CIA-DIA WSAG STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000400010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1971
• Content Type: NOTES

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PACOM Review Completed
DIA review(s)
completed.
ARMY review(s)
completed
State Dept. review
completed
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0. P B
Manpower Requirement$ Issue
1. We have never been able to "balance" the enemy's
manpower books. As a result of our previous efforts on this
subject we believe that MACVs total reported losses (KIA,
Died & disabled by wounds, POWs, Hoi Chaus & "other") were
understated for 1968 but have been over-stated in subsequent
years. To MACVs credit, the total losses concept is not
used anymore. In September 1969, CINCPAC had to request that
MACV report the figure.
2. For recent manpower estimates we have used a figure
of 100,000 as the approximate number of NVA soldiers needed
to keep the forces in South Vietnam (and Cambodia) at a
constant level. This figure is roughly the number of NVA
infiltrators that arrived during 1970 (57,000) plus the
number of personnel that we estimate the forces were eroded
during 1970 (40,000-45,000=20,000-25,000 combat, 10,000 A.S.
and 10,000 Guerrillas). If anything it may be a little
light because strictly speaking it should include something
for maintenance of the VCI and maintenance in north and
south Laos if we want to view Hanoi's overall manpower
requirements.
ARMY review(s) completed.
PACOM Review Completed
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In this simple approach -- in which it is assumed that
the infiltration figure and net change in forces are
acceptable k.nowns -- it is not necessary to consider gross
losses or recruiting in $VN.
3. The 100,000 is conceptually the same as the 75,000
figure in the DIA paragraph, but the DIA concept is even
more restrictive than is ours. In addition, DIA's figure
of 20,000 for net change in aggregate force level is too low.
4. To get our estimate of the NVA manpower ,requirement
to boost combat forces up to the pre-Tet 1968 level -- an
increase of about 60,000 -- we had to abandon the 100,000
concept because it is inconsistent with the phenomenon we
are trying to estimate, i.e., a countrywide increase beyond
maintenance. In addition, we had to consider the fact that
the rate of combat (and losses) would go up considerably
beyond the 1970 rate,what ever that might be. The figure
200,000 was selected as a reasonable loss rate under such
circumstances. This loss would take place before, during,
and after the buildup as it did in 1968. (It is only
circumstantial that 200,000 happens to be the same as the
reported 200,000 which no one holds in any repute.)
5. Apparently DIAs 125,000-150,Q00 figure was derived
as follows: 60,000 plus 75,000=135,000=125,000-150,000.
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Thi.s would imply a loss rate of only 65,000-90,0.00 during
a period that would see. a rate of combat considerably
higher than we have experienced during the past two years
or so.
CIA/OER/I/SV
2 April 1970
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Analysis of the Communists Logistical
Position in Indochina
Input into the Laotian Panhandle was estimated for
this dry season -- 70,000 to 89,000 tons. (290-370 STPD).
Throughput for this dry season was derived by
correlating data on deliveries to the
southern Binh Trams. A projection was made for the
remainder of the dry season. Our throughput estimate is
ranged between 11,800 and 15,500 tons. (49 to 65 STPD)
Communist requirements in South Laos were calculated
for the last year: they were 53,800 tons (224STPD).
This year the burden is greater.
Even before Lam Son 719 began the Communists
logistical burden in South Laos had increased due to
the need to replace Sihanoukville and supply greater
force levels in the Panhandle. Thus the burden was
up from 53,800 to between 67,000 and 69,800. (280-291 STPD)25X1
Lam Son 719 itself added another supply burden,
a very high but brief requirement of 34 tons a day.
Much of it was met from stockpiles already in place.
Supply captures also added a large resupply
burden -- 73 tons a day during the operation.
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:? r- %W ii? V II
The results of our study show that there will be
precarious balance between enemy requirements and
throughput in the months ahead. (See Below)
Throughput
Requirements
Short Tons Per Day
49 to 64
44 to 50
However, through September the Communists will
be able to maintain the war in Indochina at about the
same levels as they did in 1970. Stockpiles will help
mitigate some of the Communist's most serious logistical
problems. We believe stockpiles are still considerable
in Cambodia, of less size in southern South Vietnam.
Finally, the study shows that the Communists will
have to get off to a fast start next fall if they are
to regain the favorable logistical posture they once held.
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Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
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15 April 1971
SUBJECT: Conversation with David Brown, State, INR
1. On this date David Brown called to get
concurrence on a paragraph which INR would incorporate
in a memorandum that they intended to publish on the
effects of Lam Son 719. The conversation was centered
around the figures we calculated in our WSAG paper
of 2 April - 278 tons a day as the daily input
requirement on the Laos Panhandle for the dry season
and a 28 ton incremental burden imposed by Lam Son 719.
2. I told Mr. Brown that I could not authorize
his use of our figures because of their sensitivity,
and the fact that the DCI himself dictated a moratorium
on our publication until such time as the WSAG
and SRG completed their current round of deliberations.
3. Mr. Brown told me that he would report this
to his supervisor, Evelyn Colbert. I assured him
that Evelyn would understand this position. I also
asked him to tell Evelyn that if they intended to
go ahead that I would place a formal objection.
Deputy Director
Distribution:
Orig - CIA-DIA WSAG study folder
1 - DD/OER
crr'r-I r, -94
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Q3'LU tL 1,
J3tc 191/
NVA/VC MILITARY' ACTIVITIES DURING 1971-72
1. Purpose
A. The purpose of this study was to assess the
logistic and manpower considerations likely to influence
Hanoi's choice of military strategy over the next 18
months. There are, of course, a number of non-quantifiable
factors which could well have equal weight in Hanoi's
thinking.
B. The study also estimated the logistic and man-
power resources that the North Vietnamese would have to
commit to support a variety of military options. Five
options were considered:
1. The lowest option was a continuation of
the 1970 pattern -- protracted warfare including
occasional points.
2. The highest option was sustained offensive
activities throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia.
3. Between these low and high options we
considered three intermediate strategic options:
a. An offensive campaign confined to
b. A campaign confined to Cambodia
c. An offensive campaign carried out
simultaneously in Military Region I and
Cambodia. SECRET
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A. Our analysis of the logistic aspects involved
three steps:
1. Calculating the volume of supplies which
would be consumed or stockpiled to attain each of
our assumed strategies.
2. Expressing these tonnages in terms of
input requirements -- by which I mean the volume
of supplies which the enemy would have to move
from North Vietnam tkowa* the panhandle of
Laos during the 1971-?74 dry season if the
requisite volume of supplies were to be delivered
to South Vietnam and Cambodia.
3. As our last step we compared these input
requirements with the performance of the logistic
system -- in terms of input tonnage -- during the
current dry season. This comparison gave us
a general approximation of the capability of the
system to meet these input requirements.
4. The controlling figures for these logistic
factors are shown in Table 1.
D. Our manpower analysis consisted primarily
of estimating the size of the enemy force required to
support each strategy. We then added this increment
to our estimates of the amount of infiltration required
to maintain force levels. This gave us a rough -- and
I would emphasize rough -- approximation of the
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. n. .v ltl %i~ ^
manpower resources required to support a given strategy.
These are shown in Table 2.
ITI. The Results
A. I would like to discuss our results just
from the logistics point of view and then from the
manpower point of view:
B, Logistics
1. The low option -- the protracted warfare
of 1970 -- would mean that during the 1971-72
dry season Hanoi would have to move an average
of 278 tons a day from North Vietnam into south
Laos. This is what we call our input requirement.
2. The maximum option -- a sustained
offensive throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia --
would generate an input requirement of between
4onsL
332 - 3644days,
3. The intermediate options generate some-
what smaller input requirements, the lowest
being 293-301 tons a day for a Cambodian offensive,
too as much as 320-347 tons a day for a simultaneous
offensive in both MR 1 and Cambodia.
C. Input Requirements and Performance
1. During the current dry season we estimate
that Hanoi demonstrated a capability to input into
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south Laos between 295 and 370 tons a day.
D. Comparing this performance with out estimates
of input requirements leads to the following broad
judgments based on logistic considerations alone.
1. Working from the mid points of our
estimates all but Case I -- the countrywide
offensive -- should be feasible sometime
during the 1971-72 dry season.
2. If performance is at the low end of the
range -- 295 tons a day -- our judgment would
change somewhat. None of the intermediate
strategies would be possible very early during
the dry season. MR 1 would be an exception
because of its closeness to North Vietnam. Case II
-- Cambodia alone -- would appear to be feasible
toward the end of the season.
3. If performance is at the high end of
the range all of the strategies -- even Case I,
the countrywide offensive, would be feasible.
However in this case the margin is so slight
that we believe Hanoi would opt to wait out the
1972 wet season before attempting such a major
offensive.
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D. Manpower Constraints
1. [-To maintain protracted warfare at the
1970 level the drawdown on Hanoi's manpower pool
would be slight.] We estimate that maintaining
the forces currently deployed in South Vietnam
a ~-t~t o
and Cambodia would require infiltration of about
100,000 troops. This could be done without any
drawdown of manpower reserves.
2. Our alternative strategies require
augmentations of the force levels in Cambodia
or South Vietnam. These range from 20,000 in
the case of offensives in either MR 1 or Cambodia,
to 40,000 for simultaneous offensives in both
MR 1 and Cambodia to 60,000 for Case 1 -- the
countrywide offensive.
