, West
57. Bac Ninh
58. Vinh, Xuan Yen
59. Tri Binh
60. Xuyen Duong
61. Can Cong
62. Tung Tu
63. Don Son
64. Quy Khe
65. Tran Xa
66. T'hanh Hoa
67. Tram Du
68: Luc Nong
69. Thai Nguyen
70. Tien Nong
71. Vinh, Ben Thuy
72. Chi Linh
73. Vinh, Yen Dai
74. Iloang Pha
75. Kien An
76. Phu Thi
77. Phuc Yen
78. Vinh, North
79. Mach 'Prang
80. Tram Bac
81. Nam Lo
82. IIanoi, Duc Noi (Area 5)
83. Lai Son
84, Phu Xa
85. Hoa Loan
86. Tu Iloang
87. Tay Tun
88. Nguyen Khe
89. Lau Khe
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FIGURE 6. HANOI (DUC NOI) DISPERSED STORAGE TANK SITE. NOTE NATURE AND
STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION, TANK SIZE MIX, AND LOCATION REMOTE FROM POP-
ULATION AREA.
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All of the identified sites are served by road: 38 are served by road,
rail, and waterways, 30 others by road and waterway, 16 more by road
and rail, and the remaining 5 by road only. The waterways that serve
these sites are shallow, however, thus limiting the type of craft that
can approach. Table 2 shows the location and capacity of the 89 iden-
tified sites and indicates the kind of transportation routes available.
The dispersed storage tank system provides North Vietnam
with a new and greater capability to distribute petroleum internally.
Although the estimated capacity of this system is far less than the
capacity destroyed at the principal storage terminals, the flexible and
reasonably secure routes of communication that serve the dispersed
sites and the ability to move and store sizable quantities of petroleum
in bulk closer to points of consumption are offsetting influences. More-
over, the dispersed tank sites are relatively invulnerable to bombing.
Figure 8 illustrates the latter characteristic. More than 400 airstrikes
were mounted against 39 dispersed tank sites, where an estimated
5, 000 tons of capacity were destroyed. * Only 85 airstrikes were
mounted against principal storage terminals, destroying an estimated
77, 000 tons of capacity.
c. Dispersed Storage Sites -- Drums
North Vietnam has accumulated a sizable inventory of various
types of small petroleum containers. It is not possible to identify the
number or size of these containers; for purposes of this memorandum,
estimates are expressed in terms of 55-gallon-drum equivalents. A
drum-equivalent inventory has been estimated from the tonnages of
packaged petroleum shipped to North Vietnam on dry cargo vessels
during the period 1 January 1963 through 31 December 1966 by convert-
ing at the rate of six drums per metric ton. A loss factor of 10 percent
per year was applied to the estimated drum inventory at the end of 1963,
1964, and 1965, and 5 percent was applied as of mid-1966. It is esti-
mated that by mid-1966 there may have been about 130, 000 drums in
North Vietnam. An additional 49, 000 drums were received during the
last half of 1966. A loss factor of 5 percent was applied to the total to
account for normal losses in the last half of 1966. On this basis,
170, 000 drums -- equivalent to about 28, 000 tons of storage capacity --
may have been on hand in North Vietnam on 31 December 1966.
In addition, almost 800 strikes were made against identified or sus-
pected dispersed tank and drum storage sites for which no damage
assessment is available.
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Not all of these drums are filled at any one time. ~k reason-
able drum use cycle can be postulated as follows:
(a) Drums in reserve supply depots - filled
(b) Drums at fill and repair sites - empty
(c) Drums at points of consumption - one-half
filled, one-half empty
(d) Drums en route to points of consumption -
filled
(e) Drums en route to fill and repair sites - empty
In the absence of the intelligence necessary to make a more definitive
estimate, each phase of this cycle is considered to require an equal
share of the drum inventory. Overall, therefore, 50 percent of the
drums are estimated to be filled and 50 percent empty at any given time.
