WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A010700020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010700020001-3
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP79-00927A010700020001-3
4F,01 Nod~
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed
Secret
Secret
25 January 1974
No. 0004/74
Copy N2 59
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CONTENTS (January 25, 1974)
a unauthorized person is prohibited by
1
The Middle East
6
International Monetary Developments
EAST AS I A
PACIFIC
8
Korea: Watchful Waiting
9
Cambodia: Government Gains
10
Vietnam: A Quiet Tet
10
Thailand: The King to the Rescue
11
Laos: Hope Springs Eternal
1.2
Indonesia: The Morning After
14
Belgium: Government Crisis
15
France Proposes Energy Talks
16
at UN
USSR-China: Expulsion and Retaliation
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
17
Tunisia-Libya: Marking Time
18
India: New Uncertainties; MIG Troubles
19
Greece: Beset by Economic Woes
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
25X1
21
Argentina: Terrorists Set Back
21
Bolivia: Banzer's Problems
sued every Friday t inrning by
Bence, reports and analyzes signif-
week through noon on Thursday.
erial coordinated with or oreoared
Research. the Office of Strategic
Science and Technology,
mprehensive treatment. and there
security of the United Sta#es, within
1,8, sections 793 and 794, .of the US
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THE MIDDLE EAST
Breakthrough on Disengagement
I Israeli forces began moving off the Suez
Canal's west bank this week in implementation of
the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement
signed on January 18. During the 40-day dis-
engagement period, the UN Emergency Force will
establish a buffer zone several miles wide inside
the Sinai Peninsula, to be flanked on each side by
"security zones" for limited and lightly armed
Egyptian and Israeli forces. The Egyptian area
will be located between the canal and the UN
zone; the Israeli area, between the UN forces and
a point just west of the Sinai passes, thus leaving
these in the full control of Israel's main force]
I Israeli military sources have said that the
evacuation of the west bank salient will be under-
taken in three stages, all to be completed by
February 12. The entire disengagement process is
to be completed no later than March 6. According
to the Israelis, forces deployed on the Cairo-Suez
road blocking access to the city of Suez and the
Third Army will be evacuated first, probably
within the week, and as each stage proceeds, UN
forces will move in to replace the Israelis briefly
before turning the areas back to the Egyptians.?
5 IBoth sides made concessions to achieve the
agreement. By accepting limitations on its forces
and armament on the east bank, Egypt conceded
its freedom to use recaptured territory as it sees
fit. Israel, of course, has committed itself to with-
draw from territory it has occupied for years, and
it did not receive the firm assurance of an endur-
ing peace it had apparently sought as an earnest
of Egypt's sincerity in pursuing a negotiated
settlement
i 5- [Reaction to the disengagement agreement in
the Arab world has ranged from Syria's pointed
silence, through unenthusiastic acceptance by
many of the peripheral states, to the severe
opprobrium of Libya Iraq, and the majority of
the fedayeen leaders ] fl he reaction is chiefly based
~' on widespread apprehension that Egypt intends
to negotiate a unilateral settleme t with Israel, in
disregard of over-all Arab interests
Egyptian Follow-up
fro counter this impression, President Sadat
launched a wide-ranging diplomatic offensive
among the Arab states immediately followin
)/,)L- [Public Egyptian commentar on the dis-
engagement agreement has been25X1
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carefully designed to reassure the Arabs about
Egyptian intentions. The media and official state-
ments, for instance, have repeatedly emphasized
that the agreement is a military accord only and
that a similar Syrian-Israeli disengagement should
be negotiated before the full Geneva conference
can be resumed. The Cairo media have also jabbed
at Arab dissenters, calling for continued joint
Arab action as the best assurance of progress
toward Israeli withdrawals on other fronts.!
Syria has been the chief target of the Egyp-
tian efforts. Cairo can point to the disengagement
agreement to refute charges from militant Arabs
that only war can bring progress toward an Israeli
withdrawal, but without Syrian support, Sadat's
insistence that he is not pursuing solely Egyptian
interests remains suspect. Syria is a key element,
in the Egyptian view, in the continued success of
negotiations, and Sadat has made a particular
effort to convince the Syrians that he does not
intend to leave Damascus or the other Arabs
behind!
Egyptian Chief of Staff Gamasy reviews
Israeli map of disengagement zones
7 )He is unlikely to make any decision, there-
fore, on whether to turn over a POW list to Tel
Aviv-an Israeli prerequisite for holding disengage-
ment talks-until sometime after he receives a
response to the suggestions he gave Secretary 25X1
Kissinger to pass on to Israeli leaders. Indeed, he
may wait for Secretary Kissinger to resume the
shuttle diplomacy that brought the Egyptians and
Israelis together[
Syria's Reaction
I f anything, the Egyptian-Israeli accord
seems to have sharpened 'Syrian distrust of Egypt
and deepened the divisions within the Asad
regime between those opposed to negotiations
with Israel and those at least willing to explore
that path.)'In Damascus last weekend, Sadat en-
countered deep skepticism among Syrian leaders,
with the notable exception of President Asad,
about Cairo honoring its commitments not to
negotiate a separate peace settlement with Israel.
Asad probably still hopes to attend the Geneva
conference, but he is likely to play his cards very
cautiously, not only to drive a hard bargain but to
protect his own position'
Fedayeen Disarray
5 )The leaders of all the major fedayeen organi-
zations but Fatah have criticized Egypt's willing-
ness to get ahead of the other Arab states and the
Palestinians by signing the disengagement agree-
ment with Israel. Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion Chairman Arafat, sensitive to the need to
cooperate with Egypt, is seeking, so far with little
success, to moderate the statement denouncing
the Egyptian initiative put out in the name of the
organization's Executive Committee while he was
in Cairo. Although he has been able to keep his
followers within Fatah in line, Arafat has only
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1) t- -Vao
limitad influence with the leaders of the other
fedayeen groups:1
) ~ iSaiqa, the Syrian-supported fedayeen organi-
zation, will be unable to approve the disengage-
ment accord or any Palestinian role in peace nego-
tiations until Damascus does. The smaller and
more radical organizations- whose policies often
parallel those of Libya and Iraq-oppose the
agreement as a sell-out of Palestinian interests.
