WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A009900040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 24, 1972
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review
completed.
Navy review
completed.
Secret
24 November 1972
No. 0397/72
Copy NQ 46
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SUMMARY, issued everv Friday morning by
Trent Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif.
opments of the week through noon on Thursday.
ly includes material coordinated with or prepared
ice of Econormr Research; the Office of Strategic
and the Direeto ate of Science and Technology.
equiring more comprehensive Treatment and there
iblisiaed separately as Special Reports are listed in the
CONTENTS (24 November 1972)
3 Banking on the West
4 Argentina: The New Politics
6 Indochina
8 Korea: Elections North and South
9 French Arms Sales Slacken
10 New Trade Talks
11 The Netherlands: A Squeaker
12 Poland: Grumbling Through Channels
13 Romania-Yugoslavia: In Helsinki
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
14 Egypt-USSR: Keeping in Touch
14 Egypt: A Season of Discord
15 Israel: A Message to Syria
16 Zaire: Looking to the Future
17 Angola: Divided Liberators
18 Morocco: More of the Same
18 The Arabs: Still at Odds
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
19 Uruguay: Navy Upset
19 Brazil: Municipal Elections
20 Cuba: Changes in the Party
21 Chile: Allende Heads Abroad
22 Honduras: Waiting for Lopez
23 Haiti: A Strongman Gets Axed
24 Ecuador: A Gaggle of Problems
SPECIAL
REPORTS (Published separately)
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Mw~ JCUIiC I 141110p+
7 IThe USSR and Eastern Europe are in the
market for new Western credits. They have
stepped up their contacts with leading US finan-
cial houses and have consulted with the president
of the US stock exchange. The Russians have now
agreed to permit two banks with large interna-
tional credit operations-one US and one
French-to open "representative" offices in Mos-
cow. Judging from the volume of new orders for
Western machinery and equipment, Communist
needs for credit will increase-probably at an ac-
celerated rate in the case of the USSR and a
somewhat slower pace for Eastern Europe.
J ;Except for food aid under PL-480 and assist-
ance by the Commodity Credit Corporation,
which recently extended $500 million to help
finance Soviet grain purchases, US banks and of-
ficial agencies have not participated significantly
in granting credit to Communist countries. With
the easing of political relations, however, Moscow
expects the US Government as well as private
American institutions to play a major role in
financing Communist imports. Export-Import
Bank credit and insurance have been made avail-
able to the USSR, Poland, and Romania.
Other US banks appear to be willing to enter into
consortia to finance US exports for various indus-
trial projects in the USSR and have participated
in marketing bonds floated by Hungary. The pres-
ent financing activities of all Western organiza-
tions, however, could be dwarfed by Western con-
tributions to the multi-billion dollar projects in-
volving oil and liquid natural gas now being dis-
cussed.]
!The USSR is in a somewhat better position
vis-a-vis its Western creditors than the East Euro-
pean countries. Soviet indebtedness rose from
$50 million in 1960 to over $2 billion this year,
but the average maturity of the Soviet debt is
longer than that of Eastern Europe and, there-
fore, easier to service. The USSR's large stock of
gold, worth over $2 billion, enhances its credit
worthiness, and its rich reserves of raw materials
can help pay for machinery and equipment. Self-
liquidating credit deals, such as the gas-for-pipe
contracts negotiated with Western Europe, have
further lightened the burden of the growing
Soviet debt and promise large foreign exchange
earnings in the future.
{ ~f I.Some of the East European countries, on the
other hand, are at or near levels of indebtedness
where repayment becomes a serious problem.
Yugoslavia's debt burden is the greatest, having
climbed from about $600 million in 1960 to
about $2.5 billion in 1972. The rest of Eastern
Europe's debt rose from $600 million to over $4
billion during the same period. Romania carries a
particularly heavy burden; about 40 percent of its
1971 exports to hard-currency countries had to
be used just to service the debt. Romania has
managed to reschedule some of its debt and ac-
quired a hard currency loan from China. Bulgaria
has received hard currency assistance from the
USSR in order to protect Communist credit
ratings. Eastern Europe has warned Western coun-
tries that they must make efforts to increase their
purchases from Eastern Europe if present trade
levels are to be maintained. Joint ventures and
barter deals are also being tried to augment
financing by credits. Nevertheless, Eastern Eu-
rope's indebtedness is likely to exceed $5 billion by
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ARGENTINA: THE NEW POLITICS
Since arriving in Buenos Aires on 17 Novem-
ber, former dictator Juan Peron has done more to
move toward a broad political accord than Presi-
dent Lanusse has since coming to power in March
1971. Peron's efforts to fulfill his proclaimed
"mission of peace" have been facilitated by the
unexpected freedom of movement that Lanusse
has permitted him over the strong objections of
elements in the armed forces.l
The rousing and violent welcome that mili-
tary 'leaders had long believed would occur if
Peron ever returned did not materialize. Large
crowds gathered around Peron's home in the sub-
urbs after the government allowed the old dic-
tator to leave the airport, but for the most part
they were joyful and orderly. Obviously tired, but
just as obviously reveling in the adulation of his
followers, the 77-year-old former president lost
little time in demonstrating that he is indeed a
potent political power in Argentina. I
1 r; [Peron gathered leaders from a wide spectrum
of political parties and movements to discuss the
formation of a broad popular front for the presi-
dential elections scheduled next March. Peron still
has much to do before he can claim success in this
venture, but the first meeting did produce what
he termed a "censensus to share a common atti-
tude." The group that shares this consensus en-
compasses representatives of all major political
views except the conservatives and the extreme
left. The group reportedly agreed to ask the gov-
ernment to remove the residency requirement
that bars Peron from running for president, al-
though it seems unlikely that Peron seriously con-
templates being a candidate.;
it Ilt would be difficult for President Lanusse
to agree to a suspension of the residency require-
ment. He was under criticism from his military
comrades for letting Peron return at all, and the
#_ ~4_~_Alllll MAO
Waiting to Greet Peron
Still a Potent Political Power
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Peron at Suburban Villa
"Neither Menacing nor Timid "
armed forces opposition to Lanusse's handling of
the affair has increased with each new move by
Peron3
' JLanusse has continued to play a waiting
game, however, hoping that Peron's popular
image will be tarnished through public exposure.
Lanusse has, however, made some moves behind
the scenes to try to prevent Peron from achieving
a coalition or, if he does, to improve the chances
that it will be acceptable to the armed forces. i
Both Peron and Lanusse seem to agree that they
time is propitious for the division between
Peronist and anti-Peronist that has wracked
Argentine society for decades to be overcome.
They both appear to realize that this cannot be
accomplished without the cooperation of the two
most powerful forces in Argentina, the military
and the Peronists. A direct encounter between
Peron and Lanusse, or possibly their seconds,
would seem to be a necessary step. Years of bitter 25X1
antagonism, the massive egos of the two men, and
the impatience of the military, will make reaching
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3Both sides are still trying to expand their
territory before a cease-fire is declared. In the
northern half of South Vietnam, South Vietnam-
ese Marines north of Quang Tri City moved close
to the Cua Viet River, the last natural barrier held
by the Communists south of the DMZ. West of
the city, South Vietnamese paratroops are in an
area that had been under enemy control since the
early weeks of the offensive. Heavy rains and
flooding are hampering movements on both sides.':
;In the central highlands, elements of the
North Vietnamese 320th Division are conducting
a campaign in western Pleiku Province. Most of
the attacks have been near the Thanh An District
capital, the last major government district head-
quarters in the western highlands. These actions
are similar to those mounted by the Communists
against border ranger camps in both Kontum and
Pleiku during the past few weeks and apparently
are intended to eliminate any significant govern-
ment presence near the border.'
(Military activity in the southern half of the
country has been light and sporadic. The Com-
munists continue to shell scattered district and
provincial cities in the delta but have not fol-
lowed up with major ground attacks.