Drums, too, have been the targets of air attacks, but it is not
possible to make a realistic estimate of losses. Losses probably have
been small because drums are dispersed among woods, in fo'Liage along
roads, and in trenches and thus are difficult to identify and destroy.
d. Other Storage Sites
Other bulk petroleum storage facilities have been identified at
industrial and military installations. These facilities are for the ex-
clusive use of the installation they serve, whereas the facilities dis-
cussed above store and distribute petroleum for a variety of consumers.
It is estimated that total capacity represented by these limited-use
facilities -- about 5, 000 tons -- did not change during 1966.
e. Capacity at the End of the Year
Petroleum storage capacity as of the end of 1966 may be sum-
marized as follows:
n 1' f-' i r T
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25X1
25X1
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Thousand
Metric Tons
Principal
storage
terminals
24
Dispersed
storage
sites (tanks)
30 to 40
Dispersed
storage
sites (drums)
28
Military and industrial sites
(tanks)
87 to 97
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4. Petroleum Supply and Demand in 1966
It is estimated that supplies of petroleum in North Vietnam on
1 January 1966 were between 46, 000 and 71, 000 tons. The lower
limit represents 90 days' supply at the then-current rate of consump-
tion. It is reasoned that North Vietnam would maintain a minimum of
90 days' supply. Seaborne deliveries from the Black Sea normally
take about 30 days. In the event of abnormal delays in resupply, stocks
of petroleum in North Vietnam might otherwise decline to a dangerously
low level for a country on a wartime footing.
The upper limit of the range was derived from a supply/demand
balance calculated (in reverse) from the estimated supply of petroleum
on 28 June 1966. It is estimated that the supply of petroleum on the
latter date was 103, 000 tons. This estimate is based on the assumption
that all the bulk petroleum storage was filled to 75 percent of capacity
and drums to 50 percent of capacity. Information from the US oil in-
dustry suggests that, in the absence of definitive information, bulk
storage normally may be considered to be filled to 75 percent of capacity
on the average. Moreover, other considerations suggest that stocks on
hand were this great on 28 June.
bombings. This was probably necessary because there was insufficient
unused storage capacity in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. High stock levels
were created, in turn, because imports in the ten-month period --
September 1965 through 28 June 1966 -- were substantially in excess
of estimated demand. *
It is estimated that consumption of petroleum for the year 1966 was
about 190, 000 tons. This total reflects a moderate increase from
slightly less than 15, 000 tons per month (500 tons per day) at the outset
of 1966 to 16, 400 tons (about 550 tons per day) at the end of the year.
Consumption from 28 June to the end of the year was estimated to have
been 99, 000 tons. Table 5 shows the estimated normal monthly con-
sumption of petroleum, by sector, for the last half of 1966.
The estimated loss of petroleum through bombings before 28 June
was 1, 000 tons and after 28 June between 40, 000 and 61, 000 tons. The
range of these losses is a function of the inventory of petroleum on
28 June, the inventory of petroleum in specific storage sites at the time
of the bombing, and destruction of storage capacity at the specific sites.
* For details of the methodology used in deriving these estimates,
see Appendix A.
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Using these data, estimates of petroleum supply and demand dur-
ing 1966 are summarized as follows:
Supply, 1 January
Plus
Thous and Metric 'I'ons
Lower Limit Upper Limit
46 71
Imports, 1 January - 28 June 121+ 124
Minus
Consumption, 1 January - 28 June 91
Losses, 1 January - 28 June
91
1
Supply, 28 June 78 103
Plus
Imports, 29 June - 31 December 11- 1=_3
Minus
Consumption, 29 June - 31 December
Losses, 29 June - 31 December
Supply, 31 December
99 99
4(J 61
5. Effects of the Bombings of Petroleum Targets
The principal effects of the bombing of petroleum targets in North
Vietnam during 1966 are as follows;
a. The destruction of an estimated 77, 000 tons
of storage capacity at the principal terminals and
5, 000 tons at the dispersed tank sites plus related
support facilities,with a total replacement value of
about $3. 6 million.
b. The destruction of between 41, 000 and 62, 000
tons of petroleum valued at between $1. 3 million and
$2 million.