3. As you can see from Table 2 the annual
infiltration required to sustain these alternative
strategies would range from a low of 120,000 to
a maximum of 250-300,000.
4. From a strict numbers point of view
all of the strategic options are within North
Vietnamese capabilities. However, these draw-
downs would not be completely trouble free.
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Logistic Factors for Alternative Strategies
Strategy
Input
Requirement
Case I (GVDT/Cambodia)
332-364
Mid-point
348
Case II (Cambodia)
293-301
Mid-point
297
Case III (MR 1)
304-322
Mid-point
313
Case IV (MR 1/Cambodia)
320-347
Mid-point
333
1970-1971
Dry Season Performance
295-370
332
295-370
332
295-370
332
295-370
332
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Incremental Combat Forces and Infiltration
Required for Alternative offensive Strategies
Increment to Total
Combat Force Infiltration a/
(Thousands) (Thousands)
Case I (GVN/Cambodia) 60 250 - 300
Case II (Cambodia) 20 150
Case III (MR 1) 20 120
Case IV (MR 1/Cambodia) 40 180
a/ The annual infiltration required both to maintain the
combat forces at their current strength of 115,000 and to
augment forces as required for each alternative strategy.
12 April 1971
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We judge that at the point annual infiltration
required the input of 180,000 troops as in
Case IV would be exceedingly difficult and
pose strains on trained manpower reserves and
training capabilities.
5. Finally, a manpower drain on the order
of 250,000 - 300,000 men a year would be so large
and the prospects of heavy losses so great that
we estimate Hanoi would be unwilling to undertake
such a commitment.
IV. Overall
A. As we can see Hanoi has the capability to
exercise several options over the next 18 months.
Whether Hanoi will opt for any of the variants we have
analyzed will depend on many factors other than
logistics and manpower. Whatever its decision Hanoi
will consider other variables such as the course of
pacification and Vietnamization, the South Vietnamese
elections, Hanoi's own staying power, and its view of
developments in the US during 1972.
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V. Final Observations
A. Our numerical analysis considered capabilities
only. Whether Hanoi would succeed in any of these
?ac s
strategies will depend on such as the actual
balance of forces it faces in each MR by mid 1972,
how the control situation develops over the next 18
months; and Hanoi's success in getting its men and
material to those forward positions within South Vietnam
or Cambodia from which it will try to launch its
offensive programs.
B. Our analysis is only one approach to a
complicated estimative problem. It answers some of
the questions about capabilities and possible intentions.
It does not consider some Allied courses of action
which could change our judgments radically. One of
these, for example, would be the effect of another
Lam Son 719 during the 1971-72 dry season.
C. The report also does not consider other
outcomes such as the adoption of a variant not considered
in our analysis. This could be, for example, a
decision to mount an offensive in MR 2 or MR 3.
F RFT
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D. Our analysis was also based on several assump-
tions, any one of which, if changed, could substantially
affect our results.
1. The most important were:
a. The volume of supplies moved through
south Laos during the current dry season
would essentially be sufficient only to
maintain the protracted war levels of
1970. Thus the attainment of offensive
capabilities would depend on performance
during the 1971-72 dry season.
b. Air interdiction during the 1971-72
dry season would remain at current levels.
c. The forces in south Laos would not
be allowed to go below the level maintained
there at the beginning of this dry season --
80,000 troops. Moreover, Hanoi would not
feel compelled to maintain the augmented
force used to cope with Lam Son 719.
inP"t-
d. Logistic and manpower requirements
to prepare each offensive strategy would be
roughly e%uivalent to the average maintained
during 1968.
T 9
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'SECRET NO LO -111
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
S-0109/DI-4
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Communist Logistics (U)
.A 2 iPiti
Reference: Telephone Request of
r 0.-, n "-u Economic
1. (C) Attached are the detailed worksheets used in
developing our estimates for communist-external rcquiremcnts
in the Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia. Included in the
attachments are a breakdown of logistics factors for southern
Laos during the 1970-1971 time frame (enclosure 1) and tables
of external requirements for postulated enemy courses of
action (enclosure 2). Additionally, i have attached a state--
ment of assumptions used in developing these:: requirements
(enclosure 3), and our estimate of LAMSON 719 supply loss
and expenditures (enclosure 4).
2. -(U-) I hope that these papers will provide an insight into
our methodology and conclusions.
4 Enclosures
1. Estimated Logistics
Factors (S/NFD)
2.* External Requirements
for RdI/N & Cambodia
(S/iNTFD)
3. Methodology Employed
in Estimating Enemy
External Requirements
in :?vii & Cambodia (/NFD)
4. LZUISON 719 Supply Losses
and Expenditures (S/N'D)
DA?~IEL r3~T
Eear J dnliral, 1.'ISN
Assistant DeputyDireetor
for lilt elligene01
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
ESTIMATED LOGISTICS FACTORS
October 1970 - 1 October 1971
ITEM
QUANTITY (SHORT TONS)
1. INPUT FROM NVN
75,000
- 85,000
(80,000)
2. BDA IN SOUTHERN LAOS
23,000
- 25,000
(24,000)
3.' LAMSON EXPENDITURES/ATTRITION
6,000
- 7,000
( 6,500)
4. THROUGHPUT TO RVN/CB
10,000
- 13,000
(11,500):-
5. CONSUMED (LAOS)
28,000
- 32,000
(30,000)
6. STOCKPILE (LAOS) +
LATER THROUGHPUT
7,000
- 9,000
( 8,000)
7. EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS IN
RVN/CB (FROM LAOS)
16,000
- 18,000
(17,000)
Group 3
., I-A i- 7 ;nterva1s;
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EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RVN AND CAIEODIA
4
CONSUMED
TOTAL*
HIGH MONTH
GRAND TOTAL
CASE 1
11 RVN and CB)
CLASS I
11,680'
12,559
1,047
CLASS II & IV
4,855.
5,335
444
CLASS V
611
2,263
305
TOTAL
20,157
STOCKPILE 10%
2,016
GRAND TOTAL
22,173 TONS/YEAR
(21,000-23,000)
CASE 2
(Cambodia Only)
FOOD
8,943
9,616
801
W/E
4,417
4,853
404
AMMO
448
1,503
156
TOTAL
15,972
STOCKPILE 10%
1,597
GRAND TOTAL
17,569 TONS
(17,000-19,000)
CASE 3
(MR 1 Only)
FOOD
10,768
11,578
965
W/E
3,687
4,052
338
AMMO
451
1,671
165
TOTAL
17,301
STOCKPILE 10%
:1,730
GRAND TOTAL
19,031-TONS
(18,000-20,000)',
CASE 4
(RVN MR 1 and Cambodia)
FOOD
10,768
11,578
965
WE
4,782
5,255
...438
AMMO
522
1,730
205
TOTAL
18,563
STOCKPILE 10%
1,856
GRAND TOTAL
20,419 TONS
(19,500 - 21,500;
MAY 1972 (BASIC CASE)
FOOD
8,943
9,616
801
WE
3,322
3,651
304
AMMO
376
1,393
116
TOTAL
14,660
STOCKPILE 10%
1,466
GRAND TOTAL
16,126 TONS
('16,000-18,000)
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED IN ESTIMATING ENEMY EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS IN RVN AND CB r
Only MR 1 and northern MR .2 require food from external sources (Laos or
the DMZ).- The estimated external food requirement for MR 1 is 25 per cent of
the total food requirement for the MR. The estimated external food require-
ment for northern MR 2 is 50 per cent of the total food requirement for the
same area.
Thirty per cent of the total weapons/equipment requirement in-RVN is
externally acquired -- from Laos or the DMZ.
One hundred per cent of the total weapons/equipment requirement for
Cambodia comes from external sources -- Laos.
Ninety per cent of the total ammunition requirement:. for RVN and Cambodia
comes from external sources -- Laos or the DMZ.
Discussion:
During the past year, documents, prisoners of war, Hoi Chanhs, and
COMINT have indicated that because of Allied sweep operations and intensified
pacification efforts, the NVA/VC have had difficulty moving supplies from
base areas to units in forward areas. This has created shortages mainly in
food but also'in,.ammunition and weapons/equipment. The shortages in food
have caused him to revert to
- Lowering food rations.
- Providing troops with money to buy their own food.
- Producing his own food in secure area. For example, in` the
western highlands during 1970, the local force units were expected to be
self-sufficient for the entire year.
Using personnel from his combat units to procure food.
The lack of ammunition has caused him to
- Decrease the basic loads for some units --"in some instances up
to 50 per cent,
- Economize on ammunition expenditures.
- Order his troops to capture and use Allied weapons and ammunition
whenever possible.
In at least one case, prevent a unit from carrying out its
assigned tasks.
Those factors as well as othersp-ovided a basis for determining the extent
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Sk GRLi/NO FOREIG~v Di bLL1 .
1 LAMSON 719 SUPPLY LOSSES AND EXPENDITURES ,
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY SUPPLIES CONSUMED AND LOST DURING
LAMSON 719 THROUGH'22 MARCH 1971
ESTIMATED NVA CONSUMPTION *
REPORTED CAPTURED/DESTROYED-
REP ORTED LOSS FROM AIR STRIKES (BDA)
TOTAL
CONSUMPTION CHART
ESTIMATED DAILY REQUIREMENT - LAMSON AREA *
Short Tons
2,300
- 2,600
2,800
- 2,80'0-
5,100
- 5,400?
