PROCEEDINGS IN CLOSED SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 20, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2006_/Q6/26_: CJARDIP788,1Q2A':,' 2A000100040001-2
November 20 1975
C TGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SLIN A. /
Niue
stimulate purchase of potables in returnable
containers.
'Elie council's action in Montgomery is, 'of
course, only a skirmish won in a war in which
the bottling and beverage industries have
shown no inclination to surrender. But, in
conjunction with other recent engagements,
it is progress.
The Environmental Protection Agency last
week took the first procedural step to require
a 5-cent deposit on all beverage containers
sold under federal auspices, which would
have an obvious impact on the Washington
area. And the Maryland Court of Appeals in
March upheld an ordinance passed by the
town of Bowie in 1971, requiring the manda-
tory deposit.
There appears to be developing a wider
feeling that disposable containers represent
a ridiculous wastefulness and a lack of aes-
thetic concern for onr own backyards. The
arguments of the bottlers and soft-drink
purveyors do not hold water, and they would
do well now to get cracking on the the con-
versiorf back to returnables instead of trying
to impede the effort by rhetoric and. litiga-
tion.
No serious argument has been made that
elimination of throwaways would involve no
difficulties. But the point is that these would
be temporary and worth the economic divi-
dend in conservation. One recent study, by
the Maryland Governor's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, said that weaning ourselves
from disposables would create 1,500 jobs in
the state, would produce $1.1 million in new
tax revenue, and would reduce highway litter
in the neighborhood of 30 per cent.
Throwaways are a problem, as we have sal
before, that is not so intractable as many o
our urban knots. We trust that Mr. Gleasoi
will see it that way, this time around. An
in a time of scarce household money, eve
in Montgomery, the savings to the consume
of drinks In returnables over throwaways
amounts to 60 per cent.
'
CULTURAL NOTE
This tidbit is offered to any sociologist or
urban anthropologist who has been too busy
filling out forms for foundation grants to
get around to field work. It means something,
we think, perhapS something of coruscating
insight.
A proud municipality in our area spon-
sored a Halloween dance for its "older teen-
agers" at the community center. The town
will be left anonymous, to spare it possible
embarrassment, but also because we suspect
its experience was duplicated in other
suburbs. The following description comes
from the town newsletter.
"Despite the presence of some 10 chaperons
and 3 policemen, the men's toilet was stopped
up with paper and the room flooded, and
empty beer cans, bottles and cartons were
strewn over the parking lot area. Considering
that an estimated no young people were
present during -the evening, except for the
problems noted above and a messed up gym
floor, the dance was characterized to be about
- as orderly as expected in these days and
times."
The comingling of tones in this brief dis-
patch?of fatalism, ennui, frustration,, and a
sense that the town may have gotten off
with lesser ravages than anticipated?should
Speak eloquently to the trained investigator
of current social phenomena.
NOTE
In the Recant) of November 11; 1975,
the first paragraph of Mr. BAYH'S re-
marks on page S195138 are incorrectly set
forth. In the permanent. REcoaa the
paragraph will be printed as follows:
EXTENSION OF REVENUE SHARING
Mr. BAYH. Mr, President, I wish to
express my concern about the need for
early action to extend the revenue shar-
ing program. I believe that most Mem-
bers of Congress and concersed citizens
agree that the revenue sharing program
has been successful, and it is my percep-
tion that the program will be reenacted
with little opposition. The questions are
when Congress will act and how much
money will be allocated to the program.
CONCLUSION OF ROUTINE
MORNING BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GLENN). The period for the transaction
of routine morning business is closed.
CLOSED SESSION
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GLENN)-. Under the previous order, the
hour of 9 a.m. having arrived, the Senate
will go into closed session, not to extend
beyond 1 p.m.
The Chair now directs the Sergeant at
Arms to -clear the galleries, close the
doors of the Chamber, and exclude all
those not sworn to secrecy.
(At 9 a.m. the doors of the Chamber
were closed.)
PROCEEDINGS IN CLOSED SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
GLENN). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am
about to make a unanimous-consent re-
quest, and I do so with some fear and
trepidation because of the numbers in-
volved, and that number in relation to
the closed session which the Senate will
now undertake.
I think it is a very bad precedent to
have more than two people here at any
time from outside the Senate, but on this
occasion, in view of the situation which
has developed, I ask unanimous con-
sent?and this is not to be considered a
precedent?that the following members
of the staff of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence be accorded, full
privileges for tile period of this closed
door session of the Senate.
Before I list their names, again, they
will have to be sworn in by the Sergeant
at Arms and pass that test:
William 0. Miller, Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Curtis Smothers, Charles
Kirbow, David Aaron, Joseph Di-
Genova, Richard Inderfurth, Robert
Kelley, Charles Lombard, Michael
Madigan, Elliot Maxwell, Walter Ricks,
Burton Wides,
Mr. ALLEN. Reserving the right to
object?and I shall not object?will the
Senate be given an opportunity to ex-
%1100
press itself during this. session on the
advisability of releasing the names of
CIA agents who may have been involved
in assassination plots?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The leadership
would never think of foreclosing any
right, privilege, or prerogative of the
Senate, and the answer_ would be in the
affirmative.
Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING Gleh'ICER. Is there
further objection?
Mr. ALLEN. I thank the distinguished
majority leader.
Mr. GRIVetiN. Mr. President, on the
point that the Senator from Alabama
has just raised, when will it be possible
to have a discussion on that particular
question. I ask the majority leader?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Under the agree-
ment reached, the session cannot go be-
yond 1 o'clock,
Mr. GRIFFIN. Then I wonder if there
could be a period of at least 15 minutest
something at the beginning, to lay out
some basic legal questions about this
that Senators could then be Mulling over
in their mind as they are listening to
the rest of the presentation and then,
perhaps, some further discussion at the
.end?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would think so,
and I am sure that the chairman of the
committee and the ranking Republican
member of the committee would be will-
ing to give that consideration.
Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. CHURCH. May I just say, in the
interest of orderly - presentation, the
chairman and the vice chairman had
hoped to present the report, during
which these questions to which the Sen-
ator from Michigan refers will be al-
luded to, became they have been care-
fully considered by the committee, and
then after that, of course, any discussion
concerning the question that the Senator
raises would be entirely appropriate.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The Senator from
Michigan has some questions that he
would not just expect the distinguished
chairman to allude to, but to address
himself to.
Mr. CHURCH. There will be plenty of
opportunity to do that.
Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
Mr. TOWER. The way that we agreed
on it yesterday is that the time should
be equally divided between the Senator
from Idaho and myself.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is right.
Mr. TOWER. And then on a rota-
tional basis we would yield to people on
our side in turn.
The presentation by the chairman and
the vice chairman should not take an
extraordinarily long time and each
mernbsr of the committee, I think, ought
to expaess himself briefly and I think
there will be adequate time for colloquies
and qu? stions on this matter on the part
of the I lembers of the Senate that wish
to participate.
Mr. CRIFFIN. Including--
Mr. ReSTORE. Reserving the right to
object? -
Mr. SPARKMAN. Just a question.-
S 20623
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Nifty
suggested that, at some pointehe the pm-
ceedings this morning; if the Senate de-
sired to engage in, debate,, these special
assistants- for the members of. the cora-
mittee-might be dismissed. I do-not object -
to that, but I think, in any case, thechiet
counsel for the Democratic- side and
deputy counsel for the Republican side
should remain. ?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator
yield?
Mr. MANSIsiELD; I yield; .
Mr, SYMINGTON. It is my under,
standing- that the committee felt the re-
port should be published. Is that correct?
Mr. CHURCH. Yes. The committee so
voted and, then, reconfirmed. its. vote fol-
lowing receipt of, a Presidential letter
asking that the report remain concealed.
Mn SYMINGTON. Was that decision
by the committeeunanimous?
Mr. CHURCH. That decision wae taken
withouta dissenting vote. There was one
abstention.
Mr. SYIVII.NGTON.. That being true, I
hope, we?do not chase windmills. We- cer-
tainly my intention, if the committee
works- this many months, speaking per-
sonally- for myself, whatever the- com-
mittee thinks should- be done with this
report I. am going to be for, and I hold
myself under no- obligation not:to-be. for.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the. Senator
very much.
Mr.- MANSFIELD: M. President, in
view' of the- fact that 15, minutes have
'elapsed- under the time schedule, could
the Chair at this -time act on, my request
that. these additional staff members. be
allowed.?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mn President,
reserving the right to object, and I shall
not object, reluctantly, because if the
subject is this complex that we have to
have this-number of staff people on the
floor I do not know how a person Iikemy-
self can understand it, I askunanienous--
Iwill not object. Go ahead.
? The. PRESIDING OFFICER. IS, there
objection?,
? Without objection, it. is so, ordered.
Mn ROBERT C..BYRDelelrePresident;
I ask unanimous consent thatparagraph
numbered 4 of rule 36, page 55' of the
Senate Manual; be printed in- the REC-
ORD at this-point..
There- being no. objections the para-
graph. was ordered, to. be printed in the
RECORD, as-follows:
4'. Any Senator or officer of the Senate who
shall disclose the secret or confidential busi-
ness or proceedings or the Senata shall be
Pablo, if a. Senator, to suffer expulsion from
the-body; and if an officer, to dismissal from
the service-of the-Senate, and to-punishment
for contempt.
Mr. PASTORE: Reserving the righlet
object--
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. There, la a re-
quest pending. ?
Mr.. MANSFIELD. I. yield, to- the
Senator.
Mr. PASTORE: I was wondering, could
we not set a, time limit insofar as the
presentation, -because none of us know
here what is going. to develop:
The PRESIDING OrtesCER. Could the
Senator speak up, please? We doe:tot have
a loud, speaker system..
Mr. PASTORE. If we go from 9until 1,
I think what we. ought to do is set aside
an hour or an hour and a half in. the
beginning and, then. we can- resume the
talk about the:legalities-involved and. the
procedures to, be followed- because, after
all, here. we are in the dark.. We do- not
know what is going to- develop, until we
hear it and I think that is what-we ought
to. do. We ought. to set aside an hour and
a_ half or an hour of the first- 5 hours.,
. What is it, 5 hours? - ?
Mr_ MANSFIELD. Four. hours.
Mr.. PASTORE_ Four haun-
t Then_ we take it. from. there, and. then
we can have 15. minutes or 20 :minutes.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Make it the last
hour to give them a chance to explain.
Mr. PASTORE. That is- right..
Mr. SPARKMAN.Will theleader yield
for ? a question e .
Mr. MANSFIELD... Yes; and then. to
the Senator. from. Nerth Dakota- .
Mr. SPARKMAN. I. merely- want to
ask, the leedee read off quite a Iong, list
of names..
Mr. MANSFIELD. Too- long a list.. .
Mr. SPARKMAN. Are. they a part of
the Senate?'
Mr. MANSFIELD. They are not, a part
of the Senate.. They are attaches, at-
tached_ to. the. Select Committee..-
Mr.. SPARKMAN. '17'hey are a part of
the committee?
Mr.. MANSFIELD. Yes..
- Mr. SPARKMAN. I thank the Senator.
; Mr.. YOUNG. My question, along the
same line, I can see where some. staff.
members are. necessary; but L cannot
understand why and I would like an. exe
planation. of why so many. There-will
probably be more staff, members than
Senators.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Will, the Senator
yield? .
There are 11 members on the. commite
tee and it allows them each an assistant,
plus the Democratic counsel and the Re-
publican counsel. Just like the umpire
made a decision based on his judgment in
St. Louis last Sunday with which- some
people found fault. The leadership has
done the best it could and it has re-
duced it from about 25 down to 13,
Mr. YOUNG. I am not going to object,
but I think there will be bigger press cov-
e Page this. way than if we let the press
it.
Mr.. MANSFIELD. I agree..
Mr. BAKER. I might say, for the ret-
as aira,nce of our colleagues,,
there is an,
ci ier reason to want thm. ehere That is
in the interest of security_ We broke the
st if clown into compartments. One cone-
pa; trnent did not know what the ether
con pa,rtment was working on. So there
is Ito staff member, except the majority
and minority counsel, who have a, gen-
eral overview, and they do, not. in, de-
tail. This was- to preserve the secrecy of
the proceedings.. It seems to me we need
at. least this many in order to have. a
full presentation. While I agree with. the
majority leader that it is unfortunate,. I
believe it is essential.
Mr.. CHTT7S. Now they will ha.ve. it. all
put together for them?
Mr. BAKER.. This is put together in a
printed book that will, be placed on the
desks. Members of the committee in a
drafting session have approved the draft.
But in. order to elaborate or. extend on
any point in there, we will need rep-
resentatives from the several drafting
groups.
Mr. CHILES., Will they all be here at
one time?
Mr. BAKER'. Eleven of them.
Mr. CHURCH, May I say in further-
ance of. what,. the distinguished Senator
Mr. PASTORE. May we take our seats
so we_can talk?
SCHWEIKER. Let us turn the
microphones on.
Mr. CHURCH: This has been- an ex-
traordinarily diligent committee. Mem-
bers have, for 6'months., sat through end,-
lesS sessions in the most intensive inves-
tigation of the assassination-issue. I have
never served on a committee where there
was such fidelity- of' attendance on the
part of the-membership-. These commit-
tee members should not only have the
right, but have- expressed the. the desire,
to participate in this presentation. Be-
-cause of the breadth. of the material
covered; each one has assumed a respone
sibillty for a particular chapterif highly
technical Questions arise. For that rea-
.son, the committee members- feel the
need to have their own staff . assistant
sitting with them.
Mr. MANSFIELD'. Time is- fleeting.
Could, we get a judgment?
Mr. CIMPS., Can I ask' one more ques-
tion? I can understand the explanation
.of the need to have the staff members
for the- answering- of questions'. I wonder
if at some stage when the questions are
answered so- to speak, if we get to- a point
where. we want some debate, could, they
then be excused? It would seem to me
that there might well be some time that
we would just want to have the Senate
here if we were going to have a debate.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The answer, I would
assume, would be in the affirmative, or
at least that wouldebe my opinion.
Mr. TOWER. I think any Senator
would be- within his rights in trying to
promulgate a consent request to exclude
staff.
Mr. CHURCH. / think in that situation
the chief counsel, the Democeatio and
Republican counsel for the committee,
ought to- be allowed to- remain.
Mr. STENN. IS, Can. the Senator speak
a little louder so. we can. hear?
The PRESIDING OvieiCER.. If we
might all keep that in minds please do so.
I am having trouble hearing up- here. We
do not have a loudspeaker system. If,
during this discussion,, we can all speak
up, we would all appreciate it.
Mn MANSFIELD. You-are-doing great.
Mr. CHURCH. Senator Crimus hos
? Mr. MANSFIELD. May I. emphasize
the fact that this is not to be considered
a precedent, the idea of having such huge
staff numbers, comparatively- speaking
in a closed sessimr.
Now the time is &mane- divided be-
tween the chairman and ti .e vice chair-
man of the committee.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. Pres. dent,. I ask
unanimous consent that tin time on the
presentation of the select cc mmittee re-
port be equally divided' betw :en the Sen-
ator from Idaho and the Sonator from
Texas. s
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The PRESIDING OSVICER. Withovio
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr, President, I be-
lieve the Senator's request is represen-
tative of the bipartisan spirit which has
guided the committee from its origin.
Mr. President, I reserve to myself such
time as this initial presentation may re-
quire.
Mr. MUSKIE. I wonder if it would not
be helpful for the Senator to speak from
the well, facing the Senate. We could
all hear him better.
Mr. CHURCH. May I inquire of the
Chair if those assistants whose presence
has been requested might enter the
Chamber and assume their places? -
[The Vice President assumed the
Chair at this pointl
Mr. CHURCH. In the summer of this
year, the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence took up the investigation of U.S.
involvements in alleged assassination
plots against foreign leaders, continuing
the task begun by the Rockefeller Com-
mission.
rhe select committee asked for
closed session today to describe our find-
ings and conclusions to our colleague's
before making =sir reIreii: report 7-1-
able to the American people later this
afternoon.