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c. The loss of the normal use of the principal
petroleum terminal at Haiphong and the complete
destruction of the principal storage and distribution
terminal at Hanoi, as well as the loss of considerable
capacity at principal storage terminals elsewhere.
d. Additional costs and inconvenience to both.
the USSR and North Vietnam for the import 'and
internal distribution of petroleum.
There is no evidence, however, that the loss of petroleum or petro-
leum storage facilities has seriously weakened the economy. There is
no evidence of widespread shortages of petroleum, of dislocations in any
sectors of the economy, or of inability to infiltrate men and supplies into
the South that is attributable to the loss of petroleum or petroleum
storage facilities.
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2:1e y
4 7 t and ?stir to ac c ?. L Fe roleum Storage Terminals
t V
1 Ian~,ar~.T n.:. 11. !iecem JE'..! ` 6
JCS Target Number .
Coordinates Metric Tons
Name North East 1 January J 31 December
Hai
phong
20
52
106
39
40,620
4,330
Han
oi
21
03
105
53
30,620
0
Vin
h
18
40
105
)3
1,350
1,350
Ng
uyen Kre
21
10
105
51
7,500
5,000
Ha
Gia J
21
16
105
50
9,910
9,910
Cl)
Ba
c Giang
21
16
106
11
2,260
1,560
Do
Son
20
42
106
47
2,860
1,430
H
Vi
et Tri
21
17
105
26
1,400
40
Du
ong Nhamm
21
01
106
30
4,130
100,650
-3,620
a. Can Thon , because of the nature of its construction and location,
considered as a dispersed tank site and is excluded from this table.
b. These capacities existed also on 28 June, the day before the intensified bombings
c. Ha Gia was attacked in late December, but information available at the end of the
year disclosed no damage.
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North Vietnam: Location, Capacities, and Routes of Communication
for Dispersed Petroleum Storage Tank Sites a/
31 December 1966
Location
Site
Number
Capacity
(Metric
Tons
Road
Rail
Water
North of 210
1
La Danh
1,230
X
X
2
Van Lung
282
X
X
X
3
Van Lung, West
71
X
X
X
)4
Hoang Mai
252
X
X
X
5
Hanoi,, Th-I.. Cam
141
X
X
7
Son La
323
X
17
Can Thon
2,520
X
X
18
Hanoi, Due Noi No. 1
385
X
X
X
19
Hanoi, Due Noi No. 2
713
X
X
X
20
Hanoi, Due Noi No. 3
252
X
X
X
21
Hanoi, Due Noi No. 44
111
x
x
x
22
Cu Van
1,827
X
X
23
Cu Van, East
1,092
X
X
24
Dao Quan, East,
373
X
X
25
Dao Quan, West
302
X
X
27
Thai Nguyen, South
1,109
X
X
28
Phuc Yen, Airfield, No. 1
252
X
X
29
Phuc Yen, Airfield, No. 2
202
X
X
32
Nui Tap Tinh
20
X
X
X
34
Phu Dong
353
X
X
43
Kep Ha
81
X
45
Dong Mai
232
X
X
47
Van Hoa
121
X
X
48
Phu Lo
192