More Support for Thieu
jThe South Vietnamese Senate added its
voice to that of the Lower House and many other
groups this week by passing a resolution of sup-
port for the government's peace stand. The reso-
lution was approved by a 36-8 vote. Senate chair-
man Huyen's Catholic group, which recently has
switched from an opposition posture to one more
favorable to the President, joined pro-government
senators in supporting the measure.
!It was opposed by Buddhist leader Vu Van
Mau and a small band of followers, who tried
unsuccessfully to postpone the vote on the resolu-
tion and to insert a clause calling on Thieu to
bring about greater "national unity." Mau, one of
the few political leaders to criticize Thieu pub-
licly in recent days, apparently believesj~he Bud-
dhists should maintain their opposition despite
the uncertainties in the current situation. Other
Buddhist leaders, including the influential Tri
Quang, reportedly are concerned about the sur-
vival of an anti-Communist government and
believe the Buddhists should refrain, for the time
being, from attacking the Thieu administration.
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Sb KI I
llj )Government efforts to retake lost territory
in south Laos are having mixed results. A twelve-
battalion irregular force in the central panhandle
is clearing small Communist units out of villages
east of Dong Hene, where sizable enemy supply
caches have been uncovered. The irregulars have
now pushed five miles east of the Se Champone
River. The North Vietnamese regiment that re-
sisted the government move across the river
earlier in the week has for the most part fallen
back to defend Muong Phalane, a town on Route
9 not far from the Ho Chi Minh supply network.
resistance, and an irregular force has reoccupied
positions at the junction of Routes 23 and
Farther south, elements of an eight-battalion
irregular force have moved back into Saravane, a
provincial capital north of the Bolovens Plateau.
North Vietnamese troops from the 968th Division
had driven government units from the town on 15
November, but the irregulars stayed nearby and
directed air strikes on enemy positions. The Com-
munists are probing irregular positions near Ban
Lao Ngam, the other government-held town in
the area, and may be preparing to push back into
the town, once used as a Communist supply
center... Lao Army units have advanced about ten
miles east of Khong Sedone without meeting any
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irregulars clear ",
villages
13 Dong
Hene I Muong
'.1 9ePhala e
va iokho,t
Kong Kok
LAO S
$~ Reoc J.pied VIETNAM
~J3aravane>
_. hellings cr ase
JwBan 11------' 96
ao Ngg
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KOREA: ELECTIONS NORTH AND SOUTH
Seoul's new constitution, approved by a sub-
stantial majority of South Koreans in a national
referendum on 21 November, will permit Presi-
dent Pak Chong-hui to continue his rule indef-
initelyjAlthough tight control of the referendum
process ensured the favorable outcome, the gov-
ernment had overseen an extensive campaign to
overcome voter apathy. Prominent officials
traveled across the country to underscore the
regime contention that the new measure was
necessary to foster national unification and pros-
perity' [The President personally took to the
hustings, sounding strident notes of nationalism
and promising rapid economic development in
rural areas in the next few years.;
;The regime was confident that any op-
position could be kept under wraps. Tanks and
troops were withdrawn from the streets shortly
before the vote, and a session of the Red Cross
talks was scheduled in Seoul just afterwardjDis-
gruntled elements within the intellectual and
Christian communities were already cowed by the
regime's tough enforcement of
martial law-more than 200 had
been arrested and several opposi-
tion politicians beaten up. The
only way left to register a protest
was to join the reportedly less
than 10 percent of eligible voters
who stayed away from the polls.
the government is likely to re-
main toughl ias it moves to com-
plete the scheduled changes.
Under the new constitution,
a National Council for Unification
and Self-Reliance composed of up
to 3,000 local officials must now
be elected, and this body will in
turn select the new president.
Both events are scheduled for mid-
December so that Pak can begin
the new year with a sweeping
mandate and greatly expanded
powers. The President clearly
AN w , " - M%
- NM60 ,iiA
a" a
9 11 0 .12,00
hopes that the rapid completion of the changes
will cut short any disarray at home and keep
adverse foreign criticism, particularly from the
US, to a minimum. Some Korean officials main-
tain that once the president is in office, martial
law w,jll be lifted and other restrictions will be
eased.)
Voting Up North
"Pyongyang has announced that it will hold
elecfrons on 12 December for the Supreme Peo-
ple's Assembly, which will in turn ratify a new
North Korean constitution. Regime spokesmen
are maintaining that the constitutional changes-
approved by a plenum of the party central
committee last month-are needed to reflect the
nation's achievement of a "higher stage of social-
ism." Pro-Pyongyang Koreans in Japan suggest
that it is also intended to facilitate national
unification by removing impediments to greater
WEE
~.?_s: ?.. -? ::.~':: ? is
Hiratsuka's "Seoul Todaimon Gate, Korea," 1934.
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FRENCH ARMS SALES SLACKEN
For France, the world's third largest arms
supplier, 1972 has not been an especially lucrative
year. In the first six months, arms sales were
down by about 40 percent from the same period
in 1971. In 1970 and 1971, sales topped the
$1-billion mark for the first time, but in both
years sales were inflated by large contracts, such
as the Mirage aircraft deal with Libya and the sale
of more than 700 Exocet anti-ship missiles to
some ten countries. I
)The French armament industry has had bad
years before and recovered. French officials have
been quick to point out that a decline in arms
sales for 1972 should not be interpreted as a
slackening of effort and that France intends to
remain as formidable a competitor as in the past j
The French expect that sales of aeronautical
equipment will continue to spearhead their effort.
The new Mirage F1 fighter-bomber, for example,
is being pushed in a number of countries looking
for an aircraft to replace aging US F-104s and
older Mirage Ills. Dassault, the manufacturer of
the new fighter-bomber, is confident that sales
will equal or surpass the more than 1,000 Mirage
Ills and Mirage 5s sold by the company. _\,
Aeronautical
Ground forces
Electronics
Naval
1969 1970 1971
Mirages at Dassault Plant
Confident of New Sales
x; )Despite the success of French arms sales in
Ithe past and French confidence about the future,
some French press writers recently suggested that
1973 may see the introduction of increased com-
petition, particularly from the US. The newsmen
argue that this may occur because of the antici-
pated cutoff of the Vietnam outlet for US arms
producers and the SALT agreements that will free
the US and USSR to concentrate on improving
conventional arms systems for sales.
)The French Government apparently views
the threat of increased competition as potentially
serious. In a recent meeting, the technical adviser
to Defense Minister Debre pointed out to the US
defense attache in Paris that reasonable com-
petition in arms sales is natural, but that excessive
competition between France and the US could be
detrimental to both countries. The French official
added that in such circumstances, third countries
might be tempted to play off one arms supplier
against the other to get the best terms. He has-
tened, however, to assure the US attache that
France has no wish to cause the US_ political
embarrassment in any specific arms deal..)
?French success in the arms field can be
ascribed to three main factors:
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The French are willing to sell arms on
easy credit terms with long repayment periods
and-unlike many other arms suppliers-with
few political strings attached;
? The French have been willing to sell
arms in markets where the US and the British
will not, particularly in the Middle East, Latin
America, Africa, and South Asia;
? The French have the added stimulus of
needing to amortize the costs of their large
national arms industry, which Paris counts as
a basic component of France's independence...
:Over the past year, the French seem to have
introduced a fourth factor. In an attempt to cap-
ture a greater share of the European arms market,
Paris is pressing its neighbors to be "good Euro-
peans" and procure arms within the Common
Market. If this effort is successful, France will
become the supplier for many major items of
military equipment, particularly fighter
NEW TRADE TALKS
iBuilding on earlier commitments by the US,
the EC, and Japan, representatives of the 57 con-
tracting parties to the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade have agreed to proceed with the
most ambitious negotiations to reduce world-wide
barriers to trade since the 1964-67 Kennedy
Round. Plans for the negotiations came out of a
two-week session that ended in Geneva last week.
