WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007800040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1970
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/10/20: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07800040001-4
aecrei
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
Secret
43
10 April 1970
No. 0365/70
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N'"'3 SECRET `~
VIETNAM
Protest activity by restive elements in Saigon
accelerated this week, with the Thieu government
using a combination of carrot-and-stick tactics to
try to calm the situation. The latest round of Com-
munist military attacks, initiated last week, has
tapered off after sharply boosting casualties on all
sides.
CHOU EN-LAI WARMLY GREETED IN NORTH KOREA
Chou En-lai's three-day state visit to Pyongyang has
capped a six-month thaw in Sino-Korean relations.
MILITARY SITUATION IN LAOS REMAINS CRITICAL
Communist forces are maintaining pressure against
government positions flanking the Plaine des Jarres,
but there has been no major change in the over-all
tactical situation.
PHNOM PENH TRYING TO BROADEN ITS POWER BASE
The government believes it has the domestic situa-
tion generally under control, but recognizes the need
for rapid steps to win broad support from the peas-
antry.
Europe
Page
1
USSR MANEUVERS FOR POSITION IN NEXT ROUND OF SALT
Private Soviet statements since the Helsinki talks
suggest that the USSR prefers a quantitative agree-
ment, and press commentary indicates that the key
issue at Vienna will be ABMs. Moscow has failed
thus far, however, to reveal the position it will
take.
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smnp AR-10k
SECRET
SOVIET OIL SALES TO THE FREE WORLD FALTER
The USSR continues to meet most of its East European
allies' increasing demand for petroleum, but Soviet
sales for hard currency to the free world have de-
clined.
ANGLO-MALTESE RELATIONS DETERIORATE
A dispute over UK aid for Malta has tied up much-
needed funds and complicated the domestic political
situation on the island.
PANKOW INTENSIFIES PROPAGANDA AGAINST BONN
In a campaign aimed mainly at the East German public,
Pankow has attacked Chancellor Brandt personally as
well as his government and party.
IAEA FACES SAFEGUARDS ISSUES
A special committee to plan for the upcoming safe-
guards negotiations has been established within the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
Middle East - Africa
ARAB FEDAYEEN LEADER VISITS PEKING
Closer ties between Communist China and Fatah may
come in the wake of Yasir Arafat's visit to Peking
and Hanoi. It is doubtful, however, that this would
result in China's supplying the fedayeen with any
significant amounts of heavy arms.
SUDAN SUPPRESSES ANSAR UPRISING
The Sudanese Government's quelling of the Ansar
sect's rebellion last week has dissipated the im-
mediate threat to internal security, but alienation
of the Ansar will probably stimulate armed resist-
ance when the sect regroups its forces.
DISSENSION GROWS WITHIN MALI'S RULING COUNCIL
Disagreement over relations with France is threaten-
ing the unity of Mali's ruling Military Committee of
National Liberation; the key issue is acceptance of
the conditions to which French aid is tied.
SECRET
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WHITHER RHODESIA?
The white minority government in Salisbury remains
firmly in power and determined to chart its own pol-
itical course despite UK efforts, directly and
through the UN, to end the "rebellion." Although
no government is likely to recognize Rhodesia's in-
dependence soon, sanctions are expected to become
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 23
DOMINICAN POLITICAL STANDOFF CONTINUES
The public impasse between President Balaguer and
the opposition is still unresolved.
GUATEMALA TENSE FOLLOWING DIPLOMAT'S DEATH
Guatemalan security forces operating under a newly
imposed state of siege continue to comb the capital
in search of the terrorists who killed the West
German ambassador on Sunday.
COLOMBIAN ELECTION WILL BE CLOSE
The presidential race between candidates Pastrana
and ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla will be close.
KIDNAPINGS CONTINUE TO CAUSE CONCERN IN LATIN AMERICA 27
The murder of the West German ambassador to Guatemala
by the pro-Castro Revolutionary Armed Forces has in-
creased concern in Latin America about kidnapings by
terrorist groups.
SECRET
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It will be a long time, if ever, before a conference on Indochina as
proposed by the French is convened. Indeed, just achieving agreement on the
terms for holding such a meeting among the various antagonists and neutral
observers involved seems an almost insurmountable task. Thus far, both
Saigon and the Vietnamese Communists are playing it cool. President Thieu
has declared that peace must first come to Laos before any settlement can be
reached in Vietnam. The Communists have simply avoided making any
comment at all, which probably means they need time for thorough consul-
tations between the Viet Cong, Hanoi, and Peking. In short, everyone is
playing a waiting game.
The Cambodian Government seems to have the domestic situation
under control. Phnom Penh is confident it has the support of the urban
populace, the civil administration, and the security forces, and is beginning
to take rapid steps to ensure fuller peasant support in order to prevent
serious rural uprisings. The government recognizes it needs peasant support
to undercut any efforts by Sihanouk and the Vietnamese Communists to
undermine its stability. However, if the government moves too precipitately
toward establishing a republican form of government, the task of winning
broad peasant support could be complicated to a considerable degree.
The North Vietnamese in Laos are continuing to put pressure on
government forces flanking the Plaine des Jarres. Both sides are bringing
additional reinforcements to bear, and the over-all situation remains critical.
The Communists are also moving against a government guerrilla base that has
long been a springboard for attacks on Communist supply lines in northern
Laos.
The atmosphere in Saigon is beginning to heat up again. Veterans'
grievances erupted into violence during protests in front of the presidential
palace and National Assembly. The government's efforts to calm the situa-
tion are being complicated by a continuing student protest, which has the
support of some opposition leaders and Buddhists. There is little indication
that President Thieu is in a conciliatory mood, and he reportedly intends to
ask the assembly for "special powers" to deal with the multitude of eco-
nomic problems that are one of the basic causes of the rising level of political
discontent.
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VIETNAM
Political Protest Turns
Violent in Saigon
The level of political discon-
tent and agitation in Saigon is
again on the rise, with disabled
war veterans moving into the lime-
light this week. Although the gov-
ernment has tried a combination of
firmness and conciliation in deal-
ing with the veterans, who marched
on the presidential palace and on
the National Assembly building dur-
ing the last few days, it has been
unable to prevent violence. Despite
orders to exercise restraint, po-
lice were forced to use tear gas
on several occasions. The veterans
have been protesting alleged gov-
ernment inattention to their needs,
and the fighting erupted after they
had rejected a broad government of-
fer to provide relief, countering
with demands for more concrete ac-
tion.
The government still hopes
that further conciliatory measures
will defuse the situation. Presi-
dent Thieu has sent draft legisla-
tion to the assembly requesting
higher benefits for the veterans,
and sites suitable for veterans'
housing have been located in Saigon.
The government appears quite aware
that there probably is considerable
sympathy for the veterans within
the armed forces and that it must
therefore handle them with extreme
care. Government officials also
probably suspect that agitation by
the veterans is receiving behind-
the-scenes encouragement from gov-
ernment critics such as Senator Don,
although no evidence of this has
been uncovered so far.
Page 2
Government attempts to calm the
situation are complicated by the con-
tinuing student protest. The stu-
dents, who are protesting the ar-
rest of several student leaders as
alleged Viet Cong agents, have re-
solved to continue boycotting their
classes until the government either
releases or tries the accused in a
civil court. The students have
picked up support from a number of
opposition politicians, some ele-
ments of the An Quang Buddhists,
university students in Hue and Can
Tho, and a large segment of the Sai-
gon press. The government's posi-
tion that some of the arrested stu-
dents must be tried before a mili-
tary tribunal rather than in a civil
court has probably reinforced the
students' determination to continue
their protest.
Thieu Cool to Indochina Conference
The government is showing no
enthusiasm for the French proposal
for international negotiations to
consider together the problems of
all of Indochina. Instead, Thieu
has recommended addressing any such
discussions only to the situation
in Laos, declaring that peace must
come first to the other areas of In-
dochina before a settlement can be
achieved in Vietnam. The South Viet-
namese remain wary of the French,
and they apparently believe that
Paris is trying to assist the Com-
munists at Saigon's expense.