X
X
49
Jaune Island
40
X
X
50
Co Nhue Hoang
151
X
X
52
Trung Phu
141
X
X
57
Bac Ninh
171
X
X
62
Tung Tu
315
X
X
63
Don Son
625
X
X
64
Quy Khe
1,129
X
X
65
Tran Xa
1,050
X
X
69
Thai Nguyen
71
X
X
X
72
Chi Linh
1,452
X
X
76
Phu Thi
302
X
X
X
77
Phuc Yen
60
X
X
X
79
Mach Trang
94
X
X
X
82
Hanoi, Due Noi No. 5
219
X
X
X
SECRET
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North Vietnam: Location, Capacities, and Routes of Communication
for Dispersed Petroleum Storage Tank Sites J
31 December 1966
(Continued)
Location
Site
Number
Capacity
(Metric
Tons) _
Road
Rail
Water
North of 210
83
Lai Son
555
x
x
x
Continued)
(
85
Lung Ngoai
91
x
x
x
,
86
Tu Hoang
147
x
x
87
Trung Tu
273
x
x
88
Nguyen Khe
30
x
x
x
89
Lau Khe
181
x
x
x
Subtotal
19,533
Between
200 and 20059'
8
Thuong Thon
383
X
X
10
Thai Lai
101
x
x
.12
Thanh Lang
373
X
X
13
Hanoi, Thanh
Liet No. 1
433
X
X
X
14
Hanoi, Thanh
Liet No. 2
101
X
x
x
15
Bang So
196
X
X
X
26
Nam Dinh
222
X
X
33
Sac Le
14l
x
X
41
Ninh Giang
272
X
X
42
Viet Yen
1,210
X
X
44
Tien Hoi
393
X
X
51
Quang Suoi
81.
X
X
54
Chay
Bai
42
X
X
60
.
Xuyen Duong
81.
X
x
61
Cau Cong
322
x
x
67
Tram Du
882
x
x
68
Luc Nong
605
x
x
x
70
Tien Nong
353
X
X
X
74
Hoang Pha
202
X
X
X
75
Kien An
242
X
x
80
Tram Bac
1,071
X
X
81
Nam Lo
84C)
X
X
X
84
Phu Xa
168
x
x
x
Subtotal
8,71!l.
0L`/-I D L`T
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North Vietnam: Location, Capacities, and Routes of Communication
for Dispersed Petroleum Storage Tank Sites a/
31 December 1966
(Continued)
Location
Site
Number
Capacity
(Metric
Name Tons)
Road
Rail
Water
Between
19? and 19059'
6
Bai Thuong, Northeast 1,159
X
X
11
Yen Mau 333
X
X
X
16
Son Chau 282
X
X
X
37
Thann IIoa, No. 1 99
X
X
X
40
Tho Trang 202
X
X
59
Tri Binh 40
X
66
Thanh Hoa, No. 2 71
X
X
X
2,186
Between
18? and 18?59'
9
Ngoc Son 292
X
X
35
Thuan Le 229
X
39
Phuc Loi 252
X
X
X
53
Gia Hoa 111
X
X
X
55
Vinh, Yen Thinh 111
x
x
x
58
Vinh, Xuan Yen 59
X
71
Vinh, Ben Thuy 141
X
X
X
73
Vinh, Yen Da.i, 60
x
x
78
Vinh, North 81
X
X
Subtotal
1, 336
Between
17? and 17?59'
30
Xom Duong, East N.A.
X
X
X
31
Xom Duong 20
X
X
36
Phu Loc 131
X
X
X
38
Ba Don 161
X
X
X
46
Xom Lang 262
X
X
X
56
Ba Don, West 71
X
X
X
645
32 4
a.
,FCR FT
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North Vietnam: Estimated Imports of Petroleum, by Carrier
1964-66
'housand Metric Tons
1964
1965
1966
Tanker
138
160
186
Cargo
vessel
4
10
15
Rail.
8
7
36 a/
150
177
a. Including 33,900 tons of petroleum aboard tankers diverted to
Communist China and considered to have been transshipped by rail to
North Vietnam.
