SIHANOUKVILLE -- PORT OF ENTRY FOR ARMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 2000
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
DIA review
completed.
ARMY Review
Completed
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
DIA REVIEW COMPLETED
ARMY Review Completed
5 August 1970
The North Vietnamese Logistical System
Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
I. Introduction -- The Laotian Panhandle
and Sihanoukville
supported almost entirely by two separate logis-
tical routes. (1) The Ho Chi Minh Trail from North
Vietnam through Laos to South Vietnam and, (2) The
sea route by which supplies have moved to the port
of Sihanoukville and then overland to Communist
sanctuaries astride the Cambodian-South Vietnamese
border.
Both the Washington intelligence community and
the intelligence components at CINCPAC and MACV have
agreed since early 1968 that enemy forces in III and
IV Corps of South Vietnam have received large amounts
of sea-delivered arms and ammunition transshipped
through Cambodia.
However, there has been some disagreement between
Washington and the field in the relative importance
of the land and sea routes. The field view has been
that the Communists have moved VC/NVA military sup-
plies through the port of Sihanoukville since October
1966 and that this route has completely supplied the
. VC/NVA forces in southern TI Corps and in III and
.IV Corps.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
The CIA view -- and the Washington view -- has
been that the overland route through Laos has been
the primary logistics route for even those enemy
forces that operate in the southern half of South
Vietnam. CIA has believed that the Sihanoukville
route did not become an important source of supply
for the Communists until sometime around mid-year
1968, and that probably no more than one-half of the
estimated Communist resupply requirements for arms
and ammunition in Southern II, III, and IV Corps
were supplied by sea.
MACV has estimated that during the period October
1966 - September 1969 about 17,800 tons of Communist
arms and ammunition were delivered to Sihanoukville.
The comparable CIA estimate included 7,100 tons of
confirmed ordnance (that is, arms and ammunition) and
4,100 tons of other military cargoes both ordnance.
and non-ordnance. The differences in the estimates
stem from judgments about the size and composition
of cargoes, not the sources available to the analysts.
Other differences between CIA and the field have
involved the share of Communist arms legitimately
destined for the Cambodian Armed Forces (FARK) and
the tonnage of ordnance that actually moved to the
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5 25X1
VC/NVA forces. The CIA position has been that until
recently there has been little reliable evidence
with which to quantify this latter flow. Thus the
CIA position has been that the sum of our intelligence
on both the Sihanoukville and overland routes has
been inadequate to assess the relative importance
in terms of specific tonnages supplied by each with
any degree of confidence.
Despite the past differences about the role of
Sihanoukville in supporting enemy forces in South
.Vietnam it is obvious that the Communists, probably
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
for all time, have lost this convenient back-door
route to their forces in lower South Vietnam. The
total logistic burden must now be carried by the 700
mile overland route that stretches from Hanoi to the
Fishhook and Parrot's Beak. Since the last known
arms shipment to Sihanoukville was in April 1969,
the land route has in fact been the sole supply
channel for the last 15 months.
II. The Overland Route Through Laos
A. During the remainder of this briefing:
1. I shall describe the charac-
.teristics and capabilities of the enemy's
overland supply system from North Vietnam,
through Laos and Cambodia.
2. I shall follow this analysis with
CIA's conclusions as to how this system
has operated under the pressure of air
attack, first during the last months of
the Rolling Thunder program in 1968, and
second, more recently in the panhandle of
Laos.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5 25X1
B. Nature of the Overland System
1. Organization
The logistics organization responsible for
supplying Communist forces in South Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia is the General Directorate of.Rear
Services (GDRS), located in Hanoi, and subordinate
to the North Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense.
This organization moves men and supplies from North
Vietnam into Laos, Cambodia, and ultimately South
Vietnam. In the Laotian Panhandle specific responsi-
bility for infiltration and supply was assigned to
the NVA 559th Transportation Group (TG) as long ago
as 1959. The 559th TG has about 40,000 personnel
in its transport, engineer, commo liaison, and
infantry units. Its truck inventory is maintained
at an estimated 1,400 trucks in current use. This
probably represents about 10% of the North Vietnamese
truck inventory. The 559th TG controls.an elaborate
supply organization whose basic units are military
stations called Binh Trams (BT). Binh Trams dotted
along the entire logistical network comprise trans-
shipment points, storage warehouses, and other
facilities.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
2. Description of the Logistic System
a. In North Vietnam
Throughout the war, the Communists
have worked continuously to build, maintain, and
expand a complex overland logistics system capable
of supporting their forces in South Vietnam.