Communists Play it Cool Also
For their part, the Vietnam-
ese Communists seem to be in no
rush to move the Indochina situation
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Apr 70
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into the international diplomatic
arena--if indeed they are disposed
to do so at all. They have an-
nounced no official position on
last week's French proposal, which
has been ignored in the North Viet-
namese press. Communist spokes-
men at the Paris talks have dodged
the issue under persistent question-
ing by newsmen.
The Vietnamese Communists pre-
sumably are unwilling to turn the
proposal down cold, although they
have generally held that no outside
interference is needed to work out
problems in Indochina. They might
even discern some advantages in tak-
ing a relatively forthcoming atti-
tude, such as the possibility that
an internationally sanctioned set-
tlement would encourage friction be-
tween Washington and Saigon or would
bring greater pressure on the US
to withdraw from the area. On the
other hand, the Communists must
reckon that any negotiations could
inhibit their operations on the
ground in Indochina, and they prob-
ably would be apprehensive about
the prospect of going to the con-
ference table with their Soviet and
Chinese backers at odds.
Hanoi has also taken a de-
cidedly negative attitude toward
Cambodian requests for interven-
tion by the International Control
Commission (ICC) or by the UN. The
Communists' public line is that
this would help the Lon Nol govern-
ment retrieve its "isolated and un-
stable" situation and divert atten-
tion from Washington's "plots" in
Indochina. More importantly,
Hanoi clearly realizes that the
presence of an international ob-
server mission in Cambodia or even
formal consideration of the situa-
tion by the UN could be politically
embarrassing and might eventually
redound to its detriment in South
Vietnam.
Military Developments in
South Vietnam
The latest round of country-
wide enemy attacks that began on
31 March continued through 5 April,
but has tapered off since. Most of
the action consisted of relatively
light harassing attacks, although
the enemy did inflict severe punish-
ment on several allied centers, in-
cluding a provincial capital in the
southern highlands and a South Viet-
namese fire-support base in the
delta.
Following the initial wave of
some 150 attacks on the night of 31
March, the enemy averaged in the
neighborhood of 50 to 60 attacks per
day over the next five days. As a
result of this intensified action,
US combat deaths last week reached
138, the highest figure in six
months. The South Vietnamese losses
were over 700 killed according to a
preliminary count, and enemy combat
deaths are believed to have exceeded
3,300.
the Communists had wanted
to make an impressive show of force
by overrunning an allied fire-sup-
port base or investing some provin-
cial capitals. In addition to
boosting the morale of their own
troops, their recent local victories
along these lines have probably
shaken the confidence of some South
Vietnamese units near the scene of
such reverses. On the other hand,
SLC,R i'i'
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a number of South Vietnamese units
have responded aggressively in the
latest fighting, seeking out and
engaging the enemy. For example,
South Vietnamese Army and Regional
Force troops reported killing 54
of the enemy not far from the lo-
cation of the recently overrun
fire-support base.
It appears unlikely that the
Communists are willing to accept
the heavy casualties involved in
maintaining the recent high level
of attacks over a protracted pe-
riod. If this is so, the enemy's
latest offensive probably will not
result in any permanent damage to
the allied military position or
even set the government's pacifica-
tion program back significantly.
Although the series of country-
wide attacks seems to have abated,
at least for the time being, the
enemy has steadily been building up
pressure against the allied Special
Forces camp at Dak Seang, a remote
outpost in the central highlands
province of Kontum. Two North Viet-
namese regiments that laid siege to
the Ben Het and Bu Prang camps last
year have moved across the border
from Laos and have closed on the
Dak Seang position, which is manned
largely by montagnard tribesmen and
SECRET
by a few US advisers. South Viet-
namese Ranger units, which have per-
formed well against previous enemy
siege campaigns, have reinforced Dak
Seang's defenses and have already
fought several sharp engagements.
Enjoying strong allied air and ar-
tillery support, the rangers claim
to have killed several hundred enemy
troops in the first days after their
arrival there.
With respect to the Cambodian bor-
der, it appears that the South Viet-
namese have modified their rules of
engagement. Despite some earlier indi-
cations that both South Vietnamese and
Cambodian authorities wanted to pre-
vent the spread of the war across
the border, South Vietnamese forces
conducted a ground raid in strength
into the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cam-
bodia on 5-6 April and a helicopter
assault against the same area on 7
April. In view of the sensitivity
of such operations, it seems unlikely
that these raids, the first of which
involved two South Vietnamese battal-
ions supported by armor and air
strikes were undertaken without
high-level approval from Saigon. At
least three other cross-border forays
were staged by South Vietnamese
forces in March after the Cambodian
coup.
SECRET
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CHOU EN-LAI WARMLY GREETED IN NORTH KOREA
Chou En-lai's three-day
state visit to Pyongyang has
capped a six-month thaw in Sino-
Korean relations. He arrived
on 5 April just over a week
after Peking's new ambassador
was received in Pyongyang. This
followed the posting of the
North Korean ambassador to Pe-
king in February, thus ending
a two-and-one-half year period
during which relations were
maintained at the charge level.
Relations reached a low
point about three years ago in
the early months of China's
Cultural Revolution when the
ambassadors were recalled
amidst searing propaganda ex-
changes. The thaw first became
noticeable last October when
Pyongyang sent a delegation
headed by President Chae Yong-
kon and Foreign Minister Pak
Song-chol to China's National
Day celebrations.
The speeches given by Chou
and Kim Il-song during this
week's state visit reflect the
decision in both capitals to
rebuild the relationship by
stressing common interests and
ignoring differences. Kim
emphasized that the two peoples
are historically linked together
as "blood and flesh" and that
victories were won in the past
by relying on the strength of
unity. He pledged to revive
this unity in the future. Both
premiers devoted considerable
time in their speeches to
Page 5
criticism of the expanding role
of Japan in Asia, a subject
that has received increasing
and parallel coverage by both
states since the Sato-Nixon
communique last November.
By common agreement, both
officials avoided the sensitive
issues of the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. The timing of the Chou
visit and the reciprocal speeches
warning of Japanese expansion
almost certainly are intended
by both Peking and Pyongyang
as a rebuff, however, to what
they view as growing cooperation
between Moscow and Tokyo as ex-
emplified by recent air transit
agreements and joint ventures
for the study of the Sea of
Japan.
From the Chinese point of
view, Chou's visit could indicate
a return to the style of per-
sonal diplomacy favored by Pe-
king before the Cultural Revo-
lution. China's new diplomatic
flexibility, particularly toward
its Asian Communist neighbors,
appears primarily designed to
gain support for its side of the
dispute with the USSR.
It is unlikely that the
rapprochement with Peking will
hamper Pyongyang's delicate
relations with Moscow because
the thaw is almost certainly
predicated upon a belated
Chinese acceptance of North 25X1
Korea's independent line in its
dealings with the two major
Communist powers.
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 10 Apr 70
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LAOS: Current Situation
Na
Khan
Bouam`
Longs
NVA betnning
toatthi;
Enemy tanks
spotted
Phu
Vien
Ton'q
Government trying t-
dislodge Communists
Tie
lVang Vieng
Mu4ng
SouL
" i ?an
Xieng'A, Luang
Dat 4.
Ban Na.
NVA attach -
`repeiiec 4 ;
Government ,
still' reinforcing
;1020 Miles
10 m, o,kS m?tvA-
Pl41NE IVorg eft., ;
Xteng Khouang
JARRES
'anBa
Xieng
4houangviile
ThaTam
?leung
7S(hog
-Heavy shelling
1 Apr.
SECRET
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MILITARY SITUATION IN LAOS REMAINS CRITICAL
Communist forces are main-
taining pressure against govern-
ment positions flanking the Plaine
des Jarres, but there has been no
major change in the over-all tac-
tical situation. In the critical
Long Tieng - Sam Thong area south-
west of the Plaine, North Vietnam-
ese troops renewed their ground
attacks against Sam Thong, push-
ing to within a mile of its air-
strip. Government troops backed
by heavy air support repelled the
assault, however, and are still
holding the base and most of the
Sam Thong valley.