The negotiations, expected to begin in November
1973, will deal with tariff reductions, a wide
range of non-tariff obstacles to trade, and the
special problems involved in reducing agricultural
protectionism.
for the negotiations. In September 1973, a minis-
terial-level session is scheduled to work out the
final negotiating guidelines Although the EC
agreed to open the actual negotiations next No-
vember, it is somewhat skeptical that the US will
be able to meet the schedule. The hoped-for date
for concluding the negotiations is 1975.'
)A number of points of contention between
the EC and the US will arise during the talks.
Commenting on last week's meetings, the Euro-
,( pean press pointed to alleged US demands that
the negotiations aim principally at the eventual
elimination of all industrial tariffs. The EC,
following the French line, has long maintained
that a tariff wall is still necessary to provide
"cement" for the community. In part through
deft intervention by the EC Commission, how-
ever, the community has now accepted zero
industrial tariffs as one approach to be considered
for the negotiations. The question will be debated
again. The hotter the pursuit of a zero-tariff goal,
however, the more insistent will be demands for
safeguards against "disruptive" imports.'
)Another set of GATT negotiations will begin
early next year. These talks are to arrange for
compensation due the trading partners of EC
members because of new discrimination arising
from the community's enlargement and its free-
trade arrangements with certain other European
countriesl1These talks should be finished prior to
the general trade talks, but are likely to be dif-
ficult because the EC will not want to make
concessions in them that could be better saved for
the later bargaining.]
\t the Geneva talks last week, some less-
developed countries again laid claim to the sort of
special consideration in the general trade talks
that the industrial states are unwilling to grant.
The developing countries were assured that they
should secure additional benefits in the general
talks, but they will press their wider demands
3 -throughout the negotiations, and considerable
Preparatory work on the "tech
i
n
ques and effort will be necessary to prevent the talks from
modalities" of the trade negotiations has been degenerating into a dispute between the "haves"
.under way for some time' ~A ,,..
itt ...
m
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NETHERLANDS: A SQUEAKER -I- 9 '7 )
3 7 tWidespread disagreement over how to deal
with the nation's most pressing problem-infla-
tion-has turned a rather desultory campaign into
a heated struggle between the Biesheuvel govern-
ment and the opposition just a few days before
the 29 November national elections. The unstable
minority coalition had hitherto been able to beat
back challenges to its legislative program and was
deriving satisfaction from the latest polls that
indicated growing popular support. The govern-
ment, however, must endure a crucial parliamen-
tary debate that might affect its electoral for-
tunes...)
4 ;?Prime Minister Biesheuvel has faced con-
siderable criticism that he has followed economic
policies designed to do no more than preserve the
tenuous unity of his coalition. The center-right
parties that form the government, for example,
have long disagreed about the need for wage and
price controls to combat the high rate of infla-
tion. The opposition Progressive Bloc, led by the
DS'70 8
CPN - Communist Party of the Netherlands
PSP- Pacifist Socialist Party
Progressive Opposition Bloc
PPR- Radical Political Party
D '66- Democrats `66
Pvd A- Party of Labor
DS '70- Democratic Socialists '70
Government Coalition
KVP- Catholic People's Party
ARP-Anti-Revolutionary Party
CHU-Christian Historical Union
VVD-Liberals
Prime Minister Biesheuvel
Labor Party, saw a good chance that voter dissat-
isfaction with the government's economic policies
might give the bloc enough seats in parliament to
form a government of its own.
,)The opposition's efforts to dramatize the
issue had been unfruitful until now. In an elev-
enth-hour challenge, the Labor Party, supported
by the trade unions, demanded a price freeze and
threatened a parliamentary debate this week if
the government failed to act. Biesheuvel tem-
porarily pre-empted the debate, however, by an-
nouncing selected price controls. Any decision
was a calculated risk, for either labor or manage-
ment might as a result have backed off from the
accord recently reached on wage-price guide lines
for next year-an accord that had improved the
coalition's election prospects. The government
won the support of the trade unions for its deci-
sion, but the employers are claiming that the
price controls will undermine the equity of the
projected 1973 guide lines and are now refusing
to sign the accord.
y? Although the outcome will not be known
until the votes are counted, Biesheuvel probably
gained from this week's maneuvering. His efforts
showed that his factious coalition, including the
business-oriented Liberals, is willing to support
limited price controls. The government may even
regain the allegiance of its former coalition part-
ner, the Democratic Socialists, who have re-
peatedly urged Biesheuvel to adopt anti-infla-
tionary measures. On the other hand, the opposi-
tion's demand for a full-scale price freeze is un-
likely to win support, even from the trade
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[Polish workers at a recent trade union con-
gress let it be known that they are not entirely
pleased with their present standard of living. They
acknowledge, however, that they are better off
under party chief Gierek than they were under
Gomulka, and they therefore seem willing to give
Gierek a short-term vote of confidences
trade union charter only after strongly criticizing
it. A draft labor code, presented to the congress
with much fanfare, also came in for sharp criti-
cism. Many delegates argued that the guarantees
of worker and union rights, as outlined in the
draft code, were too narrow and too vaquely
defined. The code was sent back to be rewritten.
s %"k till, the seventh congress of the Polish Cen J~, The militancy of Polish workers reflects a
tral Association of Trade Unions ended in Warsaw growing awareness of their political clout and an
last week on a somewhat controversial note. Only interest in organizing their unions into a more
the election of trade union officials for the next r-,')effective mechanism to exert pressure on their
LI` four years went according to party plan. The `"behalf. Delegates to this congress were younger
delegates accepted the government-proposed than those who attended the previous one in
Gierek with Gdansk Shipyard Workers, 1971
A Short-term Vote of Confidence
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";Z)1967; some got to the congress by challenging the
traditional selection process in their local unions.
Polish workers in general are still testing their
power. They well remember that it was their
demonstrations in December 1970 that resulted
in the downfall of the old regime and sent
tremors throughout the Soviet bloc. Minor strikes
and work stoppages have been occurring with
increasing frequency this year, and most have
ended to the workers' satisfaction
es ite these difficulties with the
workers, a regime prefers to have their com-
plaints out in the open. Gierek has consistently
tried to use the unions as a vehicle of communica-
tion between the workers and the party leaders
and seems willing to accept that the communica-
tions should be two ways. Therefore, although
Gierek did not get all that he wanted from the
trade union congress, he at least saw to it that the
workers, unlike during the December 1970
period, blew off excess steam through approved
channels. Because the Polish worker is going to
have to live with substantial economic problems
for some years to come, a safety valve of this sort
is a political necessity.
s4'ugoslavia and Romania will work hard to
ensure equal rights for all participants gathered in
Helsinki this week to prepare for a full dress
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe next year. In the process, they will
espouse positions contrary to those held by the
US and USSR, but neither of the mavericks is
likely to push the preparatory talks onto the
rocks. J
)If the preliminary talks were to get into
atters of substance, Belgrade, with support from
Bucharest, would press the desirability of estab-
lishing nuclear-free zones in the Balkans and
Mediterranean area, a prohibition on military
maneuvers and bases on foreign soil, and the
removal of all barriers to increased trade, scien-
tific, and cultural exchanges. j
~-3 Yugoslavia has voiced concern lest the out-
come of European detente merely shift the great-
power confrontation from central Europe to the
7 )Mediterranean] his past week, Belgrade con-
demned the scenario for force reduction talks-to
be held separate from the security conference-as
a superpower design that would fail to offer
security to countries outside central Europe. The
commentary suggested that the only way such
great-power games can be frustrated is for smaller
countries to force the conference to live up to its
responsibilities to provide security for all
Europeans.l
,'~ks one counterweight, Belgrade has been
r
omoting a Mediterranean security meeting
p
which, although still plagued by differences over
agenda and attendance, could take place before
the security conference itself convenes, probably
in June 1973. The participants-presumably in-
cluding such countries as Egypt, Tunisia, and
Algeria-would highlight the Mediterranean
aspects of the over-all problem.j
,S4 ZLike Yugoslavia, Romania regards the
European Security Conference as a forum for
countering Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe
and a politically united Western Europe. Bucha-
rest opposes bloc politics on principle and, over
the long run, hopes that some sort of machinery
or a secretariat will be established that would
"guarantee" the territorial integrity and inde-
pendence of all European states. More im-
mediately, the Romanians will be pressing for a
declaration of "solemn principles" governing the
relations between states-a declaration that would
be aimed at counterin the "Brezhnev doctrine"
of limited sovereignty
?)",2-Pn 18 November, the party daily, Scinteia,
published a lengthy editorial setting forth the
Romanian position on the eve of the talks. It
2 forcefully reiterated Bucharest's desire that the
Helsinki meeting should set an early date for
holding the conference itself. Ceausescu, in a
speech before party leaders in Bucharest on 20
November, attacked the concept of separate
conferences on mutual and balanced force re-
ductions and on European security.