We will turn to the contents of the
reports in a moment, but, first, I would
like to express my gratitude to Senator
TOWER, whose constant attention to his
responsibilities as vice chairman has
been of invaluable assistance to the com-
mittee. And to all other members of the
committee who have worked so hard.
The same expression of appreciation has
been earned by members of the staff, in
connection with this report, whose names
I ask unanimous consent to have printed
at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the names of
staff members were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
William G. Miller, Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Curtis Smothems, Charles
Kirbow, David Aaron, Frederick Baron,
David Bushong, Elizabeth Culbreth,
Rhe it Dawson. '
Joseph Dennin, joSeph. DiGenova, Rich-
ard Inclerfurth, Loch Johnson, Robert
Kelley, Charles Lombard, Michael
Madigan, Elliot Maxwell.
Paul Michel, Andrew Rostal, Gordon
? Rhea, Walter Ricks, Patrick Shea, Jack
Smith, Greg Treverton, Burton Wides.
?
Mr. CHURCH. Never have I known a
group of harder working men and
women.
This committee has heard over 100
witnesses. It has studied thousands of
documents and amassed a record of sworn
testimony almost 10,000 pages long. We
have spent months drafting and redraft-
ing this report to make sure the evidence
was stated fairly and completely. Meeting
first in a subcommittee composed of
Senator TOWER, Senator HART of Colo-
rado, and myself, and then in the full
committee, our descriptions of the assas-
sination plots are all carefully docu-
mented, and we have done our utmost to
meet i he requirements of Senate Resolu-
tion 21 to determine the full facts about
the matters we investigated.
I am proud to say that the committee
adopted this report by unanimous vote,
an accomplishment, I think, that was
not thought possible when we first un-
dertook the investigation.
The committee also decided to recon-
firm its earlier decision last summer te
make the report public. Thissvote was also
unanimous, with one abstention. Our
reasons for feeling so strongly about tha
Trigt of the people to have access to this
historic document are set forth in sum-
Marv' on_nage a cir tate report.
We believe the publiFis entitled to
know what the instrumentalities of their
Government have done. We believe that
our recommendations can be judged only
in the light of the factual record. We be-
lieve the truth about the assassination
charges should be told because democ-
racy depends upon an informed elec-
torate. Truth is the very anchor of our
democracy.
We wrestled long and hard with the
contention that the facts disclosed in this
report should be kept secret since they
are embarrassing to the United States.
We concluded that despite any tern-
porary injury to our national reputation,
foreign peoples will, upon sober reflec-
tion, respect the United States more for
keeping faith with its democratic deals
than they will condemn us for the mis-
conduct revealed. We doubt that any
other country would have the courage to
make such a disclosure, and I personally
believe this to be the unique strength
of the American Republic.
? Our decision to make the report public
was reinforced by the fact that portions
of the story had already been told. In-
nuendo and misleading piecemeal dis-
closures are unfair to the individuals in-
volved; nor are they a responsible way to
lay the groundwork for informed public
Policy judgments. In short, the rumors
and allegations about the assassination
plots must be put to rest. Any effort to
keep the truth from the American public
could on have the effect of increasing
the corrosive cynicism about Govern-
ment, which is such a threat to. our so-
ciety today.
au) without dissent, the committee
agreed upon clear criteria for determin.-
frig-which individuals shouldhe identified
byh their true names in the repnrt.
-W-e-Vere exceedingly careful. We asked
the administrations so ? - GIME ?
fire-report for the purpose of comments
frig on this particular quesp:onee&ter
lengthy cliTscus-gfon and. atmlication ....of
thesnommittee's standards, we agreed to
lisnit_insference for more than one-half
of the nani-e-i regnested to be deietedsiy
thLariministration ton title or, in some
cases, a pseudonymTifowever, some pub-
lic officials and some of tile -persons
sMom t="Agericy used in-rosrraliTSTibla
incluoing Cer.D.in iijxr
fignressewere so central tOollie....reirart
that we concluded their true identities
shoiUdiferiliade IrrrCWTt
Tames _Madison recognized the right
of freely examining public characters
and free communication thereon as the
only effective guardian of every other
right. And, as the Supreme Court stated:
The power of the Congress to conduct
investigations is inherent in the legisaltive
process. That power is broad. It comprehends
the probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, ineffi-
ciency or waste.
the right of the committee to name
in --reporrthose offf6Taisha were-re-
sponMe for the assassination plots-- is
beyond serious doubt.
The -o-iilY time this right was chair
lenge-UT-is iTiVaS In an ft th-hour attempt
tose-gatide a certain name fiiii tne-fe-
pert, the lightis-Laeseonamitteestoom-
clusie that rianaelipl-kericialsy
the Fetters,' district courts
Earlier this week, the U.S. district
? court had occasion to review whether
the inclusion of the name of a certain.
former official in the report violated any
of his constitutional rights. Judge Ger-
hard Gesell found, in his opinion that the
only right even conceivably at issue was
the right of privacy. He then concluded,
after having heard full argument in
camera in which the CIA and its general
counsel were represented, and after tak-
ing public arguments in open session,
that--
A former government official has no right
of privacy vis-a-vis the Congress where his
official conduct is under review.
The court decided further?
. This is not, as the Court views it, a case of
exposure for the sake of exposure alone,
? The court ruled in this case that "the
public interest greatly outweighs any
private interest of the plaintiff." The
court found the standard the committee
applied in determining whether to in-
clude certain true identities to be, in the
words of the court, "responsible criteria."
Now let me turn to the substance of
the report. AU of you have a copy before
you, and from time to time we may have
occasion to turn to certain parts of it.
It is organized as follows:
Part introduces the committee's
work, explains why the report must be
made public, and summarizes the events
examined in the body of the report.
Part II explains several key concepts
which are necessary to understand the
events reviewed in the report, such as
the nature of covert action, the basic
lines of authority in the CIA, and the
doctrine of plausible denial.
Part III sets forth the facts and testi-
mony relating to the assassination oper-
ations and the level at which they were
authorized.
Part IV contains the findings and con-
clusions of the committee.
? Finally, part V, outlines the recom-
mendations of the committee.
During the course of Its investigation,
the committee addressed four broad
questions.
First, did the United States or U.S.
-officials instigate, attempt, or aid and
abet plots to assassinate foreign leaders?
Second, did U.S. officials assist foreign
dissidents in a way which significantly
contributed to the killing of foreign
leaders?
Third, where U.S. officials were in-
volved in assassination plots or other
killings, were their activities r.uthorized,
and if so, at what levels of ou Govern-
//lent?
Fourth, even if the involvem .tat- of of-
ficials of the U.S. Government 11 assassi-
nation activities was not expr !ssly au-
thorized, did those officials perceive their
actions to be within the ,scope of their
lawful authority? Furthermore, slid high-
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mileNGRESSIONAL RECORD?SE?Th' Zove'nwer2 1975'
er authorities exercise, adequate control the opportunityarose. In the AMLasaa, Presidents o otherperg.mis above- the govern.
to. prevent such. operation, the- CIAmisinterpretation?-r--
gave active support mental agency PT agencies involved.
Richard. Helm, whohad been involved ? and encouragement to. a. Cuban whose Let me just. diese here a..moment to
hi an assessination, plot before he be- intent to assassinate Castro. was, known, explains that the committee was very
came-the Director of the CIA, issued. an and provided him with. the ?means for ? careful:- not to- make- findings.. where: the
intraageney order banning assassination, carrying. out the assassination. - evidence- was insufficient,. 07 where it
once he-became Director in 1972. William. ? The overthrow of Rafael Trujillo was, was-conflicting, or where there-were gaps
Colby did the: same- in 197%. and told the clearly an. objective of U.S. foreign.- pole -- which we were unable. to fill because. we
committee: _ . - icy.. American officials offered both en- were reaching back 15 years into a world
couragement and Weapons. to- dissidents, .
With respect to assassination, by ;position- of secrecy.
is clear. I just think it Is wrong. . in the Dominican Republic., known. to.' In those cases.; however, we set out the
have the Intent to assassinate Tnijillo. evidence so that Members of the Senate,
The committee's findings and canal- The United States was not involved, the American public, and historians in
sions are set out. in. part IV of the. report, however, in the- actual assassination, the future- might have an. opportunity to
beginning at page 255. Its. findings re- Similarly, American officials offered. know what this committee found isa con-
garding whether officials of theU.S. Gov' encouragement to a group of Vietnamese nectima with the evidence and.make their
ernment were involved in. assassination generals plotting the overthrow of Ngo- own appraisal of each case., _
attempts. appear at pages 255 through Dinh Diem. However, the assassination Di fairness to men now dead who can-
257. of Diera and his brother Ngo- Dinh lah.0 not speak up for themselves,. only in. those
Senator TOWER and I have-agreed. to. was neither planned nor suggested, by situations where the evidence was con-
'divide the initial presentation, and in or- officials of this country. elusive; did the committeemake findings,
der not to duplicate. what he intends to Our investigation has established that .Sce if I may repeat,. the committee-
.
say, I would like to address the remain-- officials of the U.S. Government offered, makes four other major findings..
der of my time toan outline of the. find- encouragement to the Chilean dissi-- The first relates to the committeeoa in-
ings and. conchisions of the committee. dente, and plotted the kidnaping of ability to make a finding that the- asses-
The committee,s investigation estab- Gene Ren?chneider, but no U.S. at- sina,tion plots were authorized by the
lishes once and for all that assassination cial planned, or encouraged Schneider's Presidents or other- persons above- the
is an abhorrent practice that must never murder. Certain high officials did knows. governmental agency or- agencies in.-
again be undertaken in times of peace however, that the dissidents planned to -
by the U.S. Government. Our view that - volved: -
kidnap General Schneider, and. the pos-- The. second. explains -why certain- offt- -
assassination. has no, place in, America's sibility that he would be killed. should cials, may have perceived that according
arsenal is shared by? this- administrations have been recognized as a. foreseeable to their judgment and experience as-
President Ford, when he asked this. come- risk of the kidnaeine, sassination was an. acceptable course of
mittee to study- America's involvement in In addition to these five cases, the action. -
. assassinatione bated: . committee has received evidence that. The third criticises. Agency officials for
I am oppose& to political assassination.. ranking Government- officials discussed, ladling: on, several occasions- to. disclose.
This administration has. not and will not use and may have- authorized the establish- their plane anti, activities to superior =-
such_ means. as instruments of national
ment within the-CIA of a. generalizect as-- thorities.- or for failing to da so with
policy,
saesination. capacity known. as the Ex- sufficient-detail and clarity_
Witnesses; who. testified before the eeutive Action project. . The fourth, criticizes administration
committee- denounced assassination. as The question of the level at which. officials for not ruling out assassination,,
immoral, described it as impractical, and these plots were authorized or known ? particularly after. certain administration
reminded us. that an open society, more about in the U.S. Government Is a, coin- officials had become aware of prior asses-
than any other, is particularly vulnerable plex one, not susceptible to-easy answers. sination plans and the. establishment of
to the risk that its own leaders may be. Our conclusions concerning this-issue are- a general assassination capability. .
assassinated-.something of which we set forth at length in pert 4- of there- As explained at. pages 262' and. 263', we
hardly need to-be- reminded, I should port. Those findings are- introduced and could find no hard evidence that asses-
think. summarized at pages 6 and 7 of the in- sinetion was seriously considered or
ment outside of the CIA. The- minutes
Now let me, turn to our findings with troduction and summary section of the--
urged in the high councils of Govern-
respect to the' plots themselves. Turning; report, from which I now quotes .
first to the- Lumumba? case, we have-con- The picture that emerges from- the evt-
of the National Security CounciL and
cluded that officials' of the. U.S. Govern- dencs is not a clear one. This may be- due special. group meetings, however, con-
n
/tient formulated a plot' to- assassinate to, the. system of deniability; and thee come-' tai repeated exhortations, for action
Patrice-Lumumba., and took steps in fur- quasi state of the evidence which', even after such- as. getting rid. of. Lumumbe and re-
therance of that plot; including the-tie- our long investigation, remains conflicting- moving Castro While assassination- may
livering of lethal biological substances to, and. inconclusive. Or it may. be that. there not have been, explicitly authorized by
the Congo. This Nation had no involve-
were in fact serious shortcomings in the sys- the Presidents and, their advisers; their
ment, however, in Lurnumba's actual
tem of authorization so that an activity such strong expressions' of hostility to cer-
as- asassthation could have been undertaken. thin foreign leaders created: arr. environ-
death, which occurred at the hands of by an agency of the United States- Govern-
his Congolese enemies. meat- without express authority. ment in which it was likely that some
In the Castro case, the committee has The Committe hnds that .the system of ex--
CIA. official& would perceive- assassina-
found that officials' of the U.S. Govern- ecutive. command and control was so am-
time as a permissible course- of action.
meat initiated and participated ill a se- big-uous that it is difficult to be certain at We have found that the plots to: as--
what levels assassination activity was known.. sassinate Lumumba. and Castro were
ries of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro
and other members of the Cuban leader and authorized. This situation creates the- clearly authorized by. the Deputyy. Direc-
ship. Plans to assassinate Castro with --
disturbing prospect that Government officials tors for Plans, the head of the CIA
-
might have undertaken the assassination. covert-actionarm.. The plot to a...ia.S.,-,
poisoned Cigars-, exploding seashells-, and plots without it having been uncontroverti- s ? - mates Lumumba had the approval of
a contaminated diving suit did not ad-- lily clear that there was explicit authorize-
vance beyond the laboretory phase. An-- tion from the Presidents. It is also possible Alien Dulle,s,.whawas the Director of the-
e User plot, however, in which the- U.S. there might have been a- successful "plaits-
Central Intelligenee Agency when the'
Government used unca rworld figures, ible denial" in which Presidential authorize-
assassination, plot in. the- Congo. took
reached: the stage of 11; ?clueing .poison tion was issued but is now obscured. Whether place:. ?
pills, procuring potential tesassins within,
or not the respective Presidents knew of or There is. considerable evidence that.
authorized the plots, as. chief executive of... Dulles.nuay himself have- authorized the
Cuba, and appa,rently del vering the pills
ricer of the United States, each, must bear plot, to kill. Castro. althougle there. is no
to the island itself. the ultimate resposihility for the activities
Yet another episode in ?olved a Cuban of his subordinates. eviden.cee that. his. successor, John. Mc-
who initially had no in ;ention of en- The Committee- makes-four other major Cone,. was. aware of the assassination Iat-
gaging. in. assassination, ut who finally findings. The first relates to- the Commit-
tempts against Castro that- took place
agreed, at. the. suggestion of the CIA, tee's Inability to make a finding that the during his tenure. as, Director of thefl
to attempt to assassinate Raoul Castro it assassination plbts were authorized by the CIA.
