WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005800030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 12, 1967
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
State Dept. review completed
AG C.X AA VFS#
5 0 25X1
12 May 1967
No. 0289/67
ARMY review(s) completed.
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=_ SECRF: J :~
(Information as of noon EDT, 11 May 1967)
VIETNAM
There is evidence that Communist aggressiveness
south of the Demilitarized Zone may continue for
the next few months and perhaps spread to the cen-
tral highlands areas. In Saigon, Premier Ky con-
tinues to gain ground in his drive for the presi-
dency. The North Vietnamese evidently have made
some adjustment in the pattern of their waterborne
logistic traffic to circumvent the mining of five
major river mouths early in March.
PEKING PROCEEDS WITH REORGANIZATION OF PROVINCES
The long drawn out shake-up of the party and military
structure in Szechwan evidently has been completed,
and sweeping changes may soon be announced in other
provinces.
SUHARTO FURTHER CONSOLIDATES LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA
He has reshuffled key military assignments and has
taken steps to prevent a recurrence of last month's
anti-Chinese disorders.
COMMUNIST INSURGENTS STEP UP ACTIVITY IN NORTHEAST THAILAND
A marked rise in the number of armed clashes and
casualties on both sides reflects insurgent efforts
to defeat a new government security program.
Europe
SECRET
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RECENT SOVIET MILITARY HARDWARE DELIVERIES
The Soviet Union is continuing to deliver a substan-
tial volume of military hardware in fulfillment: of
its contracts with a wide spectrum of regimes
Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
YEMEN CONTINUES TO HOLD US OFFICIALS
Although Yemeni officials in Yemen declare that the
two Americans imprisoned there will be tried, Cairo
is calling the tune in the crisis and has given as-
surances that they will be released soon.
GREECE STILL QUIET UNDER NEW 1zEGIME
The government seems still preoccupied with estab-
lishing the guilt of its political opponents. On
Cyprus, meanwhile, the Makarios government remains
apprehensive that the Greek junta may extend the
coup to the island.
CONGRESS PARTY WINS INDIA'S PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST
Its comfortable majority provides a needed boost. to
the party's sagging prestige and may strengthen
Prime Minister Gandhi against her critics within
the party.
NIGERIA'S WESTERN REGION CONFRONTS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 17
Gowon now is backtracking on his agreement to remove
Northern troops from the West and, in response,
Western Governor Adebayo is boycotting future Su-
preme Military Council meetings.
FACTIONALISM PLAGUES CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) REGIME
The squabbling and mutual distrust which continue to
dominate the political scene may come to a head dur-
ing the coming national congress of the ruling single
political party.
SECRET
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Western Hemisphere
RENEWED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN BOLIVIA
Guerrillas ambushed an army patrol on 8 May, initi-
ating the first clash between the insurgents and
the army since 25 April. Guerrilla successes may
be spurring other dissident elements into action,
and the Bolivian military fears a new outbreak in
another part of the country.
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT REACTS TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Balaguer has adopted a hard and uncompromising line
toward left-wing critics who charge his government
with inaction toward right-wing terrorism. He has
charged that the Communists are responsible for much
of the political violence--an approach that seems
likely to provoke counteractions and encourage po-
litical polarization.
CONTINUING PROBLEMS FOR CHILE'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
President Frei will face problems from within his
own party during the rest of 1967. The group sup-
porting the administration will be challenged for
leadership by a faction favoring stepped-up reform
programs.
SECRET
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DISSENSION WITHIN URUGUAY'S GOVERNING PARTY
A young factional leader, who hopes to win the
presidency in 1971, is challenging newly inaugu-
rated President Gestido's control of the Colorado
Party. A serious split may have been only tempo-
rarily avoided.
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES PRESSURE AGAINST LABOR
The Ongania regime is taking advantage of the pres-
ent disorganization in the labor movement to keep
key labor leaders from mounting effective opposi-
tion to government economic reforms.
S E C R t'I,
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FAR EAST
Hanoi's determination to avoid any sign of
wavering under intensified US air operations against
the North is evident in the strong pressure North
Vietnamese forces are exerting against allied posi-
tions south of the Demilitarized Zone. They have
employed artillery, mortars, and rockets in well-
coordinated attacks and have put up heavy resistance
to US Marine probes of fortified enemy positions.
There are continuing indications of Communist prep-
arations to increase the pace of offensive actions
in other parts of South Vietnam.
In Saigon, the rivalry between Premier Ky and
Chief of State Thieu took on a new complexion with
an announcement by the minister of defense that the
armed forces would not officially endorse a mili-
tary candidate for president. This decision may
open the way for Ky to declare his candidacy without
waiting for Thieu to make the first move. It also
raises the possibility of a split in the military
if these two fail to reach a private understanding.
The May Day show of unity by Chinese leaders
has been undercut by reports of violence in at
least nine provinces. Peking posters continue to
accuse the army of repressing "revolutionary rebels."
Reports of heavy casualties in the west China prov-
ince of Szechwan--almost certainly exaggerated--
preceded disclosure of a central committee directive
formally dismissing the first secretary of the
Southwest party bureau and the commander of the
local military region, both of whom have been in
disgrace and apparently powerless for several months.
This action signaling reorganization of Szechwan
may be followed by shake-ups in other provinces.