Facing this opposition, and caught between Egypt
and Syria, Arafat is making little headway in his
efforts to lead the Palestinians to the peace talks:]
4 Talks between Labor and representatives of
National Religious Party have prompted
cautious optimism among Alignment leaders that
t he National Religious Party will ultimately
soften its demands for legislation establishing
rigid standards for conversion to Judaism. Such
legislation is unacceptable to the Alignment. In
return, the Labor Alignment is likely to agree to a
policy statement which, although paralleling that
of the existing government in almost all respects,
leaves in abeyance official policy on the sensitive
issue of withdrawal from the Israeli-occupied
West Bank.
Israeli spokesmen this week have refused to
con irm press speculation that a breakthrough is
`Israel's Knesset, meeting this week for the, near on possible Israeli-Syrian negotiations)~ln her
first time since the December election, approved') 'address to the Knesset, Mrs. Meir claimed that
h fielded no progress
we
the disengagement agreement after heated debate.
The conservative opposition Likud bloc, which
sharply criticized the accord as well as the govern-
ment for signing it before referring it to parlia-
ment, was able to organize sizable public protest
demonstrations early in the week. Opinion polls
indicate, however, that a majority of Israelis favor
the agreement.]
y
contacts with Damascus a
and Foreign Minister Eban told reporters that
talks between Tel Aviv and Damascus "had barely
entered a pre-preliminary stage." Both repeated
that Israel will not discuss a separation of forces
with S ria until it has received a list of Israeli
POWs.
Soviets Unhappy with Cairo
C,, )Prime Minister Meir and other Israeli leaders I i.j IThe Soviets are not saying very much in
are engaged in a campaign to reduce domestic public, but privately they have made it clear they
opposition to the agreement. In addressing the are very unhappy with Cairo. The head of the
Knesset on January 22, Mrs. Meir stressed that i ,Soviet delegation in Geneva, Vinogradov, rebuked
Israel was not required to make, nor would it the Egyptians for "having forgotten their true
undertake, any commitments beyond stabiliza- friends." In Moscow, Gromyko told Egyptian
tion of the cease-fire and the separation of forces. ' Foreign Minister Fahmi that the USSR does not
The Prime Minister discounted claims by some object to US efforts in the Middle East provided
b d P le tinian ri hts and
s g
A
Egyptian leaders that the accord placed few
restraints on the deployment of Egyptian forces
as designed for "public consumption in the Arab
countries."
(The government's public relations efforts are
in large part designed to facilitate the formation
of a new government. With Likud in opposition,
Mrs. Meir's Labor Alignment cannot form a viable
coalition without the cooperation of the National
Religious Party, the third largest in the Knesset.
On security matters that party's position is closer
to Likud's than to Labor's.)
ra an a
that they preserve
are not detrimental to a "third party." Gromyko
seemed to imply that the US-orchestrated dis-
engagement talks did not fit the bill-]
The Soviets are irritated because they were
largely cut out of the disengagement talks and
because the prominent, and effective, role played
by the US diminished Moscow's stature all the
more. The Soviets clearly would prefer to have all
issues discussed and resolved at Geneva, where
they have a voice
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Moscow is therefore apparently attempting
to force the focus of the negotiating efforts back
to Geneva. Fahmi's arrival in Moscow on January
21 has probably provided the Soviets an op-
portunity to impress upon Fahmi their disap-
pointment at having been excluded. Moscow may
be using other means to put pressure on Cairo.
For example, recent articles in Soviet-influenced
Arab newspapers have denounced Egypt and the
disengagement agreement for betraying the Arab
cause.
)The unanswered question is how tough Mos-
cow is prepared to be with Sadat. If the issue
between the two countries is only a question of
Egypt's recognition of the proprieties, i.e., Mos-
cow's desire to be part of the action, then re-
turning the next stage of the negotiations to
Geneva should get their relations on a more even
keel. But if Moscow is determined to do what it
can to forestall closer Egyptian-US relations and a
continuing prominent US role in working toward
a peace settlement, then tougher days lie ahead..
ARAB OIL REVENUES
~,? J~~4 kZC i=i ,~
The Arab oil producers anticipate a $30?
billion current account surplus this year, and have
taken several preliminary steps since December to
deal with their burgeoning reserve holdings:
? Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi,
Qatar, Egypt, and Sudan formed an invest-
ment company to finance Arab agriculture
and shipping ventures;
? The Arab Bank of Jordan and a London
merchant bank established a joint venture to
assist Arab governments in channeling surplus
oil funds into large-scale development pro-
jects, such as oil refineries and manufacturing
plants;
? Kuwaiti quasi-public and professional
organizations will sponsor a seminar in
Kuwait next month on investment of Arab
surplus funds;
? Twenty-five Islamic nations are stepping
up preparations to establish an Islamic Devel-
opment Bank by April 1974;
? The Arab League agreed on January 23
to set up a fund to speed economic develop-
ment for African countries.
These actions should markedly increase the
amount of money directed to domestic Arab
development. More Arabs will also inevitably be
involved in development administration-an im-
portant consideration in an area where foreigners
are traditionally distrusted and where lack of
trained personnel has been the greatest stumbling
block in diverting investment to domestic devel-
opment. Greater Arab cooperation in financial
matters should also be a by-product, but because
of basic differences in investment policy, the
wealthier nations are unlikely to pool more than a
small fraction of their assets. Western capital
markets, therefore, will probably absorb the bulk
of Arab funds.
RE-OPENING THE SUEZ CANAL
I; ,nL
The Suez Canal Authority is ready to start
clearing the canal whenever disengagement of
Israeli and Egyptian forces is accomplished. The
immediate problem is clearing the canal and its
banks of unexploded munitions and sunken
obstacles, which will probably take four to six
months. At the same time, the canal will be
dredged to shape the bottom and restore it to its
pre-1967 depth. Best estimates indicate that the
dredging portion of the project will also take four
to six months. Silting, once thought to be a major
problem in clearing the canal, appears to be less
than previously estimated.
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A ship reportedly sunk by the Israelis during the June 1967 war
The Egyptian Armed Forces will do most of
the work of clearing the canal area of mines and
unexploded munitions. The canal authority will
use its own personnel to do the bulk of the
dredging. Negotiations are in an advanced state
with a consortium of two European firms, Ulrich
Harms of West Germany and Brodospas of Yugo-
slavia, to do the heavy work of raising and clear-
ing obstacles in the canal and its approaches.