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IV 07.'0110er -.V'U, 1t175 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 20627
We have no solid evfaRRPL-Y4ECKII,eleigAi3q9WWPciigAla-1 rt)fe)7c?gP2-n?A?99i1P4?93/29P12a., our future
President Eisenhower or President Ken- Wiand and control system must await will illaaalvorthy of the best of our past.
nedy were aware of any U.S. assassina- completion of our continuing investiga- [Applause.]
tion plots. One witness did recall a tion and the issuance of our final report. Now, I should like to recognize the clis-
statement by President Eisenhower at But the committee has received sufficient tinguished Senator from Texas who
the NSC meeting that left him with the evidence to be convinced that an ab- serves so well as vice chairman of the
impression that President Eisenhower solution prohibition against assassination committee.
had ordered Lumumba's elimination, but should be written into law. Mast TOWER. I yield myself such time
other persons who attended that meet- It would be irresponsible not to do all as I may require.
lag testified that they did not recall ever that can he done to prevent assassination Mr. President, I compliment the dis-
hearing President Eisenhower order his from happening again. A law is necessary tinguished Senator from Idaho, the
assassination, to deter specific conduct, to strengthen chairman of the Select Committee, for
Our investigation has also raised seri- the will of those who want to resist urg- his very good summation of the contents
ous questions not only about knowledge lags to engage in such conduct, and to of the report. He has worked very hard
and authorization of the assassination express the values of our Nation, to make this report a reality and has
efforts at the Presidential level but also The committee, therefore, recommends earned the gratitude of the Senate in the
about whether officials of the CIA suffi- the enactment of a law that will provide Process. .
eiently informed their superiors in the criminal sanction against the assassina- I have just a few comments in ampli-
agency and officials above the CIA about tion of foreign leaders, as well as any ileation of the chairman's presentation.
their activities, conspiracies or attempts to commit Such While I agree with him substantively on
In the final analysis, the tragic events acts in time of peace everything that he said regarding the re-
investigated by the committee were in The proposed law is contained in ap- Pert, we may have come degrees of dis-
large part a result of the system of exec- pendix A at page 289 of the report. It agreement on matters of foreign policy,
utive command and control which is sometimes asked whether a,ssassina- but I will not open the foreign policy de-
created the risk of confusion, rashness, tion should be ruled out absolutely, such bate here today.
and irresponsibility in the very areas as in a time of truly grave national The select committetawernes before the
where clarity and sober judgment were emergency. Adolf Hitler is often cited as Senate today for consideration?prior iii
eoaaaasa
most, necessary, an example. Of course, the cases which officiaraisclosure to allpjablicfeater
Whatever can be said in defense of the the committee investigated were not of Port on matters of veryea_nayeonsational
original purpose of the doctrine of plau- that character at-an. Tragically, they re- importance.-ItThas been apparent since
sible deniability, the extension of the lated to Latin leaders and black leaden the first sill...facing of allegations of U.S.
doctrine to internal decisionmaking was of little countries that could not possibly involvement in assassination attempts
absurd. have constituted a threat to the security that this Senate inquiry would have a
The democratic process is undermined of the United States, profound ipapa,ct on the future course
by any doctrine which insulates elected The only time when Mr. Castro per- of our intelligence organizations and
officials from information on which to mitted his island to become a base for their activities. This report will be the
base their decisions. According to some Russian missiles, the only time during first public document to provide an in-
witnesses, the extension of the plausible which it might have been said that he depth review of some of the workings of
denial doctrine to internal decisionmak- had become a threat to the security of intelligence-related aspects of our m-
ing required the use of circumlocution the American people, was the one time tional security apparatus.
and euphemism in speaking with Presi- when all assassination activity, plans, Along with some other members of the
dents and other senior officials. Failing and plots against his life were stood select committee, I initially expressed
to call dirty business by its rightful name down. strong reservations against any detailed
may have increased the risk of dirty So we are not talking about Adolf account of the evideuce received by this
business being clone. Hitler or anything of that character, nor committee?not because of any partisan
Ultimately, Presidents must be held are we prejudicing actions taken in a consideration but, rather, for fear of
responsible for determining the nature grave national emergency when the life permanent damage to the Nation's se-
at' major Government activities and for of the Republic in endangered. In such curity and the continued effectiveness of
preventing undesirable activities from cases, the President has constitutional our intelligence agencies,
taking place. High administration of- powers to act to defend the Nation; and While I accept and respect the judg-
ficials had a duty to make clear to their he is answerable to history, to Congress, rnent of my colleagues, T am corn elled
subordinates that assassination VMS im- and to the American people for the RC- tO state m continuing concern regsr
permissible and to inquire further when tion he takes in emergencies of that trig the wiz cun ou pu c isclosure.
they received indications that assassi:na- extreme character, The ultimate effect of the repo-II-may be
ton was being considered by some of The committee's sentiments are aptly for the American public to appreciate
their subordinates, summarized in the epilog to the report that quick, seemingly easy answers, such
Just as Presidents must be held ac- which appears at page 285. as assassination, are not the most effec-
countable, their subordinates through- The committee does not believe that live way to rid ourselves of those with
out the Government had a concomitant the acts which it has examined repre- whom we are engaged in ideological
duty to disclose fully their plans and ac- sent the real American character. They combat.
tivi ties. This sets a demanding standard do not reflect the ideals which have given Careful public examination of the en-
but the committee supports it. The fu- the people of this county and of the tire 1-e o?aar'aMb gfilaillarap-ravide eozne nee-
tura of democracy rests upon such ac- world hope for a better, fuller, fairer spec are or evaluation of the views of
life.
countabili ty. thiaaFaalreasSatalaTasurramarilf place the
I might suggest, as all Senators know, We regard the assa.ssination plots as Outire 'Et-a_a?rlia........raruTr departures from
that nothing is more fraught with peril aberrations. The United States must not dernocraticoleadition at the feet of th,e
to the foreign policy of a nation than adopt the tactics of the enemy. means much maligned and too of ten maligned
assassinations. They have set off great are as important as ends. Crisis makes it iiitellige_nce cornet-natty. IThatafilliTa?tje.
wars including, as Senators will remem- tempting to ignore the wise restraints Pu- blic win begin to aa-estle, as the select
her, the First World War, and thus the that make men free; but each time we committee has, with the real problem--
need is evident for clear command, con- do so, each time the means we use are the absolute necessity for instrumentali-
trol, and complete accountability within wrong, our inner strength, the strength ties of the U.S. Government to have
the executive branch, which makes us free, is lessened, secrets and discharge their obligation to
The committee's long investigation of Despite our distaste for what we have protect the people's right to be secure,
Investigation
assassination has brought a number of seen, we have great faith in this coun- with the assurance that the American
important issues into sharp focus; Above try. The story is sad, but this country public and Congress stand behind them.
all stands the question of whether as- has the strength to hear the story and It may be that baring these reprehen-
sassination is an acceptable tool of to learn from it. We must remain a 'aible activities is necessary to achieve
American foreign policy. Recommenda- people who confront our mistakes and this result.
tions on other issues which relate more resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, It is a very difficult problem with
s -
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rvorember 20, .197,7,1
which to wrestle. We might raise this
rhetorical question: At what point must
the people's right to know be subordi-
nated to the people's right to be secure,
to the extent. that an effective intelli-
gence-gathering capability can make
them secure?
Before turning to the results of our
investigation, I should like to say an-
other word concerning public, release of
the report. The President sent a letter
to every member of the select commit-
tee, asking that we not_make the report
public. His concern is not to conceal
from the public any activities of his ad-
ministration. Everything we looked into
occurred before this administration
came into office; so it is bemuse of no
concern with the President's own skin
that he made this requet of us. Rather,
he feels that public . release will cause
serious harm to the national interests
and would endanger certain individuals.
I fully understand and accord a great
deal of weight to the President's con-
cern.
The Preeident., in the concluding para-
graph of his letter, sharpened the com-
mittee's problem by stating:
I am sure the select committee will recog-
nize the enormous responsibility it has to see
to it that serious damage will not result to
the United States by the publication or this
report and will recognize also the duty
which I have to emphasize the disastrous
consequences which can occur by publica-
tion.
receiving the President's letter,
the committee has made---Fateat st-ficles
in accommodating most of his stated
elejection.s. In the few instals in which
ilaajantiu4e of the report :Fii-gift, have
:-revealed sensitive sources or methods,
the com.mittee has deleted entirely such
ref eren.ces.
The committee has always intended
to omit such references, and this con-
cern in that regard has been heightened
by the President's remarks. The dele-
tions were based on the judgment and
advice of a longtime CIA employee who
worked for several days with a member
of the staff in receiving the report.. This
expert also pointed out several places in
the report which may have unneces-
sarily -risked the life or livelihood of a
CIA employee or agent by divulging his
name. In each instance, we weighed the
risk fonnetential harm ttiTM individual
whlea?might result if his or-Tier name
were used. The committee then decided
wtilatoisdekte the name, to ProvitV
an alias, or to leave the individual's
iilithe repciet.
7m-iiir"fiTt=7ep or t itself: In gen-
eral, I believe the report fairly repre-
sents what happened. Some of the wit-
nesses, I personally believe, did not tell
the whole truth, and others concealed
what may be the truth. On the whole,
history should record this investigation
as an honest effort by a hard-working
committee.
The select committee, pursuait to Sen-
ate Resolution 21 and the necessity to
-:omplete the work begun by the Rocke-
'eller Commission, spent many long
nours over the last 8 months conducting
our investigation into the alleged as-
mssination efforts against foreign lead-
ers. As a matter of fad, we have been
so diligent in this activity that I suspect
that all 11 members of the committee
have allowed -some constituent business
to slide a bit. We May be rewarded for
that later.
One aspect of the plots which has be-
come clear to me is the historical con-
text of the times in which they occurred.
America in the post-war period was en-
gaged in a battle against the spreading
infection of communism in what have
been called the "back alleys of the world."
Soviet influence was increasing In the
emerging new nations that were former-
ly of colonial status. In the summer of
1960, shortly after the Congo gained its
independence from Belgium, Patrice Lu-
mumba threatened to invite the Soviets
into the hastened Belgian withdrawal.
When Fidel Castro came to power in
Cuba in 1959, his appearance was gen-
erally acclaimed, but it became increas-
ingly clear Over the next 12 months, as
Cuba signed a trade agreement with the
Soviets and then nationalized industries,
that Castro's presence and influence 90
miles off our shores constituted a clear
and present danger to the United States.
It is understandable, then, that as to
each target of assassination that this
committee Studied, we found that the
President of the United States viewed
those targeted with extreme hostility.
Commenting further on the-matter of
Cuba, and I shall not go into the assassi-
nation plots, because my distinguished
colleague from Idaho has already sum-
marized these, I would expand further,
however, on the Castro matter. The au-
thorization for the plots against Fidel
Castro appears to stem from a document
discovered by the CIA only last week
and delivered to the committee last Fri-
day evening while the staff was in the
process of proofreading the galleys of
the report.
This document makes it crystal clear
that Allen Dulles approved the thorough
consideration of the elimination of Fidel
Castro in December of 1959. Prior to the
receipt of that document, it had not been
entirely certain whether Allen Dulles ap-
proved or knew of the planning against
Castro. In light of that document, the
only question remaining is whether the
individuals who were directed to consider
the plan somehow exceeded Dulles' order
by contacting underworld figures. It is
my strong personal conclusion that the
CIA employees who received the order
from Dulles to plan for eliminating Cas-
tro need not have returned to him at
that point, even assuming that they did
not. In the highly disciplined CIA, I
would expect employees to go forward
with an order for consideration until
they came up with a plan which they
were confident would succeed.
After these many months of investiga-
tion. I concluded that in each of the cases
studied, assassination Was an improper
and reckless tactic, one which did not
serve our national interest. I concur in
the committee's recommendation that
there be legislation to outlaw further as-
sassination efforts against foreign
leaders.
My second and more general conclu-
sion is that by no means should any past
involvement in -;isassination- plots
versely reflect on the present CIA lead-,
ership or on the great number of its high;
ly disciplined, dedicated, and enormous-
ly- loyal employees. I sincerely hope thati
we have not placed the CIA or our other.
intelligence apparatus in a position which
would, in any way, erode or threaten our
necessary covert efforts or our highly1'
sophisticated and sensitive collection
methods.
As the chairman noted, the task be-
fore our committee has been difficult and}
carrying out these responsibilities ha4
been painful. We have worked diligently
in our efforts to provide the Senate al
liar
assassination
American people answers to the ar
assassination questions. I believe than
to the extent possible, this report pro
vides those answers.
Mr. President, I think I would be remiss
if I did not allude to the fact that the
report of the select committee whicn
the Senate is considering today is 'very
unique as to subject matter. But it. haa
something in common with most well-
prepared Senate documents. It would not
have been possible without the dedicated
_work of the staff. I think we have been
especially fortunate on the select com-
mittee in assembling a most able an
well-trained group of capable people ie
all levels of positions. The excellence in
our clerks, secretaries, researchers, an
professional staff members is exceede.
only by their willingness to work. lorn
long hours furthering the committee
investigative efforts and accomplishin
the formidable paperwork which accom
.panies a major investigation. In no are
of the committee's work have these quail
ties been more evident than during ti:
investigation of the various assassin,
tion allegations and in preparing the in
port submitted today.
I should like personally to thank ever
woman and man on our staff who Seer.
ficed personal time in order that the a,
jectives of Senate Resolution 21 coul.
be Met. The preparation of the repot
has been a bipartisan staff effort, and
know that I express the sentiment of a.
of my colleagues on the committee whe
I extend our appreciation to the entin
staff for a splendid and, perhaps, menu
mental piece of work.
? Mr. CHURCH. ejee. President, this re
port, as I earlier mentioned, is the me
port of your commiffee. The resolutioi
1...)y which the committee was ernpowere,
to undertake this investigation delegla(rei'
to the commtltee The authority to Issue
sal reports as, in the judgment of tee
coininittewarrantect. Zhis repot:.
bears the signatures ort-fie members oi
the co___,_minitlee, all- of whose sioxia.tures
eieepear ,i2-.-eTtf 'that of Puna? TIAR
on the Democratic sicfr-Wao was unable
to attend many of the hearings because
of his illness.
I should like, first, to lefer to Senator
HART, the ranking Demi ,cratic Member,
for any remarks he wou d like to make.
Then other members of the committee
may have some commen Is, after which
the floor will be open te general ques-
tions and debate.
- Senator HART, is there anything you
would care to say?
Mr. PHILIP A. H/ART. No; except to
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thank you and Senator Towaa and oth-se the senior Senator from Minnesota
ers for your kindness during that periocrironr 5 minutes.
and to indicate that my views, very brief,
. are found on page 297. In short, I feel
1 that I have been able to inhale enough of
. the testimony and participate in suffi-
cient of the discussion to support the
1 ? committee recommendations for a stat-
' ute explicitly prohibiting assassination
'? activity. I feel that I would be faking it
. if I signed a rePort indicating that I par-
ticipated in the authorship, or signed as
a regular participant.
Mr. CHURCH. I just want to say
how much we all appreciate the fact that
Senator HART is back with us again in
connection with our continuing work.
I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from
Tennessee.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, in my 9
years in the Senate, I have never under-
taken anything more difficult, more em-
barrassing, and potentially more darnag-
ing than this inquiry and investigation,
notwithstanding the others in which I
have participated. Even so, I think it
was essential that we go forward 'with
the inquiry, because I think that, having
. the suggestions made that there were, I
believe, irregularities in the intelligence
apparatus, it would be unconscionable
not to inquire into it.
I think both Senator CHURCH and Sen-
ator TOWER have done a magnificent job,
not only of administering the investiga-
1 Lion and the staff, but of maintaining a
' degree of equanimity and tranquility in
1 an emotionally charged and a potentially
political atmosphere.
I commend them and each member of
9 the committee as well as the staff for
keeping their cool.
I generally agree wtih the committee
report and with the observations by Sen-
ator Cirencir and Senator TOWER. I do
believe, however, that were we involved
in a trial of the facts before a jury in
the usual traditional way that a different
result might have obtained.
. I. rather expect that a scholarly and
responsible analysis of the facts does
indeed give us only one possible conclu-
sion, and that is we do not know whether
Presidents authorized or did not au-
thorize these assassination attempts.
There is no doubt that the attempts
occurred. But I think if we tested the
proof by the usilarFaxtroom standards,
tna is, the appearance and demeanor of
the witness while testifying, of his means
of knowledge, of his prior inconsistent
statements, of the possibility of involve-
meat, and inconsistencies while testi-
feing under cross-examination of the
witness , his means of knowledge, his
interest in the subject matter, if .any, I
think by observing the testimony as
well as hearing it, one woql_d_cuncluae?L_Is
I have concluded, -oh-bajance iLis mare_
likely that Preside/Its did knee:v._ jalq
i probalfly authorized the several activities
; tbanTeat teey did tiot.
It TS a -97,17-f cry from saying we have
I proved that. Rather I think it more likely
that diminishes the linage of the intelli-
gence community as an irresponsible ap-
paratus. I think it intensifies the need
! that we put in place a system of account-
ability for significant agency and Presi-
dential activities.