Vang Pao's guerrilla head-
quarters at Long Tieng sustained
its heaviest shelling in nearly
two weeks on 7 April. Casualties
and damages were light, however,
and there was no sign that the
attack might generate an exodus
of civilian and military person-
nel similar to that which occurred
when the base came under siege in
mid-March. Another regular army
battalion has moved into Long
Tieng, raising the total govern-
ment complement in the area to
approximately 5,700. Government
forces continue to patrol the
valleys north of the base, but
they are still having trouble
dislodging Communist forces from
the Tha Tam Bleung area. Vang
Pao's guerrillas have succeeded,
however, in recapturing the nearby
base at Khang Kho, which was lost
to the enemy last month.
The Communists are also mov-
ing against Bouam Long, the most
important government base north
of the Plaine des Jarres. After
weeks of reconnaissance and bat-
tlefield preparation, enemy troops
this week attacked government po-
sitions commanding the approaches
to Bouam Long. Five enemy com-
panies, supported by heavy artil-
lery, reportedly participated in
the attacks, all of which were
successfully beaten back. The
action probably marks the start
of operations by major elements
of the North Vietnamese 312th Di-
vision, largely uncommitted thus
far in the current offensive, to
eliminate Bouam Long as a spring-
board for guerrilla operations
against Communist supply lines
in northern Laos.
The North Vietnamese are
also demonstrating fresh interest
in government positions west of
the Plaine. A few enemy tanks
have also been spotted moving west-
ward along Route 7 near the govern-
ment base at Phu Vieng. There is
still no evidence of any imminent
movement of substantial North Viet-
namese forces against these posi-
tions, however. Last year, a
North Vietnamese battalion threat-
ened the road junction at Sala Phou
Khoun, and there has been some
speculation that the enemy intends
to cut Route 13 there, possibly as
a prelude to a drive into north-
ern Vientiane Province. 7
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Lambodia
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Current Situation in the 'Parrot's Beaki*
SOUTH
PHNOM* Area of
PENH map
`~SOVTN
v~LTNh7+(
Toy Ninh
11~>
TAY NINH
6overnn,eta riHte&ses
o?inforcec
Prasot
Chipou
?
Ti,reater,ed by Vf_ i
vacuater! by Government
after V( ' attars
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25X1
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:..r SECRET NWO,
PHNOM PENH TRYING TO BROADEN ITS POWER BASE
Government leaders appear
satisfied that the internal sit-
uation generally is under control
and that they have the support of
the urban populace, the civil
administration, and most security
elements. They also recognize,
however, that they must take rapid
steps to win more peasant support
in order to prevent the develop-
ment of serious rural "uprisings."
Using many of its existing
supporters, Phnom Penh has launched
a widespread face-to-face campaign
to carry its message to the con-
servative peasants. There is a
possibility, however, that the
government's apparent intention
to form a republic in the near
future may further alienate pro-
Sihanouk peasants. Although some
officials probably have serious
reservations about abolishing the
monarchy now for just this reason,
government leaders have gone ahead
nonetheless and solicited the "ad-
vice" of the country on this is-
sue. Initial urban popular re-
sponse predictably is in favor of
a republic.
While the government is de-
voting its main energies to solid-
ifying its domestic control, it
probably will try to keep the
Vietnamese Communists confined
to their base areas on the eastern
border. The Communists, meanwhile,
have engaged in limited but wide-
spread aggressive actions to safe-
guard and to extend slightly some
of their base areas. Viet Cong
elements also have been doing some
pro-Sihanouk propagandizing and
proselyting along the border. Viet
Cong activity was particularly
heavy in the "Parrot's Beak" area
of Svay Rieng Province. This ac-
tivity may have been in response
to recent South Vietnamese cross-
border operations there. Accord-
ing to the South Vietnamese, these
operations were being carried out
in cooperation with the Cambodians,
although the local Cambodian com-
manders may have been operating
without Phnom Penh's approval.
In the longer run, however,
the government is still seeking
to resume negotiations with the
Vietnamese Communists in order
to resolve their differences
peacefully. Although Prime Min-
ister Lon Nol very likely has pre-
pared a specific negotiating po-
sition, there are no signs that
the Vietnamese are interested in
talking just now. Peking's belated
endorsement of Sihanouk's "libera-
tion" movement indicated that the
Chinese similarly are determined
to keep their distance from the
government, at least for the time
being.
Meanwhile, in another appeal
from Peking, Sihanouk for the first
time implied that he would return
to Cambodia in the "near future."
His message on 4 April again asked
the Cambodian people to take to
the "bush" and wage an armed fight
against the government.
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v SECRET lwo~
Moscow's failure to provide Sihanouk with the same kind of political and
propaganda support he is getting from Hanoi and Peking is further evidence of
Soviet dismay over the recent turn of events in Cambodia. The Soviets have gone
along with North Vietnam, however, in rejecting the Lon Nol government's
proposals to reactivate the ICC and to submit the Cambodian problem to the UN.
Although the Soviets say they have asked China for agreement on Vladimir
Stepakov as ambassador to Peking, there has been no confirmation from Peking of
an agreement to exchange ambassadors. Moscow may believe that continuing the
border talks at the ambassadorial level would facilitate the return home of chief
negotiator Kuznetsov.
Brezhnev, in Budapest for the 25th anniversary of the Hungarian liberation,
gave public endorsement to the Kadar leadership for the first time since the
Czechoslovak crisis in 1968. There was a hint, however, that Moscow disagrees
with Kadar's earlier statement supporting "legitimate national interests."
Italian Premier Rumor is expected to receive a vote of confidence soon on
his new government and its ambitious legislative program. Only minimal parlia-
mentary action is likely, however, prior to local and regional elections, now set
for 7 June.
The UN General Assembly's outer space committee, meeting this week in
Geneva, has been unable to resolve differences over how to complete the draft
convention concerning compensation for damage caused by space vehicles. A
number of compromises to overcome Soviet objections to binding arbitration are
being considered by the committee, which is under pressure from the less-
developed countries to produce an agreed convention before the fall session of the
assembly.
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rim
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USSR MANEUVERS FOR POSITION IN NEXT ROUND OF SALT
Private statements by Soviet
diplomats since the windup of the
Helsinki SALT talks suggest that
Moscow is looking toward a quanti-
tative agreement that would limit
the numbers of offensive and de-
fensive missiles, rather than a
qualitative agreement restraining
improvements such as MIRVs.
These statements, as well as
press commentary, point toward
the ABM system as the key issue
for Moscow when the talks resume
in Vienna. At the same time, how-
ever, the Soviets apparently in-
tend to return to subjects that
would create difficulty for the
US, such as banning the transfer
of strategic weapons to third
countries and limiting patrols
of strategic bombers and subma-
rines. The extent to which Mos-
cow will press for agreement on
these issues is not known. The
Soviets have not elaborated on
the suggestions they made at Hel-
sinki, such as controls against
accidental or unauthorized
launches of strategic weapons.
The Soviets have been least
ambiguous on the subject of ABM
limitations. Recently, the Soviet
press has been trying to create
the impression that an agreement
on ABM deployment may be the key
to getting any agreement at all.
An article in Pravda on 7 March--
signed "Observer" to mark its
high-level endorsement.--summarized
Soviet commentary against ABM
plans of the US. This is one more
indication that such plans may be
causing Moscow the most difficulty
at this time, but "Observer"
stopped short of indicating what
Moscow would do about them.
The Pravda article, pitched
to disarmament audiences in the
US and elsewhere, was probably
intended to put the onus on the
US should the talks fail or bog
down. The piece was careful, how-
ever, to handle the matter in such
a way as not to diminish the pos-
sibilit of further negotiation
or of an improvement in Moscow's
bilateral relations with the US.
Moreover, Moscow is still willing
to permit its commentators to warn
of the potentially harmful effects
of US weapons programs on SALT
without directly committing Soviet
policy to these warnings or set-
ting conditions for the Vienna
round.
Soviet remarks thus far
merely reiterate Moscow's support
for continuing the talks. Private
statements of Soviet diplomats
apparently are being used to
prompt US initiatives when talks
resume on 16 April rather than to
reveal features of the Soviet po-
sition. The public commentary is
calculated to put pressure on the
US to slow its weapons deployment.