Stretching more than 700 miles from Hanoi to the
many enemy supply bases along the border of South
Vietnam, this system uses all modes of transport
except air to move supplies southward.
Since the total bombing halt on
.31 October 1968, Vinh has become the major storage
and distribution center in the panhandle of North
Vietnam, providing logistic support not only to
the front in South Vietnam, but also to Communist
forces fighting in northern Laos. Supply shipments
destined for South Vietnam are transported over a
net of roads, waterways, and a meter-gauge tramway
which feed into the cross-border corridors linking
.up with the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos.
A smaller volume of supplies moves directly south
.across the DMZ to support NVA forces in that area.
In July 1968 the North Vietnamese
started the construction of a petroleum pipeline
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
system capable of moving up to 1,000 tons of fuel
per day. This line now extends south from Vinh
through the Mu Gia Pass and some 22 miles into Laos.
More recently, the Communists have built another
pipeline system farther to the south, crossing the
border near the western DMZ and terminating near
Tchepone -- the major logistical transfer point in
southern Laos for supplies destined for South Vietnam.
When complete, this new pipeline should connect with
recently installed petroleum storage depots at the
ports of Quang Khe and Dong Hoi. The addition of the
two pipelines to the enemy's logistic system provides
him with the year-round means of transporting large
amounts of petroleum across the rugged Laotian border
largely uninhibited by either weather or Allied
interdiction efforts.
b. In Southern Laos
Three logistics corridors consisting
of five major roads, a long-used water route, two
petroleum pipelines and numerous trails serve as
cross-border access from the sanctuary area of North
Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos.
The oldest and the northernmost active
corridor crosses through the Mu Gia Pass, 80 miles
southwest of Vinh. The second corridor crosses the
Laotian border at Ban Karai Pass 40 miles farther
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
south. Built in early 1966 to counter the effects
of the air interdiction campaign, this 56 mile long
road (Route 137/912) has become more important than
the Mu Gia route in moving supplies to Base Area 604
(Tchepone). To further counteract the effects of
the bombing, the North Vietnamese opened a third
cross-border route in the vicinity of the western
DMZ during the 1969/70 dry season. This latter
trans-border route is the most complex of the three,
comprising three major road crossings with a fourth
presently under construction, the heavily-used Se
Bang Hieng river, and, as mentioned earlier, the
newly completed petroleum pipeline extending into
Tchepone. After reaching the logistics hub at
Tchepone, supplies are shuttled southward by truck
through a series of Binh Trams southward to the
Cambodian border.
To expand the capacity of the major
north-south artery which focuses mainly on Route 92/96
the North Vietnamese have during the past several dry
seasons undertaken a major road-building program.
Parallel road segments and numerous bypasses have
been built creating a dual road system that has proved
.virtually impossible to interdict on a sustained basis
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5 25X1
during this dry season. Supplementing Route 92/96
is the Se Kong river which crosses the north-south
route at Ban Bac and winds south 145 miles to the
Cambodian border. Until now, only the extreme northern
and southern reaches of the river have been used by
the Communists for logistics purposes. There are
recent indications that the North Vietnamese now
intend to exploit this means of transportation much
more fully. The Communists have secured control of
the Se Kong and Mekong route from Laos to within
100 miles of Phnom Penh.
c. Along the Laos-South Vietnam Border
Between the DMZ and the triborder
area of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam (Base
Area 609) supplies are moved into South Vietnam
over a network of trails and one major road (route 9
into the A Shau valley). Nine Binh Trams support
this activity, which, because it serves the supply.
needs of the enemy in I and II Corps is a fairly
high volume logistical operation.
d. Along Cambodian-South Vietnamese
Border
Logistic support to the B-3 Front in
South Vietnam has been chiefly supplied from depots
in the tri-border area (Base Area 609) and from Base
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
Area 740 adjacent to Quang Duc Province. Four Binh
Trams and an interspersed net of commo-liaision
stations along the border between Base Area 609 and
the Tonle Srepok river provide route security and
the means for the movement of supplies to B-3 Front
elements. Reconnaissance reports indicate that truck
transport is used on only the northern 40-50 miles of
this corridor, with bicycles, animal carts, and porters
assuming the burden thereafter. Below the B-3 Front,
enemy forces are supplied by Rear Services groups
concentrated in 12 Base Areas in South Vietnam and
Cambodia subordinate to COSVN, the controlling
authority for all enemy military operations in Southern
South Vietnam.