General Suharto has further consolidated his
leadership in Indonesia by several key military re-
assignments. He has also moved to avert further
anti-Chinese agitation which produced the recent
threat of a rupture of diplomatic relations with
Peking.
SECRET
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NORTH.
VIETNAM
SECRET
Pleiktr,
tBan Me
Thuot
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VIETNAM
North Vietnamese Army as-
saults on Marine outposts imme-
diately below the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) on 8 May and the 12
days of intensive action northwest
of Khe Sanh suggest that the Com-
munists; are still determined to
achieve some substantial victories
in Quang Tri Province. Communist
losses in this area this week have
been heavy--a confirmed total of
951 killed--but evidence continues
to mount that additional large-
scale attacks are planned in the
central. highlands and northwest
of Saigon as well as in the far
north.
There are also indications
of Communist intentions to step up
military activity farther south
in the III Corps area. The 9th
Viet Cong Division severely hurt
in Operation JUNCTION CITY in
March and April, may be preparing
once again for offensive action
in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and pos-
sibly Phuoc Long provinces. MACV
analysis of documents captured in
that operation points to the ex-
istence of a replacement and
convalescent group in the Cam-
bodian border area with an esti-
mated strength of 7,500. 1
this unit withdrew to Cambodia 25X1
after JUNCTION CITY, received
replacements, and redeployed to
South Vietnam.
South Vietnam Politics
In Saigon, Premier Ky con-
tinues to gain ground on several
fronts in his drive for the
presidency.
Ky's supporters in the Con-
stituent Assembly won a major
victory on 8 May, when a fairly
close vote determined that the
future president will be chosen
by a simple plurality vote in a
single election. Supporters of
various civilian candidates had
advocated a runoff election if
the top vote-getter received less
than one third of the popular
vote. This issue--the most cru-
cial the assembly has faced thus
far in determining electoral
regulations--was colored by the
widespread feeling that the mili-
tary candidate will probably run
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 May 67
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SECRET
ahead of the several civilians in
a general election, but that he
might not fare so well in a run-
off against a single prestigious
civilian.
Critics of the assembly de-
cision have also pointed out that
it is now possible for a president
to be elected by a small percent-
age of the vote, which could seri-
ously damage his mandate to govern
in various quarters. The assembly
may reconsider its action before
voting on the entire electoral
law, but as things now stand, Pre-
mier Ky is generally considered to
have obtained a notable advantage.
Within the military estab-
lishment, Joint General Staff
Chief Cao Van Vien announced on
8 May that the armed forces would
not formally nominate a candidate
for president. This statement,
made by the armed forces' highest
ranking officer, clears the way
for Ky to announce his candidacy
unilaterally. Ky had publicly
asked for this action several
weeks ago. By avoiding a formal
showdown between the supporters
of Ky and Chief of State Thieu,
the decision at least postpones
any open split within the military.
With Ky's candidacy now
virtually certain, military unity
and the general trend of politics
during the coming campaign will
be significantly influenced by
General Thieu's course of action.
He is quite free to announce his
own candidacy, to support a civil-
ian, or to arrive at an amicable
agreement with Ky. His actual
intentions remain obscure.
Effects of Mining in
North Vietnam
There has been no appreci-
able decline in North Vietnamese
coastal or inland waterway traf-
fic since the aerial mining of
five major river mouths from 26
February to 15 March. US pilots
have reported sighting about 200
coastal cargo craft each week
since the mining began and more
than twice that number on the
inland routes.
There is some evidence to
indicate that even though the
mining has not stopped the south-
erly flow of waterborne logistic
traffic it has forced Hanoi to
turn to less efficient procedures
in maintainin its sully lines.
n
transferring cargo at the river
mouths between inland and coastal
shipping the North Vietnamese
may have had to employ land port-
age or small rafts in cleared
channels in order to bypass the
minefields.
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NW, SECRET
PEKING PROCEEDS WITH REORGANIZATION OF PROVINCES
Peking apparently has com-
pleted its long-drawn-out reor-
ganization of the party and mili-
tary structure in the west China
province of Szechwan, and sweep-
ing changes may be announced soon
for other provinces.
According to a usually relia-
ble Red Guard newspaper, the cen-
tral committee announced on 7 May
the dismissal of top party and
military leaders in Szechwan and
named their replacements. This
completes the overhaul of the
Szechwan leadership which has
been under way since December or
January.
The dismissed officials are
Li Chin-chuan--first secretary
of the Southwest party bureau and
political commissar of the Cheng-
tu Military Region (CMR)--CM.R
commander Huang Hsin-ting and a
deputy political commissar. All
three have been in disgrace and
lacking effective power for months.
Li Ching-chuan, a politburo mem-
ber, was publicly denounced by
Madame Mao on 18 December, has
been accused of being a key mem-
ber of a group that plotted a
coup last year, and is reported
to have been paraded by Red Guards
in Cheng-tu in late January.
Chang Kuo-hua, long the top
party and military official in
Tibet, is reported to have been
named CMR political commissar to
replace Li Ching-chuan. Chang's
announced task will be to pave
the way for a revolutionary com-
mittee similar to ones already
established in four provinces
and in the cities of Peking and
Shanghai. The choice of Chang
was unexpected, since he had been
under heavy attack last winter
in his own jurisdiction by Red
Guards believed to be responsive
to Mao and Lin Piao.