700
- 2,000
5,800
- 7,400
Short Tons
CLASS I 40
CLASS II & IV 5
CLASS III 5-10
CLASS V 4- 6
TOTAL 54-61
TOTAL ESTIMATED REQUIREMENT - LAMSON AREA (8 FEB - 23 MAR)
CLASS I
40 STPD X 43 DAYS =
1,720
- 1,720 ST
CLASS II & IV
5 STPD X 43 DAYS =
215
- 215 ST
CLASS'III
5-10 STPD X 43 DAYS =
215
- 430 ST
CLASS V
4'- 6 STPD X 43 DAYS =
172
- 258 ST
TOTAL
54-61 STPD
2,322
- 2,623 ST
ye 40,000 troops in LAMSON area.
Group 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
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MEMORANDUM FOR: OLlya L I
IV Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The attached Memorandum to Holders
presents additions and changes requested
by General Bennett in his concurrence
in the Joint CIA-DIA study, "*1VA/VC
Military Activities During 1971-72,"
dated 2 April 1971.
Deputy Director of Economic Research
Central Intelligence Agency
Copy Nos. 1, 2, 3 7 April 1971
(DATE)
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Identical Memos to:
The Hon David Packard
Admiral Thomas Moorer
The Hon. U. Alexis Johnson
DDCI
ALSI
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Donald Bennett I
The attached Memorandum to Holders
presents the additions and changes
requested by you in your memorandum of
5 April to the Director of Central
intelligence regarding DIA concurrence
in the joint CIA-DIA study, "NVA/VC
Military Activities During 1971-72,"
dated 2 April 1971.
Deputy Director of Econom c -search
Central Intelligence Agency
Copy Nos. 7, 8
7 April 1971
(DATE)
I nrr'rr?i I
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SENDER WILL CHECK CL.ASSI__' I I' " w-
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
-'D/OE3 tF-1$
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(40)
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The attached Memorandum to Holders
should be inserted in your copy of the
joint CIA--DIA study, "NVA/VC Military
Activities During 1971-72," dated
2 April 1971.
Copy No. 12
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LLLJV1\L .L
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM.
NVA/VC MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING 1971-72
2 April 1971
PREPARED JOINTLY BY
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR THE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP
5 April 1971
Copy No.
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lJL'V1\1:i 1
5 April 1971
SUBJECT: NVA/VC Military Activities During
1971-72, 2 April 1971
1. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
has communicated to the Director of Central'
Intelligence his concurrence in subject memorandum,
provided the following changes are made:
a. DIA requests the insertion after
paragraph 61, page 26, of the following
paragraph: "Hanoi has new problems; new
requirements for protection and maintenance
of the Laos,supply route, requirements for
increased supplies in Cambodia, require-
ments for protection of the NVA Panhandle,
growing ARVN capabilities, and the waning
prospects for an overall SVN collapse."
b. DIA requests the insertion of
the following after paragraph 63, page 27:
"DIA believes that the progress in Pacifi-
cation and Vietnamization will enable
South Vietnam to cope with communist
terrorism, subversion and political agita-
tion over the long haul."
2. In addition to the above changes, DIA has
suggested and CIA agrees to the following textual
changes.
a. Change line 1, paragraph 62 to
read as follows: "The results of the
Communists' low-profile tactics ..."
b. Appendix, page A-l, change the
title of Appendix to read: "CIA Appendix"
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atta ix t hG joint CIA-.!)IA
shady r* 3ted by or. Ki5 inr s at
the WSM m :..ting of 26 :arch.
Atta t:
Cy #4.
(DATE)
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MEMORANDUM FOR:I
Attac? Aed i t the joint
t LSt :ti by 11
ti" 7 ,: f
(DATE)
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 x. . _
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I MEMORANDUM FOR: HWI. b 1" . l Xi: ve 1son I
t S.ttaciiec1 is the joiat CIA-DXA
study reuuested by Dr. Kissinger &t
t le: WSzG rno tip g of 26 larch.
R.L. C hluian, Jr.
Lieutenant General, JSMC
Attachm:,nnt
Gy 4's
(DATE)
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 I
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MEMORANDUM FOR:LL
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2 6
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VaJ V1\L 1
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
NVA/VC MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING 1971-72
2 April 1971
PREPARED JOINTLY BY
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR THE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP
5 April 1971
Copy No.
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\Jl.~`I1111~ 1
5 April 1971
SUBJECT: NVA/VC Military Activities During
1971-72, 2 April 1971
1. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
has communicated to the Director of Central
Intelligence his concurrence in subject memorandum,
provided the following changes are made:
a. DIA requests the insertion after
paragraph 61, page 26, of the following
paragraph: "Hanoi has new problems; new
requirements for protection and maintenance
of the Laos supply route, requirements for
increased supplies in Cambodia, require-
ments for protection of the NVA Panhandle,
growing ARVN capabilities, and the waning
prospects for an overall SVN collapse."
b. DIA requests the insertion of
the following after paragraph 63, page 27:
"DIA believes that the progress in Pacifi-
cation and Vietnamization will enable
South Vietnam to cope with communist
terrorism, subversion and political agita-
tion over the long haul."
2. In addition to the above changes, DIA has
suggested and CIA agrees to the following textual
changes.
a. Change line 1, paragraph 62 to
read as follows: "The results of the
Communists' low-profile tactics ..."
b. Appendix, page A-l, change the
title of Appendix to read: "CIA Appendix"
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fir, )1C.C 1
NVA/VC MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING 1971-72
2 April 1971
PREPARED JOINTLY BY
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR THE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP
12 25X1
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
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NVA Military Activities During 1971-72
Introduction
The purpose of this memorandum is to assess,
the logistic and manpower considerations likely
to influence Hanoi's choice of military strategy
over the next 18 months. The memorandum also
estimates the logistic and manpower resources
that the North Vietnamese would have to commit
to support a variety of military options. These
range from a low option which would be a contin-
uation of the 1970 pattern -- protracted warfare,
including occasional high points -- to a high
option involving sustained offensive activities
throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia. The
analysis also considers three possible inter-
mediate strategies. These are an offensive
campaign confined to Military Region 1, a
campaign confined to Cambodia, and, finally,
offensive campaigns carried out simultaneously
in Military Region 1 and Cambodia.
The methodology underlying this analysis
involved estimating the manpower and logistic
resources which the North Vietnamese would have
to commit in support of a given strategic option.
The resource commitments for each strategy were
then compared with North Vietnamese logistic per-
formance during the current dry season and with
previous infiltration patterns. On the basis of
these comparisons, estimates are made on the
feasibility of each of the various strategic
options being attained and, when applicable, the
time required to do so.
The terms "protracted war", "high points" and
"major" or "general offensive" are defined as
follows:
Protracted war -- the level of activity
in which the Communists were engaged in
South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos during
1970. This period was marked by the absence
of multi-battalion attacks, a very limited
number of battalion attacks, and periodic
increases in harassment, attacks by fire,
ground and ambush attacks, and terrorism.
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High point -- an enemy term used to
describe a period -- usually of short
duration -- during which he intensifies
or sharply increases his level of mili-
tary activity. High points are character-
ized by widespread attacks against both
military and civilian targets.
Major offensive -- a campaign involving
multi-battalion attacking forces of two to
five battalions fighting for a period of
at least five to ten days in three or more
simultaneous actions. The concept includes
sufficient stockpiling to enable the of-
fensives to be continued for longer periods
if conditions warrant.
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I. Overview: March - October 1971
1. The Communists will not be in a position
to mount a sustained countrywide main force mili-
tary action in South Vietnam over the next six to
nine months, although significant high points may
occur in any of the military regions. The enemy
forces in South Vietnam have been depleted over
the past year by the deployment of some Main Force
Units into Cambodia or Laos. For example, only
43 of the 93 battalions normally deployed in
South Vietnam's Military Region (MR) 3 are now
physically located there.
2. The predominant threat in MR 1 is from
forces in the Lam Son 719 area of Laos and north
of the DMZ area. The recent shift of 324B Division
elements to the Lam Son 719 area of Laos has some-
what eased the threat of multi-battalion attack in
Quang Tri. In the Front 4 area of operation, the
recent move of the 4th Regiment to within 20 miles
of Da Nang increased the threat to Da Nang and Hoi
An.
3. The most significant Main Force threat the
enemy poses in MR 2 is in the Central Highlands
area of Pleiku and in.Kontum Provinces. The enemy
is apparently preparing to use two infantry regi-
ments with associated artillery elements to conduct
an attack against isolated ARVN positions in that
area. Other significant force dispositions in the
region consist of the 3rd Division with two sub-
ordinate regiments in Binh Dinh Province and six
battalions in Binh Thuan Province. Both of these
forces appear to be-suffering from personnel and.
logistic shortages.
4. In MR 3, only 50% of the enemy combat per-.
sonnel, excluding guerrillas, threatening the area
are physically located within the country. In-
country units have experienced great difficulty in
establishing an offensive posture. The enemy has
been forced to recombine, reconstitute, and down-
grade Main Force regiments and battalions to Local
Force Units, because of the lack of supplies, re-
placements, and materiel. While many of the units
currently operating in Cambodia have the capability
to deploy against targets within MR 3, they have
been tied down by ARVN operation TOAN THANG 01/71
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and would not be available to protect base areas
and LOCs in Cambodia if they returned to South
Vietnam at this time.