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Soviet-Egyptian contacts continue at an ac-
tive pace, but they do not appear to be producing
much of a reconciliation between Moscow and
Cairo.)
This week, the commander of the Egyptian
Air Force, General Mubarak, led a three-man mili-
-tary delegation to Moscow: Moscow also is ex-
pected to receive an Egyptian economic delega-
tion led by Deputy Premier Marzaban later in the
month. The two sides will sign a trade protocol
for 1973 and discuss Soviet financing of Egyptian
projects and other increases in economic coopera-
tion. On 18 November, Soviet Ambassador
Vinogradov met with Egyptian Premier Sidqi for
75 minutes. What they discussed was not re-
vealed, but Moscow may be attempting to co-
ordinate its position with the Arabs before the
UN General Assembly debate on the Middle East.
On the same day, Syrian President Asad received
the Soviet ambassador to Damascus-
These exchanges have led to speculation-
encouraged by the Egyptians-that preparations
for a Soviet-Egyptian summit meeting are under
way. The Lebanese press claims that Premier
Kosygin will visit Cairo in December to smooth
the way for a meeting between President Sadat
and party leader Brezhnev. The Kremlin probably
will allow the dust to settle a bit more before
committing itself to a summit.
The Soviets probably are not too unhappy
I'll with the current state of play with Cairo, and
they do not appear anxious to accommodate
Sadat after his expulsion order last July. They
have remained active in other parts of the Middle
East and, while their role in Egypt has dimin-
ished, so have their costs and the danger of be-
coming engaged in a hot war on the Egyptian
front. ?
)Indications of political ferment continue to
surface in Cairo. Although President Sadat's posi-
tion has not as yet been seriously threatened,
these signs of discontent do serve to highlight the
increasingly troublesome political climate facing
the President.
?` One of the latest examples of anti-regime
activity reportedly involved a group of air force
officers from a base south of the capital city.
Various versions of the episode are circulating;
some describe it as a coup attempt, others as a
relatively minor act of insubordination. Whatever
the true nature of the affair, several arrests were
apparently made, and, in a possibly related de-
velopment, the director of Military Intelligence
was sacked.
in early October, a small number of army person-
nel in Cairo publicly denounced the Sadat regime.
Later last month, there were instances of student
restiveness with the government, and more re-
cently sectarian strife broke out between
Egyptian Muslims and adherents of the Coptic
faith,
''~ The recent activities of Egypt's two leading
military figures demonstrate official concern over
the situation. War Minister Ahmad Ismail Ali had
been scheduled to attend the opening session of
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Page 15 WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 Nov 72
the meeting of Arab foreign and defense ministers
in Kuwait on 15 November, but delayed his de-
parture by a day to continue his visits with Egyp-
tian troops, exhorting them to "maintain disci-
pline" and focus on strictly military matters.
Chief of Staff Shazli did go to Kuwait, but re-
turned after only one dayj
i , (Dissatisfaction with Sadat is fueled by a
number of factors. The credibility of the regime is
low. The thaw in relations with Moscow bothers
some, the no-war, no-peace situation is an irritant
to many, the followers of ousted war minister
Sadiq are doubtless not happy, and a number of
Egyptians are uneasy about the projected union
with Libya.!
no evidence that the many disaffected elements
are coalescing. Sadat is doubtless taking greater
security precautions, but as the discontent
spreads, so do the dangers to his position. F
J ;The recent expressions of discontent were
apparently isolated incidents, and so far there is'
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President Mobutu Sese Seko on the seventh
anniversary of his accession to power on 24 No-
vember plans to call attention to his determina-
tion that his country, despite its current eco-
nomic slump, become a leading economic power
in Africa. Dedication of the second of a series of
hydroelectric plants at Inga is being used to draw
attention to Zaire's hydroelectric potential, which
he hopes will attract the large-scale, foreign-
financed industry essential to the country's
development.;
The Inga Dam is an ambitious scheme to
harness the potential-reputedly the greatest in
the world-of the Zaire River (formerly known as
the Congo). The project, which could cost some
$3 billion before it is finished, will not be com-
plete before the mid-1980s. The first of three
stages is to be finished around 1974, and will
provide electricity for the capital, Kinshasa, and
the surrounding area, where most of the country's
population and light industry are located. The
second stage, scheduled for the late 1970s, will
include a 1,000-mile-long transmission line,
costing some $300 million, that will connect Inga
with mining areas in the copperbelt. Copper pro-
duction is being expanded, with the aim of
doubling output and revenue by 1980. Success in
this expansion program, the quickest way to re-
vive the economy, is at least partially contingent
on electric power from the Inga Dam.;
1The second stage is also designed to power a
vast industrial complex that Kinshasa hopes will
develop adjacent to the dam site. Foreign in-
vestors are being courted to set up industrial
plants that require large amounts of cheap elec-
tricity. Negotiations have been stalled, however,
by a current world surplus of capacity in the
industries the Zairians have in mind and low
prices for the products. Until customers are found
for all of Inga's stage-two power, plans for the
final stage will probably be shelved.(
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' LThe potential symbolized by Inga contrasts
sharply with the current performance of Zaire's
economy. A steady decline over the past two and
a half years in world prices for copper, the major
export and leading source of government revenue,
has reduced the country's growth rate. The gov-
ernment is operating in the red by more than
$100 million, despite cutbacks in planned invest-
ments. The budget is top heavy, supporting an
inefficient bureaucracy and an oversized military
establishment, which probably cannot be reduced
significantly without upsetting the delicate
political balance. Inefficient means of production,
low prices paid by the government to farmers,
and transport difficulties continue to plague both
agriculture and industry. Foreign exchange re-
serves are at a low level, and a trade deficit is
likely for a second consecutive year. Imports will
approach last year's record level, since demand
for foodstuffs, consumer goods, and capital
equipment remains high.
ANGOLA: DIVIDED LIBERATORS
Despite a reconciliation in principle last
June, Angola's two major liberation movements
remain as far apart as ever. Indeed, a recon-
ciliation meeting scheduled to be held in Kinshasa
early next month seems likely to end in a dead-
lock.
A major stumbling block is, as always, the
question of who would lead a unified movement.
SECRET
At a press conference following last June's agreement 25X1
in principle: (left to right) Holden Roberto, Presidents
Mobutu and Ngouabi, and MPLA head Augustino Neto.
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tThe announcement last weekend that a new
government of technocrats had been formed bears
witness to King Hassan's failure to win the sup-
port of the political parties. The new government,
like the old, will do little to popularize Hassan's
regime or to encourage participation in promised
elections. I
/?Ahmed Osman, the King's brother-in-law,
-
heads the 18-member government. It has ten
holdovers from the previous apolitical cabinet and
eight new ministers with long-standing palace con-
nections. The Benhima brothers, two of the
King's closest advisers, have retained the key
posts of foreign minister and interior minister.