Mr. CCIURCH. Mr. President, I recogs
Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senator
very much.
I also wish to join the others in com-
mending our chairman and our vice
chairman for their work in -the devel-
opment of this historic report. -
In my opinion, we need a CIA; we
need the best intelligence-gathering
agency in the world, and we must make
certain that we continue to have it.
To have a CIA, it must operate in
secret. This is a very grievous conces-
sion for a democracy to make but one
which must be made if it is going to do
its work. -
What bothers me about what has been
developed in this report as that our in-
telligence operations are not only secret
but they have been unaccountable; as
we tried to sort through the facts of these
'allegations and pin down what hap-
pened, it came to be like trying to nail
jello to the wall..
Practically everything said in direct
testimony was contradicted by somebody
else. The documents often contradicted
one another or there were contradictions
in the same document..
As you read this report you will find
that running through the whole CIA and
the Government sthicture that was sup-
posed to control these very sensitive and
explosive matters was the doctrine of
plausible deniability, the theory that if
something was exposed everyone is re-
sponsibility ought to be in a position
to deny it.
I think you will see by the documents
that it does not work. It ends up with
a principle of implausible deniability.
We put our top officials in a position
where -they either ultimately have to ad-
mit responsibility for an operation or
worse they have to lie about it, as we did
in the U-2 incident, as we did initially
in the Bay of Pigs, and so on. It is a
theory that does not work. It is humiliat-
ing- and it undermines American confi-
dence in its own Government;
SO I would hope, as we consider this
report, we would see how we can
strengthen the CIA. Equally important
we must consider how we can also make
certain that from here on out should
there be questions about responsibility
for an operatien, the record, privately
and secretly, but clearly, disclose who did
it, why, and who is responsible.
Not only is this required because de-
mocracy must have that kind of ultimate
accountability but, I think it can help
increase the sobriety and restraint of
those making the decisions. I think there
is evidence in the report that many of
these steps were taken by people- rather
loosely and without mature considera-
tion?among other reasons, because they
did not think they would be blamed if
someone found out.
So both because our Constitution re-
quires it and, second, because we want
to make certain that our Government is
very careful when they do covert oper-
ations?and I hope we will prohibit much
of the sort of thing that is in this re-
port?I think it is important to nail
down on accountability system that can-
not he avoided.
A second point I would like to make
S 20629
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cone' the technique of assassination
itseirst of all, I think it is a very
dangerous tactic for Government leaders
to pursue. There is a statement in Mac-
beth about how inventions return to
plague the inventor. We do not know
what happened, but when we pursue a
strategy of assassinating foreign leaders,
I think we ought to concern ourselves
with the possibility that foreign leaders
might decide that if we are going to play
such a game against them they can play
it against us.
Now, it embarrasses me, with Senator
KENNEDY present?and it also is not an
accurate refleotion of the record?to say
that one of the things that disturbed me
the most in our investigation was to find
an interview by Prime Minister Castro 5
weeks before the tragic assasination of
President Kenedy in which he said just
that. He knew that the CIA was trying to.
assassinate him, and he said so publicly.
The second thing I would like to say
on this point is this: running through
practically every one of these attempts
by the CIA was an incredibly naive view
that somehow, with a couple of guns, a
couple of bucks -or a couple of lies, we
know no one could ever do to us, -
It never worked. We were never able to
kill anybody we tried to kill?that is the
first thing; and, moreover, there is no
evidence that if succeeded, it would not
be more harmful to us than leaving
things the way they were.
Third, it seemed to me there was never
any serious discussion about the overall
risks of what we were doing; what hap-
pened if the public heard about it, what
would be the results in that society, and
what would be the fundamental result -to
the integrity and moral authority of our
country in foreign affairs. Today, no mat-
ter what happens around the world, if
Faisal is killed, we did it. If there is
trouble in Portugal, we did it. We get
blamed for more things we do not do than
any country in the world, because we
have stuck our nose naively and foolishly
into too many people's businesses. And
almost always, it does not work. It kicks
back on us, and it hurts us more than
it can possibly help. But it seems those
questions were never asked.
So I would hope we would look at the
system of command and control over
overt operations. But I also hope we
would look at the question of how much
American can really influence the inter-
nal politics of another society in this
way.
Mr. President, the events described in
this report are in every sense a tragic
chapter in American history, Rather
than dwell on the report and its detailed
account of the assassination plots which
the Select Committee investigated, I
would rather dwell upon America's re-
sponse to this tragic story.
There are two basic response: to trag-
edy. One is to withdraw, to tune out, to
become self--absorbed and cyni ai. The
other, more difficult, response I; to ac-
cept the facts and then go forwt rd with
the changes that will help ? ass i re that
tragedy will not be repeated.
I believe that confronted w,th the
facts, the American people ha re the
strength and character to choose tae sec-
ond course. It is my hope that, through
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-Ra.:01{0?sEr. -ivovember 20, 197,:,
save
all the public outcry that this report will
rightly generate, the American people
will not lose sight of the important les-
sons to be learned. It is my conviction?
based on this report and the subsequent
work of the committee in the whole range
of intelligence activities?that major
changes are required in the way our Gov-
ernment conducts itself in this vital field
of national security. ?
Today I would like to focus briefly on
these changes.
The first step, as recommended in the
report, is to rule out assassination as an
instrument of U.S. foreign policy. War-
time obviously constitutes a different
sit-
uation, but in peacetime, there is no
place for assassination in our arsenal of
international policies and programs.
Nonetheless, if we are to continue to
have clandestine intelligence organiza-
tions?which I believe are necessary
given the current state of world affairs?
then we must take steps to insure that
these organizations strictly adhere to
policies, purposes and standards of the
American Government and the Ameri-
can people.
Two things are called for:
111.171er Te.viiietter struc-
tureuntaninty for clandestine ac-
Tieniee.
Second, we must adopt more mature
poritcies aoveming sudh" inteingeleacieene
era ions.
Accountability is the most important
issue. I am. prepared to accept that in-
telligence activities must be secret. But
I am not willing to further concede that
they can be unaccountable. I am con-
vinced that if we had an effective sys-
tem of accountability, the misguided ef-
forts outlined in this report would never
have been undertaken.
Much public discussion is likely to fo-
cus on whether the President knew and
approved of the assassination plots out-
lined in the committee's report. This is
an important issue and we have put for-
-ward all the relevant facts at our dis-
posal. But tbe real issue is that there
Is no system to hold the Government to
account in such matters. Instead we had
a system of deniability, where everyone
could avoid responsibility or claim higher
authority for their actions, or both.
Theoretically, the CIA reports to the
President. But in practice, the Agency
usually takes orders from a committee,
or from Presidential assistants, or acts
on its own authority. Committees, of
course, are a notorious way to avoid re-
sponsibility. And in some a.clminstrations,
there were up to a half-a-dozen Presi-
dential assistants purporting to speak
for the President. Even in those adminis-
trations where the line of command was
clear. Presidential assistants have not
been subject to congressional scrutiny.
Until the establishment of the Select
Committee, the CIA itself did not appar-
ently discuss the matters contained in
this assassination report with the then
duly-constituted congressional bodies.
This system is unacceptable in a de-
mocracy. It must change. To this end, I
propose that the following remedies be
given serious consideration. They seek to
provide a clear system of accountability
backed up by one of the most important
principles of our Founding Fathers?the
control of power through the process of
checks and balances.
There must be a clear chain of com-
mand. No longer should the CIA report
to a committee, or to a shifting group
of Presidential aides and advisers. More-
over, all Clandestine activities?intelli-
gence and counterintelligence, not just
covert actions?should be subject to re-
view in this chain of command.
The chain of command should in-
clude a Cabinet officer. The President is
too busy to monitor the intelligence com-
munity. The chief of intelligence cannot
do it himself; for he has too great a
self-interest. So there must be someone
between him and the President. Assist-
ants to the President should not do it, for
they are too insulated from congressional
oversight.
I have therefore concluded that it is a
Cabinet officer, be it the Secretary of
State or the Secretary of Defense, on
whom we must place the primary re-
sponsibility for policy review and opera-
tional accountability for our clandestine
intelligence activities.
he clas services the '`o sera-
tonal" part of the CIA I.
ifiro?a?separate aaencv with a Primary
mission _to cells -s.Tslenntealigence_
This is strong medicine, but I believe
it is essential to strengthen outside con-
trol over potentially dangerous and risky
clandestine activities. It would apply the
concept of checks and balances to the
Intelligence community. It would permit
intelligence analysts to make a more ob-
jective assessment of the activities of the
clandestine operators than if they live
under the same roof as they do today?
an arrangement by which the operators
have inevitably bested the analysts.
The effectiveness of congressional
oversight would also be strengthened.
There is no question but that we can
keep closer tabs on clandestine activities
if they are not insulated from over-
sight by being mixed in with an agency
that has a vast array of other programs
and personnel running technical collec-
tion projects and producing various
forms of intelligence.
Moreover, we are likely to produce bet-
ter intelligence by moving the clandes-
tine service out of CIA. This would free
CIA analysts of any obligation to rely
more on their clandestine services than
on other vital sources of intelligence such
as NSA, State and Defense.
Finally, we must establish a system of
effective congressional oversight. The
Select Committee staff has been develop-
ing proposed legislation to that end,
which the committee will turn to shortly.
We must of course have no illusion
that structural changes alone will solve
e sery problem. They cannot provide 100-
percent assurance against future abuse.
While we must be realistic about-what
wr can accomplish through legislation,
ws must avoid the cynicism which says
th it Government is inherently had, that
no ;hing can be done about it, and that
all we can do is hope for better human
nature. I believe that something can be
dor e; that something must be done. And
II
_
hope that the changes I have outlined
will be given the most serious considera-
tion.
In addition, however, we need to make
some changes in our outlook. The Amer-
ican people are determined not to be the
world's policeman, prepared to intervene
with military force in every corner of the
globe. We must not substitute the equally
fallacious and naive idea that we can
change the course of history with a cou-
pie of bucks, a couple of lies, or a couple
of guns.
As we face the challenges of the next
quarter of this century, we should keep
in mind an important lesson which ap-
plies to every aspect of life and human
endeavor. We should do those things that
we do best; those things that we are -
equipped to do. The brightest chapters
of American international involvement
in peacetime are the constructive epi-
sodes?the Marshall plan, NATO, the
Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress?
and the darkest chapters are those when
we thought we could beat the totalitar-
ians at their own game.
In facing the unpleasant facts of the
assassination report, America must also
face the more encouraging fact that we
are just not very good at that sort of
thing.
. The idea that this kind of business can
be kept secret, and therefore cost free,
has proven to be an illusion. The dirty
secrets Inevitably come out and America
ends up paying more, once these dee-dh.
are revealed, than it ever could have
achieved by their success..
Mr. President, I am hopeful and con -
fident that America will learn the lesson,
of this report. I believe that we can
modify our intelligence institutions to
make them accountable to the Cons rese
and the American people and prevent,
further abuses of this sort. In the end,
van confident that America will be
strengthened by once again learning the
lesson that our Government must be true
to the American character and to our
basic values.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield a
minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. GOLDWAreast. Mr. President, be.
fore Tread the paper I prepared I woulo
like to concur in what Senator BAKER ha,
said and what Senator MoNnsnE
touched on by this statement: I askee
two different top men of the CIA if they
would lie to protect the Presidency, an
they both said they would. I think w
have to accept that determination on
their part as an obstacle over which we
probably can never crawl.
I believe that theennislientannn. a an in-
terim report on assassinations is an ac-
t-tones which the-S-enajaasiell_nonme to regret..
While I have added my signature to
the report, it is purely an act of gratitude
for the hard work done by the committee
and the staff.
My own views on this whole subject
matter are appended to the report.
Now, strong arguments can be made
for the public's right to know. And, in
general, I fully support the principle that I
Americans must know and need to know
about their Government.
But ile,ditioenaesellynansle_apinas, iaack to
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the founding of this Re )ublic certain But, the fact that substantial damage
iiiarzeim ave been exciutd from
Ceneraf re=ciple, qrand-Jury nropecesE
iflis cot71earriple. The conduct nLin-
tellieence operations and methods is
anc tiler example.
-In one way or another the United
States has been involved in intelligence
activities beginning with the Revolution-
ary War. By tradition common to all
nations our intelligence operations have
been shrouded in secrecy.
It is inconceivable to me that any of
our allies would publish the kind of re-
port we propose to release today; and
let us remember that some of them hold
to democratic principles just as dearly
as we do.
There are several questions I believe
the Senatorsshould ask themselves as
We ponder the question of releasing an
intteien report on _assuesinatiouse
it will answer? I believe answer is_
"First. Will it raise more _questions than
"Yes."
Will the reputation of great
Americans be damaged? -behe-c76:15-3
answer is "Yes."
Three. vora serve any_p_ubfic
este iiTaTr'NZT
-Trolif:WETTI serve any legislative j?ux-
po se :) IThay "No.'
---FIVCITS-the-benefits of publishing met-
weigh-flie-liazaras EinphaficallVrsay
- -Tr
Wfifie there may be some possibility
that classified information will be re-
vealed through the publication of this
report, I believe a sincere and deter-
mined effort has been made to prevent
such an occurrence.
3:y1m _augsjin is the diplomatic
damage this documenr" ma do
country. It is difficult o preeict the re-
aZadirs of our friends and enemies
abroad, but I believe it will be generally
unfavorable to our interests.
In fact, a few weeks ago, in visiting
the headquarters of NATO, this whole
subject was the major subject of dis-
cussion between our eommanders there
and the commanders of our allies.
Cooperation by foreign governments
wich- our diplanalfe and interir,--geriCe
SZ'eices T-s to r large extent based on
intituar confildF?nce. Where-intelligence
opTei'aTiFiris are involved, assurances Cif
s-eCreey provfde a flow of Itifeemation-.-a
ow-that, s7cipS-7,_ theiT seercry agreements
are iTioiead. --
-,lallfirrhuteation of thlets renort will
certainly have one bad eYe-ct; It will
m fe 17:more coeficulrfor fbragen govern-
717-1i7-67.TilTeirrelYTO-r-eiiTiTdinfe'firf-o-a-
eeetteiFeST-65.if f-Hter into c-onTricTeTitial
eTiis with- tife
A til?F?-;STi-v-vi_ ire',Ta will be respeaa-NrahTer
die information received by the wEele-C1
Con-aWEtee fla-ta -W.Er7,-Iiito the initearti-re:
port was gaTEed in oTher years from
seilli-V were given promises of coat-
dentia lee and in some -cmifances protec-
ti-Zen..
I ha ;ten to add that the substantial
dame ee that has been done to our Intel-
beence services is not the result of ac-
tions by Congress. We all know the story.
Much o.' what has appeared In the press
was released by persons who had some
political or personal grievances.
has already been done is no reason to
throw another log on the bonfire.
Part of the problem we are facing
comes from the determination of recent
Congresses to assert authority over for-
eign policy. The meddling with Jewish
immigration from Russia and the med-
dling in the Greek-Turkish conflict over
Cyprus are two examples--and two ex-
amples where the effects were bad. I
could cite more.
I believe it is impossible for the Con-
gress to try to influence the day-to-day
decisions in foreign policy. Moreover, I
believe the President and his agents must
have the primary role in our relations
with other countries..
In other words, the Congress is at-
tempting to do something which has
failed in the past. One of the weak-
nesses in the Articles of Confederation
was the lack of executive authority in
foreign policy.
In the aftermath of World War I, the
Senate injected itself into the postwar
settlement with considerable damage
done for the long-range interests of
America. Notably, was the failure to join
the League of Nations, which signaled
that America had retreated into isola-
tionism.
I believe that Congress does have rights
and obligations in the conduct of foreign
policy. They derive from article II, sec-
tion 2 of the Constitution e What we are
talking about is the broad area of gen-
eral policy decisions through the treaty
making process.