5. Enemy forces in MR 4 have been seriously
eroded during the past year, and have had difficulty
in securing supplies. Unless personnel and supply
losses can be made up in the next several months,
the enemy's military capabilities there are unlikely
to improve significantly during 1971.
6. The current enemy strength in Cambodia is
estimated at 50,000 to 60,000 personnel (excluding
5,000 to 10,000 Khmer Communists). The dispositions
of these enemy forces are mostly in the south and
eastern third of the country. The major enemy
threats in Cambodia are in three strategic areas.
Approximately 15 battalions are deployed in the
general vicinity of Route 4; 7 in the Kompong Thom-
Skoun-Kompong Cham area, and 55 battalions in the
northeast and TOAN THANG areas.
7. In South Vietnam we expect the Communists
to continue the current spring campaign for a few
weeks before settling into a rainy season that
should be similar to those of the past two years.
However, they could maintain a relatively high
rate of terror, harassment, and small unit attacks
into the rainy season. The exception here, as
always, is northern MR 1 where because of short
LOCs and a unique weather cycle -- the dry season
runs from Maythrough September - Hanoi's capa-
bilities are not governed by the same manpower
and logistical constraints that pertain to the
south. In Cambodia, Communist efforts over the
next six to nine months will remain focused pri-
marily on reconstituting and securing supply
routes and base areas, just as they are in
southern Laos. Stronger military action may also
be initiated elsewhere in portions of Cambodia or
Laos.
8. Hanoi's actions during the current winter/
spring campaign have been limited. Manpower needed
to be fed into the COSVN area (MRs 3 and 4 and
Cambodia) to rebuild forces in order to maintain
a credible military threat and to support the effort
to build an expanded insurgency base and logistic
system in Cambodia. Beyond that, the defense of
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the logistic system in Laos was the principal task.
The bulk of the 35,000 personnel destined for COSVN
were dispatched early in the 1970-71 infiltration
cycle. The manpower requirements of Communist
forces in Cambodia for reorientation of the supply
system and for security apparently have been sub-
stantial, Few infiltrators have been detected
being allocated to enemy units in MRs 3 and 4 despite
the fact that the enemy's position in these MRs has
continued to erode.
9. Clearly one of the primary manpower require-
ments during the 1970-71 dry season was seen by Hanoi
to be the operation and defense of the Laos Panhandle
supply system. From April 1970 to early 1971 some
20,000 personnel were sent to southern Laos. During
February an additional 20,000 troops were deployed to
the Lam Son 719 area from North and South Vietnam.
The 35,000 personnel sent to the COSVN area plus the
40,000 deployed to the Laos Panhandle represent about
75% of the total detected manpower allocated to South
Vietnam and southern Laos this dry season.
10. We cannot predict with any large degree of
confidence what immediate course the enemy will
follow with its forces currently deployed in the
Tchepone area. Clearly personnel losses have been
considerable and, although enemy forces maintained
heavy pressure on ARVN forces as they withdrew from
Laos, they are not expected to move on into South
Vietnam in any significant numbers at this time. Most
of the Communist units that participated in the defense
against Lam Son 719 will need rest and to be refitted
and are hardly in shape at this time to engage in major
offensive activities against the present heavy concen-
trations of Allied forces in MR 1. Action has picked
up in MR 1 but this is largely the work of units which
were already deployed in the area and were not directly
involved in the fighting in Laos.
11. As the rainy season in Laos really begins to
set in, however, some of the enemy's forces now there
are expected to redeploy to South Vietnam as well as
North Vietnam. If Hanoi wishes to heat up the war
with Main Force activity some of the sizable force
now tied up in Laos could be deployed into MR 1,
However, Allied forces should be able to contain
even heavy attacks in this area.
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12. Given the enemy's already reduced capabilities,
and the fact that the inputs of both supplies and man-
power during this dry season were modest, heavy main
force military pressure in MRs 2, 3, and 4 are not
expected during the upcoming spring and summer months.
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II. Logistic Performance 1971-72 Dry Season
A. The Analytical Approach
The CIA View
Paragraphs 13-38 present the CIA
methodologies and estimates of pos-
sible levels of NVA logistic perform-
ance during the 1971-72 dry season.
The DIA view is presented in para-
graphs 39-44.
13. The level of logistic activity in the Laos
Panhandle during the 1971-72 dry season (October
1971-May 1972) will depend on a wide range of
variables. These include the size of the forces
deployed in southern Laos, South Vietnam, and
Cambodia; the level of the US air effort and the
degree of its effectiveness in interdicting the
supply system; the extent of ground operations
by RVNAF forces and by friendly guerrillas; and
the choice of strategic and tactical options
which Hanoi and Saigon may try to follow in the
12 months following the opening of the dry season.
14. The latter is a critical variable since
it presumably will be a large factor in estab-
lishing the logistic target which the supply
system in Laos will seek to attain during the
next dry season. It is also the most difficult to
come to grips with because it raises the funda-
mental question of the extent to which Hanoi's
strategic and tactical options are circumscribed
by logistic constraints. Given our lack of knowl-
edge on what these targets are, it is impossible
at this early date to project any meaningful quanti-
fication of what the actual level of logistic
performance will be during the next dry season.
15. We can, however, compute with reasonable
accuracy the logistic requirements which must be
met to satisfy a broad range of strategic and
tactical options, and on the basis of previously
observed performance, we can assess the capability
of the system to meet these requirements. Using
this approach, we analyze in this section the logistic
requirements ranging from a minimum required to keep
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the war going at the low levels of 1970 to the maxi-
mum required to obtain a capability for a sustained
and widespread military offensive. We then, on the
basis of assumed alternative levels of air inter-
diction, assess the extent to which the system is
likely to meet these varying requirements for the
1971-72 dry season.
H. The Minimum Goal
16. In this discussion we assume that Hanoi has
set as its minimum goal a logistic performance ade-
quate to enable the war in South Vietnam and Cambodia
to continue at the low levels of protracted warfare
observed over the past 18 months. To meet this
minimum goal, the North Vietnamese must provide suf-
ficient input along the entry routes from North
Vietnam into Laos to reestablish depleted stockpiles,
to meet the requirements of its forces in southern
Laos, to offset supply losses resulting from inter-
diction, and to provide an adequate throughput of
supplies for its forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia.
Southern Laos
17. In an earlier analysis of the logistic flows
through southern Laos during the 1970-71 dry season,
the normal flow of supplies was estimated to require
a daily input from North Vietnam into southern Laos of
224 tons a day. It was further estimated that the
need to replace the loss of Sihanoukville as well
as the expansion of logistic and security forces
required to maintain and defend the logistic system
increased the minimum required daily input of sup-
plies to 278 tons a day. For this analysis we now
assume that the higher input requirement has in
effect become the normal burden imposed on the
system -- first, because the Communists are still
denied access to Sihanoukville and, second, there
is no evidence to warrant a judgment that Hanoi
would feel able in late 1971 to maintain a smaller
force in southern Laos than it had there at the
beginning of the 1970-71 dry season. This force is
estimated at 80,000 troops.
18. In measuring the logistic flow for forces
in southern Laos, we have assumed that by the end
of this dry season Hanoi will probably withdraw the
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forces deployed to southern Laos in reaction to Lam
Son 719. We have also assumed that Hanoi will not
redeploy these forces at the start of the next dry
season, preferring to keep them in southern North
Vietnam or in South Vietnam so long as it perceives
no immediate threat of a renewal of incursions of
the scale of Lam Son 719.
19. These assumptions reduce somewhat the esti-
mated burden imposed on the logistic system during
the next dry season. The incremental consumption
and ground losses of supplies by the forces committed
against Lam Son 719, for example, would be equivalent
to an added daily drawdown of 28 tons of supplies
throughout the dry season. Simply maintaining these
forces in southern Laos without their being committed
to combat would increase the daily consumption in
Laos by 15-20 tons a day.
South Vietnam and Cambodia
20. The minimum goal of sustaining the war at
the low levels of 1970 assumes that enemy forces in
South Vietnam and Cambodia will be kept at their
mid-1970 level of about 220,000 troops, of which
50,000 - 60,000 were deployed in Cambodia.
Input Requirements
21. The forces in southern Laos, South Vietnam,
and Cambodia would have a total daily requirement
of 164 tons a day in the 1971-72 dry season and 114
tons a day during the wet season. If the North
Vietnamese attempt to carry out a full year's re-
supply of these forces during the 1971-72 dry season,
the total daily input, including allowances for
air and ground losses, would be 278 tons a day, as
shown in the tabulation below:
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Short Tons
Daily
Cumulative
Dry Season
Requirement for forces
in southern Laos
1971/72 dry season
120
36,000
1972 wet season
70
10,500
Minimum requirement for
forces in South Vietnam
and Cambodia
44
20,100
Total
66,600
Daily input requirement
(66,600 : 240)
278
22. On the basis of past performance, this in-
put requirement appears to be well within the capa-
bilities of the North Vietnamese logistic system.