Poster reports indicate that
military and political authority
in Szechwan has been exercised
since at least 15 April, and
probably since late January, by
senior military figures trans-
ferred from other areas. The
two most authoritative figures
active in the CMR recently have
been Kan Wei-han, sent to Cheng-
tu from the army's General Polit-
ical Department in Peking in
early February, and Liang Hsing-
chu, a political commissar trans-
ferred from Canton in March or
April. The two probably were
assigned to Cheng-tu to rebuild
the command. Liang is reported
to be the new CMR commander.
A CMR deputy commander who
has been denounced by Red Guards
probably fell along with his su-
perior. The deputy commander,
Wei Chieh, was making public ap-
pearances as recently as March,
but evidently failed to survive
the latest purge.
The central committee an-
nouncement accused Li Ching-chuan
and others of instigating bloody
conflicts in Cheng-tu, accounts
of which were widely publicized
through Red Guard posters just
before the reorganization an-
nouncement. The speed with which
the central committee seized on
these allegations as the pretext
for formally dismissing top
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 May 67
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aKr'
~N.'11K:1f
4LKItASI
JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
ie dispute)
Szechwan leaders suggests that the
accounts were either fabricated
or deliberately exaggerated for
use against officials being
brought down.
Since 1 May, Peking has been
flooded with Red Guard posters
describing in lurid terms the
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SHENSI
Ch'ang.sha?
}HUNAN
Kuei-yang
KWEICHOW
~~wum~pMgas~ - ,or
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NORTH
VIETNAM
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PEKING/
/Mukden?
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HOPEH
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SHANSI a SHANTU,
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CHEKIAr49
TAIWAN
PHILIPPINES
outbreak of violent clashes be-
tween Red Guards and Mao's ene-
mies in several provinces be-
sides Szechwan--Kansu, Honan,
Hupeh, and Sinkiang. It is
likely that the stage is being
set, as it apparently was in
Szechwan, for announcement
reorganizations elsewhere.
SECRET
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rl Urumchi
JJ SINKIANG UIGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGION
12 May 67
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SZECHWAN
?Lhasa
PAKISTAN / J j Kf URINAN
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Nwe SECRET 'W
SUHARTO FURTHER CONSOLIDATES LEADERSHIP IN INDONESIA
Two months since assuming
the title of acting president,
General Suharto has further con-
solidated his leadership of In-
donesia by reshuffling key mili-
tary assignments. At the same
time he is keeping a tight lid
on anti-Chinese elements to
prevent new internal disorders.
On 3 May Suharto gave up his
duties as army commander, and
named as acting commander his
former deputy, Lt. Gen. Panggabean.
The latter had been handling most
of the day-to-day tasks since he
became deputy commander last
August. Suharto's continuing
firm control over army affairs is
ensured by his retention of the
post of first minister for defense
and security, as well as his posi-
tion as head of the cabinet pre-
sidium.
Among regional command
changes, the most significant is
the long-expected removal of Lt.
Gen. Mokoginta as commander of the
Sumatra 'Enter-Regional Command.
Although generally considered
loyal to Suharto, Mokoginta per-
formed so effectively, particularly
in his promotion of avigorous civic
action program, that he tended to
run Sumatra as if it were his
private fief. Some elements of
the army high command reportedly
began to fear his growing influ-
ence. His successor, Maj.
Kusno Utomo, can be expected to
be more receptive to Djakarta's
direction. Mokoginta has been
named ambassador to Egypt.
The appointment of Brig.
Gen. Sarwo Edhie to the North
Sumatra Bukitbarisan Command
may reflect Suharto's concern
with the widespread smuggling
in North Sumatra and with latent
unrest due to the strong anti-
Chinese sentiment there. Edhie's
present command, the elite Army
Paracommando Regiment (RPKAD),
has been highly effective in
putting down disturbances in
central and east Java since the
abortive coup in 1965.
Anti-Chinese activity has
generally subsided since Suharto,
following last month's disturb-
ances, ordered his regional com-
manders to prevent further trouble.
A top-level State Committee for
Chinese Affairs has been formed t
monitor this problem.
Despite the press furor over
the Red Guards' harassment of the
Indonesian diplomats expelled from
Peking last month, the Djakarta
government remains auxious to avoid 25X1
a rupture in relations with Commu-
nist China.
SECRET
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COMMUNIST INSURGENTS STEP UP ACTIVITY IN NORTHEAST THAILAND
Communist insurgents are in-
tensifying their activities in
northeast Thailand in an apparent
attempt to counter government se-
curity programs there.
wring March t e in-
surgents increased their harass-
ment of government security pa-
trols. They initiated 30 per-
cent more armed encounters than
in February for an average of
one a day, which matches the fre-
quency of clashes initiated by
government forces. The increased
intensity of the encounters was
reflected in a marked rise in
casualties on both sides.
Although the picture is not
clear, there are indications that
the insurgents are tailoring their
effort to meet a government secu-
rity program initiated last Janu-
ary in areas of known Communist
strength. The guerrillas have
avoided direct confrontation with
large security units by moving
some of their assets into peri-
pheral areas. At the same time,
they are trying to upset Bangkok's
efforts to establish local defense
forces in isolated villages.
They have apparently taken
advantage of the government's in-
ability to react quickly by mov-
ing into villages and disarming
some newly formed defense units.