King Hassan will continue to control the military,
the position of minister of defense having been
abolished shortly after the assassination attempt
last August. Several of the new appointees add
administrative strength to the cabinet, but the
entire government will, of course, remain under
the close supervision of the palace.(
The principal opposition parties refused to
join Osman's government. Hassan has since an-
Marrakech
No Change in Sight
nounced that there are still vacancies in the
cabinet, which is to oversee elections promised
for early next year. Although further negotiations
between the palace and political leaders cannot be
ruled out, Osman's appointment and the com-
position of the government would seem to pre-
clude early compromise. The parties have been
making demands that are unacceptable to Hassan;
for example, the lion's share of the cabinet seats.
The impasse between King and opposition is
likely to erode moderate backing for the political
leaders who let pass another opportunity to re-
gain access to power and royal patronage. Their
failure may increase the weight of those urging
The Arab foreign ministers' conference held
in Kuwait last week made no progress toward
solving the problems dividing the Arab states.
After the conference, Arab League Secretary
General Mahmud Riad admitted that Jordan's
dispute with the fedayeen was continuing "even
more fiercely than before." The fedayeen and
their supporters made their standard demand that
the terrorists be allowed to operate from all
fronts, but King Husayn has made it clear that
fedayeen are not welcome in Jordan)fAn attempt
to schedule an Arab heads of state summit ap-
parently got nowhere .f
i he conference did prepare studies for a
"joint Arab plan of action." The participants also
agreed that the Arab military chiefs would meet
in Cairo in the first half of December and that the
Arab Defense Council, which brings together for-
eign, defense, and economy ministers, would
meet in Cairo in January.
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25X1
URUGUAY: NAVY UPSET
`" UPresident Bordaberry has managed to delay
the arrest of political opposition leader Senator
~,_} Wilson Ferreira by the navy, but the issue could
still boil up to another full-fledged, military-
civilian dispute.]
LL Until now the navy has stayed out of politics
and even sought to act as a brake on the army's
late penchant for involvement in civilian affairs.
;~. Ferreira, however, provoked the navy by dis-
closing classified information showing that Argen-
tine shi s have been allowed to fish in Uruguayan
waters
4/..r
)If the judges decide that Ferreira should be
prosecuted, the President will come under heavy
pressure from the military to request Congress to
lift the senator's congressional immunity. While
the navy does not have sufficient clout by itself
to force the issue, the case could serve as the basis
for a reconciliation between the army and the
navy. Army commanders earlier had voiced a
desire to move against Ferreira for smuggling.\
;'!I ?President Bordaberry is thus still caught
between the politicians and the service com-
manders. Despite mounting civilian opposition to
its new role, the army has given fresh evidence of
its intention to stay in politics. At a recent gather-
ing of officers and civilians, General Zubia, com-
mander of the Second Army Corps, stated that
he, for one, would not go back to the barracks
but would remain involved to the fullest extent]
/,Several weeks ago, pressure from the army
forced Bordaberry to allow the arrest of political
leader Jorge Battle. Although civilian tempers
have cooled now that Battle is out on bail, the
arrest of Ferreira would cause an even greater
reaction. Despite Ferreira's popularity, there is
little doubt that military leaders could again make
Bordaberry bow.
()('0 JPn 15 November, city councilmen and
;mayors were elected in nearly 4,000 municipali-
ties in the first elections throughout Brazil since
President Medici came to power in 1969. They
are the only officials in the executive branch of
government who are elected. Although results
probably will not be complete for at least a
month, partial returns indicate that the official
pro-government party will win all but a handful
of the races.]
caw TAt stake are city council seats all over the
country and the mayoralties of all municipalities
except state capitals and those in what the gov-
ernment calls "national security areas." In these
cases, mayors are appointed by state governors,
who in turn are named by the President. All
candidates ran under the colors of either the
official party or the nominal opposition party.
Candidates of the official party appear to have
won in all but three state capitals, and the govern-
ment will also win or at least make good showings
in several cities in Minas Gerais, where the opposi-
tion has been in power.l
/,Given the many restrictions placed on the
elections, many Brazilians viewed the exercise as
fr pointless. Nevertheless, the contenders took the
contests seriously, and there were numerous
,17incidents of violence in towns throughout the
interior. It appears that, despite the highly cen-
tralized, authoritarian style of government that
has predominated since 1964, intense local
rivalries and feuds are still very much alive. In
fact, the turmoil that attended some contests may
now be used by the regime to justify continued
muzzling of political activity in larger cities.?
h he government will not be able to convince
very many that the vote was proof of its popu-
larity. Political "undesirables" were not permitted25X1
to run, and potentially sensitive local positions-
//such as the executives of certain important
cities-were nqt filled by the elections.
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011=u ht: I
1 The Soviets are sending another small
naval task group to Cuba following a hiatus of
six months. Two surface combatants-a
,Kresta-class cruiser and a Kanin-class de-
stroyer-are in the mid-Atlantic and could
arrive in Caribbean waters this weekend. A
tanker is accompanvina the warships- There
CUBA: CHANGES IN THE PARTY
;:The Cuban Communist Party is apparently
undergoing an extensive program of expansion,
reorganization, and normalization of ties with for-
eign Communist parties. These changes seem to
point toward a more important role for the party
in both political and economic affairs on the
island. i
`Fidel Castro criticized the party in July
1970 for its shortcomings during the ill-fated ef-
fort to harvest 10 million tons of sugar that year.
The criticism was directed at party cadres who
were untrained and therefore unable to cope with
the technical complexities involved in harvesting
sugar. Fidel promised that changes would be
made in the party's structure and in its role in the
Cuban political system. a
'?`1 /Soviet warships and submarines have
made periodic visits to Cuba since 1969, and
they took part in anti-submarine operations
with Cuban naval units during November of
`` since then, the Central Committee has
established a number of subordinate commissions.
Most of them have economic responsibilities, sug-
gesting that the party will become more involved
- yin economic matters\`tn addition, press accounts
indicate that the party is now involved in a
serious effort to increase its membership. This
drive is apparently being supervised by a special
committee, probably created earlier this year.
(In addition, the Cuban party has played host
to Communist party delegations from a number
of countries in recent months; they have come
from the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, Czecho-
slovakia, Mongolia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Canada, the US, and India. Since
1968, relations with foreign Communist parties
have gradually improved as Havana has reduced
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- StUKI I AMEOP,
its involvement with non-Communist national (=:ibe from 30 November to 3 December, but
liberation 'groups. The recent flurry of visits, how-
ever, indicates an effort by the Cuban party to
accelerate the normalization of ties with other
parties.)
r
butte signs so .. v
greater acceptance by Fidel Castro of the need to legislative elections: (communist Party boss
delegate some of his authority. While the party Corvalan already is in Moscow, reportedly to
will thus become more involved in mobilizing the supply the details and the political justification
masses in support of the government's objectives for Allende's pitch. The Soviets so far have pre-
and monitoring economic production, all key ferred not to get too deeply entangled with
policy decisions will continue to emanate from Allende)
)Jesus Montane Oropesa, the minister of com-
munications, has been the central figure in this
increased party activity. Montane has become
prominent in party activities during the last year
or so, and although no formal announcement has
been made, he has in effect replaced an old Castro
crony, Armando Hart, as party organization
secretary..!