C. Operation of the ystem Under Air Attack
Despite the intensive US bombing campaigns
in North Vietnam and Laos, which have inflicted heavy
and widespread damage and burdensome resupply diffi-
culties, the enemy has continued to move supplies
into and through the long logistical pipeline to his
forces in South Vietnam.
1. ? In North Vietnam
During the four years of the Rolling
Thunder bombing campaign against North Vietnam the
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
enemy's logistical system proved surprisingly durable.
North Vietnamese success in offsetting the effects of
the bombing was due in part to the primitive nature of
the target system that US bombing sought to neutralize;
but even more important were the inventive counter-
measures developed by the North Vietnamese. To
insure the movement of supplies, Hanoi put some
600,000 people to work, full and part-time, repairing
bombed roads and railroads and building now roads and
railroads as well as hundreds of bypass bridges and
fords, pontoon bridges, and ferries.
The enemy minimized damage to supplies and trans-
port equipment by moving under cover of darkness and
by taking full advantage of sanctuaries provided by
air strike restraints. By these and other ingenious
countermeasures -- supplemented by large amounts of
supplies from their Communist allies -- the North
Vietnamese were able to maintain and even expand their
logistical flows. The last seven months of the Rolling
Thunder program -- the period of the partial bombing
halt (31 March-31 October 1968) -- was probably the most
effective period of the air war against North Vietnam
in terms of complicating the flow of supplies from
North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Bombing was concen-
trated on logistics targets south of the 19th parallel.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
I I
For several weeks prior to the total bombing halt
the combination of several fall typhoons and heavy
air attacks had greatly slowed the movement of
supplies in the panhandle. The enemy lost more
trucks during the seven months of the bombing re-
strictions than had been destroyed in all of 1967.
But supplies continued to move. Throughout the
entire bombing era the system continued to function
and was able to support adequately the military
effort in Laos and South Vietnam. By the end of
the Rolling Thunder Program in 1968 the system had
greater capacity and flexibility than at the start
of the bombing. The problem of air interdiction
was rendered most difficult by the fact that route
capacities were less than 20% utilized.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
2. In Laos
The interdiction campaign in southern
Laos which began in late 1965 has increased in mag-
nitude and scope during succeeding years. The first
major step-up in bombing occurred during the 1967-68
dry season when attacks more than doubled compared
to the level of the previous dry season. The bomb-
ing was further intensified during the 1968-69 dry
season when the bombing halt in North Vietnam at the
end of October 1968 made available a doubling of
resources for the air war in Laos, The bombing
continued at a high rate during the past dry season
though the number of sorties flown was somewhat
lowered.
a. The 1968-69 Dry Season
The sudden and substantial increase
in the level of Allied sorties during the fall of
1968 resulted in severe logistic problems for Com-
munist forces. The transportation of supplies was
seriously disrupted. Antiaircraft defense and com-
munications systems were ineffective and internal
resupply problems prevented quick improvement.
There was insufficient food, and work schedules
were disrupted throughout the panhandle.
(1) However, in early December
1968 the enemy launched a major effort to counter
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2695R000200110001-5
the effects of the increased Allied interdiction
program. Hanoi ordered crash logistic campaigns:
(1) to increase the effectiveness of the AAA de-
fenses in the panhandle, (2) to keep the roads
open and build new bypasses, (3) to meet the trans-
portation quotas. In addition, more engineer,
AAA and transportation battalions were deployed to
the Laotian panhandle, the number of Binh Trams
was more than doubled in southern Laos, and radio
and landline communications were expanded.
(2) By early January 1969, the
North Vietnamese countermeasures had begun
alleviate logistic problems.
increasingly large numbers of vehicles
were reported moving
(3) The path was by no means a
smooth one for the enemy, however. In late spring
of 1969, the US Air Force shifted the emphasis of
the bombing program from the not too successful
attacks on roads to a program of truck killing.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
(4) Overall, however, the season
ended with the Communists considering their logistics
efforts to have satisfied their requirements.