In one incident, the Communists
captured an entire 16-man village
defense unit without. firing a
shot, destroyed its headquarters,
captured 20 weapons with ammuni-
tion, and abducted two security
officials.
The insurgents are also step-
ping up their political activi-
ties. They conducted 26 village
propaganda meetings in the north-
east during March, the highest
monthly total of the year. This
increase is consistent with re-
ports that the Thai Communist
Party has decided to expand the
"organization of the masses" in
rural areas. This program along
with the increased harassment of
village defense units serves to
underline the inadequacy of gov-
ernment security.
Despite the rise in the Com-
munists' activity, there is no
evidence that they have signifi-
cantly increased their strength
or have brought new areas under
their influence. Since the first
of the year field estimates of in-
surgent manpower in the northeast
have been raised by some 300 to
1,300, but it is not clear whether
this change reflects an increase
in the actual numbers or better
intelligence.
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EUROPE
Activity in two matters of capital US interest,
the draft nonproliferation treaty and the Kennedy
Round of tariff and trade negotiations, dominated
US-European relations during the week. The draft
nonproliferation treaty may be tabled at the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee next week by the US
and USSR, leaving blank the provisions for safeguards
and amendments. There are hints that the Soviets
will compromise on the amendments question, but they
will probably hold firm on their opposition to any
special position for EURATOM on safeguards--with the
support of the nonaligned nations. All participants
in the Kennedy Round negotiations, which have been
hanging by a thread, are agreed that they must be
completed by midnight, 14 May.
Moscow continues to apply diplomatic remedies
to the divisive tendencies in Communist Eastern
Europe. Soviet leader Brezhnev is in Sofia to sign
a new treaty of friendship and mutual assistance,
the latest of several among these governments.
Later this month, East Germany's Ulbricht is to
visit Hungary and possibly Bulgaria, and similar
treaties will probably result.
Moscow presumably was not pleased by Rumanian
Premier Ceausescu's strident public critique of
last month's meeting of European Communist leaders
in Czechoslovakia. Choosing the anniversary of his
nationalistic protest of 7 May last year, he
vigorously upheld his and Yugoslav President Tito's
right to boycott the meeting.
The Soviets are still trying to impress the
US with the possibility that their position on
Vietnam will harden if the US continues to intensify
its war effort. They have suggested that this may
be manifested by increased military aid to North
Vietnam, by a cooling of US-Soviet relations or
both.
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RECENT SOVIET MILITARY HARDWARE DELIVERIES
Soviet deliveries to Egypt's
military establishment continue.
Eleven SU-7 fighter-bombers were de-
livered in April, increasing Egypt's
inventory of this high performance
aircraft to at least 49. Cairo is
also expecting delivery of Soviet
naval equipment, including Kotlin-
class destroyers equipped with sur-
face-to-a.ir missiles.
The arrival of 14 MIG-17 jet
fighters in Algeria in early May
continues; the program begun in Febru-
ary 1967 to increase the capabilities
of the Algerian Air Force. Algeria,
whose air power far exceeds that of
its neighbors, now has 108 fighter
aircraft and 33 IL-28 jet light
bombers. More than half of these
arrived in the past year.
The second shipment of military
equipment to Morocco under the $2-
million agreement concluded in Octo-
ber 1966 arrived in Safi in late
April. The delivery consisted mainly
of small arms and ammunition for
Morocco's auxiliary police force.
Spare parts for Soviet equipment re-
ceived in 1960--including tanks, ar-
tillery and MIG-15/17 jet fighters--
were also purchased.
The Soviet arms that arrived
in Tanzania in mid-April have been
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transshipped by boat to the pu.r-
chaser, Uganda. The shipment,
which included 24 fieldpieces and
60 tons of small arms, is the
initial delivery under a military
aid agreement concluded in July
1965. At least 30 Ugandans have
already returned from military
training in the USSR.
SECRET
Face 12 WEEKLY SUMMAPY 12 May 67
25X1
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r SECRET Nmo~
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The Egyptians, who are pulling the strings in
Yemen's confrontation with the US, have given as-
surances that the two imprisoned US AID officials
will be released. Nonetheless, Cairo is seeking to
reduce the US presence in the Yemen to the barest
minimum, and the US has been requested to close one
of its two diplomatic posts there.
The new Greek Government has reached a modus
vivendi of sorts with King Constantine, who hopes
to exercise what influence he can toward moderation.
Observers are looking now to Cyprus, where there
are signs that the Athens regime may still try a
power play against the leftists there, and possibly
even against Makarios.
Other problems in the Middle East are again
simmering. New flare-ups may be in store for the
troubled border between Israel and Syria, as the
Israelis become increasingly impatient with "new
style" terrorist incursions mounted from Syria. The
Syrian regime itself has been beset by merchants'
strikes. The shops have been forced to reopen, but
various factions may see the uneasiness as an op-
portunity to maneuver.
President Arif's assumption of the Iraqi premier-
ship seems to be a modest move toward "moderation,"
but in Cairo it will likely be seen as an anti-
Nasir gesture. In the Sudan, by contrast, new po-
litical attempts to oust pro-Western Prime Minister
Sadiq al-Mahdi appear to be afoot.
A means of stemming the breakup of Nigeria is
as elusive as ever, and there are new stresses, this
time between the Western Region and the federal
government. For the time being, African diplomatic
attention generally is focused on New York, where
Africans in the UN are lobbying for a stronger Western
stance on removing South-West Africa retoria's
control.