For the most part Presidents have
submitted important _policy decisions to
the Congress. The creation of NATO and
of the Marshall plan are examples of
how the President and the Congress have
shared important policy decisions. And,
here are two examples where the Nation
and the free world benefited beyond
measure.
Mr. President, one more minute or two
Is all right.
Turning to the subject of abuses, I
believe we know the story of where re-
cent administrations strayed away from
the law. If laws have been violated, then
let us return indictments, and let the
courts do their job.
The wholesale foraging of the Con-
gl.'esa-Tago-Tire---anztas---or-feeeTlinTare-k
ariil the intellrgence serVICes diI?IfWljICh
It d?rx life- COM-
fort to our opponeriles and to embarrass
our frfacTS.
- ? "Our reputation absrecie.1 ne Lee-thee-teed
bye-eeclacie Cif-public self-flagellafion.
Most of our alliT-1 are dumfounded, In-
('i featrais7a, fia7; ?_q-C1 by -Ellg we are.
eloffig.
-TTel us get on with the job of remedial
legislation where needed.
Let us not tell the world we are re-
treating into isolationism.
meet_ important let us eet our intel-
ligence _services out orfifFElece lighth,
because those-rigTitsThlinc ? ern at a
ieerfeI,e-afib-ff'ellf[lir7Flrr-fTtnerOVe.
cffil-,cfrr---A,rf:- terarcteTit I rec-
ognize Senator HUDDL2STON for 5 min-
utes.
Mr. IIUDDLESTON. I thank the chair-
man.
S2031
First of all, I express My appreciation
to the chairman and the vice chairman
of our committee and the entire staff. I
think the leadership they have given to
this very important work has been ex-
emplary in every aspect of the word
and has contributed to the success the
committee has had to date- in dealing
with these very difficult and complex
problems. ?
Mr. President,. the Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities is today
releasing its first-and One of its. princi-
pal-reports.
It is, therefore, a proper and fitting
time for us to pause to reflect on the
duties and responsibilities of the U.S. in-
telligence community and of this con-
gressional committee and to bring the
focus on this report and the committee's
activities into perspective.
There have been, since this investi-
gation was initiated, fears by those who
believed legitimate ? and necessary intel-
ligence activities would be undermined
and those who believed that a coverup of
Improper activities and policies was like-
ly. I believe that our committee has prov-
en that those on both the outer edges of -
the spectrum were incorrect. I believe
that we have proven that we can study,
even Investigate, without impairing nec-
essary operations and without blinding
'ourselves to questionable activities, which
may have gone beyond authority granted,
legal norms, or simple propriety.
But, Without a doubt, the greatest dis-
service we can do to our intelligence ap-
paratus, our investigation, our Nation, or
ourselves is to ,view these activities out
of the context in which they exist and
which, to a great extent, has formed
them. For me, the danger of any imbal-
ance, of any misunderstanding, of any
misrepresentation, lies in three areas we
should all be aware of. It lies, I believe,
In, first, a discounting of the threats to
U.S. security which do exist; second, a
'pretension that ill-advised actions and
policies have not taken place; or third,
allowing sensational and isolated
events-especially those events occurring
In other times, other places, other at-
mospheres-to be viewed outside the
context in which they had their being.
Fire is comfort or danger, depending on
Its nature and the circumstances. So, tete
are intelligence activities. The key lies
in protecting the features which provide
comfort and preventing those which raise
danger.
Intelligence activities do- not today-
and never have-existed in a vacuum. It
is, I believe, important to remember that
modern U.S. intelligence activities were
an outgrowth of the attack on Pearl Har-
bor more than 30 years ago. There had
been a number of warning s:.gris that
hostilities could be -expected, but the
available information was not properly
analyzed and evaluated--and ii, there-
fore, was not translated into pee icy. U.S.
intelligence activities were furd-ter nur-
tured in post World War n Europe,
where a confrontation between East and
West became the modus operate U. And,
with time, as American in le rests-
whether for good or for bads whether in-
evitable or avoidable-., nread through-
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'NS
out the world, so too did U.S. intelligence
efforts.
As the years have passed, the direct
and obvious relations between intelli-
gence and national security have perhaps
been obscured. A softening in the chal-
lenge atmosphere of previous decades
and a diminishing threat of military
confrontation in Europe have suggested
to many that the cold war has indeed
become history. As Berlin walls have
given way to detente, Sputniks to joint
space ventures and Czechoslevakias to
security conferences, the events and de-
velopments which once reminded us of
security needs have been clouded.
This does not mean, however, that
they have ceased to exist. Today, inter-
ests continue to vary among nations. One
need only look at recent debates within
the United Nations to see how far and
deep the divisions run. One need only fol-
low the arms sales throughout the world
and the probable impending enlargement
of the nuclear community to understand
how fragile peace and security really are.
One need only review the recent history
of the Middle Fest to know that, despite
some rays of light, the -stages for con-
frontations- are still set. One need only
examine the very complex shifts in world
-economic power to realize that challenges
to peace and economic well-being will
arise in many new forms in the years
ahead. One need only refer -lb scholars'
speculations about the Soviet Union after
Erezhnev or Yugoslavia after '171tce to un-
derstand that the world is still not the
safe haven we wish it would be. One need
only read the press speculations about
SALT violations to recall that some of
our security blocks are agreements,
which are subject to abrogation and
breach.
The threats remain. The conflicts
among those who share this planet are
still there. That they may look?and in-
trinsically be?different from the way
they were, in the late 1940's, the 1950's,
an.d even the 1960'a, does not signal their
demise. Forms can change but basic real-
ities remain. And out of this conies two
lessons: The need for a strong, effective
Intelligence community continues, and
methods and policies of the past may be
creatures of their own time and place.
While today's interim report of the
select committee details the kind of sen-
sational, spectacular, and even bizarre
activities that always grab the headlines,
It is important to remember that intelli-
gence operations are more than dreams
and fancies pursued by modern-day ad-
venturers. They are much more than
groups of ill-advised men and women
stirring a witches brew of plots and
counterplots and manipulating foreign
nations and peoples, as many detractors
of the intelligence community would have
us believe. These situations are the ex-
ception, not the rule. They are the few
instances where the bounds of authority
and propriety have been clearly over-
stepped. They need correction. But, the
larger number of persons in the intelli-
gence community are inVolved in legiti-
mate activities, taken under proper com-
mand and control?honest men and
women pursuing a job which few will
ever know about or appreciate and yet
which is a cornerstone to much of our
Nation's security. As such they need, de-
serve?and must know they have?the
firm backing of those they work to pro-
tect. And, they are certainly entitled to
clearly defined authority and guidelines
clearly enunciated by the Nation's policy-
makers.
Thus, in approaching the committee's
work, I have tried constantly to keep
in mind these few principles?my work
on the committee has only underscored
my belief in them?my commitment to
a strong, efficient, well-organized intelli-
gence community as an essential of our
national security, my concern that in-
telligence agencies be put above the level
of suspicion raised by many reports and
the belief that we must constantly strive
to keep the information available and
our activities in proper perspective.
As we begin with the report before us
today, I hope my colleagues will think
about these principles and their relation
to our considerations.
EVOLVEMENT Or ASSASSINATION REPORT
To properly appraise the significance
Of the committee's Interim Report on
"Alleged Assassination Plots Involving
Foreign Leaders" we must look at the
genesis of the report. The enabling reso-
lution, Senate Resolution 21, instructs
the committee to investigate and report
on the full gamut of governmental in-
telligence activities and the extent, if any,
to which such activities were "illegal,
Improper, or unethical." Moreover, in ad-
dition to that general mandate, the com-
mittee was and remains bound to investi-
gate, study, and make legislative rec-
ommendations.
? Senate Resolution 21, for example, re-
quires the committee to study and inves-
tigate the following: .
The extent and necessity of . covert in,.
telligence activities . . abroad;
(The) nature and extent of executive
branch oversight of all United States In-
telligence activities;
The need for improved, strengthened, Or
Consolidated oversight of United States in-
telligence activities by the Congress .
During the course of the inquiry of
'the Presidentially appointed Rockefeller
Commission into improper domestic ac-
tivities of the CIA, allegations surfaced
concerning assassination activity by the
agency on behalf of the U.S. Government.
That panel conducted interviews and re-
viewed documents, and it filed with the
President a separate, classified report on
the various assassination plots pursuant
to information provided to it by. the CIA
in the form, basically of the 1967 Inspec-
tor General's report. That Commission's
report was not and never has been made
public. At the direction of the President,
however, the Commission delivered to the
select committee what work it had com-
pleted, along with documents relating
to assassination.
? The committee then proceeded to con-
duct an exhaustive investigation. Liter-
ally thousands of documents were read,
hundreds of witnesses were interviewed,
and thousands of pages of testimony were
taken under oath in executive session to
determine both the truth of the allega-
tions and under what authority such ac-
tions, if true, were conducted. The corn-
3 Pt
Irgmber 20, 1975
xnittee, in an effcsrk to be fair to the
agency and to the Individuals involved,
hying and dead, and hopefully to resolve
the questions concerning authority and
command and control followed every
lead, requested every relevant document,
and interviewed every available witness.
It is important to note that as a result of
such an indepth look at this single issue
of assassination we gleaned valuable in-
formation that will be applicable to our
broader investigation of the intelligence
community. For example, we have re-
ceived documents of the various National
security council, special group, special
group?augmented, 303 committee, and
40 meetings. Thus, we have been privy
to the documents of the decisionmaking
mechanisms in the executive branch
which deal with covert actions of vari-
ous types. We have seen the problems in
that decisionmaking process, the dilem-
mas, and pitfalls.
- Our exhaustive look into "Operation
Mongoose," the anti-Castro covert action
program in the post-Bay of Pigs era,
readily demonstrates the importance
which our assassination investigation
served. The totality of the documents
and testimony concerning that operation
provided a substantial background for
the consideration of other instances of
covert action.
IMPORTANCE OP REPORT -
It is certainly true that the assassi-
nation issue is not only one of the more
sensational of those covered, but prob-
ably also the most unpalatable to the
American people and to the world. But
its sensational and unsavory nature does
not mean that it can or should be
avoided. In fact, it is,- perhaps, particu-
larly important that these matters bt
reviewed in an open and objective man-
ner and be placed in proper perspective.
Ignoring the issues could only have
fueled the fires of'speculation and innu-
endo. It could only have provided those
with qualms about the agency with addi-
tional reason to charge "coverup." The
far better approach, I believe, is this re-
port which has been worked on by all
members of the committee and which
seeks to bring the very important ele-
ments of knowledge and perspective to
the events of a time when U.S. foreign
policy and the U.S. role in the world were
perceived quite differently from the way
they are today.
At the same time, the report is im-
portant because, as I suggested earlier,
It: raises many of the more general issues
regarding intelligence activities. It raises
'questions of propriety regarding policy.
This is, of course, an extremely difficult
area with which to deal. One man's
morals are not another's. What is per-
missible in war and confrontation may
not be permissible in peace. Considera-
tion of such issues readily lends itself to
plot s oratory and rhetoric which contrib-
ute little to a true understanding of the
corn olex and comprehensive issues in-
volv et I think there could be little de-
bate over the statement that assassina-
tion of foreign leaders is not a policy of
the lf.S. Government. It is not. It should
not 1 e. But, to wax oratorically on that,
to th exclusion of other considerations,
is to place the issue out of context.
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eiggi646(5PbtAkkteGOROP-7.81Miag20,000100040001-2 S 20633
IbelOof the kind of activities detailed in this coined in the Federalist Papers and
e report, the records of the Federal Convention,
s I believe further that the legislative that the President was to be held re-
c response is much more likely to be ap- sponsible when he failed to superintend
- propriate if both Congress and the people his subordinates. Moreover, superim-
i are informed of the nature and extent of posed upon this more particular stand-
e - the problems.
ard wire his constitutional duty to take
The findings of the committee repre- care that the laws be faithfully executed.
sent a distillation of all the evidence, Thus, whatever else may be said on the
- both documentary and testimonial, com- question of authorization, the various
Piled by this committee on this highly Presidents involved in the time frame of
- sensitive Issue. We deplore the-use of as- these plots should have known about
t sassination as an instrument of either them if, in fact, they did not. It is such
official or unofficial U.S. policy. Having accountability that supports the fragile
said that, however, I must hasten to add underpinnings of a democracy. This
that it was not and As not the task of this conclusion is clearly supported in terms
committee to assess blame for these acts, of the constitutional history and frame-
Our investigation into this one area was work within which these tragic events-
not conducted as a trial. Our objective occurred.
has been to ascertain what occurred, how But, as I have said, it is for each reader
it occurred, why it occurred, under what of the report to decide for himself where
authority it occurred, and how the decd. responsibility rests. Our task now is to
sions were arrived at. assume the burden. of oversight and act
There is no doubt, as the report clearly where we may have failed to act in the
details, that agents of the U.S. Govern- Pas
ment plotted the assassination of foreign We have an old saying in my State
leaders and in some cases direct action that "it ain't what you don't know that
was taken to carry out the plots, hurts you; it is what you know that
The evidence does not show that any ain't so that gets you into trouble." I
foreign leader was actually slain as a think from reading reports around the
result of these plots, country and the world a lot of people
And, unfortunately, the evidence also know a lot of things that "ain't so" about
Is not conclusive as to the question of ori- the United States and our intelligence
gin or authority and to what extent, if gathering operations. I believe the no-
any, Presidents participated or had lease of this report will help dispel some
knowledge of the plots themselves or the of those misconceptions.
actions to carry them out. I decided to su rt the r
It is not happenstance that this is the eeyeer?.eanlz.afterebeing fuleyeesenyineedetei
case. The doctrine of plausible deniabil- my own mind that the releaSe would do
ity, the practice of circumlocutory re- suliZantiarrn
ports, and oral-only accounts of official gaffiering oreeralle-rai1taate
meetings have effectively confounded all thar-7-I might sueeteleyelayeetaelthefree
efforts to piece together the complete and the committee members of the
accurate story after the passing years, genee_zathering organiztforis who haye
as indeed they were probably Intended testified that thisektne theew.ork
of
to do. That is part of the system as it EF,Qs,c-iiTtnittee, the information that has
operated that cries for correction. been obrailiett?ra-S?CatiSetr no?serious
What Presidents knew and what part pFablem. -TriTereTtetiZrarsratie-piissie
they played in these matters is left to t'aTi-CTe?Where' one ageTiFthat they might
the inference of each reader of the re- haVei" te"- get- ffra:dislC.17..tio
t t
port. The available evidence is there, become part o r &Joao -0 e
f?c-pu 'op ? n n that
Whatever view is taken on that issue, the the?iiirrir-nre-,02_11:53-6:i.
system by which CIA actions in this Wile en ; ey would havetgotteniallneor
area of inquiry were supposed to be no
Beyond . the propriety question, the
are the questions of what intelligene
policies are proper, how such policie
should be- determined in a democrati
society, what command and control ar
rangements exist or should exist botl
within an intelligence agency and ahoy,
it, what the role of covert activities ir
intelligence work is, what standard
should overlay our entire intelligence ef
forts, and what degree of direction and
,supervision should be assumed by Con
'gross. These are not easily answered, bu
the information which we-have gathered
as part of the assassination study should
lend understanding to them, and it cer-
tainly underscores the necessity for
clearer determinations of policy as early
as possible.
COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS
The committee has, of course, con-
ducted all of its proceedings concerning
the subject of this report in executive
session. This was done out of a unmet-
! mom understnding and appreciation of
the need to be responsible in our method.
We have had access to the most sensitive
, information which nations can possess.
We heard from individuals whose very
lives were in the balance because of their
past involvement in these activities. All
of the members of the committee felt a
deep sense e of personal responsibility for
. the actions of the committee and, on the
whole, we met that challenge by estab-
lishing what I consider to be a remark-
? able record of security during our delib-
erations. Each member exercised great
restraint considering the length and
depth of the proceedings on this issue.