The new program is not yet fully developed,
oint in the direction of a
h f
CHILE: ALLENDE.HEADS A ROAD
ri \President Allende's foreign trip from 30 No-
>vember to 13 December will provide him with an
;(,.-opportunity to publicize himself as a leader of the
Latin American left, to lambast large US com-
panies and to solicit increased aid from the So-
viets. The trip is designed to raise Chile's prestige
among sympathetic audiences and to emphasize
the seriousness of Chile's need for immediate eco-
nomic help. Few quick changes are likely to result
from the trip, but it could influence the direction
of Chile's international relations for some time'
jllende's principal stops will be in Mexico
City, New York, Moscow, and Havana.IHe has
little business to conduct in Mexico, where he will
&he Cuban stop, scheduled for 9-13 De-
cember, will give Castro the chance to reciprocate
'.;-Allende's earlier hospitality. It will be Allende's
first visit to Cuba since his inauguration, and he is
certain to be given a red carpet reception.-)
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Allende would like to use this visit to de-
monstrate his popularity among the Mexicans J
)!I [In New York, Allende plans to address the
UN General Assembly on 4 December. His speech
has been billed as a blast at US-based multina-
tional corporations. He will zero in on the US
copper companies whose lawsuits are hindering
some sales of copper from the nationalized mines.))
bhe Chilean President plans to be in the
USSR from 5-9 December. He is expected to ask
for new credits in hard currency. He wants the
money right away to buy consumer goods to
carry the Chilean economy past the March 1973
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;Hh I
HONDURAS: WAITING FOR LOPEZ
fihe atmosphere of instability that has hung
over Honduras for months has finally penetrated
the presidential palace. President Cruz now
acknowledges that his days in office are num-
bered.IlThe so-called "unity" government, which
he nominally heads, has been generally regarded
as a failure since shortly after it took office 17
months ago, and Cruz' eventual ouster has been
seen as a virtual certainty for over a year. The real
to the Central American Common Market or to
restore normal relations with El Salvador.
[Honduras is, in short, a country ripe for a
change, and it is looking to former president
General Oswaldo Lopez, now chief of the armed
forces, to provide it. Pressures from the military,
labor unions, businessmen, and leaders of both
parties have been strong, but Lopez has thus far
failed to move,'{Some observers believe he is try-
ing to devise a constitutional means of resuming
direct control, but Lopez has already said that a
strict constitutional solution is impossible. Others
allege that he is waiting for the popular demand
to become irresistible. Lopez, however, has al-
ready proven that he can orchestrate public opin-
ion. He is probably waiting for some indication
from the US that a new government would re-
ceive recognition and financial assistance.'
seeing his substantial sup ort eroded.
-r? /Despite Lopez' tendency to procrastinate, he
is in a position to take over easily and quickly
once he decides to move. A change of government
cannot be delayed indefinitely, or Lopez will risk
General Lopez
An Urge to Return
question has always been, "When?" Increasing
pressure from many quarters for a change and
Cruz' newly expressed worries indicate that a
coup may be at hand.j
;_ jAlthough few Honduran governments have
enacted significant social and economic reforms,
conditions have degenerated to a new low under
Cruz. Corruption and abuse of privileges are more
widespread than ever. Relations between the two
major parties have become even more antagonistic
under the "unity" plan than they were before.
The economy is stagnant, the government has
stumbled from one fiscal crisis to another, and
the lack of progress in agrarian reform confines
over half the population to miserable conditions.
In foreign affairs, nothing has been done to return
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President Cruz
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HAITI: A STRONGMAN GETS AXED
p(1~ iPresident Jean Claude Duvalier made the
first significant cabinet change in his
19-month-old government on 15 November when
he suddenly fired his key aide, Minister of In-
terior and National Defense Luckner Cambronne,
and one other lesser figure. Cambronne im-
mediately sought asylum in the Colombian
Embassy in Port-au-Prince, and no untoward re-
actions have been noted.]
4 !An able but avaricious official, Cambronne
was largely responsible for the smooth func-
tioning of the government that assumed control
when dictator Francois Duvalier died in April
1971. Long a trusted lieutenant of Papa Doc,
Cambronne became in effect the glue that held
the new regime together while the elder Duvalier's
wife, Madame Simone Duvalier, and his son, Jean
Claude, shared the trappings of executive power.
Cambronne's role as de facto prime minister
earned him more enemies than political support.
Marie Denise Duvalier Dominique, Papa Doc's
ambitious eldest daughter, became a particularly
bitter enemy after she and her husband lost an
earlier round against Cambronne and had to leave
Haiti.
[it is clear that Cambronne never had the
military or political support he would have
Luckner Cambronne
More Enemies Than Support
Roger Lafontant
Less Freedom of Action
needed to challenge his dismissal. His free-
wheeling use of power made him many enemies;
for one thing he extorted many fancy profits on
virtually every important commercial deal con-
summated in Haiti in recent years. This greediness
apparently was a major cause of his downfall.]
,y? `President Duvalier named Roger Lafontant,
an influential friend who was consul general in
New York, to succeed Cambronne. Although
Lafontant is reported to be tough and shrewd-
qualities that also characterized his predeces-
sor-he may well be neither as forceful as Cam-
bronne nor destined to wield the same kind of
power. Duvalier clearly served notice that hence-
forth all ministers will work "under the direct
supervision of the chief of state," implying that
Lafontant will lack the authority and freedom of
action Cambronne enjoyed.
,3' LIn fact, this assertion of control over his
cabinet by the young Duvalier may indicate that
he intends now to act as chief executive in fact as
well as in name. Should he desire to move very far
in this direction, however, he would be required
to challenge the authority of his mother, his
eldest sister, and the rest of the Duvalierist hier-
archy, a task that is likely to prove difficult for
him and unsettling for Haiti.
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ECUADOR: A GAGGLE OF PROBLEMS
Inept may be the best way to describe the
military government as it enters its tenth month.
Although most Ecuadoreans applaud the seizures
this month of "unlicensed" US tuna boats fishing
within the claimed 200-mile territorial sea, there
is a rising tide of opposition to President Rod-
riguez. Labor is reacting strongly to a decree
limiting strikes, students are responding violently
to repressive police tactics on campuses, and
business circles are alarmed by uncertain credit
policies. Moreover, Rodriguez' dismissal of a mili-
tary court to prevent it from acquitting a former
cabinet minister of misconduct during the pre-
vious administration has stirred the political op-
position from its torpor.
In addition, Minister of Natural Resources
Jarrin has ignored the advice of the state petro-
leum enterprise, as well as a direct order from
Rodriguez, and presented yet another ultimatum
to the oil companies. Jarrin is threatening to
annul the contract of any company that fails to
pay rent for its concession by the end of the
month. Since June, when higher rent schedules
were decreed and made retroactive to October
1971, the companies have shown decreasing
interest in Ecuador's profit potential. Companies
with relatively little to lose have even relinquished
concessions rather than bow to government de-
mands.
Until now, Rodriguez has remained rela-
tively aloof, so the intensity of the criticism has
taken him by surprise- Supreme Court justices
and a former president have lashed out at him for
his affront to the judicial system, and dissenters
within the high command are grumbling about his
poor judgment and lack of leadership. He can
contend with the oil problem by reversing or
tempering the ultimatum presented to the com-
panies, but in this matter anything he does is
likely to provide grist for the opposition mills. As
the unity of the military slips, the government is
less able to deal with its problems. This down-
ward spiral will prove difficult to arrest and could
lead first to personnel changes within the
administration and then to the discrediting of the
entire military government.
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Troops Confront Students
Inept Tactics, Violent Response
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Asian Exodus from East Africa
Special Report
Secret
N2 46
24 November 1972
No. 0397/72A
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"The expulsion of the Asians,
seen by most of the world as brutal,
inhumane, and foolish, has enhanced
Amin's popularity not just in Uganda
but throughout east Africa"
The Economist
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I~n early August 1972, Uganda's unpredict-
able leader, General Amin, ordered virtually the
entire country's Asian community-some 44,000
people-to leave within 90 days. For the next
three months, Britain and several other countries,
as well as the UN, worked hard to help evacuate
those affected by the expulsion order. This was
not the first time that world attention has
focused on the plight of the Asian in east Africa,
and it is not likely to be the last.)
'Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda had large and
well-entrenched Asian communities when they
became independent in the early 1960s. Since
then, Asians have been leaving the area in large
numbers. The reason for the exodus is simple.
the Asians are envied and
hated. Their only virtue in the eyes of the three
east African governments is the fact that they
possess vitally needed skills that are in short
supply. By the same token, their predominance in
commerce and industry has been the source of
long-standing popular grievances. Each govern-
Typical Asian Quarter in East Africa
Special Report
ment has dealt differently with this problem, but
the goal has been the same-to push the Asian
out. In Kenya, this process has been a slow and
pragmatic one. In Tanzania, the pace has been
somewhat faster and disjointed. Now, in Uganda,
Amin has uprooted the Asian community at a
single stroke, seriously damaging the modern
parts of the economy.]
Historical Backdrop
I ong before the Western age of discovery,
Asian merchants-mainly from southern Arabia
and the Indian subcontinent-had been drawn to
the east coast of Africa by the lucrative trade in
spices, leopard skins, rhinoceros horns, gold,
ivory, and slaves. By the time the Portuguese
arrived at the end of the 15th century, Indian
bankers, money-lenders, and middlemen were
well established in all the major coastal towns
from Mogadiscio to Mozambique. It was not until
the European colonial powers established them-
selves in the interior in the late 1800s, however,
that Asians-this time mainly from India-began
to flock to this part of Africa in large numbers.
Some Indians were brought in by the British to
build railroads in Kenya and Uganda. Others
fought there against the Germans during World
War I and stayed on. But the majority of Asian
immigrants came later. Between 1921 and the
early 1960s when Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya
gained independence, the Asian population in east
Africa increased from 50,000 to over 375,000.'
i 'Barred by British colonial law from owning
farm land (except in Tanzania), most Asians
initially moved into commerce and the skilled
trades or sought jobs in the colonial administra-
tion. The dukawalla, the small Asian shopkeeper
and trader, became ubiquitous in rural areas.
Later, as their wealth increased, some Asian
families entered the professions and invested
heavily in local manufacturing and construction.
Although only about one percent of the popula-
tion in east Africa, the Asian communities made
up the bulk of the middle class before independ-
ence. They still do.F
?During the colonial period, British officials
did everything they could to keep the races apart.
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Each racial group had its own schools, clubs,
hospitals, residential areas, even cemeteries. In
government, British colonial civil servants monop-
olized the top positions while Asians filled the
middle ranks and Africans were consigned to the
more menial tasks. The same was true in business.
European companies hired Asians over Africans,
and if an Asian wanted to expand his business he
sought the help of a relative. This naturally gen-
erated resentment among Africans who came to
regard the Asians as a roadblock to economic
advancement.J
I (though relegated to second-class citizen-
ship himself, the Asian grew to accept this situa-
tion. Not only did east Africa offer a better life
than he had known before, he enjoyed a priv-
ileged position above the African. Independence,
however, reversed the roles-at least politically-
and Asians were called on to adapt in ways few
were willing to do.]
I [Asians who could prove that they and at
least one of their parents had been born in east
Africa were automatically granted local citizen-
ship after independence. Those who did not
qualify were given the option of applying for
citizenship by giving up their British "protected
person" status. The Asians were already heartil
disliked by the Afric
/ and most were unwilling to
bind themselves to the new nations. This left the
Asians vulnerable to attack by the new African
governments, which were under popular pressure
to break the Asians' stranglehold on commerce
and to end their predominance in the civil service.
In order to accomplish these objectives, the three
governments adopted "African ization" programs
designed to ease the Asians out in favor of the
Africans, without seriously disrupting the
economy or the government. At least this was
true until Amin abruptly moved against the Asian
community in Uganda.]
Kenyan Pragmatism
[Two years ago, the picture of a dejected
young Asian girl named Rajanbala Viad made the
Special Report
front pages when immigration officials in
England, Germany, and Kenya refused her entry.
Unable to obtain a work permit needed to stay in
Kenya, Miss Viad flew to London to join her
brother in hope of gaining admittance. Turned
away, she became caught up in a nightmarish
round of transcontinental flights that took her to
Frankfurt, Nairobi, Johannesburg, back to
Nairobi, and then back to London, where she was
finally admitted because of her inability to re-
enter Kenya.]
tfhe Asian lobby in London immediatel25X6
seized on the incident to focus attention on the
plight of other non-citizen Asians in Kenya
caught in the crunch of Africanization. Although
Kenya's 130-140,000 Asians have been subjected
to much verbal abuse, harassment, and racial dis-
crimination, the number of persons affected by
this displacement policy has been greatly ex-
aggerated by the international press. Hoping to
avoid the dislocations that are now occurring in
Uganda, the Kenyatta government in fact has
moved its so-called "Kenyanization" program at a
gradual, almost glacial pace.)
)X-2-[Nothing did more to confirm the Kenyan
Government in its conservative approach than the
panicky, much publicized flight of 15,000 Asians
from Kenya in early 1968. Their departure was
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EAST AFRICA
F.T.A.1.
jibouti
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
Population Figures*
Total Asian European
Kenya 10,942,702 139,037 40,593
Tanzania 12,311,991 79,900 17,500
Uganda 9,526,000 90,000 10,300
"Figures from Census of : Kenya. 1969;
Tanzania, 1967; Uganda, 1969
UGANDA
ZAIRE
' Rwe oa
Kalem
?`Mwanza
KENYA
IgN,akuru,
~af
Ting
ETHIOPIA
Dodoma ?lanzibar
TANZANIA
Lubuirnbashi
Special Report
ZAMBIA
Iringaa -Kidatu `.
j Lindi
SOMALIA
t= z
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triggered by the Kenyan Government's efforts to offered reassurances to skilled Asians both
lay the legislative groundwork for turning control verbally and by freely issuing work permits. It
of the economy over to Kenyan citizens. The also postponed the implementation of the trade
bureaucracy had already been largely Africanized licensing act for one year. Even after the law was
by then, but the Asians' domination in trade and put into effect, the government did not move as
industry had hardly been touched. The govern- vigorously against Asian traders as it had pre-
ment had informally encouraged some large for- viously indicated it would. In fact, it allowed
eign corporations to hire more Africans. It had 4 many of them to dodge the intent of the act by
also established a chain of "people's shops" to ., registering their firms in the name of a relative
compete with local Asian retailers. Neither step with Kenyan citizenship or by taking on an
had proved very effective] 1- ostensible African partner.i
un order to speed up matters, the National 7 Lince then, the Kenyatta government has
Assembly in December 1967 enacted an immigra- maintained a delicate balancing act. On the one
tion and a trade licensing act. The immigration L hand, it has moved steadily ahead with its
law required all non-citizens to register for work Africanization program. Lower and middle level
I d lerical ositions are gradu-
c
h
permits and gave the government the power to
withhold or revoke these permits, thus termi-
nating the holder's right to stay in Kenya. The
licensing act empowered the government to
prohibit businesses owned by non-citizens from
handling certain basic goods and from trading in
some parts of the country. Fearing the worst,
thousands of Asians stampeded to the British
passport office in Nairobi, prompting an alarmed
British Government to clamp a lid on the flow of
Kenyan Asians to the UK on 1 March 1968. After
that date, a quota was established permitting only
1,500 Asians with British passports and their
immediate families to emigrate to Britain eac
year. This quota was increased to 3,000 in 1971.
p
nics , an
labor, tec
ally being filled as qualified Africans become
available. On the other hand, the government has
resisted popular pressure to move faster. When
pressed, it has taken action amid much fanfare
designed to give the impression that it is making
greater strides forward than is actually the case.)