The Soviets probably want to make
their own contribution to the SALT
discussions--particularly in the
areas of ABM, nontransfer of stra-
tegic weapons, and strategic
equality--but nothing they have
said publicly or privately has
revealed how they will treat these
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issues in Vienna. In discussing
the three types of possible agree-
ment suggested by President Nixon
in his "State of the World" ad-
dress on 18 February, however,
several Soviet diplomats have
made it clear that the suggestion
concerning the quantitative agree-
ment is the most interesting to.
Moscow.
SOVIET OIL SALES TO THE FREE WORLD FALTER
The USSR's aggressive oil
sales effort in the free world
has faltered. The USSR and East-
ern Europe are increasing their
procurement of oil from the free
world to meet a growing demand
for petroleum that apparently is
outpacing Communist production.
Soviet oil sales, which ac-
count for most Communist petro-
leum exports to the free world,
declined by almost three million
tons last year. This is the first
drop since major sales to the free
world began in the late 1950s. The
decline probably would have been
greater if the USSR had not met
some export commitments with about
1.5 million tons of crude acquired
from Egypt and Algeria. The So-
viets,.however, are meeting most
of their East European allies' in-
creasing needs for petroleum, but,
even here, Moscow has urged that
supplies be supplemented from
the free world.
Soviet sales of oil continue
to earn more hard currency than
any other single export commodity.
Last year Soviet deliveries to the
free world amounted to 42 million
tons, worth $575 million. Sales
for hard currency, principally to
Western Europe, amounted to $340
million, an estimated decline of
$30 million from 1968. These ex-
ports represented about seven per-
cent of Western Europe's demand.
The principal recipients were
Italy, Finland, West Germany, and
Sweden.
Soviet exports to the less
developed countries increased
slightly last year after several
years of decline. Most of the
increase occurred in deliveries
to Egypt. On a net basis, how-
ever, Soviet exports to Egypt
were down as the USSR acquired
more than one million tons of
Egyptian crude from the El Morgan
field in the Gulf of Suez. This
exchange, which is scheduled to
increase this year, probably will
continue as long as the Suez Canal
remains closed and Egypt's oil
economy suffers from domestic im-
balances and dislocations. The
USSR also supplied almost all of
Somalia's small petroleum require-
ments and provided over one third
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of the petroleum demand in Ghana,
Morocco, and Senegal.
Soviet oil exports to markets
east of Suez, complicated by the
canal closure, declined for the
third straight year. Exports to
Japan, the largest Soviet market
in the area, declined 15 percent
to about 2.4 million tons. An
even greater decline was stemmed
by some one million tons of Persian
Gulf oil made available through
East-West oil exchanges. Sales
to India continued to decline, and
Ceylon suspended Soviet oil ship-
ments completely.
Petroleum exports from the
USSR and Eastern Europe to the
free world in 1970 probably will
not exceed the 50 million tons ex-
ported last year. Moreover, pro-
curement of oil from the free world
by these countries may reach be-
tween seven million and eight mil-
lion tons this year, compared with
about four million tons in 1969.
Some of this oil probably again
will be used to meet the Commu-
nists' commitments to their for-
eign customers.
ANGLO-MALTESE RELATIONS DETERIORATE
The economic and political
situation in Malta has deter-
iorated during the last six
months, largely because of an
impasse between the government
and the British over financial
aid. With a general election
due within the next year, the
pro-Western government of Borg-
Olivier is looking for some
politically advantageous way of
resolving the stalemate in or-
der to turn back the challenge
of the opposition Malta Labor
Party (MLP) led by self-styled
neutralist Dom Mintoff. The
consequences of an MLP victory
could be serious for NATO inter-
ests in the Mediterranean
country.
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Since the island won inde-
pendence in 1964, UK-Maltese re-
lations have periodically been
strained over UK aid. The
British promised at that time
to lessen the economic impact
of the withdrawal of their troops
by closing their installations
gradually and by providing fi-
nancial aid until 1974 to encour-
age expansion of the Maltese
economy. For the first few
years it was agreed that 75 per-
cent of the aid would be in the
form of outright grants rather
than loans. In 1969, however,
London decided that its own eco-
nomic problems dictated that
funds be distributed on a 50-50
basis. Prime Minister Borg-
Olivier refused to accept the
decision, and negotiations have
been deadlocked since last sum-
mer.
The economic consequences
of this stalemate have become
increasingly apparent. Uncer-
tainty has hampered all gov-
ernment planning, capital invest-
ment and public works projects
have been delayed, and short-
term inflationary borrowing has
replaced British funds. Other
economic problems, not directly
related to the impasse, have
also complicated the picture. Un-
less the stalemate is resolved,
the Maltese Government will have
to find new sources of money or
curtail its capital development
program. It has hinted on sev-
eral occasions that if the Brit-
ish refuse to give Malta its
due there are others--perhaps
even outside NATO--who will.
The stalemate has also
increased anti-British senti-
ment among the electorate and
uncertainty about the govern-
ment's competence. Borg-Olivier's
failure to resolve the dispute
has made him progressively more
moody and difficult. He often
alludes to real or imagined
slights by the British.
London, meanwhile, is flatly
refusing to alter its position.
It believes that although Borg-
Olivier knows that more liberal
financial aid terms are not
justified, he will not accept
the 50-50 proposal because he
fears it would put a political
weapon in the opposition's hands.
In any case, the British attrib-
ute Malta's problem to ineffi-
ciency, claiming that it misses
many opportunities afforded by a
growth in tourism and refuses to
follow suggestions on economic
development made by the UK. Lon-
don concedes that the economy
has faltered somewhat recently,
perhaps as a result of the dis-
pute, but it does not believe
the political consequences will
be far-reaching. Even if the
MLP wins the next election, the
British expect Mintoff to main-
tain Anglo-Maltese relations,
including the defense arrange-
ments, "because he has to," but 25X1
believe that he might well sever
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PANKOW INTENSIFIES PROPAGANDA AGAINST BONN
The East German. regime, in
an effort to combat what it con-
siders are popular misconceptions
concerning the East - West German
summit meetings, has stepped up
propaganda attacks against the
government in Bonn and against
Chancellor Brandt personally.
In recent issues of the main
party daily, Neues Deutschland,
the East Germans have stressed the
theme that nothing has changed in
West Germany since Brandt became
chancellor. They have scored him
and other officials for keeping
"monopolists and imperialists"
in power. Significantly, these
attacks no longer include, as ear-
lier commentaries did, the state-
ment that it is too early to tell
whether the Brandt government will
act differently from its predeces-
sors. Pankow singled out for par-
ticular criticism Bonn's advance-
ment of the concept that East -
West German relations must be of
a "special type." Propagandists
have continued to insist that Bonn
must recognize East Germany, and
several regime officials have
stressed that at the next summit
meeting, Brandt must discuss the
East German draft treaty.
East Germany has also inten-
sified attacks against certain
West German laws that its spokes-
men claim discriminate against
East German citizens. In particu-
lar, they have zeroed in on the so-
called "handcuff law," passed by
the West German Bundestag in 1966,
which guaranteed safe passage for
East German party representatives
who were to participate in a pro-
posed "speakers' exchange" with
members of the Social Democratic
Party. The East Germans used this
law as a pretense for aborting
the exchange.
Pankow has reacted to West
German newspaper reports concern-
ing the arrest of East Germans
after the Erfurt meeting, by deny-
ing that any arrests have been
made despite the fact that at
least 140 people were jailed. The
minister of interior also charged
that the West German intelligence
service has spread such stories
to "burden and disturb" the next
session of the summit talks, sched-
uled for 21 May in Kassel.
This campaign is almost cer-
tainly aimed at the East German
public, and is designed to con-
vince the populace that it is the
West German side that prevents
progress in improving East - West
German relations. At the same
time, the regime appears to be
building a case for breaking off
the talks, should it decide that
such action is necessary.