For security reasons., some information
must remain secret. But, because of the
attention given to the issue and the ques-
tions raised, a report to the American
people seems essential to overcome any
brooding shadows which may remain. We
would not have served our citizenry well
- had we left them totally in the dark on
these activities. I decided to support; re-
lease of the report, however, only after
assuring myself that such release would
1 in no way impair our national security.
The committee has engaged in long and
) deliberate consultation with the various
7 agencies who are referenced in the re-
./ port in order to come to agreement; on
what had to be deleted to avoid harming
legitimate intelligence activities' of an
ongoing nature. These negotiations have
led to massive deletions from the original
text .hi an effort to accommodate the
needs of intelligence with the needs of
the public.
In concluding that American citizens
should be advised to the fullest extent
possible of the activities of its Govern-
ment full consideration was given to the
probability that the revelation of these
activities most likely will be embarrassing
' to our country. Great care was given to
differentiate between embarrassment and
real harm to national security.
It is my judgment that our Country is
great enough and our people hearty
enough to sustain embarrassment when
such is called for. And perhaps the em-
barrassment itself will provide us with
the necessary incentive to take swift and.
decisive action to prevent the recurrence
supervised and controlled was grossly So we are not engaging here, in my
inadequate. Agency officials have testi- ? Judgment, in. any exercise that is going
fled that on occasion they failed to fully to cause serious harm to the security of
or adequately disclose to both Directors ow* country.
of Central Intelligence and to officials We are, of course., fully aware of the
above the agency the exact nature of Probability. that the release of this re-
their actions. Conversely, this approach pert would cause some embarrassment
to "briefing" both directors and respon- to the United States. We have taken that
sible officials at high levels of the execu- into full consideration. We have been
tive branch was, in part, precipitated by very careful to delineate between cm
the subtle indications .of those higher barrassment and real harm. I personally
officials that they wanted to be kept in- think that our country is strong enough'
striated from certain "activities," so that and our people are hardy enough that
they could plausibly deny knowledge, we can accept embarrassment when such
Is called for. It just might be that that
very embarrassment will provide the in-
centive, the spur that we need, in order
to take the kind of decisive and swift
ateigate and the formal imptachment action that, is necessary to provide th.e
proceeding?ha,ve focused on the stand- legislative framework to prevent these
ard of Presidential responsibility re- things from recurring.
quired in areas involving the actions of As has already been pointed out, we
subordinates. Indeed, during both of the did not conduct the hearings as a court_
above investigations frequent reference It was not our objective to attempt to
was made to the Madisonian precept, fix blame. We simply trierlto find out
As the committee notes, blame not-
withstanding, the responsibility for the
plats must lie with the Presieents. Re-
cent inVestigations by the Congress?
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ONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENA,,,,X November 20, 1075
what occurred, when it occurred, why it
occurred, how it occurred, and how the
decisions were arrived at that initiated
this action.
The evidence, of course, is not con-
elusive in every respect.
There can be no doubt that this coun-
try was involved in plots and attempts
to assassinate foreign leaders. There can
be no doubt that in at least-two instances.
plans were put into effect to carry out
these plots by our own agents.
The question of what Presidents knew,
to what extent they participated, is left
unclear and is left to the inference of
each reader of this report as to where
that responsibility is.
But I believe the report is correct, and
the findings- of the committee are cor-
rect, when they say that the -final re-
sponsibility must rest with the Presi-
dents.
Our responsibility now is to proceed
to our own oversight burdens, and the
burden. of providing the kind of- legis-
lativetframework that is necessary in
order-to make sure that our-intelligence-
gathering operations can-operate in the
very- efficient manner that is necessary
but stay within the bounds .of what a
free and democratic society demands.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I yield 5
minutes to. the- Senator from Maryland.
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Texas- for yielding me
this -time--------
-
1. believe that the painful story that
has unfolded in the factual record which
is now on the desks of Senators can, In
fact, be the source of some important
lessons-for the future.
Very briefly, I would suggest that these
included some new insight into the cor-
rosive effects of the exercise of great
power in excessive secrecy without those
checks and balances that are designed
to . guard liberty and- to protect, our
values. ?
Second; I -would_ suggest that it poses
the necessity .for Congress to determine-
the proper role of intelligence- agencies
within the constitutional system of Gov-
ernment.'
Finally, that it poses the need for a'
new, comprehensive statutory charter
for all of the intelligence agencies.
I think viewed in this perspective we
can see that the publication a the report
does have a clear legislative purpose, for
the proposal of that charter for all in-
telligence agencies is the most -useful
work that the select committee can sic-
complisie I think it Is the basic Justifi-
cation for the existence of the commit-
tee. I believe we are going to-have to work
very, very hard in the next 3 months to
ful nu that purpose.
But the legislative purpose is also
served by the mere factual record which
is set forth -as a part of this report.
In the course of this examination and
this irieestigation, as Senators have
heard, we have examined witnesses, we
have examined many documents. I be-
lieve constitutional government requires
more than rhetoric. It requires some ren-
dering of accounts, accountability. That
is really the definition of this report.
On the question of publication, I would
refer you again to James Madison. He
said that knowledge will forever govern
ignorance and people who mean to be
their own governors must arm them-
selves with the power which knowledge
Is.
I believe Madison there spells out a
duty which is the very essence of democ-
racy.
This is a darker side of life, a darker
side of Government, centained in this
report, but life presents us sometimes
with hard and difficult jobs. If we are to
prevent further erosion and rot we have
to face tip to the facts as we have found
them to be.
Much of what Senators will End he this
teport is, of course, inconclusive. There
ought to be no- illusions that even the
work done by the Members of the com-
mittee and by the very efficient and effec-
tive staff that we have gathered gives us
any more than some oblique insight into
the destructive effect of excessive secrecy
on the practice of Government. There-is
much more here that is of concern to the
Congress: Attempts to pervert the press;
attempts to invade the literary and aca-
demic Worlds. If. the _Congress is con-
cerned about these subjects, it is going to
have to stiffen its backbone to consider
what was the job to be done in these
areas.
. Our purpose here was not -to damage-
the intelligence services or injure the rep-
utations of past administrations, What
we were trying to do and are trying to do
is to stop the erosion of society's values
caused by excessive secrecy and by un-
checked executive power by making this
tecord just as factual and accurate as
possible.
These assassination plots are, of
course, profoundly . disturbing. But I
think we have to recognize they are not
unique. They are a repetition of many
stories that are familiar in history. I be-
lieve they are disturbing because they
represent a step backward. History has,
In fact, often witnessed the practice of
assassination as an instrument to prac-
tice or to terminate political power, and
history also shows that men and govern-
ments have come to recognize the com-
pelling force of ethical principles.
Over that far doorway is the motto'
novous ordo seclorum, a new order of the
ages.- But the etory that is unfolded in
this document is not the story of a new
order for the ages. It is the old order, the
order that we thought we had abandoned
in establishing this Government.
When practiced against a domestic
leader, essessination is common murder.
When practiced against a foreign leader,
assassination is an act of war without
even the sorry sanction that war gives to
the taking of human life.
I think there can be no place in a
world that is striving toi lard civilization
for either practicing or condoning assas-
sinations. I think that pr nciples are im-
personal?if they are rigl t for the weak,
they ought to be right ft r the strong?
and that moral strength s more endur-
ing than power.
If nations will be guide- by these con-
cepts, I think they caneavc id some of the
lessons of history, that a contrary course
brings tragedy not only to the victim of
the assassination but to tie assassin as
well. I believe that nothing that is in
these pages will be found to contradict
the lessons that mankind ought to have
learned, that you cannot practice this
kind of policy, without very grave conse-
quences.
The question has been raised here, and
I arn sure will be raised in many places,
as to whether there will not be grave-
damage to our country's name in the eyes
of our friends abroad and our friends
around-the world. I think that we will
In fact strengthen our country's reputa-
tion by making known our efforts at
self-correction, and by our adherence to
the traditional values and' beliefs that
the world associates with Americas I
think that by doing that, we can insure
that America keeps its place as a beacon
to which men everywhere may look as
the best hope for representative democ-,
racy On the globe.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
STONE) . Who yields time?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished Senator from North Cam-
line.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President and gen-
tlemen of the Senate: I join with what
has already been said by my colleagues,
and especially with regard to the objec-
tivity of the committee and the diligence
of the committee. I think if you read this
report carefully, you will find the sub-
stance of some 11,000 or 12,000 pages of
testimony set forth in a very objective
manner.
At the end of the report, On pages 299,
300, and 301, are set forth three pages of
additional views which I have tried to-
prepare very carefully. I,ask unanimous
consent that those three pages be printed
in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the addi-
tional views of Senator MORGAN were
ordered to be printed in the Recoare as
follows: .
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SK.NATOR ROBERT Moacits4
. Our Nation needs a strong, secure, and ef-
fective intelligence community. Our memory
of Pearl Harbor and testimony taken in hear-
ings with regard to that catastrophe as well
as testimony taken during these hearings
clearly establish the need for a central intel-
ligence- agency to coordinate the intelligence
gathered by our various agencies of Govern-
ment. If the United States had had a co-
ordinating intelligence agency in 1941, the-
disaster at Pearl Harbor would, in my opin-
ion, have been averted. That we have now,
and continue to have, such an agency is es-
sential if we are to avert any future threats
to our national security. Our national secur-
ity is, after all else, of paramount import-
ance.
We must recognize, however, that our
national, security can be subverted by over-
zealous governmental action as well as an
domestic or foreign agents. Our Na-
tion cannot remain intact if we ourselves
subvert our own ideals; consequetitly, it Is as
Important for our government, to abide by
them. In the words of I.1.3. Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis:
i"Decency, security, and liberty alike de-
mand that governmental officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct as
'the citizen. In a government of laws, exIst-
ence of the government will be imperiled If
It fails t,o observe the law scrupulously. Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for Ill, it teaches the
whole .people by its exarriple. If the govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con-
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, tempt for the laws it invites every man lobe- *teeither authority, even though this Commit-
come a lave unto himself; it invites. anarchy.
To declare in. the adenhais.tration of la
democracy suelr as eursj the end justifies the
means would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine, ?-[wel. re-
solutely set four] face." - ?
It Is argued, and.in many cases justifiably
so, that in dealing with our national secur-
ity, and, especially with hostile or adversary
forces abroad, extraordinary means are neces-
sary. So long as the Soviets maintain HOB
agents around the World, we must maintain
an effective intelligence gathering capability.
However, this report deals with a particular
activity of the government, which in, the
absence or armed conflict, would, if true,
shock the conscience and morals -of most
Americans. That this investigation was neces-
sary was unfortunate, but it was nracle so
by the broadly circulated and printed re-
parte of alleged. assassination plots,: some of
which were given, credence by public state-
ments by various officials.. It was my belief, in
the beginning, end still is, 'that it would. be
far better to ascertain, the truth as far as pos-
sible, and clear the airs to the .end that our
intelligence agencies Could get back to their
assigned, taska . .
I have weighed in my own mind for many
days and nights how much of the informa-
tion contained in this report should 'be made
available, to the American public- and thus to
the world, 'Including our potential adver-
saries. That the public, has a right to know
le incontrovertible, but whether that right
extends to -information-which could damage'
-our: 1.-rnage and national- security is not. so
e wily deternani:ed.:?10,, '.0.tiStactory roi. the
Members of the -Congress .t the dilly -eleeted
representatives of the people, to hold such
Information. in, trust for the people2 In some
cases of national security the answer can
. and must be "yes", and in the future, such
Information must be held' by competent and
aggressive oversight' committees.
In the present situation too. much Water
has gone.nver-the dam for such secrecy and
to refuse- to make as full and complete a 'dis-
closure as is consistent with the safety end
protection of our present intelligence per-
son'nel would only add to the intrigue, and
the issue could not be put to rest. So though
I have in some instances voted with ? some
of my colleagues to-retain much information
in executive session, I have concurred with
the issuance of this report after being assured
that the release of it would not violate any
law with regard be classified matter and after
the respective agencies have had. another
chance to recommend aeclusitin of extremely
Sensitive matters,
Throughout the hearings one issue has re-
mained paramount in my mind. If the alleged
acts happened, were they the result of over-
curious, over-zealous intelligence agents who
were acting like "a rogue elephant on the
rampage, or,- were they basically the acts of
responsible, well-disciplined . intelligence
agents acting in response to orders of "high-
er authority"? Tti Me the conclusion is im-
portant. If the first is true, then the agencies
must be revamped or possibly dismantled
and new agencies created to replace them. If
the second is true, then clearer lines of au-
thority must be established and stringent
oversight by the duly elected representatives-
of the people must take place.
During the course of these hearings. I have
been impressed by the belief held by the
principals that those illegal- end immoral
acts engaged in by our intelligence agenda
n ere sanctioned by higher authority and
even by the "highest authoeity." I am cons
-slimed by the huge amount of eircurnstan-
tee evidence that this is true. Although
illegal and immoral activities carried out by
our intelligence agencies cannot be justified
by any argument, it is, I think, important
to note that these actions were carried out
in the belief -fleet they were eanctioneel by
teo has been, unable to esteblish whether or
not presidential authority was given.
Some of the acts conducted by these agen-
ekes could have been, and probably were, be-
yond the scope of the 'projects authorized.
In addition, the agencies. may have con-
dilated. other activities which, in spite of this
investigation, am still unknown-to this Com-
mittee, Thus, they cannot be absolved. of all
the blame_
Since our Intelligence agencies act on both
a compartmentalized and need-to-know
basis, it is difficult to establish in retrospect
who was informed and what authority was
given. It, is also difficult to establish what
was told, to those who were- informed since
circumlocution was aLso a standard practice
within the chain of authority. The practice
was, after all,' adopted to insure official de-
niability as -well 'as to acquire consent. And
the effectiveness or these techniques of
."need-to-know" and "circumlocution" is at-
tested by the fact that this Committee not
only has been unable to establish whose con-
sent was given, but has also been unable to
establish who was not involved. We have been
able to establish neither responsibility nor
innocence. In this situation, the presumption
of, innocence cannot be applied without
question, since, the mere willingness to par-
ticipate in circumlocutions briefings implies
a willingness to deny responsibility at crucial
times, Consequently, I also believe that re-
sponsibility for the illegal actions of our in-
telligence agencies must be shared; it should
not- ? be tarried entirely by our intelligence
community.
Itt drafting- legislation to circumscribe the
activitiea of intelligence gathering agencies,
I would stress the need to guarantee their
ability to function effectively jour complex
and dangerous world. The effectiveness of
our intelligence agencies must not be limited
solely by sound and practical applications of
law drafted with clear objectives -in , mind.
..We must know what we want our intelligence
, agencies to do and what we do not want them
to do.. Then we can confidently allow them to
function in the knowledge that they will not
only defend the law but abide by it. Only in
that, way can we be certain that our society
will be preserved as an embodiment of our
openly democratic ideals. Although we must
Muse intelligence, we also must preserve our
_open society, for to destroy the latter for the
sake of the former would be a complete per-
version of our goals.
While we may realize that investigations
of this nature into sensitive governmental
actions In effect strengthen our country, we
would be foolhardy to think tor a moment
that our enemies, and perhaps even friends,
will openly acknowledge this significant ac-
complishment. We can EtSfiUnle, for instance,
that our opponents will go to greet lengths
to publicize and distribute propaganda based
'on this report Inimical to the best interests
of the United States. That this, in fact, will
be done only serves to reinforce my belief
that we need, and must have, as strong an
intelligence capability as possible. And while
this Committee is charged with the respon-
sibility of investigating end reporting on the
misdeeds of the Central Intelligence Agency,
we cannot reveal the details of the many
meaningful accomplishments of the Agency
which without a doubt have been beneficial
to our country, That we have such an agency
now, that we maintain our intelligence po-
tential in these times of contineing inter-
national tension is essential to our society
and, continued existence as a nation. ?