We currently are estimating that during the 1970-71
dry season the Communists will have maintained a
daily average input of 295-370 tons of supplies into
the Laos Panhandle.* If this level of input is sus-
tained during the 1971-72 dry season, it would
clearly be adequate for maintenance of combat activi-
ties at 1970 levels.
23. The lower input -- 295 tons a day -- would
impose a much tighter condition on the North Viet-
namese and quite possibly could enforce some further
drawdowns on existing stockpiles to maintain the
1970 pace of the war. The higher input -- 370 tons
a day -- would present a more comfortable position
from Hanoi's point of view. It would, for example,
* This estimate is based on the assumption that
the additional burdens and disruptions imposed on
the Logistic system this year will cause the North
Vietnamese to try to maintain a high level of input
past the normal end of the dry season and through
the month of May. If the monsoon rains appear early
in the month, it will become increasingly difficult
to maintain the flow of supplies at this level.
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provide Hanoi with more resources to support a some-
what broader range of strategic or tactical opera-
tions.
24. In neither case, however, should the gross
difference between daily input represented by our
performance figures of 295-370 tons a day and the
input requirements shown in Table 1 be regarded as
a residual throughput into South Vietnam or Cambodia.
Part of the residual, of course, would be subjected
to air interdiction as it moved through the Pan-
handle. An unknown share of the apparent input
surplus, particularly at the higher level of 370
tons a day, would probably be used to expand stock-
piles within southern Laos. Much. would also depend
on how much of the residual flow could actually be
moved into South Vietnam and Cambodia and placed
into forward supply caches by Rear Services Groups.
25. The problems of distribution to combat units
from storage areas in South Vietnam and Cambodia
have become increasing complex. Enemy deliveries to
combat units have been spotty for sometime because
of Allied operations. Supply distribution has been
disrupted and caches have been captured or destroyed.
Improvements in RVNAF and FANK capabilities over the
past year and an increase in their operations over
the next year or so may further increase Communist
distribution problems.
26. The extent to which the actual input of
supplies during the next dry season influences Hanoi's
capabilities and thus its choice of strategies for
the 1971-72 period will also be affected by logistic
performance during the coming wet season. The analysis
just presented imposed a full year's logistic burden on
an eight-month dry season. Throughput during the next
wet season would reduce the required input during the
next dry season or give the Communists more tactical
flexibility by drawing on stockpiles to expand combat
rates.
27. We estimate that with a major effort the
Communists could continue to move supplies through
the Laos Panhandle during the 1971 wet season. De-
pending on the length and severity of the monsoon
rains, this throughput could range between 10% and
20% of normal dry season throughput, or from 1,200
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to 3,000 tons. This amount would be equivalent to
from 30 to 70 days of supply requirements at 1970
combat levels.
C. The Maximum Goal
28. In this discussion we assume that Hanoi has
set as its goal a buildup of stockpiles in South
Vietnam and Cambodia sufficient to permit the launch-
ing of a sustained offensive in both countries.* In
addition, the discussion considers strategic
variants which would involve general offensives of
less universal proportions. The three other variants
analyzed are offensives limited to:
(a) Military Region 1;
(b) Cambodia; and
(c) Military Region 1 and Cambodia
The Logistic Burden
29. The following discussion outlines the
logistic burden under each of the four strategic
variants. The derivation of these factors is dis-
cussed in the Appendix. In each case the flow of
supplies required to support forces in southern
Laos is held at 1970-71 levels as discussed for
the minimum case.
30. As shown in Table 1, the dry season input
flows would range from a low of 293-301 tons in
the case of an offensive limited to Cambodia,
* For this analysis, stockpiling requirements are
judged to be one and one-half times the average
daily expenditures of externally procured supplies
(Classes II, IV, and V for Cambodia and South Viet-
nam's MRs 1, 2, 3, 4 and Class I for South Vietnam's
MR 1) during 1968 for a six-month period. This is
thought to provide adequate supplies to sustain a
continuation of Zow-level combat during the pre-
offensive phase and to provide ample support for a
major offensive. To this total was added a six
month's resupply flow requirement of the low combat
level of 1970 to round out the annual requirement
for 1971-72.
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1971/72 Dry Season Supply Flows Needed
to Meet Requirements for Sustained Offensive
Operations
Short Tons
Daily
Requirement
Cumulative
Dry Season Inputs
Southern Laos
1971/72 dry season
120
36,000
1972 wet season
70
10,500
Case 1
Country-wide South
Vietnam and Cambodia 73-90 33,187-40,950
Total 79.,687-87.,450 a/
Daily input require-
ment. 332-364 b/
Case 2
Cambodia; low combat
elsewhere 52-56 23,850-25,650
Total 70,350-72,150 a/
Daily input require-
ment
Case 3
Military region 1,
293-301 b/
low combat elsewhere 58-68 26,437-30,825
Total 72,937-77,325 a/
Daily input require-
ment
Case 4
Military region 1 and
Cambodia, low combat
304-322 b/
elsewhere 67-80 30,487-36,675
Total 76,987-83,175 a/
Daily input require-
ment 320-347 b/
a. Including southern Laos tonnages, above.
b. The daily input requirement is calculated on the
basis of a 240 day dry season (October-May) and in-
cludes an allowance for air Losses.
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to 332-364 tons in the case of an offensive mounted
throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia.
31. Using the same technique as that presented
in the analysis of the minimum goal, we will compare
the input requirements of each variant with capabili-
ties as measured by logistic performance during the
1970-71 dry season.
Case 1 -- Maximum Offensive
32. In this case a general offensive throughout
South Vietnam and Cambodia would require an average
daily input of 332-364 tons during the 1971-72 dry
season. On the basis of the 1970-71 dry season,
we can anticipate that actual input will range be-
tween 295 and 370 tons a day. The low end of this
range is so far short of required inputs that a
general offensive of this magnitude would not seem
feasible during the 1971-72 dry season. The re-
quisite stockpiles would probably not be in place
until the approach of the 1972-73 dry season (October
1972-May 1973).
33. On the other hand, if the higher range of
estimated input -- 370 tons a day -- is achieved
during the 1971-72 dry season then the logistic
imperatives to enable a general offensive will be
close to satisfaction some time toward the end of
the season. Because the margin is narrow and be-
cause a reliable means of resupply during the rainy
season would be less certain, the Communists would
probably prefer to wait out the wet season before
launching the offensive. Moreover, their problems
in moving supplies from Laos and distributing them
to combat units in South Vietnam and Cambodia would
further complicate the launching of such a wide-
spread offensive. Much will depend upon the impact
of Allied operations in 1971-72 and the degree to
which the Communists are determined to expand the
war. Their prudence would be cast aside, however,
if the developing situation in Cambodia or South
Vietnam revealed opportunities which gave the
promise of highly successful operations. There is
a greater chance that the Communists would attempt
one or more of the variants discussed below.
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The Intermediate Cases
34. The variants for less extensive offensives
would require the following daily inputs during the
1971-72 dry season:
Short Tons
Case 2 - Military Region 1 304-322
Case 3 - Cambodia 293-301
Case 4 - Military Region 1 and
Cambodia 320-347
Intermediate Options
35. In these cases we assume that Hanoi will
desire to undertake sustained heavy offensive
activity in only one or more regions of South Vietnam
and/or Cambodia. Analytically, the logistic flows
required for these intermediate models have been
constructed in the same manner as in the "maximum
goal" strategy. For the region where a high level
of offensive activity is postulated, the flow of
supplies needed to establish stockpiles is calculated;
elsewhere, the enemy requirements are based on the
1970 expenditure rates.
36. The input requirements of all of the three
"intermediate" strategy options fall within the
range of estimated 1970-71 dry season daily average
input of 295-370 tons of supplies into the Laos
Panhandle. At this level of input, particularly
as we move away from the low end of the range, each
of these strategies is more feasible.
37. The high range of the estimated input --
370 tons a day -- is slightly above average daily
input requirements for building up to a sustained
high level of combat in Cambodia and MR 1; it is
well above the requirements needed to build stock-
piles for high combat in Cambodia or MR 1 separately.
This suggests that the enemy, operating from the high
end of the estimated input range, could probably
undertake extended offensive actions in either
Cambodia or MR 1 some time before the end of the
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1971-72 dry season provided that supplies reach the
combat units concerned. This is particularly so in
MR 1 where the Communists could concentrate the through-
put of supplies on Routes 926 and 922 and quickly
deploy the required forces. In the case of MR 1,
general offensive activities could probably be
undertaken early in the 1971-72 dry season because of
its location. The time required to build stockpiles
for.both MR 1 and Cambodia would indicate that simul-
taneous offensives in-both areas could probably not
be undertaken until the end of the dry season, in
which case the Communists might await the start of
the 1972-73 dry season.
38. A somewhat different picture emerges if one
considers the low end of the estimated input -- 295
tons per day. This amount would appear to be in-
sufficient to undertake any of the "intermediate"
strategies very early during the 1971-72 dry season.
Again, MR 1 would be an exception for the reasons
discussed above. The Cambodia strategy alone would
appear to be feasible toward the end of the period,
and somewhat sooner if stockpiles in Cambodia have
not been seriously depleted.
39. DIA. finds it difficult to work from an
"input requirement" or a "supply flow" approach.