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YEMEN CONTINUES TO HOLD US OFFICIALS
Yemeni officials continue to
proclaim that the two US AID of-
ficials imprisoned in Yemen will
be brought to trial. It remains
evident, however, that Egypt is
calling the tune in the matter,
and in Cairo there have been
reassurances of their release.
After considerable delay, US
approaches to Egyptian Foreign
Ministry officials finally
elicited the assurance of Foreign
Minister Riyad that the two
Americans would be released soon
without trial. The Egyptians,
who continue to assert that they
are trying to be helpful in end-
ing the crisis in US relations
with Yemen, also advised US offi-
cials in Cairo that they should
not be upset by any contrary
Yemeni declarations of the next
few days. Although interroga-
tion of the two imprisoned
Americans has been continued,
they have been well treated by
the Egyptian investigators and
have been visited by the commander
of the Egyptian forces.
Cairo delayed the departure
of a four-man US Embassy team
from Cairo going to Taiz to re-
cover the AID files there,pre-
sumably until Egyptian intelli-
gence could go through them.
Permission was finally granted
and the team arrived. in Taiz on
11 May.
The Egyptians,
are undoubtedly
seeking to reduce any US presence
in Yemen to the barest minimum.
On 8 May the Yemeni foreign of-
fice asked that the US consul in
Taiz be transferred to Sana "for
his personal safety," and that
the consulate be closed.
The Yemeni regime appears
to be incapable of understanding
that it is caught in the middle
of a crisis in US-Egyptian re-
lations. The same Yemeni offi-
cials who continue to issue state-
ments indicating that the two
prisoners would be brought to
trial are also issuing statements
claiming that Yemen would still
like to receive US assistance.
They say Yemen hopes exposure to
the American people of the pris-
oners' "perfidious acts" will still
allow continuation of friendship
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Page 14 WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 May 67
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GREECE STILL QUIET UNDER NEW REGIME
The new regime in Greece ap-
pears to have achieved a modus
vivendi with King Constantine, who
now lends his presence to the gov-
ernment's individual actions in re
turn for the junta's support for
the monarchy and a voice in its
councils. No effective antire-
gime activity has been reported,
and despite the many restrictions
which have been imposed, the
daily life of most citizens has
returned to near normal.
There is still little indi-
cation that the new government
has a clear program or set of
priorities. It seems preoccu-
pied with establishing the guilt
of its political opponents, the
most prominent of whom are still
imprisoned, and with cleaning out
the administration. A great mass
of evidence seized in the first
hours after the 21 April coup is
now being sifted for use in the
political trials to come. Andreas
Papandreou and three other depu-
ties associated with the leftist
"Aspida" conspiracy are to be
tried for high treason. The gov-
ernment initiated a press campaign
aimed at implicating George Papan-
dreou as well, but subsequently
permitted him to deny the authen-
ticity of the allegations, and then
released him.
The government has announced
that a new constitution, embodying
much of the last one, will be
drawn up by a panel of 20 jurists
and then submitted to a national
referendum. A general election,
the date of which government
spokesmen refuse to set even ten-
tatively,is supposed to follow.
Repercussions of recent
events in Greece are being
felt in Cyprus, despite the
Makarios government's efforts
to maintain a neutral stance.
Fearing repression in an
Athens-inspired coup on the
island, the pro-Communist AKEL
leadership has placed itself
under the protection of its
erstwhile enemy, Minister of
the Interior Georkatzis. This
prevented clashes between Com-
munists and anti-Communists
during the delayed Labor Day
celebrations held on 7 May,
but it did not alter the basic
situation.
The positions of both
President Makarios and Cypriot
armed forces commander Grivas
vis-a-vis the new Athens govern-
The Turkish Cypriot leader-
ship is still maintaining its
defensive posture, but appears
encouraged by threats to Makarios'
control of the island. It would
probably welcome a move by Athens
against Makarios and would remain
on the sidelines in any ensuing
struggle, unless "instant enosis"
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CONGRESS PARTY WINS INDIA'S PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST
India's Congress Party has
emerged victorious from its first
major confrontation with its op-
position since its setback in the
legislative elections earlier this
year. Incumbent Vice President
Zakir Husain, the party's candi-
date for president of India, won
by an unexpectedly comfortable
margin in the 6 May election.
His running mate, V. Girl, was
also successful.
Past presidential elections
have been largely rubber-stamp
affairs, since the Congress Party
always held overwhelming majori-
ties in the electoral college--
the elected members of Parliament
and the state legislatures. This
time, however, with Congress hold-
ing only a slim majority among the
electors, leaders of seven of the
major opposition parties succeeded
in uniting behind a candidate of
their own--former chief justice
K. Subba Rao.
Their primary moti-
vation in joining forces
was not so much any per-
sonal objection to Hu-
sain--a widely respected
Muslim educator--as it
was an attempt to embar-
rass Prime Minister Gan-
dhi and her government,
provoke a crisis of con-
fidence among Congress
rank-and-file, and per-
haps even topple the gov-
ernment.
Page 16
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office. Husain, how-
ever, could wield impor-
tant powers during his
five-year term should
no party in Parliament
hold a clear majority
or should the majority
party be torn by fac-
tional disputes. He re-
portedly favors a strong
central government and
improvement of relations
with Pakistan, but his
influence on policy is
likely to be minimal.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 May 67
Husain's substantial ma-
jority underscores the continuing
lack of real cohesion among Con-
gress' opponents and indicates
that there were sizable defections
from the splintered opposition.
