COMMENTS ON WORKING PAPER: THE QUESTION OF THE KHMER COMMUNIST ORDER OF BATTLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000100100006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 21, 1971
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Reuse 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78T02095R000100100006-1
0
MEMORANDUM FOR:
21 June 1971
Analyst, I/L
SUBJECT Comments on Working Paper: The.
Question of the Khmer Communist
Order of Battle
Attached are my comments on Sam Adam's paper.
IA4eneral, I think, that it a subject that deserves
close attention from an analytical as well as a
collection viewpoint. While I have taken exception
throughout the paper to the numbers and methodologies
used, I believe, as the paper states, there are more
of the enemy in Cambodia than present estimates indi-
However, I feel that the efforts directed on
the Communist infrastructure and force levels in
Cambodia would be of greater value if they stressed
the areas of concern to the enemy and the nature of
his presence in these areas. Cambodia to Hanoi is a
bridge to South Vietnam. They do not necessarily have
tohe own the bridge to use it. More importantly, it
J (., C7 t-,- C Uri , .~t fU
must--be--emembered that the North Vietnamese regime
euI-d not look favorably on a strong, indigeous
Cambodian armed force, no matter who controlled it.
 Approved For Release 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78T02095R000100100006-1
?
The force of history is often blurred by the speed
of current events. To date, the opposition has proved
far more capable of controlling the speed of events
than have we.
PARA 4;
"The Khmer OB does not'treat the lower four in
detail, although Communist forces in Indochina cus-
tomarily build their armies from the bottom up,
using the larger number if troops at the lower
echelons to flesh out the higher levels."
The underlined assumption directs the reader
to view the building of the K infrastructure and
military arm as if he were on the tip of the pro-
verbial iceberg when in fact I believe he really,'
standing on the scaffolding in the sub-basement of
a skyscraper still abuilding. I know of no study
nor compilation of facts which would indicate that
the Communists could afford the luxury of the "tra-
ditional" from "bottom up"mode in Cambodia. In
fact, all of the available evidence suggests the
opposite is the case. In short, the'Vietnamese
Communists have formed a military arm in Cambodia.
The personnel in this arm went from peasant to
combatant in the length of time it took to recruit
him as such. There are no stages of development of
-2- ,
 Approved For Rase 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78T02095R000100100006=1--'-
r
,the ideological commitment or any similar, thing as
there was in Vietnam. The man is a number whose
effectiveness in combat can scarcely be considered
more than his brother in FANK.
PARA 4;
Furthermore, the OB does not take n-ote.of such
phenomena.as the massive training program which the
Viet Cong started in Cambodia last year which is now
graduating many thousands of new soldiers.
I know that the Communists have been trying to
"graduate-many thousand" of recruits, however, I am
not aware that they have met with such sweeping
success. I would be reluctant to accept that such
is the case,'taking exception to those areas where
there is a paucity of reporting. These areas would
include Siem Reap, northern Kampot, and the entire
northeastern quarter of the country.
Second, the OB may too strict in its criteria
for accepting new units on its rolls.
While the criteria may be too strict, a case
,41f ft e q v,0 0
may also benwhich this study does no tAaddress where
the Communists have formed units but found them in-
effective or, in some cases, uncontrollable and
subsequently disbanded them. What the study is in
effect calling for is the inclusion in the OB of
-3-
 Approved For Rase 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78T02095R000100100006-1
revery Tam, Duc, and Hally who the Communists have
approached in the past year.
PARA 4;
Third, the OB should take into account past
experience concerning the Viet Cong's demonstrated
ability to organize people, both in Viet-nam and Laos.
A most important point which the study unfortu-
nately does not adequately develop. Recent report-
ing of more than 9,000 Khmer Communist regrouping
to NVN and available to reinfiltrate-if they have
not already done so- far more palatable argument
for the numbers of "guerrilla-militia" assumed in
the report than to take a population figure and
apply what appears a somewhat arbitr my arrived at
factor of 3 percent. The study's raison d' etre is
to alert the community to the developing presence in
Cambodia. To reach responsive ears it would seem
advisable to discusss the problem in growing functions
and probable potentials rather than staggering factors
and figures.