Cairo has plans for widening and deepening
the canal, but this depends on the canal being
open, and even then would take several years to
complete. Japanese Deputy Premier Miki recently
promised Egypt $140 million in credits at very
favorable terms to start the job, and has indicated
Tokyo's willingness to increase the loan to $280
million if Cairo wishes, enough to cover 70 per-
cent of the cost of repairing and enlarging the
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The French decision to allow the franc to
float independently has for the moment relieved
France of the danger of incurring potentially dis-
astrous reserve losses but adds to the economic
and political disarray in the European Commu-
nities. In addition to dealing a setback to long-
established goals, such as economic and monetary
union, and possibly a regional development
policy, the action gives West Germany the un-
sought leadership of a deutschemark zone and
emphasizes the growing rivalry within the com-
munity between Paris and Bonn.
Percent Change In the Value of the US Dollar
Relative to Selected Foreign Currencies
Compared With January 2, 1973
lo,-
In the financial markets, the French decision
created a new rush for dollars and gold.
? Gold surged to a record high of $141 as
speculation accelerated against paper curren-
cies.
-301~i- ..11-A-1.~ _ I 1 u_ L _1_u 1 _ I - --
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 01's 31
? European currencies declined sharply rel-
ative to the dollar on Monday, then regained
some of the losses as speculation subsided
later in the week. The mark remained the
strongest major European currency.
? Rome is apparently taking action to
maintain a stable exchange rate with the franc
at the rate it has held since mid-December.
? Since the Tokyo exchange reopened
Wednesday the Japanese have sold over $700
million to hold the dollar rate at 300 yen.
Although the market calmed Thursday as a
result of new credit restrictions imposed by
Tokyo, a renewal of heavy speculation will
probably force the Japanese to let the rate
drift down further.
Paris' move has already resulted in a sub-
stantial de facto devaluation of the franc, which
has declined 5 percent against the dollar and 4
percent relative to the mark. Thus, the float will
improve Paris' trade competitiveness, one of
France's principal goals, and protect its currency
reserves.
Protecting the joint float's parity structure-
which would have had to undergo sharp revisions
once the effects of oil price increases were
?i 1+100(1v 0(lrc d! bank 1100010
"Relative to 16 major currencies
known-was causing great difficulty for France.
Since last summer Paris had lost about $3 billion
in reserves in defending the franc. France also
faces a $3-billion trade deficit in 1974 compared
with a $1.5-billion surplus last year; Germany still
anticipates a surplus this year.
Paris' move also increases French flexibility
in pursuing domestic economic policy goals. Cur-
rency intervention had been reducing the French
money supply and driving interest rates up. Now
the French are free to use monetary policy-their
main economic-policy tool-to head off an eco-
nomic downturn if higher oil prices adversely
affect employment and economic growth.
In order to keep the franc from declining
drastically, Paris apparently is prepared to inter-
vene in moderate amounts-the Bank of France
has reportedly sold about $330 million during the
first four days of the float-and has moved to
alleviate speculative pressure by tightening capital
controls.
? lighter restrictions were placed on for-
eign lending, forward currency purchases, and
import payments to limit outward capital
flows.
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? Paris is also keeping the two-tier ex-
change market to retain greater control over
the exchange rate of the franc used in com-
mercial transactions.
The remaining members of the EC float in
effect now constitute a "deutschemark zone," in
which the mark is floating with six other cur-
rencies. For Bonn, there is little difference be-
tween this situation and Paris' controlled float.
Germany's partners, however, are unlikely to be
any more willing than the French to maintain
fixed parities within the joint float if a drain is
placed on their reserves or if exchange rates ap-
preciate too much relative to their trading
partners outside the float.
Whatever its success in meeting French
policy objectives, the independent float has killed
all hopes for movement toward monetary union
based on the original conception-i.e., that the
EC's narrow currency band would foster harmony
in economic policy and lead to a strengthening of
community institutions. Some members of the
commission now recognize that it was a mistake
to attempt closer monetary links before estab-
lishing greater harmony in economic policy.
French Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing has
said he will call for an EC meeting in July to
discuss economic and monetary unification. With
continuing uncertainties in the financial situation
and little chance that the EC will reach agreement
on policy harmonization by that time, the pros-
pects for a new start toward monetary unification
this summer remain bleak. Support may now be
developing within the commission for sanctioning
an independent float for all until the necessary
measures can be developed to coordinate policies
and goals.
The French move itself caught most EC
members and the commission off guard. Although
Chancellor Brandt and Finance Minister Schmidt
were quick to announce that they understood the
need for the measure, they expressed disappoint-
ment at the adverse implications for European
cooperation. The private reaction of German
officials was more critical.
Bonn is sure to resent the blatant disregard
for community interest evident in the float and
may want to re-examine its position on the re-
gional fund dispute and common agricultural
policy, in light of it.
The French move was regarded by nearly all
the seven remaining members of the float as
symptomatic of the progressive deterioration of
the EC as a stable monetary group. A Dutch
official said the franc float had precipitated a
crisis of confidence and set in motion an "un-
raveling" process in the EC. Great Britain, on the
other hand, probably believes that the French
decision will relieve pressures on London to join
the joint float.
Senior EC Commission officials now feel it
imperative that the community move to counter
the psychological blow dealt by the French
action. They feel that the cumulative effect of the
float and the inability to proceed in other areas
has seriously deepened community malaise. The
commission intends to bring the deteriorating
state of affairs within the community to the at-
tention of the member states and ask that they
take a new look at their interests in the com-
prehensive development of the community.
The de facto creation of a deutschemark
bloc, meanwhile, will tend to polarize further a
community already badly split by self-interested
French and British actions with respect to the oil
problem.