(5) Late in May 1969 -- with the
onset of the wet season -- Rear Service units in
the panhandle began to withdraw to North Vietnam.
The fact that the enemy had maintained at least
part of the system open and operational during the
summer of 1968 suggests that the decision to close
the system in 1969 was dictated by the logistical
planners' determination that it was not needed
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
rather than a decision forced on Hanoi by the
bombing.
(6) It is also significant that
the decision to close down for the wet season was
taken despite the fact that in May 1969 Sihanouk
had suspended all supply shipments to the Communists
while attempting to negotiate new arrangements gov-
erning the use of Cambodian territory by Communist
forces. Hanoi planners could have had no assurance
at that time when, or even if, the unpredictable
Sihanouk would permit the resumption of supply
shipments through his country.
b. The 1969-70 Dry Season
The enemy returned to his logistical
tasks in the panhandle early in October with a de-
liberateness and resolve that clearly underscored
Hanoi's intentions to resume large-scale resupply
to its forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam.
(1) Initial activity was focused
on the restoration of the weather and the bomb dam-
aged panhandle roadnet which was opened for through
traffic to the tri-border area by the end of
November. An intensive program was also launched
for constructing new access roads and a POL pipe-
line in the western DMZ area.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
(2) By early December 1969 the
logistic system in the panhandle was completely
operational and the first of a series of well-
organized "crash" transportation programs to move
supplies to South Vietnam was laid on. Similar
programs during the previous dry season had not
occurred until early January -- indicating the
relative speed with which the North Vietnamese re-
stored the logistic system this past dry season.
(4) In contrast to the preceding
year, the system operated without prolonged or
chronic problems. Convoys moved continuously
because roads were kept open and gasoline supplies
were adequate. Favorable weather, effective cam-
ouflage of truck parks and warehouses, and an
efficient AAA defense also contributed significantly
to the effort.
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
c. Comparisons of the 1968-69 and
1969-70 Dry Seasons
The primary lesson to be learned
from the enemy's behavior under two years of inten-
sive bombing in the Laotian panhandle is that he
possesses the capability to learn, to adjust and to
adapt his logistics efforts to the rigours imposed
by the bombing. At the beginning of the 1968-69
season, the Communists did not have in place in
southern Laos a logistic organization properly
equipped (or experienced) to counter the effects of
a greatly intensified US bombing. Consequently,
the early portion of the dry season was devoted
primarily to increasing the capability and flexi-
bility of the system. The net effect of this
experience was demonstrated during the 1969-70
season; a well-coordinated logistics effort early
in the season led to the completion of transporta-
tion missions two months ahead of schedule.
18 ?-
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
III. The Effect of the "Sihanoukville Load" on the
Overland Route
A. Introduction
1. Our studies of the enemy's logistical
efforts of the past several years and the effects
of the US bombing has led us to several conclusions
which are based on a considerable body of intelli-
gence. The evidence I am referring to is:
a. Statistics on miles of new roads,
new bypasses, new pipelines, and the observed
repair times of damaged facilities, all of
which can be measured in aerial photography.
sources such as captured 25X1
documents, interrogations, road watch teams,
all play important 25X1
roles.
B. Our conclusions, based on such hard evidence
carefully studied over the years, are that:
, I. The bombing caused the North Viet-
namese great difficulties and resulted in
the destruction of very significant quanti-
ties of warsupporting goods. We believe
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
that the Communists lost about 25% of their
supplies in transit.
2. The Chinese and Soviets have shown
.a willingness to replace the destroyed sup-
plies. The North Vietnamese, by applying
massive amounts of labor, have been able
to repair the damage to their logistical
system and keep supplies moving needed to
support their forces in the South.
3. In summary, bombing has not prevented
the Communists from supplying their forces
in South Vietnam. We believe that more
supplies could have been pumped through the
overland system if the North Vietnamese had
felt the need to do so. In southern Laos
during the past dry season, the North Viet-
namese countered the effects of the bombing
much easier than the year before and clearly
delivered the planned quantities of materiel
early in the year.
4. We do not, however, conclude that
the overland route can absorb the Sihanouk-
ville burden with ease in the face of a
continuing air war in Laos, or if the bomb-
ing of the panhandle of North Vietnam were
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
I I
to be resumed. Even with no bombing, the
additional trucks, carts, and porters that
will be necessary to move the Sihanoukville
tonnages are a significant new drain on
Communist logistical resources. The distances
are long, and the crates heavy even if the
total tonnages to western eyes seem small.