North Vietnam: Estimated Monthly Imports of Petroleum, by Carrier
1966
Thousand. Metric Tons
Month
Tanker
Cargo Vessel
Rail
Total
J anuary
21.0
0.3
0.8
22.1
February
9.7
0.2
0
9.9
March
21.3
1.6
0.2
23.1
April
31.9
2.4
0.2
34.5
May
31.8
1.0
0.3
33.1
June
10.0 b/
1.1
0.2
11.3 b/
July
0
0.9
0.5
1.4
August
10.8
1.4
10.4 cJ
22.6
September
11.0
3.1
12.0 iJ
26.1
October
4.0
1.1
11.8
16.9
November
11.9
0.1
Hegl .
12.0
December
22.6
1.6
24.2
186.0 14.8 237.2
a. Except for the months August, September, and October~see foot-
note c, below), imports by rail include only observed shipments and,
therefore, are considered to be a minimum.
b. A tanker with a cargo of 10,000 tons arrived in the Haiphong har-
bor before 28 June. However, it was not completely discharged until
mid.-August, and the cargo is considered as an import during the last
half of 1966.
c. Immediately before and after the bombings began in mid-1966, a
total of 33,900 tons of petroleum consigned to North Vietnam by tanker
was delivered to ports in Communist China. This petroleum was con-
sidered to have been delivered subsequently to North Vietnam by rail as
follows: August, 10,400 tons; September, 12,000 tons; and October,
11,500 tons.
QL'C'D L`T
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SEURE 1
North Vietnam: Estimated Average Monthly Consumption of Petroleum
July-December 1966
Metric Tons
Percent
Aircraft
1,106
6.7
Naval vessels
281
1.7
Wheeled vehicle
s 2,690
16.4
Armored vehicle
s 75
0.5
Generators
2,272
13.8
6,424
39.1
Civil transport
Trucks
3,852
23.5
Coastal and inl
and waterway vessels 1,314
8.0
Port vessels
33
0.2
Cars, buses, an
d administrative vehicles 297
1.8
Fishing fleet a
nd merchant vessels 487
3.0
Subtotal
5,983
36.5
Industry
1,833
11.2
P,Cri culture:
84
0.5
Household
2,083
12.7
Total 16 407
100
a. 3 . Estimates shown are intended to reflect a "normal" pattern
without taking into account interruptions resulting from the inten-
sified bombings of petroleum storage sites or other targets. Esti-
mates for civil transport were derived from indicated activity during
the first half of 1966; estimates of military consumption were based
on the inventory of petroleum consuming equipment on hand as of
1 August 1966 and the observed or calculated use of such equipment
during 1966; estimates of industry, agriculture, and household con-
sumption are rough calculations based on probable consumption in 1965.
SECRET
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The limits of the range of the estimate of petroleum supplies in
North. Vietnam on 1 January 1966 were derived from two approaches:
The 46, 000 tons represents 90 days' supply at rates of consump-
tion estimated for the end of 1965. This level was considered to be
a minimum. Tanker deliveries to North Vietnam from the Black Sea
take about 30 days. It was reasoned that if a tanker became disabled
only a few days before arrival at Haiphong and a substitute tanker Were
ordered from the Black Sea, another 30 days would elapse before re-
supply to North Vietnam would be possible. If levels of petroleum
supply in North Vietnam were maintained at less than 90 days, inven-
tories (under the above thesis) would decline to a dangerously low
level for a country on a wartime footing. Imports of petroleum from
1 January through 28 June were added to the supply estimated for
1 January, and consumption and modest losses (from bombing isolated
dispersed storage) were deducted. The remainder represented the
estimated supply on 28 June, the day before the bombing attacks on
petroleum storage began.
2. The Upper Limit
The 71, 000 tons was derived from the supplies estimated to have
been in North Vietnam on 28 June -- 103, 000 tons. A reverse supply/
demand balance was calculated to yield the estimate for 1 January.