An early test of French influence will be
provided by community preparations for the
Washington energy conference. French disregard
for community interest on the monetary issue
may make it easier for a common position to
emerge amon members opposed to Paris'
views. 25X1
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fSince Pyongyang claimed the territorial
waters surrounding South Korean - occupied
islands off the west coast seven weeks ago, both
Koreas have brought additional naval ships into
the area, but each has carefully avoided provoking
incidents. South Korean ferry and resupply ships
with naval escort continue routine trips to the
islands, ignoring Pyongyang's demand that they
obtain prior approval for transitl
jPyongyang's rationale for its action is still
not fully apparent, but it almost certainly in-
cludes the desire to establish full access to waters
within 12 miles of its coasts and to associated
airspace.;
While pressing the limits of its territorial
sovereignty, the North wants to avoid creating a
situation that Seoul might exploit to divert atten-
tion from its present domestic problems. Pyong-
yang has passed up several chances to raise the
territorial issue at recent meetings of the Military
Armistice Commission, thereby preventing the
South from using that forum to present the issue
more credibly to a domestic audience grown in-
creasing) skeptical of "the threat from the
North." I
i 1j INor has the North broadened its earlier
claims to include the islands themselves, although
Pyongyang undoubtedly remains interested in ne-
gotiating their status if and when the UN Com-,
mand-which technically controls them-is dis
,-solved. It may be significant, in this connection,
that in commenting on the current Paracel Islands
dispute, North Korea has carefully avoided draw-
ing parallels with the local situation.;
0 10 20 30 40MIles
0 10 20 30 40 Kilometers
q(- iAt the same time, the North continues its
propaganda attacks alleging that provocative
South Korean naval and air activity off the west
coast is a tactic of the South Korean President to
justify his recent emergency decrees. Such allega-
tions, of course, also provide a basis for Northern
complaint or retaliatory action in the event that
an incident of some sort occurs in the disputed
zone.
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CAMBODIA: GOVERNMENT GAINS
1 {Cambodian Army forces this week regained tacks, the Education Ministry temporarily closed
~. the initiative northwest of Phnom Penh's Pochen- all universities and schools in Phnom Penh. This
tong airfield as command and control problems move was aimed at undercutting a strike by the
began catching up with the Khmer Communists' city's primary and secondary school teachers,
dry-season offensive.( who have been protesting the high cost of living.
L..l \Despite ammunition shortages and increasing
casualties from artillery fire and air strikes, the
Communists had held on in the northwest for
"I over a week. They apparently anticipated that a
planned offensive against the capital's southern
defenses would divert government attention, but
when the offensive did not materialize, Commu-
nist resistance in the north began to wilt. The
airport is now beyond the range of Communist
mortar crews for the first time in almost two
weeks. Government troops continued mopping up
operations in the northwest late in the week and
claim to have captured significant quantities of
arms]
I., I )1_1 !Communist initiatives along the southern
31" 31,.,_-,10.surgen} pressure
ground attacks and shell ing:VNevertheless, some _.___i
fighting has occurred within four miles of Phnom 2i 0 Miles
Penh and government units in several areas have 555132 1-14 CIA
pulled back north of the Prek Thnaot River to
more defensible terrain. A sizable Communist/ [Long Boret probably also hopes that the
campaign in the south still seems likely. Barring closing will dampen any sympathetic student re-
any flare-up in the northwestern sector, however, J-- action to former prime minister Son Sann's recent
the government can now safely commit more 3C) proposal that Lon Not leave the country. Son
reinforcements and most of its aircraft and artil- Sann presented this proposal as a way to reach an
lery to the defense of the southern front. immediate cease-fire and early negotiations. Be-
fore the schools were shut, several university stu-
dent groups had openly endorsed Sann's scenario.
VThe new government headed by Prime Minis- One leftist student association outdid Sann by
ter Long Boret this week exploited the military calling for a complete change of leadership in
situation for domestic political purposes. Citing Phnom Penh and by_supportin i the Communists'
the continuing threat of Communist rocket at- "cause."
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VIETNAM: A QUIET T T
ilitary action fel~ off shay ly durin the
three-day lunar new year festival.
`\Bangkok last week had a bad case of the
political jitters, sparked by unruly student dem-
onstrations against Japan and the US and student-
instigated law-breaking. During a recent press con-
ference, Prime Minister Sariya replied to press
criticism of the deterioration in law and order by
offering to resign if the press believed his govern-
ment was too weak]
i'Sanya contributed to doubts about his abil-
ity to cope with the situation-which are held by
the conservative elite, and particularly the army
officers-by indicating in private that he has little
stomach for the pressures of the job and was
prepared to step down if the King so desired.
When the Prime Minister flew off to Chiang Mai
over the weekend to consult with the King, many
believed Sanya would return to Bangkok an ordi-
nary citizerfl\lnstead, the Prime Minister returned
to the capital armed with a tough statement link-
ing the survival of his government to the passage
of several key tax bills that the National Assem-
bly had earlier rejected. The Prime Minister
strongly implied that his challenge to the assem-
bly had the firm backing of the King. Sanya
alluded to the King's advice on the measures that
should be adopted in order to deal with the
energy crisis. He also referred to the monarch's
"interest" in recent student demonstrations-an
oblique but still clear signal to the students to get
off the streets and back into the classrooms.I
\The episode is illustrative of the new politi-
cal forces now at play in Thailand. In particular,
it points up the King's new political status and his
willingness to become deeply engaged in domestic
affairs. When student pressures threatened the
stability of the government, it was the King's
support, not the military's, that proved crucial.
For the time being, at least, army chief Krit
Sivara appears content to defer to the King's
wishes and remain on the political side-
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N%W 5L UKL I Iw
c.f-0 [Negotiations on a new coalition government
may soon gather momentum. Prime Minister
Souvanna, in a private conversation with visiting
USIA Director Keogh on January 20, said he now
expects the new government to be formed early
next month. Souvanna indicated that Soth
Phetrasy, chairman of the Lao Communist delega-
tion to the Joint Central Commission to Imple-
ment the Agreement, informed him late last week
that chief political negotiator Phoun Sipraseuth
would soon be returning to Vientiane with a list
of Pathet Lao ministers for the new government.
Phoun left Vientiane for consultations in Sam
Neua on January 16J
}C' For weeks, the Prime Minister has been
pressing his half-brother, Lao Communist leader
Prince Souphanouvong, to submit such a roster as
a means of helping move the negotiations off
dead center, but up to now these requests had
fallen on deaf ears in Sam Neua. Souvanna's new
optimism is in marked contrast to the gloom he
had exhibited in earlier discussions with senior US
officials in Vientiane?
In another encouraging development, Soviet
Ambassador Vdovin departed Vientiane January
19 for Hanoi and Sam Neua. Vdovin promised US
Ambassador Whitehouse that he would discuss US
policy objectives in Laos, including North Viet-
namese troop withdrawals, with North Viet-
namese and Lao Communist leaders and attempt
to convince them that Souvanna was negotiating
LI in good faith. Vdovin had earlier acknowledged to
the US ambassador that the Pathet Lao were
responsible for the delay in implementing the Lao
accords, and that he intended to do everything
possible to facilitate political negotiations on a
new coalition government. He also predicted that
the Pathet Lao would change their negotiating
tactics early in 1974 and agree to begin serious
~Cdiscussions on a new government. His visit to Sam
Neua marks the first time since 1969 that a Soviet
ambassador has traveled to the Lao Communist
headquarters.?