C. The various areas of South Vietnam would be
affected differently by intensified bombing:
1. Ids
The Communists remain in a strong
logistical position in I Corps. In-country stock-
piles and stockpiles in Laos are intact and large
stockpiles exist north of the DMZ. There have been
no changes in the enemy's strategic or tactical
position that have altered his resupply requirements
or upset his plans. The enemy's logistical position
in I Corps has always been particularly strong because
he has the option of moving supplies directly south
across the DMZ, around the western edge of the DMZ,
or drawing from the logistical artery that runs
parallel to I Corps in the Laotian Panhandle.
At present the enemy's external
resupply requirements for weapons, equipment, and
ammunition in I Corps are about 9 tons per day,
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
I I
about 40% of the Communists total 1969 external
resupply requirements for those classes of supply
in South Vietnam. During a Tet-like offensive this
requirement could double but there is no doubt that
the enemy could logistically support such an effort
in I Corps. Air interdiction is probably already
degrading the logistical system in Laos as much as sortie
ceilings and the weather permit. A resumption of
air attacks against the panhandle of North Vietnam
would obviously complicate the North Vietnamese re-
supply activities but would not critically affect
them.
2. II Corps
II Corps is dependent on the Laotian
supply system'only for weapons and ammunition. Food
for the rice-deficient highland provinces comes
from Cambodia. II Corps resupply requirements for
ordnance have always been much less than I Corps --
less than five tons a day. Thus the total additional
burden of supplies (from the Sihanoukville closing)
that must now move through Laos for enemy forces in II
Corps is small, if indeed it exist at all. It could
easily be absorbed by the overland route.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
I I
3. III Corps and IV Corps
III and IV Corps, based on 1969
resupply requirements, must receive about 11 tons
of ammunition, weapons, and equipment_a day via the
Laotian Panhandle. If it is assumed that the enemy
desires to replace its losses of ammunition and
weapons recently incurred in Cambodia, another 11
tons per day of supplies will be required for the
next six months. It is clear that III and IV Corps
will be the North Vietnamese's major logistical
problem in the year ahead; its solution will require
significantly higher supply inputs through the Lao-
tian Panhandle. We believe that the Communists
will be able to move these additional supplies through
the panhandle during the dry season (from October
through June) to meet normal needs but will probably
have difficulty in restoring his stockpile levels
in Cambodia to levels sufficiently high to embark
on a Tet-like offensive in III and IV Corps. Restora-
tion will, of course, be possible over many months.
The Communists should have little
difficulty, once the rainy season ends in October, in
maintaining a sufficient flow of supplies to III and
IV Corps to maintain their low profile of recent
months.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
D. Post Script
There are complicating factors that must
be mentioned in conclusion. (a) The future course
of the war in Cambodia is obviously unknown at this
time. If the enemy steps up the pace of the war
during the forthcoming dry season, his logistical
requirements in Cambodia may place a substantial
additional burden on the overland supply route.
(b) Communist control of much of the interior of
Cambodia while easing some logistical problems has
created others others which the enemy must live
regardless less his their offensive posture. So
long as Hanoi maintains troops in Cambodia, some
internal resupply will be necessary. (c) Finally,
while we are certain that the Communists suffered
a heavy blow as a result of our Cambodian opera-
tions,-the intelligence community has no firm
knowledge of the extent of the stockpiles that
remain in VC/NVA hands. Their stockpiling doctrines,
however, suggest that very large stocks may yet
remain cached in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam;
such caches will tend to limit the effectiveness
of future US interdiction efforts by providing
reserves to tide the enemy over bombing-imposed
resupply difficulties.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
SECRET
3 August 1970
CIA View of the Role of Cambodia As A
Source of Communist Supplies
The Intelligence Problem
1. During the past two or three years the
intelligence community has labored intensely to
resolve the issue of the relative importance of two
routes for getting supplies to VC/NVA forces in
South Vietnam ... an overland route through Laos
and the so-called Sihanoukville route.
2. The judgments of the relative importance
of each route have polarized between the views of
Washington based analysts -- CIA, DIA, and State
and the views of analysts in the field -- CINCPAC,
MACV and COMUSNAVFOR.