The release of this report, based on the
public's right to know, does not cemproiniee
our right to be secure. The report details
only the actions of Aeency employees in the
ertees under investigation and does not un-
necessarily reveal confidential'i nrefllgence
sources and methods. One can. however, suc-
cessfully predict the impact the report. will
?
have11101.he news media. A.review of previous
revelations concerning a.seasainations whicit
have appeared in the press have gone a long
way towards sensationalizing this country's
involvement in assassination plots. This re-
port corinrms smne prior public allegations
while it disproves others. While some may
shudder upon learning that the events re-
lated in the report actually took place, we
can all take great-pride in. the ability of this
country to look frankly at problems within
our system of government, and accordingly,
in our ability to govern ourselves. History
undoubtedly' record our ability to openly
? reveal and discuss improper, unpopular gov-
ernmental actions as. one of tie- basic, ele-
ments in the continued existence of our free
society and the general ability we, as a na-
tion, have achieved to subject ourselves and
our government to the rule of law.
Mr. MORGAN. In, addition to that, let
me say just one or two things.
I join especially in the comment of
the distinguished Senator from Ten-
nessee with regard to the facts and the
evidence as he has observed them, and.
especially in the comments. of the Sena-
tor from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE)
with regard to his very keen observa-
tions concerning the need for a Central
Intelligence Agency, and also, the need
for some degree of Secrecy. -
As we have gone about our duties
throughout these several months, there
has been one question paramount in my
mind. That question is this: Were the.. ?
events which we have all found shocking
to the morals and consciences of all
Americans conunitted by agents of the
Central Intelligence Agency on their
own and without authority, acting irre-
sponsibly, or were they in fact acts which
Were cerninitteii by a well-disciplined his
organization acting under the
justified belief that they were carrying
out orders of higher authority?
- I -think the- answer to these questions
is important. For if the answer to the
first is affirmative, then we must, in my
opinion,, reorganize and revamp the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, if not in fact
dismantle it and start again. But if, on
the other hand, the answer is "no" to
the first and "yes" to the second, that is,
that they acted in. the belief that they
were carrying out orders of higher au-
thority, then I think we are compelled
in this Congress to strengthen the guide-
lines under which the intelligence agen-
cies operate, and the oversight that Con-
gress must maintain.
From listenino? to all of the evidence
.anaehserving_the witnesses
fled before us, us, I have concluded from
ence?Mat, by. what we. in law
would call its -g-ferri. er-weigiit file Prin-
cipals in the events tlialThve, are talking
ab:efLaIted- ta?Ehe firm-retief that they
were carrying out orders of higher au-
thority, aticr-ram satisfied in my mind
that they wre jus fled Ln,L)ef.
That is not to say that I believe that
every single act carried out by the Cen-
tral Intelligence agents was authorized
by higher authority, but it is to say that
I think the overall planning was author-
ized by higher authority, or -at least the
principals were justified in believing so.
That being true, I believe it devolves
upon us now to legislate change, not only
in outlawing assassinations, which, as
I say, have shocked the coitriences anti
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S 20636 Approved For Re94's
morals of every freedom-loving !i-
can, but also it becomes incumbent upon
us to make sure that we maintain strict
oversight over these. agencies.
I find, Mr. President, as a whole, that
the members of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the other intelligence agen-
cies are highly dedicated and competent
individuals. I have said many times
throughout this investigation that while
I am extremely concerned about the
events that we have disclosed to you here
this morning, I believe more strongly
than I ever have that the real; threat to
the national security of this country and
to the individual freedoms and liberties
ofthe people of this country comes not
so much from the Central Intelligence
Agency, but from the abuse Of power and
the misuse of power by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation and pc.ssibly the
Internal Revenue Service.
So as ? we proceed with the next 3
months of this investigation, I. hope you
will be just as aware and just as atten-
tive to what is going on as you have seen
for the last 9 months.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ?
Mr. TOWER. I yield 5 minutes to the
Senator from Pennsylvania. -- .
Mr. SCHWELKER. Mr. President, first,
I wduld like to compliment the chair-
man - of our distinguished commit-
tee, the. Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH) and the vice chairman of our
committee, the Senator from Texas (Mr.
Towza) for their very great leadership
and very fair and equitable handling of
some very difficult and complex problems.
Second, I would like to compliment the
staff for their dedicated seal in. the effort
that really made this very tedious and
painful job possible.
I join with my colleagues on the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence Ac-
tivities to present to the Senate a report
entitled "Alleged Assassination Plots In-
volving Foreign Leaders." The investiga-
tion which led- to this report has been
long and difficult. I believe the commit-
tee report accurately reflects the evidence
uncovered, and I concur With the com-
mittee's findings and conclusions. Thus,
I would like to address these remarks to
the question of why -this report should
be made public.
The Select Committee voted without
dissent to make the report available to
the public. I strongly support that judg-
ment. This decision was made after 9
months of taking testimony from over
100 witnesses, reading literally hundreds
of documents, spending many hours dis-
cussing findings and formulating rec-
ommendations. It was made af ter exten-
sive consultations with the executive
branch, including meetings with repre-
sentatives of tile Defense Department,
the State Department, and the CIA.
These discussions enabled the committee
to insure that no sensitive sources and
methods of intelligence gathering were
ncluded and compromised. It was made
. titer the committee examined the pros-
( ill circumstances of each individual who
.gured in this report, deleting the names
c.f many and disguising others by the use
c aliases, so that no one's life or lived-
h sod would be threatened.
In short, the decision to make this
VII3W8M644-cifsPegos2V61-hao 000ziok5)-r-rber 201 1975
report public was made against the backArritcret agency and the other agencies as
ground of the fullest possible study of well. Such an understanding is abso-
the issue. lutely necessary if the public Is to be a
But some might say that the securing
,of sources and methods of intelligence
gathering and the protection of individ-
uals is not enough. They say that the
report should not be published because
it would embarrass the United States and
hinder our Nation in the conduct of its
foreign affairs.
There may be temporary injury, true.
But I believe the countries of the world
will recognize that our willingness to ex-
amine our past and seek a better future
openly, without flinching, is an indica-
tion of the greatness of our country. In
our effort not to offend, we could suppress
this report, but our Nation is admired in
proportion to the openness of our society.
Withholding this report from the public
would more .closely resemble the prac-
tices of totalitarian regimes, who are
haunted by the disparity between their
Public faces and their private souls, than
it would the history of this great land.
Even more important than the impact
of this report on other nations are the
effects of its publication here at home.
It is these ultimate positive effects on the
Nation which led me to join with the
.committee in, its dpproval of the publi-
cation of this report.
The publication of this report will:
First, clear, the air. The innuendb,
charges, piecemeal and self-serving dis-
closures, have provided an incomplete
and distorted view of what individuals
and Government agencies did, and what
they did not do.
The publication of this report will dis-
courage similar occurrences in the future.
Great power, arid the serious abuses
which flow from it, flourish in secrecy.
Government officials with such power will
hesitate to use it for illegal or unethical
conduct if they know that some day their
actions will be exposed and that they will
be held accountable. Thus, public dis-
closure is yet another check in our sys-
tem of checks and balances.
The publication of this report will re-
new public faith in Government. The
public has been ignored, or deceived, too
long. The public needs governmental rec-
ognition of their right to know, and gov-
ernmental acknowledgment of the im-
portance of honesty and candor. The
public will .not stand for yet another
coverup.
The publication of this report will al-
low the public to make up its own mind;
not the Senate, not Congress, not the
President, not the CIA?the Public.
Without the information contained in
the body of this report, the public could
not possibly judge either the conclusions
or the recommendations of this commit-
tee or whatever legislative action that we
are going to take in the future in this
area.
The publication of this report will en-
courage public participation in the legis-
lative process. Congress will soon be con-
sidering legislation concerning not only
assassination, but also executive and con-
gressional oversight of the intelligence
agencies. This detailed report provides a
basic understanding Of the very special
problems of -this important and highly
participant instead of a bystander in the
dialog about the CIA and other intelli-
gence agencies' future.
These are among the positive benefits
of publishing this report. I do not need.
I believe, to belabor the point that de-
mocracy depends upon the accountability
of public servants. And accountability
rests upon. knowledge. Thus, the public's
right to know is central?is funda-
mental?to our very form of government.
As James Madison wrote:
A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is
but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance. A people who mean to be their
own governors, must arm themselves with
the power which knowledge gives.
The report should be made available
so that the public will know what has
been done in its name. Without such a
report, the people could not understand
their past, nor would they be able to de-
sign a better future. The great American
philosopher Santanyana once wrote:
Those who do not remember the past are
condemned to relive it.
The assassination T attempts by our
Government .are a? shameful part of
American .history. They must be con-
demned. They must not be repeated. As
they were a product of secrecy, public
disclosure will assure that they will never
happen again.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I yield
5 minutes to the Senator from Colorado.
Mr. GARY HART, Mr.- President,
shortly- after taking office, President
Eisenhower asked a citizen commission to
study the status of the intelligence com-
munity in this country. In September
1954 that commission reported back to
the President and its chairman, General
James Doolittle, in statements contained
in the introduction of that report, stated'
as follows:
.
another important requirement
an aggressive covert psychological, politica
and paramilitary organization more effective,
more unique, and, if necessary, more ruth-
less than that _employed by the enemy. 2,1(
one should be permitted to stand in the way
of the prompt, efficient and secure accom-
pilshment of this mission. . . .
. . . It is now clear that weare facing an
Implacable enemy whose avowed objective
is world domination by whatever means cod
at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a
game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human
conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive,
long-standing American concepts of "fair
play" must be reconsidered. . .
. . It may become necessary that the,
American people be made acquainted with,
understand and support this fundamentally
repugnant philosophy.
Mr. President; we have sowed the wind
and we are reaping the whirlwind.
That philosophy antic nated in that
report has dominated tne intelligence
community in this country the last 20
years, and today we are seeing its
results..
Our committee did not choose to get
into the assassination 'question. But W3
had no alternative once the facts began
to emerge but to inquire mo those facts
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No ve)nber -'roved FoRgatS2Wiskg2e-:EbiArftb-FrAbli
*es been an. Instance In which, in my
judgment, someone in our committee or
on its staff has leaked Information, but
not to the jeopardy or detriment of the
national security of this country..
Mr. President, Congress itself has been
on trial?the question of whether Con-
gress could exercise investigative respon-
sibility in an area of the utmost secrecy
and delicacy and carry out that respon-
sibility in the manner that it has been
carried out. I think our committee arid
the Members of this body should he
proud of the work that has been done
here and all done under the umbrella of
national security.
I was appointed to this committee less
than. 30 days after I took the oath of
office. In the 9 or 10 months that have
passed since that time; I have become
aware that whether I serve here 5 more
years or 50, more years, the work that
this committee does may be the most im-
portant think in which I will have an
opportunity to participate. The work
that the committee presents to you, the
Sente of the United States, will be among
the most important of the issues that
any of you will face..
There is a saying from the Bible:
You shall know Lne truth, and the truth
shall make yern free.
and we had no alternative but to follow
those facts wherever they might lead..
Mr. President, if this report represents
anything, it is the fact that the. truth
cannot and will not be hidden. lArlat
have we found as a result of 9 mon'ths' of
a:T*71We -found cffaosi wel(Wnalaiure
QLS9:9..fi'61.7-Tv,"6"-Toillia--e-ifie?drency, and
worst or all; WFThund abandonment-of
the
tfus Naitien was founded:
It is tragic andiromc that Upon the
eve of the celebration of the 200th anni-
versary of this Nation its greatest delib-
erative body would sit here today dis-
cussing matters of this sort.
I point out that this is., first of all, an
interim report. None of us believes that
this report contains all of the facts. For
myself, r am net sure that all of the
facts will ever be known. In a footnote
at page 181 of this report, Senators will
find a matter that only recently came to
our attention that a middle-level. CIA
official requested the establislunent of
something that he called a. "Health
Alteration Committee! to deal with an
Iraqi colonel, presumably to eliminate
him merely because he did not agree
with. our foreign policy in his nation or
in fact balked at some of the activities
that we wanted to pursue.
Information of this sort will continue
to come out over the years, and I am not
sure the American people will ever en-
tirely know the truth.
One other fact I think is important.
We are looking at the entire intelligence
community. As our distinguished col-
league from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON)
has pointed out on many occasions, the
CIA in dollar torteinly represents
?''15 percent of Uria entire =Minna.
Mtn The information that we develop
about other elements of this community
win be brought out in our finalereporti
There is one other element. that I
think is important for us particularly
here today to note, and that is there is a
tendency when things go wrong. or un-
happy facts come out for the politicians
of this country to point their finger at
the people who carry out. orders. But if
this record_ shows. anything, Mr. Presi-
dent, it shows that the politicians in the
White House, in administrative - posi-
tions, were themselves as guilty as the
operatives who carried out many of these
activities, and the Congress of the United
States over the years, I think, must bear
equal blame for riot exercising its proper
role of oversight and responsibility, and
that is the matter that not only our com-
mittee, but every Member of this body
will have to answer for eventually.
I add one word to that which has been
said by many of our colleageus. We had
a staff of 100-some individuals collected
under an atmosphere where people in
the press and in this body itself said we
could not put together a staff which
would act responsibly and even the-mem-
bers of the committee themselves. could
not act responsibly. I took the floor sev-
eral days ago to point out there had been
leaks, tut there had not been at that
Lane one leak that was attributable to
roe comealttee members or the staff that
we had ,acillected.
Unforaunately, since that time, there
Ironically i that motto is found on the
walla of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I should.
like to stress, one or two other matters,
and I will be brief.
-Firat of all, this committee faced. the
choice, when it began this unpleasant
duty of investigating the aasassination
allegations, of whether to conduct its
hearings in public_ or in executive ses-
sion, behind closed doors. I do not believe
that any member of the committee had
any doubt that a long series of public
hearings, featuring these many witnesses,
and telecast to the four corners of the
globe, for weeks and months on end,
would have constituted unprecedented
political box office. But it would have
done this country grievous damage. So
we refrained from. holding any public
hearings. on the mattersthat are taken
up and discussed in this report.
However, from the bettilTz., it was
understood?an'-he committee twice
its vote, affirmed?that at the end of the
investigation a report would issue. That
was iiiidersicial by Clre PresidenfTand all
theanif the
%7e
At ['he 11th nQL:tr, alter the work
of :1-.:corj?trniqee had. been clone, any
ratalTii?telis Were ffirTiWfiThiyiliii
an attempt to this report concealed.
The viP1'Isto tioCe romitibnreTae Inr-d
Mia Plea
Una report.
--Senator Towsa has already told you
how carefully we went through this re-
port with agents of these very agencies
to execlude any name that, in the judg-
ment of the committee, should be deleted.
or any reference that in any way might
expose intelligence sources or any other
matter relating to the legitimate national
security interests of the United States.
Of those names they asked us to ex-
clude, we excluded 20 and that left aborit
cYcY2A000100040001-2 S 297
Atli the committee took a view dif-
ferent from that of the executive branch.
I can explain each of those nine, but
will just give you some idea why the com-
mittee took a different view, by citing
a few examples,
One such example is Mr. Dearborn,
who is named in the report. He was the
ranking U.S. official in the Dominican
Republic where the assassination of -
Trujillo occurred. He was in close and
continuous- contact with the assassins,
even transferring weapons, and has iden-
tified himself publicly by writing a letter
to the editor of the Washington Post on
the assassination..
A second, Conein, was the contact with
tire assassins in another country, Smith
Vietnam, and his role was fully publi-
cized when the Pentagon papers were
published. Indeed, the reference to Intri
by name in the report helps to clarify
the fact that the United States never_
intended the assassination of Diem.
Three others?Harvey, King, and
Tweedy?were high-ranking CIA officials
who helped, develop detailed plans for
the assassination plots. Two of them held
policy-making positions,. and their role
is so intricately interwoven into this re-
port that to exclude their names and po-
sitions would be to render the report
incomplete.
Two others are Viaux and Valenzuela,
who are foreigners. They were convicted
by military tribunals for their roles in
the pilots in their own countries..