9c-- (Government and Lao Communist nego-
tiators at the working level have also made limited
progress in resolving some of the difficult prob-
lems associated with the neutralization of Vien-
tiane and Luang Prabang. Both sides have agreed
in principle on the size, duties, and prerogatives
of the "joint protective military forces" called for
in the neutralization of the twin capitals, but
there has been no meeting of the minds on the
question of "joint police forces" for the two
cities-a sticking point that has hamstrung delib-
erations in the Joint Central Commission for
several weeks.
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4 Jakarta is slowly returning to normal after nightclubs and massage parlors unless they are
the riots last week, the worst since the overthrow closed down. They believe the situation in the
of the late president Sukarno. Official statistics city is still tense and that a small spark could
show 11 dead, 139 injured, 877 automobiles trigger anti-Chinese rioting there
(mostly Japanese-made) vandalized, and 144
buildings damaged. The intensity of the violence The government is making appropriate
and the speed with which it spread caught security notes about the validity of some student criti-
officials by surprise; they had anticipated rela- cism, particularly regarding corruption and Indo-
tively small, easily contained student protests] nesia's dependence on foreign money, but offi-
Non-student youth were responsible for
most of the violence and vandalism, but the gov-
ernment now believes that its tolerance of student
protesters created a climate of permissiveness that
contributed to the rioting. The government has
decided therefore to crack clown on all dissent-
ers-175 persons have already been detained, in-
cluding many students and intellectuals. Campus
political activity is banned, and six newspapers
have been closed temporarily)
Jakarta students are quiet for the moment,
stunned by the violence spawned by their demon-
strations, but the government fears that students
in other cities may see the riots as an exhibition
of student power and try to further the cause.
The press reported on January 21 that some
1,000 university students gathered in Bandung,
West Java, to protest new government strictures
on campus political activity. The local security
chief subsequently imposed censorship on all
local newspapers "to ensure security and order."
Authorities in Surabaya, East Java, are worried
about student threats against local Chinese-owned
cials have made it clear that the government and
not the students will decide what changes are
needed. Major reforms that threaten the interests
of important members of the ruling elite are un-
likely, but the government has announced some
measures to meet popular grievances. Guidelines
are being issued to curtail the lavish lifestyle of
government officials. The government has also
promised a new policy on foreign investment to
encourage projects that benefit indigenous busi-
nessmen(fln addition, one of the President's ad-
visers, bitterly attacked by the students as Japan's
broker in the government, may soon be eased
out-ostensibly for reasons of failing health(
s}~ f -It is not yet clear how the fallout from the
riots will affect the budding student movement.
The violence was a sobering experience for stu-
dent leaders, but it also graphically demonstrated
the validity of their original assessment of latent
popular discontent. The tough new government
measures against political activity will provide an
acid test of the students' commitment to their
cause.
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BELGIUM: GOVERNMENT CRISIS
Prime Minister Leburton's coalition of So- demands. Tindemans was apparently hoping to
cialists, Social Christians, and Liberals missed trade off cooperation on the refinery agreement
celebrating its first anniversary by one week when for new concessions on issues sensitive to Flem-
it resigned on January 19. The immediate cause ish-speaking areas.T
of the government's collapse was Iran's cancella-
tion of the $200-million joint petroleum refinery (. [If another government cannot be patched
(lbramco), which Leburton and his Socialist Party together, the King will dissolve parliament and
have strongly supported. The root cause of Bel-J_ new elections will be held within 40 days. A year
gium's political instability, however, is the old(i1 ago when elections were unpalatable to the major
bugbear of regional strife between the Flemish parties, it took 65 days to hammer out a coali-
speakers in the north and the French-speaking tion. This time, the Socialists appear to welcome
Walloons in the south] elections, which they believe will improve their
!The refinery was slated for an area near
Liege and would have been of particular benefit
to eastern Wallonia, where it was linked to the
area's economic regeneration. The agreement was
parliamentary position. They have already de-
clared that they will not participate in a new
coalition unless the government is given the right
to intervene in state energy matters.
warmly supported by Walloons in all three coali-
tion parties, but was never popular with the Flem- i(? L/ ) Leaders of the Social Christian and Liberal
ings. The predominantly Flemish Social Chris parties also sense that the Socialists are in a strong
tians, under the leadership of Deputy Prime Min-~ bargaining position. They are likely to stall elec-
ister Tindemans, have been accused of scuttling? tions as long as possible in order to draw atten-
he plan by raising eleventh hour negotiating tion away from the energy-related lbramco
Premier Edmond Leburton, flanked by cabinet members, announces his resignation
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controversy and back to more traditional issues. and resources. Since the next regularly scheduled
In the interim, the outgoing Leburton govern- session of ECOSOC is still almost three months
ment will act in a caretaker capacity away, an emergency session may be necessary to
maintain the momentum of the proposal. Dutch
(:.C) JUS interests will not be directly affected by representatives in New York have urged their gov-
the government's fall, although there probably ernment to request a special ECOSOC session to
will be a further delay in reaching a decision on determine the UN's role in the energy crisis. The
(,.L/selecting fighter aircraft to replace the Belgian Air Dutch Government, however, may favor a broad
Force's aging F-104s. The Belgian aircraft pur- meeting outside the UN framework, involving
chases are linked to those of the Dutch-the two producers, consumers, and developing countries.1
countries are considering a joint purchase of
either American or French planes-and possibly (? [Paris maintains there is no conflict between
to those of Norway and Denmark. Belgium was its UN conference proposal and the February 11
said to be giving serious consideration to the meeting of oil-consuring states in Washington.