T [Kenyan Asians have become inured to this
F- kind of display and there has been
i')-
4 IThe 1968 exodus had no serious repercus-
sions on the Kenyan economy. Many commercial
firms and small repair shops were temporarily hit
by a loss of clerical and semi-skilled personnel. In
addition, some capital was smuggled out of the
country and private domestic investment and
employment fell as jittery Asian businessmen
tightened up their operations and converted more
of their assets into cash. Few professionals, skilled
artisans, or Asian merchants left, however, and
the economy continued to show signs of strength]
t- 2[Nevertheless, the government became con-
cerned about the decline in local business con-
fidence and about the unfavorable impact the
exodus might have on foreign investment and
tourism-Kenya's largest foreign exchange earner.
To counteract these tendencies, the government
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repetition
Kenyatta with sculpture symbolizing Kenya's
commitment to multiracialism.
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or-uht I
of the 1968 panic. Nevertheless, events such as
those in Uganda are vivid reminders of how vul-
nerable they are, and many Asians have probably
made plans to leave Kenya if things get rougher
under a successor government that is less prag-
matic than that of venerated 80-year-old Presi-
dent Kenyatta.)
Tanzania: Socialism with a Racial Tinge
lWhen General Amin issued his expulsion
order, the only African leader to condemn him
publicly was Tanzanian President Nyerere. Al-
though his attitude hardly reflected the feelings
of most Tanzanians,ilNyerere has long been an
outspoken opponent of racism-white or black.
"Socialism is not racialism," Nyerere proclaims.
There is a certain irony, therefore, in the fact that
the President's socialist policies have done much
to undermine the Asians' position in Tanzania.]
By far the most damaging blow to Asian
interests came early last year when the govern-
ment nationalized all rental property in the
country worth more than $14,000. Some African-
owned buildings were expropriated, but the
Asians suffered more by virtue of the fact that
they were the country's property-owning class.
The suddenness with which the government
moved, moreover, aroused an intense feeling
within the Asian community of being under siege,.)
3 (Since Nyerere launched his socialist "revolu-
tion" in 1967, the government has steadily
whittled away at the Asians' control over the
economy. A few Asian agricultural estates and
commercial holdings were nationalized in 1967
along with several other foreign-owned concerns.
Subsequently, the Tanzanian Government has
taken over most of the import-export trade as
well as the wholesale business-areas traditionally
dominated by Asians. Over 90 percent of all
imports and probably all exports are now handled
by the State Trading Corporation and other gov-
ernment agencies]
5' )in an effort to curb the outflow of foreign
exchange, the government halted all educational
remittances abroad in mid-1970. The measure
may not have been intended as "anti-Asian," but
Special Report -6
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it hit hardest at Asians who send their children to
India or Europe for schooling. Many Asians sub-
sequently began to fear that the government
would move against their few remaining private
schools in Tanzania-that their very cultural
identity would come under attack next J
LIn the face of these events, many Asians
began to move their assets out of the country.
This movement became so great that the govern-
ment finally imposed strict exchange controls in
April 1971. The expropriation of rental prop-
erties a few weeks later was the crowning blow.
Within a matter of months, Tanzania's Asian
population shrank from about 70,000 to 50,000.
Among the first to leave were the most talented.
Scores of Asian doctors, nurses, civil servants,
technicians, and businessmen departed, resulting
in a deterioration in services and a general slow-
down of the economy. The government initially
made some half-hearted conciliatory gestures to
try to stem this brain drain, but these efforts
quickly ceased and the departures continue.]
j IFor those Asians who remain, the future
looks bleak. As a business and professional class,
they face extremely high taxes, a crushing credit
squeeze, a reduction in income and capital as a
result of the loss of rents, and increasing competi-
tion from government-supported cooperative
enterprises. In short, Tanzania has become less
and less hospitable to local capitalists, and few
Asians still take heart from Nyerere's continued
espousal of multiracialism.]
S' )Although ostensibly a part of Tanzania,
Zanzibar has treated its Asian minority far more
harshly than the mainland. Since 1964 when the
African majority overthrew the island's Arab
ruling caste, the virtually autonomous Revolu-
tionary Council has carried on a vendetta against
the small but dwindling non-African communities
(Indian, Persian, Goan, and Arab). In the name of
socialism and equality, the council has purged
Asians from the civil service, confiscated their
businesses, and forced their daughters into mar-
riages with Africans. All of this has made the
Asian a vanishing species on Zanzibar. The Asian
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merchant and craftsman who once filled Zanzibar
town's main bazaar and narrow side streets is
almost a thing of the past. In 1964, there were
),some 66,000 Asians on the island; now there are
less than 7,000)'
Amin's Folly
a sense, the exodus of Asians from
Uganda began even before Amin's expulsion
C/ orderl[in contrast to Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda
had brought little government pressure on the
Asians until three years ago. Then in January
1970, the Obote government passed licensing~. and
immigration legislation similar to Kenya's]1Five
months later, Obote announced that his govern-
ment intended to take over the import-export
trade by the end of the year and to become the
senior partner in the 85 largest industrial and
financial enterprises, most of which were owned
by Asians.]
I Jo.t surprisingly, the Asian community
welcomed the overthrow of President Obote by
General Amin in January 1971. A few months
later, however, Amin himself began to lash out at
the Asians, accusing them of sabotaging the
economy and of failing to integrate with Africans.
He also canceled long-pending citizenship applica-
tions of 12,000 Asians. In December 1971, Amin
called a conference to allow the Asian community
to air its grievances. The meeting, however,
turned into a long recital by Amin of past and
present Asian sins. The session must have con-
vinced those Asians who had remained that it was
)Rime to leaven any event, by August 1972 when
Amin ordered all non-citizen Asians to leave
Uganda, the Asian population had dropped by at
least 30,000 from an estimated 80,000 only three
years earlier.]
I~ LMost of the 44,000 Asians who were
expelled have found some place to go. Britain has
absorbed just over 25,000. India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Canada, and other Commonwealth
countries have taken several thousand more.
About a thousand have come to the US. Another
4,000 stateless Asians have found at least tempo-
rary refuge in relocation centers in Europe. Up to
8,000 Asians are still in Uganda. Some are
Special Report
An Asian shop-before and after.
Ugandan citizens; others have been granted
special exemptions because of their skills. Under
the circumstances, however, most of these people
will probably leave before long if they can find
some place to god
/ fAmin's action is immensely popular in
Uganda, but the results of his folly are already
evident. At least 40,000 Africans have been
thrown out of work. Trade has declined sharply,
and basic commodities are becoming scarce.
Tourism, a growing exchange earner in east
Africa, has ground to a halt. Some of Uganda's
smaller urban areas are reportedly almost ghost
towns. In Kampala, most of the stores, garages,
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restaurants, and other small businesses are closed
and up for sale. Government efforts to help
Africans take over these concerns have largely
been limited to rhetoric. Even if there were
enough trained Africans to buy and run the busi-
nesses-and there are only a handful-credit has
;,virtually dried up. Because most Ugandans live at
the subsistence level, they will not be greatly
affected by all of this. But by dispatching the
Asians, Amin has gutted the small modern por-
tions of the economy and set back economic
development in Uganda by a number of years. J
Where They Go
1), SAII told, east Africa's Asian population of
some 375,000 has in the last decade dropped by
almost half. Well over 100,000 have left in the
last five years. Some have gone to nearby African
Special Report
Departing Asian families
in Kampala.
states such as Zambia and Malawi and perhaps
Mozambique, where there are small Asian com-
munities. But most have left the continent`3
,India and Britain have been the main recip-
ients. Over 60,000 Asians have emigrated to the
UK since 1968. Once there, they have met with a
mixed reception. London's policy of letting in
large numbers of coloreds from the West Indies
and the Indian subcontinent as well as east Africa
has never been wildly popular. The British econ-
omy has managed to absorb what is for England
large numbers of these people, providing them
with jobs, largely menial, and housing. Prejudice
against them has obviously not been legislated out
of existence, and most of them live in the poorer
sections of English cities. Nevertheless, their lives
and property are no longer in ieonardy as they
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