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IAEA FACES SAFEGUARDS ISSUES
The 26-nation Board of Gover-
nors of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed last
week to create a special commit-
tee to consider the position the
agency should take during the
forthcoming negotiations with
the nonnuclear-weapon states on
the safeguards required by the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
The negotiations, certain to be
tough and prolonged, will be an
important test of the ability of
the international community to
set up effective procedures for
verifying compliance with major
disarmament commitments.
A committee on safeguards
mechanisms to prevent the diver-
sion of fissionable material from
peaceful uses was proposed to the
board in February, but the Soviets
blocked agreement on the initia-
tive at that time. Their consent
to the committee's establishment
was achieved last week at the
cost of leaving vague its pre-
cise terms of reference. The
USSR is expected to press for
strict adherence to the IAEA's
so-called draft model agreement
with Finland that gives the IAEA
a comprehensive inspection role
in policing compliance with the
safeguards requirements. The
six members of the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM),
on the other hand, do not want
the committee to recommend pro-
cedures that might infringe on
EURATOM's own safeguards system.
Another group of IAEA mem-
bers, led by Spain and India,
wants the new committee to under-
take a complete review of inspec-
tion procedures and requirements.
They are motivated principally
by concern that the NPT safe-
guards discriminate against the
nonnuclear-weapon countries by
exposing their industrial appli-
cations of atomic energy to inter-
national inspection not required
of countries already possessing
nuclear weapons. Spain and India
would also like to have the com-
mittee discuss the problem of
how to finance the anticipated
increase in required inspections.
The board last week did not
attempt to deal with the question
of its own future membership--an
issue that has become increas-
ingly contentious in view of the
significant new role to be played
by the IAEA. Italy wants to
expand the board to 33 partici-
pants, with itself and West Ger-
many--both EURATOM members--hold-
ing permanent seats. Moscow also
favors an increase of the present
membership by seven, but its plan
would not give either Rome or Bonn
a permanent seat. The board may
tackle the expansion issue at its
June session.
The recent East German re-
quest for IAEA safeguards on
slightly enriched uranium re-
ceived from the Soviet Union
poses another thorny problem.
Bonn, hoping to emphasize the
Soviet-IAEA aspect of any agree-
ment, wants the agency to negoti-
ate with Pankow in Moscow. Mos-
cow is unlikely to accept this,
however, because it probably fa-
vors an attempt by Pankow to en-
hance its international status 25X1
by sending a high-level delega-
tion to Vienna for bilateral ne-
otiations with the IAEA.
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v SECRET ifto,
/The Israelis
are reinforcing their suggestion with almost daily attacks against installations
alon the canal while leaving the immediate environs of Cairo and Alexan-
dria trictly alone.
Egyptian charges that an Israeli aerial attack on 8 April killed 30
schoolchildren brought an immediate denial from the Israelis
Elsewhere along the Israeli frontiers, military activity was at a low level,
Israel might be ready to permit the resumption of repairs to
Tentative agreement has been reached for a cease-fire and an interim
solution to the eight-year-old Yemeni civil war. Meeting under Saudi
auspices, Yemeni republican representatives agreed to end the fighting and to
take other measures designed to reconcile the two Yemeni factions. The
agreement has yet to be approved by the Yemeni leadership, however, and
the problem of defining the eventual status of the Yemeni royalist family
must still be solved.
Prime Minister Gandhi defeated an adjournment motion in Parliament
implying censure of her government for the rough treatment of demonstra-
tors by police this week in New Delhi. This was her closest call since the
Congress Party split last November, and her prestige has suffered at least a
short-term setback.
Pakistani President Yahya Khan's constitutional proposals are being
sharply criticized in East Pakistan. The Awami League of influential Bengali
politician Mujibur Rahman is deeply dissatisfied with the provisions giving
the President extensive powers over the constituent assembly. A key ques-
tion now is whether the mutual confidence built up between Mujib and
Yahya will erode and jeopardize the political stability of the country.
Dahomey's inept and divided army officers this week continued their
search for a solution to the country's deepening political crisis. The threat of
another military coup or serious street violence is increasing as each of the
three civilian kingpins still insists on his own version of a settlement to the
current impasse.
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ARAB FEDAYEEN LEADER VISITS PEKING
Yasir Arafat's recent two-
week trip to Communist China and
North Vietnam may be the prelude
to closer Sino-fedayeen ties.
Peking, apparently seeking to
widen its influence among the
Arabs and simultaneously to under-
cut the Soviets, underscored its
interest in the fedayeen movement
by according Arafat an official
reception during his visit in late
March. Premier Chou En-lai led
the list of high civilian and
military leaders who hosted ban-
quets in his honor. This was in
sharp contrast with Arafat's Feb-
ruary visit to Moscow where, al-
though he probably met members of
the Soviet hierarchy, his visit
received no official publicity,
and his host was a nongovernmental
group.
The relative nonproductivity
of Arafat's Moscow visit may have
provided the impetus for his Asian
trip, which apparently was de-
cided on short notice. It is
doubtful, however, that Arafat
was any more successful in wheed-
ling significant amounts of heavy
arms from Peking than he was from
Moscow
Page 2 0
Aside from a possible in-
crease in the training of feday-
een, any gains Arafat may have
made in Peking will be largely
political. China has long been
vocal in its support of the Pal-
estinian cause, which it views
as a national liberation movement,
and has already increased its pro-
fedayeen propaganda. Although this
might be of little immediate prac-
tical value to his cause, Arafat
could use closer ties with Peking
as a means to play off one Com-
munist power against the other.
The coming months may therefore
see him attempting to emphasize
ties with Peking.
Meanwhile, there has been
a relative lull in threats of
international activity by the
more radical commando groups
since the two airliner explos-
ions they claimed credit for in
late February. Nevertheless, these
groups need publicity to bolster
their fund raising, and the wide
press coverage given to the kid-
naping of diplomats in Latin Amer-
ica could lead organizations such
as the Popular Front for the Lib-
eration of Palestine to buoy their
sagging fortunes by further spec-
tacular acts, including the kid-
naping of prominent figures. 25X1
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SUDAN SUPPRESSES ANSAR UPRISING
The Sudanese Government's
quelling of the Ansar sect's
rebellion last week has dissi-
pated the immediate threat to
internal security. At the same
time, alienation of the Ansar
is now total and will probably
stimulate armed resistance when
the sect regroups its forces.
Although the Numayri regime
has apparently won the first
round, the reaction to the fall
of Aba by the some three million
Ansar may confront the govern-
ment with continued armed resist-
ance. Furthermore, the killing
of the Imam, the spiritual leader
of the sect, has shattered the
prospect for an Ansar-government
reconciliation for a long time
to come.
The Ansar, currently leader-
less and in disarray, will prob-
ably turn to underground activ-
ity for the time being. The
immediate problem confronting
them is the selection of a suc-
cessor to the Imam. Most of the
members of the Imam's immediate
family, the likely candidates,
are either under detention or
out of the country. The exile
to Egypt earlier this week of
Sadiq al Mahdi, the Imam's nephew
and a former prime minister who
has been in confinement since
the coup of May 1969, underscores
the lengths to which the regime
has gone to deny the Ansar a
leader around whom they might
rally. Nevertheless, it seems
likely that the Ansar will even-
tually regroup and find a new
leader.
The crushing of the Ansar
uprising demonstrated the capa-
bility of the regime, armed with
the weapons of modern warfare,
to deal with dissident tribal
elements and will deter other
groups--including other Muslim
sects, students, the professional
classes and some armed forces
officers--currently disaffected
by the government's radical
leftist leadership and policies.
The uprising, however, dramatized
the ruling Revolutionary Council's
failure to come to terms with
an important traditionalist
group whose alienation has pre-
vented a national consensus in
support of the government. _T
~ 25X1
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DISSENSION GROWS WITHIN MALI'S RULING COUNCIL
Disagreement over relations
with France is threatening the
unity of Mali's ruling Military
Committee of National Liberation
(MCNL). The key issue is accept-
ance of the conditions France has
tied to its aid.
displeasure, reportedly arousing
bitterness on both sides.