Mirage, and an early decision for the French planet(; The French have been concerned, however, that
might have influenced the other NATO countries the Washington meeting would offend the Arab
to opt for the Miragq Jy world. By promoting a world conference, Paris
Am
riding high, and the US companies need time to
get their fighters into production-one of the
Mirage's strong points is that it is flying now-and
with the producers and to assure that developing
countries have a say. Belgium, for example, re-
to protect its freedom to make bilateral deals for
oil. 7
25X1
j~ (Other consuming countries also see merit in
a global approach as a way to promote dialogue
FRANCE PROPOSES ENERGY TALKS AT UN gards the UN forum as an opportunity to educate
developing countries on the relationship between
(a7 1Paris formally proposed to UN Secretary higher oil prices and the decreased ability of West-
General Waldheim last week that a world energy 0 ern countries to provide development aid. Lon-
conference be held under UN auspices. Waldheim,
who is always interested in expanding UN activi-
ties, is likely to enlarge as much as possible on
France's suggestion. Even before receiving the let-
ter, he had called for a global approach to the
energy problem and had established a study group
in the Secretariat to review the situation.)
(TAccording to Quai UN Director Leprette,
the French letter emphasized the magnitude and
urgency of the problem but did not suggest a
specific time or procedure. The General Assem-
bly's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
would be the most likely forum for such a confer-
ence. Waldheim has focused his suggestions on
ECOSOC, and its wide mandate would be consist-
don has been expressing interest in a broad con-
sumer-producer meeting. EC Commission Presi-
dent Ortoli wants the community to include spe-
cific reference to the French proposal among the
common positions the EC will take at the Wash-
ington conference on February 11.1
The French suggestion is likely to find sup-
p~or from at least some of the nonaligned coun-
tries, even though a global energy conference
could strain nonaligned solidarity. While these
states have thus far given full support to Arab
diplomatic efforts, some of the lesser developed
nations-such as India-are severely threatened by
the oil shortage and high prices. Soviet representa-
tives at the UN expect Moscow-which has not
ent with France's desire for the conference to 7-suffered from any significant oil shortage-to
look beyond the immediate concerns of oil and oppose the conference.
give consideration to all forms of energy needs
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rican aircraft industry. Bias for the Mirage is the oil-producing states. Paris also may be seeking
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SbLHE I
~ IMoscow's token retaliation for the expulsion
of three Soviet diplomats and their wives from
Peking last week indicates that the USSR does
not want to risk a further deterioration of Sino-
Soviet relations. The language of the Soviet pro-
test and the expulsion of only one Chinese diplo-
mat reveal that Moscow would like the episode to
ckl
Moscow is preparing
to return its chief negotiator to the border talks
at Peking after an absence of more than six
months.
Politburo, it is likely that the Soviets had stepped
up their intelligence gathering activities in Peking.
If the incident was merely trumped up, it may be
part of Peking's effort to focus popular attention
on the alleged "threat from the north," a per-
sistent propaganda theme since the Chinese party
congress in August. In any event, the Soviet
response was minimal; the Chinese diplomat ex-
pelled in retaliation, for example, was already en
route to Peking, having completed a six-year tour 25X1
in Moscow. I
fThe imbroglio began on January 15 when
the Chinese arrested the Soviet diplomats,
charged them with espionage, and put them on a
plane for Moscow four days later. They were not
permitted to contact the Soviet Embassy during
this period. On January 16, police in Peking were
still stopping traffic near one of the diplomatic
compounds in a search for "Soviet revisionists."
Moscow's protest note, delivered on January 21,
claimed that the five Soviets were subjected to
"barbaric treatment" and charged that the in-
cident was a "carefully planned hostile act against
the USSR." The note also said, however, that
further consequences of the affair would rest with
China, suggesting that no further actions against
Peking are currently contemplated.(
fin view of the recent transfer of military
commanders in China and the return of former
party secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping to the
Irhis Soviet restraint comes as no surprise.
Even during the worst excesses of China's Cul-
tural Revolution, particularly the two-week siege
of the Soviet Embassy in 1967, Moscow resolved
to hold on in Peking as long as it could. Now that
the Soviets are trying to project an image of
accommodation and good will toward China, they
are evidently determined to contribute as little as
possible to the Sino-Soviet polemic."?
,iii IAnother possible reason for Moscow's
restraint may rest in its current effort to organize
an international communist conference. Several
prominent Communist parties are already op-
posed to such a conference on the grounds that it
would be no more than a Soviet forum for institu-
tionalizing the Sino-Soviet dispute. A further
deterioration of the dispute would give additional
parties-particularly in Asia-ample reason to
boycott any communist meeting.
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TUNISIA-LIBYA: MARKING TIME
L s~Lc) /
Tunisian President Bourgia departed for)
Geneva on January 19 for a medical checkup and
several weeks of rest, leaving behind the recent
merger fiasco with Libya. In his absence, Prime
Minister Nouira, Nouira's deputy, and the interior
minister-all opponents of the plan-will be the
key leaders. They will continue to pay lip-service
to the idea of union with Libya as they proceed
with delaying tactics designed to let down gently
both President Qadhafi and those Tunisians who
favor union.
Nouira has already launched a public cam-
paign that stresses the need for a step-by-step
fulfillment of the numerous pre-conditions for
unity that his government set forth last week.
Nouira's sttempt to convey the impression that
Tunisia still supports the union reflects the
apparent government position that Bourguiba's
agreement to the union should not be publicly
rescinded.
Although Tunisian authorities are still con-
cerned about adverse reactions from domestic
pro-union groups, there have been no significant
disturbances. Students and workers whose expec-
tations of new job opportunities in Libya have
been dashed, however, are believed to be sharply
disappointed.
The union affair has intensified the long-
standing political rivalry between Prime Minister
Nouira and the recently dismissed foreign min-
ister, Mohamed Masmoudi. Nouira played a key
role in convincing Bourguiba to back away from
the merger, which Masmoudi and Qadhafi
apparently worked together to arrange. The fiasco
has dealt at least a short-term setback to Mas-
moudi, but he remains on the political bureau of
the ruling Destourian Socialist Party and is
making efforts to preserve his position.
There still has been no official comment
from Libya since Tunisia began to back away
from the union agreement. The nationwide
referendum-originally scheduled for last week-
was canceled by Tripoli without explanation, in
an apparent effort to avoid further political
embarrassment. Libyan media continue to give
low-key coverage to the unity scheme, but no
mention has been made of joint preparations or a
future referendum date. Never enthusiastic about
the merger, the Libyan public has quietly
accepted the entire affair, which many apparently
view as one more of Qadhafi's earnest but fruit-
less efforts to promote Arab unity.