As an alternative to that methodology, DIA first
calculates enemy requirements to support combat
activities in South Vietnam and Cambodia. These
calculations are then compared with DIA estimates
of supplies throughput to South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia, estimates of supplies stockpiled in Laos
for later throughput, and estimates of enemy
input to the system at the Laos border. Thus an
overall estimate of enemy logistic performance is
achieved. The DIA estimates for October 1970 to
October 1.97.1 is set forth below:
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DIA ESTIMATE
Period - 1 Oct 1970
- 1 Oct 1971
Short Tons
Input
75,000-85,000
(80,000)
Throughput
10,000-13,000
(11,500)
Stockpile - Laos
(for later throughput) a/
7,000-9,000
( 8,000)
Requirements - RVN/CB
(external from Laos) a/
16,000-18,000
(17,000)
a. Subject to additional ground/air interdiction.
b. To conduct a protracted war of the type
observed since 1 Oct 1970.
This estimate suggests the enemy is barely able to
sustain the current level of effort.
40. It is unlikely that enemy logistic input
effort will increase significantly during the
1971-72 period. The estimated input for 1970-71
is measurably higher than in any previous year.
The toll the enemy would pay in consumption and
losses to air and ground interdiction in Laos
would increase sharply were the enemy to turn to
daylight operations, increased road building, in-
creased security troops, and increased wet season
operations. Moreover, even though the enemy may
calculate that during the 1971-72 period he will
not have to contend with the losses of another
Lam Son 719 operation, he must consider carefully
the new vulnerabilities of his Laotian stockpiles.
He might be able to stockpile the rough equivalent
of his Lam Son losses but these would remain tar-
gets for RVNAF and allied air and ground opera-
tions.
41. in view of the air and ground interdiction
of the supply system over the past year, the
Communists have no assurance that they would be
able to deliver sufficient supplies to their
forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1971 to
maintain the 1970 levels of combat. Although
interdiction losses at the 1970-71 rate in Laos
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and consumption by enemy forces in Laos have been
considered, the loss of supplies in South Vietnam
and Cambodia and the problems of distribution to
combat units from storage areas in Cambodia and
South Vietnam further reduces the amount of supplies
which these combat forces would actually receive.
Enemy deliveries to combat units have been spotty
for some time due to Allied operations. Supply
distribution has been disrupted and caches have
been captured or destroyed. Improvements in RVNAF
and FANK capabilities over the past year and an
increase in their operations over the next year
or so would further increase Communist supply
problems. Thus even at the projected supply inputs
maintenance of the 1970 combat levels would become
increasingly difficult by 1972.
42. In postulating possibly enemy courses of
action for the period 1 October 1971 - 1 October
1972, four cases have been constructed. Enemy
requirements in these situations have been de-
veloped and are compared with estimate of the ex-
pected enemy logistic performance.
Action
Requirements Short Tons
Case
1
21,000
-23,000
Case
2
17,000
-19,000
Case
3
18,000
-20,000
Case
4
19,500
-21,500
For
computing logistical requirements for the
four
cases involving the General Offensive,
DIA
assumed the following:
CASE ONE: (TOTAL RVN AND CAMBODIA)
Nine to 15 combat battalions fighting
simultaneously for at least five to ten
days in Cambodia and each Military Region
of the Republic.
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CASE TWO: (CAMBODIA ONLY)
Nine to 15 battalions fighting simul-
taneously for at least five to ten days
in Cambodia with the RVN remaining at a
low level.
CASE THREE: (GVN MR 1 ONLY)
Nine to 15 battalions fighting simul-
taneously for at least five to ten days
in MR 1 with the rest of the RVN and
Cambodia remaining at a low level.
CASE FOUR: (GVN MR 1 AND CAMBODIA)
Nine to 15 battalions fighting simul-
taneously for at least five to ten days
in both Cambodia and GVN MR 1 with the
rest of the Republic remaining at low
level.
43. The added tonnage required represents pri-
marily additional ammunition expenditures and food
requirements. Ammunition requirements increase in
proportion the number of engagements whereas food
requirements are a function of the numbers of per-
sonnel involved and the location.
44. On balance, it can be seen that under the
estimated conditions of supply the Communists
probably would not be capable of Case 1, a general
offensive throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia.
The risk of such an operation would not only in-
volve a serious drawdown of supplies but also high
losses. Thus, it would probably not be acceptable
to them. Case 2 would at best be only marginally
within his capability, but could be prohibited by
losses to his stockpiles and supply movements
through air and ground interdiction. Case 3 would
appear feasible due to its location nearest the DMZ
and his stockpiles in Laos. Case 4 would seriously
tax his supply capabilities in 1971-72 and might be
well beyond any action he might undertake in this
time period.
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45. The previous analysis assumed that the
level of air interdiction in southern Laos during
the 1971-72 dry season would be the same as that
maintained during the current dry season. If the
US air effort during the 1971-72 dry season should
be altered then we would have to make adjustments
in our estimates of the constraints imposed by
air interdiction upon the NVA logistic system.
If, for example, the US air effort were reduced
by 30% and the sortie mix remained essentially
as it is under current programs, we would antici-
pate a proportionate and significant loosening of
the logistic constraints the enemy experiences
in southern Laos.
46. The effects of changing levels of air
activity in southern Laos are currently being
studied by a working group panel of the Vietnam
Special Studies Group. When its work is completed,
more specific analysis of the effects of a reduc-
tion in the US air effort will be possible.
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III. Manpower Constraints
47. Even with the war at the low levels observed
during 1970, the drain on Communist manpower has
been substantial. Over the past few years, North
Vietnam has had to bear an increasing share of man-
power losses as Communist ability to recruit in
South Vietnam declined to low levels. The manpower
drain during 1968 and successive years was one of
the principal determinants of Hanoi's electing to
follow a course of protracted warfare. A reluctance
to make continuing large inputs of power is reflected
in statistics on infiltration arrivals in South
Vietnam/Cambodia, which declined from about 250,000
in 1968 to 100,000 in 1969 and to only 55,000 in
1970. These declining inputs have brought about a
steady erosion of NVA/VC combat forces in South
Vietnam/Cambodia which totaled only 110,000-125,000
at the end of 1970.
48. If Hanoi chooses now to increase its offen-
sive capabilities by the end of the 19.71-72 dry
season, its forces in South Vietnam will have to
be augmented substantially. The estimated current
disposition of NVA/VC combat forces and the in-
creased force required to support the alternative
offensive strategies are shown in Table 2.
49. The force augmentations shown in Table 2
reflect a strategy of offensive operations roughly
akin to those observed during the Tet and May of-
fensives in 1968. There are several favorable as-
pects about the actual pre-Tet manpower situation
which will be difficult for the enemy to recreate.
The buildup of the enemy combat force structure
during 1967 was accomplished with South Vietnamese
rural manpower recruited from territory not under
South Vietnamese control. Similarly, the major part
of the fighting during the 1968 campaign was under-
taken by southern Main and Local Forces units, As
these forces were drawn down by high losses, however,
replacements were made by the infusion of NVA
personnel. Given the current status of the enemy
force structure, and the Communists' limited capa-
bility to recruit manpower from the largely GVN-
controlled population, the enemy could only simulate
a true pre-Tet manpower situation through large
infusions of NVA personnel.
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50. As Table 2 shows, these augmentations
range from 20,000 to prepare for general offensive
campaigns in either MR 1 or Cambodia, to 40,000 for
simultaneous offensives in both MR 1 and Cambodia,
to 60,000 for Case 1 -- a general offensive through-
out South Vietnam and Cambodia.
Table 2
Current Disposition and Estimated Combat Force
Levels Required to Support Alternative
Offensive Strategies a/
May 1972
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case '4
MR
1
35
55
55
35
55
MR
2
23
33
23
23
23
MR
3
17
27
17
17
17
MR
4
15
20
15
15
15
Total
115
175
135
135
155
a. Case 1, general offensive throughout South
Vietnam and Cambodia; Case 2, general offensive
in Military Region 1; Case 3, general offensive
in Cambodia; and Case 4, general offensive in
Cambodia and Military Region 1.
51. An augmentation of 60,000 troops would be
required for this strategy. Losses during 1970
were. reported from the field as over 200,000, and
if we accept them for analytical purposes then
infiltration arrivals in South Vietnam would have
to be on the. order of 250,000-300,000 troops. We
have estimated that since 1968 infiltration on the
order of 100,000 troops a year would generally be
adequate to maintain force levels. If a country-
wide offensive were initiated, however, casualties
would increase dramatically and infiltration re-
quirements would undoubtedly soar as they did in
1968. Infiltration at such a rate would take a
considerable period of time to organize and
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implement. Moreover, a manpower drain of this
magnitude would draw deeply from North Vietnam's
manpower pool, and severely strain the training
capacity of the North Vietnamese armed forces,
particularly if such training had not been pro-
ceeding apace, and contribute to further disrup-
tion of the North Vietnamese economy.
52. DIA believes that the enemy could increase
his force structure by 60,000 with an infiltration
arrival of approximately 125,000 to 150,000 per-
sonnel. This is based upon his current strategy
of attempting to..maintain his 1970 force structure
with approximately 55,000 arrivals last year.
The estimated decrease in his order of battle was
about 20,000 (240,000-290,000 in December 1969 to
220,000-270,000 in December 1970). Adding his OB
losses and infiltration, the enemy needed only
about 75,000 arrivals to maintain his end 1969
level of forces. For lesser amounts of buildups,
infiltration requirements would be reduced.