THE MAIN FORCES
PARAS 24 THROUGH 31
The 174th is presently north of Binh Long
Province and is believed subordinate to the 5th
Division, not the C40 Front. Furthermore, it appeared
-4-, k
 Approved For Rase 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000100100006-1
-'during the developments of last spring and early
summer of 1970 that the 5th Division was tasked with
the training of any Khmer force that was to develop.
Witness the 275 A and B, the latter which was to
become the 203. What occurs to me is that NVA fillers
were used to restaff the 5th Division after'it had
dispatched a considerable number of its own forces
to the Cambodian effort. What I would like to stress
is that there was only one Communist Division split
kkMer
for theACommunists and it seems unlikely that it
could lave regenerated itself, much less formed a force
of superior numbers. That is, the ten to fifteen
regiments mentioned in para 30 is perhaps on the
high side. Ten regiments, after all, amounts to
three divisions, one of which would be re-inforced.
I would judge it unlikely that the Communists-no
matter how effective their recruiting program might
have been- could have duplicated in Cambodia in one
year what they have committed to the GVN MR 3 area-
the 5th, 7th, and 9th divisions,-for the past 2 years.
Furthermore, these are divisions which must be
filled with personnel infiltrated from the north
. ecause there are not enough VIETNAMESE in South
Vietnam available for recruitment to replace losses.
 Approved For Rase 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78TO2095RQ00100100006-1
LOCAL FORCES
PARAS 32 THROUGH 49
I do not feel that I am presently well enough
read on this area to comment more than in general
terms. I do know that in the beginning of the war
in spring 1970 there were numerous reports ,from
border provinces of district and provincial level
local force units springing up all over creation.
However, by the summer of 1970 there were a like
number of reports of these forces being disbanded
or disserted en masse.
GUERRILLA/MILITIA
PARAS 50 THROUGH 63
I find the methodology unacceptable. -As men-
tioned above, I believe the problem should be
approached from an input position; that is, what
could they do. If all of the 9,000 Khmers have
returned by, say, December 70, then it would not be
too much to expect that they have at least recruited
by this time an equal number; by December 71 twice
their number and so forth. To arbitraily apply the
3 percent factor where the Vietnamese are foreigners
who are ethnically unacceptable to the Cambodians
and assume that could in one year perform on a level
-6- .
 Approved For Rase 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000100100006-1
at one half of what they did in many years in
Vietnam is giving the devil his due and a few
points for bad behavior.
THE MATTER OF QUALITY
PARAS 64 THROUGH 72
At last' "Z4owever, I would in my most-cynical
moments put FANK at better than a stand off with
what forces the Communists have been able to
recruit in Cambodia. I know little of the situation
in Laos, but the fighting in Cambodia has been under-
taken by the Main Force Vietnamese elements against
FANK. While I would be the last to defend FANK as
anything but a weak army, it is an army that is
getting better and until more information on the
Communist's counter part emerges, I cannot see any
reason to expect them to be better than the Cambo-
dians we are training. In fact, the Communists
could be expected to be of lesser quality owing
material problems shortages and are certain to
be a lesser quantity. In short, I find no reason
to assume that the KC and FANK would fight to a
stand off. In fact, if this was not the case
there seems little reason for the Vietnamese Main
Force elements to continue to engage FANK as has
been the case for the past year.
-7- ,
 -Approved For R!~Jgase-2006/10/18 C-IA-RDP78T02095R00644G400006-1-- ----
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Indochina Division
SUBJECT Comments on the Working Paper: The Question
of The Khmer Communist Order of Battle
1. Attached are written appraisals of the subject
memorandum as prepared separately
There apparently seems to be a consensus that
existing estimates of Khmer Communists are too low. Saying
this, however, all seem to agree that given the existing data
base any upward scaling of this force level to a minimum of
100,000 men is unwarranted. Each provide some compelling
arguments to underwrite their position and I generally endorse
the overall-level of analysis as contained therein.