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NEW UNCERTAINTIES
kAs Indian farmers harvested a bumper rice
crop last fall, it appeared that better days lay
ahead for Prime Minister Gandhi. It is evident
now, however, that India's continuing economic
problems, recently aggravated by the oil shortage,
have increased popular discontent with her
party's rule.
Earlier this month, the Ruling Congress
Party was shaken by four by-election defeats in
Maharashtra State, heretofore a party stronghold.
Coupled with a wave of anti-government dem-
onstrations in many areas, these defeats have
party leaders worried about what may be in store
next month when four states and a union terri-
tory elect new legislatures.
The swell of popular discontent and the re-
sulting swing against her party have probably
come as a shock to Mrs. Gandhi and her sup-
porters. The fall harvest hadl been expected to
alleviate the serious food shortages that followed
the weak monsoon of 1972. Many farmers, how-
ever, have refused to sell their crops to the gov-
ernment for re-sale in "fair-price" shops and are
either hoarding or selling on the open market
where they can get higher prices. Food at con-
trolled prices thus remains scarce. Other essential
commodities, such as kerosene and cooking oil,
have also become increasingly hard to obtain, and
the government has raised gasoline prices 70 per-
cent in order to reduce consumption.
The most important of the five approaching
z3iections is in the north-central state of Uttar
Pradesh. With a population of 90 million, it is
India's largest state and is Mrs. Gandhi's home
base. Since its last legislative election in 1969, the
Mate has been run by a series of shaky admin-
istrations with interludes of direct rule from New
Delhi. The Prime Minister is qoing all out to win
this one, beginning with her installation last
November of an interim government controlled
by the Ruling Congress party. She has also pro-
vided ample food stocks and a multitude of cen-
!rally funded development projects, and is making
numerous personal appearances.
Victory in Uttar Pradesh seemed assured-
until the Maharashtra debacle demonstrated the
depth of public disenchantment with the Ruling
Congress. The party's electoral prospects are
further threatened by two particularly disgruntled
groups in Uttar Pradesh, the untouchables and the
Muslims. Either group or both may withhold their
customary support on the grounds that the gov-
ernment has not provided adequate safeguards
against discrimination by caste Hindus.
At this time, Mrs. Gandhi still remains un-
challenged as a national leader. Her government
does not face re-election until 1976, and as yet
there are no indications that a viable alternative
to her party and its programs is in the making.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Prime Minister's
image has been tarnished and that a more ef-
fective performance by her administration will be
required if she is to escape more serious political
consequences-1
MIG FORCE IN TROUBLE
IndiamaV h~a?v to ground all of its MIG-
21FL fighters until structural fatigue problems
with the aircraft are overcome. New Delhi has
about 200 of these planes.
The USSR, I I has
reluctantly agreed to send repair materials for the
planes that were built in the USSR. Hindustan
Aeronautics, the firm that constructs the MIG-21
in India, has reportedly asked for help in mod-
ifying the MIG-21s it produces under license, but
the Soviets have not yet replied.
The Indians have also begun producing a
newer model, the MIG-21M. This version has been
modified for a tactical strike role, but does not
have the range at low altitudes that the Indian Air
Force wants. the MIG-21M
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`we SCUKL I
has the same wing skin as the MIG-21FL and that
similar problems with the wings are anticipated.
Dissatisfaction with the capabilities of Soviet
aircraft as well as a desire to diversify pro-
curement prompted India to send evaluation
teams to France and the UK in mid-1972 to look
for possible alternatives. Lack of sufficient for-
eign exchange, however, has forced New Delhi to
postpone plans to purchase any Western air-
GREECE BESET BY ECONOMIC WOES
One of the legacies of the ousted Papa-
dopoulos regime was a developing economic
crisis. Soaring inflation and a deteriorating bal-
ance of payments are being aggravated by sharp
rises in wages and import prices-most notably for
oil-and by a too rapid expansion of the money
supply. Wholesale prices increased by nearly 50
percent last year, cutting deeply into workers'
real income.
The trade deficit rose to $1.8 billion
for the first nine months of 1973, compared with
$1 billion in the corresponding period of 1972;
the over-all payments balance dropped by nearly
$400 million. The regime will find it difficult to
redress the trade imbalance because Greece
imports the major portion of the machinery and
raw materials needed by its industries as well as
all of its crude oil. These commodities, for which
there is little possibility of substituting domesti-
cally produced goods, constitute nearly 60 per-
cent of Greece's import bill. Because of the
seriousness of the trade deficit, the government
reportedly is considering an austerity program
that would force cutbacks in public investment
and reduced imports of foodstuffs and non-
essential consumer goods.
In recent years, Greece's large trade deficit
has been covered by remittances from Greek
citizens working abroad, earnings from shipping
and tourism, and by capital inflows. As a result of
the energy crisis, however, these receipts are
likely to stagnate or decline this year. An
economic recession in Western Europe, partic-
ularly in West Germany, could reduce worker
remittances substantially below the nearly $600
million recorded in 1972. In West Germany,
where 270,000 Greek workers remit nearly $300
million annually, officials are no longer issuing
new permits to workers from non-EC countries.
Should Europe suffer a serious recession, nearly
200,000 Greeks might have to be repatriated,
resulting in a serious labor surplus in Greece.
Earnings from tourism will grow more
slowly in 1974, as rapidly increasing prices have
reduced the cost advantages of vacationing in
Greece. The impact of oil price rises and supply
problems on the cost and availability of inter-
national travel, as well as sagging incomes in
countries experiencing economic slowdown, will
also cut into tourism.
The aura of political instability created by
the coup also will discourage investment. Much
foreign investment in Greece has been based on
the potential profitability of combining cheap
local labor with preferential access to the EC
market. But in 1973, the government permitted
wages, under pressure from prices, to climb by
about 20 percent. Substantial wage hikes this year
are inevitable, further cutting the cost advantage
for industrial investment in the country.
The bleak forecast for the economy will do
nothing to aid the regime's efforts to create a
"new" Greece. Economic stresses at the consumer
level are bound to be blamed on the government,
as consumers make adverse comparisons between
the present and preceding regimes. Public dis-
satisfaction will probably be muted-at least for
the short run-because of press censorship and the
harsh penalties that the government has been
meting out to critics of its policies.
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Nose SECRET Nwe
'-1'( (President Peron's dramatic call for a national
mobilization to destroy terrorism has, at least
} temporarily, united a large part of the fractious
Argentine community behind him and isolated his
opponents.'