53. All of these factors plus the knowledge
that a 1971-72 offensive of these dimensions would
probably result in high casualties would give
Hanoi much food fQr thought. Any decision to
commit these forces would be reached not simply
by considering numbers but by hard consideration
of many other factors including the increasing
social and psychological pressures that would
ensue, balanced against the likely results of
such action.
The Intermediate Cases
54. The military options open to the enemy in
MR 1 are unique in several ways. The proximity to
North Vietnam, the relatively short distance to move
supplies and personnel in short. periods of time, and
the capability to withdraw units back into North
Vietnam for retrenchment safe from Allied ground
forces give MR 1 a unique position.
55. For the purpose of this analysis, it is
estimated that a strength augmentation of 20,000
would be necessary to mount a sustained offensive
in MR 1. Assuming no logistical constraints and
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a low level of activity in the area over the next
month or two, this increase could be achieved within
a relatively short period, This number of personnel
would not appear to create an inordinate strain on
the infiltration system nor would it impose any
serious drawdown on the manpower pool in North Viet-
nam. A key factor in assessing enemy options in
MR 1 appears to be the current availability of
units now in southern Laos used to counter the Lam
Son 719 operation. Once they are refitted, approxi-
mately half of the 20,000-man augmentation could
be deployed from enemy units currently in the Laos
Panhandle into MR 1 within a week's time. The
additional 10,000 combat personnel required to
mount and sustain a high level of military activity
would have to be infiltration personnel and at best
could not be expected to be in an offensive position
until mid-year.
Case 3
56. The buildup of a general offensive capability
in Cambodia is also estimated to require a force
augmentation of about 20,000 troops. The lateral
redeployments of enemy units from adjacent military
regions in South Vietnam does not seem a likely
source of manpower for this strategy, because of
the already weakened force structure in these areas.
Thus the major source of manpower for troop aug-
mentation in Cambodia would be from infiltration
of units and filler personnel. Assuming a continua-
tion of a low level of combat activity until such
time that a force buildup can be implemented in
Cambodia, it is estimated that some 50,000 infil-
trators would have to be directed to Cambodia in
order to result in an overall force strength of
about 45,000. If force levels in South Vietnam are
also maintained, infiltration arrivals through 1971
would have to be about 150,000, Although several
regimental-sized units could be dispatched from
southern Laos in a matter of weeks if Hanoi were
willing to weaken its defenses there, it does not
seem likely that overall requirements for a troop
buildup in Cambodia could be met until early 1972.
Case 4
57. This variant considers the manpower re-
quirements to sustain a general offensive capability
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in both MR 1 and Cambodia. The forces in each region
would have to be augmented by 20,000 troops. Al-
though enemy troop strength in MR 1 could be built
up in a relatively short period, the necessary man-
power inputs to permit simultaneous offensive opera-
tions in Cambodia would not appear to be possible
until sometime early in 1972. This time would be
required for a force buildup in Cambodia and, in
addition, allow time to deploy replacement personnel
to depleted units in the other areas of South
Vietnam. The infiltration requirements for this
option would be on the order of 180,000 personnel,
of which 50,000 would be committed to Cambodia and
the remaining 30,000 to MR 1. The deployment of
sufficient troops to Cambodia and MR 1 in time to
launch an offensive by early 1972 would be exceedingly
difficult and would pose some strains on trained man-
power reserves and training capabilities in North
Vietnam through the remainder of this year.
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IV. Overview: October 1971 - October 1972
58. Our analysis to this point has focused
on one of the prime factors that affects Communist
military capabilities in South Vietnam and
Cambodia -- Hanoi's ability to move men and supplies
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But we recognize that
there are other equally important factors determin-
ing the Communists' capacity to fight.
59. The Communists are not likely to be able
to fight -- nor are they likely to choose to
fight --- simply at whatever level of intensity their
logistic situation permits a year from now. This
would, among other things, fly in the face of what
we still believe to be basic Hanoi strategy -- to
rely mainly on the staying power of its forces to
outlast US patience with the war.
60. The North Vietnamese have relied heavily
at times on the kind of strong military force that
can be applied only by big units that require sub-
stantial logistics support. They still have many
such units engaged in the fighting, but for the
past two years, particularly in South Vietnam,
the Communists have soft pedaled big-unit warfare.
This kind of warfare is extremely expensive, and
the chances of achieving significant gains are re-
mote, given the current balance of forces. More-
over, the Communists' ability to sustain large-scale
action in many areas has been degraded significantly
since the loss of Sihanoukville. None of the evi-
dence we now have in hand suggests they expect these
obstacles to be overcome easily or soon.
61. Indeed, all the current evidence from South
Vietnam suggests that the Communist forces have
been told in no uncertain terms that they should
not expect much more than brave words from higher
authorities and that they cannot count on being
bailed out by big units. In many ways the wheel
has come full circle for the Communists in South
Vietnam; they are back trying to fight what they
call a "people's war." Its precepts include local
initiative, self-sufficiency, economy-of-force
military tactics, and heavy reliance on subversion
and the organizational groundwork of an insurgency.
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62. The results of these low-profile tactics
are likely to affect Communist capabilities to
fight in South Vietnam next year, as well as their
long-term prospects, at least as much as their
ability to move men or supplies south. Indeed their
need for supplies from North Vietnam could be re-
duced to some extent if they succeeded in living off
the land and in obtaining supplies from South Viet-
namese sources.
63. We are uncertain about South Vietnam's
ability to cope with Communist terrorism, sub-
version, and political agitation over the long
haul, nor can we be sure of how to measure the
results of this sort of warfare at any given time.
But the Communists probably are not confident of
their long-term prospects either, and we doubt
very much that they are doing well enough now to
provide the essential underpinning for a success-
ful return to main force warfare in South Vietnam
in the next year or so, even if enough men and
supplies can be moved south through the Laotian
corridors. Nevertheless, Hanoi has other options.
It could, for example, raise the level of military
action significantly in the form of more frequent
high points and more extensive small-unit actions.
These would not require large inputs of supplies
or manpower but would make the Communist military
presence more visible. One can also easily conjure
up a situation 12-18 months from now in which Hanoi
has concluded that a strong attack, such as the
offensive variants analyzed for MR 1 or Cambodia,
would be worth the effort.
64. Whether Hanoi actually makes such efforts
or whether it sticks to the lower profile tactics
of most of the past two years will, of course,
depend on other key variables not discussed in
this memorandum. Elections in South Vietnam this
year may have an important influence on Hanoi's
tactics -- not just their outcome but how the
elections are conducted and whether they prove a
force for cohesiveness or for divisiveness among
the South Vietnamese.
65. The elections in the United States will be
a prime consideration in Hanoi as the Communists
try to chart their course for 1972. Hanoi may
well decide that it must make a major effort to
undercut long-term US support for an anti-Communist
regime in South Vietnam, either by trying to bring
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about changes in President Nixon's policies or by
trying to make Vietnam a major liability for his
administration in 1972. Thus, what the Communists
set out to do next year is not likely to be governed
rigidly by their raw capabilities to move supplies
from North Vietnam. An equally important considera-
tion could be a determination in Hanoi that it
must do whatever possible to alter the impressions,
if not the realities, of the current situation in
South Vietnam by pumping in more North Vietnamese
manpower and by ordering its forces to attack in
whatever ways they can.
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Conclusions
66. Logistic considerations during 1971-72
will still loom large in Hanoi's strategic planning.
Even though the Communists' resupply capability is
substantial, the strategic options which it will
support are by no means unlimited. Moreover, there
are a number of key factors other than the volume
of supplies moved down the Ho Chi Minh Trail which
Hanoi must weigh in making its decisions on future
strategies. These include such issues as how much
further Hanoi is willing to drawdown its manpower
and how it assesses the likely results if the level
of military action were raised significantly. The
North Vietnamese must:also continue to wrestle with
the complications arising from the loss of their
Cambodian sanctuaries and the need to reestablish
viable supply corridors from the southern Panhandle
of Laos to MRs 3 and 4. Finally, the deterioration
of the Communist infrastructure in South Vietnam
and the stronger position of the GVN are major con-
straints on Communist capabilities.
67. Viewed strictly from the point of view of
North Vietnamese logistic capabilities, a number
of conclusions can be drawn about the type of
military action Hanoi might pursue over the next
18 months.*
68. On the basis of its performance during the
current dry season -- an average of 295-370 tons
of supplies moved into the system daily -- the
Laos supply system, by repeating this performance
during the 1971-72 season, can continue to handle
the volume of supplies needed to support the war
at the protracted level observed during 1970. We
estimate that support of the Communist forces in
southern Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia during
the 1971-72 period would require a daily input of
278 tons of supplies from North Vietnam. In the
absence of operations similar to those of Lam Son
719, the logistic burden on the Laos system during
the 1971-72 dry season would be less than it was
during the current dry season.
DIA roes not concur in those portions of these
conclusions, and other portions of the paper that
are based upon "input requirements." The DIA
position appears on page 10 beginning at paragraph
39.
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~71:itJ1\J~ 1
69. The capabilities of the logistic system
would be more taxed if it were called upon to
support the various options for offensive campaigns
analyzed in this study. These options require in-
puts of supplies from North Vietnam ranging from
293 to about 364 tons a day.