2. My own personal feelings after reading the piece is
that the analysis being so loaded with "mays", and "possibles"
has value, only in that it will give impetus to a complete
review of the problem. This is not to say our position will
change radically, but it is true that the press" of other
business - I might add of considerably higher priority -- has
not permitted in depth research on this problem. Finally,
perhaps this new effort_is indeed all the author of the piece
really wanted. If so, he has achieved his; goal.
3. Some other comments are in order. I am left totally
unimpressed by the statistical gamemanship that laces the
entire analysis. Cambodians are n8t Vietnamese nor Laotions
either in their religious, political, and social structure.
To take the Vietnamese analytical framework transfer it to
Cambodia and cut the percentage relationships to the aggregates
by some margin ranging often as high as 50 ,and then adding
and rounding upward or downward as the mood fits is not a
very persuasive analytical tool in my judgment. I focus here
on one particular issues the guerrilla - militia figure. First
the base data of population under Communist control has to
be viewed not in the aggregate but on a province by province
 .Approved-For Reease;200611.0119-.CIA-RDP78T02095R000100100006-1
basis. There is a qualitative factor that is ignored by
lumping all provinces together. The northeast provinces,
where there is no government presence, and the population
is small, is unlike the northwest or southeast etc.,where
somewhat different conditions prevail. Moreover, I perceive
that dissatisfaction with the existing government by Cambodians
in rural areas can not easily be translated into a willingness
to carry arms to overthrow the existing regime. To the
apolitical Cambodian peasant, the insertion of a Pro-Vietnamese
Communist regime must certainly be an enigma -- especially in
light of their distrust, fear, and hatre-d of most Vietnamese
whether they be ARVN or NVA/VC. Moreover, thy' new regime
would offer as much chance for peace as the current one does.
4. Other things in the paper such as equating the KC
with FANK is at best an oversimplication and at worst un-
warranted by the facts of either the.equippage and role of
each. Despite its somewhat poor performance, FANK is
victimized mainly by poor leadership not a lack of zeal by
.the men, women, and boys manning the defenses. The fighting
qualities of the KC is underscored more by the fact that
given their,postulated structure, the NVA/VC have borne the
brunt 4 -not nearly all the fighting. We certainly haven't
seen si ificant KC elements involved in any of the major
actions of the war in Cambodia so far.
5. In sum, therefore, although the analysis may appear
rational and proportioned on the surface, its structural
foundations are weak and need much more support if the edifice
is to stand. Perhaps, summed it up best of all-
"multiplying two conjec ures m lead to an-ahsli-rdity"_
South Vietnam Branch
 Approved For R ase.2006/10/18 : CIA-RDP78T02095BQQQ1QQ QQ006-1.
?
1. Mr. Adams has written a very thought provoking study
on the question of the structure and size of the Khmer Communist
(KC) OB in Cambodia. His study obviously has involved much
research and the compiling of numerous fragments of data. Mr.
Adams, the principal analyst
the Communist /OB in SVN, as
involved in the 1968 reform of
drawn heavily upon h.i-s-wea3th-ef
i-n-form,it-ron.-about the Communist
structure in South Vietnam.
2. Having worked closely with Mr. Adams for some 3 years,
and having seen history "prove" his original SVN enemy OB
figures
"correct", I
However, I
to justify
more." As
of such an
his part.
do not view Mr. Adams' paper lightly.
do not feel that he has provided sufficient evidence
6 11 OJ c 21
a KC estimate ar+alys-i-s, near "as high as 100,000 or
Mr. Adams admits throughout the paper, the construction
estimate is based on a great deal of confect Ve-on
On the other hand, I feel that Mr. Adams has demon-
strated sufficiently 5w.-h as -_ e-_, that the enemy's
structure and strength is probably greater than we are currently
estimating. (Although I did not specifically address the KC
estimate, see my Memo for the Record dated 28 April 1971,
indicating a growing concern on the reliability of I/SV's Esti-
mates of Communist Forces in Indochina). Specific comments
follow.
 Approved =For Rase 2006/10/18".. CIA RDP78TO20 5R-0.Q0-1O0100O06-1.
3. Pages i, ii, iii and 3: Mr. Adams assumption
regarding the correlation between a large KC force and the
population under Communist control do not in and of themselves
constitute evidence of a given force level.