It also gives a badly needed
boost to Congress' prestige.
Contrary to some predictions,
northern Hindus did riot desert
Congress ranks in great numbers
to vote against a Muslim in the
secret ballot.
Mrs. Gandhi, who had run up
against considerable opposition
within the Congress Party hier-
archy, when she promoted Husain's
candidacy, may now find her
hand strengthened against crit-
icism generally of her leader-
ship.
The presidency until now
has been a largely ceremonial
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NIGERIA'S WESTERN REGION CONFRONTS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The focus of the Nigerian
crisis is now on the confronta-
tion between the northern-domi-
nated Federal Military Government
(FMG) and the Western Ragion,
with the East waiting in the wings
to profit from developments.
FMG head Lt. Col. Gowon is
backtracking on his initial agree-
ment to the West's demand that
Northern soldiers in the region,
including those just outside Lagos,
_. _ChiAD6
Page 17
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 May 67
be replaced by 31 May. Yielding
to pressure from his hard-line
advisers, Gowon now has said pub-
licly that for security reasons
this is not the time to move his
Northern troops out of the West.
In the face of such FMG pro-
crastination, Western Governor
Adebayo boycotted the meeting of
the Supreme Military Council
(SMC) in Lagos on 8 and 9 May,
although he sent representatives.
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Reportedly, he will not attend
any further SMC meetings until the
Northern troops are removed
A newly formed National Con-
ciliation Committee, composed of
senior civilian notables from all
parts of the country except the
East and apparently blessed by
Gowon, sent a delegation under
the West's most influential ci-
vilian, Chief Awolowo, to persuade
Eastern Governor Ojukwu to send
representatives to the committee's
next meeting. This civilian in-
itiative to provide a Nigerian
forum for seeking a solution to
the crisis gives Ojukwu an oppor-
tunity to enter negotiations on
Nigeria's future governmental
structure. Whether he takes ad-
vantage of it depends on the rela-
tive influence exerted by the
moderates and the hard liners
The Northern Region leader-
ship has explicitly reaffirmed
its support for a strong central
government in a communique of
5 May, which also endorsed the
FMG plan gradually to restore ci-
vilian rule by 1969. The Northern
leaders said nothinct about the re-
cent developments ir. the West--
which apparently sharpened the
divisions among the Northern fac-
tions--but did express great dis-
may at the SMC's failure to deal
effectively with Eastern defiance.
The Northern communique in-
dicates that the dominant politi-
cal and military elements there--
also pre-eminent in Gowon's fed-
eral regime--are not yet ready
to accept the formula for a loose
association of regions now em-
braced by both Eastern and West-
ern regions. The small and trib-
ally fragmented Mid-Western Re-
gion has not yet made clear its
position on this formula but is
under growing pressure to join
in a common front against the
SECRET
WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 May 67
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mw~ SECRET %WW
several months, a vitriolic propa-
ganda war has been waged between
self-styled "revolutionary intel-
lectuals" associated with the Pe-
king-financed weekly newspaper
Dipanda and rival extremists in
the federation. In addition, fac-
tionalism 'within the organization
itself led to the exclusion from
its recent national congress of
three of the country's best known
old-line leftist labor leaders.
A resolution demanding immediate
nationalization of the economy
capped this meeting but was pub-
licly ridiculed by President Mas-
samba-Debat as unrealistic.
Since late 1966, the regime's
poorly disciplined paramilitary
youth forces have been involved
in a number of altercations; they
have brutalized civilians, har-
assed government officials
throughout the country, and
clashed with regular police and
military forces. On 14 April, in
perhaps the most serious incident,
a Cuban-trained Civil Defense
Corps unit attacked and destroyed
the police station at Pointe-Noire
in retaliation for the arrest of
one of its members for a minor
infraction.
There is reportedly some
fear within the government that
this incident may cause the po-
lice to join with traditionally
antiregime elements in the gen-
darmerie and army in seeking to
control the paramilitary youth.
The emergence of such an alliance
would serve to further sharpen
the already serious dissension
within the regime.
Restiveness within the
largely French-trained regular
military forces is long-stand-
ing and deeply rooted. Although
the military suffered a net loss
of prestige and capability in
the aftermath of last year's abor-
tive army mutiny, there is evi-
dence that radicals still con-
sider them, especially the 1,600-
man gendarmerie, a potential
threat.
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FACTIONALISM PLAGUES CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) REGIME
Political tensions in radi-
cal-dominated Congo (Brazzaville)
continue to be marked by sporadic
violence and increasingly heated
public exchanges.
The currents underlying
these tensions have no discerni-
ble principal focus, but involve
contending factions within and
among the government, the single
political party and its mass or-
CONGO
CAMEROON
Bat
Ed. ab
GUINEA
(Sp.)
sue.. ~..
Libreville
Yaounde
ti
k ),Oue
G A B 0 N
Mossend o
Brazzavill
7
Kinshasa
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
a!` ANGOLA
(Port )
Sibiti?
Pointe. Noire
G( ' Boma
SECRET
ganizations, and military and
paramilitary forces. These fric-
tions could come to a head dur-
ing the party's national congress
expected sometime between now and
the end of July, the first since
the party was formed three years
ago.