70. The option requiring the greatest inputs of
supplies -- a major offensive throughout South
Vietnam and Cambodia -- would clearly not be
feasible before the start of the 1972-73 dry season
if inputs from North Vietnam are at the low end of
the range -- 295 tons a day. On the other hand, if
input were at the higher end of the range -- 370 tons
a day -- the Communists could, from the logistic
point of view, consider the possibility of a major
offensive toward the end of the 1971-72 dry season.
71. We believe, however, that a number of
constraints would cause them to avoid such an offen-
sive. These constraints include the uncertainty of
continued resupply during the wet season, the prob-
ability of extremely high casualties, the uncertain-
ties of the results of such an offensive, and problems
of distributing supplies within Cambodia and South
Vietnam, particularly in the far reaches of MRs 3 and
4.
72. If Hanoi's plans were directed to the inter-
mediate offensives analyzed in this memorandum --
MR.1 alone, Cambodia alone, or MR 1 and Cambodia
combined -- the logistic constraints are relaxed
considerably and the options are considerably wider.
73. If North Vietnam were able to achieve in-
puts at the high end of the range, any of the inter-
mediate options would appear to be feasible. The
offensives in Cambodia alone or in MR 1 could be
feasible logistically before the end of the 1971-72
dry season. Given the proximity of MR 1 to North
Vietnam, offensive activities could probably be
undertaken early in the season. To launch an
offensive in both MR 1 and Cambodia simultaneously
would put greater pressure on the logistic system,
and it would probably not be possible until the end
of the dry season.
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S.Ct.l K1. 1
74. If the inputs into the system are at the
low end of the range, none of the intermediate
strategies would appear to be feasible very early
in the dry season. Again, MR 1 would be an ex-
ception because of its proximity to North Vietnam.
The timing of offensive activities in Cambodia
would depend in large measure on whether a crash
program of resupply were undertaken and to what
extent existing stockpiles have been depleted.
75. From the manpower point of view, all of
the strategic options are within North Vietnamese
capabilities. Force augmentations for the inter-
mediate strategies and the maintenance of force
levels would require inputs over the next year
ranging from 120,000 to 180,000. These forces
generally could be in place by early 1972 and much
earlier in MR'1. The manpower requirement for a
countrywide offensive (including Cambodia) are so
large and the prospects of heavy losses so great
that we estimate Hanoi would be unwilling to under-
take such a commitment.
76. Despite the several options that would be
available to Hanoi from the point of view of logis-
tic and manpower considerations, we estimate that
the overall course of the war is unlikely to under-
go radical changes in the next few months. Hanoi
is still bent on outlasting the United States and
in South Vietnam is concentrating on the fundamentals
of a."people's war" in an effort to correct its pres-
ent weaknesses. It recognizes the deterioration of
its position in South Vietnam since 1968, the dif-
ficulties of rebuilding an adequate base to support
main force warfare, and the adverse longer term con-
sequences of mounting a major military effort that
fails to produce really decisive results.
77. But Hanoi has other options falling well
short of a do-or-die military offensive in all of
South Vietnam. It can still raise the level of war-
fare significantly without a proportionate increase
in supply and manpower requirements by relying on a
high rate of small-scale activity, or it could opt
for a major offensive in. MR 1. Whether Hanoi would
make such a decision depends not only on its logistic
capabilities but also on a host of key variables.
The conduct and outcome of South Vietnamese elections
this year will have some impact on Hanoi's view of
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Z)rM_.tc.G 1
the war, and we believe the US presidential
elections will loom very large in Communist think-
ing as 1972 approaches.
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The following discussion presents the meth-
odology which has been used to develop numerical
appreciations of the enemy's supply requirements
to support various military strategies during 1971-
72. In general, two historical records have been
used to obtain factors for enemy requirements: the
1970 expenditure and ground loss rates in South
Vietnam and Laos and the 1968 expenditure and ground
loss rates in South Vietnam. Our knowledge of
the enemy's requirements in Cambodia is very slight.
Consequently, the methodology extrapolates from the
South Vietnam experience to arrive at some apprecia-
tion of Cambodian expenditures.
The projected expenditure rates for southern
Laos for the 1971-72 dry season are based on the
1970-71 Pre-Lam Son dry season experience. The
expenditure rates for the 1972 wet season are es-
sentially those of the 1970 wet season. The fol-
lowing tabulation present these factors.
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1971/72 Dry Season (240 Days)
Daily
Cumulative
Class I
46 X (240)
11,040
Classes II & IV
12 X (240)
2,880
Class III
46 X (240)
11,040
Class V
16 X (240)
3,840
Total
120 X (240)
28,800
Total with 25% bomb
damage (BDA)
36,000
1972 Wet Season (120 Days)
Class I
46 X (120)
5,520
Classes II & IV
12 X (120)
1,440
Class III
9 X (120)
1,080
Class V
3 X (120)
360
Total
70 X (120)
8,400
Total with 25% BDA
87.5 X (120)
10,500
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South Vietnam and Cambodia
Four classes of externally procured supplies
are considered in all the following models: food
(Class I); weapons and equipment (Classes II and IV)
and ammunition (Class V). All Military Regions of
South Vietnam and Cambodia have a requirement for
Classes II, IV and V. Only South Vietnam's MR 1
is assigned a Class I requirement, food for the
other regions being supplied by other than the
logisticw channel from North Vietnam.
Model One: Minimum Requirement for Forces
in South Vietnam and Cambodia
MR 1 Class I
Classes II, IV, V
MR 2 Classes II, IV, V
MR 3 Classes II, IV, V
MR 4 Classes II, IV, V
Cambodia Classes II, IV, V
Total
Total with 25% BDA
Daily
Cumulative
24
(365)
8,760
5
(365)
1,825
2
(365)
730
5
(365)
1,825
2
(365)
730
6
(365)
2,190
44
(365)
16,060
20,100
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Model Two: Requirement for Forces
in South Vietnam and Cambodia
to Prepare for General Offensives*
Daily
Cumulative
MR 1
Class I
(low
combat)
24
(180)
4,320
(buildup)
25x1.5
(180)-
25x2.0
(180)
6,750- 9,000
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(180)
900
(buildup)
14x1.5
(180)-
14x2.0
(180)
3,780- 5,040
MR 2
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(180)
360
(buildup)
4x1.5
(180)-
4x2.0
(180)
1,080- 1,440
MR 3
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(180)
900
(buildup)
7x1.5
(180)-
7x2.0
(180)
1,890- 2,520
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(180)
360
(buildup)
3x1.5
(180)-
3x2.0
(180)
810- 1,080
Cambodia
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
6
(180)
1,080
(buildup)
16x1.5
(180)-
16x2.0
(180)
4,320- 5,760
Total 26, 550-32, 760
Total with 25% BDA 33,187-40,950
* Buildup for a sustained (six months) high ZeveZ
of combat was developed analytically by applying a
range of [footnote continues on p. A-5)
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Model Three: Requirement for High Level of Combat
in Cambodia, Minimum Requirement Elsewhere
MR 1 Class I
(low
combat)
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
MR 2 Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
MR 3 Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
MR 4 Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
Cambodia Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
(buildup)
Daily
Cumulative
24 (360)
8,640
5 (360)
1,800
2 (360)
720
5 (360)
1,800
2 (360)
720
6 (180)
1,080
16xl.5 (180)-
16x2.0 (180)
4,320- 5,760
19, 080-20, 520
23,850-25.,650
factors 1.5-2.0 to the average daily enemy require-
ments (consumption and ground losses) during 1968,
then multiplying this by 180 days. The stockpiling
factors are consistent with those derived from an
analysis of the data available on base area deploy-
ment of supplies shipped to the enemy forces via
the port of SihanoukviZZe during 1966-69 and con-
forms to our understanding of enemy stockpiling
practice. The stockpile buildups represented by
the 1.5-2.0 factor was considered also to reflect
the accumulation of sufficient supplies to maintain
a low Level of enemy activity during the time that
the buildup was taking place.
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Model Four: Requirement for High Level of Combat
in MR 1, Minimum Requirement Elsewhere
Daily
Cumulative
MR 1
Class I
(low
combat)
24
(180)
4,320
(buildup)
25xl.5
(180)-
25x2.0
(180)
6,750- 9,000
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(180)
900
(buildup)
14x1.5
(180)-
14x2.0
(180)
3,780- 5,040
MR 2
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
MR 3
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(360)
1,800
MR 4
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
Cambodia
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
6
(360)
2,160
21.,150-24,660
26, 437-30, 825
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Model Five: Requirement for High Level of Combat
in MR 1 and in Cambodia, Minimum Requirement
Elsewhere
Daily
Cumulative
MR 1
Class I
(low
combat)
24
(180)
4,320
(buildup)
25x1.5
(180)-
25x2.0
(180)
6,750- 9,000
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(180)
900
(buildup)
14x1.5
(180)-
14x2.0
(180)
3,780-5,040,
MR 2
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
MR 3
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(360)
1,800
MR 4
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
Cambodia
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
6
(180)
1,080
(buildup)
1.6xl.5
(180)-
1.6x2.0
(180)
4,320- 5,760
Total with 25% BDA
24,390-29,340
30.,487-36.,675
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Or,urcil I
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