The next regular meeting be-
tween French and Malian officials
on the accords is coming up soon,
probably this month, and the MCNL
has been meeting feverishly in an
effort to draft an economic pro-
gram. A minority of committee
members is pressing hard for
closer collaboration with France,
but most are reluctant to accede
fully to French demands. There
is strong domestic opposition to
such a course, focused particu-
larly on the fate of the state
enterprises. Although many are in
fact uneconomic, left-leaning
labor unions and powerful groups
within the overstaffed civil serv-
ice are either ideologically com-
mitted to the state system or fear
reforms would cost them their jobs.
Additionally, some MCNL members
regard the conditions placed on
French aid as a threat to Mali's
policy of nonalignment and, ulti-
mately, to Malian independence.
French aid to Mali's stag-
nant economy is contingent upon
Bamako's reforming its socialist
economy along lines specified in
a series of Franco-Malian accords
signed in 1967. Reforms include
reorienting Mali's trade toward
France, balancing the budget, in-
itiating an austerity program,
and reforming unproductive state
enterprises. The eventual goal
is Mali's full reintegration into
aae franc zone.
The reforms were originally
accepted out of financial neces-
sity, by the radical regime of
former President Modibo Keita.
The army leaders who ousted him
in November 1968 immediately re-
affirmed Mali's adherence to the
accords,. but in practice the MCNL
has been slow to implement the
changes.
France, although basically
well disposed to Mali's govern-
ment, has grown increasingly im-
patient with this situation. In
January, Paris bluntly stated its
Despite these problems, Mali's
leaders have few realistic choices
other than compliance with French
demands. Mali is a poor country,
even by African standards, and
France is the only government
able and willing to provide aid
in the required amounts.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Violence dominated the news in Latin America this week, with most
countries expressing shock over the murder of the West German ambassador
to Guatemala. In Nicaragua two pro-Castro guerrillas and one National
Guard officer were killed as the government continued its counterinsurgency
effort. The government has managed to keep the guerrillas off balance, but
they are still capable of staging occasional terrorist incidents.
In Chile, Salvador Allende, the presidential candidate of the Communist
Socialist front, said that he was dismayed by the violence that had taken
place at campaign rallies of the conservative, Jorge Alessandri. Allende feared
that Alessandri might be harmed personally, and that continued violence
might cause some of his own more moderate supporters to withdraw their
backing.
In three countries actions and statements by government leaders have
had a harmful impact on foreign investment. Peruvian President Velasco told
a meeting of Latin American industrialists that the state must play a greater
role in bringing about reform and curbing foreign economic influence. He
suggested setting a fixed term for reversion of foreign corporate investment
to the state after the investment and an "acceptable amount" of profit has
been recovered. Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana attacked foreign aid,
including US assistance, and strongly criticized private investment and for-
eign banks. He demanded 51 percent equity in future foreign investment
projects in forests and minerals. The Panamanian Government is intensifying
its efforts to gain popular support, even at the expense of further alienating
the business community. The government has taken over workmen's com-
pensation insurance and is considering establishing a government monopoly
over the importation of medicine and foodstuffs.
The Caribbean Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference is
scheduled for the week of 13 April in Jamaica. Regional integration will be
one of the main subjects on the formal agenda, but principal topics of
interest in backroom discussions will revolve around proposals of Trinidad's
Prime Minister Williams for integrating Cuba into the hemisphere and the
future of black power in the Caribbean. Guyana will probably cast about for
support in its border dispute with Venezuela. Several of the Caribbean
leaders have recently been making determined efforts to increase their
personal prestige, and this may hamper cooperation
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DOMINICAN POLITICAL STANDOFF CONTINUES
The public impasse between
President Balaguer and the opposi-
tion parties threatening to boycott
the 16 May elections has provoked
further political violence and labor
unrest. The President's tough re-
sponse to disturbances, however,
seems likely to dampen the opposi-
tion's enthusiasm for a showdown at
this time.
tion leaders. They continue to de-
mand that he resign for the remainder
of his term or they will abstain from
the elections. Late in the week,
Foreign Minis ter Fernando Amiami Tio
and his brother were acting as in-
termediaries in an effort to provide
a face-saving way to move toward a
compromise.
Last weekend, the President re-
sponded to the increased agitation,
which has included shooting inci-
dents and widespread disorders, by
closing schools in the urban areas
until June. The government also re-
portedly took control of hospitals
where services had been disrupted by
a doctor's strike. As rumors of a
pending general strike mounted, the
military on 7 April backed Balaguer's
hard stand by closing off the na-
tional university with armored ve-
hicles and raiding and occupying the
headquarters of some of the princi-
pal leftist labor organizations. In
a joint armed forces communique, the
military commanders warned they would
crush violence from any quarter. Sev-
eral professional organizations none-
theless declared a 24-hour strike at
midweek to demand an end to repres-
sion, and the extreme left reportedly
was still attempting to organize
widespread work stoppages.
In typical fashion, Balaguer
tempered his pressure tactics by
establishing a civilian commission
to investigate charges of interfer-
ence in the electoral process. Lead-
ing church figures called for a dial-
ogue, and Balaguer has indicated that
he is willing to talk with opposi-
There are several indications
that at least some of the members of
the opposition bloc are not yet ready
to abandon the electoral route. Ini-
tial reporting on the negotiations
suggests that although the parties
are still pressing demands that Bal-
aguer will find unacceptable, such
as the exiling of top-ranking mili-
tary figures, their requirements are
highly negotiable. Balaguer is prob-
ably counting on weaning at least
one or two of the more moderate mem-
bers away from the seemingly tenuous
seven-party front. He will probably
sweeten any public compromise with
an under-the-table offer of campaign
funds.
The note of cautious optimism
occasioned by the beginning of the
negotiations has been somewhat off-
set by the surprise announcement
that former President Juan Bosch
will return to the country next week.
Bosch, the leader of the major oppo-
sition Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD), was overthrown by the military
in 1963. He has reneged on plans to
end his self-imposed exile in the
past, but the formal announcement by
his party suggests his return is more
likely this time. President Bala-
guer has often stated that he would
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welcome Bosch's return, but in the
present situation it will generate
further uneasiness and harden the
already prevalent military distrust
of the PRD.
Under the present conditions,
major disturbances could force all
the disputants to harden their posi-
tions and place the elections them-
selves in jeopardy.
GUATEMALA TENSE FOLLOWING DIPLOMAT'S DEATH
Guatemalan security forces
operating under a newly imposed
state of siege continue to comb
the capital in search of the ter-
rorists who killed the West Ger-
man ambassador on Sunday. There
is fear in the city--and among
the diplomatic corps particu-
larly--that the terrorists will
attempt further kidnapings and
assassinations.
Rumors of more abductions
and of an impending coup are
rife. President-elect Carlos
Arana's right-wing National Lib-
eration Movement is again preoc-
cupied with the fear that leftist
colonels will seize the govern-
25X1 ment before 1 July, when Arana is
to take office.
The
known hostility between Arana and
the commanders of the two major
troop concentrations in the capi-
tal is the basis for the right-
ists' concern. The majority of
the ranking military officers,
however, are believed to support
him.
The Communists' demands for
the release of 22 prisoners in
exchange for the German ambassa-
dor's life placed the Mendez gov-
ernment under serious strain, and
the President's ultimate refusal
to acquiesce more than likely re-
sulted from strong military pres-
sure. Police and military offi-
cers have been principal targets
of the terrorists, and a number
of security personnel were killed
in the capture of the guerrillas
now under arrest. The military
has been embarrassed by the con-
tinuing terrorism and by the ab-
sence of major breakthroughs in
the Communist net, and has also
been impatient with Mendez' re-
luctance to launch a significant
antiterrorist effort.
President Mendez' ability to
complete his final three months
will probably depend on his giv-
ing a free hand, including the
use of harsh methods, to the
armed forces in their counterter-
rorist attack. With tight secu-
rity in effect, the Communist
groups may slow their activities
to targets of opportunity./
F-The muti-
lated corpse of a leftist poli-
tician was found on Wednesday after
an anonymous caller described it
as "the first installment" of re-
taliation for the German ambassa-
dor's deat.