3. The field view has been that the Communists,
with Cambodian complicity, have been moving supplies
through the port of Sihanoukville since October 1966
and that this route has been the primary means of
resupplying the VC/NVA forces in southern II Corps
and in III and IV Corps.
4. The Washington view is that the overland
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
route through Laos has been the primary logistics
route. We acknowledge that some small flow of
supplies was always obtained from Cambodian sources
but do not believe that the Sihanoukville route
became an important source of supply until sometime
in 1968, probably around mid-year. Moreover, our
best estimate of actual ordnance deliveries during
1968 and 1969 indicates that the Sihanoukville route
probably provided no more than one half of the
estimated Communist resupply requirements for arms
and ammunition in southern II, III and IV Corps
during this two year period.
Evolution of CIA Views
5. Prior to the fall of 1968 the intelligence
community was in close agreement on the role of
Cambodia in the Vietnam War. All agreed that
Cambodian territory was important to the Communists
for the infiltration of personnel and supplies, and
as the site of a well organized system of base
areas used for sanctuary, military staging and
training.
6. It was also agreed that Cambodia was an
important source of rice -- some 10,000-20,000
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
SEC ET
tons annually -- for enemy forces in the rice
deficit areas of South Vietnam and in Laos.
7. Cambodia was also viewed as a source of
non-lethal supplies -- medicines, communications
equipment and clothing -- purchased on the open
market or smuggled.
8. Finally, all agreed that the VC/NVA forces
worked with Cambodian smugglers to obtain other
supplies -- including small arms and ammunition --
but these amounts were not judged to be large. In
addition it was agreed that some military supplies
were infiltrated over Cambodian beaches near South
Vietnam, although this means of resupply dropped
significantly after the start of the Market Time
operation.
The Graham Group
9. In the fall of 1968 MACV presented its
estimate that since October 1966 the Sihanoukville
route had been the primary means of resupplying
VC/NVA forces in southern II Corps and in III and
IV Corps. The seriousness of this estimate was
fully appreciated in the Washington community and
at the request of Assistant Secretary of State,
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
SECRET
William Bundy, an inter-Agency task force -- known
as the Graham Group -- was created to reassess all
the evidence pertaining to the external supply routes
used by VC/NVA forces..
10. The Graham Group reported on 31 October 1968
that with the evidence currently on hand, neither
case -- the overland route or the Sihanoukville
route could be proven or disproven beyond all
doubt. The Group found, however, that the weight
of the evidence supported the case for primary
reliance on the overland route. The Group also
urged more intensive study of the intelligence
data relevant to the issue and made recommendations
for increased intelligence collection activities,
11. Upon the submission of this report, Mr. Helms
then directed the Graham Group to make further field
studies of the extent of Cambodian involvement.
In November and December 1968, the team visited
CINCPAC and MACV, as well as Hong Kong, Thailand
and Laos, to review and discuss available intelligence
and collection programs.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
SECRET
12. The views of the Graham Group were changed
somewhat as a result of this field investigation.
It became clear that the involvement of the Cambodian
army was something more than "small-scale" smuggling
of arms to the Communists, and that it involved persons
of sufficiently high rank to suggest that Sihanouk
himself was aware of this arms traffic. Nevertheless,
the Graham Group still differed sharply with MACV's
views on the quantities of arms being moved into
Sihanoukville, the amounts moved to VC/NVA forces,
and the extent to which the Communists had been
denied access to other routes of supply, notably
the overland route through Laos.
Reasons for Rejecting MACV's Views
13. Our refusal to accept the MACV view was
based on several points:
a. The first and most important point
was that although we were unable to quantify
the flow of supplies, a large body of
evidence
clear, despite MACV's views, that the
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
enemy maintained an effective and functioning
overland logistics system through Laos and
southward along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese
border. Moreover, analysis by both CIA and
DIA indicated that the tonnages moved through
Laos were more than adequate to meet the
requirements of the Communist forces in South
Vietnam, including those in southern II Corps
and III Corps.
b. Secondly, we believed that the evidence
available at the time was insufficient to
make any firm estimate of the tonnages of arms
and ammunition arriving at Sihanoukville.