7 [The audacious and bloody attack by Marxist
&i 8
guerrillas on a military garrison last weekend has
resulted in near universal shock and outrage, even
in a society inured to growing violence. The raid
also was a tactical disaster, and the terrorists are
publicly admitting it. Although there are conflict-
ing reports, as many as 20 terrorists may have
been killed, and hundreds of suspected extremists
are being rounded up in large-scale police opera-
tions.(
y [Although recent events clearly have pre-
sented Peron with a unique opportunity to strike
a hard blow at the terrorists, there are dangers
inherent in the situation. Heavy-handed actions in
political purges of his movement or in security
operations would soon undercut the psychologi-
cal advantage he now holds and would drive the
Peronist left wing into the extremist camp. On
the other hand, the military could quickly be-
come disenchanted if Peron does not follow up
his pronouncements with effective action.F_
f)5 Military leaders seem reassured by Peron's BOLIVIA: BANZER'S PROBLEMS
tough response. Although their role in the coun-
ter-terrorist drive is still not clear, most officers 9C? Colivian security forces are on alert follow-
see recent developments as a watershed that will j, ing scattered demonstrations and strikes protest-
mark the end of Peron's policy of restraint to- )Co ing official price increases of several basic food
ward the extremist groups. The President's blast items. The government raised domestic prices by
against unidentified provincial authorities for ~Dl as much as 100 percent early this week in an
being soft on leftists-a clear move to force the effort to discourage the smuggling of scarce com-
ouster of administrators who are out of step with +~ modities, especially wheat, to external black mar-
his policies-was particularly welcomed by the ? kets.1
mil itary.l
11 VA number of labor groups, including the
,I7 (The left-leaning governor of Buenos Aires ~ volatile mine workers, initiated walkouts of 24 to
Province, where the guerrilla incident occurred, 36 hours duration on January 22. Serious con-
was forced to resign, and there are press reports IO3frontations have been avoided thus far, and no
G~ that the province will be taken over by central strong leaders have arisen among the strikers to
government officials. Similarly, the governor and make the situation more troublesome-1
leftist labor leaders in Cordoba Province are under
fire and will, at least for a while, be more cautious
'Ct The atmosphere is expected to remain tense,
in their opposition to the policies of the federal
government: ow ver, for at least a week. If the strikes are
0 3rolonged, Banzer will be in serious trouble1
el L~ The left-wing youth of the Peronist Move- ) 'J VEven before the price hike, the US Embassy
ment have denounced the terrorists' actions but reported that at least one demonstration by
they have also condemned as "repressive" the workers against food shortages and costs was
tf draft laws now before Congress aimed at tighten- ) b?broken up by police. Embassy observers also
ing anti-terrorist legislation. While they may con- noted that the lack of meat, sugar, and cooking
tinue demonstrating against the laws, their posi- oil had become a "principal topic of conversa-
tion has been weakened and the legislation will tion," and that there were long lines of shoppers
undoubtedly be promulgated soon.] at stores all over La Pazj
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the shortages and inflated prices come at a
time when Banzer can ill afford a new political
challenge. Many of his former supporters-both in
the military and in the two main political par-
ties-have gone into some form of opposition.
The President recently exiled former president
Victor Paz Estenssoro, the nation's most pres-
tigious political figure, who was accused of ac-
tively plotting against the government. Now in
Argentina, Paz is seeking to forge an alliance with
other prominent Bolivian exiles to overthrow
Banzer. The serious supply situation could arouse
consumers and stimulate more active coup plot-
ting both within the country and among ex-
Costa Ricans will go to the polls on Febru-
ary 3 to choose a president for the next four
years. Voters are exhibiting little enthusiasm for
the contest, a factor that may work to the advan-
tage of the governing National Liberation Party's
presidential candidate, Daniel Oduber. He must
win a plurality of 40 percent in the eight-candi-
date race or face a run-off in April. Oduber's
strategists, after some initial doubts, are confident
of victory on the first ballot(
Oduber has pursued an intellectual ap-
proaVh, dryly describing the nation's problems
and explaining how he and his party propose to
cope with them. He has divorced himself as much
as possible from the Figueres administration and
its vulnerability to charges of corruption and inef-
ficiency, but without openly breaking with the
President and thus losing the large block of votes
he controls\
0 q r Fernando Trejos is even more bland than
Oduber. Even though there is an arsenal of poten-
tially damaging charges available to use against
the administration, he has chosen to ignore such
issues. In anticipation of a possible run-off elec-
tion, however, he has,been even more gentle with
the minor candidates.(
Of the lesser candidates, only two stand a
chance of winning even 10 to 15 percent of the
votes: Rodrigo Carazo, who heads the ticket of a
splinter of the governing party, and Jorge Gon-
zalez Marten of the right-wing National Independ-
ent Party. Although more strident than the two
top contenders, neither Carazo nor Gonzalez has
generated much appeal among the uncommitted.
The extreme left seems to be doing even more
poorlyi
The only note of color in the campaign has
The candidates, especially Oduber and his been provided by a fringe candidate, Gerardo
chief opponent on the conservative National Uni- ;r'; Villalobos, whose antics have delighted--though
fication ticket, Fernando Trejos, are not the col- not persuaded-the electorate. He has parachuted
orful figures to which Costa Rican voters have from airplanes, wrestled with the Central Ameri-
become accustomed. For the first time in 30 ), can champion, and ridden a donkey to publicize
years, neither of the two principal political adver-
saries, whose supporters fought a civil war in
1948, is participating in the campaign. One is
dead, and the other, the usually irrepressible Pres-
ident Jose Figueres, is remaining above the battle,
obeying the constitutional injunction against par-
tisan activity.1
Rulings by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
have also dampened enthusiasm. They have, for
the most part, stopped the extra-legal tactics and
mud-slinging of past campaigns. Even the news-
papers, fearing that they will be fined, have re-
fused to accept paid political ads that they con-
sider offensive. Fd
the energy crisis. Although Villalobos probably
will not poll many votes, in a recent television
interview he was watched by 70 percent of the
viewing public, an indication of the public's
hunger for a candidate with some flair.
The uncommitted voters, many of them
newly enfranchised 18-year-olds, could be a de-
,,,-tiding factor in the election, providing the margin
Oduber needs to win on the first ballot. The
campaign may liven up somewhat in the remain-
ing few days but, barring very unusual circum-
stances, the Costa Rican tradition of peaceful and
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