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COLOMBIAN ELECTION WILL BE CLOSE
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With barely one week left
before the general elections on
19 April, it still looks as though
the presidential race between of-
ficial National Front candidate
Misael Pastrana and ex-dictator
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla will
be close. The other two candi-
dates, Evaristo Sourdis and Beli-
sario Betancur, are far behind.
ast.rana s support-
ers are now more optimistic that
he may win a slim plurality in
the voting, but the margin is so
small that the outcome is still
General Rojas is expected
to do well in Bogota and possi-
bly in other large urban areas.
During a rally held in the capi-
tal's central square on 4 April,
Page 26
40,000-50,000 spectators gave
Rojas an enthusiastic reception.
The political factions
represented by the presidential
candidates now are giving final
approval to the election slates
for Congress (108 national sena-
tors and 204 representatives will
be elected), departmental assem-
blies, and municipal councils.
There is likely to be a prolifer-
ation of electoral lists as a re-
sult of intragroup divisions,
which will, at a minimum, result
in voter confusion.
In the meantime, the military
and police are preparing for pos-
sible disturbances after the elec-
tions. The greatest threat to
public order will come if Rojas
loses by a small margin because
he probably would then declare
fraud and could call his followers
into the streets. The US Embassy
in Bogota believes that the secu-
rity forces would be able to re-
store public order in such an
eventuality.
The mili-
tary's publicly stated position,
however, is that the will accept
the popular will.
SIE.CRFT
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KIDNAPINGS CONTINUE TO CAUSE CONCERN IN LATIN AMERICA
The murder of the West German
ambassador to Guatemala by the
pro-Castro Revolutionary Armed
Forces (FAR) has increased con-
cern in Latin America about kid-
napings by terrorist groups.
Chilean President Frei linked the
killing to the spread of violence
generally and pointed out that
the mass media encourage such
action by making "terrorists sound
like heroes." A Peruvian news-
paper called the incident "a
crime that shames the Americas."
Moscow termed the murder a "trag-
edy," but went on to say the
rightist forces intended to use
it'as a pretext to "crush any op-
position."
There have been exceptions,
however, to this general condemna-
tion. Cuba has'described the
killing as a "revolutionary execu-
tion." When the Venezuelan Cham-
ber of Deputies passed a resolu-
tion deploring the murder, the
Communist Party secretary general
suggested that the Guatemalan
Government be equally censured
and attributed the ambassador's
death to the'existence of govern-
ments like those in Guatemala,
Argentina, and Brazil, "which
trample on human rights." A Chil-
ean Communist has insinuated that
the German was killed by rightists
as part of a sinister "grand de-
sign" to provoke anti-Communist
terror in Latin America. The ex-
treme left in Mexico calls the
murder the result of an "oppres-
sive system."
A number of diplomats in
Latin America as well as political
leaders believe that one method
of dealing with such kidnapers
would be to threaten to execute
the prisoners whose exchange is
demanded. Military men in some
countries are known to be upset
about releasing prisoners who
have been captured at great risk.
Some may come to believe the solu-
tion is to kill extremists rather
than capture them, as the govern-
ment would then have no one to ex-
change. Should such measures be
widely adopted, hostility between
extremists and security services
would become even greater.
This problem is especially
likely to arise in Brazil, where
an attempt was made on 4 April
to kidnap the US consul in Porto
Alegre. Some suspects have been
arrested and have revealed in-
formation about the perpetrators.
Fearing a repetition of previous
cases, the security services may:
decide:to murder the implicated,
extremists.
In Argentina, which is the
only Latin American country to
defy kidnapers successfully, a
Foreign Ministry official likened
the present. situation to a war
where everyone has to take his
chance, even though a few more
foreign representatives may
initially lose their lives. The
Argentine Government plans to
seek OAS action to help curb the
present wave of "diplonapings."
The government will sound out
other countries on the possibil-
ity of denying political asylum
to persons involved in terrorism.
Argentina has had such a law on
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the books since 1963, but the
government fears that some coun-
tries will oppose watering down
Latin America's traditional rec-
ognition of asylum. Uruguay has
publicly supported the move,
however.
Mexico, where all released
prisoners have gone initially,
claims that its embassy in Guate-
mala has been threatened by right-
wing extremists if it continues
to accept the ransomed terror-
ists. The government plans to
maintain its policy on granting
asylum, however.
A number of countries, in-
cluding Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile,
and Ecuador have taken extra
measures to protect foreign dip-
lomats. In some cases these new
responsibilities may stretch secu-
rity forces beyond their capabili-
ties. The Brazilian Foreign Minis-
try, however, has criticized the US
consul in Porto Alegre, alleging
that he had dispensed with his
extra police protection shortly
before the attempt to kidnap him
was made.
25X1 Kidnaping is likely to con-
tinue--the Guatemalan ambassador
in Washington has even been
threatened.
T
recent publication of the Afro-
Asian - Latin American Solidarity
Organization reprinted a manual
on urban terroism by Carlos Mari-
ghella, the Brazilian leftist
leader whose organization engi-
neered the kidnaping of Ambassa-
dor Elbrick in Brazil and who
later was killed by police. Mari-
ghella wrote that the object of
kidnaping was to obtain the ex-
change or freedom of prisoners
as well as to end the use of tor-
ture by police. He added that
the most valuable victims would
be police, US representatives,
political figures, or "notorious
enemies of the revolutionary
movement." These ideas fit in
with statements by the captors
of the Japanese consul general
in Sao Paulo. They said that
they had hoped to abduct a high-
ranking Brazilian military offi-
cer but, because security was
too tight, had switched to a dip-
lomat. They told him that he had
been chosen because of the impor-
tance of Japan and the large Japa-
nese population in Brazil. 25X1
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Whither Rhodesia?
Secret
N2 43
10 April 1970
No. 0365/70A
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`rrri v 1\ 1- 1
"The white man is master of Rhodesia. He has built it and he intends to keep it."
Prime Minister Ian Smith
The white minority government in Salisbury remains firmly in power and determined
to chart its own political course despite the efforts of the United Kingdom, directly and
through the United Nations, to end the Rhodesian "rebellion." By 1969, in fact, Rhodesia's
economy had recovered enough from economic sanctions to permit Prime Minister Ian
Smith to forgo further talks with London. Early this year, the government implemented a
republican constitution that severs all remaining ties with the British Crown and institu-
tionalizes white rule. Although no government is likely to recognize Rhodesia's inde-
pendence soon, sanctions are expected to become less and less effective as time goes on.
Smith and Acting President Proclaim Rhodesia a Republic
Africans today outnumber whites in Rhodesia by better than 20 to 1, yet most of
them, notwithstanding their many real grievances, remain withdrawn and indifferent to
politics. This is partly the result of stringent government security controls, but it is the case
also because most Africans are still more concerned about scratching out a living from the
soil than about what goes on in the country at large. The rapid growth of the African
population, with resulting land shortages and rising urban unemployment, could eventually
create severe social and political strains. These problems, however, may not become critical
for a generation or more. Meanwhile, although guerrilla insurgency will probably continue
intermittently, the nationalists do not pose a serious threat for the foreseeable future.
S pecial Report
1 - 10 April 1970
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As long as Prime Minister Smith sought a
negotiated settlement with the United Kingdom,
Rhodesia's political future remained unclear. His
decision last year to forgo further talks with the
Wilson government and to proceed with a new
constitution-approved by referendum in June
1969 and finally put into effect in March of this
year-ended much of the uncertainty. The new
constitution ensures continued white supremacy
rule, short of revolution.
Rhodesian politics have always been to the
right in the political spectrum, but the new con-
stitution moves Rhodesia closer than ever before
to the policy of separate racial development
practiced by its neighbor, the Republic of South
Africa. Under the 1961 constitution, eventual
African majority rule was a possibility. The
RHODESIA: From Colony to Republic
November 1965
Rhodesia unilaterally de-
clares itself independent
from the UK.
December 1966
May 1968
June 1969
UN invokes selective man-
datory economic sanctions
against Rhodesia.
UN invokes comprehensive
mandatory economic sanc-
tions against Rhodesia.
Rhodesia's republican con-
stitution is approved by
referendum.
present constitution provides for eventual parity
between the races in the Rhodesian parliament,
but it ensures that such parity is unattainable,
possibly for centuries.