Thus, while MACV, in December 1968, claimed
that almost 14,000 tons of arms and ammunition
had entered Sihanoukville between October 1966
and August 1968, we were able with hard
intelligence to confirm deliveries of less than
1,700 tons of military supplies, less than a
also noted that MACV classed all the military
deliveries to Sihanoukville as arms and ammunition,
fourth of which was arms and ammunition.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
EET
failing to distinguish between ordnance and
other types of military supplies.
c. Third, neither we nor MACV had any
satisfactory basis for determining how much
of the military shipments to Cambodia were
being used to reequip the Cambodian armed
forces, for stockpiles in FARK depots, or
for Cambodian operations against dissident
forces.
d. Fourth, the quantities reported by
MACV to have actually been delivered to the
VC/NVA forces appeared to be unusually large
in terms of the enemy's resupply requirements.
The 1969 Reassessment
14. With the completion of the Graham team
investigations, it was apparent that the divergencies
IT
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
E "'ET
Gift
between the field and Washington views were still
substantial. In CIA we undertook a number of
measures designed to clarify the many uncertainties
about the role of Cambodia and, hopefully, to resolve
our differences with the field. These included the
liaunching of an intensive restudy of all intelligence
pertaining to the movement of military supplies to
Cambodia
15. The new collection effort has had a high
degree of success in gaining reliable information on
supply operations, as well as documentary evidence
providing information on the actual volume and
composition of Chinese and Soviet military deliveries.
16. As a result of these efforts, we were able,
over the past 15 months, to produce intelligence which
resulted in significant breakthroughs in our knowledge
of this subject.
17. The result of our study seemed to make two
things clear:
a. That virtually all the military
deliveries to Sihanoukville until some time in
1968 went to Cambodian forces or stocks.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
fET
b. That even when the Sihanoukville
route did become an important supply route
in 1968-1969, it probably supplied only
about half of the enemy's requirements in
southern South Vietnam. The enemy throughout
the period has placed continuing reliance on
the overland route through Laos as the basic
means of supplying his forces in South Vietnam.
The Analysis
18. I would like now briefly to compare the
results of our analysis with the estimates held by
MACV.
19. For the relevant period -- October 1966-
September 1969 -- we estimated that a total of
tons of military supplies were delivered to
Sihanoukville, of which Z,090 tons were confirmed
ordnance, 3gg tons were goods we know to be non-
ordnance materials, and 4,121 tons were probably
military deliveries which might or might not be
ordnance.
20. During the same period MACV estimates that
T 7j 77S
14-0 tons of Communist arms. and ammunition were
delivered to the Port of Sihanoukville. The comparable
CIA estimate would include 7oq_y tons of ordnance and
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
4,i.Z o
-- tons of probable military cargoes including
both ordnance and non-ordnance items.
21. The resolution of these differences is
crucial to a determination of how much ordnance has
been available for transshipment to the VC/NVA in
South Vietnam. To our knowledge MACV had available
the same sources of information as CIA. Differences
appear to stem from judgments made about the size
and composition of cargoes, particularly MACV's
failure to remove non-ordnance items from their
figures. The differences in the estimates would
also depend on each party's judgment about how much
of these supplies were for Cambodian forces and how
much were for VC/NVA forces.
22. We have had little reliable evidence with
which to quantify the actual flow of materials to
VC/NVA forces. A rigorous examination of our intelli-
gence holdings failed to unearth any reliable evidence
of a significant and organized flow of ordnance during
1966-1967. Our most reliable evidence
(points to the likelihood that about
2,000 tons of ordnance moved to the Communists from
October 1968 through January 1970. Even if the actual
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78T02095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
deliveries since 1967 had been 50 percent greater,
this amount would be only about half the estimated
Communist resupply requirements for their forces in
southern 'South Vietnam, the area supplied by Cambodian
base areas. This is an important amount of ammunition.
But in our opinion it was not of the magnitude that
warranted a judgment that Sihanoukville had been
the primary means of resupply since October 1966.
23. Despite a continuing effort to resolve the
differing views about the role of Sihanoukville, both
the Washington community and MACV were holding to the
estimates I have just discussed at the time of the
Cambodian operations.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
SEC ET
preliminary analysis of the documents indicates that
we will undoubtedly make revisions in our estimates.
The size and significance of these revisions cannot
be determined at this time, but when they are known
they will be published and disseminated throughout
the intelligence community. We would at the same
time be pleased to brief this Board on the results
of the analysis.
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
 Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5
Iq
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000200110001-5