4. Pages iii and iV: I would concur with the two
conclusions that the Communists probably have been much more
successful in organizing the population than has been recognized
and that they intend to give considerable priority to operations
in Cambodia for the immediate future.
5. Page 1: I would agree w4mAPd the general development
of the KC OB estimate. OER/I/SV has relied exclusively on DIA
for these numbers and has no independent estimate. However,
we bear the fa burden of responsibility for the number as we
have accepted and used it "lock I stock I and barrel."
6. Page 2: Although the intent of the Communists to'
establish a KC military structure with six echelons as in SVN
is accepted, the extent to which this has been done is still
questionable in
my mind. Although I have not studied the KC
position in any where near the detail that Mr. Adams has, I
do not believe that they are 10 feet tall in their ability to
organize and develop a viable military structure.,-t;
Page 3: I would take exception with Mr. Ada m4)
statement that our "criteria"
(which j>e never define) for
 --Approved-For Re ease 2006/10/18`: CIA-R-DP78T020g-6R-0041.001000-06--1 -
accepting new units into the OB are too strict. In fact,
our "criteria" is quite loose, depending largely on analyst
judgment rather than any fixed number of reports from cap-
tured documents or prisoners as was the case with the SVN
OB in and prior to 1968. In doing an enemy OB by unit
for any country, including Cambodia, a must have some
evidence before accepting the existence of a unit. As
Mr. Adams readily admits on pages 3 and 8, available
intelligence on the KC from document, prisoners, and defec-
tors as well as COMINT is seriously limited.
8. The "most prolific" source of intelligence on
Cambodia Mr.,Adams ascribes (on page 3) to the Agency's
agent reports. He indicates that,these reports are not
used in our "criteria" for accepting a unit into the OB.
In this Mr Adam's is generally correct. However, he
himself clearly explains why this is so on page 4 where
he states that "agents are prone to exaggerate and because
our units in Cambodia are inexperienced." Again, talking
about Local Forces on page 18, he downgrades the signi-
ficance of these reports indicating the evidence from them
"is usually low level and-always incomplete, often acquired
from persons who are none too sure what they are reporting
about." In other words, information provided in the agent
 _Approved For 6se?2046/10/18 -CIA-RDR78TO209 i Og?04006-1
reports on military matters is not generally reliable
enough to be accepted.
9. In his specific discussions of KC Main Force,
Local Force, and Guerrillas, Mr. Adams appears to make a
good case that their forces do exist and possibly in a
number larger than we currently carry. However, he has
not proven to my satisfaction that their strengths is
anywhere near the level cited. A Fank 6-2 report, used in
deriving the structure and thr size of KC Main Forces
(page 15), is not in and of itself evidence that these
units do exist, the main hypothesis Mr. Adams is trying
to prove. In addition, the doubling of the'figure of KC
in regimental formation to take irfto account smaller
units also is not evidence of their existence or size.
Since this latter figure is directly derived from one based
on the number of KC regiments, a*' figure we believe is
yh too high, the estimate of KC in largely Khmer units
is probably overstated to a considerable extent.
10. In addition, the development of Local Forces
and guerrillas appear to be overestimated. While there
no doubt has been some development of these forces, I do
not feel the evidence is as yet sufficient to extrapolate
from a few localized cases to a countrywide estimate. I
just cannot believe that the KC have developed to the
 - --Approved For RW!`e2006/10/18': CIA=RDP78TO2095 00100006-1--
extent indicated in the paper. Such a development as Mr.
Adams' portrays seems to contradict the Communists's
conse'cious decision and apparent need to maintain a
large number of.NVA/VC combat and support personnel in
Cambodia.
11. Despite my overall rejection of Mr. Adam estimate,
I do feel that he.has brought to light a considerable amount
of information on the KC force structure and size. This
information to me suggests a KC force level pr--bay above the
CIA/DIA 5,000-to 10,000 estimate but considerably below his
estimate of 100,000 or more. Therefore, I feel a careful
review of documents be made with the intent of deriving a new
OER/I/SV estimate of KC forces..
1