Some of the current tension
revolves around the regime's
single labor federation. For
I.GIN l ttHL
1 AFRICAN Bangui
REPUBLIC
Ouess1`s?
12 May 67
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*4W~ SECRET "''
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
terrorism and may in fact serve to accelerate the
trend toward a sharp left-right polarization in
Dominican politics. In Guatemala, the activities
of rightist terrorists in the capital have recently
increased again, but the Mendez gov nt believes
Commentary and follow-up activity on decisions
reached at last month's summit meeting in Uruguay
are still being given considerable attention by a
number of Latin American governments.
Peruvian Foreign Minister Vasquez, who earlier
had briefed his country's Senate on the presidents'
meeting in terms rather critical of the US, spoke to
the lower chamber on 4 May on the same subject but
this time avoided blaming Washington for the "short-
comings" of the summit. Delegates to the 12th
annual session of the UN's Economic Commission for
Latin America now meeting in Caracas have given some
attention to the summit's guidelines on Latin Ameri-
can economic integration, although their major con-
cern has been with the trade problems of underdevel-
oped countries.
Several governments remain preoccupied with
problems affecting their domestic stability. Gov-
ernment forces in Bolivia continue to engage in
sporadic clashes with guerrillas, and appear to be
reacting just about as ineffectively as they did when
the guerrillas first appeared two months ago. Do-
minican President Balaguer's tough 8 May speech may
not succeed in stemming recently increasing political
it has the situation under control.
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RENEWED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN BOLIVIA
Guerrillas ambushed an army
patrol in southeastern Bolivia on
the night of 8 May, inflicting
light casualties on the govern-
ment force. This incident is the
first reported encounter with the
insurgents since 25 April. Once
again, government losses are at-
tributed to poor training and lack
of experience.
The army's strategy has been
to try to encircle the guerrillas,
cutting off avenues of escape and
access to food and supplies,
rather than to engage in a direct
confrontation against a well-armed
and disciplined insurgent band.
This strategy will continue until
the newly formed 2nd Ranger Bat-
talion, now located in Santa Cruz,
has completed three or four months
of US-sponsored counterinsurgency
training. It is then scheduled
to move into the guerrilla zone
to conduct search-and-destroy op-
erations.
Guerrilla successes against
the army may be spurring other
President Barrientos is press-
ing the US for additional auto-
matic weapons, bombs, and support
aircraft. He feels, as do his
military commanders, that these
supplies are necessary to enhance
the morale of the Bolivian forces,
increase their aggressiveness, and
promote their combat efficiency.
He tends to discount the need for
training in the use of new weap-
ons.
Failure to move soon against
the guerrillas, however, may per-
mit them to exfiltrate the en-
circlement and establish a safe
haven elsewhere.
Although the guerrillas do
not pose an immediate threat to
political and economic stability,
prolongation of the insurgency
will force the government to di-
vert its meager economic resources
to military use as well as cut
back needed development projects.
The short-term effect would be a
slowdown in economic progress
with a concomitant increase in
popular discontent. Moreover,
the failure of the crovernment's
counterinsurgency campaign could
further strain relations between
Barrientos and the armed forces--
his most important power hacP
S EC R E'1'
WEEKLY SUMMARY 12 May 67
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Pos G Site
Future e Guerrilla
A.,S w t,ctivity
)yuibe
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DOMINICAN PRESIDENT REACTS TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Recent incidents of political
violence and terrorism have posed
major new problems for President
Balaguer. The most politically
sensitive was the apparent fire
bomb attack on Casimiro Castro,
a prominent senator of the left-
of-center Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD), on 4 May. Other in-
cidents; that have aroused concern
over the government's ability to
maintain order include the kill-
ing of a US teacher and an attack
on the government's director of
telecommunications.
The PRD saw the Castro inci-
dent as further proof of its al-
legations that Balaguer, through
inaction, has created a climate
in which rightist terrorists can
thrive? In a move designed to
underscore this point and pressure
the government, the PRD announced
that its minority congressional
delegation would boycott the leg-
islature.
The Revolutionary Social
Christian Party (PRSC), a small
but significant group, reacted to
the Castro incident by threaten-
ing to junk its policy of "con-
struct:Lve opposition" and adopt
a more militant stance toward
Balaguer. Over the last several
weeks the PRSC leadership has been
intensifying its attacks on the
President, accusing him of vio-
lating the constitution.
Balaguer responded to criti-
cism in a hard and uncompromising
speech on 8 May. He absolved the
government of responsibility for
terrorism. He portrayed an exag-
gerated picture of Communist capa-
bilities and activities and said
the far left was responsible for
much of the violence. The Presi-
dent has subsequently begun es-
tablishing a special military
tribunal--headed by one military
officer--which will try all crimes
of political terrorism and sub-
version.
In his speech Balaguer placed
considerable blame for the dete-
riorating political situation on
the PRD, which he indirectly char-
acterized as "the intellectuals
behind the crime of terror" and
"the systematic opponents of the
government." Balaguer implied
that Castro had not been attacked
but had wounded himself accidently
and said the PRD congressional
boycott merely added "fuel to the
fire."