Three others were members of the
Mafia. John Roselli was a Mafia leader
who, contacted by Mayheu, participated
with the CIA in several attempts against
the life of Castro. His appearance before
the committee was. highly publicized, not -
by the committee but by the press. His
role has been commented on exteneiVely
in the .press on numerous occasions. An-
other is Santos Trafficante. He was a
Mafia chieftain with gambling interests
in Cuba who was used by Roselli and
Mayheu to locate the Cubans to carry out
the assassination plots and was a prin-
cipal in the conspiracy.
The final name was Robert Maheu,
himself, who was the CIA's. contact man
with the Mafia_ He testified before the
committee amid, indeed, afterward he
hold a press conference in which he die-
c cissed his role. .
i5cr weliclieveetilat in those CP eS where
we
i5snnrnu in the report. we have
it_iudiciouslY a:a:it unfit:411-z t 1.1
eir,e,_;1-iritlitt not be a 1.1t,Ason for (1%)jecF.g
te: the-r;ile-as-F-67f "MT...reportefi h tam!.
TOGT.R. r yield
myself 2 minutes.
Generally speaking, althoitgh what, the
enairman says is correct, that sonic ob-
stacles were thrown in the way of the in-
vestigation, we. probably got as much cm-
operation as we reasonably coull expect,
note that it was not so miiUIh he:?q-
tartez in disclosing, matters to tue com-
mittee as in Making those matt' rs pub-
lic. I think that has been the irimary
concern of the various agencii a with
which we have dealt?not tint they
did not want- to cooperate with tics com-
mittee- and disclose eensitive mainers to
the committee, but that they 'did nc t want
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S 20638 CON9tESIONAL UCORD SENAI'.E - Npvember 20, 1975
Approved For Release 6/06/26 ? CIA-RDP78B02992A000100040001-2
the matters further disclosed to theeeeb- signed to serve the national interest. Tbf It Is going to have a profound impact
lie. It is important to make that di7rnc- materials were turned over in classified form, on our international relations. It Will
You will recall that I said on June 9, 1075,
"I know that the Members of Congress in-
volved will exercise utmost prudence in the
handling of such information."
The President goes on in his letter to
the chairman of the committee:
It Is not a question of withholding infor-
mation required by the Select Committee to
carry out its inquiry into these allegations,
which relate entirely to past achninistrations
of both parties. On the contrary, I have en-
deavored to make all of the information
available to your committee so that legisla-
tion can be proposed, if necessary, and to the
Justice Department to facilitate any investi-
gation indicated. However, we must distin-
guish between disclosures to the Select Com-
mittee of sensitive information and publica-
tion of that information which is harmful to
the national Interest and May endanger the
physical safety of individuals. There is no
question about the access to these materials
by appropriate official. The only issue con-
cerns publication, which obviously cannot
be limited to Members of Congress or other
American citizens.
Then, if you will read with me from
rule The VerY first clause cin7F-
tion 3 reads as follows'
All confidential communications made by
the President of the United States to the
Seril 1- shall be by the Senators and the
officera of the 'Senate kept secret: and all
ti.eaties which may be laid before the Senate,
and all remarks, vote-s-,?Knd- proaeTdings
thereon Shall alio-be kept secret . . .
Notice the word "also," which indicates
that the second clause is a separate
clause from the first clause. But even in
the case of treaties, it says
. . . until the Senate shall, hy their reso-
lution, take off the Injunction of secrecy, or
unless the same shall be considered In open
Executive session.
?
Even more pertinent is section 5 of
rule =XVI.
Whenever, by the request of the Senate or
any committee thereof . .
And these materials were provided in
response to the request of the commit-
tee?
. . . any documents or papers shall be com-
municated to the Senate by the President or
the head of any Department relating to any
matter pending in the Senate . . .
The CIA investigation by this commit-
tee was a matter pending in the Sen-
ate?
. . the proceedings in regard to which
are secret and" ardfltW1,_...tiRaincter ratm
sareectoeumepes ericapaperseetiall be consid-
ered as contidentiale_ancl shall tioL als-
CIOSed without leave of the Senate.
.1 raise this question becausei think it
is a very, very ftindamental Questiene
I understend the situation which is being_
presen-tede it is that unless the Senate
takes some affirmative action to o'verfilff
the action of We TaT6et-eariffattee-e-thiS
report will
-f-submit that would be not only in vio-
lation of the rules ortri-e-eriate, but.
.5
very bad precedent. If we were to do
this?anniia,y5i-it should be done?it is
certainly one of the most basic and fun-
damental decisions that is going to be
made in the service of any of us in this
body.
tion because, generally speaking, I think
we have had a pretty good level of coop-
eratiort
I must eay_ehat Min_Colhy has been
extremely coopera.tive. Ii_ge_alourse, ob-
jected to our publicalion of us rei-M. -
which T think is normal under the cir-
cumstances. But I do not believe that at
any time he withheld anything from the
committee in an effort to impede its in-
ves tiga Lion.
So again I think the point should be
made that the question is; What do we
make public? What is of such sensitive
nature that it should not be made pub-
lic? I think the Members- of the Senate
and the Members of the House have a
right to know, on a need-to-know basis,
anything that the intelligence commu-
nity has. But I think that we, ourselves,
must be very judicious in what we reveal
to the public. We will be facing up to
this awesonie responsibility in. the days
to come, in our continuing investigation.
I stress what Senator HART men-
tioned?that is, that this is an interim
report, that our work is not yet -done,
and we are currently engaged in looking
Into the matters that I think prompted
Senate Resolution 21 in the first place,
which launched this investigation, and
that is in the area of domestic abuse.
I believe this is the area of perhaps
greatest importance.
- So I want to make sere that you have
everything in perspective and know that
this committee has not been dealing only
with assassinations. This is only part, Of
it. - This is perhaps a less important part
.of it than what is done in the domestic
area, in the way of abuse, that infringes
on the rights of American citizens.
Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to
the Senator from Michigan.
Ur. GRIFFIN I thank the Senator
from Texas.
Mr. President. I did not rise to speak
to'ffre. question of the wisdom of releas-
ing this report to the public but, rather,
the question or the procedure by which
Ira-V5Tird-1ie?datreeTrta is made.
I should lute to prevail. upon Senabas
to referto the Standing Rules of the
Senate and turn TOTi1fe-1=1, particui-
ar y secteoras and a ereo , and- I think
we can bring into focus the question I
want to raise.
That ee rule X7s..eXITI of the Senate,
particularly sections 3 and 5. I take it
that no one wouldiiiesto,thit tills re-
por EF6atairis information which was pro-
vided by the President or heads of de-
partmen.ts of the executive bra in
classified form. Ifie basic Question is
whether or not that material is to be
made public_ and It see-Ifatris it to be
iTie publiejlenahatepeonesluee9 Let me
just fill in here be calling attention to
I, letter dated October 31, addressed to
Chairman CHURCH, from the President
c f the United States, to which reference
Las already been made. I want, to faces
o u a couple of. sentences.
I have endeavored -to make available all
tl e material in the executive branch on this
in bject to -the Select Committee of the Seri-
at and the House and -the Department of
Ju -dice. This was done under procedures de-
have a profound impact, I suggest, on the
ability of the executive branch, of the
President, under any administration of
either party, in his relationship with
Congrees, if he Cannot assume that con-
fidential Information requested of him
and delivered on a classified basis will be
treated as classified information, at least
in accordance With the rules of the Sen-
ate itself. And certainly, it will have a
profound impact on the ability of the
President of the United States to deal in
international affairs with other nations.
It is not enough to say, yes, but you can
make a motion here, in the Senate, in
closed session, to deny the committee the
right to publish this report. If we accept
that, then we have said that any com-
mittee or any subcommittee of the Sen-
ate, from now on, has the right to make
public any classified information pro-
vided by the executive branch.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield
for a question?
Mr. GRIFFIN. I gladly yield.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator agree
that the Senate itself has the right to re-
moire the secrecy and authorize the ad
hoc committee to publish the report?
Mr. GRIFFIN. I think that section 5
Is right on the point.
- Mr. PASTORE. In other words, what
you are actually saying is that the com-
mittee, on its own?
Mr. GRIFFIN. Does not have that
authority.
Mr. PASTORE (continuing). Must
have to report back to the Senate with
their recommendations.
Mr. GRIFFIN. That is right.
Mr. PASTORE. But it is up-to the Sen-
ate to authorize the publication of it.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And it is an obligatior,
under the rules that the Senate itself, as
a whole, cannot duck.
Mr. PASTORE. I think the anator is
right. Otherwise, we would be setting a
ba rece en , . i we can do it,
I1IFXN. We had this kind of
question arise in the Committee on For-
eign Relations, having to do with classi-
fied documents relating to the Sine!
agreement. The committee inadvertently.
I would say, because I do not think we
were adequately aware of the rules of the
Senate when it was done, without any
improper motive, whatsoever?rand I at-
tribute no improper motive, incidentally.
in this situation, either. We can have dif-
ferences of opinion as to what the rules
should require.
In that instance, classified documents
which had already appeared in the New
York Times were made public by a com-
mittee vote. But, afterward, the com-
mittee itself recognized that they had
made a mistake and that the action
taken by the committee was not in ac-
cordance with the rules, and it so Indi-
cated. At least, that precedent was not
established, because the rornmittee, it-
self, acknowledged that it had. not acted
in accordance with the rul ts of the Sen-
ate.
I just want to emphash e the impor-
tance here of not allowir g this to be
made public without COM aliance with
the rules of the Senate,
-
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Novembel. 20, IniSroved FoCP4kcaliM 12RECONZP-78615
I will say this: As for me, I shouldligrave received from the Parliamentarian,
have a difficult time voting today, not tha t1Tri committee was given the ad.
having had a chance to read this report thority to issue this rewirt judethie_rufejs
at all, on the question of whether the of the in beingbeing referred to here are
Senate should authorize it to be made ?not being interpreted pranerlv by the
public. I think Senators ought to have distinguished Senator from Michigan.
an o foIflit3r read-and-1T if They do not, in the circumstances, pre-
and-etnedeliberate, to some extent, on -tile elude the committee from issuing the
very, very fundamentaTiirettfdifiliWifv-- -report, on its own authority. We have
ing naq.ional securitytand national inter- looked into this very carefully.
est, as to Tv-Figh?er thficimu1d If the Senate wants to vote no confi-
ffe-rifiateitir TT-that-In -fife denne_inetlistsona4t.tee nd enioituae-
eircirnViii-vOte tir Make it puhlft3713Ilt committee irom?slit= tbis
I should thi_p_k_Lc,a1173iira b the be-tier
part of wisdom to delay this decision
until _Eiffel' The recess and to-give ae7ii-
klt"s an 01-1-DOEIliatY tO be flayogni-
zapLand aware of what they might be
doing
Mr. cunus. Will the distinguished
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. GRIFFIN. I am glad to yield to the
Senator from Nebraska. ?
Mr. CURTIS. Is what the distin-
guished Senator saying that a commit-
tee cannot release secret information
unless the Senate affirmatively grants
permission for it?
Mr. GRIFFIN. I have a difficult time
reading section 5 any other way, I say to
the Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. CURTIS. In other words, the ab-
sence of a motion denying the committee
the right to release it would not suffice,
would it?
- Mr. GRIFFIN. Absolutely not.
cuRaas. I think the penalty re-
ferred to in section 4 or paragraph 4,
whichever it is, of rule XXXVI is so
2=A000100040001-2 S 20639
severe--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator's 10 minutes have expired.
Mr. TOWER,. I will yield 5 additional
minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. CURTIS. IJi1ieiia wastlinlid,bau-
dleethisein stnineLecintormity_toules,
etrheeyeiese theecommittee or those mem-
berseetithe eommilketwhe do release it
wouldebeefacing a very enTharrassinix
Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator for
his contribution.
I will be glad to yield to the Senator
from Alabama,
Mr, ALLEN. I think we might inquire
of the chairman if this committee report
may not possibly be in the hands of the
media now in view of the embargo
printed here on the outside indicating
they have got a right to MOVE: it eta rting
at 4 o'clock this afternoon?
Mr. CHURCH. First of all, I am in
complete disagreement with the argu-
ment being made about the rules of the
Senate end their applicability in this
case, and we are prepared--
? Mr. THURMOND. Will the Senator
speak louder; we cannot hear him?
Mr, CHURCH.. I
agmementiLigaentjemng
ina-ctre that our proceedings here are in
any ,riispect, contrary Jo the, rules of the
SeniaL.
We have investigated this very thor-
oughly. We have conferred with _tine F
liamentalaan; ..We, have received his orrin-
loneba-sed u p with e iIr&f?Iancflve
amp ninpeineet[to arffitentheenaee.
Now, we are pTepared to show, based
flq, the precedents and the oflliTh7t17,i7e
may do so. But it takes on af1b:rao tire_
arthe Senate to clTat. It is always
within the Senate's power7For that rea-
son, although these reports are out on
the Senators' desks and, as practical
public men we knoW the difficulty, fol-
lowing this session, of preventing the
contents of the report from being dis-
seminated
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. CHURCH (continuing). Never-
theless, in deference to the Senate, we
have refrained from circulating the re-
port to the press until we have first had
an opportunity to come to the Senate
and make its contents known to the Sen-
ate. But we do not accept the proposi-
tion laid down by the Senator from
Michigan, and we are prepared to refute
it.
Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator saying
that he original lesolaion f2311n..1
tad alit] otly ?
Mr. CHURCH. yteen
Mr. PASTORE. I would like to hear the-
iiegmilent as to whSilt dOes.
Mr. CIIIITICTITITiTeTd7CiSena tor MON-
Mr. MONDALE. I would like to respond
to this.
Mr. TOWER. Mr, President, is this on
the time of the Senator from Idaho?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, itis.
Mr. MONDALE. This executive session
was called under the unanimous-consent
agreement propounded by the majority
leader, not for the purpose of acting on
the report, but for the purpose of hearing
it. We thought out of deference to the
Senate and in view of the delicacy of
this matter that it ought to be heard
first by Senators before it is released to
the public. It is not here to be adopted
OU approved. It is here to be heard. That
is the nature of this meeting'.
The suggestion was made by the Sen-
ator from Michigan that under. rule
XXXVI, since this report- was based in
part upon sonte classified information
obtained from the executive department-,
it may only he released under that rule
by an affirmative vote of the Senate.
ejaaie_cilrecked_with_the EaL111-7
neentarian and it is elriti_onininhntneet
ruin foOck-TI refers to private c-emmuni-
6.7t1Eiris- tlifft-rtre erei terrte---the Sen-
ate as a hoTe iThIl?itt6f
deliberations waif- respect to a treaty,
anrmatters oi that kind that are con-
Sq-cWrecratexeciffri.'e session. tlider those
eirsamistances yotilave to yore- to no-
lease it. tly_,t he satit7liat matters that
grurii_titinelyre committees, TaiTh
are_p_ften efiTTTsifleci,Than leriTeased
tilcse_committees iiiirteir normal tune-
tion.
Sift
ASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a questiOn?
Mr. MONDALE. Yes, I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. Why did we have to
have an executive session today if you
are going to release it anyway? If you
are not seeking the approbation of the
Senate in what you are doing, why did
we come here in secrecy to begin with?
"VVIly did we not have- an open meeting?
Mr. - MONDALE. Two things: First,
there are. many matters that could be
asked about that could only be answered
in executive session and, in deference- to
the Senators--
Mr. PASTORE. Answered by whom, by
the Senate?
Mr. MONDALE. Well, by experts?
Mr. MANSFIELD. By the committee.
Mr. MONDALE. By expert people,
dealing with some aspects not neces-
sarily stated in this report, matter that
could not be answered except in execu-
tive session.
Second, out of deference to the Sena-
tors, in light of the highly delicate na-
ture of this matter, it seemed only proper
that a thorough briefing of our colleagues
be made.
Now, the, Senate resolution, which was
the product of -1174-distlii-Fiaceil--Set-i-ci-
t-o-r-firOlft-Rhocre Island,, confers dit?
this committee_ the_m_thoritYi......11.14tie-d
requircs ..oL. this commitke?thal is Committee on on- Intelligence, tly