Accompanying the new constitution are a
number of acts that sharply draw the lines be-
tween the races. Franchise qualifications, for
example, are now based not only on property,
income, and education, but for the first time on
race as well. Europeans are restricted to voting
only for European candidates, and Africans can
vote only for African candidates. The Land
Tenure Act divides the land almost equally be-
tween Rhodesia's 228,000 whites and its more
than 4.8 million blacks. Although land holdings
and constituencies were, in practice, already
divided largely by race, these new measures make
any constitutional change in a more liberal
direction incomparably more difficult than be-
fore.
The constitution also gives the government
normally powers it previously had only in times
of emergency and only under parliamentary
supervision, such as censorship and preventive
detention without trial. Moreover, the bill of
rights, originally designed by the British to
protect African political and civil rights, is
rendered meaningless by eliminating judicial re-
view of constitutional questions.
This course, set by the ruling Rhodesia
Front party, has the overwhelming approval of
white voters. In fact, Rhodesia has become nearly
a one-party state. The front won all 50 white
constituency seats in 1965, and it will probably
do so again in this month's general election. It is
opposed by the moderate Centre Party, which
supports multiracialism, and the ultrarightist
Republican Alliance, which wants full apartheid.
Neither party has appreciable support, and their
chances of winning more than one or two seats
are nil.
March 1970 Rhodesia becomes a re-
public.
Special Report
10 April 1970
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The silent majority of Africans-80 percent
of whom live in rural areas-take little part in
national politics. Only about 8,000 Africans are
even registered to vote. The African voice in par-
liament is muffled and ineffectual, with member-
ship limited now to eight directly elected repre-
sentatives and eight members selected by tribal
chiefs and rural councils. Most Africans, in fact,
are still governed by their tribal leaders, who in
turn act as agents for the white government in
Salisbury.
There is probably substantial residual sup-
port for the proscribed nationalist movements
among blacks in urban areas. Fearful of the police
and its ubiquitous network of informers, how-
ever, and disdainful of the few African parties
that try to compete legally within the system,
most supporters of the nationalists have with-
drawn from politics altogether. Members of the
small African elite in particular steer clear of
antigovernment activity to avoid jeopardizing
their relatively high-paying jobs in the white-
controlled economy.
THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT
The Closing of the US Consulate and other
Western missions in March following Rhodesia's
shift to republican status was a blow to the Smith
government's hopes for early de facto recogni-
tion. South Africa and Portugal, whose assistance
has prevented Rhodesia from being crippled by
sanctions, continue to maintain close relations
with Salisbury. Even they, however, are unlikely
to extend formal recognition soon because it
would only focus unwanted attention on them-
selves, particularly at the United Nations.
In the meantime, Rhodesia will probably
concentrate mainly on expanding its commercial
ties with other states.
Special Report
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A new round of negotiations with London is
still possible, but this depends largely on whether
the Conservative Party wins the general election
that is expected in the UK later this year. There is
it great deal of sympathy among party members,
particularly among Conservative Party right-
wingers, for their "kith and kin," the Rhodesian
whites. Although party leaders would like to
reach a settlement, even they would probably
find the price too high. Smith is unlikely to
concede much now in return for formal recog-
nition and an end to sanctions because Rhodesia's
economy is doing so well.
Economic sanctions have fostered a kind of
war psychology among Rhodesian whites since
1965, and reminders of this "economic war" are
often heard from political leaders. The govern-
ment still holds its economic statistics closely,
and prosecutes offenders for disclosing trade data.
Rather than bringing Rhodesia to terms, the sanc-
tions have stiffened the resolve of most whites to
resist and have united them solidly behind Prime
Minister Smith and his government.
The trade embargo had its greatest impact in
1966. Tobacco, until then Rhodesia's largest for-
eign exchange earner, and some other agricultural
products were particularly hard hit. Exports con-
tinued to decline slowly through 1968. Last year,
however, the economy showed definite signs of
recovery. National income rose for the third year
in a row, and exports increased for the first time
since Rhodesia declared itself independent.
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This strong showing is in large part the result
of booms in manufacturing and mining. Spurred
by import restrictions, Rhodesia's manufacturing
sector has diversified and expanded at a rapid
pace in the last few years. Only the mining
industry--which now produces asbestos, chrome,
petalite, copper, pig iron, gold, and nickel--is
expected to grow faster than manufacturing
during the 1970s. The substantial increase in
exports-perhaps as high as 20 percent above
1968-is probably attributable mainly to the
growing skill of Rhodesian businessmen in evad-
ing economic sanctions. As the demand increases
for Rhodesian goods, particularly mineral
products, more and more holes are likely to
appear in the sanctions dike. Similarly, the recent
UN Security Council decision to extend manda-
tory sanctions to include Rhodesia's transport
links with the outside world cannot be enforced
effectively.
Special Report
Some economic problems will continue to
plague Rhodesia, however. Probably the most
important of these is African unemployment.
Between 30 and 40 thousand Africans leave
school and enter the labor market each year, but
the total number of jobs in the cash economy has
changed little in the last decade. Employment will
rise, now that the economy is beginning to grow
again. It will not increase fast enough, however,
to accommodate much of the growing labor sup-
ply as long as white labor unions, with the
support of the government, continue to bar
blacks from most skilled jobs. Unless more blacks
are trained for the skilled and professional trades,
moreover, shortages in skilled manpower will hold
back economic development. This is a price,
however, that the whites seem willing to pay.
One obvious partial solution to the lack of
jobs is to encourage African peasants to turn from
subsistence to cash-crop farming and to related
industries. So far, however, the government has
taken only modest steps in this direction. In 1968
it set up the Tribal Trust Development Corpora-
tion, which last year it gave $580,000 for the
development of feeder roads, irrigation projects,
and marketing cooperatives. Rhodesian business
leaders and the chairman of the corporation have
indicated that much more will be needed if
Africans are to be brought fully into the money
economy and unemployment significantly allevi-
ated. Whether the government is willing to
commit more to this effort is doubtful.
In January 1970, after a 16-month lull in
guerrilla activity, a small group of Rhodesian
nationalists crossed the Zambezi River from
Zambia and attacked a border police post and the
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xatab*
V-111,
TWA
M A T A B E
BOSS CANA
RHODESIA
(U. K.)
International boundary
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Special Report
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LUSAKA
10 April 1970
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Victoria Falls airport. Even though only one
policeman was killed and only minor damage was
inflicted on the airport, it was the nationalists'
most dramatic and successful raid since insur-
gency began almost four years ago. Prime Minister
Smith, under pressure to strike back militarily,
for the first time publicly warned Zambia to
discontinue its aid to the guerrillas. Although
Rhodesian military forces could have wiped out
the guerrillas' holding bases in Zambia, Smith was
reluctant to order them into action because of the
unfavorable publicity and international pressures
that would result.
Subsequently, Rhodesian security forces
killed or captured most of the raiding party and
also part of another small group that tried to
infiltrate at about the same time. A few of the
guerrillas crossed into Botswana just ahead of
pursuing police units, only to be promptly ar-
rested by Botswana authorities. The outcome of
this counterinsurgency operation illustrates the
way the guerrilla war in Rhodesia has gone in the
past and how it is likely to go for a long time to
come.
Special Report
Many observers consider Rhodesia a racial
time bomb. They point to the already large ratio
of blacks to whites, and to the fact that the
African population will double in only 20 years.
As a result, periodic food shortages and increasing
pressures on available land in tribal areas are
likely to grow more severe, and may lead to
widespread rural unrest. In the cities, African
discontent will be further intensified by rising
unemployment. In the early 1960s, the nation-
alists drew extensive support from urban areas.
When they resorted to violence, however, the
government easily asserted its authority. Since
then, the nationalists have been forced to operate
largely from exile, and most of the rest of the
African population has remained apathetic.
Rhodesian whites, consequently, are certain
to retain a hammer lock on political power for
the foreseeable future. In addition, the economy
is now beginning to overcome the effects of sanc-
tions, and will probably expand at a healthy rate
during the 1970s.
- 6 - 10 April 1970
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