Balaguer's response indi-
cates he has rejected a policy
of accommodation and compromise
with his opponents--particularly
those on the left. Instead, he
seems willing to adopt strong
measures that will strengthen
his position among conservative
and right-wing backers and allay
military unease. His approach
also seems likely, however, to
promote leftist counteractions
and encourage political polariza-
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CONTINUING PROBLEMS FOR CHILE'S CHRISTIAN DENOCRATS
The Frei government in Chile
is heading into a long cold win-
ter of political maneuvering and
reassessment. The disappointing
showing of President Frei's Chris-
tian Democratic Party (PDC) in
the last month's municipal elec-
tions and its poor prospects in
next month's senatorial by-elec-
tion have heartened Frei's oppo-
nents inside the party, and stim-
ulated a full-fledged re-examina-
tion of policy by the PDC leaders.
There are several reasons
for the PDC's current difficul-
ties. First of all, the party
is suffering from the midterm
loss of popular support frequently
experienced by a party in power.
Some of its reform programs have
lost steam, whereas others have
yet to be started. Voters who
united behind Frei in 1964 rather
than back his pro-Castro oppo-
nent have returned to their his-
toric multiparty tradition. PDC
leaders are therefore trying to
infuse some much-needed spirit
into their "revolution in liberty"
campaign promise.
The present PDC leadership
strongly supports President Frei's
administration. Control of the
party is being challenged, how-
ever, by two dissident groups.
The left-wing "rebel" group--which
nearly won the party presidency
in 1965--claims that the adminis-
tration has lost its revolutionary
fervor and is not pressing its
reform program vigorously enough.
This group sees in the municipal
election results a vindication
of its criticism of the adminis-
tration, and it certainly will
mount a strong campaign for con-
trol of the party at the PDC con-
vention later this year.
The "third position" group
purports to occupy the ground be-
tween the rebels and the leader-
ship. This faction actually backs
the rebel position, but is some-
what less vocal.
President Frei, faced with
an obstinate opposition in the
Senate, needs firm backing from
his own party to implement the
social and economic reforms he
has pledged and to conduct the
active foreign policy to which he
aspires. PDC officials have se-
lected Jaime Castillo, a
as the party's candidate for the
special senatorial by-election
on 11 June. He is not expected
to defeat the Socialist candi-
date--the widow of the former in-
cumbent--but he must make a strong
showing to avoid increased left-
wing attacks on the Harty 1Pir1Ar-
ship.
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12 May 67
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DISSENSION WITHIN URUGUAY'S GOVERNING PARTY
Uruguay's governing Colorado
Party is plagued with factionalism,
and a serious split may have been
only temporarily avoided.
At the heart of the dissen-
sion is the competition for long-
range control of the party between
President Gestido, who has been
in office less than three months,
and young Jorge Batlle. Batlle,
who heads a party faction known
as "List 15," hopes to win the
presidency in 1971. He therefore
is reluctant to support Gestido's
programs unquestioningly for fear
of compromising his position as a
national leader and spoiling his
image as a bright, independent-
minded, responsible politician.
Two recent quarrels--one on
the local level, the other over
appointments to the directorships
of key government-controlled en-
terprises--received national
publicity. The first resulted in
the Bathe faction's voting with
the opposition to interpellate
the interior minister. The second
concerned Batlle's initial refusal
to support Gestido's list of
candidates for the directorships.
Although these differences appear
to have been patched up, hard
feelings remain. Batlle probably
decided to avoid a complete split
only because it would not "look
good" to break with Gestido so
early in his administration.
Batlle has stated that his
faction will continue its inde-
pendent criticism of Gestido's
government but that it will stop
short of an open break. "List 15"
legislators are likely to continue
to vote against Gestido on occa-
sion. This practice is certain to
increase the tension within the
party and heighten the probability
of an eventual split. The Colo-
rados have only a slim congres-
sional majority--one seat in the
Chamber and three in the Senate.
If "List 15" denies Gestido its
support on key issues or adopts
delaying tactics, the legislation
urgently needed to curb Uruguay's
spiraling cost of living and im-
prove its stagnating economy will
probably be in serious trouble.
SE REIII
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ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES PRESSURE AGAINST LABOR
The Ongania government is
continuing its pressure against
Argentina's disorganized and weak-
ened General Confederation of
Labor (CGT), in an effort to pre-
vent effective opposition to
economic reforms.
The government has made a
series of moves to weaken the
unions that make up the CGT. In
some cases it has suspended the
legal status of unions and refused
to permit their leaders to attend
a proposed CGT congress. This
decision affects such prominent
labor figures as Augusto Vandor,
the country's most powerful union
boss, and Andres Framini, a left-
ist Peronist.
The Ongania regime, unlike
previous authoritarian regimes,
has not moved against the CGT
directly, however, apparently
because the action taken against
member unions has been effective:
enough in disrupting efforts to
organize strikes and demonstra-
tions against reforms. The unions
oppose the revised work rules for
dock and railroad workers, as well
as currency devaluation and re-
strictions on wage increases. They
claim that these policies put the
burden of ending the chronic in-
flation on the back of the labor-
ing class.
Although a truce existed
between labor and the government
during the first six months of
Ongania's rule and some negotia-
tions were held, it now seems
highly unlikely that the earlier
rapport can be restored. The
government now seems to want to
deal with new labor representa-
tives. The present union leader-
ship, however, may try to retain
control of the 2.5-million-man
CGT by operating through front
men acceptable to the government.
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