The estimate for 28 June was based on the belief that all the bulk
storage facilities were filled to 75 percent of their total capacity and
that 50 percent of the inventory of 55-gallon drums estimated for
mid-1966 was filled. Several factors supported the basis for consider-
ing the bulk storage to be 75 percent full:
a. Information from the US oil industry suggests
that, in the absence of definitive information, it is
reasonable to consider bulk storage to be about 75
percent full on the average.
b. The calculated upper limit of the range for 1 Jan-
uary 1966, derived from the 75-percent factor for 28 June,
- 19 -
Q17 PPT"
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SECRET
compares closely with data derived from a supply/
demand balance starting on 1 September 1965,.
Imports in the last four months of 1965 were at
an average monthly rate of almost 21, 000 tons,
compared with an estimated average monthly con-
sumption rate of only 15, 000 tons.
d. The development of dispersed tank storage
sites was well advanced by mid-June, and it is
reasoned that imports and inventories were high in
order to fill that storage. Moreover, the drum
inventory had grown, and this storage medium prob-
ably also was being exploited.
e. There was worldwide speaa.lation that: the
petroleum storage sites might be bombed. The
North Vietnamese probably calculated that, with
large inventories of petroleum on hand, there was
a good probability that a sufficient amount would
survive any bombing to support their needs until
post-bombing supply procedures were established.
f. Examination of post bombing photography
suggests that the storage tanks probably contained
sizable quantities of petroleum.
It was estimated that the following petroleum storage capacity was
available on 28 June (rounded to the nearest 1, 000 tons):
Principal
storage
terminals
101,000
Dispersed
storage
sites (tanks)
17,000
Dispersed
storage
sites (drums)
22,000
Military
and industrial sites (tanks)
5,000
(OL`!"'D L`T
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SECRET
It was reasoned that the North Vietnamese would exploit, to the
optimum, the capacity at facilities other than the principal terminals.
Thus under both approaches the dispersed tank and industrial sites
were considered to be filled to 75 percent of capacity; the drum inven-
tory to 50 percent (one-half the drums were considered to be filled).
Under the lower limit the petroleum represented by the derived
difference between the petroleum stored at the dispersed facilities and
the total estimated supplies on 28 June was allocated to the principal
storage terminals in the relative share which each terminal represented
of the total of such storage capacity. Under the upper limit, the capacities
at the principal storage terminals were considered to be 75-percent full
on 28 June.
a. Imports
Stocks in the dispersed tanks, industrial sites, and drums
were maintained at the levels described above by allocating sufficient
imports to these storage facilities. During those periods when imports
exceeded the amount necessary to maintain these stock levels, the excess
was allocated to each principal storage terminal in shares corresponding
to the capacity that each. terminal represented of the total storage capacity
at these terminals,
b. Consumption
Estimated withdrawals from stocks were made from each terminal
or category of storage on a pro rata basis,
co Losses of Petroleum from Bombings
The percentage destruction of capacity at each terminal or in
each category of storage was estimated from photography. This per-
centage was applied to the stocks estimated to have been in storage at
the site at the time of the bombing to calculate the losses of petroleum.
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has prepared :indepeiicteint
estimates of the petroleum situation in North Vietnam during 19u6, The
DIA approach. involved the use of a combination of supply/demand cal-
culations and the allocation of stocks to dispersed storage on a percentage
basis. Selected estimates for 1966 by DIA and CIA are as follows:
QFf`A R?T
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Metric Tons
DIA a~ C::A
Supply, 1 January
52,500 46,ooo
to 71,000
Imports
233,700 237
,200
Consumption
190,600 190
,600
Losses
51,500 41,000
to 62,000
Supply, 31 December
Storage capacity, 31 December
44,100 52,000
to 56,000
.Principal terminals b
23,750 2
3,620
Dispersed sites
49,320 63,000
to 73,000
Tanks
30,000
'to 40,000
Drums
2
8,000
Other
5,000
a
b. Capacity at Can Thon , normally
included by DIA in its list of major insertions, is
included in dispersed sites in this tabulation.
nrI'n r ~
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Secret
Secret
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